January
2017
Threatening democracy
in the name of the
demos?
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POPULISM’S POTENTIAL THREAT
TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC,
AUSTRIA AND DENMARK
NADIM EL HELW
Master Thesis Political Science
International Relations
University of Amsterdam
Supervisor:
Dr. Annette Freyberg-Inan
Second reader:
Dr. Marcel Maussen
1
Table of contents
1. Introduction 2
2. Theory 6
3. Are populists in Hungary and the Czech Republic 15 more illiberal than populists in Denmark and Austria?
4. Party system instability and prospects for populist parties 30 5. Constitutional rigidity, mass democratic culture and barriers 43
to implementation of populist erosion
6. Conclusion and discussion 55
2
1. Introduction
Today’s world is increasingly shaped by the complexity that emanates from the processes of globalisation. With progress in science and technology, instantaneous communication has become not just feasible but a daily reality, transportation is increasingly fast and cheap, and physical distance forms less and less of a barrier to trade and communication. While our knowledge about the world is constantly increasing, however, the increasing complexity of societies has coincided with the disappearance of old certainties, and while globalisation promised peace and prosperity, its impact on environments and societies has invited strong and diverse reactions. These range from critical embracement to total rejection, including calls for everything from cosmopolitanism and socialism to a reinvigoration of nation-state and religious identities (Worth, 2013; El-Ojeili & Hayden, 2006). Owing to the vast diversity of criticisms and resistances, it can be difficult to identify common factors in these reactions. However, populism may be a feature common to a broad array of them, whereby some reference is made to a moral division in society among good people and bad elites (Mudde, 2004). This theme can be found in both left-wing and right-wing reactions, with broad variation as to who exactly belong to these separate categories, and how the people should be emancipated from the elite.
The emergence of populism as a relevant political phenomenon in a broad range of cases in (especially) the Western world has been linked with the idea of the emergence of a new societal cleavage dividing the winners and losers of globalisation, allowing political actors to mobilise on the basis of this new cleavage (Kriesi et al., 2006). While talk of a populist zeitgeist has been widespread for years (Mudde, 2004), the year 2016 has especially shown just how relevant a political
phenomenon this has become, especially with the United Kingdom voting to leave the EU and the election of Donald Trump to the office of President of the United States, contrary to widely held expectations that these outcomes were highly unlikely, and in defiance of the political mainstream in both countries.
These events have shocked many, and fears abound about populists’ potential impact on liberal democracies among those who consider themselves supporters of that system of
government. Populism’s ambiguous relationship to democracy has been widely noticed (Urbinati, 1998; Canovan, 1999, Arditi, 2004; Abts and Rummens, 2007; Kaltwasser, 2012; Mudde and
Kaltwasser, 2012): If populists support the rule of the people, they are democrats, but if they prefer a strong leader with an unmediated bond with the masses to a system of representation mediated by political institutions (Kaltwasser, 2012), it should inspire concern about the possible threats populism poses to liberal democracy.
3
It is inadequate to dismiss the idea of a populist threat to democracy out of hand, but neither is it acceptable to engage in fearmongering where any hint of populist discourse is viewed as a mortal threat to democracy. This only reinforces the use of the term populism as a smear rather than a coherent and useful concept of political science. Instead, there should be a thorough and empirical examination of how and under which circumstances populism can pose a threat to liberal democracy. Fortunately, there is a growing body of comparative scholarship that has emerged on this topic in recent years (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). However, we still know little about what factors condition populism’s potential threat to democracy. Government and opposition status has been proposed as an important factor, where populists in the opposition can give greater voice to traditionally marginalised populations, while posing a danger to checks and balances and minority rights in government (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012: 21). Another factor that has been identified is democratic consolidation, whereby less consolidated democracies are more vulnerable to the effects of populism on liberal democracy (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012: 23).
In this thesis, I will attempt to shed more light on what aspects of democratic consolidation might protect liberal democracies from a populist threat. To do this, I will conduct a comparative analysis of four European cases, two from Central and Eastern Europe and two from Western Europe, where the Western European cases are expected to be more consolidated against a potential populist threat because of their longer experience of democracy than the Central and Eastern European cases, which endured decades of authoritarian state socialist rule. The cases considered are Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria and Denmark. As such, the research question to be answered in this thesis is: To what extent are Austria and Denmark more consolidated against a populist erosion of liberal democracy than the Czech Republic and Hungary?
This question will be answered by testing three propositions that will be developed in the theoretical framework. In short, populists are expected to be more illiberal in the Czech Republic and Hungary than in Austria and Denmark because liberal democracy is not expected to be as hegemonic an idea among political actors there, populists are expected to take government power more easily in the Czech Republic and Hungary than in Austria and Denmark due to their more unstable party systems, and populist governments are expected to face less barriers to the implementation of their programme in the Czech Republic and Hungary than in Austria and Denmark because of lesser constitutional rigidity and a weaker culture among citizens of support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy, trust in political institutions and political participation.
4
Relevance
The social relevance of this question lies in helping learn what the emergence of strong populist political actors might mean for the future of liberal democracy, and what factors may help protect against a deconsolidation of liberal democracy in Europe. Too often, these dynamics are unclear and as such accompanied by nonchalance, defeatism or, conversely, alarmism. By helping decrease under- as well as overestimation of a possible populist threat, society is better off, because this improves its ability to find ways to better ensure the survival of liberal democracy without itself hurting democracy by excessively limiting the scope of the influence of the majority on policy, or limiting citizens’ rights to free speech and expression.
More theoretically, answering the question helps to evaluate the utility of the concept of populism and how to use it. Should it be seen as a coherent enough phenomenon so as to perceive it generally as a potential threat to democracy if it weren’t for the presence of certain safeguards, or as a phenomenon that takes on so many different forms that only contextual, idiographic usage of the term is warranted? Furthermore, researching this question can help bridge the gap between the study of Central and Eastern European politics on the one hand, and studies of Western European populism on the other, identifying lessons that may be of use in the other discipline.
Methodology
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the building of a theory of how longer-established democracies might be better consolidated against a populist threat to liberal democracy. As such, an inductive approach is warranted, whereby a broad comparative perspective is applied to help elucidate certain causal mechanisms, given that the causal mechanism connecting democratic consolidation to the populist threat to liberal democracy is not clear. To this end, three propositions informed by existing theory will be presented in the chapter building a theoretical framework for analysis.
The method to be used is a comparative study of the four cases, building on existing studies, some primary sources and descriptive statistics.
