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The quest for liberal democracy in Palestine
A cycle of violence, progress, and setbacks
Master thesis
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C
ONTENTS
Introduction ... 3
I – The Democratic Peace Theory ... 9
2 – Violence, progress and setbacks ... 18
3 – The Islamists ... 27
4 – The incumbent regime ... 41
5 – The liberals ... 49
6 – The separation of powers ... 59
Conclusion ... 69
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I
NTRODUCTION
‘Although much controversy about a causal link between regime type and interstate conflict remains, to the extent that authoritarian regimes are more aggressive neighbors, the tendency of religious fundamentalism to make governments more authoritarian implies a more violent world’ – Monica Duffy Toft1
In the aftermath of „9/11‟ attacks in 2001 by the Islamist organization al-Qaida, the Bush administration developed a new vision about the cause of security problems in the Middle East2. The old policy of keeping oppressive and corrupt authoritarian regimes in power, had bred extremism and terrorism in the region. It was the absence of democracy that had prevented the development of a liberal view of Islam, had kept dangerous regimes with weapons of mass destruction in power, and had driven the poor and desperate into the arms of Muslim radicals. A
new strategy, commonly known as the „freedom agenda‟,3 was designed to make the region safer
for the West. Derived of the „democratic peace‟ proposition that liberal democracies do not go to war with each other, the agenda was to spread liberal democracy in the region by pressuring for economic liberalization, elections, and a more assertive civil society. Once installed in key countries, democracy and liberalism would spread through the region.4
The strategy, however, was controversial from its outset. Most political analysts supported the general idea of spreading liberal democracy in the Middle East as a long term strategy to make the region safer to the West. But the execution of the idea by the Bush administration was hotly debated. On one side of the debate were those that thought that certain reforms were necessary in the Middle East, but that the region was „not ready‟ for elections. They feared it would bring Islamist regimes to power. These regimes would not only be anti-Western, but also very „illiberal‟. Especially the latter was troubling, as the influential studies of Zakaria and Mansfield & Snyder had pointed out that the most conflict-prone of all regime types were the so-called „illiberal democracies‟. These regimes hold elections, but lack a strong legal and institutional framework that could check the power of the executive and protect civil liberties – a framework Zakaria called
1 Monica Duffy Toft, „Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War‟, International Security 31, 4 (Spring 2007) 97-131, p. 102. 2
The range of what constitutes the Middle East has often been defined rather loosely. In this study it comprises all Arab states in Western Asia and Northern Africa, in addition to Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
3 This strategy is sometimes also referred to as the „democracy agenda‟ or as a pillar of the so-called „Bush doctrine‟. See: J. Scott Carpenter,
„Bush‟s freedom agenda: alive but not kicking‟, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy watch 1332 (24 January 2008) 1-3, p. 1; William Fisher, „Iraq and the Bush “democracy agenda”‟, Zimbio.com (12 September 2007) retrieved 3 February 2010,
<http://www.zimbio.com/Democracy+and+Capitalism/articles/3/Iraq+Bush+Democracy+Agenda+World+According>; Robert Jervis, „Understanding the Bush doctrine‟, Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (Fall 2003) 365-338, p. 336-369; Marina Ottaway & Julia Choucair-Vizoso eds., Beyond the façade. Political reform in the Arab world (Washington, DC 2008) p. 2.
4 Entire paragraph, see: George W. Bush, „Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina in Columbia, South Carolina‟, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents 39, no. 19 (12 May 2003) 531–575, p. 568-571; Reuel Marc Gerecht, The Islamic Paradox. Shiite clerics, sunni fundamentalists and the coming of Arab democracy, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy (Washington, D.C 2004) p. 3-5; Paul
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„constitutional liberalism‟. As Zakaria thought capitalism was the main drive behind constitutional liberalism, he claimed that the best way to spread liberal democracy, was to press for economic liberalization, not for elections. Accordingly, he and his supporters were more in favor of a „gradualist‟ approach towards achieving liberal democracy: the free market system and constitutional liberalism had to be firmly institutionalized, before elections could be held.5
At the other end of the spectrum were political analysts like Gerecht and Wittes that consented to the ideas behind the freedom agenda, but did not necessarily agree with the way the Bush administration executed the strategy. They did not think capitalism was enough to create liberal democracies the Middle East as the incumbent regimes had ways to deflect the societal implications of economic liberalization. Therefore, free and fair elections were an indispensable aspect of reform in the region. They proposed a more „all-in-one‟ approach towards creating liberal democracy in the Middle East. That is, pushing for elections, economic liberalization and at least some civil liberties – such as freedom of speech, press, association and assembly, the most basic requisites for democracy to function6 – at the same time. This would in the long term lead to political pluralism and religious moderation.7
After elections were held throughout the region between 2005 and 2006, the debate seemed to have a clear winner. The Islamists gained heavily in all the elections. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine subsequently experienced severe internal violence. The first two even exported violence to neighboring countries, whereas Palestine was entangled in a conflict with Israel, a „fellow‟ democracy. Those who believed that holding elections in the region would only make the region less liberal and more dangerous to its neighbors and the West, were right. Only a gradualist approach could spread liberal democracy in the region.
However, this conclusion is premature as it neglects regional differences that could have effected these outcomes. It also brushes aside questions about cause, consequence and side-effect. By focusing only on countries that recently experienced tremendous destabilizing changes such as Afghanistan and Iraq – which were forced by military invasion to change from oppressive political systems with deep religious and ethnic cleavages into democracies within a few years – one neglects the effect a more gradual and long term increase in political rights had on other countries in the region. Moreover, by only taking into account the observation that violence erupted after elections, one leaves out the question why the fighting began. For instance, did violence erupt
5 Entire paragraph, see: Natan Sharansky, „The price of ignoring Palestinians' needs; Hamas in power‟, International Herald Tribune (2 February
2006), p. 8; Fareed Zakaria, The future of freedom : illiberal democracy at home and abroad (2nd edition; New York 2004) p. 45-77, 152; Ibidem,
„The rise of illiberal democracy‟, Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (December/November 1997) 22-43, p. 26. Although the author herself is not a supporter, this view is documented in: Tamara Cofman Wittes, Freedom‟s unsteady march. America’s role in building Arab democracy (Washington, DC 2006) p. 69-71.
6 Ottaway & Choucair-Vizoso eds., Beyond the façade, p. 11-12.
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because the victorious Islamists were illiberal and undemocratic, or because the ruling regime was not willing to share power? Furthermore, this conclusion ignores the possibility that democracy itself may have had a moderating or liberalizing effect on society, and that violence may have been a short term tragic necessity for a long term positive outcome. After all, the sheer experience of elections and subsequent violence might have changed the attitudes of political parties and their constituencies towards democracy and liberalism. Whether it is for the better or for the worse, is unknown.
In sum, to make an accurate assessment of the effects of democracy on Middle Eastern politics and societies, one needs to look further than statistics on violence and elections. Knowing what the effects are of democratization in this region is important for two reasons. First, finding out how liberal democracy is achieved in the Middle East furthers academic knowledge in the field of Political Science and International Relations about the transition of autocratic regimes to a liberal democratic regime, which is useful in its own right. Second, the outcome of this research has important policy implications for a region that has reached the crossroads between democracy and authoritarianism. Considering its strategic importance to the West, it is crucial to assess what the broader consequences are of democratization of the Middle East, whether democratization should and could be supported, and, if this is the case, how this should be done.
As it has a long tradition of democratic practices, rivalry between secular and Islamist parties, and violence, Palestine provides an interesting case study of the push and pull factors at work in democratization efforts in the Middle East. Therefore, this research will be centered around the following question: To what extent did political liberalization between 1994 and 2008 further Palestine’s development into a liberal democracy that could fit the requisites of the liberal democratic peace theory?
„Political liberalization‟ is defined here as a period in which political rights have increased. As will be shown in chapter 2, Palestine has seen two periods of political liberalization since 1994. The first is 1994-1996 and the second is 2002-2006. As there to this date not an official Palestinian state and the term has been used through time and by different people to describe different territories, in this research Palestine comprises the territories that are administrated by the Palestinian Authority (PA). This definition is chosen because the relation between government, citizens and the rule of law is the object of study, and the PA is the de facto government of Gaza and the West Bank, also known as the Palestinian Territories.8 As the PA was created in 1994, this year is taken as starting point for this research. The end of the period, 2008, is chosen because it was the last year of the Bush administration, which had made the spread of democracy one of the
8 „Palestinian Territories‟, European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity, retrieved 1 October 2009,
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cornerstones of its foreign policy in the Middle East. However, as the situation in Palestine keeps changing, relevant updates until the end of 2009 will be made where necessary.
To proceed with the research a conceptual framework needs to be established. As the importance of „constitutional liberalism‟ to the democratic peace theory has been verified by multiple studies,9 Zakaria‟s concept of liberal democracy shall be adopted. Liberal democracy is thus defined as a combination of the two interrelated concepts „democracy‟ and „constitutional liberalism'. Derived of his descriptions, democracy will accordingly be defined as a political system of selecting government (institutions) through regular, free, fair, multiparty and generally accessible elections;10 and constitutional liberalism will be defined as state-guarantee on freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and association; the rule of law and independence of the judiciary; equality before the law of all citizens; a separation of church and state; protection of property; and a separation of powers.11
As Zakaria himself mentions, the distinction Freedom House makes between civil liberties and political rights roughly corresponds to the distinction he makes between constitutional liberalism and democracy.12 As Freedom House‟s distinction is focused more on individual freedoms and less on the institutional aspects of liberal constitutionalism and democracy – which is useful for semantic reasons – this terminology will be incorporated as well. Freedom House defines political rights and civil liberties as following:
„Political rights enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state‟[emphasis added].13
Thus the more political rights a citizens enjoys, the more democratic a polity is; and the more civil liberties a citizen enjoys, the more a polity approaches a state of constitutional liberalism. Despite efforts to distinguish between the two concepts, conflation is not entirely inevitable. In the media and academic literature people who support civil rights are usually grouped together with those clamoring for more political rights – probably because there is a great deal of overlap – which makes a distinction between „liberals‟ and „democrats‟ difficult. Therefore, in this thesis, the
99 Vesna Danilovic & Joe Clare, „The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited)‟, American Political Science 51, no. 2 (April 2007) 397-414, p. 397,
408-413; Edward Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Electing to fight. Why democracies go to war (Cambridge, MA 2005); Shah M. Tarzi, „Democratic peace, illiberal democracy, and conflict behavior‟, International Journal on World Peace 14, no. 4 (December 2007), 35-60.
10 Zakaria, „The rise of illiberal democracy‟, p. 24-25. 11 Ibidem, p. 22,25-26, 30, 34, 37.
12
Ibidem, p. 23.
13 Freedom House ,„Methodology‟, retrieved 11 September 2009,
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adjective „liberal‟ will be given to any party, policy or person that promotes constitutional liberalism and/or a democratic political system.
Although one could argue that civil liberties and political rights are assigned legally to the people, and can therefore only increase as a consequence of law amendments, in this thesis they can also increase as a consequence of regime weakening, without legal change taking place – reflecting an inverse relationship between regime repression on the one hand, and political rights and civil liberties on the other. „Can‟ is emphasized, because civil liberties and political rights do not have to increase when a regime weakens, nor do they have to increase in the same amount. The focus is on actual improvement. After all, if political opponents are able to get more power through the legislature because the regime needs their support to survive, political rights have increased. But a weaker regime does not necessarily mean that common citizens are more able to speak their mind in public. Besides the possibility that a regime makes distinctions in the targets of repression – allowing politicians certain freedoms that common citizens do not enjoy – civil liberties can remain the same because they are also affected by the impact of violent conflict and actions of other (repressive) societal actors than the regime. These factors too, can reduce the ability for citizens to meet, exercise their religion and/or express their opinion on the street. This approach is chosen because Palestine is known for its disregard for the law – by both the PA and society at large – and for its repressive and instable environment. This makes „de facto rights‟ and actual behavior more important than legal rights. That is not to say that legal reforms are not significant. After all, they can add legitimacy to opposition movements and be a sign of actual change. But the focus will be on change in practice, because legal rights can be violated and thus do not always reflect reality.
In line with this focus on change in practice, it is important for the answering of the research question to know whether political liberalization has led the dominant actors in domestic politics – the incumbent regime and the Islamists – to become more supportive of liberal democracy; liberals to gain influence; and led to the improvement of the separation of powers. To conceptualize this inquiry, the following hypotheses have been constructed:
Hypotheses:
1) More political rights made the majority of Islamists more pragmatic, accountable and more respectful towards
democratic principles as they had to compete for office;
2) More political rights improved the governance skills of the incumbent regime and increased its respect for
liberal democracy, which increased both the level of democracy and liberal constitutionalism;
3) More political rights made the political proposals of liberals more known and more popular than before. This
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4) More political rights strengthened the power of the legislature and the judiciary vis-à-vis the executive.
To provide an answer to the all-encompassing research question, each chapter will deal with a separate hypothesis. However, to explain why states in the Middle East need to become liberal democracies in the first place, the democratic peace theory needs to be discussed. This will be done in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 will deal with the process of democratization in Palestine and describe its consequences. Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6 will respectively deal with hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4. After weighing the findings a conclusion will be drawn that will provide an answer to the central question of this thesis.
About the sources
This research is based on an extensive literature study. As fieldwork was out of the scope of this study, the sources used are primarily secondary. Academic works in the form of books and articles have been combined with reports from nongovernmental institutions like human rights organizations and the International Crisis Group. Whenever possible, they are supplemented with news paper articles and public opinion polls from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and Near East Consulting. Although it is difficult to guarantee objectivity in a study that is in a sense inherently ideological – it is based on the assumption that peace, religious pragmatism, and individual liberty are higher values than war, religious absolutism, and submission to (divine or traditional) community duties – efforts have been made to remain as political neutral as possible in the analyses of all relevant parties involved. Therefore sources that lean towards a pro-Israeli or Western viewpoint and those that favor a Palestinian or Islamist perspective have been compared and reviewed critically in an effort to filter out political bias.
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I
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T
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EMOCRATIC
P
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T
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Before proceeding with the research, the assumption that countries in the Middle East need to become liberal democracies needs to be justified. This chapter will therefore be devoted to give an overview of the democratic peace theory, its proponents, and its critics. After discussing the theory itself, the focus will be on the different approaches that academics and policy makers have towards achieving liberal democracy. This means discussing the „gradualist‟ and the „all-in-one‟ approach. The last part of the chapter will be devoted to the effect the freedom agenda of the Bush administration had on the region.
The theoretical debate around the absence of war between Western states
The democratic peace theory is one of the most hotly debated issues of the last thirty years in the field of International Relations (IR). Although the philosophical foundations of the theory go back to the 18th century writings of Immanuel Kant, it is the 20th century scholarship of Doyle, Rummel, Maoz, Bremer, Russett and many others that brought the concept of a „liberal peace‟ or „democratic peace‟ into mainstream social science. Its main proposition is that „liberal democracies‟ – that is, sovereign states with some form of representative government, popular suffrage, free press, equality before the law, and freedom of speech and assembly – do not go to war with each other. However, this is not to say that democracies are not violent or never fight other states. To the contrary. Although some researchers contend that there is evidence that democracies are inherently more peaceful in their external relations,14 there are many examples of mature liberal democracies initiating wars against other regimes. Therefore most proponents of the theory are in favor of the so-called „dyadic peace‟, which means that liberal democracies tend not to fight each other, but at the same time have a tendency of aggression towards other type of regimes. As Doyle puts it:
„Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. They are also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might‟.15
Although there is much debate about what to do with apparent anomalies and with the dependency of the statistical results on definitions of the dependent variable „democracy‟ and independent variable „war‟, even critics agree that there is a significant negative correlation between liberal
14
Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett, „Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986‟, American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993) 624-638, p. 625, 633-635.
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democracies and war.16 However, this doesn‟t mean that the causal mechanisms underlying the „democratic peace‟ or „liberal peace‟ are undisputed.17
For instance, realists like Sebastian Rosato believe that the absence of war between Western democracies is not caused by a „special relationship‟ between liberal democracies, but by raw national security objectives, especially during the Cold War.18 However, these realist theories do not explain why these Western democratic states chose each other as allies and why these alliances have proven to be so stable. According to the realist paradigm, they should fear each other and shift their alliances more frequently considering their relatively high military capabilities. Furthermore, these theories do not explain why Western democracies have been so peaceful towards each other for the last two decades after the Cold War. Neither do they explain why they have joined forces to topple regimes for less than clear „national security objectives‟, as they did with the regime of Milosevic to put an end to the wars in former Yugoslavia. Clearly the realist critique does not take into account the role of perceptions, norms and beliefs of decision makers, public opinion, interest groups and many others that shape foreign policy, which makes the democratic peace theory more valid.
Proponents of the democratic peace theory, however, also disagree on the causal mechanism that underlie the peaceful behavior of democracies towards each other. The „normative model‟ contends that in democracies domestic conflicts of interests are channeled through peaceful means, thereby creating a norm of nonviolent competition and tolerance to those with different viewpoints and interests. These norms are externalized in case of conflicting interests with other states. According to Maoz and Russett this principle makes democracies inherently more peaceful. The reason that democracies do fight other regime types, is that „democratic norms could be more easily exploited than could nondemocratic ones‟, which revolve around violence and coercion.19
Because democratic norms are easily abused, „democracies are more likely to shift norms when confronted by a nondemocratic rival than the nondemocratic rival to shift to democratic norms‟20
The proponents of the „institutional constraint‟ variant of democratic peace theory do not claim that democracies are inherently more peaceful. Rather, they focus on the specific institutional make-up of democracies that makes it difficult for the executive to declare war. Only in „emergencies‟ – that is, when confronted by autocracies, which are by nature less constrained in declaring war – are democracies able to bypass institutional constraints and able to declare war.
16 Sebastian Rosato, „The flawed logic of democratic peace theory‟, American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (November 2003) 585-602, p. 585. 17 Ibidem; Tarzi, „Democratic peace‟, p. 37-45.
18
Rosato, „The flawed logic‟, p. 585-602.
19 Maoz & Russett, „Normative and structural causes‟, p. 625.
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This explains why democracies are peaceful to each other, but not towards non-democracies.21 Bueno de Mesquita gives an interesting twist to the institutional constraint logic. He maintains that because democratic governments are so concerned about the next elections, they will only start wars they are certain to win. As democracies are able to mobilize the entire population and national resources for war, they have a comparative advantage over non-democracies. This also creates an impediment for democratic regimes to declare war on each other, because they consider each other dangerous opponents.22
In sum, the claim that there is something about their specific make-up that makes liberal democracies more peaceful towards each other, remains the most plausible explanation for the absence of war between Western democracies. But the causal mechanisms behind the „democratic peace‟ are still disputed.
Democratic peace in practice
Irrespectively of which of the schools is right about the causal mechanisms that underlie the peace between mature liberal democracies, Zakaria pointed out that many studies fail to recognize the importance of the process that led to democracy in the West. Not every democracy is the same. In Western countries, civil society, the judiciary and the legislature have been able to effectively check the power of the executive, because their rights and powers were secured by a constitution. Moreover, they actively fought against any infringement to these acquirements. But in countries that lack a tradition of „constitutional liberalism‟, elections have often installed aggressive and illiberal regimes, as there is nothing that can prevent the executive from declaring war and violating rights of citizens. What is more, „democracy‟ has often proved self-defeating in countries where civil liberties and the separation of powers were weakly institutionalized – elections often turned out to be „elections for life‟. This scenario was not only caused by a power-hungry executive. Society at large played a role too. To become guardians of liberal democratic values and institutions, the public and elites need time to get accustomed to them.23 Otherwise the public opinion can be stirred up easily by demagogues to support the most devastating policies – which was evident in the wars in former Yugoslavia. This way „illiberal democracies‟ can be a source of internal and external aggression. Therefore, Zakaria maintains that it is crucial that a country first internalizes constitutional liberalism before elections are held.24
In fact, applying this criterion of constitutional liberalism significantly decreases the amount of „republican states‟ that would meet the conditions to join the „league of peace‟ that
21 Ibidem, p. 625; Tarzi, „Democratic peace‟, p. 39-40
22 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., „An institutional explanation of the democratic peace‟, American Political Science Review 93, no. 4 ( December
1999) p. 804, cited in Tarzi, „Democratic peace‟, p. 42-43.
23 Zakaria, The future of freedom, p. 78, 96, 99-100, 102-117.
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Immanuel Kant was envisioning in his famous To Perpetual Peace essay, seen by many as the blueprint for the modern democratic peace theory. Zakaria claims that Kant himself was also no proponent of democracy, viewed it as a form of tyranny, and actually meant with the „republican states‟ that would have a separate peace amongst themselves, countries that had adopted constitutional liberalism.25
Staying close to Kant‟s argument that the logic of free trade reduces war-incentives, Zakaria argues that the surest way to create a tradition of constitutional liberalism is to spread capitalism. As the free market can only function when the rule of law and property rights are secured by a professional and independent judge, rulers eager for increasing their tax incomes by a flourishing economy are stimulated to respect the autonomy of the judiciary and forgo arbitrary rulings. Once an independent judiciary is created, a protector of civil rights and a powerful check on the executive is born. Furthermore, capitalism creates an independent middle class that demands peace and socio-economic freedom in order to conduct business. After a while, this could culminate in demands for participation in governance as well.26
Other famous proponents of the democratic peace theory, such as Doyle, also mentioned that states needed to be qualified as „liberal‟ democracies before the proposition of the democratic peace theory could hold. However, the focus of this research was still on the institutional and normative constrains that were presumed to be inherent to the democratic system with its political culture of deliberations and its influence of public opinion. Recent scholarship, however, more explicitly supports Zakaria‟s claim about the importance of constitutional liberalism to the democratic peace theory.
For instance, in a statistical study Snyder and Mansfield discovered that young democracies and countries in transition to democracy – especially those with weak „political institutions‟, in other words, those that lacked constitutional liberalism – are more predisposed than mature liberal democracies to external conflict behavior, including with other democracies.27 In a qualitative study Tarzi concluded that „regimes in transition to democracy and illiberal democracies, including electoral democracies characterized by contested institutions or contested sectarian and identity groups, are highly predisposed to external conflict and divisionary war with both other democracies and non-democratic regimes‟.28 Moreover, in the empirical study of Danilovic and Clare „constitutional liberalism, rather than democracy, shows to be both more
25 Entire paragraph, see: Ibidem, „The rise of illiberal democracy‟, p. 37.
26 Entire paragraph, see: Ibidem, p. 33-34; Ibidem, The future of freedom, p. 45-76, 152; Richard Re & Sabeel Rahman, „Illiberal democracy five
years later‟, Interview with Fareed Zakaria, Harvard International Review (Summer 2002), retrieved 28 September 2009, <http://fareedzakaria.com/interviews/hir.html>.
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central for Kant‟s theory and empirically more robustly related to international as well as domestic peace‟.29
However, although these studies have confirmed Zakaria‟s claim that constitutional liberalism matters to the democratic peace theory, and many academics now share this point of view, not all scholars agree on how to achieve liberal democracy, especially in the Middle East. As noted before, Zakaria‟s advice to Western powers is to stimulate incumbent regimes to accept the rules of a capitalist market system and to refrain from pressing for elections before liberal constitutionalism has taken root. However, critics like Wittes note that this policy does not deal with the question what to do if incumbent regimes are unwilling to pursue economic liberalization, despite encouragement. Authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have proven to be rather resistant against internal and external pressures for reforms that they perceived to undermine their own powerbase, and economic reforms touch on their capacity to sustain patronage networks.30 Critics therefore claim that gradual liberalization without political reform would not work. Economic, civil, institutional and political reforms need to be pushed simultaneously.
According to these critics, political rights are an indispensable aspect of reform in the Middle East, which cannot be added at the end of the road towards liberalization. By being able to participate in the national politics, citizens are able to hold their governments responsible for mismanagement and are able to address their grievances. This approach calls for a more „all-in-one‟ approach towards democratization. That is, the push for elections, economic liberalization and at least some basic civil liberties – such as freedom of speech, press, association and assembly, the most basic requisites for democracy to function31 – at the same time will in the long term lead to pluralism in the Middle East. As a variety of opinions and dissent – even though they may be restricted to some extent – are disseminated to the public, and citizens get used to having their say in national politics by their vote, a democratic culture of pluralism will develop.32
Proponents of this approach claim that banning Islamic parties from participating in the democratic process would only contribute to their mythological allure as their reputation would remain untainted by political or managerial mistakes. Once co-opted into the new system, they would find out that the world of politics and policymaking is not as black and white as the world of monotheist theology. Provided that the democracy would be strong enough – that is, the Islamic parties would not be able to get „elected for life‟ – the result would be that they are either forced to
29 Danilovic & Clare, The Kantian Liberal Peace, p. 397.
30 Ottoway & Choucair-Vizoso eds., Beyond the façade, 4-15; Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner & Daniel Blumberg eds., Islam and democracy in
the Middle East (Baltimore, MD & London 2003), p. x-xvi; Wittes, Freedom’s unsteady march, p. 38, 62-66, 87.
31 Ottaway & Choucair-Vizoso eds., Beyond the façade, p. 11-12.
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soften their ideological positions to survive in the new system or punished in the next elections for being incompetent policymakers.33
Although the proponents acknowledge the dangers of a „one time election‟ and bringing anti-Western regimes to power, they claim the West has no other choice.34 Otherwise wars or revolutions will break out that will bring even more illiberal and hostile regimes to power, or more terrorist attacks will follow. By holding elections the group of restless and frustrated youth, who are growing in the Middle East,35 will be able to use their energy in a more peaceful way by participating in the political system, causing them to refrain from cooling their frustration on the West and on political opponents – making the Middle East safer for the rest of the world than it otherwise would be. Besides, by supervising the democratization process – that is, providing financial support to liberal nongovernmental groups and organizations; making aid to autocratic governments conditional on opening up the political arena; and pushing for liberalizing the economy through aid and free trade agreements – the West could also pursuit other liberal policies, such as spreading free market principles and strengthening civil society.36 This way liberal contestants are better able to organize and get their views heard, so the Islamists – who can circumvent the state monopoly on the media by disseminating their views in the mosque – are not the only opposition voice the public knows about.37
The debate on how to spread liberal democracy in the Middle East is complicated by the fact that there is a great deal of overlap between the requisites for democracy and constitutional liberalism, and that they are sometimes reinforcing each other. Meaningful democratic participation would necessary entail basic civil liberties as freedom of speech, press, assembly and association, as oppositional movements cannot operate effectively otherwise, nor can voters make a fully weighed judgment about the contenders.
The proponents of the „all-in-one‟ approach therefore think that having oppositional groups compete with each other publicly, has its own moderating, if not liberalizing effect on politics in the Middle East. Not only do Islamists have to show their true colors to the public – which might reduce their appeal – fractionalization between the moderates and the hard-liners will be triggered as well when internal dissent becomes public. Moreover, freedom of press would also ensure that other opinions would be broadcasted.38 This could give liberal groups finally a possibility to express their thoughts and create a support base – something they have had great difficulty with
33 Wittes, Freedom’s unsteady march, p. 8, 75, 105; Gerecht, The Islamic paradox, p. 51; Fattah, Democratic values, p. 24-25. 34 Wittes, Freedom’s unsteady march, p.6-8, 31-32, 140; Gerecht, The Islamic paradox, p. 12-17.
35 Wittes, Freedom’s unsteady march, p. 31. 36 Ibidem, p. 32, 102-124.
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Ibidem, p. 138-145; Barry Rubin, The long war for freedom. The Arab struggle for democracy in the Middle East (Hoboken, NJ 2006) p. 32-33, 38-47, 100-101.
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due to the fact that authoritarian regimes and Islamists were able to monopolize the very popular notions of nationalism/pan-Arabism and Islam and had means to reach their constituencies, leaving the liberals with little more than promoting „suspicious Western ideas‟ such as modernity, democracy and liberalism with few means to explain these to the public.39 Finally, out of fear of losing power, incumbent regimes might improve their governance skills, which could make the state institutions more in line with constitutional liberalism, for instance, by ensuring the independence of the judge and the rule of law.
In sum, although most agreed with Zakaria‟s claim that constitutional liberalism is a requisite for new democracies to become peaceful to other democracies, the debate in academic and foreign policy circles continued on the question how to achieve liberal democracy in the Middle East in general, and how capitalism, civil liberties and political rights effect each other in particular.
The Freedom Agenda
These questions became more pressing after the 9/11 attacks. As mentioned previously, the Bush administration learned that it was the US policy of supporting authoritarian regimes in the region that had indirectly fueled terrorism. To prevent future attacks, Bush adopted the freedom agenda, which was based on the premises of the democratic peace theory. As a staunch proponent of the theory, he was convinced that spreading liberalism and democracy would create a safer world, and especially a safer Middle East.40
But Bush went even further than the original premises by linking authoritarian regimes not only to war, but also to the use of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The cure against these dangerous regimes would be liberalism and democracy, because they would weed out extremism in both leaders and citizens. According to Bush, liberal democracies would use the energies of the Muslim population in a more constructive way – that is, for entrepreneurship and political participation, and not for religious zeal and violence.41 Accordingly, it would not only be a moral plight, but also in the national interest of the United States to promote liberal democracy in the Middle East. It would also solve the Arab-Israeli conflict in the long term. As Bush made clear in a 2004 press conference, „these objectives - two states living side-by-side in peace and security -
39 Rubin, The long war, p. 11, 41-47, 55-59.
40 George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002) p. i-ii, retrieved 3 September 2009,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss.pdf>; „President and Prime Minister Blair discussed Iraq, Middle East‟, The White
House, President George Bush Archives (12 November 2004), retrieved 27 July 2009,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041112-5.html>; „President thanks US and coalition troops in Afghanistan‟, The White House,
President George Bush Archives, 1 March 2006, retrieved 3 September 2009,
<http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060301-3.html>.
16
can be reached by only one path: the path of democracy, reform, and the rule of law‟.42 Thus in order to pacify Palestine, the creation of a Palestinian state was not enough, it needed to become a liberal democracy as well.
To spread liberal democracy in the Middle East, the Bush administration adopted a very divergent approach: regime-toppling and (liberal democratic) state building in Iraq and Afghanistan;43 stimulating economic liberalization through negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with Middle Eastern governments, and through multilateral economic and educational projects under the auspices of the G8, known as the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative; strengthening civil society through funding nongovernmental organizations and giving professional trainings by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI); and pushing for free and fair elections through high-profile diplomatic and political pressure on autocratic regimes.44
The administration did not treat every country the same, however. There was a hard, all-in-one approach towards weak states and a softer, more gradualist approach towards strong states, especially towards the strategic allies, such as Saudi-Arabia and Egypt. In the weak states, such as Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, where the government had no strong hold on their citizens and little leverage over the US, the Bush administration tried to push for full-fledged elections through high-profile diplomacy. At the same time it tried to work on strengthening – or building – government institutions and liberal civil society organizations.45
The stronger states got a milder approach. Bush did pressure them to hold (more free and fair) elections, but most of these initiatives – even the MEPI which was designed to strengthen nongovernmental groups – were conducted as partnerships with Middle Eastern governments.46 Furthermore, the elections held did not lead to radical change in the domestic power distribution, as the incumbent regimes were still firmly in place and could overrule the decisions made by parliaments. However, U.S. pressure did succeed in persuading many rulers in the Middle East to cede more civil liberties and more political rights to their citizens – at least for a while.47
But after the all elections turned out to the advantage of Islamists in Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine by 2006, and endemic violence erupted in the latter three, the freedom agenda was not as vigorously supported anymore by the Bush administration. Its critique on the backsliding of the strategic allies into violations of civil and political rights became strikingly mild
42 „President and Prime Minister‟, The White House, President George Bush Archives.
43 Although spreading liberal democracy in these countries was arguably more a side-effect of the removal of these regimes for security reasons,
than a policy goal from the outset – the effect was the same as the Bush administration did not choose to install a new „strongman‟ in these states, but tried to build liberal democracies. Therefore it did become part of the new Middle East policy.
44 Wittes, Freedom’s unsteady march, p. 76-101. 45
Ibidem.
46 Ibidem, p. 87-97.
17
or absent. The policy started to resemble more and more the old policy of supporting authoritarian rulers to safeguard their allegiance to the U.S.48
However, due to U.S. pressure the region did see more free and fair elections than ever before. Although the executed policy might not always have matched its goals and rhetoric – especially after 2006 – the region has definitely changed during the eight years reign of the Bush administration. Democratically chosen regimes have been installed in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and, for a brief period of time, also in Palestine.
This leaves us to the question whether the increase in political rights has also brought the goal of the policy – that is, to spread liberal democracy – closer in sight in Palestine. The following chapters will describe Palestine‟s history and analyze the effect of political liberalization
on Islamists, the incumbent regime, liberals, and the separation of power.
48 Wittes, Freedom’s unsteady march, p. 76-78, 99; Peter Baker, „As democracy push falters, Bush feels like a “Dissident”‟, Washington Post, 20
18
2
–
V
IOLENCE
,
PROGRESS AND SETBACKS
To make an assessment of the progress made, this chapter will give an overview of the experiences of Palestine with liberalism and democracy. As will be shown, Palestine has seen many increases in political rights and some significant increases in civil liberties, but has always suffered major setbacks. However, even though government-related democratic institutions were sometimes shut down, democratic practices continued in other organizations. Another remarkable aspect is that Palestine‟s history shows a cycle of violence and subsequent political and civil liberty clampdown, followed by opposition and a period of increased liberalism and innovation. The innovations created their own anti-movements, which subsequently brought back violence and a decrease in liberty. Furthermore, some of the incentives for change were external – caused by neighboring countries, Israel or the U.S. – some of them were internally driven – by ideological differences between different Palestinian factions – but most often they were a combination of both. To show how these dynamics work, an overview will be given of the most important events that have shaped the present situation in Palestine.
Palestine’s political evolution and revolution
After Israel declared its statehood in 1948, neighboring Arab countries immediately declared war. The end result was that Israel increased its own territory, Jordan annexed East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and Egypt seized the Gaza Strip. Although there was no full-scale democratic system in Jordan or Egypt, elections for local governance bodies were held in Gaza and the West Bank. In both areas chambers of commerce emerged, of which the boards were democratically chosen.49 Moreover, Egypt allowed elections in Gaza for the Palestinian National Union in 1961 and allowed Palestinians to have a legislative council and their own constitution.50 West Bank Palestinians were granted municipal elections, but could also participate in Jordan‟s parliamentary politics. Traditional local elites usually won in these municipal elections.51 All the same, political parties started evolving. As early as the 1950s the Palestinian local branches of the Muslim Brotherhood – an international Islamist movement founded in Egypt in 1928 which strives for the recreation of the Islamic caliphate – ran for office in these elections. In addition, local affiliates of the PLO, an umbrella organization of different secular Palestinian resistance movements created in 1964, took part and won from the traditional elites in the 1976 municipal elections.52
49 See the historical overview on the website of the different local branches of the Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture,
retrieved 24 October 2009, <http://www.pal-chambers.org/chambers/chambers.html>
50 Nathan Brown, Palestinian politics after the Oslo Accords. Resuming Arab politics (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London 2003) p. 65; Moshe
Shemesh, The Palestinian entity 1959-1974. Arab politics and the PLO (2nd edition; London and Portland, OR 1996) p. 5-6.
51 Shemesh, The Palestinian entity, p. 70, 181, 250-256.
19
After the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel seized the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, as well as the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. This meant that Gaza and the West Bank were reunited under the same administration. Subsequently, ties between the two territories intensified, which strengthened a sense of national unity amongst Palestinians.53 However, Palestinians lost a form of democratic self-rule, as Israel suspended municipal elections in the late 1970s and made the municipal board subordinate to its military administration in the occupied territories.54 Democratic politics continued, however, by elections for the executive boards of professional unions, chambers of commerce and student unions.55
While the PLO was drawing all the attention of Israel and Jordan with its dramatic terrorist attacks in the 1970s – which led to its expulsion from Jordan in 1970 – the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), al-Mujamma al-Islami, was able to extent and strengthen its organization unobstructed as Israel viewed it as a non-threatening charity organization.56 This changed with the outbreak of a popular uprising against the Israeli authorities in 1987, known as the first „intifada‟. To safeguard its peaceful activities from Israeli retaliation, al-Mujamma created a militant branch, the „Islamic Resistance Movement‟, also known as „Hamas‟, to participate in the struggle against the occupation.57 Its 1988 founding charter stated that its goal was to destroy Israel through armed struggle and create an Islamic state in the entire British Mandate – which includes both Israel and the Palestinian territories – as it was holy Muslim land, which no-one had the right to cede to non-Muslims.58
The exiled PLO leadership saw its influence on the ground wane as local organizations like Hamas gained popularity and respect among the Palestinians in the intifada. To regain its influence, the PLO tried to outbid local movements in delivering a Palestinian state to the people. Accordingly, it declared in 1988 the independence of the Palestinian state and tried to end the occupation by means of a peace treaty, using the PLO‟s international status as „the representatives of the Palestinian people‟ and its powerful connections.59
The peace proposal was warmly welcomed by the International Community, which had long sought to put an end to the conflict. In the presence of US President Bill Clinton, the Oslo Accords were signed in 1993 by PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli president Yitzak Rabbin, by which the PLO traded recognition of Israel, disarmament of „terrorist organizations‟, and an end to
53 Ibidem, p. 28-29; Glenn E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian state. The incomplete evolution (Bloomington and Indianapolis 1997) p. 19-22,
29-30, 38, 132.
54 Gunning, Hamas in politics, p. 28-33; Shemesh, The Palestinian entity , p. 167-168.
55 See the historical overview on the website of the different local branches of the Palestinian Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture,
retrieved 24 October 2009, <http://www.pal-chambers.org/chambers/chambers.html>; Gunning, Hamas in politics, p. 32-33.
56 Wim Kortenoeven, Hamas. Portret en achtergronden, Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël (1st edition; Soesterberg 2006) p. 102-103;
Jonathan Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah. The struggle for Palestine (New York 2008) p. 19-21.
57 Kortenoeven, Hamas, p. 102-103. 58
„Hamas Covenant 1988. The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement‟, 18 August 1988, retrieved 23 October 2009, The Avalon project, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp>.
20
all hostilities, for gradual self-government and a future Palestinian state.60 Following up on the Oslo Accords, in 1994 a government institution, the Palestinian Authority (PA), was created that obtained „full or partial control of up to 40 percent of the West Bank, more than 50 percent of the Gaza Strip, and 98 percent of the Palestinian population‟.61 Complete sovereignty over the territory, the status of East Jerusalem and the fate of the refugees outside of Palestine would be the subjects of future negotiations. As its stated goal was the destruction of Israel, Hamas viewed the peace treaty as a treacherous act of the PLO and vowed to continue „armed struggle‟ to undermine the peace process and the authority of the PA.62
Resulting from the agreements about liberal democratic self-rule, elections were held in 1996 for the presidency and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), which were overall free and fair.63 Although most Palestinians were enthusiastic about the elections,64 the largest opposition groups – Hamas, DFLP and PFLP – decided not to run (officially) for office, maintaining that participating in elections for PA institutions would imply acceptance of the Oslo Accord.65 As a result, the only party of significance that ran for office in 1996 was Arafat‟s own Fatah. Arafat became president with 88 percent of the vote and his Fatah won 53 of the 88 PLC seats. Independents – of whom some were aligned with Hamas 66 – won 35 seats.67 Despite its democratic outset, the PA with all its donor dollars soon turned into a tool for Arafat to anchor his autocratic rule through patronage and a policy of divide-and-rule, by buying off opposition and setting up competing information and security forces.68
Nevertheless, although critics were sometimes „harassed, threatened, arrested, and abused…the pattern of repression was so uneven – and many Palestinians so accustomed to defying governing authority – that remarkably frank and critical discussions remained a staple of Palestinian political life‟.69
In this relatively „free‟ political environment, opposition forces in the PLC – not all Fatah members agreed with Arafat‟s increasingly autocratic rule – joined forces and drafted an interim constitution, the Basic Law, in 1997, and many law proposals which outshone the rest of the Arab world by their progressiveness and liberal content. The PLC also created fairly effective institutions for investigating and documenting corruption and mismanagement in the PA.
60 Entire paragraph, see: Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah, p. 23-40.
61 Freedom House, „Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories [Israel]‟ (2008), retrieved 18 October 2009,
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008>.
62 Robinson, Building a Palestinian state, p. 165-168; Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah, p. 38-43.
63 Freedom House, „Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories [Israel]‟ (2004), retrieved 23 October 2009,
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2004&country=3079>.
64 Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), opinion polls 3- 14, held between November 1993 and December 1994.
65 Shaul Mishal & Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas. Vision, violence, and coexistence (2nd edition; New York 2006), p. 119-140; Amal Jamal,
„State building , institutionalization, and democracy: The Palestinian experience‟, Mediterranean Politics 6, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), 1-30, p. 23.
66 Ibidem, p. 135-136.
67 Freedom House, „Freedom in the World - Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories [Israel]‟ (2004).
68 Nathan Brown, „Requiem for Palestinian reform: clear lessons from a troubled record‟, in: Marina Ottaway & Julia Choucair-Vizoso eds, Beyond
the façade. Political reform in the Arab world (2008) 93-113, p. 95-96; Gunning, Hamas in Politics, p. 44; Jamal, „State building‟, p. 3-13, 25;
Robinson, Building a Palestinian state, p. 198-200; Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah, p. 91, 149.
21
These efforts were complemented by a thriving civil society that kept documenting and voicing its critiques of the PA‟s conduct, despite harassment. Unfortunately, Arafat ignored many of these laws and research reports, and succeeded in intimidating or buying PLC members into submission. Moreover, Arafat kept postponing elections without meeting much resistance from the EU, the US and Israel.70
By the end of the 1990s, Palestinians started to become frustrated and disillusioned with the peace process as there was still no final settlement of all pending issues with Israel and no Palestinian state.71 After the 2000 Camp David Summit on a final settlement failed to produce an agreement, a new intifada erupted. Israel responded by breaking off relations with the PA and conducting raids in the Palestinian territories. The chaos caused by the street violence, Israeli attacks, and the subsequent economic break-down, brought the PA to a near collapse.72
In the intifada Arafat‟s grip on power significantly weakened, especially when Israeli forces put Arafat under virtual house arrest in his compound in Ramallah from 2002 until shortly before his death in 2004. Widespread perception of corruption and mismanagement in the PA further damaged Fatah‟s standing. The weakening of the regime allowed domestic opposition to join forces with Western donor countries to pressure Arafat for reform.73 Subsequently, Arafat ratified the Basic Law in 2002 and endorsed the creation of the position of a prime minister in 2003. To revive the peace process the PA agreed with Israel in 2003 to sign the „Road Map to Peace‟, put forward by the United States, Russia, the United Nations, and the European Union (EU), which stipulated what steps needed to be taken by both parties to reach peace and an independent Palestinian state within three years.74
It was however after Arafat‟s death in 2004 and Israel‟s creation of a „security fence‟ that separated Israel from the West Bank and Gaza, that the intifada effectively came to an end.75 Seeing a chance in Arafat‟s death to implement its freedom agenda, the Bush administration pressured Fatah create a more accountable PA and hold elections. Subsequently, presidential elections were held in January 2005 – the first election since 1996. Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah won with 62 percent of the vote.76 Municipal elections were also held between 2004 and 2005. As those were not a product of the Oslo Accords, Hamas decided to participate. Much to the surprise of
70 Entire paragraph, see: Ibidem, p. 93-98.
71 Khalil Shikaki, „Old Guard, Young Guard: the Palestinian Authority and the peace process at crossroads‟, PCPSR.org (November 2001),
retrieved 23 October 2009, <http://www.pcpsr.org/strategic/occasionalpapers/youngvsoldguard.html>.
72 Brown, „Requiem for Palestinian reform‟, p. 99; Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah, p. 60- 62, 72. 73 Entire paragraph, see chapter 3 and 5.
74 Sharon Otterman, „Middle East: The Road Map to Peace‟, Council on Foreign Relations.org (7 February 2005), retrieved 28 October 2009,
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/7738/#p1>.
22
Western supporters of democracy, Hamas gained heavily, especially in Gaza.77 Hamas had won not only because of widespread dissatisfaction with corruption in the Fatah-led PA and economic hardship, but also because Israel‟s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 gave many Palestinians the impression that Hamas‟ campaign of violence had delivered more to the Palestinian cause than the peace talks of the PA had.78
Although Fatah was weary about holding PLC elections at that moment, the Bush administration pressured it to hold them in January 2006 anyway.79 Having won in the municipal elections gave Hamas confidence of its potential in other elections. It changed its attitude towards PA institutions and decided to run for the PLC elections. However, in order to participate, Hamas had to become a member of PA‟s umbrella organization, the PLO, which had signed a peace treaty with Israel. To justify a PLO membership, Hamas argued that during the intifada the PLO and Israel had broken off relations, and that participating in a PA institution would thus no longer mean the acceptance of the Oslo Accords.80
Partly due to its reputation of being non-corrupt providers of social services, and partly due to the district voting system, Hamas won with 44% of the popular vote 74 of 132 seats, while Fatah won just 45 seats with a popular vote of 41%.81 The results caught both parties by surprise. Hamas, not ready to form a government alone, asked Fatah to form a national unity government, but Fatah, humiliated by the results, declined.82
Israel, the United States, and the EU were horrified by the victory of Hamas – although all of the elections were recognized internationally as free and fair.83 They refused to work with a Hamas-led government as long as Hamas did not recognize Israel, endorse previous PA-Israeli agreements and renounce violence against Israel. Hamas did not give in. Subsequently, the United States and the EU, the largest donors to the PA before the elections, cut off assistance to the government and Israel withheld tax income it collected on behalf of the PA. This caused a heavy recession in the aid-dependent Palestinian economy, which the World Bank compared to the Great
77 In the first round, Hamas won 35.6 % of the votes, thereby taking over 13 of 26 municipalities in the West Bank. In Gaza, Hamas won 78 seats
out of 118, taking over 7 out of 10 councils. Meanwhile, Fatah won 44.4 % of the votes in the West Bank and only 30 seats in Gaza. The victory of Hamas in the other three rounds was impressive as well. See: Mishal & Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, p. xv.
78 Entire paragraph, see : Ibidem, p. xiv-xvi.Are Hovdenak, „Hamas in transition: the failure of sanctions‟, Democratization 16, no. 1 (February
2009), International Peace Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 59-80, p. 67-68.
79 David L. Philips, From bullets to ballots. Violent Muslim movements in transition (New Brunswick, NJ and London 2009), p. 72, 82, 92; Wittes,
Freedom’s unsteady march, p. 81-83.
80 Entire paragraph, see: Hovdenak, „Hamas in transition‟, p. 62-68.
81Palestinian elections, PLC elections results 2006, retrieved 18 October 2009,
<http://www.elections.ps/pdf/Final_Results_PLC_Summary_Lists_Seats_2_En.pdf>; Freedom House, „Palestinian Authority-Administered Territories [Israel]‟ (2008).
82
Philips, From bullets to ballots, p. 84; International Crisis Group (ICG), „Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling back from the brink‟, Middle
East Report 54 (13 June 2006), p. 2, 9-11; Hovdenak, „Hamas in transition‟, p. 68-69.
23
Depression of the 1930s.84 To avoid a humanitarian disaster, aid was channeled to the President‟s Office, thereby bypassing and undermining the Hamas government and its ministries.85
Soon after the elections, disputes arose between the Fatah president Abbas and the new Hamas government. The latter complained the Fatah-dominated PA would not obey its orders due to Abbas‟ obstruction. As it could not get a hold on the security services of the PA, Hamas‟ efforts to achieve its election promise of more law and order were frustrated. In retaliation, it created its own police force and refused to integrate its own militia in a Palestinian army under control of a Fatah minister. This did not improve impartial enforcement of state rulings, nor did it create an environment in which the Palestinian law and international human rights were respected. Both police forces were involved in armed clashes, political assassinations and acts of torture.86
Meanwhile, Fatah grew frustrated as PA finances and the aid-dependent Palestinian economy kept deteriorating as a consequence of the Western boycott of the PA. Gambling on increased public support for Fatah‟s policy of negotiating with Western donors and Israel, Abbas threatened – in violation of the Basic Law – to dissolve parliament and hold new elections in December 2006.87 This heated up tensions with Hamas, which accused Fatah of staging a coup.88
Political bickering was coupled by clashes between Hamas and Fatah militias on the street. Besides fighting Fatah, Hamas also kidnapped in June 2006 Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit – who is held captive to this day. Israel responded by arresting many high-ranking PA members and conducting a large bombardment on Gaza, causing heavy damage to PA buildings. Meanwhile, many ceasefires were brokered between Hamas and Fatah. But they all failed. The most promising was the Mecca Agreement, which Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniya of Hamas signed in February 2007. Both parties agreed to form a „national unity‟ government, live by the „effective laws of the PA‟, support political pluralism, and solve disputes by dialogue, not violence.89
Additionally, Hamas‟ government would „respect…the Arab and international legitimacy resolutions and agreements signed by the PLO‟.90
Although Hamas did not want to go as far as
84
Steven Erlanger, „World Bank imagines dark Palestinian days‟, International Herald Tribune. Africa & The Middle East (16 March 2006), retrieved 22 October 2009, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/03/16/news/quartet.php>.
85 Hovdenak, „Hamas in transition‟, p. 70.
86 Entire paragraph, see: ICG ,„After Mecca: engaging Hamas‟, Middle East Report 62 (28 Februari 2007) p. 17; Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah, p. 99;
Philips, From bullets to ballots, p. 88-92; „From lawlessness to civil war‟, Mideast Mirror (19 May 2006);.Elizabeth Freed, Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG), Fatah and Hamas human rights violations in the Palestinian occupied territories from June 2007 to October
2007 (Jerusalem 2007), p. 3-12, retrieved 23 October 2009, ,
<http://www.windsofchange.net/archives/hamas_and_fatah_human_rights_abuses_documented.html>; Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), „Security Chaos. Clashes between Armed Groups and Security Forces‟ (January 2007), retrieved 23 October 2009,
<http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/weapon/english/2007/report9.htm>; Ibidem, „Clashes between Armed Groups and Security Forces. Internal Palestinian Fighting Continues…‟ (28 January 2007), retrieved 24 October 2009,
<http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/weapon/english/2007/report8.htm>.
87 Philips, From bullets to ballots, p. 86-89.
88 David Hardaker, „Hamas accuses Abbas of launching coup‟, ABC News Online (17 December 2006), retrieved 23 October 2009,
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200612/s1813233.htm>.
89
Schanzer, Hamas vs. Fatah, p. 103; „Text of Palestinians‟ Mecca Agreement‟, Agence France Presse (9 February 2007), retrieved 22 October 2009, <www.lebanonwire.com/0702MLN/07020923AF.asp>.
