Heroes versus Money Makers: Should Crisis Response Strategies of Aid Organisations Differ from those of Profitable Companies?

Heroes versus Money Makers:

Should Crisis Response Strategies of Aid Organisations Differ from those of

Profitable Companies?

Master’s Thesis

MSc Crisis and Security Management Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs

Benthe de Ridder S1691767

Thesis supervisor: Dr. Wouter Jong Second reader: Dr. Sanneke Kuipers

Word count: 24337 10-01-2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 2

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 6

3 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 10

4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK IN THE SETTING OF NPOS AND AID ORGANISATIONS 16

4.1 Public expectations of NPOs 16

4.2 Trust and NPOs 16

4.3 Solutions to Rebuild Broken Trust 17

4.4 Reputation 18

4.6 Conclusion 20

5 LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST NPO-CRISES 22

5.1 Background to the transgressional crises 22

5.2 What can emergency aid organisations expect in a transgressional crisis? 23

5.3 Conclusion 27

6 PROPOSING CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR NPOS 29

6.1 Determinants of appropriate communications strategies in the context of NPOs 29 6.2 Applicability of SCCT strategies to aid organisations 32

6.3 Missing elements in SCCT 37

6.4 Conclusion 39

7 CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR AID ORGANISATIONS: THE PRACTICIONERS’

PERSPECTIVE 41

7.1 Methodology interviews - conduct, coding and analysis 41

7.2 To what extent is crisis communication for aid organisations different from that of POs? 42 7.3 The Vignette Study: Comparing SCCT to Expert Recommendations 46 7.4 Which determinants influence the communication strategy that respondents choose? 57

7.5 Conclusion 62

8 CONCLUSION 64

9 DISCUSSION 68

BIBLIOGRAPHY 71

APPENDICES 81

Appendix 1: Full text vignette YoungAid 81

Appendix 2: Background experts 82

Appendix 3: Coding schemes 84

1 INTRODUCTION

For international emergency aid organisations based in Western-Europe, the years 2018 and 2019 were years of reputational crises: the #MeToo movement echoed within the charity sector. Within this short time span, senior staff of Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK and Médecins Sans Frontiers were implicated in allegations of sexual misconduct of aid receiving locals and staff members (“Oxfam Haiti Allegations”; Charity Commission 2018; Perkins 2018). What has been coined the #AidToo movement (Hodal 2019; Gullan 2018) started with an article in The Times (O’Neill 2018), reporting that senior staff of Oxfam GB sexually abused Haitian women during their aid work. In a series of events, the Red Cross; Save the Children and Doctors Without Borders, have been implicated in matters of sexual misconduct. Consequently, 7000 people cancelled their donations to Oxfam GB and Save the Children suffered from a 67-million-pound reduction in funding and donations (“Oxfam Haiti Allegations” 2018; Marsh 2018).

Within the field of organisational crisis management, crises are defined as events that threaten the reputation of an organisation (Barton 1993). In restoring an organisation's image during and after a crisis, researchers deem crisis communication crucial (Coombs and Holladay 2010). Communication is a powerful tool to influence public perception of the organisational reliability and stability by framing issues in a particular way (Vos et al. 2017 Vos and Schoemaker 2011). Therefore, scholars have proposed numerous guidelines for effective crisis communication for organisations (Russ 1991; Benoit 2003; Dardis and Haigh 2009). One of the leading scholars in this field and whose work serves a foundation for many others is Coombs. With his Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT), Coombs (1995) contends that the effectiveness of one’s crisis communication depends on the characteristics of the crisis one is faced with. He distinguishes several features that should determine how organisations should shape their crisis communication. As such, he proposes seven different crisis response strategies which are effective for the type of crisis that they are matched to (Coombs 1995; 2007).

In profitable organisations, reputational damage might manifest in negative media attention and a drop in revenues. Non-profit organisations (NPOs), including emergency aid organisations such as Oxfam or Save the Children, do not depend on their reputation for profit. Instead, NPOs receive funding from a multitude of sources (donors, government, international institutions,

corporations, etc). Their reputation is essential as NPOs depend on people’s and institutions’ willingness to donate (Sisco et al. 2010; Frumkin 2002). The organisation’s reputation is one of the key characteristics that influences people’s willingness to donate (Schloderer et al. 2014). Like profitable organisations (POs), NPOs too suffer from severe reputational crises as is illustrated by the #AidToo events (Gaskin 1999, 165-166). Yet, communication research has paid little to no attention to NPO crisis communication. To illustrate, Coombs claims that SCCT includes crisis response guidelines for ‘organisations’ but he only employed examples of profitable organisations (POs) in developing his argument (Coombs 2014, 458; 459; 469).

