Faculty of Governance and Global Aff airs
Testing the rally ‘round the fl ag and
the electoral accountability theory
after major IS terrorist attacks in
the West
Master Thesis
Crisis and Security Management
Kjell Rasenberg
Preface
Before you lies my Master’s thesis for the Crisis and Security Management Program, named “Testing the rally ‘round the flag and the electoral accountability theory after major IS terrorist attacks in the West”. I have written this thesis between February 2017 and April 2018. The research process has proven to be difficult, especially finding the right research question and an operationalisation that fits the question. However, with the help of my supervisors, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Edwin Bakker, I have managed to conduct this research. For their support and guidance during this difficult process, I wish to thank them deeply.
The issue of terrorism has always interested me, as well as politics. Therefore, I always knew that my thesis would be somewhere in this direction. However, I was unsure how to form this interest into a proper research question. After multiple failed attempts, as one always has to fail first to find success afterwards, I managed to finally create the right research question with the right operationalisation. The writing process has been intense, but it was very satisfying to see the idea that was inside my head put into practice in this research. I hope you enjoy the reading of this Master’s thesis.
Content
1. Abstract 5
2. Introduction 6
2.1. Societal and academic relevance 8
3. Theoretical Framework 9
3.1. Rally ‘round the flag theory 9
3.2. Electoral accountability theory 10
3.3. Comparing the theories 11
3.4. Reflection of literature review 14
3.5. Literature in practice 14 4. Hypotheses 16 5. Conceptualisation 18 6. Method 20 6.1. Operationalisation 22 7. Limitations 25 8. Cases 28 8.1. Paris Attacks 28
8.2. San Bernardino Shooting 29
8.3. Brussels Attack 29 8.4. Orlando Shooting 30 8.5. Nice Attack 30 8.6. Berlin Attack 31 8.7. Manchester Attack 31 9. Results 33 9.1. Paris Attacks 34
9.2. San Bernardino Shooting 35
9.3. Brussels Attack 37 9.4. Orlando Shooting 38 9.5. Nice Attack 39 9.6. Berlin Attack 41 9.7. Manchester Attack 42 10. Analysis 44 10.1. Paris Attacks 44
10.2. San Bernardino Shooting 44
10.3. Brussels Attack 46
10.5. Nice Attack 47
10.6. Berlin Attack 48
10.7. Manchester Attack 49
10.8. Overall review 50
11. Reflection 52
11.1. Comparison with cases from 1990 to 2006 53
12. Conclusion 55 13. Bibliography 56 13.1. Literature 56 13.2. Internet sources 57 13.3. Poll links 61 14. Annex 62
14.1. Table of researched polls 62
14.2. Tables of researched newspaper articles 63
1. Abstract
This Master’s thesis analyses the consequences of seven cases of major terrorist attacks on the support for the leader of the country that has been struck, a Prime Minister in the cases in Germany, Belgium and the UK, a President in the France and the US, of the particular country in question from both the public and the political elite. It assesses whether the public and the political elite will rally ‘round the flag and fully support their Prime Minister or President after a terrorist attack has struck the country, or that the public and the political elite will hold their leader accountable for the lack of protection that he or she has provided. This assessment is based on the different findings of the rally ‘round the flag theory and the electoral accountability theory that can be found in the literature on the subject of the consequences of crises for a leader. This research is a case study that involves seven cases of terrorist attacks (the Paris attacks in November 2015, the San Bernardino shooting in December 2015, the Brussels attacks in March 2016, the Orlando shooting in June 2016, the Nice attack in July 2016, the Berlin attack in December 2016 and the Manchester attack in May 2017) in five different countries from the period between June 2014 and the present time. The results show us that in none of the cases, a rally around the flag did occur, but on the other side, in the cases of the Nice, Berlin and Manchester attack, the leaders were held accountable. In the analysis, it becomes clear that in the cases of IS terrorist attacks, the repetition effect and the terrorist threat level is of great importance in the process of a potential rally ‘round the flag or whether leaders are held accountable. This effect means that the repetition of attacks under the same leader decreases the chance of a rally and increases the chance of criticism from the public and the political elite. However, other factors can also play a role in this process.
2. Introduction
Islamic State (IS) is calling for its followers to execute more and more attacks on the territory of the members of the coalition against IS in Syria and Iraq (Daerden, 2017). More and more civilians’ lives have been taken by IS and its followers, both in the West and the Middle-East. Leaders are expected to prevent these terrorist attacks or deal with the situation when an attack does take place. A rally around the flag may occur, in which the people and the political elite stand behind their leader and country. However, the leader can also be held accountable for the attack. The literature is divided on this subject. That is why it is interesting to conduct a research on this issue in relation to IS attacks, which has not been done before. One can ask whether a rally ‘round the flag is still likely to occur when a country has been struck by multiple terrorist attacks. These questions I hope to answer in this thesis.
In my research, I would like to address the issue of the public’s and political elite’s approval of a democratic leader after the occurrence of a terrorist attack. Seven cases of IS attacks that have taken place in France, Germany, Belgium, the UK and the US and its political consequences will be analysed thoroughly. The selected cases have caused the most victims in the West over the past two and a half years, with an exception for the attack in Barcelona. In this period, IS and its followers have been actively executing terrorist attacks in the West, after having already conducting multiple attacks in the Middle East. As almost all of these attacks have been executed by members of IS or its followers, the past two years can therefore be called the IS era of terrorism in the West. The research question is as follows: “To what extent have major IS attacks caused a rally ‘round the flag and/or has the national leader been held accountable in seven attacks in France, Germany, Belgium, the UK and the US since June 2014?”
The question for each case will be whether a rally ‘round the flag has taken place and whether the leader in question is held accountable by the public and the political elite. Which national leader is meant in the research question, will be explained in the method paragraph. Where each case will be analysed deeply and the answers for the research question will be given, a general line might also be found in the results. The results will be analysed by the hand of the theoretical framework that is described in the paragraphs that follow this one.
The research question is particularly interesting, because the literature is strongly divided on this issue. The rally ‘round the flag theory argues that the people and the political elite will believe in their leader when a certain type of crisis hits the country (Mueller, 1970; Chowanietz, 2011; Berinsky, 2009; Brody, 1991; Merolla, Romas & Zechmeister, 2007; Mueller, 1973). The approval ratings of the leaders will go up as both the political elite and the people will stand behind their government, according to this theory. The other theory is the electoral accountability theory. This theory argues that the government is held accountable for their lack of protection in the face of a crisis (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007; Bali, 2004; Montalvo, 2011). The approval ratings and the
support from the political elite will go down as the public and the political elite loses faith in their leader. These theories strongly contradict with each other, but yet both theories seem to be relevant in the analysis of the political consequences of terrorism.
