Before and after accession : Bulgaria's implementation of the EU acquis in the environmental field

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BEFORE AND AFTER

ACCESSION: BULGARIA’S

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU

ACQUIS IN THE

ENVIRONMENTAL FIELD

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OLITICAL

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ELATIONS

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NIVERSITY OF

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MSTERDAM

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CHOOL OF

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Name: Ilies Benmansour-12100609 Supervisor: Professor Jonathan Zeitlin Second Reader: Professor Dimitris Bouris Date: 21/06/2019

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INTRODUCTION

Over the years, the European Union has evolved from an organization integrating Europe’s coal and steel sector in the 1950s to one of the most influential international organizations in the world today (Mastenbroek, 2005). Established by a group of 6 founding countries (Belgium, France, West-Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands) the Community has grown in size and in importance. A further 22 countries have joined the EU, which currently comprises a noteworthy number of 28 member states (soon possibly to become 27 due to Brexit) forming one of the most powerful continental pacts of modern history. Indubitably, the European Union has constantly been driven by a multilevel process of integration of new countries. In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, EU member states agreed that all succeeding candidate countries will have to fulﬁl three main criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria, before they would be able to join the Union. Accordingly, the candidates need to have: (1) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and minority rights; (2) a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures inside the EC; (3) the ability to adopt the acquis and to accept the aims of political, economic, and monetary union (European Commission, 2016).

Even though the EU accession has generally been regarded as a greatly effective process of policy, and an institutional model diffusion, it has often encountered obstacles (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009). The EU has mainly developed its influence through the projection of the “acquis communautaire” conducted through the accession process of enlargement. The process of the EU’s transmission of its influence has often been referred to as “Europeanization”. Radaelli (2003) defines Europeanization as a process of “construction, diffusion and institutionalization of EU rules that shape domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 2003 p. 30). As regards the field of environment, “the acquis comprises over 200 major legal acts covering horizontal legislation, water and air quality, waste management, nature protection, industrial pollution control and risk management, chemicals and genetically modified organisms (GMOs), noise and forestry” (European Commission, 2019). Without a doubt, the EU has emphasized the importance of cooperation on environmental policy measures. Many environmental issues are transnational concerns which cannot be solved by member states acting in isolation. EU environmental

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policies require member states to cooperate and cannot allow diverse environmental standards. Weak implementation generates high societal, economic and environmental costs and the adoption of environmental measures can both protect the environment and raise the ‘quality of life’ for EU citizens (Keulartz, Leistra, 2008).

To spread its influence, the EU has extended its laws through enlargement (Lavenex, Schimmefelning, 2009). The European Union accession process is regarded as one of the most prominent mechanisms for the international promotion of democracy and the rule of law (Sikkink, Whitehead, 1996). According to the European Commission (2003) the most noteworthy example of external action and the EU’s most successful foreign policy has been the adoption of the acquis through enlargement. Nonetheless, EU rule adoption has always been a challenge for member states. After the EU’s fifth enlargement and the entry of Bulgaria in the EU in 2007, certain worries regarding the new member state were brought up. Truly, the Eastern enlargement presented the EU with a new set of challenges. “The resulting concerns about the EU’s absorptive capacities were exacerbated by serious doubts about the commitment and capability of ex-communist states to implement the acquis communautaire” (Sabel, Zeitlin, 2008 p. 320). In this day and age, the EU can be considered as a key driver of environmental policy in Europe and in the world. Environmental policy is now on the agenda of every EU member state, determined by the need to apply European environmental directives (Von Homeyer, 2009). Environmental issues are at the heart of EU policy but their application in member states has always remained more difficult than expected to carry out. The environmental acquis has been one of the most demanding areas for Eastern-European countries in their progress towards accession (Pavlinek, Pickles, 2005). During the accession negotiations, Bulgaria committed to adopting supranational environmental policies. However, EU environmental compliance in Bulgaria has been demanding. Environmental policies has remained a particular area where Bulgaria has had difficulties applying EU laws.

As stated in Chapter 27 of the acquis, compliance requires significant investment. A strong, well-equipped administration at the national and local level is imperative for the application and enforcement of the environment acquis (European Commission, 2019). Moreover, environmental policies are shaped by a variety of actors. State institutions and non-state actors such as NGOs are some of the many important proponents of EU environmental policies in member states. As a matter of fact, many factors have had an influence on the

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adoption of EU environmental governance in the case of Bulgaria. Weak state capacities such as the lack of resources or the lack of national organizations weakens the possibility for environmental implementation in member states (Börzel, Fagan, 2015). Furthermore, particularly in the case of Bulgaria, corruption has been an important obstacle to the implementation of EU law. Due to these many hitches and concerns in Bulgaria’s capability to implement EU law, the country’s accession was subject to safeguards and monitoring measures. Therefore, I have chosen to research on the field of environment as it has been one of the most problematic area for the Republic of Bulgaria to apply EU laws. During the first ten years of accession it was one of the main sources of infringement cases, thus implying EU environmental norms are not always followed in the country. From 2007 to 2017, the European Union opened more than 250 cases on Bulgaria, of which almost half were devoted to environmental issues (European Commission, 2007-2017). By the end of 2017, 53 infringement cases remained open against Bulgaria (European Commission, 2017)

Nonetheless, ever since its accession in 2007, Bulgaria has made significant improvements regarding its environmental performance. Even so, Bulgaria has come a long way from its pre-accession period to its present environmental situation. However, despite EU rules being at the center stage of Bulgarian legislation, their application in practice have often been lacking. Bulgaria is today in the process of joining the Schengen Area and has also expressed its wishes to join the Eurozone. Even though the Schengen Area and the Eurozone are not interdependently linked to environmental policies, bad rule implementation and corruption will always be brought up as a reason to oppose these wishes (Pop, 2013).

That said, the aim of my master thesis is to analyze the accession and post-accession experience of the Republic of Bulgaria in the context of the EU’s 5th enlargement in 2007. The intention of this exploratory study is to analyze the evolution over time in the levels of implementation of environmental laws in Bulgaria and to review the influence of the European Union in both the pre-accession and post-accession periods. My thesis seeks to fill a gap in the study of environmental rule implementation assessment in Bulgaria. I intend to fill this gap through a combination of desk research and by means of varied interviews and case studies. To do so, the thesis aims to answer the following research questions:

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- How has Bulgaria’s compliance with EU environmental regulation shifted from the

pre-accession to the post-pre-accession periods?

- To what extent and under what conditions has the EU shaped the environmental policy

field in Bulgaria?