In other academic disciplines, strategies and theories originally designed for profitable businesses have been applied to the non-profit sector in an increasingly common fashion (Tapp 1996; Saxton 1994). Due to its rapid growth in the 1980s, the non-profit sector has undergone a process of professionalisation, a term which refers to the adoption of business-like strategies to maximise funding or efficiency of operation. Within the NPO sector, especially marketing, sales and brand management strategies have been adopted (Tapp 1996).

The professionalisation of NPOs has not been a sudden desire of NPOs to resemble POs nor was it a transition taking place in a void. Rather, two recent social-economic developments have fed the perceived need of NPOs to commercialise or professionalise. First, NPOs have to compete for limited resources in a diverse field of competition (Sakhon et al. 2010; Saxton 1994). In the Netherlands alone, the registered number of NPOs that serve public interest (having a so-called recognised ‘ANBI status’) grew from 12.000 early 2000s to over 50.000 according to the most recent data of Goededoelen.nl. Of these 50.000, it is estimated that 500 to 600 actively seek national fundraising. Note that the number of NPOs that seek local fundraising is unknown (Goededoelen.nl “veelgestelde vragen”). In other European countries a similar expansion and fragmentation of the charity sector can be detected (Hankinson 2001). In the face of the increasing competitiveness for funding and donations, research of the mid-90s suggested that NPOs needed to exploit their branding more effectively (Tapp 1996). Scholars like Tapp (1996), Roberts-Wray (1994) and Saxton (1994) contend that only with tailored branding and marketing strategies charities would be able to survive competition over funding and donations. Moreover, these strategies would help consumers to navigate better through the variety of causes and organisations.

A financial incentive has thus underlain the transition of NPOs toward a more commercial way of work.

Secondly, public institutions and donors have been expecting more (financial) accountability from NPOs (Sloan 2009). The demand for accountability resulted in organisation reforms including decentralisation, paid wages for professionals and streamlined hierarchies (Clifford and Backus 2010; Eikenberry and Kluver 2004; Sloan 2009). The organisational reforms are sustainable because they seem to please the donors. Sloan (2009) found that donors are more likely to donate to NPOs with high accountability ratings given by NPO-monitoring institutions.

The commercialisation of NPOs has both been hailed and scrutinised in academia. One side of the debate argues that the new marketing and branding strategies have increased NPOs’ efficiency, income, consumer trust and improved awareness (Stride 2006, 116; Ritchie et al. 1998; Hankinson 2001). Accordingly, the professionalisation has helped NPOs to further their cause. Other scholars warn for over-commercialisation and loss of identity (Sternberg 1998; Salamon 1999). Saxton argues that branding strategies from profitable businesses are not one-size-fits solutions, calling them ill-fitting intellectual hand-me-down[s]” (in Sternberg 1998). While scholarly opinions differ on whether this trend of professionalization is desirable (Stride 2006), the reality is that NPOs have started to adopt marketing and communication strategies typical for profitable organisations. The question arises if this trend could or should be extrapolated to the field of crisis communication.

Given that the non-profit sector has known a professionalisation in other fields of operations and is very much dependent on a solid reputation, the question arises to what extent current literature on PO crisis communication strategies is of value to NPOs when faced with a crisis. We cannot rule out that, when we take into account the fundamental differences between FPOs and NPOs, the field of NPOs requires specific crisis response strategies. Within this context, this thesis will answer the following research question:

To what extent does Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory offer guidelines for crisis communication that is appropriate for non-profit organisations in transgressional crises? And if limited, which crisis response strategies are appropriate for NPOs?

The aim of this research is to make a start in establishing a grounded framework for NPO crisis communication by examining the applicability of the SCCT theory to NPOs. In doing so, it adopts a multimethod qualitative approach consisting of literature research, case studies and expert interviews. The research focuses on NPOs’ response to so-called ‘transgressional crises’ (Coombs 2007). This concept refers to organisational crises for which the public holds the organisation responsible and are neither accidents nor are they caused by external factors (like a hurricane). An example might involve an organisation that knowingly sells misleading products. To delineate the umbrella term of NPOs, this thesis will focus on emergency aid organisations. These delineations are discussed more in-depth in the methodology section (chapter 3).

As stated before, crisis communication can limit the reputational damage to an organisation in crisis. The foundational concepts of what constitutes an organisation’s reputation are discussed in the theoretical framework. In chapter 4, this framework of expectations, trust and reputation is applied to NPOs in order to identify possible limitations to the applicability of SCCT to NPOs. Chapter 4 delves into three case studies of transgressional NPO crises in the Netherlands in order to characterise the consequences NPOs face once a crisis arises, and how these may differ from POs. Chapter 6 combines the knowledge of the previous chapters which results in a set of propositions on appropriate crisis communication for NPOs. It discusses the extent to which SCCT is expected to be suitable for emergency aid organisations and where additional strategies might be needed to fit the characteristics of NPOs best. These propositions are built upon through the analysis of interviews with six communications experts from five humanitarian aid organisations. Through a vignette study of a hypothetical transgressional crisis, this thesis investigates their perspectives on what characterises solid crisis communication for NPOs. The thesis is concluded with a set of guiding principles of appropriate crisis communications for NPOs and humanitarian aid organisations in particular.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Research on crisis communication is situated at the intersection of public relations, communication, psychology, sociology and governance. Within the field of crisis communications, this thesis makes use of the existing theories and knowledge for organisational crisis communication: the strand of research that focuses on restoring an organisation’s reputation. SCCT forms one of the leading works in organisational crisis response research. Coombs assumes that the SCCT strategies, when adopted appropriately, effectively reduce or repair reputational damage once a crisis arises due to behaviour that deviates from public expectations.

This chapter takes a step back and discusses how an organisation’s reputation is constituted through the lense of public expectations, demonstrated behaviour and trust. Understanding the theoretical foundations of an organisation’s reputation in a stable situation helps us to comprehend how SCCT limits or prevents reputational damage once a crisis arises. Through a lens of existing organisational research, this chapter will discuss (the interaction between) the concepts of the expectancy-behaviour gap, trust and reputation in the context of (profitable) organisations.

Expectations versus demonstrated behaviour

An organisational crisis can be defined from two perspectives. One is that from the organisation’s perspective. As such, a crisis is considered an event that threatens the reputation of an organisation (Barton 1993). The other perspective is that of the stakeholder, or the receiver of the communication. A receiver-based definition reads as follows: “a crisis is an event or a perception of an event that threatens or violates important value expectancies of stakeholders” (Fediuk et al. 2010, 638). Accordingly, a crisis develops only when a receiver estimates the gap between their expectations and the demonstrated organisational behaviour to be too large. The term ‘expectancies’ refers to “enduring patterns of anticipated behavior … [that] serve as a societal norm to describe which behaviors are typical and appropriate by the organisation” (Fediuk et al. 2010, 638 based on Burgoon 1993). The closer behaviour and expectancies align, the more satisfied is the consumer. Vice versa, a greater expectancy-behaviour gap results in greater ‘moral outrage’ which might damage the organisation’s reputation instantly (Fediuk et al. 2010 643; 348). Moral outrage can be defined as the outlet of anger, disappointment or resentment by stakeholders who feel they or their interests have been wrongfully harmed by immoral behaviour. If people

decide to translate these emotions into action, such as boycotting a firm, this has severe consequences for the company (Fediuk et al. 2010).

Trust and organisational behaviour

Seemingly self-evident is the premise that with an organisational crisis consumer trust is broken or at least damaged. However, the dynamics of how and why trust is broken are complex (Swift 2001, 18). Barber (1983) explains trust as a form of confidence in the predictability of another’s behaviour. In other words, one expects that the other will not endanger or harm one’s interests. In every transaction between two or more parties, trust is an integral part. Both parties expect that their interests will not be harmed, and this leads to a continued business arrangement or other form of transaction. The behaviour of the other party thus must be predictable in order for the organisation to be trustworthy (Zucker 1986). Distrust in this sense refers to the one’s suspicion or expectations that a particular party will betray or disregard one’s interests (Swift 2001).

As trust is based on the predictability of behaviour, trust in an organisation is thus intertwined with expectations of stakeholders. They expect that their interests are safeguarded by the organisation. As long as the behaviour of the organisation aligns with these expectations, trust is created, reinforced and maintained. Once that alignment breaks, the reputation of an organisation suffers (Herzlinger 1996).

Reputation

An organisation’s reputation refers to how relevant stakeholders evaluate an organisation’s actions (Brown et al. 2006; Gotschall 2011). Fombrun and van Riel define the corporate reputation as a “collective representation of a firm's past actions and results that describes the firm’s ability to deliver valued outcomes to multiple stakeholders” (1997, 10). Stakeholders develop a ‘collective representation’ based on their personal experience with the organisation, the information and narrative published in media and judgments from people within their social network (Fombrum and van Riel 2004). As personal experiences thus affect the lens through which one perceives an organisation, an organisation’s reputation can differ among stakeholders when having (heard of) different experiences with the organisation (Gottschalk 2011). According to Fombrun et al. (2000), six theoretical dimensions constitute good or bad corporate reputations: social responsibility, financial performance, vision; workplace environment; the delivered products or services,

emotional appeal and leadership. The constitution of a favourable or negative reputation is thus multifaceted: an organisation must not only deliver the quality of products which is expected but must also demonstrate its vision and its commitment to social responsibility.

But how does a good reputation help an organisation? An organisation’s reputation is the moderating link with the organisation’s (potential) consumers and partners (Martín-de-Castro et al. 2004). Corporate organisations strive for a good corporate reputation because it is known to attract customers, investors, partners and applicants (Fombrun and van Riel 1997; Srivastava et al., 1997). Namely, the very impression external stakeholders have of the behavioural record of an organisation weighs heavily in their decision to cooperate or engage with an organisation (Herbig and Milewicz 1993). As Dowling put it: “the past (good) behaviour of the firm signals its future (good) behaviour” (2016, 211). A good reputation gives stakeholders the confidence to choose to do business with this particular company over others at a similar price and quality range (Gottschalk 2011).

For some corporate sectors reputation is more important than for others. As Gottschalk (2011) differentiates corporate service industries from manufacturing companies, he argues that with the invisibility of a product, the importance of a good reputation grows. For example, with an organisation that makes drinking glasses, people can examine the product for damages before purchasing it. When a customer decides to shop online, but upon arrival the glass is damaged they can return their purchase and get a refund without ever having drunk from the glass. However, with companies from the service industry, a law firm for example, a customer relies more heavily on the reputation of the company before deciding to choose said firm. In this case, the customer does not have tangible proof of what exactly they will get beforehand. Reputation thus is not of equal importance to different corporate sectors but is an intrinsic part of the decision of a customer or partner to engage with a supplier.

An organisational crisis most often is a reputational crisis. If stakeholders are dissatisfied with the organisation's inability to meet the expectations of its stakeholders, they may decide to change their commitment to the organisation (Coombs 2007). As such, stakeholders can affect business continuity by either choosing to ignore the events, asking for compensation or engaging in retaliation (Fediuk et al. 2010 648-649). They could also further damage the reputation of an

organisation by spreading negative feedback or experiences about the organisations, harming the organisations image and reputation (Coombs 2007). A crisis thus can damage an organisation’s reputation, but a solid reputation can help an organisation to recover from a crisis as well. Namely, a reputation can serve as a buffer which makes the organisation less vulnerable for damage and more resilient to the damage done (Fombrun and van Riel 2004; Coombs 2007).

Combining the theoretical concepts

The previously discussed principles and their contingencies thus lead to the following relationship: in a stable pre-crisis situation, the behaviour of a company aligns with stakeholder expectations. That alignment reinforces trust level and creates a good reputation in the long run. In an organisational crisis however, the alignment breaks, and the expectancy-behaviour gap widens. Thus, client expectations and the crisis itself determine the size of the expectancy-organisational-behaviour gap. The greater the gap is, the more trust is broken, the greater is the crisis which determines the impact of the crisis on the reputation of the organisation.

3 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This research aims to contribute to the development of academic knowledge on NPO crisis communication and explore the applicability of the existing theory SCCT. The theoretical framework as explained above forms the foundation for this thesis. It assumes the interaction between public expectancies and organisational behaviour on the one hand and an organisation’s reputation on the other. Coombs finds that ‘appropriate’ crisis communication can interfere in this interaction and lessen the reputational damage to an organisation. Yet, SCCT has only been based on the case studies of corporate organisations. Knowledge on the relevance of SCCT to organisations which do not make profit, let alone on specifics of NPO crisis communication, is lacking. This thesis aims to contribute to lessening this gap of knowledge and seeks to develop a deeper understanding of appropriate crisis communication for NPOs in a transgressional crisis.