Both theories and its assumptions will be tested in this research by applying them to the seven cases in the five selected countries. The research will be operationalised in the following way. Firstly, the results of different poll organisations from before and after the terrorist attack in the specific country will be used. For example, for the approval rating of President Obama, the results from the polling organisation ‘Gallup’ will be used to analyse the rise or decline in support from the public. In all cases, local polling organisations have measured the approval ratings for their leaders, creating the data I can conduct my research with. The polling results from the data that are as close as possible before and after the attack, with a minimum of three days apart, will be used. To be able to use this crucial data in my research, I am forced to assume that the rise or decline in support is mostly caused by the terrorist attack. This is not ideal, as the causal link is difficult to prove, but it is the only way to conduct this research. If any other major events have occurred that might have influenced the approval ratings, this will be discussed in the analysis. Secondly, reports from national newspapers will be used to determine whether the leader has been criticised by the other (or own) mainstream political parties. In this research, like Chowanietz’s (2011) research, criticism means that a member of the mainstream opposition or the government itself strongly disapproves with the policy the leader of this particular country has conducted in any relation to the terrorist attack, including for example his or her policy concerning the type of perpetrators long before the attack, within ten days after the occurrence of the attack. The criticism has to be related to the policy that the leader conducted concerning the terrorist attack. This does not mean that only criticism to the leader’s response to the terrorist attack is included. Also, for example, criticism to the policy concerning refugees or weapon availability will be included. In general, the criticism should include that the leader has lacked in providing security in any way. Support for the leader from the political elite means that the politicians from the mainstream parties support the leader and express this in their comments. This support or criticism is a major factor in determining whether a rally did indeed take place. The political context of each case will be widely discussed, including the literature that has been written on this case. The specific questions of the polls may differ, but a rise or decline in approval of the public can be witnessed. The newspaper reports will determine whether the political elite approves the leader’s policy or not. Combined with other factors mentioned later in this text, it will be determined whether the theory of ‘rally around the flag’ or ‘electoral accountability’ is most applicable and, in each case, why the theory is more applicable.
2.1. Societal and academic relevance
This research is of high societal relevance. It is important to see how terrorist attacks, in this research in particular IS attacks, affect the support for the leaders of the countries that were struck. The way that is thought of a leader after a terrorist attack has shocked the country, may have changed over the period of time. Where after for example 9/11, the public supported George W. Bush fully when he took the Americans to war (Gallup, 2001), times might have changed. The events on 9/11 turned out to be the beginning of an era and people and politicians figured it was best to unite as a nation. However, as times might have changed, this unity of the nation and a rally ‘round the flag might not be so certain anymore. It is important to analyse the effects of the different attacks in the West that have taken place in the selected time period. One can individually analyse and compare the cases, while a greater line in the timeline can be found.
From an academic perspective, this research is also very interesting. As stated before, there is a clear division within the existing literature on whether terrorist attacks are beneficial for a leader’s popularity or the opposite. Where Chowanietz (2011) and many others have conducted a research on the rally ‘round the flag effect after terrorist attacks, no one has researched the effects that IS terrorist attacks in the West have had on the support for political leaders. With my research, new information will be added to the already existing knowledge. The rally ‘round the flag effect will be measured after IS terrorist attacks, which might differ from previous attacks. With the knowledge basis from other scholars, I will be able to add another piece to the puzzle.
3. Theoretical Framework
As stated previously, the literature on this subject is divided. On the one hand, there is the rally ‘round the flag theory. This theory states that people will stand behind their leader in the face of a crisis, and therefore also when a terrorist attack has occurred (Mueller, 1970; Chowanietz, 2011; Berinsky, 2009; Brody, 1991; Merolla, Romas & Zechmeister, 2007; Mueller, 1973). The theory argues that the support ratings of leaders should go up after a terrorist attack, both of the public as the political elite. The theory is created by Mueller (1970), as he analysed the effects international crises have had on public opinion. He came to the conclusion that in the face of an international crisis, people would support their leader more often than not, making a rally possible (Mueller, 1970). Mueller defined a rally ‘round the flag to be international, it involves the US and the President directly and the event is specific, dramatic and sharply focused (1970). Where I will look at cases outside of the US as well, I shall define a rally around the flag as follows: ‘a large movement of public and elite support in favour of the government in the face of a crisis’. Another perspective is offered by the electoral accountability theory. Even though this theory concerns elections, it is also important for the leader’s approval. This theory argues that a government and a leader is punished for allowing a terrorist attack to occur (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007; Bali, 2004; Montalvo, 2011). Due to the lack of goods, in this case security, provided by the government, the public and political elite will hold the leader accountable and criticize him or her. Therefore, approval ratings of a leader will go down after a terrorist attack has occurred, according to this theory. This theory is thought of by Barro (1973), in which he argued that the people will hold the government accountable for the crisis or attack instead of supporting their leader.
3.1. Rally ‘round the flag theory
Within the rally around the flag theory, two distinctions are also made. Many scholars have acknowledged that wars and crises can create a rally ‘round the flag (Brody, 1991; Hymans, 2005; MacKuen, 1983; Mueller, 1973; Oneal & Bryan, 1995; Ostrom, 1985; Polsby, 1964; Waltz, 1967). However, there is a lack of agreement on how the rallying process is initiated (Chowanietz, 2011: 676). Mueller argues that people will rally around the flag in case of a specific, dramatic and sharply focused international event (Mueller, 1973; Chowanietz, 2011: 676). The rally ‘round the flag theory is widely explained in Mueller’s article, where is claimed that in case of an international crisis, the President or Prime Minister will gain in popularity (1970: 21). The people will support their leader when an international crisis hits the country, with a rise in approval ratings as support (Mueller, 1970; 21). Or as Waltz argues, “in the face of such an event, the people rally behind their chief executive” (1967; 272). Another definition of rallying around the flag is “a very large movement of public and elite support in favour of the government that aims at defending the country in times of peril, a sort of levee en masse (Chowanietz, 2011: 675). Where Mueller (1973) argues that focusing events are determining, Brody
focuses on how rallies develop and particularly how criticism on the government is subdued (Brody, 1991; Brody & Shapiro, 1989; Chowanietz, 2011:677). He argues that the lack of criticism that a government endures in the face of a crisis, is one of the crucial factors that determine whether the people will stick behind their leader (Brody, 1991). Brody distinguishes the political elite, the media and the general population in his reasoning (1991). He focuses on the way the opposition elite criticizes or does not criticize the government’s way of dealing with the events. The two theories within the rally ‘round the flag theory do not contradict each other per se, as they can be combined.
