What is good for us is good for the world : the U.S. instrumentalization of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror

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What is Good for Us is

Good for the World

The U.S. Instrumentalization

of the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’

Karen Veintimilla Diaz

Master Thesis

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What is Good for Us is Good for the World The U.S. Instrumentalization

of the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’

Master Thesis

MSc Political Science: International Relations University of Amsterdam 2016

Author: Karen Veintimilla Diaz Student ID: 10053506

Course: International Relations of the Middle East Supervisor/Examiner: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan

Assessor: Dr. Polly E. Pallister-Wilkins

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Abbreviation list

9/11 – Terrorist Attack on 11th Of September

ANDSF- Afghan National Defense and Security Forces CDA – Critical Discourse Analysis

CFR- Council on Foreign Relations CIA- Central Intelligence Agency CNP – National Police of Colombia DOD – Department of Defense

FARC – The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ELN – The National Liberation Army

IMF – International Monetary Fund IR – International Relations

ISIL – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

NIC - United States National Intelligence Council NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organization PRT- Provincial Reconstruction Team UN – United Nations

USAID- United States Agency for International Development UP- Patriotic Union Party

WOLA – Washington Office on Latin America WWII – World War II

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Maps

Map of Colombia

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Map of Afghanistan

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Introduction

War, danger, fear, security, power, globalization, states, social welfare— these are all important interrelated terms that are fundamental for understanding particular

complexities of the present day world order. Yet, when reading these terms in

conjunction a more specific relationship emerges from this grouping, these are concepts and notions central to foreign policy and hegemony. Interestingly and befittingly enough, these are also all terms used in the United States National Intelligence Council (NIC) Global Trends 2015 Report, written by experts and consultants outside the government intelligence network in 2000 that reflects projections of security matters for 2015 (U.S. NIC, 2000). The report identifies possible expansions of different threats that can be expected to negatively impact global affairs. However, the greatest threat that stands out in the report is neoliberal globalization: “Its evolution will be rocky, marked by chronic financial volatility and a widening economic divide.”; “deepening economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation [will] foster ethnic, ideological and religious extremism, along with the violence that often accompanies it” (cited in Chomsky 2003, 113). Evaluating these estimations with the present international context, the experts’ diagnoses have been perceivably confirmed. Yet, what is hard to understand is why U.S. national and international strategies comprised from these projections to contain the threats of globalization were so ineffective? Examples of such strategies were their policing and enforcement policies, both nationally and internationally, towards

containing the problem of drugs and terrorism1. This observation leads into an inquiry

1_{E.g. national and international drug policies respectively: National Drug Control Strategy since} 1999-present (it has focused on incarceration and punishment, which has failed to decrease the national drug consumption) and Andean Counterdrug Initiative since 2001-present (it has focused on eradication by targeting local coca farmers, these large fumigation initiatives have harmed ecosystem and possibility for alternatives for farmers)(Common Sense for Drug Policy, 2000; United States Government Accountability Office, 2002).

E.g. national and international policies for counterterrorism respectively: USA Patriot Act since 2001- present (it greatly enlarged law enforcement agencies practices, mechanisms and investigation channels of operation, thereby blurring the line of citizens privacy in the name of national security) and Anti-terrorism Program since 2001-present (it focuses on cooperation and training of law enforcement agents in partner nations for counterterrorism practices, thereby internationalizing U.S. counterterrorism practices, however the effectiveness of the program has been contended due to its immeasurability) (White House President

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into the U.S. role in international relations—one that is focused on ideology, power and exploitation.

The U.S. has been involved in indefinite wars for almost half a century; the ‘War on Drugs’ coined by Nixon in 1970’s and the ‘War on Terror’ coined by Reagan in the 1980’s (Chomsky 2003, 6). These wars marked the rise of an age where the U.S. pursued legitimized international interventions. Yet, before tracking the underlying mechanisms and conditions that have led to the preeminence of the U.S. in the international sphere, a closer look at these two wars is necessary to outline the precariousness of U.S. non-inclusive global governance policies. These policies are not only sanctioned by the prevailing U.S hegemony2, but also help further strengthen and entrench the existing hegemonic world order. The U.S. forms of intervention that are illustrative in the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’ are ridden with problematic ideological hypocrisies that are unchallenged because of the discourses and narratives that frame foreign policy strategies and actions. But what is it about both these wars that illustrates U.S. hegemonic power and non-inclusive governance practices? Broadly speaking it can be seen in the general outcomes of the wars, the unfavorable conditions and disenfranchisement of certain periphery states while enhancing the surveillance system and world economic system of the core. While the political discourse that is employed to inform the public about the objectives of these interventionist projects follow the American foreign policy tradition of framing wars as moral crusades. Thereby, advertently projecting a ‘White Man’s Burden’3 strategy and propagating the hierarchy of the prevailing world order. More specifically, when observing the ‘War on Drugs’, it is evident that a national

problem, the rise of drug usage, is internationalized by moving the policing and enlarging

2_{The reference to hegemony from here on out will refer to Gramscian concept of hegemony, unless} otherwise explicated. The concept of Gramscian hegemony finds international order and power to be steered not merely by coercive and manipulative power relations, but also by the prevailing ideology and strong intersubjective elements that illustrates that preeminence by a dominant power can only be stably maintained if there is consent from the lesser powers through established concessions or compromises that are supported by universalist principles (Cox & Sinclair 1996, 56). This concept will be further analyzed in section 1.1 conceptualizing power, world order and hegemony on pg. 19.

3_{White Man’s Burden refers to the 1899 poem of British writer Rudyard Kipling, in remark to the}

American involvement in the Philippines during the Spanish- American War (Foster & McChesney 2003). It emphasized the necessity of the Western world to take responsibility of the savage ‘Rest’. It positioned imperialism as a racial imperative, where only the White men in reference to the Western powers could impose order and peace onto the barbarian ‘Rest’. This is a term still used today to reference