The case selection is based on a most similar systems design for the Central and Eastern European cases, where Hungary and the Czech Republic share many characteristics, both being members of the Visegrád 4 group of most developed Central and Eastern European states, and were widely considered among the most consolidated liberal democracies in the region until 2010, but where Hungary has witnessed a populist erosion of liberal democracy and the Czech Republic has not. For Western Europe, the two cases of Austria and Denmark differ in many respects, but both
5
showcase strong and relevant populist actors who have exercised some form of governmental influence while neither has experienced significant erosion of liberal democracy, and in this sense they are considered to be likely to have benefited from some relevant aspect of democratic
consolidation, and this should help in identifying which of these aspects may play an important role. The first proposition, which states that populists in the Czech Republic and Hungary are expected to be more illiberal than in Denmark and Austria, will be critically examined by analysing existing scholarship on populist actors, their ideologies and policy preferences, which will be enhanced with references to primary sources where available.
The second proposition, which states that greater party system instability in the Czech Republic and Hungary than in Denmark and Austria is expected to make it easier for populists to come to power, will be critically examined by studying descriptive statistics on electoral volatility, election results and existing scholarship on those party systems.
The third proposition, which states that less constitutional rigidity and less developed democratic cultures among citizens means populists would be expected to experience fewer and weaker barriers to the implementation of their programme in the Czech Republic and Hungary than in Denmark and Austria, will be examined by analysing its requirements for constitutional
amendment and descriptive analysis of survey data on aspects of mass democratic culture. In the next chapter, the nature of the potential populist threat to liberal democracy is theoretically described, and the propositions with regard to the expected effects of democratic consolidation are developed. Then, the propositions are each examined in separate chapters. Finally, a conclusion and discussion of the results of this study will be formulated in the final chapter.
6
2. Theory
Conceptualisation of populism
The usage of the term populism can be very vague. In daily political use, it is often used in an accusatory manner, referring to politicians acting opportunistically, acting to increase their popularity and using simplistic rhetoric without regard to the complexities of political issues and against their own best judgment (Mudde, 2004). Such use has contributed to populism sometimes becoming a charged and subjective term, and many political actors that are often classified as populist reject that label.
As a concept in political science, the use of the term tends to be more objective and analytical. However, there are still a multitude of conceptualisations in use, which can lead to confusion. Broadly, there is a division between those who identify the term with certain
programmatic and organisational characteristics of political actors and those who prefer a more minimal, discursive definition based on the core beliefs expressed and advocated by political actors.
An example of the former category is a definition, used in Latin American contexts, that defines populism according to its multi-class support and the combination of egalitarianism, authoritarianism and charismatic leadership (Germani, 1978 cited in Kaltwasser, 2012). Obviously, this definition is too specific to be of use outside the context it was coined for. Other
conceptualisations that fall into this category tend to define populism according to more general characteristics such as charismatic leadership and unmediated ties between a political leader and his/her supporters (Kaltwasser, 2012). However, this risks putting organisational rather than discursive characteristics at the heart of the concept.
I prefer the use of a definition based on ideological and discursive features, instead seeing the other characteristics commonly associated with populism, such as charismatic leadership, as emanating from the discursive core of the concept. Such a definition should allow for the fact that populism has been combined with other ideologies, both left- and right-wing, while at the same time being specific enough to distinguish populist actors from non-populist actors. Cas Mudde’s (2004) definition fits these criteria. He presents a definition of populism as an ideology:
Populism […] [is] an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the
7
In describing populism as an ideology it becomes more than a set of features of politics in general. Although discourse associated with populism may be widespread, for political actors to be considered populist they must profess a belief in the moral dichotomy between the people and the elite and in the idea that politics should be the expression of the popular will. Despite the
classification of populism as an ideology, its substantive core is very thin, allowing it to be combined with a broad array of other ideas, ranging from socialism to nationalism. This has led to it being described as a thin-centered ideology (Stanley, 2008).
Populism and democracy
There is considerable disagreement over the relationship between populism and democracy. This is usually more the result of different approaches to the conceptualisation of democracy than
disagreement over the nature of populism.
Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) makes a distinction between three different approaches. He identifies a liberal approach that sees populism as a pathological phenomenon caused by democratic malaise, a radical approach that sees populism as a pure expression of democracy and a minimal approach that sees the relationship between populism and democracy as ambiguous and therefore an empirical question (Kaltwasser, 2012). The reason for this ambiguity is that the concept of democracy has different aspects that vary in their relationship with populism. Kaltwasser (2012), following Robert Dahl (1998), utilises the distinction made between public contestation and inclusiveness as two dimensions of polyarchy (the institutional approximation of the ideal of democracy). He argues that populism usually tends to be conducive to inclusiveness at the cost of public contestation. This is because it can foster the inclusion of people that have often been excluded from political participation, while not adhering to democratic norms of public contestation (Kaltwasser, 2012: 200). However, he acknowledges that populism can also be exclusionary if combined with a nativist definition of the people (Kaltwasser, 2012: 198-199).
There is value in disentangling the various aspects of democracy in order to reveal the varying effects of populism on these different dimensions. However, that should not imply that this minimal approach resolves the debate by adopting an empirical instead of a normative approach. After all, empirical conceptualisations of democracy still derive from democracy as a normative ideal. The usage of different conceptualisations of democracy can reveal different tensions within the concept of democracy and therefore lead to different conclusions as to the ambiguity of the relationship between populism and democracy.
8
An example of an approach identifying a different tension between populism and democracy is that of Margaret Canovan (1999), who views the presence of populism as the result of an
inevitable tension between two faces of democracy. To her, democracy is both a redemptive ideal that carries in it the promise of popular sovereignty and a pragmatic institutional form of
government that attempts to peacefully resolve the myriad conflicts of interest in a highly complex society. A functioning democracy needs both these faces, because a purely pragmatic form where politics is purely about compromise is alienating and loses its legitimacy, whereas the exercise of popular sovereignty without the pragmatic institutions and checks on power has totalitarian
tendencies (Canovan, 1999: 9; 11). Tensions arise when the pragmatic reality of democracy does not live up to the promise of popular sovereignty, which is essentially inevitable. Populism carries in it the promise of restoring democracy as a redemptive ideal, by getting rid of the elite and the barriers to the expression of the popular will through government (Canovan, 1999). This approach therefore posits that populism is in a way inherent to democracy rather than simply fundamentally inimical to it. Unlike Kaltwasser (2012), however, Canovan (1999) argues that the corrective aspect of populism vis-à-vis democracy lies more in the promotion of democracy’s redemptive aspect in the face of ossified institutions and overly pragmatic politics, rather than in promoting the political participation of disadvantaged populations. As such, it may, in opposition at least, be more beneficial to public contestation than to inclusiveness.
Building on Canovan’s (1999) argument, Benjamín Arditi (2004) stresses that the gap
between the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy is not a gap that can be bridged but that the conflict between the two faces is in fact constitutive of democratic politics (Arditi, 2004: 139). This contradicts liberal interpretations of populism as a pathological phenomenon. Adding to Canovan’s (1999) metaphor of populism as a shadow cast by democracy, Arditi (2004) characterises populism as a spectre that follows democracy, both accompanying and haunting it (Arditi, 2004: 141). This spectral character demonstrates that just because populism can be associated with democracy, this does not mean that it poses no danger to democracy. When in government, populism’s tendency to reject the institutional procedures and rules of democracy can morph into authoritarian practices when legislative deliberation and judicial independence are presented as illegitimate obstructions of the people’s will (Arditi, 2004).