Also today, it is argued that rallying round the flag after a terrorist attack is the way political elites attempt to gain in popularity (Chowanietz, 2011: 693). Multiple authors have claimed that the existence of an external threat increases the public’s support for the political leader (Berinsky, 2009; Brody, 1991; Merolla, Ramos & Zechmeister, 2007; Mueller, 1973), and also for the whole political system (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2008; Jost et al., 2008; Jost, Toorn & Tyler, 2011) (Albertson & Gadarian, 2015: 75). A crisis will improve the way the leader’s charisma is received by the people (Merolla, Ramos & Zechmeister, 2007). Individuals also tend to respond differently to an international threat, making this a crucial aspect in the rally around the flag effect (Hetherington & Rudolph, 2008). This could mean that the public responds differently to the terrorist attack than the political elite does (Jost, Toorn & Tyler, 2011). A leader’s response to a terrorist attack, in for example a speech, can therefore be crucial in creating a rally ‘round the flag. Also, the leader’s way of dealing with the terrorist attack, in terms of crisis management, can play a part in the way that the leader is criticized or not in the days that follow the attack. This can make or break the rally ‘round the flag.
3.2. Electoral accountability theory
However, there is a contradicting theory in this field as well. The accountability theory of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) argues that governments face a trade-off between rent extraction and the provision of public goods (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007: 126). This means that the government needs to provide enough public goods to keep their popularity, especially when looking at elections (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007: 126). In this theory, the government gets ‘punished’ when a terrorist attack takes place. The public good of security has not been provided sufficiently by the government, which means that their popularity decreases (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007: 129). For this reason, it is argued that the rallying around the flag theory is wrong. The people will turn against their government in case of a terrorist attack instead of supporting them, despite the international crisis. This theory looks at the way that governments are ‘punished’ at the next elections when a crisis has struck the country. The leader has then been unable to protect the citizens of that particular country, meaning that he or she will have to face the consequences of the accountability that a leader has (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007). The authors come to the conclusion that the greater the severity of the attack is, the higher the chances are that the government will be held politically
accountable (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007: 129). Criticism is a part of this. This is in contradiction to what Chowanietz (2011) argues, to which will be returned later.
Another research within the electoral accountability theory focuses on the fall of cabinets after a crisis has struck the country, which is the game theoretical approach (Lupia & Strøm, 1995; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007). They argue that after a country is attacked or is facing another major crisis, a cabinet is more likely to fall (Lupia & Strøm, 1995; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007: 127). The reason for this fall of the cabinet is, according to Lupia and Strøm (1995), that a change in power distribution within the cabinet occurs when a crisis like a terrorist attack strikes the country (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007). For one of the parties within the coalition, it can be interesting to force a new election, as they expect to get more votes due to the effect that the crisis brings along (Lupia & Strøm, 1995; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007: 127).
Although this part of the electoral accountability theory is not directly linked to my research, as I will conduct research on the direct consequences of a terrorist attack on the occurrence of a rally ‘round the flag or not, it can still be interesting when discussing the long-term consequences of terrorist attacks, for example the fall of a cabinet. Due to the fact that a majority of the cases that I have selected are in the campaigning period of the election process, this part of the electoral accountability theory might be of importance. According to this theory, parties within the government are more likely to turn against their own coalition after a crisis strikes the country, as their electoral results are likely to have benefited from the crisis (Lupia & Strøm, 1995; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007: 127). Criticism from within the government on the leader of the country could be explained with this part of the electoral accountability theory.
3.3. Comparing the theories
The performance of the government in terms of counterterrorism policy can, in my research, be criticized or not. De Graaf and De Graaff have conducted a research on the subject of effectiveness of counterterrorism measures and the performance of leaders in terms of this counterterrorism policy (2010). They came to the conclusion that a low level of performative power has a more rapidly neutralising effect on radicalisation and political violence than large scale public counterterrorism efforts (De Graaf & De Graaff, 2010: 261). This could also be of influence in my research, as the public and the political elite are able to criticize the government’s counterterrorism measures.
Where Chowanietz (2011) has used a formula to compare the 181 cases he used in his research, I shall look at only seven cases, as I will be able to go more into depth for each case. Chowanietz argues that there are several aspects that have a certain influence on the rally around the flag effect, which he uses in his regression formula. These aspects, factors and effects are the following. Firstly, the magnitude effect plays an important role in the rallying around the flag process. The more victims caused by a single terrorist attack, the more likely a rally will take place. People are more likely to stand behind their
leader, as they are shocked by the attack that the country has just suffered. The political elite does not express their criticism towards the leader, as this could backfire for them due to the rise in public support for the leader. A rally around the flag is likely to occur after a great tragedy. Secondly, there is the repetition effect. “If the government cannot maintain order and security, the political opposition will grow impatient and increasingly critical” (Chowanietz, 2011: 686). This means that the more terrorist attacks take place under the same regime, the less likely a rally will be. Where after the first terrorist attack in a country, the public is likely to stand behind their leader, after a certain number of attacks, people will be more critical for the lack of protection that the leader is providing. Both the people and the political elite are more likely to criticize their leader and government for not preventing the attack from occurring. The magnitude effect and the repetition effect can be potentially contradicting, leading to sometimes different results in the public support and the (lack of) criticism from the political elite. Thirdly, there is the target effect. This effect means that when a symbol of the state is attacked, a rally is more likely to occur (Chowanietz, 2011: 686). Fourthly, the 9/11 effect also has a certain influence on the rallying around the flag process. An attack that has taken place after 9/11 is more likely to cause a rally than one before 9/11 (Chowanietz, 2011: 687). Fifthly, the international terrorism effect means that when the terrorist attack is executed by a foreign group, a rally is much more likely to occur. As I shall only analyse cases after 9/11, as the IS era does not start until 2014, executed by foreign groups, these factors will not be used in my research. Also in the case of a jihadist that originates from the country where the attack takes place, it will still be seen as international terrorism due to the fact that the attack is executed in the name of a foreign organisation. The threat is therefore external, even though the perpetrator lived or was even born and grown up in the country in question. Finally, there is the right-wing effect. It is argued that a right-wing party is tougher on terrorism than a left-wing party, meaning that a rally is more likely when a right-wing party is leading the country (Chowanietz, 2011: 688). However, this can differ per country. Chowanietz concludes that the magnitude effect and the repetition effect are able to influence the support for a leader after a terrorist attack the most (Chowanietz, 2011: 686). Therefore, these are the primary factors that I will look at during this research. In the research of Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau (2007), different factors that determine whether the leaders of countries that are struck by terrorism are being held accountable for the lack of protection provided, were found. Firslty, there is the severity effect. This is the same as the magnitude effect, only it works in the other direction. The more casualties that are caused by a terrorist attack, the more likely it is that the leader of the country is held accountable. This completely opposes the conclusion that Chowanietz (2011) drew in his article, in which the magnitude effect had a positive effect on the support for the leader. Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau (2007) argue that this factor is the most influential. The second factor is the level of the terrorist threat under a regime. When the terrorist threat is high, due to for example previous terrorist attacks, it is more likely that the leader will be held accountable (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007: 126-127). This is in line with the repetition effect from the
rally around the flag theory. This factor is also named as crucial to holding the leader accountable. The third factor is the level of democracy, which depends on what kind of leadership the country in question has. Due to the fact that this factor is a full democracy in all of the cases that my research will cover, this factor will not be included. The fourth factor is the number of purges, meaning that there will be people looting after a terrorist attack has struck. As this rarely occurs in the cases that I will conduct research upon, this factor will also not be taken into account. The final factor is the presence of a civil war, which is also not applicable for my research. Therefore, I shall primarily look at the severity effect and the terrorist threat level to analyse this theory.
Factors rally ‘round the flag theory Factors electoral accountability theory
Magnitude effect Severity effect
Repetition effect Level of terrorist threat
Target effect Level of democracy
9/11 effect Presence of civil war
International terrorism effect Number of purges Right-wing effect
In my research, I shall analyse the effects of IS terrorist attacks on the leaders of the affected country. The factors that play a role in the rally around the flag theory and the electoral accountability theory will be tested in the cases that will be involved in my research. The question is whether the people and the elite will stand behind their leaders or hold their leaders accountable for allowing a terrorist attack to occur. As described in the previous paragraphs, there are two major theories in this field that strongly contradict. The magnitude of the attack and whether previous attacks have occurred in the same country play an important role according to Chowanietz (2011). According to Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau (2007), the severity effect also plays a role, but opposite to Chowanietz, as explained above. Also, the level of the terrorist threat before the attack plays a role. This is rather similar to the repetition effect. When multiple terrorist attacks have occurred before, the terrorist threat level is also higher. These factors are crucial to my research, as they can make or break a rally ‘round the flag. To deeply analyse the different cases in my research, I will have to take these factors into account when looking for reasons why a rally did or did not occur and why a leader has been held accountable by the public and political elite or not.
3.4. Reflection of Literature review
The issues that I argue the literature on the rally ‘round the flag theory is missing, are the following. In Chowanietz’ (2011) research, he analyses the (lack of) criticism that has been expressed by the political elite. However, he only analyses the newspaper reports up to five days after the attack. Debates for example, in which criticism can be expressed, are often not held until a week has past. An example is when George Bush addressed Congress in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks: it took nine days for this to occur (The Guardian, 2001). Besides the debate issue, expressing criticism is often also ‘not done’ immediately after a terrorist attack has struck the country. This is something that Chowanietz (2011) has not taken well into account, meaning that the results might be aiming more towards the rally ‘round the flag theory than it should.
In the research that Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau (2007) conducted, the conclusion was drawn that a terrorist attack would have a negative effect on the support for a leader and the likeliness of a cabinet to fall apart. Their research confirmed the electoral accountability theory. They used data from many terrorist attacks and elections. They came to the conclusion that the support indeed declined, like the electoral accountability theory argues. However, I argue that they did not add enough other factors that played a role in the decline of the support for the leader. Even though terrorism seems to be the only significant factor involved in their research, they could also have added more international factors, which seem to be missing. This could have changed the results of their research, meaning that the results might be leaning more towards the electoral accountability theory than it should.
3.5. Literature in practice
Terrorism has proven to be a consistent threat in Europe and the US over the past decades. This includes the period that has been studied by Chowanietz (2011), in which 181 attacks have been recorded in the five selected countries. I have chosen to limit the research to major IS terrorist attacks. IS has been fighting for a sovereign state in Syria and the Levant for a number of years now (Daerden, 2017). As the West in particular is opposing IS in their wish, IS has chosen to conduct attacks on European and American soil to avenge the bombs that the alliance has dropped on their fellow jihadists (Daerden, 2017). Civilians and sometimes police or military personnel are the target of IS. IS wants the people to hate Muslims, so that the Muslims feel left out of the Western society and join IS instead. This will help IS in their cause. The leaders of the Western countries must attempt to keep the citizens in their countries united, but this is not easy while extremist parties are on the rise. That is why I have chosen to study the consequences that leaders face in Western countries after terrorist attacks.
Leaders are expected to prevent such attacks, but sometimes, they are unable to do so. To keep the public and political elite behind the leader, a rally ‘round the flag would be beneficial for the leader. The leader will not be held accountable for the attack, but the public and political elite will rise against the common enemy. The approval ratings and the potential criticism that the political elite expresses, determine whether a rally did indeed occur or not. Many factors play a crucial role in this process. The magnitude of the attack and the repetition of attacks can contribute to the rally or work counterproductive. Through the analysis of the results, the research question can be answered. Has a rally ‘round the flag occurred, or are the politicians held accountable for the lack of providing security?
4. Hypotheses
In the following paragraphs, I will answer the research question “To what extent have major IS attacks caused a rally ‘round the flag and/or has the national leader been held accountable in seven attacks in France, Germany, Belgium, the UK and the US since June 2014?” But first, I shall give the expectations that I have for the results of this research.
My hypotheses are the following. Firstly, I expect that the magnitude effect and the repetition effect described by Chowanietz (2011) and the severity effect and the terrorist threat level described by Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau (2007) will play a major role in the process of a potential rally around the flag. Secondly, I expect that both the rally ‘round the flag theory and the electoral accountability theory can still be relevant in different cases in this research. Thirdly, I expect that the results will show more cases in which the rally ‘round the flag theory is correct than in which the electoral accountability theory is correct, due to the fact that I have only analysed seven major terrorist attacks.
The hypotheses are predominantly based on previous research by other scholars in this field. The first hypothesis is a claim made by Chowanietz (2011) and Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin and Mierau (2007), as the results in their research show this. I argue that these factors are likely to still play a major role in the process of a rally around the flag. Chowanietz (2011) described more factors that can play a role in the process of a rally, but he mentioned that the magnitude and repetition effect were the most important factors. I also expect the severity effect and the terrorist threat level (Gasseber, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007) to play a role. Despite the fact that the severity effect is in contradiction to the magnitude effect, I argue that the consequences of the attack can work both ways. The magnitude effect and severity effect will not play a role in the same case, but are likely to do so in different cases. This brings me to the second hypothesis, which is based on both the literature as the experience in practice with the consequences of previous attacks. Both rallies around the flag and electoral accountability have occurred in history and it is rather unlikely that one theory has stopped being relevant now. Scholars that have analysed this subject most, came to the conclusion that there were cases of both sides in their research. The third hypothesis is also based on the literature in this field, as more scholars came to the conclusion that a rally is likely to occur after a terrorist attack strikes the country (Mueller, 1970; Chowanietz, 2011; Berinsky, 2009; Brody, 1991; Merolla, Romas & Zechmeister, 2007; Mueller, 1973) than that the public and political elite is likely to hold the leader accountable for the lack of security provided (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau, 2007; Bali, 2004; Montalvo, 2011). Also, I have only conducted research on major terrorist attacks and no minor ones, meaning that the magnitude effect will always play a sort of a role, even though this can be minimal. This means that, according to the literature, a rally should be more likely to occur than that the leader is held accountable.
The hypotheses as described above will be tested and the research question will be answered in the coming paragraphs. Through a thorough analysis of the data that were gathered, the results will come to light. This way, the conclusions for the seven different cases can be drawn.
5. Conceptualisation
The most important concepts of my research will be explained in the following table. Terrorism Politically motivated violence
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience
U.S. Department of State (2000) Ruby (2002)
Approval Ratings A rating of the answers to the question to the people: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way the leader is handling his job?”
Gallup Ifop Yougov Ipsos Mori Rally ‘round the Flag “A very large movement of
public and elite support in favour of the government that aims at defending the country in times of peril, a sort of levee en masse”
Chowanietz (2011)
Electoral Accountability “Incumbent governments face a trade-off between rent
extraction and public goods provision”
Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin & Mierau (2007)
Magnitude of the act The number of casualties caused by the terrorist attack
Chowanietz (2011) Repeated occurrence of terrorist
attacks
The amount of times a terrorist attack has been executed in the same country
Chowanietz (2011)
Major IS terrorist attacks Terrorist attacks committed by IS or one of its (suspected) followers that have killed five or more civilians
Political elite criticism Direct criticism from a member of the political elite towards
any policy executed by the leader of the particular country that may concern the terrorist attack
Political elite support Direct support from a member of the political elite toward any policy executed by the leader of the particular country that may concern the terrorist attack
6. Method
This research looks into the approval ratings of countries’ leaders and the expressed criticism or support by the political elite towards these leaders in a crisis and the potential rallying ‘round the flag effect it may bring along. After a terrorist attack has stuck the country, there are many aspects that determine how the public and the political elite will think of their leader. Factors as the magnitude (or severity) and the repetition of a terrorist attack, along with the terrorist threat level, also play a major role in this issue, according to the different theories. The research is qualitative of nature. It is qualitative as it analyses the cases separately and goes into depth in all cases, but through the results, I hope to find a greater line in the data.
The cases have been selected by four criteria. Firstly, all cases are attacks that have been executed within the IS era, meaning from June 2014 up to now, which is the period that IS has declared their caliphate. I have chosen to look specifically at attacks within the IS era, as these have not been researched in connection to a rally ‘round the flag before. Chowanietz has extensively researched cases up to 2006. I wish to compare the results from his research to the cases of IS terrorist attacks in the same countries. Another reason for choosing attacks that were conducted in the IS era, is that this era has not come to an end yet. This means that the societal relevance of this research can potentially be large. Secondly, at least five people need to be killed in the attack to make the list of cases. And thirdly, the attacks need to take place on Western Europe or in the US. These countries are part of ‘The West’. France, Germany, Belgium, the UK and the US are the countries in the West that have been struck by terrorism in the selected timeframe. These are also the countries that Chowanietz has used in his research with an exception for Spain, where I have included Belgium instead. Chowanietz has used the cases in Spain in his research, but in the timeline that was relevant for my research, no major IS terrorist attacks have taken place in Spain. The Barcelona attack in August 2017 is an exception for this, but due to a lack of data due to the close proximity in time of the attack, I am unable to take this case into account for my research. Because I wanted to focus my research to cases in the West, I have only selected cases from these countries. Leaders are more likely to be criticized by the political elite in democracies, than they are in dictatorships, as this may result in severe consequences, such a prison sentence or worse. For this reason, I only involve ‘the West’ in my research. Finally, the attack has to be executed by or the perpetrator needs to have suspected ties with IS. Even though the attacks have not always been claimed by IS, the perpetrators are sometimes suspected of having ties with IS. This however, cannot be proven. The Charlie Hebdo attack is the only major attack that has occurred within the timeframe, number of casualties and the selected countries, that will not be involved in this research, as it has not been conducted by IS, but Al Qaeda.
The use of approval ratings is not a perfect way to measure the rallying around the flag effect after a terrorist attack. Chowanietz argues “Rallies cannot simply be equated with instant plebiscites in the polls
and must encompass other dimensions as well. Evidently, the support must be massive, but it must also come from different segments of society” (2011: 674). For this reason, criticism or support that is expressed by the political elite, must be looked at as well. To do this, I shall analyse newspaper reports from the same newspapers as Chowanietz has done in his research, up to ten days after the attack has taken place to determine whether criticism and support has been expressed by the political elite in that particular country. Chowanietz analysed the data of five days after the attack took place, but to make sure no expression of criticism or support is missed out, I shall analyse ten days of newspaper articles. The reason for this ten day mark is that, in some cases, the debate concerning the attack is not held until at least a week has past. The case of 9/11, in which the Bush addressed the congress nine days after the attack, was the longest period of time between the attack and a ‘debate’ that I have encountered during this research (The Guardian, 2001). For this reason, I have chosen to analyse the ten days that follow the attack. The newspapers are: The Times in the UK, The New York Times in the US, Le Monde in France, De Standaard in Belgium and Frankfurter Allgemeine in Germany. The newspaper reports are often press releases from the politicians or the party. The selected newspapers are known for their accuracy and trustworthiness in their reports and tend to write from a generally unbiased perspective (Chowanietz, 2011: 683). Opinion articles are not taken into account when looking for criticism, as these are biased. The press releases and interviews should give a clear view of any criticism concerning the leader’s policy around the terrorist attack. Through the approval ratings and the newspaper reports, I will be able to analyse the support or criticism from both the public and the (political) elite. The media by itself will not be part of this research, as there are too many different media and untrustworthy media these days. The focus for looking for criticism should lie within the mainstream political elite, not in the media. For these reasons, I shall only focus on these five quality newspapers to analyse any criticism that has been expressed by the political elite. Due to the limited number of cases, I will be able to go into great depth for each case. The backgrounds, causes and consequences for the leader will be widely discussed for each IS terrorist attack era in the selected countries.
The sources for approval ratings that will be used in this research also tend to differ in their questionnaires. Where one poll asks “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the President / Prime Minister is doing his job as President / Prime Minister?” (Ipsos Mori), another poll in another country asks a slightly different question to the public. This does need to be taken into account when drawing conclusions. However, as the approval ratings between countries will not be compared, this should not pose a big problem. Only the difference in rise or decline in support for the leaders of these countries will be compared. I acknowledge that the polls are not the ideal sources for data, but as these are the only ones available, it is the best possible way to conduct this research.
I have chosen to analyse the support and criticism for the leader of the country. However, there are some differences between the states that will be involved in my research concerning their leaders. In Germany for example, the President was Gauck during the period that is relevant for my research. The head of
state (Chancellor) however, is Merkel. Due to the fact that the Chancellor has more power than the President does (Willenbring, 2012), I have chosen to analyse the support or criticism expressed towards Merkel. In France, the French President was Hollande and the Prime Minister was Valls. Even though they share the power, the President is argued to have more power than the Prime Minister in France (Masters, 2017). Therefore, I shall analyse the support and criticism expressed towards Hollande. In Belgium, Charles Michel is the incumbent Prime Minister and has been since 2014. In the cases in the UK and the US, the heads of state were respectively Prime Minister May and President Obama. To test both theories, it needs to be analysed whether the leader has received criticism or support by both the public and the political elite. The factors that were described in the theoretical framework are used to analyse the background and the reasons for the rise in support or accountability of the leader. When a leader knows both an excessive rise in approval rating and receives support expressed by the political elite, one can speak of a rally around the flag. When a leader’s rise in support is minimal, or even negative, and the political elite has expressed their criticism, one can say that the leader is held accountable. This way, the theories will be tested.
6.1. Operationalisation
To operationalise this research, the following method has been thought of. I shall firstly analyse the data from the polls. From these polls, it will become clear whether the popularity of the leaders of the countries in the selected cases has gone up or down from the period right before to the period after the terrorist attack. As stated before, the polling results will be gathered from different polling organisations from the five countries that will be involved in my research. Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain the data of the polls from the Brussels case, meaning that the approval ratings of Charles Michel will not be taken into account for this research. The sources for the rest of the polls can be found in the annex and bibliography. The public opinion on the leader is only a part of the process of a rally around the flag. As Chowanietz (2011) has stated, this is not enough to determine whether there has been a rally around the flag or whether the country has held the government accountable for the lack of protection of its citizens. Therefore, the newspaper reports from the five selected newspapers to determine whether the leader has been criticised and/or supported, will be used as well. All newspaper articles in the digital versions of the selected newspapers that are related to the terrorist attack from the day of the terrorist attack up to ten days after this attack, will be thoroughly analysed to find any sign of criticism or support. Also in the case of the Brussels, a newspaper content analysis will be conducted. This means that the Brussels case will only be analysed from a political elite perspective. In the annex, the table of all newspaper reports that have been analysed, can be found. The criticism or the support expressed by the political elite will be noted and discussed in the analysis of the results. By analysing whether both the public as the political elite has increased or decreased their support for their leader, it can be determined whether one can speak of a rally or not and whether the leader is held accountable in each case. Multiple factors
need to be taken into account when doing this, as described above. A major analysis will determine wat the exact potential consequences of the IS terrorist attacks are for the leaders of the countries that were struck.
The numbers that will be used to determine whether a rally around the flag has occurred, are the following. For the support of the public, a rise of at least five percent in public support is necessary and there needs to be support from the political elite to be able to call the process a rally around the flag. To say that the leader in one of the cases is held accountable, there should be a maximal rise in support of four percent and expressions of criticism from multiple parties within the political elite. I have decided to choose for these limits for the following reasons. A minimum of five percent rise is necessary to show a significant rise in support from the public. Anything less is not worth naming a rally around the flag. I have chosen for a maximum of four percent rise in support, even when the leader is held accountable for the lack of protection, because a minimal rise in the approval ratings from the public can be seen after many crises, as previous research shows. When severe criticism from the political elite is expressed towards the leader, the leader can still be held accountable. The electoral accountability theory analyses the longer-term political consequences of terrorist attacks. The public’s approval is likely to rise minimally, but according to this theory, will decline on the longer term. The political elite criticism or support was measured in the following way. By reading the articles of the selected newspapers in the ten days that followed the IS attacks, I have been able to create an index of criticism or support expressed by the political elite. This can be found in the annex. By adding up the articles that mentioned criticism, support, or both, expressed by the political elite for each case, and converting this into percentages, I was able to measure to what extent criticism or support was expressed. When more than two-thirds of the reaction of the political elite is on either side, one can speak of clear criticism or support. For each case, the political elite criticism will be discussed in the results.
By analysing the criticism of the political elite and the public’s opinion on the leader of the country that has been struck by a terrorist attack, the research question can be answered. Has there been a rally around the flag after the attack, and/or is the leader held accountable for lacking in protecting the people from this terror attack. As described before, there are multiple factors that play an important role in this process, such as the magnitude effect (and the severity effect), the repetition effect and the terrorist threat level. By analysing each case into depth, taking the backgrounds and consequences of the terrorist attack into account, it can be determined whether the attack was followed by a rally ‘round the flag and/or criticism from the people and political elite. This way, for each case, it can be decided which theory is most applicable. Also, a general trend in all cases may be found. However, an additional larger quantitative research would be necessary to analyse this general trend more deeply.