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law enforcement jurisdiction to countries that supply the American demand for illicit drugs. Militarized strategies are pursued and coercive measures are set forth in order to control a national problem through the international sphere, while those countries that are being used to pursuit said strategies have not seen a great decrease in drug production and trafficking. Instead, the poor rural areas have been disproportionately targeted and it has weakened democratic institutions (Youngers & Rosin 2004, 1). Likewise, when

observing specifically the ‘War on Terror’ another national security problem, the Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on 9/11, is internationalized in order to control surveillance mechanism around the world for U.S. Military and law enforcement purposes. Although these were terrible acts of terrorism, the U.S. ferocious military response that was imposed globally as a counterterrorism strategy to eradicate terrorist organizations has caused greater security threats internationally (Kuypers 2006). The generated instability has manifested into more social unrest and conflict in the Middle East (Ibid.). Both wars are conducted through forceful means that impeach into the sovereign rights of other countries, but most seemingly into periphery states that cannot put up much resistance to the pressures of U.S. foreign policy. These wars are framed by dangers the U.S. has constructed to be of great international concern. Yet, these dangers were not initially recognized as detrimental problems for the international community. Instead it was the internationalization of the U.S. national security problems that led to the escalation of the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’. Pointing to the subversive fact that these wars are based on a non-inclusive governance strategy that cements further the core/periphery structure through intervention in security matters that advances the hegemonic world order power structure. These central observations are what frame this research project’s investigation into U.S. hegemonic power, non inclusive governance, frames of foreign policy strategies, effects of the ‘War on Drugs’ and ‘War on Terror’, and maintenance of prevailing world order power structures. However, to understand these elements that will help dissect U.S. hegemony, first an overview of surrounding conditions that have fortified U.S. power and legitimized these interventions needs to ensue.

The combined economic, political, and social changes that resulted from globalization (Krishna 2009, 3) and the primacy of neoliberal norms has led to an

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international environment with extremely high inequality between nations, specifically between core and periphery states4, but also within nations. Yet, the international

economic system has beckoned more interdependence between states, causing for greater dependence on the global superpower—the U.S. Since World War II (WWII) the U.S. has actively sought out to manage global power relations through a number of

mechanisms including, but not limited to: controlling the world economy, containing competing state’s nationalistic ambitions, mobilizing domestic constituents, constructing universal threats, and supporting Western led international institutions (Cox 2005, 16). The institutionalization of U.S. power has led to the collective belief that the prevailing structures of power are universal and immovable (Chomsky 1996, 72). Yet, how

universal, but more importantly, how fair is the spread of liberal internationalism5 that the U.S. has promoted so strongly over the last three decades? Liberal internationalism is expressed politically as the need to spread liberal democracy and human rights through international institutions and organizations for a stable and righteous world order (Jahn 2013, 1). Economically, it is the harmonization of the neoliberal agenda on a global scale; the spread of capitalism through “the deregulation, liberalization and privatization of the world market” (Ibid., 1). This project of liberal internationalism was largely unchallenged when it took a strong hold in the 1990’s after the Cold War, mostly because it was

expressed in humanizing and moral objectives. As President George H.W. Bush (1991) pronounced it in his State of the Union Address, referring to the project of liberal internationalism as the New World Order, “diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law” (cited in Lazar & Lazar 2004, 225). This doctrinal system, however is illustrative of the U.S. hypocrisy, since it narrates its power in terms of protecting human freedoms and emanating high morality into the world, while masking

4_{Core and periphery state: a division of the global economic system into two categories; a core and a} periphery. The core is made up of the dominant Western powers, while the periphery is represented by the developing world, this division is presented this way because production by the periphery serve the economic interests of the core (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002, 4; 6).

5_{Liberal Internationalism can be broadly understood as “ ‘missionary’ liberal foreign policies, sometimes} to indicate more broadly the application of liberal principles and practices to international politics, and sometimes simply the foreign policies of liberal states” (Jahn 2013, 13). This includes supporting “open markets, international institutions, cooperative security, democratic communities, progressive change, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, the rule of law” (Ikenberry 2009, 71).

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the external coercion and violence it undertakes to uphold the New World Order (Chomsky 2015, 10). This ideological strategy was meant to subvert the eyes of “the great beast”, as Hamilton referred to “the people”, from the alternative goal, American expansionism, which the U.S. was forcefully pursuing abroad (Chomsky 2003, 4). Therefore, a central but hidden aim was controlling the ambitions of indigenous populations in periphery states from using their own natural resources for national purposes to ensure internationally U.S. ideological and economic penetration (Chomsky 2015, 7). Evidence of these undisclosed objectives had been a point of discussion after WWII by the displaced imperial powers, when the U.S. had pushed to dismantle their imperial systems politically but had constructed dependencies with developing countries economically through trustee schemes, thereby securing a neo-colonial system for themselves (Ibid., 4-5). Nevertheless, the U.S. maintained its benevolence, underwriting its practices as “being made in the interest of world security rather than our own security […] what was good for us was good for the world”, as said by the leadership of the Interior Department Abe Fortas in 1945 (cited in Chomsky 2015, 5). From then forward the U.S. ideological system and material power seeped into the world, establishing an expansive and strong hegemony, that was resented by many but challenged by a few.

However, It is important to keep in mind that the U.S. was not the first to embark on this international project of dominance and subordination. Therefore, a brief

conceptualization of the structures that paved the way for U.S. domination is necessary to understand the problems evolving from its hegemony. To a great extent there is

considerable agreement that the division of the world into territorial segments of concentrated wealth against larger areas of poverty is a recent development of the last four to five centuries (Krishna 2009, 9). The European developments of the 15th_{and 16}th centuries, which were institutionalized in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, forged the sovereign state system and with it raison d’état (Cox 1987, 107; 112). Raison d’état can be seen as today’s national interest doctrine, it was a political theory that asserted the need of specific state actions to create and maintain internal unity and strength, to thwart off threats, and also to pursuit and protect state interests externally (Ibid., 112-13). The people that made up the state system were represented as subjects, that is, individuals that

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“subordinated [themselves] to a higher sovereign authority” (Campbell 1992, 63). However, the level of subordination of the people and raison d’état were not totalizing and static conditions, these changed in the interest of shifting power relations within the state. These power relations that supported the system of power within states were composed from the production relations that emerged from the capitalist development process (Cox 1987, 5; 107). Therefore, deriving from the premise that the classes of society are historically constructed by collective experiences, it can be concluded that the dominant groups of society who controlled production comparatively to the subordinate groups that worked under their control, held considerably more leverage and influence in the state system as a result of their upper-class status (Ibid., 17-8). In simpler terms, the social power of the dominant classes in society is fundamentally based on their control of production, it is the resources and capital that accumulates from this control that

translates into positions of social and political influence (Ibid, 18). Therefore, the state system that entrenched itself as the configuration model for the rest of the world was conditional on the dominant class’ stable production relations within Europe’s major states, pointing to raison d’état’s aim of internal stability, while fostering the growth of these dominant class’ production power abroad, which was illustrative of raison d’état’s logic of defending the interest of the state externally (Ibid., 113). Thus, a change in the relative productive power held by Europe’s major states that had founded the state system and had transplanted these norms of production power internationally, would lead into a shift in the international order of power. And this indeed occurred, it was not a sudden break, but a gradual change that culminated after WWII with the U.S. taking leadership, due to their unsurmounted production power and the establishment of a liberal ideology that build into a new hegemonic order (Ibid., 212). Nevertheless, this explanation of state systems is not contentious, it is extremely broad and oversimplified, and lacks an

overview of how states and their dominant classes expand and maintain favorable power relations. To unfold these practices there is a need to study foreign policy, which

considers issues of “the role and the nature of the state; division between politics and economics” and “the tension between domestic and international factors” (Campbell 1992, 45).