- Which factors and actors have influenced compliance with EU environmental

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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL

FRAMEWORK

The accession of Bulgaria and Romania on the 1st_{of January 2007 marked the}

completion of what is known as the 5th_{enlargement of the EU. Because Bulgaria and Romania}

were insufficiently prepared to join the EU in 2004 with the other Central-Eastern European countries, the European Union delayed their accession. In the context of EU enlargement, member states are required to comply to EU laws, meaning to adhere to and institutionalize EU measures (Jacobson, Brown-Weiss, 1995). Unquestionably, the transposition of EU rules into the national legislation of member states has been at the heart of the European Union integration project (Böhler, 2012). However, studies by numerous scholars such as Knill and Tosun (2009), Schimmelfenning and Lavenex (2009), and other scholars have acknowledged that timely and effective transposition of EU policies has always been a struggle for member states.

Due to insufficient reforms, despite of already having delayed their accession from 2004 to 2007, numerous governing bodies such as the European Court of Auditors underlined that Bulgaria’s accession was premature and that the country was not prepared to join the EU (Gotev, 2016; ECA report, 2006). Indeed, after Bulgaria’s accession to the EU in 2007, additional measures were still required. Progress was still much needed in the fields of organized crime, judicial reform and corruption. Therefore, the Commission adopted the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) as a tool to monitor and assess progress in Bulgaria (European Commission, n.d). As assessed by the 2018 CVM report, Bulgaria has made progress over the years in this area, even though a lot more remains to be done (European Commission,2018). More precisely, in the field of environment, Bulgaria has made significant improvements in its performance since its accession in 2007. While the Bulgarian legislation reflects accurately the environmental requirements agreed at EU level, their implementation on the ground remains a challenge (Environmental Implementation Review, 2019). Nonetheless, more than a decade after joining the EU, Bulgaria still remains subject to special monitoring to bring the country into line with European norms.

In order to fully comprehend Bulgaria’s implementation of the environmental acquis, one must first elucidate the theoretical background and the concepts underlying this thesis

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research. In sequence, to answer my research questions, one must first understand the external governance of the EU, and by what means the effectiveness of external governance is assessed. It is then essential to clarify the theories behind compliance to EU laws, and how the lack of state capacity to implement rules is seen as one of the main factors to non-compliance. In the case of Bulgaria, conceptualizing the pre-accession and the post-accession periods is then necessary. Often, accession conditionality has been a driving force for rule implementation. Lastly, when researching on the environmental acquis, it is crucial to conceptualize environmental governance. The next section of my thesis, will review and theorize the available literature on this topic.

EXTERNAL GOVERNANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS

As defined by the Copenhagen criteria, the EU sets a number of democratic, economic, institutional, environmental, and political conditions for countries wanting to join the EU. Joining the EU is beneficial for the candidate country, but is also advantageous for the EU as a whole. During the enlargement process, the Commission helps candidate countries meet the necessary criteria’s to join the EU (Kratochvil, Tulmets, 2010). The acquis is the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU member states (European Commission, n.d). To join the EU, candidate countries have to accept the acquis and transpose these EU laws into their national legislation. Indeed, the external governance of the EU has mainly been the extension of the acquis to EU candidate countries. EU external governance varies across countries, regions and policy fields. There are also different modes of external governance that can be identified. According to Lavenex and Schimmefelning (2009) the three basic institutional forms of governance are : Hierarchy, Networks and Markets. Hierarchical governance “takes place in a formalized relationship of domination and subordination and is based on the production of collectively binding prescriptions and proscriptions” (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009 p. 797). This mode of governance demonstrates a top-down approach, where influence is exerted with asymmetrical manner. Network governance is another form of governance found in the EU. Much different than the hierarchical governance, in this instance, the EU does not coercively bind the other actors to measures without voluntary, mutual agreement. Lastly, market governance is the third basic mode of governance.

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In this mode, outcomes are the result of competition between formally autonomous actors. In market governance, cooperation is subject to negotiations, e.g. over mutual recognition of rules and standards.

In order to summarize these three modes of governance, the table above has been taken from page 9 of Kirsten Van Kaathoven’s (2013) thesis. This table sums up the theoretical framework behind the different modes of governance.

Throughout the 2000s, Bulgaria implemented numerous reforms with the intention of joining the European Union. Efforts such as fighting against political corruption and human trafficking and environmental reforms were made. The integration of Bulgaria meant that all EU rules and reforms directed by Brussels were supposed to be applied. However, in the aftermath of Bulgaria’s accession this was not the case (Dimitrova, 2010). During the enlargement process many post-communist/Eastern Europe states, such as Bulgaria, accepted EU laws without necessarily undertaking any behavioral changes. The European Commission post-accession report even criticized Bulgaria’s lack of progress in terms of reforms in the judiciary, which afterwards led to a freeze in funding (Dimitrova, Toshkov, 2009). Hence, there is a need to assess the effectiveness of the EU’s external governance. By effectiveness we mean the extent to which EU rules are effectively transferred. Assessing the effectiveness of EU governance has proven to be a challenge for scholars. The evaluation of effectiveness has

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often been inappropriately measured by the quantity of legislation put on the books, but not by the administrative steps taken to carry out EU rules. “Effectiveness can be measured as the levels of rule selection in international negotiations and agreements, rule adoption in domestic legislation and rule application in domestic political and administrative practice” (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009 p. 800). Rule selection is defined as the acceptance of the third country to use EU rules as the focus of their negotiations and agreements (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009 p. 800). Rule adoption refers to whether the EU rules that form the focus of negotiations and agreements are actually transposed into the domestic legislation of the third country, which is for instance indicated by ratification of EU agreements. However, particularly true in the field of environment, rule adoption does not necessarily mean that EU laws are applied. Rule application is defined as to what extent EU or joint rules are not only incorporated into domestic legislation but also acted upon in political and administrative practice is a separate question. Rule application constitutes the deepest impact of external governance (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009). Following the application of EU rules, in her thesis, Van Kaathoven (2013) introduces one deeper level to measure effectiveness. She defines this as goal attainment, meaning to what extent do EU measures attain their intended goal.

To summarize the measures of effectiveness of external governance, the table below has been taken from Lavenex and Schimmelfennig’s (2009, p. 801) literature to place the different rule processes in a simply more understandable format.