Populism, therefore, should be construed as something that can at the same time be
inherent to democracy, while also posing a potential threat to it (Canovan, 1999; Arditi, 2004). There is disagreement, however, as to whether that threat threatens democracy itself, or just liberal democracy. Liberal democracy has been described as a form of government built on the two contradictory pillars of liberalism and democracy. The combination of rule of law, constitutionalism
9
and individual rights, on the one hand, and popular sovereignty, on the other, is often thought of as paradoxical (Abts and Rummens, 2007). It might be argued that because populism supports popular sovereignty, that it is not a threat to democracy as such, but that it is illiberal and therefore
threatens the liberal or constitutional pillar. Others, however, disagree and argue that democracy should be seen as a more coherent concept more fundamentally threatened by populism (Abts and Rummens, 2007).
Abts and Rummens (2007) subscribe to this vision and reject the idea of constitutional or liberal democracy as being internally contradictory and therefore the idea that populism is hostile only to the liberal or constitutional rather than the democratic aspect of such a form of government. Instead, they conceptualise democracy as a logic whereby the locus of power in a system is empty (Abts & Rummens, 2007). Therefore, the logic of populism is fundamentally antithetical to
democracy because it attempts to fill this empty locus of power with a substantially homogeneous concept of the people. This seems to completely separate the concept of democracy from the concept of popular sovereignty. However, Abts and Rummens (2007) argue that popular sovereignty is still vital to democracy, but that the will and identity of the people are constantly being
dynamically re-interpreted and reflect the diversity and complexity of society. Like Canovan (1999) they reject both a purely pragmatic and a purely redemptive democracy, as the first threatens societal disintegration by the absence of an idea of the common good, while the second sees the people as a substantial unity which rejects the diversity at the heart of democracy (Abts & Rummens, 2007). Unlike Canovan (1999) however, they see populism not as embodying the redemptive promise of democracy as the expression of the people’s will but as corrupting this promise into the proto-totalitarian idea of the people as a substantial homogeneous body (Abts & Rummens, 2007).
Similarly, Urbinati (1998) argues that populism is fundamentally opposed to democracy because it rejects representative democracy in favour of the unmediated, unanimous will of the people. As such, the equality of the people, which is central to the concept of democracy, is replaced with identicalness (Urbinati, 1998). Institutions that mediate between the ruler and the masses are despised and rejected in favour of the unmediated acclamation of the will of the people, which abandons debate and the open competition between ideas and values that are central to modern conceptions of democracy (Urbinati, 1998). Because Urbinati (1998) includes discussion, limits to power and individual rights as inherent facets of democracy itself rather than just of a liberal or constitutional pillar of democracy, she, like Abts and Rummens (2007) rejects the idea of populism as an expression of democracy.
10
Consequently, it might seem as if populism is a ubiquitous threat that haunts democracy, threatening a collapse of democracy into a totalitarian nightmare when populist actors gain
governmental power. Obviously, a more nuanced understanding of the threat is required. One point of nuance is provided by Abts and Rummens (2007) themselves. They differentiate populism from totalitarianism because its conception of the homogeneity of the people is generally limited to the political sphere. Populism thus does not attempt to extend the use of government power, as legitimised by the will of the people, to interference in society like totalitarian regimes have done (Abts and Rummens, 2007). More importantly, however, they seek to differentiate their ideal typical conception of the logic of populism from the practice of actual populist actors (Abts and Rummens, 2007: 420).
This nuance is valuable, but should also be criticised. Firstly, while it is true that populism should not be equated with totalitarianism, there should be no doubt that the rejection of the ordinary constitutional and political limits to governmental power can potentially pose a serious threat to individual and communitarian rights beyond the political sphere. Populists may believe in a boundary to the legitimacy of governmental power, but where they place this boundary may not coincide with mainstream democratic interpretations of that boundary. Secondly, I disagree with the claim that political actors threaten democracy according to the extent to which they are populist, i.e. by the extent to which they approach an ideal typical conception of populism. Instead, like
Kaltwasser (2012), I prefer a more minimal conceptualisation of populism. Therefore, while the populist ideology of anti-elitism and anti-pluralism (Mudde, 2004) can potentially extend to the total rejection of representation and the delegitimisation of all political opposition to them, whether parliamentary or institutional, this rejection is not a linear function of that ideology. The core of the populist ideology is so thin that it is impossible to construct an ideal typical logic of populism and its relationship to democracy. As such, I believe that populist political actors vary in the extent to which they pose a threat to democracy, rather than that they pose a threat to democracy to the extent to which they are populist.
As regards the extent to which it is liberal democracy or democracy itself which is potentially threatened, I take an intermediate position. On the one hand, liberalism and democracy are
obviously not synonymous. It is possible to envision democracy without liberalism. This democracy without adjectives is usually defined simply as a political system where government is chosen by free and fair elections (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). This need not be fully liberal, but that does not mean there is no limit to the extent of absence of individual rights and minority protection
permitted before any elections held can no longer be considered free or fair. As such, erosion of so-called liberal aspects of liberal democracy will also threaten its democratic (without adjectives)
11
aspects eventually. Therefore, I agree with Abts and Rummens (2007) that liberal democracy should be understood as a relatively coherent rather than paradoxical concept. Populism potentially threatens liberal democracy, not just liberalism. Though a populist logic could theoretically be extended to the justification of an authoritarian dictatorship, the most immediately relevant empirical threat seems to be to the erosion of horizontal accountability and individual rights rather than to the practice of free and fair elections. Consequently, in this thesis I will examine the potential populist threat to liberal democracy, not just to democracy without adjectives.
The contingent nature of the populist threat to democracy
It becomes clear when looking at the literature on the relationship between populism and
democracy that they share a complicated and tumultuous relationship. Populism can be understood as a shadow or spectre of democracy (Canovan, 1999; Arditi, 2004) that is inspired by democracy’s ideal of popular sovereignty. At the same time, its homogeneous concept of the people and
tendency to prefer government as the unadulterated and unmediated expression of the popular will (Mudde, 2004) can pose a serious threat to (liberal) democracy because of the potential
delegitimisation of political opposition and, consequently, disregard for obstacles to governmental power such as the rule of law and parliamentary procedure. This threat does not manifest itself by the mere existence of populism in a political system, but is mediated by the characteristics of those political systems and the characteristics of the populist actors within that system.
