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Mediterranean Politics
ISSN: 1362-9395 (Print) 1743-9418 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmed20
The sea as humanitarian space: Non-
governmental Search and Rescue dilemmas on the Central Mediterranean migratory route
Eugenio Cusumano
To cite this article: Eugenio Cusumano (2018) The sea as humanitarian space: Non-governmental Search and Rescue dilemmas on the Central Mediterranean migratory route, Mediterranean Politics, 23:3, 387-394, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2017.1302223
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1302223
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
Published online: 16 Mar 2017.
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https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2017.1302223
PROFILE
The sea as humanitarian space. Non-governmental Search and Rescue dilemmas on the Central
Mediterranean migratory route
Eugenio Cusumano
History institute, University of leiden, leiden, the netherlands
ABSTRACT
In 2016 only, more than 5000 migrants lost their lives while attempting to cross the Mediterranean. To mitigate this humanitarian emergency, ten different non- governmental organisations (NGOs) started conducting Search and Rescue (SAR) operations offshore Libya. While operating at sea ostensibly provides humanitarian relief organisations with the possibility to work free of political interference, non-governmental SAR entails operational and ethical dilemmas, forcing NGOs to accept uneasy compromises on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence that underlie humanitarian action.
Introduction
In 2015, over one million migrants crossed the Mediterranean sea to reach Europe. The death toll was large, amounting to 3771 estimated casualties. In 2016, migrant arrivals by sea decreased to around 360,000. Casualties, however, grew dramatically. Owing to the larger number of transits through the Central Mediterranean route, increasingly dangerous due to human smugglers’ use of more rickety and overloaded boats, migrant casualties reached 5076, making 2016 the deadliest year in the recent history of migration movements to Europe.
Such a large number of deaths at sea has turned the Central Mediterranean into the theatre of a complex humanitarian emergency. Both international non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and smaller, ad hoc charities have attempted to mitigate the humanitarian crisis arising from the absence of large-scale state Search and Rescue (SAR) operations by conducting migrant rescuing missions offshore Libya. Scholars and practitioners have extensively investigated the role of NGOs in mitigating large-scale suffering caused by conflict, natural disas- ters and extreme poverty. Existing studies, however, have overlooked maritime
© 2017 the author(s). Published by informa UK limited, trading as taylor & Francis Group.
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CONTACT eugenio cusumano e.cusumano@hum.leidenuniv.nl
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humanitarian operations, implicitly identifying the humanitarian space with the provision of aid to those suffering during crises taking place on dry land.
Consequently, while humanitarian action on land is regulated by best practices and codes of conduct, no guidance exists on the prerogatives of humanitarian actors at sea and how to ensure coordination and deconfliction between NGOs, coast guards and navies. Hence, investigating humanitarianism at sea is impor- tant from both a theoretical and a policy standpoint.
This profile article – which draws upon semi-structured interviews with NGO personnel and Italian coast guard and military officials, the observation of meetings between NGOs and European law enforcement organisations’
representatives, and a period of fieldwork in Malta and offshore Libya aboard the vessel of the humanitarian organisation Sea-Watch – offers an examina- tion of humanitarianism at sea and its tradeoffs. The nature of international waters, a space where all seafarers enjoy a right of innocent passage and no state jurisdiction applies, may prompt the perception that the sea provides an area for NGOs to operate in full compliance with humanitarian principles. This profile article demonstrates, by contrast, that conducting SAR entails some of the same dilemmas faced by NGOs when conducting relief operations on land, forcing them to accept uneasy compromises with the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence from political actors in order to conduct migrant rescuing missions. To this end, the article is structured as follows. The first sec- tion examines non-governmental SAR operations offshore Libya. The second section briefly introduces humanitarian principles, conceptualising the sea as a new humanitarian space. The third section and ensuing conclusions investi- gate the dilemmas of humanitarianism at sea, assessing the future prospects of non-governmental SAR in the Mediterranean.
Non-governmental Search and Rescue on the Central Mediterranean migratory route
Both large international NGOs and small local charities have long played a key role in addressing the suffering caused by large-scale migrations. The direct involvement of humanitarian organisations in the provision of Mediterranean SAR, however, is a more recent phenomenon. The German NGO Cap Anamur was the first organisation conducting a migrant rescuing operation in the Strait of Sicily in 2004. Upon disembarking migrants to Italy, Cap Anamur’s person- nel were prosecuted for abetting illegal immigration, which forced the NGO to suspend its activities. Italy’s approach to migrant rescuing changed by October 2013, when its navy launched the large-scale SAR Operation Mare Nostrum. One year after, Mare Nostrum was replaced by Frontex Operation Triton, a mission focusing primarily on border control which only operated within 30 miles from Italian territorial waters. The growing number of casualties along the Central Mediterranean migratory route, in combination with Italy’s commitment to
allow for the disembarkation in its ports of all migrants saved offshore Libya, has provided new possibilities for NGOs’ involvement in SAR.