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From the economic angle presented by power relations above, it becomes more understandable how and why the U.S. embarked into a period of unchallenged military intervention, hidden under the pretense of development, humanitarian intervention and self defense. Yet, perceiving American liberal ideology merely as a pretense to further U.S. global economic penetration can lead to a skewed view of power. The U.S. had indeed led Western Europe into a world economy where they, the Western powers, held an advantageous position in accessing raw materials, open trade agreements, and free movement of capital, which has led to an accumulation of capital that transcends national bounds (Cox 1987, 216). However, it has not been merely capital wealth that the U.S. has been after, it has sought out much more; it has emulated for social, political, military and economic global preeminence—after all ‘real’ hegemonic state power is more than just dominant production relations. Yet, globalization and internationalization had been a combined good- and mis- fortune for its hegemonic project, since the paradigm of the sovereign state was essential for maintaining U.S. power internationally, but the practices and institutions of globalization/internationalization undermined state sovereignty. Nevertheless, the U.S.’s awareness of this dilemma early on led to the construction of a American social space6_{that grounded its identity on more than just a territorial division} between the U.S. and the ‘Rest’, rather its formation was conceived by fabricating divergent moral spaces within the international sphere (Campbell 1992, 85). This meant that the boundaries of the American state identity were connected to the conception of their social space. A social space that had been shaped to be receptive to dualities and polarizations, where the national image was superior and secure and the international image was inferior and dangerous (Ibid., 3). Foreign policy was an essential instrument to strengthen not only the U.S. economic presence abroad, but to also secure the American

6_{A social space is to be interpreted as the environment that produces, sustains, and can transform the} normative understandings of society through appropriating social relations to assigned spaces that shape the collective awareness and acceptance of norms, values and identities. The social space is therefore

interconnected to sex, age, organization of family, organization and division of the relations of production. These are all spheres that mark the social space, but for the social space of the U.S., the productive force that marks the social space most prominently are the social relations of production. This implies that there are considerable ties between the American social space and the will of the dominant classes of its capitalists production system (Lefebvre 2009, 186-187). For more on social space and capitalist space, see Henri Lefebvre (2009). State, space, world: selected essays. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota

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social space and state identity by representing their external aims more in cultural and ideological terms than in geopolitical objectives (Ibid., 26). During the Cold War this strategy had worked exemplary, the U.S. found a prime international context where it entrenched its power through the conception of an enemy, a ‘real’ danger to the

American ideals and interests. However, the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of the U.S. search for a new aggressor, someone or something that would pose a great enough threat that would help secure internal social cohesion and externally legitimize military self-defense (Chomsky 1996, 98). The H.W. Bush administration, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, adamantly pushed in Congress to maintain military spending and strengthen “the defense industrial base because of the growing technological

sophistication of Third World conflicts”, illustrating that the strategy for defense after the breakdown of the Soviet Union was designed to harbor unsubstantiated security threats (Ibid., 123). Today, drugs and terror have been marked as the new enemy.

The objectives and promises made by the U.S. in their declaration for the ‘War on Drugs’7 and the ‘War on Terror’8 were made on grounds most of its foreign policy is made on—the preservation of international order (Cato Institute 2016; Daalder & Lindsay 2003). The normative belief claims that in the absence of order the potential for others to exploit such conditions would give rise to anarchy and totalitarian forces (Campbell 1992, 32). The U.S. presents this reasoning as a central objective to

legitimately continue both wars, but securing long-term legitimization entails more than just promoting international order, which is merely an obscure and vague objective. Therefore, greater attention had to be paid towards a far stronger mobilizing force, the American identity and social space. The confines of the American identity and its social space needed to be reinforced by challenging it with intangible and permanent dangers (Ibid., 74). For these purposes the state chose to employ political discourses of reason and rationality to fight ominous dangers (Ibid.). The U.S. promised to protect its citizens and

7_{Central objectives: “disrupt, dismantle and destroy drug trafficking enterprises [by considering] […] a full} spectrum of drug activity” (Thornburg 1990, 4).

8_{Central objectives: i) defeat globally spanning terrorist organizations, ii) deny further protectorship,} backing, and refuge to terrorist by other states, iii) diminish the degradation of international social, political, economic conditions that can be exploited by terrorists, iv) defend the United States, its citizens, and its interests on a national and international level (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2003, 11-12).

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the world from these dangers, drugs and terror, while also committing to establish in the process continual stability. Be that as it may, the political rhetoric and policy practices identified with these wars converged in many instances. Were these wars really all that different? The recent political discourse that surrounds both wars has gone as far as to conflate the two threats, even though organized crime and terrorism are separate forms of social activity, while the formal insinuation by government that there is an overlap between these two spheres incites greater public fear. In 2011 the U.S. Strategy to

Combat Transnational Organized Crime was subtitled ‘Addressing Converging Threats to National Security’ (Picarelli 2012, 184). This has been one of many different strategies, and admittingly successful strategies, at framing these two wars as paramount fights for protecting American national security. While obscuring questions that might be raised about the motives and root causes of growing criminal groups, be it terrorists or drug traffickers, or the magnitude of the budgets for government institutions that serve to protect peace and security but often times cause more instability (Ibid., 184; 185).

There are observable paradoxes in the U.S. claims for embarking on the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’ that need to be addressed. The vagueness and ambiguity of the dangers that urgently need containment lead to a representation that exaggerates the threat of drugs and terrorism, causing society to misinterpret the internal threat (Campbell 1992, 7). The consumption and the number of deaths that are associated with illicit drugs is considerably lower than that caused by licit drug use, while the number of deaths by radical Islamic groups in the U.S. since 9/11 is lower than the deaths caused by attacks from far right wing groups, 45 to 48 respectively9 (Ibid., 2; New America 2016). Empirical evidence does not support these dangers as major threats to national security, yet this fact is largely overlooked, since the U.S. focuses not on the ambivalence of the sources of danger but rather on representing the symbolic nature of the threats (Campbell 1992, 24-25). The state wants to articulate their project of security in this manner because these types of inconcrete dangers to American ideals will never cease to exist,

accordingly the state can continue to draw support from its people to guarantee the continued existence of American ideals. Therefore, the articulation of dangers through

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foreign policy by the state becomes instrumental for sustaining the state’s identity while also ensuring the survival of the favorable prevailing state of affairs (Ibid., 12). When observing the historical record of the U.S. foreign policy, it reveals little strategy variation. This strategic continuity is deeply entrenched in U.S. institutions, and is furthermore supported by the unchanging distribution of power in the domestic society (Chomsky 2015, 1).