An obvious factor that influences the potential threat of populist actors to liberal democracy is whether they are in government or opposition. The potential threat mainly refers to the abuse of government power because of populists’ possible delegitimisation of political opposition and the rejection of constitutional limits to their power. Conversely, most of the literature on the positive effects of populism focuses on the effects of the presence of populist actors in opposition. Perspectives on these effects come both from the minimal approach of Kaltwasser (2012), who focuses on the ability of populist actors to promote the political participation of disenchanted and disadvantaged social groups, as well as more radical democratic approaches that hail populism’s potential to disrupt the political order and undermine elitist cultural hegemony (Arditi, 2004;
Kaltwasser, 2012), although these effects could also exist when populist actors in government. There may also be a danger to democracy from populist actors in opposition, mostly by undermining trust in the political system or contaminating more mainstream political actors with populist ideology. Nevertheless, I consider these more indirect threats compared to the possibility of a populist-controlled government.
12
It has also been posited that populist actors represent more of a threat in new and fragile democracies, whereas established democracies are thought to be more resilient to populist threats (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). This seems intuitively logical, but the causal mechanism is not always very clear.
In the context of the third wave of democratisation, it became increasingly clear that the survival of democracy in many of the countries that witnessed liberalisation of their autocratic regimes and implemented the adoption of basic democratic institutions was not guaranteed. In many cases autocratic and military elites remained powerful and were unwilling to relinquish their power, or instability undermined the state’s authority, endangering order and the rule of law (Schedler, 2001). In such cases, sudden coups d’état or the outbreak of a civil war were immediate threats to democracy’s survival. In this light, democracies are often considered consolidated when they experience a certain number of peaceful transfers of power or survive for a certain number of years. For example, coups d’état become exceedingly rare in democracies that have survived for 17 to 20 years (Svolik, 2015).
However, beyond the risk of immediate sudden reversal to authoritarianism there is also the problem that many cases of political transition do not develop into liberal democracies but into some stable regime of electoral authoritarianism, defective democracy or other hybrid (Bogaards, 2009). In this light, Central and Eastern European cases like Hungary and the Czech Republic have been thought of as remarkably successful, given the difficulty of their need for simultaneous political and economic transitions (Merkel, 2008).
The deeper consolidation of liberal democracy against decay requires, beyond the adoption of basic liberal democratic institutions, that liberal democratic norms develop unquestioned
legitimacy among elites (Linz and Stepan, 1996) and that a democratic and participatory political culture develops in wider society (Merkel, 2008; Carpenter, 1998).
In this regard, three propositions are made with regard to the expected greater consolidation of liberal democracy against populist erosion.
1. Liberal democratic norms are so strongly established in Western Europe that even populist actors do not question the legitimacy of liberal democracy as the only viable political system. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, liberal democracy has not yet developed unquestioned legitimacy among political elites, including populists, and populist actors can advocate illiberal alternatives. Therefore, populists in Central and Eastern Europe are more illiberal than populists in Western Europe.
13
As discussed before here, populist actors are not by definition opposed to all forms of representation, rule of law and constitutional limits to power, although their anti-pluralism may predispose them to such intentions. It may be the case that populisms opposed to liberal democracy thrive in more parochial political cultures (Carpenter, 1998) whereas populisms in established and consolidated democracies with participatory and civic political cultures, at least with any hope of electoral representation let alone government participation, tend not to be opposed to liberal, constitutional, representative democracy per se, but only to what they consider to be its excesses. After all, a state of democratic consolidation means democracy is considered ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 15).
2. Party systems in Western Europe are more stable than in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, populist actors are of more marginal importance in Western Europe whereas they can easily come to power in Central and Eastern Europe.
There are as of yet no examples of populism overpowering consolidated democratic systems in Western Europe. It seems evident that Western European party systems are relatively stable, whereas Central and Eastern European party systems have been described as unstable and volatile. Their parliaments are often elected by relatively proportional electoral systems, which usually, but not always, inhibit the formation of one-party governments. As such, a populist party would struggle to form a government willing to support its anti-institutional agenda, because it would likely not be able to win a parliamentary majority. Populists would only be able to enter government through a coalition, which would presumably either demand moderation of the populist agenda or limit co-operation to practical issues of policy, hampering any ambitions to transgress traditional
constitutional boundaries to governmental power. The power of populist parties in such situations is expected to be limited to bargaining on policy issues, which may also damage their
anti-establishment appeal (Taggart, 2004; Fallend and Heinisch, 2016). In contrast, unstable and tumultuous party systems are less predictable, and populist actors may achieve sudden and rapid success in winning parliamentary pluralities or majorities, and gaining a powerful governmental role.
3. If a populist party were to gain power in Western Europe, it would encounter more barriers to the implementation of any illiberal reforms and programs than in Central and Eastern Europe.
The constitution is expected to be more difficult to amend, liberal democracy is expected to be more legitimate in the eyes of citizens and satisfaction with democracy, trust in political
14
institutions and rates of political participation are expected to be higher in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe.
More and more Western European countries thought of as traditionally resilient to the emergence of populist political actors, such as Sweden and Germany, are witnessing signs of increasing populist electoral success. With populists becoming more powerful, it is necessary to critically evaluate the extent to which and how Western European liberal democracies are protected from any potential populist erosion. For Central and Eastern European countries, the transition to democracy may be becoming more of a historical than a current process. As such, these countries’ experiences with populism may become more similar to those of Western European countries, rather than being explained by the traumatic experiences of economic transformation and the legacies of imperialism and pre-war nationalism (Blokker, 2005; Učeň, 2007). It may be the case that Central and Eastern European countries are experiencing the replacement of radical anti-democratic populists with more modern, centrist populists who gain support because of pure anti-establishment appeal rather than appeals to reverse the transition (Učeň, 2007). Furthermore, the relevance of the difference between a supposedly parochial southern and a more civic and participatory northern group of Central and Eastern European countries (Carpenter, 1998) may be decreasing. The social democratic darlings of Carpenter may be becoming less innocent as a number of governments have turned to tactics that increase their control vis-à-vis the rule of law and civil society (Bugarić, 2008).
Due to these developments, the clear-cut differences between Western and Central and Eastern Europe expected in the propositions may be more nuanced in reality. The following chapters will evaluate the propositions critically.
15
3. Are populists in Hungary and the Czech Republic more illiberal than populists in Denmark and Austria?
While some countries in Europe have witnessed populist political parties that have attempted to build and succeeded in building an illiberal system, others have not. The first proposition made in the theoretical framework expected that Western European countries had more liberal populists in the context of a more advanced political culture where liberal democracy enjoys widespread
legitimacy even among populists, who by definition challenge the elite, whereas Central and Eastern European countries have had shorter experiences with liberal democracy and their populists may be more inclined to reject liberal democracy altogether. This causal mechanism is explored with reference to the experiences of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Austria and Denmark with populist political parties. The expectation is that Hungary and the Czech Republic have experienced more illiberally inclined populist actors than Austria and Denmark due to their more recent transitions to democracy and less developed political cultures.