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When reviewing the effectiveness of the EU’s external governance, it is also essential to understand which conditions determine successful and effective EU external governance. According to the institutionalist explanation, external governance is often shaped by the EU institutions. Existing institutions may either serve as a template in a highly uncertain policy context or they may be imbued with high legitimacy. The effectiveness of external governance is considered to hinge on existing EU institutions. The general institutionalist hypothesis stipulates that effectiveness increases with the level of legitimacy. In sum, the institutionalist explanation insists on the fact that the mode and effectiveness of EU external governance depend on the quality of existing EU institutions but also on the specificity of the acquis in the policy field in question. This also means that, the less precise the acquis is in a policy area, the less likely the effectiveness of EU external governance will be. Conversely, the power-based explanation suggests that the effectiveness of external governance is determined by the EU’s power and its interdependence with regard to third countries as well as to competing ‘governance providers’ in its neighborhood and at the global level. The hierarchical mode of governance mentioned earlier requires third countries to be strongly dependent on the EU. In this perspective, power and interdependence also drive the effectiveness of external governance (Lavenex, Schimmelfennig, 2009 p. 803). Whether EU rules are selected for co-operation, and whether these rules will be adopted and applied, depends on the bargaining power of the EU. The third explanation, which will be predominantly used in this thesis, is the domestic structure explanation. According to this view, EU rules are more likely to be selected, adopted and applied if they resonate well with domestic rules, traditions, and practices. The more compatible domestic institutions are with EU governance, the greater incentive there will be comply to these policies (Börzel, Buzogany, 2018).

COMPLIANCE AND STATE CAPACITY

In the context of EU legislation, compliance is characterized by a multifaceted process often requiring a formal phase of rule adoption of the necessary national laws and regulations, the development of secondary rules interpreting and specifying the legislative framework, and conducting activities to ensure that the laws are truly implemented and applied (Toshkov, 2008). Scholars have advanced numerous divergent views concerning the reasons for

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non-compliance with EU laws. In their article Recalcitrance, Inefficiency, and Support for European

Integration: Why Member States Do (not) Comply with European Law, Börzel et al. (2007)

analyse the variables shaping compliance based on enforcement, management and legitimacy approaches. The enforcement approach emphasizes that states infringe international norms deliberately because they are not willing to bear the costs of compliance. On the other hand, the management approach, based mainly on capacity building, considers the lack of necessary sources to be the reason why states fail to comply. The third view links compliance with the degree to which a norm is internalized and accepted as a reference for proper behavior (Börzel et al. , 2007)

When studying compliance with EU environmental laws, and especially when focusing on the domestic structure explanation, it is essential to understand capacity building. State capacity has long been advanced as an explanation for non-compliance with international agreements. Skocpol (1985) defines state capacity as the ability of a government to administer its territory effectively, and as a result requiring resources. In their work entitled The New

Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (1997), Abram Chayes and

Antonia Handler Chayes, argue that there are a variety of reasons behind non-compliance of nation states (e.g. ambiguity of treaties, temporal dimension, capability). Based on the assumption that states act in good faith, they claim that often the problem lies in their lacking the resources to establish implementation mechanism rather than their willingness to do so. State capacity is often seen as a factor that explains the success and failure of accession countries in adopting and applying the acquis communautaire (Börzel, 2009). Often accession countries lack the capacities to adopt and enforce policies effectively. This is predominantly true with highly technical directives as those concerning the environment. In order to implement EU policies in the right manner, accession member state require financial resources to implement EU laws. Yet, even if a member state has financial resources this is not enough. A proper implementation process requires state actors to have qualified personnel, technical expertise on the practical application of the law and efficient national structures during the implementation process (Hille, Knill, 2006; Börzel, 2009).

Although state actors are important in regard to implementation, capacity of non-state actors is also an essential source. Often non-non-state actors like NGOs, lack the necessary capacities, such as personnel, money, and expertise in order to be an effective partner in

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policy implementation. When both state actors and non-state actors lack capacity, Börzel (2009) refers to this condition as a double weakness. Accession countries have often suffered from this double weakness of state actors and non-state actors capacities. Central Eastern-Europe and more generally new member states often have a considerably lower state capacity than Western Europe and “old” member states (Börzel, 2009).

Capacity-building by the EU in member states can be done through financial, legal, and political support. The intended goal is to support member states to adopt EU rules. Referring to the push and pull framework, the “pull” from domestic mobilization of non-state actors is often followed by a “push” from above by supranational institutions (Sotirov, Lovric, Winkel, 2015). To help countries implement the acquis, the EU has made significant efforts to assist in strengthening the governance capacities of accession countries. “The transfer of money and expertise through Community programs and twinning processes provides state as well as non-state actors with additional resources that they can exchange” (Börzel,2009 p. 25). Indeed, EU influence mechanisms, based on social learning and on financial assistance can help address the capacity building issue and therefore fill the state capacity gap (Schimmelfennig, Trauner, 2009). Looking at the capacity of firms, states, civil society and business to comply to environmental EU rules in Bulgaria seems like a much required step to understand the reasons behind EU environmental law implementation.

PRE AND POST-ACCESSION COMPLIANCE WITH EU LAW

The European Union accession process has often been seen as being an indispensable force in promoting democratic forms of governance, improving administration, decreasing corruption and many other factors. Without a doubt, the conditional motivation of joining the EU has been one of the key factors in making member state comply with EU laws (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004). The conditionality of joining the EU is an effective way to influence policy change in candidate countries. EU conditionality for candidate countries fostered compliance, and the incentive for EU accession often out weighted the adjustment costs (Grabbe, 2006; Vachudova, 2005). Numerous scholars explain the effects of conditionality by suggesting that governments would adopt EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs. According to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier

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(2004) conditionality can be defined as a “bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions” (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2004 p. 662). These authors believe that the cost-benefit balance of EU conditionality can be measured in relation to four factors: The presence or absence of credible EU membership incentives, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, the domestic political costs of adoption for member states. Pre-accession compliance literature signaled that the EU was able to overcome potential domestic opposition in the candidate countries through the bargaining power stemming from the high attractiveness EU membership (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2008). “In the absence of high conditional external benefits, domestic structures such as adoption costs, veto players, and resonance, which were put a side in the conditionality context, will again have a causal impact” (Schimmelfenig, Sedelmeier, 2008, p. 95) . The motivation of membership has indeed pushed EU candidate countries to comply with EU demands, especially in areas that were subject of accession conditionality but have no basis in EU law as it is for example the case with corruption (Sedelmeier, Lacatus, 2019). The sanctions available to EU institutions are much weaker than the threat of withholding membership during the pre-accession phase (Sedelmeier, 2014; Dimitrova, 2010). Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2007) push even further the limits of conditionality. Through data analysis, they find tendencies for candidate countries to defect if the final date of accession has been decided. The announcement of the accession date has a tendency to slow down the reforms taken in view of accession, meaning a substantial reduction in condition, thus a decline of the effectiveness of conditionality. The finding that conditionality as an external incentive is the key mechanism that leads to EU rule adoption by the candidate countries leads to question post-accession compliance (Dimitrova, Steunenberg, 2007). With this way of thought, accession poses an obstacle to the process of compliance. After accession and thus the absence of the conditionality incentive, one could anticipate compliance to suffer and a backsliding effect to emerge. As the incentives and sanctions fade away, this increases the likelihood of non-compliance with EU rules (Sedelmeier, 2008). Therefore we question whether the new member states of the European Union (EU) comply with EU law even after they have obtained membership.