In this thesis I aim to challenge the narrative the U.S. constructs to frame the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’ as legitimate projects of foreign policy for national security. This will be a qualitative discourse analysis employing a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). My aim is to provide a comparative study of U.S. foreign policy documents written for both wars, in order to problematize the practices of non-inclusive global governance that the U.S. utilizes to maintain global hegemony. Yet, in order to illustrate the entrenchment of U.S. hegemony in other international informal networks, I will also analyze independent organization reports on the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’. I will primarily examine U.S. ideology and the supporting political narratives and discourses to deconstruct and look past the rhetorical disguises and present a critical logic for their utilization. Therefore, I will be analyzing the documented/official U.S. foreign policy argumentation against the ‘real world’ application of said foreign policy, as has been observed in both wars. The historical configuration of the world will be central to this research project. The research question and sub questions that outline these investigative objectives are as followed:

How and why does the United States foreign policy instrumentalize the ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘War on Drugs’ in a pursuit of non-inclusive global governance, and which discourses/narratives are mobilized to legitimize Gramscian hegemony?

o How are these wars being framed by the U.S., and is this a continuation or shift from former prevailing foreign policy strategies?

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o What are the negative effect of these wars, when considering the core and periphery states involved in the conflict?

o Are these wars propagated to maintain existing world order power relations?

The research question and its preceding sub-questions have been introduced thematically at the beginning of this introduction through the conceptualization of the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’ that shortly outlined the precariousness of U.S. non-inclusive global governance policies.

I will be using the case study of Colombia (1985-2005) and Afghanistan (2001- 2015). These case selections are based on the central role both countries held in the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’. Half of the U.S. military aid was flowing into

Colombia by the 1980’s to fight the drug war (Chomsky 1996, 99), while the bombing of Afghanistan in 2001 started the contentious U.S. military intervention in the Middle East in the search for terrorists (Chomsky 2003, 107). Even though both countries were subjected to U.S. domination, which should have brought about stability and order according to U.S. objectives, this was not the case, instead there was great backlash and deterioration of social, political, economic conditions. In both case studies it is illustrative that the wars emphasized coercive and military repressive measures and neglected to address underlying root causes of the internal threats. I will be using critical and postcolonial theory to deconstruct and reconceptualize the U.S. foreign policy. Finally, by investigating Western foreign policy practices and the structures of power relations I expect to gain an understanding of the negative residual effects these practices and structures cause to non-Western states.

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1. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter I will delineate the theoretical foundations for critically

understanding U.S. foreign policy in the Latin America and the Middle East. I will be largely referencing critical and postcolonial theories. Firstly, a conceptualization of foreign policy and international relations concepts and notions pertaining to power, hegemony and world order will ensue. Secondly, an overview of the normative U.S. foreign policy narrative will be presented, specifically outlining the benevolent hegemon, American exceptionalism and moral crusade assumptions. Thirdly, a critical perspective of the U.S. foreign policy narrative will be presented by reviewing: i) framing,

representations and state identity formation ii) the intersection between domestic and foreign policy iii) Robert Cox’s critical theory on power and world order. Lastly, I will further problematize the U.S. foreign policy narrative through postcolonial theory, thereby establishing a perspective of the inequalities between core and periphery states.

1.1 Conceptualizing Power, Hegemony and World Order

International relations (IR) and foreign policy are spheres of practice and study that incite contentious debate, especially when topics of power, hegemony and world order are confronted. The theoretical perspectives that underlie these debates range from normative Realism to critical Constructivism on the ideological spectrum of IR.

Therefore, establishing clear academic definitions for the notions of power, hegemony, world order, and their related terms is almost inconceivable. Hence, the purpose of reviewing alternate perspectives of the aforementioned concepts will not be directed at forming distinct definitions. Instead it will problematize and expand the understanding of these notions, admittingly, with a preference towards a critical and constructivist

perspective. The initially dominating neorealist IR perspectives that took a hold in the late 1970’s altered the normative practices of state policy making. Neorealist, such as Waltz, promoted the foundations of the theory on the assumptions of its intrinsic rationality and universality to explain the patterned behavior between the relations of

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states (Waltz 1979). However, as changing historical developments emerged, skepticism arose towards neorealism’s ability to predict international relations, which resulted in the deriving policy prescriptions it had delivered to be scrutinized (Elman 1996, 8).

Neorealist perceive the accumulation of power as the main driving force for states, they view power in terms of material capabilities that can, among state actors, be possessed, used or allocated (Ashley 1984, 244; Waltz 1988). Yet, within this explanation of power there is a diminished view of society’s role in shaping power and state interests, since the state is viewed as a unitary entity (Ashley 1984, 244). Richard Ashley (Ibid., 228), a prominent critical theorist, evaluates these deficiencies and oversimplification of neorealist assumptions of power, he states:

[It] creates a theoretical perspective that parades the possibility of a rational power that need never acknowledge power's limits […] given order as the natural order, limits rather than expands political discourse […] trivializes […] time and place, subordinates all practice to an interest in control […] social power beyond responsibility […] deprives political interaction of those practical capacities which make social learning and creative change possible […] the rationalization of global politics.