Hungary
The events following the 2010 election of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán as Prime Minister of Hungary in the context of political scandal and economic crisis have been described as an illiberal turn away from liberal democracy (Rupnik, 2012; Bánkuti et al., 2012). The unusual feat of controlling a two-thirds supermajority in parliament has allowed Fidesz to radically restructure the Hungarian
institutional and political landscape, most poignantly exemplified by the adoption of a hastily drafted new constitution that, while preserving the basic structure of a constitutional democracy, firmly entrenched the power of the ruling majority by expanding its influence in the appointment of constitutional justices and the extension of office terms, as well as attempting to codify partisan conservative norms such as the role of Christianity and the protection of fetal life (Uitz, 2015; Bozóki, 2011). Nominally independent public institutions such as the National Judicial Office and the Media Authority were placed under the control of persons loyal to Fidesz, extending the reach of the government to judicial matters and the media (Bánkuti et al., 2012; Bozóki, 2011). Consequently, the power of the government and the ruling party has increased, while the influence of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition has been strongly curtailed (Bánkuti et al., 2012).
This transformation of the political and institutional landscape has been described by Orbán as revolutionary and as aiming to establish a System of National Cooperation to replace the system that arose after the demise of Soviet-style state socialism (Bozóki, 2011). The combination of the aforementioned institutional and constitutional reforms with the qualified majority of Fidesz in parliament has led to a situation in which one party, Fidesz, receives an electoral mandate which in
16
turn gives it full control of a highly centralised government and a range of public institutions. As such, it is a thoroughly illiberal system in which it is difficult to effectively contest the government’s power outside the electoral arena (Bánkuti et al., 2012; Bozóki, 2011). Moreover, the government even has the power to reconfigure electoral competition in its favour because of its control of the National Electoral Commission, which has allowed it to decrease the proportionality of the electoral system in addition to extending citizenship and therefore voting rights to right-leaning Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries (Bozóki, 2011). Due to the long office terms of Fidesz
appointees to public institutions the party may also be able to exercise substantial levels of control in the case of a hypothetical electoral defeat and formation of a non-Fidesz government (Bánkuti et al., 2012).
Hungary’s experience may be emblematic of the threat of a populist erosion of liberal democracy in the heart of Europe. While electoral democracy is maintained, the government’s democratic legitimacy does not necessitate the need for the minority opposition to exercise substantial influence in parliament or for public institutions to be independent and free of government control, and these illegitimate liberal obstacles are therefore removed to the largest extent possible. This coincides with the argument of Abst and Rummens (2012) that ideal-typical populism threatens democracy by putting a substantive conception of the people at the heart of the locus of power, thereby delegitimising political and institutional opposition to the elected
government, while still allowing for a measure of societal autonomy from the state. However, while it may be tempting to expect any populist party with a parliamentary majority sufficiently substantial to change the constitution to attempt to erode liberal democracy in this way, it is necessary to investigate to what extent different aspects and types of populism really do consider liberal obstacles to a legitimate government’s power illegitimate.
What about Fidesz’s populist ideology has led the party to disregard the need for substantial limits to government power outside of the need for an electoral mandate? Its conceptions of the people and the elite are relevant in this regard.
Populism’s portrayal of a dichotomy between the people and the elite does not generally involve neutral conceptions of the people and the elite as the average citizen and society’s
objectively most powerful members, respectively. Instead, these conceptions are idealised and can be rooted in ideologies other than, and in addition to, populism. The populist conception of the people usually depends on an idealised depiction of a virtuous heartland (Taggart, 2004). The extent to which populism opposes liberal democracy should be related to the homogeneity of its
17
expression of the people’s general will and of popular sovereignty. In the logic of (liberal) democracy, the people are seen as diverse and their identity, and therefore will, is subject to constant dynamic reinterpretation (Abts and Rummens, 2012), which legitimates the need for the rule of law, representation and the protection of individual and minority rights. In case of a
homogeneous general will and popular identity, the need for these liberal safeguards is discounted. Furthermore, the conception of the bad and/or corrupt elite influences the changes that would need to take place to strengthen the good people vis-à-vis the bad elite, ranging from a mere overhaul of economic and social policy to the erosion of institutions of representation and accountability and centralising and expanding the power of the state.
Fidesz’s conception of the people is firmly grounded in nationalism and therefore presents a homogeneous picture of an organic civic community with distinctly national values (Palonen, 2009; Müller, 2011). This spiritually minded people is an idealised heartland and is not necessarily representative of the majority of citizens. As such, Fidesz relates to the people paternalistically, seeking to motivate virtuous behaviour and punish vagrancy and other unworthy and anti-social behaviour through the use of monetary and other rewards and punishments (Enyedi, 2016; Müller, 2011). Consequently, Palonen (2009) and Enyedi (2016) claim that Fidesz possesses a bias towards a bourgeois civic (polgári) ideal of the people as opposed to favouring the lower classes, which limits the emancipatory character of its populism. Furthermore, it legitimates government intervention to shape people’s behaviour and instil the preferred values in the population. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, it combines populism with elitism in government.
Its combination of populism with elitism is made possible by its conception of the evil elite pole of the populist dichotomy as consisting of a globalist supranational establishment and its local cosmopolitan and leftist representatives (Enyedi, 2016; Müller, 2011). This allows it to use anti-establishment rhetoric while dominating the political and institutional arena. Despite striving to limit citizens’ rights to challenge legislation in the constitutional court and to initiate referenda (Bánkuti et al., 2012), it can claim that it strengthens the power of the people because it enables a strong state that can stand up to the supranational establishment.
The development of this brand of paternalistic populism can be linked to Hungary’s post-transitional political culture and has its roots in the emergence of the népi national-populist
intellectual movement in the pre-communist era (Bozóki, 2012). This movement aimed to develop a national middle class distinct from the cosmopolitan urban class and to emancipate the rural
population, opposing both liberal and communist internationalism (Bozóki, 2012). As such, a populist ideology combining nationalism with anti-liberal agitation against the urban cosmopolitan class was
18
no stranger to Hungary. However, although this movement did resurface with the transition from state socialism in the Independent Smallholders Party (FKGP) and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), it initially remained relatively marginal, unattractive to most segments of the Hungarian population (Bozóki, 2012).
Indeed, Hungary was seen by Michael Carpenter (1998) as a case of successful transition into a social democratic regime rooted in its civic political culture, in stark contrast with the development of Meciar’s national-populist regime in neighbouring Slovakia, to which he ascribes a more backward and traditional political culture. As such, he sees political culture, rather than the consequences of economic transition, as reasons for the emergence of populism in CEE countries. To the contrary, I posit that while the legacy of the inter-war national-populist movement provided a background for its later re-emergence, the agency of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán was what allowed this anti-liberal paternalistic populism to enter the political mainstream and thus to threaten liberal democracy.