As can be seen in the coding table in the annex, I have summed up the texts that portray the support or criticism in each article. In the articles that are not shown in the coding table, no signs of support or
criticism were found. All of the articles that are analysed in this research are mentioned in the table of newspaper articles in the annex. The percentage for criticism or support will be measured of the total of articles in which support or criticism is found. If this percentage exceeds 67 percent on either side, one can speak of a significant result. The 67 percent line is chosen as this is widely seen as a great majority internationally. In the open coding, the message of the text is shown. In the axial coding, this message is limited to the meaning of the message. In the selective coding, the message is limited to the intention behind the message that has been given in the text. The open coding can differ extremely from each other, where the selective coding can be the same. In the next paragraphs, it will be explained why certain messages or intentions behind messages mean that there is support or criticism coming from the political elite.
When support is already mentioned in the text, there is little doubt over the fact that this particular person, part of the political elite, supports the government and its leader. In the US, I have chosen to interpret a ‘call for gun control’ as support, as this is a direct agreement with what President Obama has stated in his speeches. When a member of the political elite states that he or she believes in victory, unity or agrees with the words that the leader has expressed in his or her speech after the attack , this can also be seen as support. The leader often expresses the same emotions in his or her speech, meaning that there is an agreement. These messages implied support. As the rally around the flag theory states, the political elite will increase their support for the leader and government. These messages would therefore be in favour of this theory.
When the intention behind the message in the text is that the government has executed a lacking or wrong policy of any kind in the past time, then one can say that the political elite has criticized the government and the leader. A call for the resignation of the leader can also be seen as criticism, as this implies that the leader has acted wrongfully or made mistakes. Also in the cases where members of the political elite stated that another policy than the current one would be better are interpreted as criticism. These statements mean that the current policy is not right, implying criticism. As the electoral accountability theory says, the political elite expresses their criticism. Messages of criticism would therefore be in favour of this theory.
7. Limitations
There are a few disadvantages to the operationalisation of this research and some other issues that need to be taken into account when analysing the results. Firstly, there is the use of polls. Polls are never the perfect source of data for a research. There is not a lot of information available that can tell how many people have responded to the polls, from which regions of the country the people come from, how old these people are and what their political views are. At least not in all of them. This means that these polls can be unreliable in a way that they do not fully represent the society of the country in question. However, to find out what the public thinks of a leader, this is the only way. I am forced to use the data that is given to me in the polls, otherwise this research cannot be conducted. I will have to work with the lack of trustworthiness in the polls, but this is something that every poll-related research has to deal with.
Another issue is the time between these polls. In the US for example, the time is very limited between the polls that are held by Gallup. However, in France, every month a poll is held by Ifop. This leaves room for speculation whether the rise or decline of the people supporting their leader has only been influenced by the terrorist attack in my research. In the UK for example, May has gotten a lot of criticism on her policy concerning Brexit. This could have had an effect on the polls that measure her support surrounding the terrorist attack in the Manchester Arena. This would mean that the results that are shown in my research do not only include the effects of the terrorist attack, but also the effects of other policies that a leader of one of the selected countries has executed. A partly solution for this, is to analyse whether another major event has occurred, besides the terrorist attack in question, and check whether the leader has received much public criticism in the newspapers concerning this other major event. Only this way, this effect can be taken into account. It is practically impossible to totally rule out any effect that another policy or event may have had. However, as the terrorist attacks that were picked in my research were all of a great magnitude, we must assume that the terrorist attack is most likely to be the determining factor when analysing the polls.
The fact that I was unable to obtain the data from the approval ratings of Prime Minister Michel surrounding the Brussels attack, is another disadvantage. In conversations with Belgian polling agency Ipsos, I was told that, due to the fact that the rights to these polling results were sold, I would not be able to obtain these. Where I am able to see to what extent the political elite has expressed their criticism and support, I am not able to analyse what the public thinks of the policy conducted by Michel around the attack. My conclusion will therefore be drawn, in this case, on the expressions of the political elite. The public opinion will be left out of this part. This is a disadvantage and needs to be taken into account when drawing any further conclusions.
The lack of time is another issue. Due to this lack of time, I was unable to conduct a broader research and to involve more cases in the research. I was forced to limit my research to a smaller number of cases
to be able to finish the research in time. For this reason, I decided to focus only on attacks in the West. If more time was available, I could have also involved non-Western cases in my research.
Another point of attention within the operationalisation lies within the data used to recover any criticism or support expressed by the political elite. Like Chowanietz (2011) has done in his research, I will search for criticism and support in the selected newspapers per country. These selected newspapers are known for their objectivity and trustworthiness. However, one can never be certain that the newspaper does not leave any criticism or support out of any kind within the political elite. As it is impossible to search for criticism or support in all the domestic newspapers due to the lack of time, we must assume that the selected newspapers have managed to report the criticism or support in their articles if it has occurred. The media is a difficult issue, as this could also have been involved in my research. However, due to the great number of media these days, not knowing which media to thrust and which not to, also taking the lack of time into account, it was impossible for me to involve the media. This could have an effect on the results of my research.
The cases have been selected on their number of fatalities. Where Chowanietz (2011) took all the terrorist attacks that had at least one victim, fatal or non-fatal, in a certain period of time, I have chosen to limit myself to seven cases. The reason for this is that, with the amount of time that is available, I can only deeply analyse a smaller number of cases. Chowanietz (2011) found the general line or trend by analysing the 181 cases from a more distant perspective. I will look at each case more closely and will analyse the backgrounds of each individual case. A general line may be found, but this is not generalizable, as the amount of cases is too low for this to be possible. Further research would be necessary. Because I only chose to analyse cases with a higher death toll, the magnitude of the attack is bigger and therefore the chance of a rally ‘round the flag is higher than when also cases with a small number of victims are involved in the research. As said before, I was forced to choose a smaller number of cases to be able to analyse each case deeply. The disadvantage is that the results of my research will not be generalizable for other cases of terrorist attacks and their political consequences, as they are researched individually and no pattern or greater line can probably be drawn.
The fact that most newspapers articles are not easily accessible, forced me to only use the web-versions of the newspapers. These articles were accessible and made it possible for me to conduct the research. This could however have made me miss some of the criticism or support that was expressed in articles that were not included in the web-versions of the newspapers. Due to the fact that this was the only way to conduct this research, I was forced to use the web-versions and draw my conclusions from the data that is recovered from these articles.
Another issue that requires attention is the fact that parties that used to be labelled as non-mainstream (Chowanietz, 2011), such as Front National in France or UKIP in the UK, have now become mainstream. These parties used to be widely criticized for their extremist views by both the public and
the political elite (Brady, 2012). However, these days, such forms of extremism in combination with populism have become mainstream. More and more people voted for these parties, giving them more power and making them lose their label as extremist (Brady, 2012). This means that in my research, I will have to involve the criticism expressed by these parties as well. Where Chowanietz (2011), who also analysed the criticism expressed by the mainstream political elite, would have not involved the criticism expressed by these parties, I will, due to the fact that these parties have become mainstream. Expressing criticism by politicians on their colleagues in the government has also become more common, especially during the campaigning period. For these reasons, the criticism expressed by the mainstream political elite might be found more often these days than it was in the years that Chowanietz has conducted his research on. This is an issue that needs to be taken into account.
Measuring the criticism or support from the political elite has also proven to be a difficult process. I was forced to judge in each article whether or not criticism or support has been expressed by the political elite. Because it was not always clear whether or not the political elite has expressed criticism or support, this may have had some influence on the results. I have attempted to judge this as unbiased as possible. There are many articles in which no criticism or support has been expressed. This amount differed significantly per country, as some newspapers published more factual reports without any political interviews than others. Therefore, I have chosen to add up the points of criticism and support and to take a percentage of this number to be able to determine whether there has been support or criticism. The factual reports in which no criticism or support has been expressed will not be taken into account when measuring this percentage.
Finally, the electoral accountability theory primarily focuses on the effects of terrorism on political elections. The leaders of a country are ‘punished’ for the lack of providing security according to this theory, but looks at the consequences this ‘punishment’ has on the upcoming elections after a crisis has struck the country. I however, look at the direct consequences of the crisis. Is the politician held accountable, like the theory argues says he or she would be in the upcoming elections, or does the support for the leader increase? Even though this theory does not completely focus on the short-term effects of a crisis like I do, I argue that also on the short term, this theory can be relevant.
Taking these issues into account, the hypotheses can be tested and the research question can be answered.
8. Cases
In Table 1, an overview of the cases that will be analysed can be seen, including the date, the leader of the country and the number of victims that the attacks have caused in a chronological order. The data is collected from the Global Terrorism Database (2017). The deaths of the perpetrators are included in the number of fatalities, if dead. I shall now give a summary of the events that have occurred during each attack.
Table 1 (GTD, 2017)
Name Country Leadership Date Fatalities and
Injured Paris Attacks France President Hollande 13-11-2015 137
368 San Bernardino
Shooting
US President Obama 02-12-2015 16
17 Brussels Attacks Belgium Prime Minister Michel 22-03-2016 35 270
Orlando Shooting US President Obama 12-06-2016 50
53 Nice Attack France President Hollande 14-07-2016 87 433 Berlin Attack Germany Chancellor Merkel 19-12-2016 12
48 Manchester Attack UK Prime Minister May 22-05-2017 22 129
8.1. Paris Attacks
The coalition against IS had intensified their actions to stop IS from gaining more and more power in Iraq and Syria in 2015, killing many of their soldiers (BBC, 2017). The Western involvement in the attacks against IS had started in 2014, when the bombings began (BBC, 2017). The consequences were that IS was having trouble defending and expanding their territory in the longer run (BBC, 2017). To take revenge for the bombings, IS decided to move the battlefield to the French capital. On Friday night, the 15th of November 2015, multiple attacks were executed. Some were unsuccessful, where others were
very successful. In total, six attacks were executed at the same time. The first was at Stade de France, where a suicide bomber tried to enter the stadium wearing a bomb vest (The Guardian, 15 November 2015). However, he was caught while entering the stadium, and he then detonated the bomb outside of the stadium. The second attack was at the Battaclan, a music theatre where the band Eagles of Death Metal was playing (The Guardian, 15 November 2015). Around 1500 people were present in the concert hall when the terrorist started shooting. After many were killed at first sight, a hostage situation occurred. More were killed, until the police entered and ended the attack. In the end, this attack caused 89 deaths
(The Guardian, 15 November 2015). Four other attacks were executed in bars and restaurants, in the city centre of Paris. Dozens of people have died here as well, totalling the number of victims of the attacks on that night on 137 (The Guardian, 15 November 2015). In the following days, many suspects were arrested in the manhunts in Belgium, including Salah Abdeslam, who is thought to be one of the masterminds behind the attack.
8.2. San Bernardino Shooting
In this case, two terrorists, whom affiliated themselves with IS, executed an attack on the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino. The two terrorists were married. One of them was born and raised in the US but had a Pakistani background, the other was born in Pakistan, but had lived in the US for multiple years (New York Times, 7 December 2015). The FBI argued they had become homegrown violent extremists (New York Times, 7 December 2015). Their religiously inspired travels to Saudi-Arabia in combination with the easy access to weaponry in the US gave the perpetrators both motive and possibility to execute the attack (New York Times, 7 December 2015). They had become inspired by the Jihad and IS, making them willing to do anything in the name of Islam. At the location of the attack, a party was going on which was attended by approximately 80 people. The perpetrators, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, shot as many people as they could. They managed to kill 14 and injure at least 17 more before fleeing the scene in a SUV (GTD, 2017). When the police quickly found out about what the license plate of their car was, they were found quite easily. After a shootout between the perpetrators and the police, both of the perpetrators were shot and killed. This was the most fatal terrorist attack in the US since the events on 9/11 (GTD, 2017). Concerning the political background of this attack, little is known. The fact that they were inspired by IS and its beliefs, is the only reason that they would commit such an attack that can be found. The perpetrators may have wanted to take revenge for US involvement in Syria and Iraq.
8.3. Brussels Attacks
In the morning of the 22nd of March 2016, three perpetrators let two bombs go off in the departure hall
of Brussels Zaventem Airport, killing at least eleven instantly (The Guardian, 22 March 2016). The perpetrators were able to walk into the terminal without being checked, as they let the bombs go off before security. While emergency services rushed towards the airport from the capital, another bomb went off in the city’s metro (The Guardian, 22 March 2016). More than a dozen people were killed in this explosion, and over a hundred were injured (The Guardian, 22 March 2016). The perpetrators were four men who had returned from Syria, where they had joined IS and the organisation was very quick to claim the attack on the Belgian capital (The Guardian, 22 March 2016). Three of the perpetrators had blown themselves up, while one remained a fugitive until weeks after the attack, when he was caught by the authorities, together with another assailant (NOS, 8 April 2016). Molenbeek, a poor part around the city of Brussels, in which a lot of Islamists live, had become a stronghold for jihadists (The Guardian,