This analysis, although articulated cynically, proposes a coherent critique to neorealist claims for adequately representing reality. The distortion of the complexities of society, states, history and international politics leaves almost no mechanisms to interpret change. Therefore, to broaden the view of power and its role in hegemony a greater reciprocal relationship between internal and external forces that constrain the state needs to be considered. As presented in the introduction, the production of state power is dependent on internal power relations of production and ideology, or as Cox (1987, 18-19) states it, “power over production combined with social power”. Robert Dahl (2007, 203), a

theorist of political Pluralism, supports this argument and asserts that the most conclusive way to define power is “that it is a relation among people”, be it “individuals, groups, roles, offices, governments, nation states or other human aggravates”. In his further theorization of power Dahl focuses mostly on power’s coercive role and does not address power’s ability to shape norms and values (Munro 2016). While most critical theorist do take into account the political economic side of state power, they also consider ideas and

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institutions as instrumental forces that shape power structures, therefore, placing attention to the dimension of power that shapes norms and values (Cox 1981, 136-37). Barnett and Duvall (2005, 42) have integrated these ideas of power relations into a more

comprehensive model for understanding power, in this model a great consideration is given to the social structures and processes that give actors access, but also limit social capacities for reaching their interests. The model is based on the taxonomy of four concepts of power, which do not exist separately from one another, but are

interconnected and make up the complicated structure of power: compulsory-10, institutional-11, structural-12and productive power13 (Ibid., 39; 69). However, there is a differentiation between these power relations. The model identifies compulsory and institutional power as “relations of interaction among previously constituted social actors”, this means that power works through an interplay between actors that produces a “power over” concept that points to the ability of actors to operate control over others (Ibid., 45-46). While structural and productive power are seen as “relations of

constitution of actors as particular kinds of social beings”, this means that power works through social relations that preexist the actors involved, these relations shape/constitute their capacities and interests as social beings (Ibid.). Therefore, social relations of constitution are centered on actors social “power to” undertake action for their own interests (Ibid.). In this research, greater emphasis is paid to structural and productive power, because constitutive relationships are the underlying foundations that keep U.S. preeminence and the world order in place. Especially productive power is of greater interest, since it is made up of systems of knowledge and discursive practices that construct frameworks for meanings and interpretations that shape networks of social forces (Ibid., 55). It is the underhanded control of social forces that is a fundamental

10_{Compulsory power: the direct influence of an actor over other actor’s actions through relations of} interaction (Barnett & Duvall 2005, 43).

11_{Institutional power: the indirect influence of actors over others through diffuse relations of interaction,} meaning that they utilize their privileged social position to control conditions of action over others positioned at a social distance from themselves (Ibid., 43; 48).

12_{Structural power: “the constitution of subjects’ capacities in direct structural relation to one another”} (Ibid., 43).

13_{Productive power: “the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and} signification” (Ibid.).

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element for establishing Gramscian hegemony. Productive power is therefore indicative to understand the international environment that supports U.S. and Western power.

The concept of power builds into the notion of hegemony. In neorealism the definition of hegemony is reduced to its limiting conception of power; the dominance in the international sphere of one state in relation to other states on the basis of physical capabilities and these capabilities capacity to influence other states actions (Cox & Sinclair 1996, 55; 357). However, this is an oversimplified perspective that neglects important principles. In order to understand hegemony in the international sphere, which is only possible if there is a social hegemony domestically, an understanding needs to be formed of the production of social hegemony (Cox 1987, 266). According to Cox, a social group's ability not only to have dominance of the material capabilities of power, but to also be able to reach consensus with the subordinate groups in terms of

concessions in interests (usually expressed terms of ideology) that leaves their position of dominance unharmed, is what constitutes ‘real’ hegemony (Cox 1983, 163; Cox & Sinclair 1996, 363-64). Similarly, within international relations global hegemony is understood in terms of Gramscian hegemony. This theory asserts that brute force and coercion are not sustainable measures of power, instead ideological and intersubjective elements have to be combined with power relations in order for the dominant state to establish a broad measure of consent among lesser powers based on terms of general interests that do not endanger the dominance of the leading state (Cox 1987, 7; Cox & Sinclair 1996, 56). Therefore, foreign policy became an instrument of intensifying state power and sustaining hegemonic order (Campbell 1992, 75). This conceptualization of hegemony, along with expanding globalization shaped the defining characteristics of the present world order. The universalist principles and interests under which hegemonic states form consent became more entrenched with the global penetration of liberal social ideology and neoliberal economic ideology, illustrating that world order is conditional on a historical structures that are not static and fixed (Hardt & Negri 2000, 8). According to Cox, this process takes place through the internationalization of production, where the production of states becomes interconnected through the structures of the world economy and the “world systems of production” (Cox, 1987, 7). This allows dominant social

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classes in the hegemonic state to find allies in other states that share mutual interests and ideologies, thereby forming global social classes around the interstate system and

composing a new structure of world order (Ibid.). These structures, or “world order pressures” impose constraints and adjustments to states, forcing them to adhere to internationalized modes of policy and action (Ibid., 108). However, this theorization of world order is to a great extent antagonistic to the image conservative neorealist propose, who portray globalization as a depoliticized natural evolution generated by the logic of the market and the economy (Krishna 2009, 2). Furthermore, neorealist conception of world order is a derivative relation to the system of hegemonic power. This means that the world system is a byproduct supported by the rational hegemon through collective goods and particular resources because it serves to stabilize the protection of their interests (Ashley 1984, 246). This interpretation of world order bypasses the notion that there are “rules, norms, mutual expectations, or principles of practice” antecedent and free from state actor’s interests and their material power to pursue these interests (Ibid., 245). Therefore, a stable world order is conditional on a hierarchical consolidation of power, because conceding to neorealist assumptions, if power is relatively equal among competing states it results in a anarchic order of the international sphere which produces chaos and war (Ibid.; Waltz 1988, 616). On the other hand, from a critical perspective, hegemony and world order is not merely a composition of order among states contingent on their material power (Cox 1983, 164). Instead, it is the move away from just pursuing the interest of a dominant class and the construction of international institutions and ideologies that penetrate states globally and generate complex international social relations that shapes people's modes of behaviors and expectations to align

homogeneously (Ibid.,168; 171). Nevertheless, there is an acknowledgement that more powerful states have relatively more leverage to pursue foreign policy in accordance to national interest than lesser powers, since economically periphery states are conjoined and dependent to core states (Ibid., 169). Yet, this recognition does not assume direct exploitation from core to periphery. As mentioned before, their relation or ‘the world order’ is based on a universalist acquiescence of concessions. Although, the lurking threat

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for coercion of those that deviate radically from the established world order is a accepted matter (Ibid., 171; 164; Cox & Sinclair 1996, 56).