Non-governmental SAR operations restarted with the creation of the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), which in the summer of 2014 launched the first non-governmental rescuing operations from a reconverted fishing vessel, equipped with drones and manned with former Maltese navy personnel. By May 2016, MOAS was joined by the operational branches of Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) headquartered in Barcelona and Brussels and the German NGO Sea-Watch.
In 2016, six other NGOs – SOS-Méditerranée, Sea-Eye, Pro-Activa Open Arms, Cadus, Jugend Rettet, the Boat Refugee Foundation and Save the Children – also started SAR missions offshore Libya. In November, most NGOs have temporarily suspended their operations until the spring of 2017, when migrant crossing will increase due to the improving weather conditions. SOS-Méditerranée and Pro-Activa, however, have chosen to remain operational throughout the winter.
NGOs’ humanitarian operations offshore Libya are based on two different models. MOAS, MSF, SOS-Méditerranée and Save conduct fully-fledged SAR missions that include rescuing migrants in distress and transporting them to the Italian port indicated by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Rome. Organisations with smaller boats, such as Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye, Jugend Rettet, Pro-Activa and the Boat Refugee Foundation, by contrast, focus on patrolling international waters offshore Western Libya, providing migrants with lifejackets and only temporarily hosting them aboard until they are transferred on a larger vessel shuttling them to Italy (Table 1).
Humanitarianism on land and at sea
The notion of humanitarian space primarily refers to those crisis scenarios where humanitarian agencies provide relief assistance. The concept, however, is not merely used to delimit any physical area where large-scale suffering occurs, but also identifies a symbolic space separated from politics where aid workers can operate in compliance with humanitarian principles. Humanitarian principles embrace humanity – or the effort to protect human life and dignity anywhere those are threatened – neutrality – hence the effort to refrain from taking part in hostilities and political controversies – impartiality – namely the tenet that aid Table 1. Migrant rescuing nGos on the central Mediterranean migratory route.
Patrolling, Rescuing and Transportation to Italy Patrolling and Rescuing only
Moas sea-Watch
MsF sea-eye
sos-Méditerranée cadus
save the children Jugend rettet
Pro-activa open arms Boat refugee Foundation
should be delivered based on need alone, irrespective of the race, nationality, and political status of those in need – and independence – the commitment to operate autonomously from political actors and refrain from supporting their economic and security agendas. Many scholars have noted that the humani- tarian space is now shrinking. The growing threat to the safety of humanitarian personnel, now frequently suffering from kidnapping and murder, has reduced their ability to access crisis areas. Humanitarian organisations have tradition- ally considered their adherence to humanitarian principles as a guarantee for their acceptance by local communities and warring parties. However, due to the growing politicisation and militarisation of aid, increasingly tied to political conditionality or seen as a vehicle to achieve the strategic objectives of military campaigns, it has become difficult for humanitarian agencies to remain aloof from Western governments’ agendas and present themselves as truly neutral, impartial and independent actors.
As the humanitarian space is shrinking on dry land, operating at the sea may provide NGOs with the possibility to conduct relief operations in full accordance with humanitarian principles. Given the increasing number of casualties at sea, it is unquestionable that the Mediterranean is the theatre of a humanitarian emergency and effective SAR is essential to preserve human life and dignity.
Unlike relief operations taking place in conflict scenarios, which could inevitably benefit some warring factions, SAR may be conducted in a truly neutral fashion.
Moreover, rescuing people in distress at sea – irrespective of their nationality and status of refugees or economic migrants – should fully comply with the principle of impartiality. Conducting SAR missions at sea may also provide humanitar- ians with greater independence from political authorities than humanitarian crises on land. The law of the sea provides all seafarers with a right of innocent passage, making it illegal for state actors to limit vessels’ freedom of navigation unless in exceptional circumstances. Consequently, humanitarians should enjoy unrestricted access to crises taking place at sea. SAR operations offshore Libya usually take place in international waters, where no state jurisdiction applies, which should further magnify NGOs’ ability to operate free of political interfer- ence. Furthermore, article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – which reinstates the obligations enshrined by the 1974 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the 1978 Search and Rescue Convention – obliges all seafarers to render assistance to those in distress at sea. Flag and coastal states must coordinate and facilitate SAR operations, sanctioning those ships that shy away from conducting maritime rescues. As conducting SAR is not only a moral calling but a duty, NGOs can exploit positive legal obligations to gain and maintain access to the humanitarian space.