Nonetheless, most data on infringements of EU laws illustrate that new EU members tend to do better than anticipated on post-accession compliance. During the beginning of

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membership, new member states perform substantially better than the old member states (Sedelmeier, 2008). However this data does not illustrate the full story. Taking a more pessimistic point of view, the relevance of this data may be questioned since the source of detecting infringements could be less developed in the new members than in the old members (Sedelmeier, 2008). An important proportion of the infringements that the Commission investigates comes from complaints by private individuals, firms and NGOs. However as illustrated by Börzel (2006) in Participation Through Law Enforcement : The Case of the

European Union, the importance and the power of these complaints are much lower in new

member states. This suggests that fewer cases of non-compliance will be notified by collective actors (Grabbe, 2001).

Furthermore, many rules have only been formally transposed (“rule adoption”) but are not fully implemented. One set of dynamics contributing to policy failure concerns uninformed, incomplete or inappropriate transfers (Dolowitz, Marsh, 2000). Hence, as clarified earlier, compliance with EU laws comprises an important distinction between rule adoption and rule application. The differences between these two concepts are also captured in the distinction between formal compliance or the formal adoption of rules and behavioral compliance or behavioral rule adoption (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2005). “Many EU rules have only been formally transposed into national legislation but are not fully or reliably implemented” (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2005, p.226). Indeed, there is an important research gap when it comes to assessing the implementation of EU rules. Scholars have produced a wide range of research on environmental rule adoption. However, assessing the application in practice of these EU laws has been under-explored. In the environmental field, even though the formal environmental EU acquis might seem to be transposed, the enforcement and the actual application often lags behind in a number of policy areas. Referring back to capacity building, when the state is too weak to support and implement EU rules, these are likely to remain “dead letters” meaning that formal rules, even though transposed into national law do not get implemented in practice (Falkner, Treib, 2008). Adding to that, Orru and Rosthein (2015) conclude in their research on the Water Directive in Estonia and Lithuania that states comply with rules that are supervised by the EU. They tend to disregard unsupervised rules that require supplementary action by the member state. Thus, Orru and Rosthein demonstrate that although rule compliance has been strengthened by the

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EU, defection practices have not been overcome. Goetz (2005, p. 276) questions not only the capacity on the part of the new member states to ensure compliance, but also their willingness to do so.

On the other hand, this mainly pessimistic point of view needs to be nuanced. Schimmelfennig and Trauner (2009) elaborate four key reasons that may contribute to explaining why compliance will still be strong after membership. First of all, post-accession conditionality can be found in other areas such as monetary policy or movement of persons. Applied to Bulgaria, this arguments very much holds, as the country is still trying to enter the Schengen area and the Eurozone. Second, conditionality may be replaced by alternative incentives and the EU has other tools to ensure that states comply. After accession, the European Union can monitor and sanction non-compliance by member states. The EU has at its disposal a variety of sanctions such as infringement procedures. Third, external incentives may be replaced by alternative external influences such as financial and technical support and social learning. Lastly, the reversal of externally induced rules might not seem like a possible option if conditionality has prompted institutional changes, as a result of which a reversal would be more complicated and costly.

Nevertheless, there is undoubtedly evidence of an important correlation between the pre-accession and the post-accession periods. Successful pre-accession compliance often leads to successful post-accession compliance. Schimmefelning and Trauner (2009) elucidate the struggles to improve administrative structures post-accession, if they were not successfully put in place during the accession process. Indeed, for a good transposition of EU rules, there is a need for good administrative capacity, and this administrative capacity has a lot to do with the administrative structures put in place during the accession process (Maniokas, 2009). Following this same line of thought, Dimitrova and Toshkov (2009) conclude in their article that a good administrative capacity in the sense of good co-ordination of EU policy making is necessary from the accession period and if so will continue with post-accession compliance. However, they specify that although good coordination of EU policy is necessary, it is not sufficient for good transposition. They do not neglect other factors such as the domestic adjustment costs, norm resonance, political salience, and the orientation of domestic veto-players and NGOs. Domestic actors often use EU rules to improve policy procedures and thus promote better governance in the country (Dimitrova, Buzogany, 2014).

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Indeed, domestic factors should not be neglected as one of the major influencers on EU impact (Vachudova, 2009). Adding to that, in his article Is Europeanisation through Conditionality

Sustainable? Lock-in of Institutional Change after EU Accession, Sedelmeier (2012) shows that

although accession changes the incentive for compliance, if EU laws are locked-in through institutional change, meaning they are fully implemented and applied or institutionalized in a member state, then they are less likely to be dismantled after accession to the EU. He states that “It makes a crucial diﬀerence for post-accession compliance whether conditionality was eﬀective in generating pre-accession institutional change” (Sedelmeier, 2012, p. 36)

As defined by the Council of Europe in 1999 , “corruption means requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or behavior required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof “ (1999: ch.1 art.2). Indeed, this broad definition reflects the negative influence corruption has on EU laws. With regard to the transposition of EU laws, corruption has been one of the main factors in several areas where compliance has been limited to rule adoption without leading to rule application (Trauner, 2009). Corruption is one of the major causes of non-compliance with environmental laws in member states (Börzel, Buzogany, 2018). When looking at accession and post-accession compliance with EU laws, Vachudova and Spendzharova (2012) take a similar approach to that of Sedelmeier (2012) but concentrating on corruption. They illustrate that accession in the case of corruption does not have a back-sliding effect but they emphasize that the issue is more whether the changes were applied successfully at the time of accession. In the case of Bulgaria, the EU failed to sufficiently address the issue of corruption before membership was granted. Bulgaria has often been criticized for lacking the institutional capacity to implement the EU acquis, due to the highest level of corruption in the EU. Tanasoiu (2012) believes that Bulgaria and Romania cannot even be considered as completely fulfilling the criteria for EU membership. He believes that these countries are incapable of adopting and implementing EU rules due to the lack of progress in fighting corruption.