There are still others, such as Hardt and Negri (2000), that to a large extent accept Cox’s articulation of hegemony and world order, but conceive the characteristics of said order through a contemptuous perspective. According to their hypothesis, the current world order is materialized by the concept of empire, which is determined by the political subject or sovereign power that controls the world, who maintains global peace and produces “ethical truths” mostly through the making of universal “norms and legal instruments” but who also holds the unitary power to pursue these ends through ‘just wars’ (Ibid., 9-10). The concept of ‘just war’ is traditionally understood as bellum justum, a term historically associated to old imperial orders that legitimized a states military actions against other states that threatened its territorial boundaries and/or its political autonomy (Ibid., 12). The problem with the resurgence of this term in the postmodern world is that the concept intrinsically trivializes war and elevates war, grounded on just reasons, as an “ethical instrument” (Ibid.). Therefore, a ‘just war’, under the

conceptualization of Hardt and Negri, can not be understood in terms of self-defense. Instead, it is a legitimization of state aggression under the pretenses of attaining order and peace (Ibid., 13). The revival of ‘just war’ is illustrative in the increase over the past decades of international humanitarian intervention and intervention on the basis of self-defense (Chomsky 2003, 107). From a realist’s perspective, the arguments that underlie the causes of war are: “anarchy; expected benefits greater than expected costs; rational preventative war; rational miscalculation due to lack of information; rational

miscalculation or disagreement about relative power” (Fearon 1995, 381). However, these arguments do not help explain many of the current realities related to the

conceptualization of war, since rationalist reasoning does not conclusively account for wars that are not fought on an interstate level. Nonetheless, the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’ are present realities that do not conform to traditional understandings of war. Therefore, both wars are better understood under terms of ‘just war’ than in terms of ‘rational war’.

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In conclusion, it is important to understand that theoretical perspectives need to be adjusted to changing realities, therefore conceptualizing the notions of power, hegemony and world order to present historical configurations will provide a closer picture to the realities that are encountered and the realities that can be expected. In the following section the broad concepts that have been considered here will be used to delineate the normative U.S. foreign policy narrative and to theorize about the mechanisms employed to maintain the current hegemonic order.

1.2 Normative U.S. Foreign Policy Narratives; American Exceptionalism

Benevolent Hegemon, and Moral Crusades

Any successful strategy to ensure the safety of the American people and advance our national security interests must begin with an undeniable truth—America must lead. Strong and sustained American leadership is essential to a rules-based international order that promotes global security and prosperity as well as the dignity and human rights of all peoples. The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead (Executive Office 2015)

The U.S. is the hegemonic power within our current world order. The power structures that stabilized Pax Americana14 established conditions that made American hegemony far more enduring and rigid than its predecessor Pax Britannica (Cox 1981, 140). Yet, how was it able to firmly entrench its hegemony? U.S. foreign policy narratives and supporting ideologies can provide for a piece to this complex puzzle, revealing the construction of universalist established norms and values in the pursuit of preserving and expanding social, political, economic and military power nationally and internationally. In the excerpt presented above, selected from President Obama’s forward letter to the National Security Strategy of 2015, a common narrative exemplary of the

14_{Pax Americana is the Latin term for a U.S. led and sustained world order of peace; it is understood as the} U.S. hegemonic order starting after WWII (Parchami 2009).

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most prevalent and ruling American foreign policy ideology is revealed—liberalism and American exceptionalism. Historically there have been variations in the U.S. foreign policy stands, ranging from rational realism, isolationism, conservatism, to liberal internationalism however these divergent tendencies converged under the dominant liberal narratives supporting American normative ideology (Dumbrell & Barnett 1990, 7). The conceptual unity of the state is not as fixed as it often is assumed. This is due to changing political contexts, competing bureaucratic actors, private and public

transnational activities, and a rise in trans-governmental networks that can all influence the direction of state narratives and ideology, thereby affirming the existence of a plurality forms of state (Cox 1981, 127). Yet, ideologically, the U.S. has consistently represented liberal ideals. The foundation of American liberal ideology is based on the Lockean philosophical tradition that supports the belief that all men have the right to life, liberty and property, placing an emphasis on the individual and his pursuit for happiness (Yamaoka 1997, 193). It is often expressed politically by promoting the values

correlating to freedom and democracy, and the inherent moral imperative to spread these ideals to all people (Belmonte 2008, 2). This vague and idealistic ideology is

superimposed with American exceptionalism, which is understood as the notion that America and its citizens hold an exclusive role in history because they are fundamentally and qualitatively unique and therefore superior to other states in the world (Nayak & Melone 2009, 254). Documents of foreign policy, similar to the National Security 2015 quote, are packed with American liberal exceptionalism narratives depicted by

proclamations such as the fundamental greatness of the nation, the ‘god-given rights’, the moral duties of Americans, and the responsibility towards peace and prosperity

(Campbell 1992, 33). Official national strategies are therefore not only documents prescribing strategic analysis and future operations, they also serve to actively

manufacture a norm of American policy through idealistic elevated principles (Ibid.). This ideology extended to the global economy, where the U.S. had materially supported a global capitalist system, but ideologically had anchored the project through the neoliberal conception of the intrinsic ‘good nature’ of free market economies. Thereby, projecting on global scale economic developments that were meant to circulate and transplant the

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‘American Dream’ abroad. This narrative generated an underlying objective within the mentioned economic and political spheres, but also within the social and cultural spheres to shape the ‘Rest’ of the world to model the U.S. (Nayak & Melone 2009, 260). The American understanding of their own hegemonic ideology was advanced by the believe that Western moral orthodoxy coordinated with universalist principles (Chomsky 2003, 111). The ideology forced conformity on the tolerated forms of state accepted into the international order, serving to facilitate U.S. dominance (Cox 1987, 266). Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., a prominent public intellectual in the 1950’s, described the goodness of American power abroad as “the general program of international good will” (Schlesinger 1966 cited in Chomsky 2015, 84). Samuel Huntington, another influential scholar15 who worked as an advisor to the White House’s National Security Council in the late 70’s, concurred with the idea that U.S. international primacy served towards the advancement of all nations around world (Chomsky 1996, 95). He often promoted American exceptionalism by claiming that the U.S.:

‘national identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values’, namely ‘liberty, democracy, equality, private property, and markets; accordingly, ‘the promotion of democracy, human rights, and markets are far more central to American policy than the policy of any other country’ (Huntington 1993 cited in Chomsky 1996, 95)

Yet, others claimed that the U.S. benevolence in foreign policy went “too far for its own good” (Chomsky 1996, 95). This is an argument known to coincide with Henry

Kissinger’s influential foreign policy views, who is a respected political scientist and a former Secretary of State16 (Ibid.). This strong liberal-conservative political discourse has been reinforced from the Truman administration to the Bush administrations and to some extent well into the Obama administration, whose most influential members normalized a neoconservative belief towards foreign policy (Belmonte 2009, 3). At the core of their strategy stood the benevolent hegemon concept, which presented the U.S.’s power as the only “reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order” (Nayak &

15_{Samuel Huntington was an Eaton professor of the Science of Government at Harvard University} (Chomsky 1996) .