The evolution of Fidesz from a liberal youth movement into the conservative populist governing party it has become occurred in the wake of its consolidation of the right wing of the Hungarian political spectrum starting during the 1990s (Palonen, 2009; Fowler, 2004) and the strong left-right polarisation of the political scene that developed, especially in the first decade of the 21st
century (Palonen, 2009; Pappas, 2014). This polarisation, especially since Fidesz entered government from 1998 to 2002, attempted to recast Hungarian politics as a cultural struggle between the
spiritual heartland of people espousing national and authoritarian values and the elite alliance of urban cosmopolitan liberals and post-communist apparatchiks, to be fought both within and outside the sphere of parliamentary politics (Bozóki, 2012). As such, it is not surprising that with the collapse of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) with an economic downturn and the political scandal
surrounding Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s profanity-laden and excessively honest speech in 2006, in which he admitted to chronic lying to the public about the state of the country’s finances and the need for economic reform (Müller, 2011), Fidesz would come to dominate the political landscape after the 2010 election. The polarisation also helps explain why, given the unique opportunity afforded by its qualified majority, Fidesz did not hesitate to effect revolutionary
illiberalisation and entrench its position as the ruling party, given its denial of the political legitimacy of the opposition, as it represents the transnational establishment and its urban, cosmopolitan, liberal representatives in Hungary.
As such, party-level populism in Hungary’s Fidesz is of a particularly illiberal kind. Its populism is influenced by a conservative nationalist worldview where the good people are not embodied by the average citizen but by a bourgeois heartland, and the evil elite is a transnational
19
conspiracy of cosmopolitan liberals and ex-communists. This narrow populism can be used
strategically to legitimise their own government as the embodiment of popular sovereignty against anti-popular horizontal accountability diluting the expression of the popular will, while delegitimising other governments for being unaccountable to the people. National populist ideology has a long history in Hungary, but developed into a potent political force in the context of party system consolidation. As such, Hungarian political culture provided a background for the emergence of a strong populist political force but did not determine its success, which was strongly influenced by the agency of Viktor Orbán in consolidating the Hungarian centre-right.
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is often contrasted with other Central and Eastern European (CEE) states and said to enjoy a more stable party system and liberal democracy immune from populist erosion, a view in line with a liberal conception of populism as a pathological phenomenon (Kaltwasser, 2012). Indeed, the Czech Republic has not witnessed the populist illiberalisation that occurred in Hungary as well as, to some extent, in neighbouring states like Poland and Slovakia (Havlík, 2016). Can this be attributed to the Czech Republic’s more civic and participatory political culture? If so, the populist parties that have manifested themselves in Czech politics may be expected to have developed a more inclusive and liberal populism, that does not extend its anti-establishment and anti-pluralist discourse to the dismantling or weakening of the rule of law and other limits to popular sovereignty. If this were the case, it could suggest that populism is not necessarily more illiberal in more recently established democracies, but can mobilise on diffuse grounds.
Populist political actors were relatively marginal in the Czech Republic during the 1990s, and most prominently manifested themselves in the extreme-right Coalition for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ). This party, under the leadership of Miroslav Sládek, espoused radical populist views, equating the governing former dissidents with the communists as forming a corrupt, conspiratorial elite controlled by foreign governments, as well as mobilising anti-Roma and anti-German sentiment (Hanley, 2012). It rejected the political transition as a façade and thoroughly demonised the entire political class as corrupt and illegitimate (Hanley, 2012). As such, it sought to radically reform the political and institutional landscape to induce real democratisation by
strengthening popular sovereignty and direct democracy, allowing citizens to recall their
representatives and decentralising power (Hanley, 2012: 78). According to Sean Hanley (2012), such measures were not accompanied by concern for liberal limits to the exercise of popular sovereignty and, on occasion, the party even justifying the hypothetical use of violence against the authorities
20
(Hanley, 2012: 79). The party was considered extremist and other parties refused to cooperate with it; it eventually exited parliament by 1998 (Hanley, 2012).
That populist parties remained so marginal in the Czech Republic during the political and economic transition is often contrasted with the situation in its neighbour and former sister republic Slovakia, where Vladimir Meciar’s national populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) governed intermittently, which was seen as threatening its potential to become a European Union (EU) member state (Carpenter, 1998). While Carpenter (1998) attributed this discrepancy to Slovakia’s historical experience as a backward and subordinated region dominated by Hungary and the resulting parochial political culture, Evans and Whitefield (1998) have attributed it instead to Slovakia’s distinct experience of the post-communist transition, where the political salience of the issue of the Hungarian minority trumped that of economic issues. In the Czech Republic such national and ethnic issues were of marginal importance and political cleavages developed along economic fault lines instead (Evans and Whitefield, 1998). The latter explanation seems somewhat more plausible, given that Hungary saw a growing relevance of national populism in the mainstream with the rise of Fidesz as the main centre-right party in Hungary, and Meciar’s relevance in Slovakia declined sharply after 1998. Such a change is more easily attributed to a change in the salience of political cleavages than a fundamental change of political culture.
The experience of the 1990s may have suggested that the Czech Republic was immune to populist challengers. However, since 2010 several new populist actors have entered parliament after a decade of absence, mobilising the increased dissatisfaction and distrust resulting from a
combination of political and economic crisis resulting from corruption scandals, lengthy cabinet formations, conflict within government coalitions and long periods of rule by caretaker governments (Havlík, 2015). The populist parties that have entered government in elections in 2010 and 2013 are Public Affairs (VV), Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO 2011) and Dawn – National Coalition (Úsvit), also known as Dawn of Direct Democracy (Havlík, 2015). These new populist actors, with the exception of Úsvit, have been described as centrist, benign and free of nationalist and radical ideological appeals, instead mobilising on the basis of pure anti-establishment appeal (Havlík, 2015; Učeň, 2007). This is often tied to the consolidation of democracy, with centrist populist actors disavowing ideological radicalism and authoritarianism and basing their anti-establishment appeal on common sense and rationalism (Učeň, 2007). However, in principle, populist actors’ generally illiberal approach to democracy can be traced to the core majoritarian logic of populism (Abts and Rummens, 2007) and not just to the logics of supplementary ideologies. As such, it is not directly clear that the new, more centrist populists’ populism is necessarily less illiberal because of the lack of radical nationalist discourse.
21
Public Affairs (VV) was a prominent example of a new populist party appealing to
dissatisfaction with the political establishment at large that had its roots in local politics in Prague and gained national electoral success in 2010, entering a centre-right coalition government (Havlík and Hloušek, 2014). It used anti-establishment discourse, deriding an out of touch elite of so-called political dinosaurs, and promoting common sense solutions as well as institutional reform to
introduce aspects of direct democracy (Havlík, 2015). However, its populist rhetoric was toned down as it entered a centre-right government coalition (Havlík, 2015) and the party collapsed after
revelations that it had essentially been used as a vehicle for party chairman Vít Bárta to pursue his business interests (Havlík and Hloušek, 2014).