In addition, the provision of humanitarian aid at sea is less constrained by logistical and security hurdles than most complex emergencies on land.
Accessing, supplying aid to and conducting relief operations in landlocked, conflict-ridden territories is a complex and costly endeavour which frequently
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endangers the safety of humanitarian workers. Achieving access to maritime migrant routes is relatively less demanding. Chartering and manning a small vessel has proved feasible and financially viable even for small, newly estab- lished charities entirely run by volunteers like Sea-Watch, Sea-Eye, and Jugend Rettet. Furthermore, conducting maritime SAR is not especially dangerous for humanitarian workers, thereby relieving humanitarian organisations of the hur- dles imposed by tight security protocols. NGOs operating in conflict scenarios have frequently been forced to compromise on independence and neutrality by seeking the protection of military forces, negotiating with local strongmen, or hiring private security companies. Such constraints may simply not apply at sea, where humanitarian personnel are relatively more secure than in the midst of most crises taking place on dry land.
The dilemmas of humanitarianism at sea
Considering all these factors, it may be argued that the Mediterranean has emerged as a new epitome of humanitarian space. Not only is the area off- shore Western Libya, ominously labelled the ‘dead zone’, a geographical space where a severe humanitarian emergency has taken place. Due to legal and logistical reasons, operating at sea ostensibly provides NGOs with the possibility to operate in complete adherence to humanitarian principles. The large num- ber of migrants rescued and the proliferation of NGOs providing SAR offshore Libya, which has proved viable even for small, newly established organisations, illustrate the importance and relative feasibility of non-governmental migrant rescuing. The provision of humanitarian relief in the Mediterranean, however, is also fraught with tension and trade-offs, and has confronted NGOs with a host of ethical and operational quandaries.
Indeed, a closer examination of migrant rescuing operations shows that mar- itime SAR may actually be incompatible with a strict interpretation of the prin- ciples of independence, neutrality and impartiality. This is the case for various reasons. Firstly, top-down coordination is a sine qua non for effective SAR to take place. In the case of the area offshore Libya, a key coordinating role is played by the MRCC in Rome, which has taken over responsibility for rescue operations taking place in the Maltese, Libyan as well as Italian SAR zones. Rescuing oper- ations are typically initiated by the Italian MRCC, which demands the closest and most suitable vessels to come into aid of migrant boats after receiving a distress call. SAR NGOs have therefore been in constant contact with the MRCC in Rome, following its requests on when to conduct rescuing operations and where to dispatch their assets. Moreover, NGOs ultimately depend on Italian authorities’ consent to disembark migrants ashore. Migrant disembarkations have to take place in the port indicated by the Italian Coast Guard and Ministry of Interior based on the availability of migrant identification hotspots. While Italy has now committed to permitting a lawful disembarkation of all migrants
in its ports, NGOs’ remain concerned that an unwillingness to cooperate with Italian authorities may entail legal consequences, as epitomized by the prose- cution of Cap Anamur’s crew. Several humanitarians, however, also fear that this tight cooperation with or even de facto subordination to Italian officials may be incompatible with the principle of independence, ultimately causing NGOs to become embedded into the same European border control policies they force- fully criticise. Independence and neutrality alike may be further compromised if some SAR NGOs accept EU and European governments’ funding, which is increasingly likely due to the financial difficulties faced by some organisations.
Operating side-by-side with military and law enforcement actors conduct- ing anti-smuggling and border control activities poses additional dilemmas to NGOs. Italian and European authorities’ pressing requests to cooperate on anti-smuggling and migrant identification matters may force humanitarians at sea to depart from the principle of neutrality. SAR NGOs have provided different answers to this predicament. Specifically, while MSF has deliberately avoided taking any visual materials that could be used as evidence for prosecuting smug- glers, MOAS accepted handing over drone footage aiding Italian authorities’
investigations. Frontex’s recent accusation that NGOs are colluding with smug- glers may prompt some organisations to defend themselves by taking a more proactive stance against smuggling at the price of further compromising on their neutrality. The attempt to involve NGOs in the early identification process may also impact on the asylum prospects of some migrants, thereby forcing humanitarian workers to partly relinquish the principle of impartiality too.
The unpredictability of Libyan security forces is yet another conundrum. On 17 August 2016, a Libyan coast guard patrol repeatedly fired against and then boarded MSF’s Bourbon Argos. As a result of the attack, the majority of NGOs suspended their activities for almost two weeks, restarting SAR only after devis- ing tighter security protocols. At the beginning of September, however, two Sea-Eye personnel were arrested by the Libyan coast guard and subsequently released. In October, a Libyan coast guard patrol aggressively prevented Sea- Watch from conducting a rescue mission, causing several migrants to drown.
The assertiveness of the Libyan coast guard – wary of foreign interference in its territory and increasingly pressed by EU authorities to conduct anti-smug- gling and interdiction missions – has limited NGOs’ access to the ‘dead zone’, prompting them to move further away from Libyan territorial waters or seek the protection of EU military assets deployed in the area. This may further reduce humanitarians’ ability to conduct timely SAR missions and impact on their per- ceived independence and neutrality.
Not only have SAR operations forced NGOs to accept uneasy compromises on humanitarian principles. Humanitarians have also become increasingly aware that the provision of SAR in the Central Mediterranean is fraught with externalities and unintended consequences. All SAR NGOs are fully conscious of the limitations of non-governmental SAR in tackling a large-scale emergency.
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Indeed, organisations like Sea-Watch have relentlessly called for a large EU SAR mission like Mare Nostrum, using their relief operations at sea both as a pro- visional sticking plaster to reduce migrants’ suffering and a political platform to shame EU member states for their failure to act. To date, however, NGOs’
calls for action have remained unanswered. Far from urging the EU to directly conduct SAR, non-governmental migrant rescuing may actually be conducive to an abdication of states’ responsibility, incentivising European countries to offload the moral and legal duty to rescue migrants at sea on civil society. The prospect of NGOs accepting state funding to conduct maritime rescuing may ultimately result in an outsourcing of Mediterranean SAR, an outcome that sev- eral humanitarians consider worrisome. Lastly, as it has sometimes occurred on land – when the flow of aid bolstered warring parties, ultimately worsening the suffering it was supposed to relieve by prolonging conflict – humanitarian action may have adverse effects for those in need at sea too. Indeed, NGOs are now confronted with the concern that non-governmental SAR operations, while morally praiseworthy, may not necessarily alleviate migrants’ plight. Between 2015 and 2016, casualties reported along the Central Mediterranean migratory route have sharply grown, rising from 2913 to 4527. The ratio of casualties rel- ative to migrant crossings has therefore increased from 1:53 to around 1:40 in spite of the larger number of NGO vessels offshore Libya, grown from three to twelve. According to critics of SAR, this is partly due to the fact that the larger presence of rescuing assets close to Libyan borders has incentivised smugglers to adopt riskier strategies, putting at sea increasingly overloaded and unsea- worthy boats. To be sure, changes in smugglers’ strategy cannot be attributed solely to NGOs, but are more likely to be primarily shaped by EU efforts to curb illegal migrations by destroying the boats used by smugglers presently car- ried out by operation EUNAVFOR Med ‘Sophia’ military assets. NGOs, however, are now forced to defend themselves from the simplistic, misdirected and still increasingly vocal accusation that SAR operations – whether public or private – are a pull factor of migration that only facilitates smuggling without effectively reducing human suffering.
Conclusions
The Mediterranean is far from being an ideal locus of humanitarian action.
Operating at sea reflects or even reinforces some of the thorniest dilemmas humanitarian actors encounter on land, forcing NGOs accept uneasy compro- mises on the principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality in order to conduct SAR offshore Libya. Moreover, there have been growing concerns over the unintended consequences of non-governmental migrant rescuing, ranging from incentivizing an abdication of states’ responsibility to the facilitation of smuggling strategies that are responsible for the growing number of casualties along the Central Mediterranean route. Such dilemmas will only be exacerbated
in 2017, when migrant arrivals are likely to remain high or even increase. The EU’s relentless efforts to curb Mediterranean migration flows – already epitomised by the ongoing training of the Libyan coast guard and the transformation of Frontex into a European Border and Coast Guard Agency – will increasingly reduce NGOs’ room of manoeuvre. The possibility that the Italian government may change its stance after the parliamentary elections expected in 2017, no longer allowing for the disembarkation of the migrants rescued offshore Libya, would ultimately make non-governmental SAR in its present form untenable.
In that event, NGOs would either be forced to suspend their activities or accept returning migrants to Africa if an agreement between the EU and some Southern Mediterranean states is reached, ultimately becoming reluctant participants in migrant interdiction efforts. Investigating the importance and tradeoffs of humanitarianism at sea is therefore all the more needed. This profile article has provided a first step towards disentangling the dilemmas of non-governmental SAR along the Central Mediterranean route, seeking to start a debate involving scholars of humanitarianism, security and migrations alike.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
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