16_{Henry Kissinger was U.S. Secretary of State from 1969-1977, under President Nixon and President Ford} (Kissinger & Luce, 1979).

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Melone 2009, 270). This political discourse descended from Wilsonian idealism, it rationalized American missions abroad in altruistic terms and legitimized interventionist actions under the narrative of a moral crusade and elevated ideals (Chomsky 2003, 25). This became a primary principle of U.S. foreign policy, based on idealistic moral ideology that helped shape the global order and perpetuates U.S. dominance (Ibid.). The U.S. was responsible for instrumentalizing this deep-rooted liberal ideology into a geo-strategic narrative, which was imperative for global consent towards its military supremacy (Lazar & Lazar 2004, 225). The norm building modalities inherent to American foreign policy made the “normative revolution” of humanitarian intervention possible in the 1990’s (Chomsky 2003, 13; 34). The U.S. and its allies set precedence for militarily intervention of sovereign nations on the condition that the state under

consideration had failed its responsibility to protect its citizens (Ibid., 34). Under the United Nations (UN) Chapter VII terms, intervention on these grounds had to be a consideration and authorization of the Security Council, however because of the fundamental moral inscription interpreted to humanitarian intervention, individual countries were not condoned for acting alone in “conscience-shocking situations” (Ibid., 34). The U.S. continued to push the boundaries of international consent when it sought to establish the norm of preventative war with the invasion of Iraq in 2001, the U.S. acted against the UN consensus opposing military intervention (Ibid., 13). This action was highly questionable because preventative war, among scholars, is often categorized as a war of choice since the threat to national security is not definite or immediate (Little 2008, 326). Invading a sovereign nation merely on the basis of suspicions is a controversial military act and is not considered a strategy of self-defense (Ibid.). However, the U.S. claimed legitimate ground in ideological terms, evading the lack of concrete evidence of Iraqi aggression, “while the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone if necessary, to exercise our right of self defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country” (Bush 2001c). The U.S. project in Iraq has been stigmatized as a failure, yet the foreign policy

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narrative on acting, even unilaterally, in defense of national and global interests and security still prevails.

Strong political actors constructed and strengthened the American foreign policy narrative. Therefore, the argument can be made that they hold great responsibility in the creation of hypocritical and contradicting projects that have resulted in international tension and conflict (Campbell 1992, 32). According to Chomsky, “intervention and subversion are conducted in the interest of elite groups”, which is often pretexted in terms of national interest or national security (Chomsky 2015, 50). While foreign policy

practices are employed at very high costs to the general population who rarely reap benefits of U.S. foreign interventions but pay materially and morally for its military adventurism (Ibid.). It should be noted that Chomsky’s observations are extremely critical and it is not fully clear the extent to which his claims are definitively representative of the hidden truths motivating the U.S. foreign policy strategies.

However, the American narratives of exceptionalism, benevolent hegemony and moral crusades can be distinguished as a hegemonic tool for American control in matters of international affairs. In the ensuing subchapter the ‘normative’ nature of the U.S. foreign policy narrative and strategy will be problematized from a critical perspective, by

analyzing framing, the relation between domestic and foreign policy and further investigating Cox’s critical theory of power and world order.

1.3 Critical Perspective of the Normative U.S. Foreign Policy Narrative

The foundations of the U.S. normative foreign policy narratives have been and still are instrumental for its global dominance. Therefore, in order to understand how the deployment of ideology alongside economic global dependency is used for maintaining and expanding its power, a critical analysis of the normalization and institutionalization mechanisms has to take place. An ideological system, such as the one the U.S. has created, admits that errors and flaws will arise from its noble, yet very expansive quest. However, it rejects critical perspectives that point to systematic patterns of exploitation and dominance that can be separated from the ‘real’ practices employed in its foreign policy, since this suggests a degree of conscious planning for the failings of its noble

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objectives professed ideologically (Chomsky 2015, 10). Nevertheless, it is the process of normalization through ideology that minimizes this critical realization, due to the forming of objective realities that arise from intersubjective ideas. It is crucial to understand that these objective realities, such as states, social classes and threats, do not exist in the same manner that people exist, but because people collectively act as though these realities exist, they thereby reproduce said realities (Cox & Sinclair 1996, 52). To understand why and how these realities are kept in place or transformed, a method of historical

materialism will be utilized. This method is used to “find the connection between the mental schema through which people conceive action and the material world which constrains both what people can do and how they can think about doing it” (Ibid.). This is an important schematic because it will help uncover the practices by which an ideological system is instrumental for governing populations, mostly to help maintain a sense of apathetic-ness and passivity towards political, economic, and social matters by constructing legitimizing ideas and institutions in the general society, and thereby deflecting criticism from “the educated, articulated and politically active classes” of the world (Chomsky 2015, 8). This section will seek to deconstruct and reevaluate the understructures of U.S. foreign policy by theoretically i) problematizing its use of framing, representations and state identity formation ii) evaluating the contradicting, antagonistic, yet unifying relationship between domestic and foreign policy and iii) analyzing Cox’s theory of power and world orders.

1.3.1 Framing, Representation and State Identity Formation

Ideological systems are sustained by complex structures of action that are largely conceived by the use of language, discourse and narratives. In a political context the process of forming a normative widespread ideology involves the historically productive processes of framing, representations and state identity formation. It is these three components that underlie the U.S. hegemonic ideological system. Therefore,

conceptualizing these practices and understanding their use, will serve to problematize U.S. foreign policy.

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Even though the world exists independently from language, this is a fact that is inconceivable to the practices of society because it is through language and

interpretations that people perceive the existence of the world (Campbell 1992, 6). Engaging in matters such as foreign policy and constructing the meanings of foreign policy are made possible through mechanisms of a discursive economy. A discursive economy is recognized as the process by which “discourse is a managed space” that constructs and represents a certain reality, by regulating what “statements and depictions” prevail more than others based on the idea that “external reality has a particular currency that is internal to discourse” (Ibid.). Campbell presents the concept of a discursive economy as a structure that cultivates framing, representation and state identity formation:

For a discursive economy, investments have been made in certain

interpretations; dividends can be drawn by those interests that have made the investment; representations are taxed when they confront new and ambiguous circumstances; and participation in the discursive economy is through social relations that embody an unequal distribution of power (Ibid.)