A new centrist populist party called ANO 2011 (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens/’YES’ 2011) appeared, winning an impressive victory in the parliamentary elections of 2013 and forming a government with Social Democrats and Christian Democrats. It was founded by the Slovak-Czech billionaire businessman Andrej Babiš and similarly mobilised dissatisfaction with the political situation by appealing to anti-corruption and anti-establishment sentiment (Havlík, 2015). Like VV, the party criticised the whole spectrum of parties and politicians as corrupt and out of touch. Additionally, it shared VV’s appeal to a common sense, rationalist approach, rejecting classification on the left-right dimension (Havlík, 2015). Vlastimil Havlík (2015), however, contrasts ANO 2011’s populist discourse with that of VV, arguing that ANO 2011 and Andrej Babiš are less enthusiastic about instituting direct democratic reforms, instead favouring a more efficient and competent government run like a private sector business. According to Havlík (2015), this shows that the party does not afford popular sovereignty and people-centrism the prominence it is typically afforded by other populist actors.
ANO 2011 does promote the adoption of aspects of direct democracy in its program (ANO 2011, 2013a). However, its focus seems to be on the simplification of rules and regulations and reducing bureaucratic red tape, as well as increasing the transparency of public administration (ANO 2011, 2013a). As such, the party does not at first sight seem to adhere to an illiberal version of populism. Its criticism of the elite is broad and based on pure anti-establishment appeal, and as such seems to eschew the more conventional conspiratorial and ideologically loaded populist discourse often associated with more illiberal populist parties, including Fidesz. However, its emphasis on elite replacement over institutional reform does signify a possible illiberal element. The focus on
rationalism and common sense may be functionally similar to conventional illiberal populist focus on the homogeneity of the people, potentially delegitimising opposition as being irrational, even when not characterised as enemies of the people. Additionally, the party’s proposals to overhaul the supervision of judges and holding them accountable for alleged excesses (ANO 2011, 2013a), as well
22
as its intention to abolish the immunity of members of parliament (ANO 2011, 2013b), are
potentially illiberal, especially if the prosecution and supervisory authorities are captured by partisan forces, as in Hungary. Although the party acknowledges the need for judicial independence (ANO 2011, 2013a) and indemnity for what is said in parliament (ANO 2011, 2013b), its policies and discourse can be disconcerting with regard to safeguarding liberal democracy.
Another instance of a populist challenger entering parliament is Tomio Okamura’s Dawn - National Coalition. This party similarly utilises a populist discourse aimed against the political establishment in its entirety. However, it goes much further than ANO 2011 in stressing the need to advance popular sovereignty (Havlík, 2015). It characterises the Czech party system as corrupt, but frames this as a wider problem of European representative, parliamentary democracy and
proportional representation (Úsvit, 2013). As such, it supports a radical overhaul of the political system, including an electoral system based on single-member constituencies, the possibility of recalling elected representatives, Swiss-style public referenda and the institution of a presidential system of government (Úsvit, 2013). The party does pay lip service to the rule of law (Úsvit, 2013), and the proposals seem like textbook examples of populists’ promotion of democracy’s redemptive aspect of popular sovereignty (Canovan, 1999). They do not resemble Fidesz’s institutional reforms entirely, because they do limit the power of any government to govern, because of the constant possibility of the loss of parliamentary majority through recall elections and the possibility of extra-parliamentary legislative initiative. However, the promotion of an executive presidency with an independent mandate, combined with a majoritarian electoral system for parliament increases the possibility of one party entirely controlling the executive and legislative branches of government. Furthermore, that party could bypass parliament by using the plebiscitary opportunities the system provides. As such, it is potentially a thoroughly illiberal system if not combined with an extensive system of checks and balances. However, the party does not seem to aim to limit the independence and jurisdiction of the judiciary or control the media like Fidesz in Hungary. Its rejection of
representation means, on the one hand, that it opposes a party or government using its electoral mandate to monopolise power, and in this sense its standpoint is compatible with liberalism. However, on the other hand, the party seems less clear as to how it stands on the protection of the minority from the rule of the majority uncurtailed by representative institutions. Furthermore, the party’s anti-establishment appeal has been combined with appeals to anti-Roma and Islamophobic sentiment (Havlík, 2015), limiting the inclusiveness and heterogeneity of its conception of the people.
Czech populism, as such, is most notable for its diffuseness and the shift from initial
23
a centrist, rationalist form supporting more efficient and accountable government, as well as a more unconventional strand combining proposals for radical overhaul of the political system with
discriminatory nativism. In its extremist format it found itself isolated from the political mainstream and marginally relevant, with the party system developing mainly along socio-economic cleavages. The more relevant recent populist actors employ broad conceptions of the elite and the people, and as such, while their proposals are not unproblematic from a liberal perspective, they advocate for a political system with more opportunities for holding elites accountable, rather than a highly
majoritarian and centralised system without checks and balances. The most relevant Czech populist actors, therefore, are noticeably liberal, with illiberal tendencies existing but being more marginal.
Austria
Austria has experienced a sustained relevance of populist actors in its political arena. The most relevant and successful populist party has been the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). The FPÖ has generally only been considered a populist party since 1986 when Jörg Haider took over as its leader (Luther, 2015). However, the party had long expressed opposition to Austria’s consociational system of proporz, where the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) shared power and influence over political and social institutions, and aimed to end this allegedly clientelistic system, espoused pan-German views and opposed state neutrality in favour of Western alignment (Luther, 2015). This opposition was rooted in its representation of a third pillar or Lager outside of the dominant pillars of social democracy and Catholicism, which espoused liberal and pan-German views (Luther, 2000). With the takeover of the party by Jörg Haider in 1986, it became a more conventional right-wing populist party, continuing its criticism of the corporatist system, but supplementing it with a populist focus on the distinction between the virtuous people and the elite as well as the distinction between a virtuous heartland and undeserving scroungers and immigrants (Luther, 2015), instilling its populism with a nativist and conservative conception of the heartland of the people.
Despite its anti-establishment rhetoric, the FPÖ has joined coalitions with the mainstream centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) on two occasions, first in 2000. This government
participation was marred by controversy, especially as other EU member states initially opposed the government participation of the FPÖ and even imposed bilateral sanctions (Fallend, 2012; Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013). The potential threat to liberal democracy from a populist party in government was therefore a widely held concern. Austria has not experienced a deconsolidation of liberal democracy, but it is difficult to discern whether this is due to moderation induced by coalition participation, limits to its power or because the FPÖ’s populism was not an illiberal threat in the first
24
place. Here, the focus is on the latter factor since this chapter concerns the extent of illiberalism present in the party’s ideology. The substantial electoral loss after its first instance of coalition participation led to a split in the party, with Haider’s more governmental participation-inclined Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ) splitting off during the FPÖ’s second instance of coalition participation in 2005, and the remaining party focussing on vote-seeking. This has left the FPÖ less relevant until more recently, which limited any impact it might have had since it has not returned to government since then.
The FPÖ shares a programmatic similarity with Fidesz. Both have their origins in liberal parties that moved firmly to the conservative right (Fallend, 2012). Both combine nationalist and social market economic views with populist discourse, and the FPÖ has similarly increasingly focused on the Heimat and traditional family values, as well as Christianity as the basis of European
civilisation (Luther, 2015; FPÖ, 2011), similarly contradicting its earlier anti-clericalism. It also likewise sought to radically reform the political system. The FPÖ proposed ending the neo-corporatist proporz system in favour of a more direct democratic system, with the explicit aim of enhancing popular sovereignty by implementing the increased usage of binding referenda and the direct election of mayors, governors and presidents (FPÖ, 1997; Fallend, 2012). Originally the party also controversially proposed the strengthening of the executive by merging the office of president and chancellor (Fallend, 2012). Such reform proposals emanated from the FPÖ’s populist criticism of the all-powerful role of parties in the system, which they argued extended to the media and all manner of other public institutions (FPÖ, 2005), but also found its roots in the pre-populist liberal nationalist ideology of the FPÖ.
Increased use of referenda and a strengthened executive have the potential to erode liberal democracy if it allows a powerful executive to institute a plebiscitary system of governance,
bypassing horizontal accountability and strengthening the executive over the legislative and judicial branches of government. The FPÖ’s 1997 programme does, however, also propose the inclusion of a substantive bill of rights in the constitution and increased autonomy for the sub-national Austrian states (FPÖ, 2005). It would simplify constitutional law by limiting the jurisdiction of the
constitutional court to the explicit enforcement of the written constitution (FPÖ, 2005). At the same time, it would strengthen the authority of the federal auditor and limit the executive’s right of legislative initiative, as well as strengthening the parliament vis- à-vis the executive (FPÖ, 2005). As such, the proposals do seem like a genuine attempt to end the neo-corporatist system and the power of political parties by enforcing a clear separation of powers, an elected executive accountable to parliament and the constitution and a strengthening of sub-national autonomy.
25
The proposals for thorough political reform seem compatible with liberalism, as it provides for decentralisation, limits to the power of both the electorate and the government, and
government accountability. However, these proposals also need to be placed in the context of a populist discourse that demonises the elite and contrasts them with the people, denying them legitimacy. Even if the proposal in principle does not contradict liberal democracy, the complete denial of legitimacy to the current system is potentially illiberal, as obstacles to the implementation of FPÖ policy and reform where it is in government may be interpreted as sabotage by the vested interests of the establishment parties and the wider elite. This issue is more clearly demonstrated by the events surrounding Jörg Haider’s governorship of Carinthia, most poignantly symbolised by his refusal to abide by a constitutional court ruling that required the erection of bilingual German and Slovenian-language signs in villages with a sizable Slovenian minority (Fallend, 2012). This signifies wider problems of populist governance, as populists tend to disregard limits to their rule as
necessarily undemocratic and often as the result of an elite conspiracy against them and the people, thus using popular sovereignty to delegitimise opposition to their rule. Jörg Haider further
exemplifies this problem with the widespread use of libel lawsuits against criticism by journalists and academics (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013).
Since Haider split from the FPÖ, forming the BZÖ, the party, now led by Heinz-Christian Strache, has focused less on political reform and redirected its attention to its anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic messages. This shift in strategy has been characterised as a move away from Haider’s more office-seeking strategy to a strategy of vote-seeking (Luther, 2015; Meret, 2010). Its 2011 programme focuses much less on issues of political reform (FPÖ, 2011), and the party has rebranded itself as a Social Heimat Party (Meret, 2010; FPÖ, 2011). This strategy may have limited the party’s threat to liberal democracy because of its weakened insistence on implementing its vision of populist governance. At the same time, the increased focus on Heimat and anti-immigration may further narrow and homogenise their conception of the people to one including substantive national and traditional values, further delegitimising alternative visions and posing a further threat to the protection of minorities and individual rights in case they come to power.
The FPÖ is a clear example of radical right-wing populism, and its strong nativist anti-immigrant rhetoric is clearly illiberal, being problematic with regard to the inclusiveness required by liberal democracy. However, its old proposals for institutional reform, though no longer emphasised by the party, could prima facie strengthen the separation of powers, the accountability of political actors and the decentralisation of power. This is influenced by its opposition to the dominance of the two main parties in Austrian politics and institutions. At the same time, this poses a problem because populism provides a discursive tool to delegitimise any constraints on the FPÖ’s potential
26
power as the result of elite conspiracy, which could lead to a drive to weaken institutions of horizontal accountability if it was in power.
Denmark
In Denmark, the most prominent populist political party is the Danish People’s Party (DF). In 1995, this party broke away from the Progress Party, another populist party that had mobilised on a radical anti-tax and small-state platform (Meret, 2010). The Progress Party’s eccentric leader Mogens Glistrup was highly controversial and opposed compromise with the political elite. The Danish People’s Party developed out of a desire to form a more pragmatic and serious political party able to influence policy (Meret, 2010). This brought about a significant shift in policy positions and
ideological orientation away from the Progress Party. The party abandoned the radical anti-tax policies in favour of sustaining the welfare state. This policy was accompanied by the adoption of an anti-immigration position, as immigration was seen as the main threat to the Danish welfare state (Meret, 2010). Its anti-immigration standpoint, however, was not just rooted in economic
considerations, but was increasingly based on an opposition to a multi-ethnic or multi-cultural society, and in particular opposition to Islam. The party considered Danish society to be an organic and homogeneous community threatened by Muslim immigration and alien values and traditions (Meret, 2010).
This new ideological profile, combined with its openness to cooperating with right-wing coalition governments of liberal and conservative parties, has allowed it to exert influence on government policy from outside government coalitions (Meret, 2010). Unlike many other populist parties, it does not place much emphasis on radical reform of the political state, unlike its
predecessor, which was committed to a thorough shrinking of the Danish state (Meret, 2010). Instead, its anti-establishment discourse is strongly linked to its nativist discourse, whereby the mainstream parties are portrayed as out of touch with the fear of immigration espoused by ordinary Danes (Meret, 2010). The DF does support an expansion of direct democracy (DF, 2002) but not the radical restructuring that has been favoured by parties like the FPÖ and Úsvit.
The DF’s mixing of its populist and nativist views has also led the party to posit itself as the defenders of democracy and liberal rights against Islam (Meret, 2010; Akkerman, 2005). As such, it combines traditional, authoritarian and conservative views on family values, law and order, the monarchy and the role of the Lutheran Church and Christianity (DF, 2002) with a focus on defending liberal values like women’s rights and freedom of speech (DF, 2002; Meret, 2010). This focus is used to differentiate progressive Danish culture from supposedly backward and mediaeval values