When Bulgaria alongside Romania joined the EU, progress in certain areas, especially in the elimination of corruption was still needed (Tulmets, 2009). While a number of member states have corruption problems, failing to combat corruption prior to accession was one of the biggest doubts and worries about Bulgaria’s entry in the EU. Even though Bulgaria was

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granted entry, the European Union tried to preserve some post-accession influence on this salient issue by creating the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (Sedelmeier, Lacatus, 2017). The CVM is a framework for monitoring improvement in the area of corruption, but in theory is not a means to enforce compliance. Nonetheless, the EU has used both negative and positive incentives to promote institutional reforms in corruption (Vachudova, Spendzharova, 2012). Negative incentives when high corruption levels may be sanctioned through different ways. The Commission may apply safeguard measures based on articles 37 and 38 of the Act of Accession. Furthermore, the Commission can withhold funding as a sanction for non-compliance, so that, high corruption levels may result in the exclusion of these states from further integration projects (Vachudova, Spendzharova, 2012). Positive incentives can be provided through funding and benchmarking. It is through “twinning” that member states, help candidate countries or newly member states adapt to the institutional norms required in the EU. As stated by Sabel and Zeitlin (2008, p. 321), “Although the new procedures tied twinning projects more ﬁrmly to the EU’s accession requirements, they also gave candidate countries considerable leeway in the selection of cooperation partners and administrative/institutional models to adapt to their own national context”. In their article entitled International Integration and National Corruption, Sandholtz & Gray (2003) examine the link between corruption levels and the international organization accession process. They conclude that the more a nation is involved in an international organization, the less corrupt it should be. Hence, Sandholtz and Gray (2003) argue that international organizations such as the EU bring transparency to their members. Indeed, EU leverage and domestic incentives are two factors that can influence Bulgaria’s government to pursue corruption reforms and thus play a key role in better implementation of EU laws (Ristei, 2010 ; Vachudova, Spendzharova, 2012). When these two variables are aligned, corruption control is more likely to occur. In other words, “EU incentives are powerful when they are mirrored by domestic incentives related to winning elections and holding power, but if domestic incentives run counter to the EU ones, our model predicts stagnation or even backsliding” (Vachudova, Spendzharova, 2012 p. 46).

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ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

Environmental governance is one of the EU’s most established area of competence, which over the last three decades has covered an ever greater number of topics and policy areas related to the environment (Futo, Fleischer, 2003). Indeed, the Union has had transformative power regarding environmental governance. Member states when joining the EU, are obliged to adopt over 450 pieces of environmental regulations (Börzel, 2009). Referred to as Europeanization (Jordan, Liefferink, 2004), this process of adapting domestic policies to the EU rules remains complicated for new entering member states.

Today, without a doubt, the EU is a key driver of environmental policy in Europe (Von Homeyer, 2009). Environmental governance should be understood as the institutionalization of social coordination by which state and non-state actors pursue to implement collectively binding laws aimed at protecting the environment (Börzel, 2015). The EU’s numerous environmental policies and legislation strive to ensure air quality, waste management, clean water, protection of habitats and many others (European Commission, 2019). European governance has witnessed dramatic changes in recent decades. Von Holmeyer, in The

Evolution of EU Environmental Governance (2009) argues that environmental governance can

be seen today as a fusion of four important environmental governance regimes that have succeeded each other over the years. The beginning of European governance in this field dates back to the beginning of the 1970s with the environment regime. During this regime the main challenges of environmental governance focused on human health and the environment. The rise of environmental governance during this period contributed to a politicization of environmental policy in some member states, even though adoption measures were still flexible. The environmental regime relies mostly on legally binding, top-down regulation (Von Homeyer, 2009).

Second, the internal market regime beginning in the early 1980s focused more precisely as its name implies on the pursuit of environmental policy in the internal market. As stated by Von Homeyer (2004) “the environmental legislation in question simultaneously pursues the goals of creating the internal market and of securing a high level of environmental protection” (Von Homeyer, 2004 p. 58). This regime reflects the development of good coordination and harmonization measures in European environmental policy. The EU has

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been very rigorous in making sure that enlargement will not weaken the internal environmental market. Over the years it has become clear that EU enlargement can pose a challenge for the European Union in terms of environmental policy (Von Homeyer, 2004). The EU applies mandatory standards on all EU member states therefore striving to avoid any economic disadvantage between countries that would engender higher spending for environmental protection measures and therefore saving money in the long run (Heritier, Knill, Mingers, 1996).

Next, came the integration regime. This regime mainly focused on issues of effectiveness of environmental measures during enlargement. It contributed to the prevalence of more inclusive policy networks because it drew attention to the variation in policies in different countries (Von Homeyer, 2009). Indeed, it underlined the need of national regulations and the necessity to cooperate on environmental regulatory measures at the EU level. Furthermore, the cost and administrative difficulties of implementing EU environmental policy came to the fore.

The final and most and recent regime is the sustainable development regime. Even though similar to the integration regime, measures in the sustainable development regime tend to be vague as they are often more long-term. In this regime, measures focus on tenacious environmental issues that have been present for years such as climate change and water quality (Von Homeyer, 2009). The sustainable development regime is critical in terms of rule implementation, requiring the formulation of concrete targets, justification of measures, action plans etc. (Von Homeyer, 2009).

The study of these four EU environmental regimes illustrates that environmental governance has developed over the years and the EU has become one of the world’s highest environmental standards setters (European Commission, 2019). Nonetheless, many different factors such as economic conditions and international political developments can have an important effect on environmental governance. Major changes in the EU polity and more particularly EU enlargement, constitute one of the many major factors impacting EU environmental governance (Von Homeyer, 2009). The environmental problems of Eastern European countries represented a greater challenge to the EU than in previous waves of accession (Futo, Fleischer, 2003). The implementation of the EU environmental acquis during the process of accession required costly administrative restructuring and technical capacity

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building (Von Homeyer, 2004). In environmental protection, the greatest task is the application of the law, and not solely rule adoption (Futo, Fleischer, 2003). To ensure environmental rule compliance, the EU monitors member states through inspection and examination of complaints therefore making sure rules are fully implemented. In case of non-compliance the EU can enforce rule observance, through sanctions going as far as infringement procedures (European Commission Environment, n.d). Adding to that, Futo and Fleischer (2003) believe that “To ensure that rules of law do not remain simply written requirements, the institutional capacity and organizational culture needs to be developed” (Futo, Fleischer, 2003 p. 16).

As seen with the different modes of external governance, network governance is a non-hierarchical mode of coordination, involving the involvement of both state and non-state actors. Krizsan (2009) argues that one of the major factors in rule adoption in the EU is civil society: NGOs and local actors. Environmental governance is no exception and is one particular policy field where civil society is even more crucial. The interest and ideological orientations of numerous non-state actors, such as environmental NGOs and business associations, can have a strong impact on EU environmental governance (Von Homeyer, 2004). With regard to the compliance to environmental EU policies, non-state actors according to Koutalakis (2004) may through various pressure activities alter the initial cost-benefit calculation of compliance. At the same time, they also contribute to essential information to the EU system of monitoring and enforcement regarding gaps in the application of these laws at the national level (Koutalakis, 2004). However, problems in environmental governance are often attributed to a weak civil society in new member states (Koutalakis, 2004). Adding to that, Howard (2002) observes that studies have shown that civil society and non-state actors are much weaker in post-communist countries than they are from other types of political regimes. Indeed, according to him, the legacy of post-communism still has an influence on the involvement of civil society. This has therefore been an issue, as the interests of non-state actors such as business associations and NGOs can have a strong impact on the orientation of environmental governance, and in making sure laws are applied in a member state (Von Homeyer, 2004).

New member state have often had limited institutional, financial and human capacity to effectively change, monitor, and enforce environmental regulation (Von Homeyer, Carius,

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Bär, 2000). The environmental acquis is considered as one of the costliest areas of EU implementation, and member states governments often underestimate the implementation costs when they agree to environmental legislation at the EU level (Keulartz, Leistra, 2008). As a result, the implementation of the EU environmental acquis is particularly difficult. This acquis requires a response from the EU with for example funding towards the strengthening of civil societal input in the policy process (Toshkov, 2008). In sum, the lack of resources, moreover, the deficiencies of political culture and of environmental awareness are obstacles to EU environmental policies enforcement (Futo, Fleischer, 2003). Despite the efforts made in recent years by the Republic of Bulgaria to implement the EU legislative framework on environment, the country is still viewed as lagging behind (Environmental Implementation Review, 2017, 2019).

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CHAPTER 2: DATA AND METHODOLOGY

My study focuses on Bulgaria’s pre-accession and post-accession performance in the EU in terms of applying the environmental acquis. I have selected Bulgaria as my focus point, due to the fact that the country’s lengthy and complicated accession to the EU makes this an intriguing case to explore. Additionally, being of Bulgarian origin from my mother side, I have always been particularly fascinated by researching on Bulgaria’s accession in the EU. Leaving aside my personal reasons, the accession of Bulgaria into the European Union offers noteworthy theoretical and empirical insights into the way in which the EU has installed and realized its enlargement strategies. Partially due to its relatively more recent accession process, Bulgaria has been researched to a lesser degree than other Central Eastern European member states. The Bulgarian case provides useful conceptual insight into the transformative power of the EU in Eastern Europe. Moreover, environmental policy has been selected, as it is one key area where the acquis has been above all complicated to be adopted and even more so to be applied. Finally, examining the post-accession period in relation to the pre-accession period, leads to a more profound understanding of the factors and mechanisms that have influenced change in the country.

In order to answer my research questions, my thesis follows a qualitative research design as the main method of analysis. My qualitative research has been based on desk research and articles focusing on EU rule compliance in the field of environment. They will provide me with theory and analysis on Bulgaria’s compliance to EU laws. Insights from Bulgarian academia will also be used to analyze the national environmental policy development in the country. Therefore, my main source will be a document analysis based on book chapters and journal articles on environmental regulation in the EU and in Bulgaria. Using these sources of information, I will be able to develop an in depth-analysis of the environmental situation in Bulgaria.

In order to assess Bulgaria’s performance in the implementation of EU environmental policies I will gather statistical data. This data has been obtained from official website of the European Union such as Eurostat and the European Commission’s Single Market Scoreboard. Since corruption plays an important role in the implementation of the EU acquis, levels of

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corruption in Bulgaria will be gathered through the annual EU CVM reports and the Corruption Perception Index. Furthermore, NGOs and Think Tanks such as the Center for European Reform, the Association of Parks in Bulgaria or the Bulgarian Society for the Protection of Birds will also provide me with data. Through these sources I have been able to obtain data and reports evaluating environmental quality in Bulgaria as well as to assess non-compliance to EU environmental rules. In addition, I will also use official national documents published online by the Ministry of Environment and Water of Bulgaria. The European Commission’s annual accession reports will also serve as basis for reviewing Bulgaria’s environmental progress over the years.

However in order to fully answer my research questions, I also conducted a few semi-structured interviews (using a mixture of pre-planned and unsemi-structured questions to the interviewees). These in-depth interviews were conducted with members of the Association of Parks in Bulgaria, a member of the Bulgarian Green Party, a staff member at the Ministry of Environment and Water, and an academic scholar. These interviews offer complementary insights to the findings from my desk-research analysis. Through these interviewees I have been able to gather data and points of view that I would not be able to obtain through books. In so doing, my interviewees also validated and completed many of the results found from my desk research. Elite interviews are a logical way to gain a better understanding of what is happening at a local level and perceive how highly ranked actors and scholars may feel about the environmental situation in Bulgaria.

Furthermore, in order to illustrate some of the main theories and findings, the final part of my thesis involves two more detailed case studies. Indeed, political science often focuses on case-oriented approaches in order to obtain a rich description of a few instances of a certain phenomenon (Della Porta, 2008). Undeniably, case studies can serve as a factual example and can be beneficial to avoid basing a research paper solely on theory. Flyvbjerg defines case study as “An intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment” (Flyvberg, 2011 p. 301). Nonetheless, Flyvbjerg in Five Misunderstanding About Case Study Research (2006) recognizes that one cannot generalize from a single case (in this thesis two cases). He adds that, theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical knowledge. Thus, the findings produced from case study can have signifying importance, but then again, should not be seen as a

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representation of a general trend. Nevertheless, I believe through case studies I will be able to exemplify some of the main theories and findings analyzed in the chapters preceding the case studies. I have decided to focus on two case studies regarding the application of the Natura 2000 Directive in Bulgaria. The first case study will be an analysis of the protected territories of the Kavarna region, while the second case study will be on the National Park of Pirin and the construction of the Bansko ski resort. These case studies have been chosen as they are two of the most striking cases of environmental issues since Bulgaria’s accession to the EU. They have also been chosen taking into consideration the available data. Bulgarian news articles and data provided by ENGOs will be the main source of information in order to obtain the necessary material for the realization of these case studies.

During the course of my thesis, process tracing will be the principle method used. Process tracing is a qualitative method of analysis, that can provide significant contributions to assessing prior explanatory findings. Indeed, over time, numerous different mechanisms have been focal factors behind complicated environmental rule adoption in Bulgaria. Nonetheless, these causal mechanisms are often inter-connected and process tracing is a judicious way to comprehend their interdependence. As stated by Jeffrey Checkel (2006) “process tracing provides the how-we-come-to-know nuts and bolts for mechanism based accounts of social change. But it also directs one to trace the process in a very speciﬁc, theoretically informed way” (Checkel, 2006, p. 363). Process tracing will also be used to look for a series of intermediate steps in EU environmental policy implementation in Bulgaria. Consequently, my more historical chapter on Bulgaria’s accession in the EU is in alignment with the use of process tracing. Adding to that, one of the most valuable pluses of process tracing is that it places theory and data in close proximity (Checkel, 2006). Therefore, I will use the literature on Bulgaria’s accession and compare it to the findings of the data gathered. Through process tracing, by means of graphical representation, I also plan to illustrate the overall evolution of EU policies in Bulgaria. By doing so, I will be able to show how policies have changed over time, as well as to evaluate how EU environmental policy implementation has evolved from the pre-accession to the post-accession periods.

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CHAPTER 3: THE ACCESSION PROCESS IN BULGARIA

The following chapter turns back the clock and presents Bulgaria’s historical road to EU accession. In order to fully research Bulgaria’s implementation of the EU environmental acquis, it is necessary to study its lengthy and challenging integration in the EU. Bulgaria’s pre-accession and post-pre-accession troubles can clarify some of the reasons behind the difficulties of EU environmental rule implementation in the country.

BULGARIA’S PRE-ACCESSION HISTORY

After several decades of communist dictatorship, notably more than 30 years under communist dictator Todor Zhivkov and a rather difficult transition to democracy, Bulgaria decided to push towards membership of one of the most important and affluent international organizations: the European Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the change of political regime, Bulgaria continuously moved towards rapprochement with the EU (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). Bulgaria’s history with the EU has been a lengthy and intriguing story (Papadimitriou, 2002). In 1992, Bulgaria began negotiation talks with the EU. From the early 1990s, Bulgaria was included in almost all programs developed by the European institutions in order to boost democracy reforms in the country. Likewise, it is also during this period that the EU became Bulgaria’s leading trading partner, shifting away from Russia. This turn towards the EU in terms of international trades was notably seen when Bulgaria joined the Central European Free Trade Agreement in 1999. According to the IMF’s Bulgaria Country Report, in 1999, 54% of total exports were oriented towards the EU, while this number was at a low 24% in 1991. Main EU trading partners became member states such as Germany, Greece, and Italy (IMF, 1999). In 1995, Jean Videnov, then Prime Minister of Bulgaria, officially submitted his country's candidature to the European Union. In 1999 the European Council, meeting in Helsinki, adopted a decision of pivotal meaning for the future of Bulgaria by accepting the country's request for accession to the European Union (Grabbe, 2001). Hence, the country concluded a partnership for accession with the European Union. This partnership enumerated the priorities that the Republic of Bulgaria would have to respect in order to join the EU. Moreover, it correspondingly specified a financial program of assistance for accession by the

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EU. In other words, the 1999 European Council officially decided that Bulgaria had become a candidate country to join the European Union (European Parliament, 1999)

With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the beginning of the 1990s gave new opportunities to the European Union and their enlargement plans. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the Eastern European countries have always embodied an essential political priority for the EU. Eastern enlargement contributed to “the formation of a role of the EU in the promotion and defense of human rights and fundamental democratic principles” (Sedelmeier, 2003, p. 2). For Bulgaria, joining the EU brought economic advantages. As stated by Bojkov (2004) joining the EU “increases the prospects of economic development by making the countries attractive for foreign investments” (Bojkov, 2004 p. 511). It was thus largely reasonable for Bulgaria to give up elements of its national sovereignty in order to pursue its wishes to join the EU.

At the time when Bulgaria was invited to start accession talks in Helsinki in 1999, the country had to face the increasingly strict conditions set by the Copenhagen European Council as necessary requirements for EU entry (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011). Some of the main criteria’s were the democratic principles of state institutions, respect for minority rights, the respect for human rights, and the building of a functioning market economy (European Commission, 1999). Although Bulgaria had emerged as an independent state a century ago after its revolution against the Ottoman empire, the country had experienced very few periods of democracy. From the time when Bulgaria expressed its wishes to join the European Union, a transition towards democracy and towards a market economy were the most difficult criteria to implement for the country. In 2002 the Commission’s regular report revealed that Bulgaria was making progress in terms of being able to integrate the single market economy, but more reforms were still needed specifically in terms of human rights and corruption (European Commission, 2002). The prospect of joining the EU had become the most effective driving force for accelerating reforms the country urgently needed. Even though developing a market economy was one of the key issues to become a fully-fledged member state, Bulgaria urgently needed to implement reforms in three other critical areas: public administration, the judiciary, and the fight against corruption.

To say the least, the process of full accession of Bulgaria to the EU encountered many difficulties in implementing and transposing European legislation into national legislation

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(Mungiu-Pippidi,2011). This was the case due to the lack of administrative capacity at different levels of public administration. In addition, shortcomings in judicial reforms, especially in terms of corruption made Bulgaria’s pre-accession period even more complicated. The high level of corruption in the public and the private sector prior to accession was one of the most concerning issue for the EU. During Bulgaria’s accession, the EU decided to use conditionality as an incentive for Bulgaria to pursue its reforms. This is precisely what the EU sought to ensure during the pre-accession period in Bulgaria, and was further strongly illustrated afterwards by the country’s delayed accession. Putting in place conditions for membership was the main tool of the EU’s leverage in inﬂuencing political processes and state institutions in Bulgaria (Vachudova, 2005)

The weaknesses identified in the Bulgarian institutional system delayed the country’s accession to the EU. The situation of Bulgaria required later on the implementation of corrective measures by the European Commission such as the Cooperation Verification Mechanism (CVM). This was not about fulfilling the obligations stemming from membership, meaning accepting the acquis, but more the issue of full implementation and respect of the EU acquis and the adoption of the rules established through Treaties. Bulgaria had no issue about adopting the EU acquis, but applying or even more attaining the goals of these EU rules were the main concern as the accession process progressed. The reform of the justice system was one of the most critical areas of Bulgarian EU membership, identified by the Accession Treaty. Throughout the period of preparation, Bulgaria carried out a large-scale of reform agenda, mainly through the direct incorporation of the acquis communautaire in the national legal system, but also through the adoption of new legislation based on EU principles in areas that were not explicitly part of the acquis communautaire. But as deep and revolutionary as they may have been, from the beginning of the accession negotiations until the date of accession, the reforms were either insufficient or were not at all implemented. Even though not precisely part of the Copenhagen Criteria, in 1995, the Madrid European Council stressed the importance for candidate countries to possess the administrative capacity in order to apply EU rules (Madrid European Council, 1995). Structural problems in the Bulgarian administration had beyond doubt been a problem in rule implementation during the pre-accession phase that persisted to the post-pre-accession period. EU rules and projects are highly

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dependent on the professional training and national capacity of the experts and the willingness of the host administrations to cooperate and ensure follow-up.

BULGARIA’S DELAYED ACCESSION

In 2004, referred to as the “big bang” enlargement, the EU accepted the admission of ten new member states at once. Bulgaria alongside Romania were left out of this enlargement. The Copenhagen European Council (December 2002) decided that Bulgaria and Romania would not be part of the first wave of enlargement as it estimated these two countries were not ready. Bulgaria’s wishes to join the EU with the other “big bang” countries were not realized due to unfinished economic, administrative and judicial reforms. Accession of Bulgaria and Romania was postponed compared to other Central Eastern European countries due to insufficient administrative and judicial capacities and broader fears about their ability to implement EU laws. Nonetheless, Bulgaria received confirmation at this same Copenhagen European Council that it would be able to join the EU in 2007 if it continued a set of political and economic reforms. The purpose of Bulgaria’s exclusion was to push the country towards further impactful reforms especially in the field of corruption (Tanasoiu, Racovita, 2012). Certainly, a three year delay (from 2004 to 2007) did not make an enormous difference in terms of reforms, as it represented a relatively short period of time. However, it served as an instrument of the European Union’s conditionality. By delaying Bulgaria’s accession, the EU intended to make the country push towards harder reforms. Positively, over this time period reforms were made, but much more was needed in order to fulfill all the conditions for accession. As mentioned previously, according to Tanasoiu (2012) at the time of accession Bulgaria was not ready to join the EU. He also largely points out that as membership was an ultimate reward, which limited the EU’s ability to inﬂuence on reforms in Bulgaria.

Without a doubt, Bulgaria’s troublesome pre-accession experience illustrates that the country’s problem in terms of applying EU rules date back to the beginning of its aspirations to join the Union and were not an issue of which the EU was unaware when it granted membership.

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BULGARIA’S ACCESSION TO THE EU

Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union together on January 1st, 2007. In spite of numerous discussions on the EU’s lacking the absorptive capacity and a mounting enlargement fatigue, Bulgaria joined the EU on the scheduled date. However, the risk of postponing accession by one year, meaning the 1st_{of January 2008 instead of the 1}st_{of January}

2007 was on the EU agenda until the last few months, as the European institutions and the member states were not convinced of the practicability of the Bulgarian judiciary and its capability to comply to EU rules. Brussels decided to accept Bulgaria’s membership and to avoid further extending the accession date as it believed this could further damage and even undermine the country’s wishes to join the EU. The EU assumed that membership could act as a motivating incentive for the country to continue on the right track towards its reforms (The Economist, 2008).

Nonetheless, even when joining the EU, Bulgaria was looked upon as a laggard of the Eastern Enlargement (Dimitrov, Stoychev, 2016). Numerous scholars have emphasized that the country was unready for membership (Grabbe, 2014). The EU was for the most part worried about the persistence of severe problems with corruption in Bulgaria (Sedelmeier, Lacatus, 2019). For that reason, the EU tried to preserve some post-accession influence and the decision was taken that strict regulations after Bulgaria’s accession would be applied by the EU that had never been done before. Following the accession in 2007, due to certain weaknesses in the judicial system and the fight against corruption, the Commission took “safeguard measures” and preserved the right to verify Bulgaria’s progress on a regular basis (European Commission, 2014). Indeed, as stated by Trauner (2009) in his paper Post-accession

compliance with EU law in Bulgaria and Romania: a comparative perspective, “The extension

of EU conditionality to the post-accession stage was an unusual procedure; It marked the final point of a pre-accession process in which EU officials frequently complained that there would be a strong discrepancy between rhetoric and action over EU conditionality issues” (Trauner, 2009, p. 2). By using the CVM as a naming and shaming tool, the European Union was able to continue to employ pressure on Bulgaria (Trauner, 2009). Many scholars and experts pointed to Bulgaria’s lack of dedication in the fight against corruption as well as its relatively weak institutions (Noutcheva, Bechev, 2008). The post-2007 Commission country reports

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repeatedly emphasized the shortcomings in addressing systemic corruption, but also the lack of administrative capacities and non-transparency in dealing with EU funds (Tanasoiu, Racovita, 2012). As a matter of fact, the 2008 CVM report showed hardening of the EU's approach to Bulgaria, mainly due to the existing difficulties of the Bulgarian authorities in the fight against corruption. As a result, the 2008 CVM report is seen as a reference point in relation to the EU fight against corruption in Bulgaria. The consequences were that 520 million euros of accession funds were frozen (BBC News,2008). This served as a reaction by the EU to Bulgaria’s alleged failure to combat corruption, organized crime and misuse of EU funds (Alber&Geiger, n.d). Undeniably, political corruption is a serious problem that can undermine state institutions and impede economic development of a country (Trauner, 2009). There has been serious concern about the way in which corruption has permeated public life, undermining the credibility of the State, preventing the impact of public policies and limiting economic opportunities.

Without a doubt the safeguard measures put on the Bulgarian justice system with the CVM were needed. When questioning my interviewees on their opinion vis-à-vis the CVM, all of them expressed a positive opinion on its influence. At the same time, however, they also believe that much more is still needed in order to reduce corruption levels in the country. Indeed, the CVM has supported the creation of stronger institutions, and has served as a constraint on derailing the fight against corruption (Sedelmeir, Lacatus, 2019). Nonetheless, analysis by scholars such as Ganev (2012) in Post-accession Hooliganism - Democratic

Governance in Bulgaria and Romania after 2007, have shown that even though the CVM was

indispensable, its success so far has been insufficient. One must not forget that the CVM is essentially a monitoring instrument, and is not truly a tool to enforce rule compliance. Gateva (2013) insists on the fact that the CVM has no sanctioning ability, therefore lacking enforcement power. According to the Corruption Perception Index of 2018 produced by Transparency International, using a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean. Bulgaria scores 42/100 and is at the moment the most corrupt country in the EU (Transparency International, 2018). Truly, corruption has remained even after accession a major problem in Bulgarian state institutions and a serious challenge to the democratic principles of justice, equality and legality. It is definitely an obstacle to the economic development of the country and to EU rule application. Therefore, the country needs a strong