Therefore, it can be assumed that within this economy there are certain dominant actors that hold greater investments in the production of certain discourses and narratives. Then, economically speaking, greater profit will amount if more people accept the dominant actors interpretations. Frames can be seen as one of the tools to market the desired product, or in other words, the particular

‘interpretations’.

Frames are defined as mental structures that mold people's understanding of the world around us (Goffman 1974). In politics, frames are therefore used to structure social policy in positive, acceptable ideas, and language in order to attain collective acquiesce (Ibid.). Frames tend to organize existing knowledge in categories; these categories are formed through absolute and dichotomous representations of subjects e.g.

traditional/modern, war/peace, enemy/secure state (Autesserre 2009, 254). This leads to a logic of interpretation, where framing an action or problem in a certain category leads to

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the acceptance of corresponding responses to that activated frame and category. Campbell describes the logic of interpretation as instrumental for understanding the workings of the international system, because it allows for the international system to be seen as a platform of practices in which certain actors gain a significant status and preserve said status by partaking in practices that have set “the boundaries of legitimate meaning” and have standardized a respective order (Campbell 1992, 45). Frames are therefore instrumental for establishing a society of normalization. A society of normalization17 is understood as an environment where there is not just one uniform authority of sovereignty, but instead the practices of establishing normalization are performed in a number of forms to discipline and dominate through the imposition of particular norms and not through the requirement to obey rules (Ibid., 10). Thereby, it constructs a process in which it supports and legitimizes distinct characters and ideas and denounces opposing orientations (Ibid.). It is frames and the process of normalization that highlight and obscure certain aspects of reality in order to formalize a causal

interpretation of ‘real’ problems, such as terrorism and drug trafficking, and through these means conceive a normative base to embark on otherwise perceived contentious actions, to resolve these problems (Entman 1993, 52-3). Although the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’ have presently become frames of their own, initially they were regarded as ambivalent policies that were then legitimized under a ‘national security’ and ‘defensive foreign policy’ frame (Campbell 1992).

Within frames there are representations that fundamentally bolster the process of normalization and stabilize a logic of interpretation. Representations are therefore not just a reflection of the ‘real’ material world, as the concept is often interpreted. It is rather a productive than reflective act that gives meaning instead of serving to deliver objective definitions (Borgerson & Schroeder 2002, 574). Representations thus construct meanings and this process takes place through language. The depiction of certain matters and circumstances through specific language shapes the collective interpretation of the

17

Society of normalization refers to the theoretical propositions made by Michael Foucault (1975) for a disciplinary society in his work Discipline and Punishment: The birth of the prison. Paris: Gallimard. His assessments on this matter will be examined further in sections 4.1 Introduction: Foucauldian CDA on pg.

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represented concept in a particular direction, and serves as a foundation for framing and categorizing future affairs through specific recognizable language (Ibid., 572). The nature of representation is complex, because it bases the construction of meanings on elements of observable reality but the discourse it produces is externally conceived from the concepts it represents (Ibid., 573). This means that those central to the matters and

circumstances that are being represented are left out of the production of meaning (Ibid.). An example of representations that follow this model and that are instrumental to

understanding the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ‘War on Terror’ are the representations of ‘the terrorist’ and ‘the narco-trafficker’, and the people and areas in which they are said to exist. These are constructions made possible through the representations of ‘Others’. Edward Said, a prominent postcolonial theorist, illustrated the relation of this concept of ‘Othering’ to the Western practice of dominating and governing the non-Western world. His conceptualization of ‘Othering’ emphasized the hegemonic power of the West to create and diffuse knowledge about the ‘Others’ throughout the world, in order to use that produced knowledge for further domination (Said 1978, 7; Kandiyoti 2002, 281). The representation of ‘Others’ employs discursive structures that produce knowledge that essentialize the ‘Others’ into subjects or objects that need to be feared and/or rescued (Nayak & Melone 2009, 256). The ‘Others’ are consequently subordinated externally by those representing them, who undermine the complexities and multiplicity that surround terrorism and drug-trafficking and choose to describe matters through a discursive economy approach; representing ‘Others’ to support their interests and to leverage prospective benefits from the constructed discourse (Krishna 2009, 73). For example, after the 9/11 attacks President Bush in his Address to Congress and the American people represented terrorism as unintelligible violence: “Americans are asking, why do they hate us? ... They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other (Bush 2001a). This

representation creates a one dimensional image of terrorists and their acts, obscuring the underlying complex causes that incited the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which implicated a degree of American responsibility since the U.S. government policies in the Middle East had been disenfranchising many Arab and Muslim people for decades (Chomsky 2003,

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115). Similarly, President Nixon represented drugs as “public enemy number one” (Nixon 1971). All actors and activities related to drugs were articulated as criminal, therefore a focus was set to the supply-chain of drugs, drug-traffickers and the region where it came from, which were labeled as the cause for increased drug use in the U.S. (Martinez Valenzuela 2013, 247). The construction of the ‘Others’ in this context instrumentally left out a consideration of the demand-side of the drug problem. The representation of drug use, drug addicts, and drug trafficking as nothing else but criminal ignored many root causes that could conceptualize the problem and accord more suitable responses. In both these examples, these representations of ‘Others’ allowed of a

hierarchical structure of order, where the ‘Others’ needed to be controlled as subordinates by a legitimate dominant ‘Self’.

It is through these representations that both Presidents legitimized their responses against the actions of ‘Others’, terrorism and drug-trafficking, to be conceived as

normative approaches. The forging of these types of representations and the consequent frames build upon these representations are central to the legitimacy of a state, because their formulations help compose a strong state identity.

Identity is performatively constituted, which means that it is defined not prior to its existence, but rather that it is defined as it comes to exist (Campbell 1992, 8). In a more concrete sense, state identity is best understood as a stable construct of relations of differences that compose an essentialized ‘Other’ and a superior ‘Self’, “demarcating an inside from an outside, […] a domestic from a foreign” (Ibid.). The dualism that is inherit to state identity formation and is a normative practice of foreign policy narratives,

naturalizes the domination of the ‘Self’ by characterizing the ‘Other’ as lesser entities that still need to be controlled (Nayak & Melone 2009, 258). Thereby deflecting any possible danger ‘They’ might pose to the rational system of the ‘Self’ (Ibid.). Hobbes (1651) political theory is illustrative of this notion of identity. His conceptualization of the ‘state’ and ‘man’ can be seen as a strategy of ‘Otherning’, it is used to discipline those inside of the system of the ‘Self’, generating a continues fight against the danger of becoming like the ‘Other’ or being threatened by the ‘Other’ if the power of the

What is good for us is good for the world : the U.S. instrumentalization of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror