The framing of the sea missions in the
Mediterranean Sea
Master thesis Political Science: International Relations
June 2015
Imrie van Nierop Supervisor: Dr. Stephanie Simon
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank my supervisor, Stephanie Simon, for her support and feedback during the process of writing this master thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank Polly
Pallister-Wilkins for being the second reader of my thesis.
Table of Content
Chapter 1: Introduction ... 1
Chapter 2: Conceptual framework ... 6
Securitisation ... 6
Securitisation: the national state and the EU ... 6
Humanitarian discourse ... 8
Humanitarianism: the national state and the EU ... 9
Migration: tensions between the national state and the EU ... 11
Responsibility ... 11
Approach... 13
Ability and involvement ... 14
Chapter 3: Method ... 18
Case selection ... 18
Discourse analysis ... 18
Texts selection ... 19
Analysing the texts... 20
Chapter 4: Italy’s Mare Nostrum ... 22
Discourse ... 22
Responsibility ... 24
Approach... 26
Involvement ... 27
Critical views ... 27
The end of Mare Nostrum ... 29
Mission Mare Nostrum ... 30
Chapter 5: Europe’s Frontex mission Triton ... 32
Responsibility ... 32 Ability ... 33 Discourse ... 35 Ability of Frontex ... 37 Involvement ... 38 Critics ... 39
Triton ... 40
Chapter 6: Conclusion ... 42
Findings ... 42
Discussion ... 43
Limits and recommendations ... 44
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Frontex has stated that in 2014 about 170,000 migrants crossed the border of the European Union (EU) illegally. They expect that these numbers will rise in 2015 (NOS 2015). On Sunday 19 April 2015 a ship with approximately 700 migrants, coming from Libya and heading for Italy, capsized in the Mediterranean Sea. A rescue mission, consisting of a Portuguese ship, the Italian and Maltese marines and Frontex, was able to rescue some of the migrants, but many of them drowned that day. This event is estimated to be one of the biggest disasters involving a single ship with migrants (NOS 2015a). It led to a top meeting in the EU with government leaders to talk about the situation and evaluate the current mission of Frontex Triton. This is a border security operation in the Mediterranean Sea, implemented after a request by Italy. The mission is made up of voluntary contributions from EU Member States. The meeting intended to agree upon a course of action, as the forecasts predict that the numbers of migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea will rise.
“With the recent tragic events in the Mediterranean, we have witnessed that the management
of external borders has increasingly become a shared responsibility. Frontex, as a coordinator, will play an essential role in its implementation” (Avramopoulos 2015).
This statement of EU Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos shows an involvement of the EU in migration at the Italian coast. It also touches upon the question of responsibility as he puts it as a shared responsibility and mentions Frontex as a coordinator. More action was intended in cooperation with the Member States; what form this should take was also discussed. What already had been done is that the European Council tripled the funds intended for operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Member States provided more vessels and aircrafts (Frontex 2015). This enlarged Triton mission managed to rescue more migrants (Frontex 2015a). Triton not only has more money and assets at its disposal, but also broadens its operational area and aims to take down the smuggling networks (Frontex 2015b). The tragic event seems to be an incentive to implement more action, but this does not mean that the involved actors agree on the best way to do this and are all willing to contribute.
The question of what to do is still present in the EU. The EU leaders have decided on new rules in the handling of illegal immigrants. The intention is to provide the EU agencies
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with more power and the support of Member States. Besides the Member States is the EU Commission trying to give Frontex the power over forced deportations. At the moment this task is under the authority of national states (Guardian 2015). Still the EU leaders and the EU Commission come with separate plans. This all occurs in a moment where Italy becomes more agitated as they think that they are left alone by the EU in their struggle against migration. They argue that the EU has to become more involved. However, what can be seen inside the EU is that its states closing down the own borders (Ibid). Which shows that the Member States have still their own plans next to the EU. All these actors are working on this issue but reaching an agreement is difficult, although it seems that they all realise that they need each other. This brings down the discussion to the questions of where the responsibility must be and what the abilities are of the actors.
While migration across the Mediterranean Sea and the ensuing tragedies is not a completely new phenomenon, these urgent reactions of the Member States are not their default reaction. The Italian island of Lampedusa has been a place where migrants have arrived by sea in order to enter the EU since the 1990s (Dines 2014). This process led to Italy becoming the most porous external border of the EU and one of the most deadly routes (Fargues & Bonfanti 2014). The Mediterranean has even been called the graveyard of Europe (IPS 2014). The situation in Italy at the moment can thus be traced back to the start of the arrival of migrants in the 1990s. This is thus not a new situation, however it has grown into a bigger issue with more tragedies. So even after all those years the situation in Italy is still problematic. But it cannot be said that no one has done something to try to get some grip on the situation. Since 2007 three phases of policies and missions have been conducted by Italy and the EU, targeting migration and the Mediterranean Sea.
The first phase can be called push back policy. This was examined by Bialasiewicz (2012) when she looked at the offshoring and outsourcing of the EU border work. In her study she used the case of Libya, which concluded an agreement about migration with Italy. This policy was active between 2007 and 2009, and consisted of several agreements between the two countries. These were aimed at combating migration by returning all illegal migrants to Libya. This policy was not only used when the migrants reached Italian territory, but ships on the high sea were also taken back to Libya without any form of assessment (Hessbruegge 2012). In this way Italy was able to circumvent EU legislation but fulfilled its obligation to
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protect the border. The policy led to a decrease of migrants arriving on Italian territory, thus Italy considered this to be successful. They also stood by their statement that no laws were violated (Bialasiewicz 2012, p. 857). However overall this policy took place in a suspension of EU norms and standards (Ibid). So in 2012 the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Italy and accused them of breaking the international human rights law when they returned migrants on the sea to Libya without any form of assessment (Vogt 2012).
In a second phase, Italy started a search and rescue mission called Mare Nostrum. This lasted for a year, October 2013 until November 2014. This new mission came as a response to the ever increasing number of migrants arriving to Italian territory from across the sea, resulting in a series of shipwrecks on the island of Lampedusa. The Italian government decided to implement this mission when more than 300 migrants drowned off the coast of Lampedusa after their ship caught fire and capsized. The Italian government wanted to tackle these problems (Marina 2015). After the Italians stopped Mare Nostrum, Frontex followed with their Triton mission. This can be regarded as the third phase of targeting migration in the Mediterranean Sea, which is leaded by Frontex and has a border surveillance policy. This mission of Frontex could only be implemented with the contributions of the Member States, they have to provide the resources. A willingness to become involved is thus necessary from their side.
In their analysis, Carrera and den Hertog (2015) used the cases of Mare Nostrum and Triton but placed these into the wider maritime security strategy of the EU. They used a legal perspective to argue that a variety of actors are involved in the Mediterranean border work and are confronting rule of law challenges and authority struggles (Ibid). They argue that the authority is a main issue. When looking at the Mare Nostrum mission and Triton, with both a different actor this issue still seems to be an important point as the authority is not the same over time.
This authority can be connected to who is seen as the responsible actor. In the statement of Avramopoulos it seems that the EU has now taken the lead of this situation as he states Frontex as the coordinator. However, does this also mean that they have taken the responsibility and so which role is left for Italy? When going back to the beginning, what was the situation before, when Italy started its mission Mare Nostrum and at the beginning of the Frontex mission Triton? Since then not only the actors have changed, but there is also a change
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of attitude in the chosen policy. It went from push back policy via a search and rescue mission to a border surveillance mission. While the initial situation, the migration across the Mediterranean Sea, remains the same, these policies and mission are different in their actors, policies and tasks. Also the way the actors view the situation can be different and reflected in the missions. What has to be kept in mind is that Frontex, as a coordinator, is dependent on the Member States. So what is its ability of the actors and what is the involvement of them? All these differences can be reflected in the framing of the missions by the two actors Italy and the EU. This led to the research question:
How are the Italian and EU border sea missions in the Mediterranean Sea framed in terms of discourse, responsibility, approach, ability and
involvement?
In order to investigate this, the last two missions, Mare Nostrum and Triton, will be analysed, not only because they are different in their overall vision, but also because one is an Italian led mission while the other is a Frontex mission. These differences can be found in their framing of the separate themes of the mission they implemented.
The framing of the missions is the way the actors carry out their missions in accordance with their statements. This is all based on the language that is used to portray the missions, so it is their formal and public face that they show to the outside. This in contrast to what is really going on, which cannot be revealed by the frame. Focusing on the discourse, responsibility, approach, ability and involvement provides a way to discover the overall frame of Italy and the EU. Each of these themes can be framed differently by Italy and the EU. By the use of a discourse analysis the themes of the frames can be ordered and analysed. The reason why the framing is important is that the used language gives a meaning to the reality and enables others to acquire an understanding of the situation. In this sense the frames are also influential because they can affect policies, institutions and actors.
Each of the two cases used here have a different actor and policy, which makes the framing more interesting because this can affect the framing that is used. That these are recent cases gives an opportunity to know more about them while they are not often used.
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Triton is still active, so it can give more understanding of the current discussion by knowing more about its background. By looking at the framing this study stands out from other studies, such as Bialasiewicz (2012) who focused more on EU out-sourcing and off-shoring, and Carrera and den Hertog (2015) who studied the legal aspects. For them the authority is a main issue. This is involved in this research as the responsibility, by looking at it from a different perspective it can add more to what is already known.
The structure of the thesis is as follows. The second chapter is the conceptual framework in which the main concepts according to this question will be laid out. These will involve the discourse that is used, who the responsible actor is, the approach, abilities of the actors and the involvement of the actors. It will be focused towards the different actors, namely the national state and the EU. The third chapter is the method section. The discourse analysis will be explained and linked toward its value for this particular thesis. The case and text selection will be told, and also how the data will be analysed. This is followed by two empirical chapters, the first is the analysis of the Mare Nostrum mission and the second is the analysis of the Triton mission. Both are analysed in accordance with the provided themes. The last chapter is the conclusion, which will provide a summary of the outcomes of the analysis and the answer to the research question. It will be closed with the limits and recommendation that can be made after this research.
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Chapter 2: Conceptual framework
Securitisation
Migration is a prominent topic in political debates. It has even become the main issue in European national elections (Hollifield, Martin & Orrenius 2014, p. 6). The discourse that is used towards migration can vary. A discourse that is often used is the securitisation of migration, whereby migration is transformed into a security issue. Security has moved beyond the military security of the nation state into all kinds of non-traditional security threats. The cross-border movement of people has thereby become a subject of security studies (Huysmans & Squire 2009, p.1). But because of the overall scale of this migration issue it has turned into one of the greatest security concerns of the 21th century in Europe (Buonfino 2004, p.23). The securitisation of migration is done by a process derived from speech acts that links migration to issues like terrorism, crime, unemployment and religious fanaticism (Bigo 2002, p. 64). This issue is framed into a threat, therefore a defence of the referent object is needed. This must be accepted by the audience on which the securitising actor focuses (Léonard, 2010). The way it is framed results in a feeling of fear and need for protection. The link between migration and security is a driving force behind the concept of a Fortress Europe (Kicinger, 2004).
Securitisation: the national state and the EU
The securitisation of migration traditionally involved the state as the referent object, but this has changed. Migration is now securitised not only by the separate nation states but also by the EU. This works with the referent object as the concept of the societal security which is the social creation of a ‘we’ feeling.
“Here, the ‘referent object’ of security is not the state—as either a government or a territorial entity—but the shared identity which constitutes a common social ‘we’, and accordingly: ‘The security of a society can be threatened by whatever puts its “we” identity into jeopardy’”
(Williams, 1998, p.435).
This societal identity can vary across sizes and levels of groups. A ‘we’ feeling can relate to a state like Italy and the feeling that it needs protection against migration. However, it can also be the European community that is the referent object, and that this needs to be protected
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against migration. This can be reflected in the last two missions, of which Mare Nostrum was an Italian mission and Triton a Frontex mission. Each can be implemented according to its own ‘we’. It is all about the societies that not only have certain things in common but also feel that they together constitute an entity (Wæver et al 1993, p.18). What can be said is that if a ‘we’-feeling is successfully created and established it can always be threatened by some kind of issue. This means that an issue such as migration can become a security issue with different groups, depending of the ‘we’ that is created.
The EU has more problems to create one voice than a state like Italy. The reason for the success of constructing a referent object lies in the size and scale of it. At the micro level the groups are too small to gain the attention that is needed while the system level has problems with the security legitimacy. “In practice, the middle-scale ‘limited collectivities’ have
proved the most amenable to securitisation as durable referent objects” (Buzan & Wæver
2009, p.255). This middle scale are limited collectivities; these are states, nations or civilisations (Ibid, p.255). They are, often by rivalry, better able to create a ‘we ‘feeling. The system level has a potential to be a referent object but it will be hard to set up a mass identity, which is needed for securitisation (Ibid). So for Italy it must be easier to frame the migration problems as a threat to the country. The Italians can create a stronger Italian ‘we’ feeling than the EU. This means that EU will have difficulties in getting all of its Member States into a European ‘we’ feeling in order to frame the migration as a threat to the whole EU.
The framing of a ‘we’ feeling is not the only part of securitisation. A step further is looking at outcomes of the securitisation process. By comparing this between a national state and the EU the result is that both outcomes are different. This can be traced to the securitising acts in the EU institutions which cannot be considered in the same way as those by a national state. These acts of a national state have a better reach towards their national audience. The EU has several problems relating to identifying its exact audience, its key securitising speaker and its capacity to use extraordinary measures in relation to security practices (Neal, 2009). Because of these problems national securitisation has a stronger relationship to policy outcomes than the EU does. This determines the possibilities for Italy and Frontex and the missions they can conduct. Italy would have a stronger relation between its framing of migration and the mission that comes out of it.
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The EU has to deal with all of the separate Member States, which still have their own understanding of threat, insecurity and the need for a policy response (Ibid). The separate states can experience the same issue in different ways. The example of this is given by Neal (2009), “the Nordic states have not had the same experience of mass maritime migration as
the Mediterranean EU Member States and this may result in different understandings of ‘threat’, ‘insecurity’ or the need for a policy response” (p.336). The explanation that goes along
with the example is that “representations and perceptions of these issues may vary hugely
according to the varying historical and social experiences of the different national ‘audiences’ involved” (Ibid, p.337). On the EU level these various views and experiences have to blend into
one European policy. Neal (2009) shows the limitations of the securitisation theory according to the EU. This is not to say that there is no securitisation, but the link with policy outcomes is weak (Ibid). The differences between the EU and a state imply that a national feeling is transferred to a higher EU level and then has to become one united view. It is more a combining of nationalities than a full European feeling that is threatened. The link between security and the national state is thus stronger than with the EU because of the nationalist state feelings.
Humanitarian discourse
Besides the securitisation discourse, migration can also be approached with humanitarianism. This discourse has become more common, not only as a discourse but also in practice. It can take many forms including framing and serving as a legitimation (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, p. 54). Lavenex (2001) explains the differences between the two opposite policy frames of securitisation and humanitarianism. The first is called the realist frame which is concerned with the protection of the borders and is turned against illegal migration. On the opposite is the liberal frame of humanitarianism which involves the human rights as freedom of movement and protection (Ibid). It is formulated by Lavenex:
“It focuses on the individual person and underlines the norms of human rights. Accordingly, it is not the cross-border movement as such, but the individual and his or her rights that are the central concern” (Ibid, p.26).
In other words the security of an individual is placed above that of the state (Huysmans & Squire 2009, p.5). In the case at hand this would mean that the migrants are not framed as a
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security threat but the focus is on the humans that are endangering their lives at sea. But in humanitarianism there is a tension because it contains two roles, those of care and control. This led to a paradox in protection because the migrant as a subject must be saved while the territory as an object has to be kept safe (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, p.60). This makes the framing of missions more difficult because if the humanitarian discourse is used the control part cannot be kept out. This adds a security aspect into the humanitarian discourse. This can also be called the safety/security nexus in which both goals are seen as achievable because the border security is framed as the means to increase the safety of the migrants (Williams 2014, p1). This is a way in which the humanitarian framing can succeed without leaving the security part out of it. This because the focus of the frame is still the safety of the migrants, this is framed as the referent object. When the framing of the missions is done with a humanitarian discourse the assumption is that in it there also will be a control of security aspect.
Humanitarianism: the national state and the EU
The humanitarian discourse can vary when used by a national state or the EU. According to Buonfino (2004) the main discourse is still the securitisation but its articulation is changing. The new focus is especially useful in a context where the migration issue has expanded beyond the state to a transnational or even global level (Huysmans & Squire 2009, p.5). This counts for the EU while it is increasingly focusing attention on human rights for “an
identity which aims to present the Union to the world as a novel, moral and supranational global actor”(Ibid, p.25). However, this new identity with the humanitarian discourse is not
such an easy goal to reach, because: “humanitarian concern for migrant welfare is a
paradoxical objective to strengthening European borders where the object is the territorial unit of the European Union itself” (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, p.64). So the humanitarian discourse is
for the EU not entirely in line with its own policies at the borders.
Another difference is the use of the humanitarian discourse by a national state and the EU as regards the way in which the security focus is formulated. For a national state, security is concerned with territory and control over foreigners. For the EU the security lies within a broader context of humanitarianism, rights and protection (Buonfino 2004, p.45). However, this new focus of the EU is only part of the story, because for the national states security is the main point and they bring this to the EU (Ibid). So the EU has to take this in their discourse. What Aradau (2004) found in her study on the trafficking of women is that the humanitarian
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discourse is focused on the victims. Trafficking as a threat was reframed into a threat to the women, the victims. The trafficking policies in the EU took together the security and humanitarian discourse, whereby the humanitarian discourse can be called ‘politics of pity’ because emotions are used to reframe the cases into focusing on the victims. The security discourse is the ‘politics of risk’ because it works with the case itself by means of technologies and risk management (Ibid). This study could be applied to the migration issue, the women could be replaced by migrants.
However, a sharp difference between both is not needed, the whole discourse can be seen as finding a balance between the threat of migration and humanitarian protection (Buonfino 2004). Or, the humanitarian discourse is not the opposite of the security discourse, but it can be accounted for as a by-product of the securitisation process (Bigo 2002). However, humanitarianism as a discourse can also be seen as a form of securitisation. It has the power in it to legitimise extraordinary measures and it can be composed and understood in different ways. In this sense it fits in a securitisation form as it has a referent object which is threatened (Watson 2011). That the securitisation and humanitarian discourse are not two separate discourses but in a way entangled in each other can be linked to the previous mentioned care and control or safety/security parts in humanitarianism. What Lavenex (2001) put forward in this issue of the two sides in the humanitarian discourse is:
“The dilemma in studying these framing processes is that in liberal democracies, immigration regimes always pursue a middle way between these two normative extremes; both aspects, efficient control and the respect of liberal values, are interdependent. Too much liberalism might lead to control deficits and thus undermine state sovereignty and, ultimately, internal security; conversely, too much emphasis on control might undermine international human rights norms and the liberal principle of freedom of movement”.
This shows how the two sides of the humanitarian discourse work in a liberal democracy, this does not necessarily have to be a national state but can also applied to the EU. Both need to find its way between control and respect of values. So the actors should find a certain balance in their discourse as it cannot go too far in one of the sides of the discourse. Overall, the humanitarian discourse towards migration seems to be more used by the EU as their focus is on becoming a moral and global actor, than by a national state like Italy. However as shown is a distinction between the securitisation and humanitarianism not possible. Therefore, it
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should be more seen as a scale on which both are present. The degree of one of these discourses can differ but are probably both present in the overall discourse that is used.
Migration: tensions between the national state and the EU
The migration in Italy is a concern of the state itself but also of the EU. Both have launched a sea mission with a different policy. As demonstrated the discourse that can be used by a national state and the EU can differ. Besides this difference also other terms can be different when used by the two actors. This lead to the question what it means when a national state and the EU are involved in this issue. Which tensions appear when these two actors are involved in the same migration issue?
Responsibility
An important point in the migration issue is who is responsible for the migration problems in Italy, and what influence this has on the missions. First of all migration is firmly linked to the nation state because migrants cross its national borders. For states it has become a threat to their national security which can be defined as: “the freedom from the threats that
put in danger the survival and the development of the society organised in a form of state”
(Kicinger 2004, p1). But it is also based on the idea of the state as a ‘container of the polity’ (Bigo 2002, p. 65). “For the states the term securitisation refers to a perception of an existent
threat to the ability of a nationally bound society to maintain and reproduce itself“ (Faist 2006,
p.104). Migration is also linked with the sovereignty of the state which is the basis of the existence of the state. The border of the state’s territory is the site where the sovereign power of the state to exclude is exercised (Geddes 2005). In this way migration is seen as a national problem for the sovereignty of Italy because the state is the only actor that can exclude the migrants at the border. This is an exclusive right of a national state and can thus not taken over by another actor such as the EU. The number of migrants entering Italian territory is so high that it can be seen as a threat to the national security and sovereignty at the border. Because it evolves around these national issues, Italy can be held responsible for dealing with it.
Although a sovereign state has to deal with migration at its national border, the EU also becomes involved in this issue when it is threatened by migration. It can be framed as a threat to the EU, which can be formulated as:
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“The EU can be existentially threatened by events that might undo its integration process. International regimes, and international society more broadly, can be existentially threatened by situations that undermine the rules, norms and institutions that continues those regimes”.
(Buzan et al. 1998, p.22).
This is in contrast with the state’s existing concepts which are at stake and which the state does not want to lose, whilst the EU has to protect the ongoing process. One such threat that may endanger the integration process is migration. This because it might distract the European integration process as it is not open for non-Europeans. It can also be related to the rules, norms and institutions in a way that migrants can bring different versions of these into the EU and undermine the EU.
With the introduction of the Schengen agreement the EU created an internal zone of free movement of which Italy is also a part. Where the internal borders disappeared and people could travel freely through the different states, the external borders became a European site of differentiation between European citizens, who are able to cross them, and non-EU citizens, who cannot (Apap & Tchorbadjiyska 2004). This shift incorporates the Italian state and Italian citizenship into the bigger picture of the EU. These borders were no longer only national borders but also became Schengen borders, and thus European borders. With this economic integration and mobility, Europe created a ‘fortress Europe’. This metaphor stands for the increasing supranational level which led to a sealing of their external borders to immigrants (Favell & Hansen 2002). Where the focus of the national state is on the sovereignty and national identity, the situation is different for the EU. It focuses more on the danger of migration to public order, cultural identity and market stability (Huysman 2000). According to this stance the migration problem is not so much an Italian problem but the EU is involved in this as well. By creating Schengen as a European space with a closed border the EU made itself involved in the issue of migration. Illegal migration is portrayed as a threat to the EU, because the EU border is crossed and not so much the Italian border. The migrants enter the Schengen area and so endanger the EU, because once they are in the Schengen area they can spread across it.
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Approach
Italy and the EU are thus both involved in the migration problem and the responsibility can be framed to both of them. But this does not have to mean that they talk about it in the same manner. To look at their approaches we have to go back to the setting of boundaries because this creates a distinction between ‘us’ and the ‘other’. The other is used to define the own identity, as the opposite of what they are. The other need to be first defined, and can be somebody “whose position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not
belonged to it from the beginning” (Buonfino 2007, p.27). It is thus the border that decides in
which category, ‘us’ or the ‘other’, someone falls. Because of the ‘other’ the identity needs to be protected (Ibid). For the societal sector an important threat is another identity, and migration is portrayed as such (Wæver et al. 1993, p. 43). The differentiation between them and us can be made nationally on the base of national identity, but there is also a European differentiation. It is not the European identity that is at stake, it is rather the vagueness of a collective political identity in Europe. It can only become a homogenous concept if a European commonality can be opposed to something else, the migrants that are not European. “The
creation of the distinction between EU and non-EU citizens has changed the relation to identity by creating an association of immigrant only with third-country nationals or "colored people"
(Bigo 2002, p.80). It is framing these migrants as the opposed others that ensures that states contribute to a more united EU because they are more connected by this opposition (Ibid). The ‘us’ contains the European community of states and people which can result in a certain kind of ‘clash of civilisations’ with the others (Huysman 2000, p. 758). Hereby the European culture is threatened by other cultures. The approach created by the Member States is mainly for the protection of their national identity. For the EU it is not just about keeping European culture together, national identities also play a role in the setup of the EU framework. The transnational framework of the EU creates a link with the identity of the Member States. The fear that exists on the national level does not only have to be dealt with on that level but is brought into the EU (Buonfino 2004). The framing of the approach towards migration seems the same for Italy and the EU: the migrants are the other.
The national state seems to use securitisation as their main frame by presenting migration as a threat and a security problem for its nationality and sovereignty. But what the immigration problem also does for the national state is to point out the contradiction in its
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democratic government. On the one hand the state holds on to unity, but on the other hand it also puts plurality forward in its approach (Ibid, p.24). The EU has taken over the approach to migration that the nation states have created, so the migrants being a security problem (Ibid, p. 48). Like its Member States the EU needs a ‘we’ identity which is created by the exclusion of those labelled as the others. Whereas the focus of the Member States is on security, the EU puts more effort into turning it to rights and protection, however the security focus of the national states will emerge in the EU.
Ability and involvement
The practices of Italy and the EU do not necessarily have to be a matter of their discourse, responsibility and approach. These two actors are also dependent on their ability to act, which determines their possibilities and limits. Besides that there needs to be a certain degree of involvement. What an actor actually can do depends on several issues. The first has to do with the chosen discourse. There may be a point where securitisation is not the most helpful discourse for a state because it can create the expectation that the state has the capacity to control migration on its own (Boswell 2007, p 592). So the image of what an actor can do and the reality can differ. At the same time it is not only the state that is concerned with the migration issue. From other sides there is always pushing from civil liberty groups or lobbies. So the state can never reach full capacity over the issue (Ibid). The involvement of other actors limits the possibilities of an actor. A main argument for dealing with migration in the EU was the idea of the Member States and the EU institutions that national migration policies are not able to face the problems that are present today in the EU Member States on their own (Moraes 2003). This could be reflected in Italy’s quest for help from Frontex in the form of a mission, which turned out to be Triton. But that does not mean that Frontex will be present with help immediately. Member States need to see a reason to help and get involved, only then can Frontex spring into action.
The EU has become more visible in the migration issue over the years because there has been a transition of tasks to the EU. This resulted in migration policies and agencies on the European level. The involvement of the EU in this traditionally sovereign issue does not weaken the state directly (Marks, Hooghe & Blank 1996). But there remains a tension between the Member States and the institution, and among the EU institutions. The main question for all these actors is where the power should be. Often it turns out that the national preferences
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are transferred to the EU (Leitner 1997). Italy has an interest in this because they want the help of Frontex, but is dependent on other Member States and their preferences.
The focus of the EU practices lies mainly in migration control in the form of keeping irregular migrants out through entry restrictions, border control, detention and deportation (Boswell 2007, p.590). Since the Amsterdam treaty, which created an “Area of freedom,
security and justice”, there was a need for more European measures regarding migration
(Guiraudon, 2000, p.253). Contrary to the focus on the national states Favell (2009) concluded that the migration issue is a European question. However the politics of it are still for a big part a national matter. This is not to say that European cooperation has no effect at all. Border control and entry policies are becoming more and more of a European matter, whereas the immigrant settlement remains in the national realm. The migration issue is under discussion in the EU for more policies. The main problem in this is that the Member States have to be willing to transfer control mechanisms to more effective agencies. The states need to see a form of interest in the involvement of the EU. The EU also has its reasons to expand on this migration issue. This is all a process of taking the internal European integration project to the external border construction and policy (Ibid). The EU is not capable of reacting to the migration issue on its own. There is dependence on the Member States, which have to make it possible by transferring power to the EU. So when Italy wanted a Frontex mission it asked Frontex and they have to create a mission with the Member States.
The main actors are the national state and the EU. However the EU is not one actor as it consist of different agencies. One of them is Frontex, this is the EU border agency that deals with the migration issue. Even as it falls under the heading of the EU, as the main actor on the migration issue it should be included while it has certain abilities and is involved. It was established in 2004 by the EU council. The purpose of the agency is: “coordination of
intelligence driven operational co-operation at EU level to strengthen security at the external borders” (Neal 2009, p.333). The establishment of Frontex is a step closer to a European policy.
Member States agreed and are willing to contribute to its missions. This implies that they see a value in the agency. Frontex is not an entirely autonomous agency, but it is given certain autonomy as regards its staff and budget. However, for materials and support the agency always has to revert to the Member States. It can thus only use its budget with the permission of the Member States. Therefore the missions stand-alone and not a part of an overall plan.
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The main achievement of Frontex is that all related tasks are now under its heading (Pollak & Slominski 2009).
Frontex was established in relation to the migration issue, which leads to the question of its the relationship with the securitisation aspects of migration. Neal (2009) argues that Frontex is not a consequence of securitisation because it does not apply exceptional security policy nor does it use the securitisation language. Instead of looking at the establishment of Frontex Léonard (2010) looks at the activities of Frontex and concludes that these are securitising practices. All activities fall into practices that are implemented in order to combat securitised migration issues or are extraordinary measure. From that vision Frontex contributes to the securitisation of migration in the EU (Ibid). The existence of Frontex is not about securitisation but about jurisdiction over external borders. Throughout the whole of the EU there was a promise made by the EU that this would remain the Member States responsibility (Neal. 2009). Beside the focus on the borders Aas & Gundhus (2015) found some of the humanitarian discourse in relation to Frontex. Human rights and humanitarian ideals are internal used and Frontex presents itself with some humanitarian aspects in it. It becomes more aware of human rights and values. This humanitarian discourse is especially visible in the language of Frontex (Ibid).
But by the coordination of Frontex together with some Member States there is an increase of security practices. It even helps states to conduct practices that they were not able to implement without Frontex (Léonard 2010). But Frontex shows that there certainly is a move from intergovernmentalism to external border management. In the end it became an agency with intergovernmental and supranational elements. This was the best outcome in accordance with the preferences of the Member States (Neal 2009). Léonard also concludes that Frontex is not an autonomous agency, it is dependent on Member States and the European Parliament. So Frontex can thus not be considered as an autonomous securitising actor. Léonard and Neal do not see Frontex in the same way; Léonard is focusing on the practices while Neal does not see the securitisation in Frontex. But lastly Neal points out that even if Frontex is not an outcome of securitisation, this does not mean that there are no securitising political elements. It only contested the link between these elements and institutional outcomes (Ibid). So Frontex does contain securitising elements. However, Frontex
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missions are dependent for a part on the Member States and their willingness to support and become involved in these missions.
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Chapter 3: Method
Case selection
The cases that were used for answering the research question are the Mare Nostrum mission conducted by Italy and the Triton mission formed by Frontex. There are several reasons why these missions were chosen. First of all both mission were in sequence but for dealing with the same issue. However the way they acted differs, Mare Nostrum had a search and rescue policy while Triton is a border security operation. Another reason is that the first mission was a clear Italian mission while Triton is a mission under the heading of Frontex. This makes it possible to investigate the difference in framing between a national state and the EU in the missions. The missions set the timeframe of the research, from October 2013, the month in which the Mare nostrum mission started. The exact starting date of the mission was 18 October, but in order to also involve data from a brief period preceding the actual start, the beginning of the data collection is 1 October. The research covers the period until April 2015. The Triton mission is at the moment of writing still ongoing as are the discussions in the EU about it. Because this is still ongoing, this will not be included as that whole discussion cannot be covered in the time set of writing. Therefore the research will include everything until April 2015, right before the recent events took place.
Discourse analysis
In order to answer the research question qualitative research is needed, as it concerns the framing of the migration issue which in itself is not an objective concept. It is not about an objective observation of migration and actual events, but about the way they are framed. In order to focus on the framing of migration the method that will be used is a discourse analysis. This method provides a way to make the social world more transparent because it can show how its elements interact (Neumann 2008, p.76). Here the discourse analysis will be based on the account of Hajer (2006). His definition of discourse will be used: “discourse is an ensemble
of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (p.67). This definition
endorses the discursive importance that is useful for the framing. Language is the basis of how we understand the world and reality, it gives meaning to it instead of give a neutral description (Hajer 2006). Language also has political influence. It makes politics and can even shift the
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power balance. It has an impact on institutions and policies. The discourse analysis is thus not only the discussion of discourses but about bringing a kind of order in the ideas, concepts and categories that are used (Ibid). The use of the discourse analysis method has three specific advantages. The first is that this method is in particular able to focus on the role of language in politics. Building on that it also shows its place of it in practice. And finally it makes it possible to see mechanisms and answer ‘how questions’ (Hajer & Versteeg 2005, p.176).
Italy and the EU are the actors of the missions targeting migration. Discourse analysis can be used to show the various actors and their behaviour (Ibid). To make this analysis more concrete the coalition discourse of Hajer is used. The starting point for the coalitions is the same in both cases, with the terms and concepts defining the objectives being agreed upon. Where they differ is in their interests and their goals. So even as they have another view on how to react on the policy problem, the problem in its essence can be understand in the same way (Bulkeley 2000). The point of origin is identical: both actors start with the migration issue in the Mediterranean Sea. However from there on they take different stands. This is called a storyline; each actor formulates one and then acts according to it (Hajer 2006). All these lines together contain the discourse coalition. This form of a discourse analysis places more focus on the interpretative and argumentative aspects of policy making. Important in this is the different manner through which actors form their own interests, beliefs and ideas in accordance with their respective policy (Bulkeley 2000).
Texts selection
The data used are written documents of various kinds but including official documents from EU institutions such as the EU Parliament, the EU Commission and Frontex. They will also include official statements by politicians from the formerly mentioned institutions and from the Italian national level. Data from the Italian navy will also be used in the analysis. These documents will be taken from the official websites. In addition to these official documents also other written and relevant documents will be analysed. These will mainly consist of newspaper articles from several national journals. These are interesting as they can provide information over the missions but can also quote politicians or other actors, and thus use resources beyond the official documents. Besides that they are also able to focus on a certain approach subject to the case. These articles are found on the media websites but also through the use of overarching sites as Statewatch and LexisNexis, because these sites contain a big
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amount of articles. Finally, articles by non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty international will be reviewed. These organisations are concerned with these cases and can provide a new and critical approach to the situation.
Analysing the texts
Most of the texts used will be in English. For the analysis of the Mare Nostrum mission Italian texts will also be used; these will be translated with the use of the internet. However, some data and quotes have an English version or are derived from English texts which already contain translations of the Italian quotes or statements. With the amount of data that will be looked at the frame will become clear, because the frame will be repeated in all the data. The collected data will be analysed on the basis of specific themes. The reason to use these themes is that these will be a guideline in finding the frame. These themes are broad concepts that are obtained from the conceptual framework. As they appear in the literature in relation to the actors and migration these themes are proved to be important. Besides its appearance these themes are not fixed items as the can be framed different by the two actors. But all of them are issues around migration that can identify the difference between Italy and the EU. The themes that will be used are:
Discourse
Responsibility
Approach
Ability
Involvement
The first analytical concept is that of the chosen discourse of Italy and the EU; this can be that of securitisation or humanitarianism. However, this is not limited to one or the other, a mix of both is also an option. So the focus will be on the degree of both discourse that is used. The responsibility revolves around the question of who is responsible for the migration issue in Italy. However, it is not about who is the responsible actor but who is framed as such. So how do Italy and EU frame this concept, do they place the responsibility on themselves or each other? By looking at the approach of both it will be possible to see how they frame themselves, their identity, and the other party. Besides these ways of framing, another point is the ability these actors have to react. What possibilities and constrains do they have to deal with, and do
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they use this in their framing? This seems of particular interest for Frontex as they are faced with dependence on the Member States. And finally there is the involvement of nation states and the EU. Who is involved and in what manner? This can be financial involvement, by delivering resources, or by criticising.
These themes will be the guidelines in the analysis of both cases. Because the use of the discourse analysis, these themes will not only generate objective answers. It is all about how the actors frame it. For example, in the end a certain actor can be traced as the responsible actor for the migration in the Mediterranean Sea. This is useful information, but the different actors involved may also point to another actor. That is where the research is about, how do the actors themselves frame the themes. Therefore the method of discourse analysis conducted with the different themes connect to the research question.
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Chapter 4: Italy’s Mare Nostrum
On 18 October 2013 Italy started a sea mission called Operation Mare Nostrum. This mission was active in the Mediterranean Sea for a year until it ended on 31 October 2014. This new mission came as a response to the ever increasing number of migrants travelling across the sea to reach Italian territory. As a result from that development there were also many shipwrecks on the island of Lampedusa. When on one day more than 300 migrants drowned at the coast of Lampedusa after their ship caught fire and capsized, the Italian government decided to implement this mission in order to tackle these problems (Marina 2015). After this tragic event Italy was accused that it had not done enough because the boat was seen too late. Angelino Alfano, the deputy prime minister of Italy said about this: “If they had, they
would have intervened, Italians have big hearts" (Guardian 2013). This statement before the
official start of the mission already showed that the Italian were willing to come into action.
Discourse
The Italian government announced operation Mare Nostrum after a summit on the immigration emergency. The minister of defence, Mario Mauro explained the mission: “It will
be a military and humanitarian operation to boost our surveillance and rescue system on the high seas, and to increase security for human lives” (Mauro 2013). The humanitarian part of
the mission is rescuing people from the sea. The military part is more focused on the criminal organisations (traffickers) that exploit migrants to not only fund themselves but also terror groups (Difesa 2014). By calling the organisations criminal the frame is already made that these are dangerous organisations. With the link between these criminal organisations and terror groups it confirms the securitisation framing. This is a kind of speech act that creates a threat, which is non-traditional but evokes a feeling of fear. The need for protection is also present in this way of framing. Based on this short description of the mission, it seems that the securitisation discourse is used in the military part of the mission by framing the criminal organisations as the threat that needs to be defended against, in other words not the migrants as would be expected.
The rescues at sea seem to fit in the humanitarian discourse as they are focused on the migrants who have to be rescued. With these two sides the mission was supposed to have a
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deterrent effect (Governo 2014). Alfano explained this by saying that the trafficking of migrants would be less attractive by the involvement of more patrols, public prosecutors, the police and the judiciary. These components together should create a frame that deterred people from becoming involved in migrant trafficking (Il fatto Quotidiano 2014). This framing is more aimed at the criminal organisations by emphasising the consequences of their actions; these organisations are hereby also framed as the threat. However, reducing these criminal activities is not the only objective; Italy also wants to ensure that less people will risk their lives at sea. Therefore the mission reached beyond Italy’s territorial waters into international waters and in this way came close to the point of departure. By bringing the aid as close as possible to the departure point they hoped to avoid more deaths and tragedies. With this strategy the safety of the lives of those who want to cross over will be higher, and it enabled Italy to get more control over the migration flows (Nesticò 2013). So not only the tasks, but also the assumed effects of the mission are a mixture of securitisation and humanitarianism, by deterring the threat of trafficking migrants and by deterring people from risking their lives at sea. This already confirms that there is no need to choose between one or the other discourse as both can be used together.
The humanitarian discourse of the mission was emphasised in several statements by the Italian government. Mauro said: “the mission will increase the level of safety of human
lives” (Il fatto quotidiano 2014). Premier Letta affirmed Italy’s view on the humanitarian
importance of the mission: “We find it intolerable that the Mediterranean is the sea of deaths” (Republica 2013). This kind of statements shows that the mission is given an importance with a humanitarian discourse on the situation. Calling the Mediterranean Sea the ‘sea of deaths’ creates a frame that shows the human tragedy that takes place. It uses the ‘politics of pity’ (Aradau 2004) as it plays with the emotions and is focusing on the victims. The humanitarian discourse is in this sense not only used as a frame but also as a legitimation for the mission. What Mauro and Letta both did is using a discourse that is focusing on the lives of the people, it is their safety that is put forward instead of the military and the security aspect of migrants and criminal organisations coming to Italy. As the focus is on the lives of the migrants the humanitarian discourse is present, however it does not clearly states anything about the human rights of these people as would be expected. It can be seen indirect in the focus on the
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lives, so the right of life, but it misses an explicit statement. But the humanitarian discourse is strengthened by the word that is used, the word humans is used and not migrants.
Overall the humanitarian discourse is more used in the announcement of the mission. On the one hand, the focus is more on the wellbeing of the people and on rescuing them. The other hand the military part of the mission is highlighted, which addresses the securitisation aspect. However, not the migrants are framed as a threat but the criminal organisations behind the trafficking are framed as the threat. These are put forward as the problem, and by linking them to terror they have even become a bigger threat. However, the framing of the military side of the mission is mainly expressed in regard to the criminal organisations and besides that in the equipment that is used in the mission (Governo 2013). So there is not chosen for one single discourse but a mixture of both, there is not a perfect balance between them as the humanitarian discourse seems to be more present. The control/care distinction of Pallister-Wilkins (2015) and security/safety distinction of Williams (2014) can be viewed in the framing as the control and security is focused on the criminal organisations and the care and safety is concerned with the migrants.
Responsibility
When Italy explained the reason for starting Mare Nostrum it emphasised its responsibility to rescue the human lives that are in danger at sea (Governo 2013). The feeling of responsibility means that Italy cannot let this happen, which implies that action is needed. It does not mention their responsibility because the migration happens at their border. But by explaining the mission it becomes clear that Italy does not think that the whole mission should be the responsibility of Italy alone. The Mare Nostrum mission was framed by the Italian government as a three-layered system. The first layer should be the concern of an international cooperation which must be focused on the issue of the departure of migrants to Europe. The second layer is border control, which was formulated as the part that the EU should take care of. And finally there is the situation on land, in other words what should happen if migrants manage to reach Italian territory (Il Fatto Quotidiano 2013). By this division Italy frames the responsibility in a broader way so that it takes the EU, its Member States and an international cooperation to handle it.
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From the beginning of the mission Italy incorporated the EU in their framing of the mission. For example, an EU Council meeting with migration on the agenda was planned soon after the start of Mare Nostrum. Italy grasped this opportunity to make the link to the Mare Nostrum mission. Mauro, spoke about a test of the mission in front of the Council. He pointed out that for Europe it is important to remain involved because if Italy itself does not take on the complete situation, the responsibility will be all the more on the EU (Republica 2013). By using explicitly the word responsibility for the EU and showing that it is not only Italy that is involved, he incorporated the EU more in its frame. Another link that was made immediately was with the introduction of Eurosur, the information exchange system to improve border surveillance. The Mare Nostrum mission, Eurosur and Frontex were used as the frame within which the protection of the European coast takes place (Ibid). Thus, Italy broadened their framing by emphasising the EU in different ways.
Mauro (2013) remarked that the EU has created a paradox. Mare Nostrum is a tool that, together with Frontex and Eurosur, takes care of the sea and coast of Europe. Both Frontex and Eurosur are helping to protect the borders and also support the Member States in doing the same. But besides this they also expect that states use the strategies made by Frontex and Eurosur. However, the borders are still under the supervision of the Member States and not, as would appear from Eurosur and Frontex, under the control of the EU. The EU thus allows a free movement inside its borders, and expects the states to work in accordance with the EU institutions. However, in fact it is the Member State itself who is actually responsible (Ibid). This observation by Mauro is important because it shows that the framed situation does not reflect the reality. Mauro also examines in this observation the actors that are involved and what their tasks are. The border is thus framed as European but the responsibility remains for Italy.
According to Mauro, the EU should not only make the strategies and use a European frame but also make it possible to act according to it. Although Italy points to the EU as a responsible actor it decided to start Mare Nostrum on its own. Premier Enrico Letta explained why the Italian government made that decision:
“We are facing a change in the immigration and this requires a radical change of legislation
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institutions and EU parliament when it is about these human lives. We have to act now and that is why the government has decided for this humanitarian mission” (Nesticò 2013).
Through this statement, and that of Mauro, Italy is pushing the EU to participate and take responsibility. Around the beginning of Mare Nostrum Italy placed the responsibility on itself, by using the humanitarian discourse which created a feeling that these people should be rescued. The responsibility that Italy used is focused on the rescuing of human lives, this instead of the responsibility that is connected to their national border. They do not involve their national state, national border or state sovereignty in their framing of responsibility. Also their exclusive right to exclude at their national border is not mentioned. This all seems to be the consequence of the humanitarian discourse with the focus on the lives of the migrants instead of framing migrants as a threat. The lives of the migrants are not a threat for the national border.
Italy has however also followed another way, namely towards other Member States. In a meeting with Finland for example, a bilateral agreement was made that Finland would help Italy. And both countries confirmed their intention to make the EU more effective by strengthening Frontex (Republica 2013). The Slovenian government also agreed to be part of the Mare Nostrum mission (Difesa 2013a). So Italy not only approached the EU directly on its responsibility, but also tried to get the EU more involved via its Member States. It is not only a side road to the EU but by facing the Member States directly it enabled Italy to point to their responsibility as part of the EU as well.
Approach
Italy has framed the responsibility towards itself, but also to the EU. This has led to an approach whereby the ‘other’ is not the migrant but the criminal organisation. This is in contrast to what was supposed in the literature, there the migrants were framed as the ‘other’. The migrants are thus not framed as a threat to the national identity of Italy. But in a sense the ‘other’ also seems be the EU. Italy does not have to protect itself against that other, but it portrays the EU as being another actor next to itself. Italy is not placing itself as a part of the EU, but as in opposition and asking for help. The framing of Italy is confirmed by Letta when he referred to a ‘we’ in his statement “We find it intolerable that the Mediterranean is
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actor who has a moral opinion about the situation. The ‘us’ in the framing is clear, that is Italy. The framing of the ‘other’ is less obvious as the criminal organisations and the EU are put opposed to Italy. The framing lacks a clear ‘us’ and the ‘other distinction, so the ‘us’ is not that much constituted by the framing of the ‘other’.
Involvement
The costs of Mare Nostrum is another point in the introduction of the mission. It was said that these would be covered by the ministries that are involved in the operation. The government said that by calculating the costs one should keep in mind what the costs would be if Italy had not decided to start Mare Nostrum (Governo 2013). This way the government immediately countered possible claims about the costs being too high. And it confirms the frame of a mission that is needed for the humanitarian reasons and is the responsibility of the country. In the first instance the costs were estimated at 1,5 million Eur per month (Libero Quotidiano 2013). However this increased to 9 million Eur per month (The Economist 2014). The costs were announced at the beginning of the mission but seem to have been overshadowed by the humanitarian framing. Because the mission is portrayed as inevitable according to the situation, the costs are a consequence and not a main point of discussion. The lack of criticism about this point in the beginning shows the prominence of the issue. Beside the fact of the lack of discussion about the costs, it clearly shows the financial involvement of Italy in the migration issue. The costs per month of Mare Nostrum are a lot for Italy but they do not use this as a main point in their framing. The involvement of the resources in the beginning of the mission were five naval vessels, helicopters, five aircrafts and two submarines. This was completed by 900 of staff (Guardian 2014). On all fronts the Italians showed their involvement in the situation.
Critical views
The Italian government mainly used the humanitarian frame in justifying and introducing Mare Nostrum. The mission was covered by the media and the government but not at length. The way the Italian government framed the mission was taken over by the media without any real discussion. The lack of attention was also mentioned by premier Letta in December 2013 at his end-of-the-year conference. He said: “Mare Nostrum was an operation
which was not given sufficient prominence politically and in the media”(Ansa 2013). It seems
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a frame must be accepted by the audience. With the mixed frame of the humanitarian and securitisation discourse the audience, the Italians, still accepts it. This is the reason that the this frame could survive. The view of the situation was the same and that the government was right by saying that they could not let this happen. This attitude remained in the first months of the mission, only from April 2014 onwards other voices were also heard.
Among these emerging critical voices was that of the vice-president of the senate Maurizio Gasparri. He advocated the suspension of the mission because it only encouraged criminals to abuse the situation in states like Libya for their own business. Gasparri continued by stating that Italy had underestimated the situation and the EU was ignoring it (Ansa 2014b). This assumed stimulation of migration was also mentioned by Roberto Maroni, the president of Lombardy (Ansa 2014c). The director of the immigration- and border police endorsed this as well but also mentioned that because the mission reaches beyond the Italian coast it makes it easier to smuggle people because they will be saved faster (Ansa 2014d).
Here is the start of an opposition that focuses on the effectiveness of the mission. The main argument is that there is no interest in continuing the mission because Italy is maintaining the problem. With these critical voices the framing and discourse of Mare Nostrum started to change. The humanitarian discourse was no longer the key frame, it was taken over by the critics. At first criticism was mainly aimed at the Italian government and not so much at the EU. But later the EU also became a subject of criticism. The mission was called an overcoming of the shortcoming of the EU, which is totally indifferent towards the situation, as said by Gabriella Giammanco of the party Forza Italia (Ansa 2014l). Sandro Gozi argued that the EU has to end its hypocrisy and start to act in accordance with solidarity (Ansa 2014e). The criticism focused increasingly on the EU. Another point was added by the Northern League, namely that the costs are too high for a problem that is not just national but also European (Ansa 2014f).
The Italian government shared the criticism of the opposition against the EU. Alfano stated that Italy cannot cope with the problem alone. Italy emphasised that the EU cannot let the country down in its struggle against the humanitarian situation and criminal organisations (Difesa 2014b). By saying this Alfano pointed to Italy’s ability, he concluded that it had reached its limit and that help was needed. The problem is too big to cope with as a single state. In addition Italy wanted to make clear that this immigration issue is a European problem, Italy