Delineation of NPO Crisis Communication

As different sorts of organisations fall under the umbrella term of ‘non-profit organisations’, this thesis has chosen one particular group as case study: international emergency aid organisations. International humanitarian aid organisations (also called emergency relief or aid organisations) have been selected as the unit of the analysis for NPO crisis communication because of two reasons. First, from the research on NPOs, only a few scholars such as Gaskin (1999) have focussed on charities. Second, the recent events of sexual misconduct scandals within international aid organisations underline the relevance of this focus. These two grounds highlight the need for effective crisis communication research. This thesis defines international humanitarian aid organisations as organisations which operate on a global scale to facilitate and provide humanitarian aid as defined by the definition of the UN General Assembly. Accordingly, humanitarian aid is the material, mental or financial support provisioned to all humans who are in need. A humanitarian aid organisation is obliged to safeguard its political independence and the impartiality and neutrality of the provisioned aid (OCHA 2012).

While some have advocated for stretching the parameters of the term organisations crisis communication, this thesis maintains the traditional definition. Accordingly, crisis communication refers to the dissemination of crisis messages to people outside of the affected organisation in response to an incident which threatens the organisation’s reputation (Coombs and Holladay

2010). As Coombs’ strategies refer to the message of communiques (1995; 2007; 2014), this research will focus on the content of the press releases rather than on its timing or the speaker’s tone.

As explained in the theoretical framework, Coombs argues that appropriate crisis communication depends on the type of crisis. To increase the comparability and validity of the interviews and survey, transgressional crises have been chosen as the main focus of this thesis. Because transgressional crises are both internally and intentionally caused incidents (Coombs 1995) and have a high level of perceived responsibility for the concerned organisation (Coombs 2007; Claeys et al. 2010). Examples include financial wrongdoing involving money laundering; integrity crises involving sexual abuse allegations; or knowingly selling harmful products. This thesis defines transgressional crises as follows: transgressional crises involve allegations or prove that employees of the organisation itself knowingly violate societal norms or existing laws to the extent that the reputation of the organisation is at stake if proven to be true.

Research outline

In order to find whether the SCCT strategies are as appropriate and effective for NPOs in crisis, this thesis uses a multi method qualitative approach:

- of literature research, - case studies,

- expert interviews which include a vignette study

Qualitative research is suited best to gain in-depth knowledge in under-researched topics. It allows for the possibility to develop a deeper understanding of the how’s and why’s of phenomena (Maxwell 2012). As there is little to none research on the specific field of NPO crisis communication, existing research in the field of marketing, public relations and communication are combined with case studies to build propositions on the applicability of SCCT.

Literature research

The first step is to apply the theoretical to NPOs and aid organisations in particular in order to identify possible particularities for the interaction between expectancies and reputation in the

setting of NPOs. This will be done through the use of existing research from the fields of marketing, public relations, psychology, communication and sociology.

Case studies

Then in chapter 5, three of the defining transgressional crises of charities in the Netherlands will be analysed. The case studies are the Foster Parent Plan (FPP) crisis of 1999 concerning how donations were spent; the Koningin Wilhelmina Fonds Kankerbestrijding (KWF) crisis (2013) for high personal expenditures in an associated organisation; and the Oxfam Haiti scandal of 2018. This chapter’s aim is to gain an understanding of which consequences charities may expect in a transgressional crisis. This output is used to build towards a framework of crisis communication that suits international aid organisations and their social context. Using the case studies, it is evaluated to what extent SCCT can anticipate this social context and what may be lacking to appropriately address public perception.

The literature research and illustrative case studies serve to identify indicators for the applicability of the current research framework. They also pertain to the second part of the research question: if

limited, which crisis response strategies are appropriate for NPOs? These methods are adopted

to explore how the current framework of SCCT might be complemented in order to fit the characteristics of NPOs best. These chapters result in a series of propositions (chapter 6) on the applicability of SCCT to aid organisations in a transgressional crisis.

Interviews

These propositions are strengthened or adapted through expert interviews, which help to amplify the understanding of appropriate crisis communication for NPOs from a practitioners’ perspective (Valentine 2005). These perspectives are only imperfect perceptions of a reality formed through the personal experiences of the interviewee (Healy and Perry 2000; Valentine 2005). However, these interviews allow the research to gain an understanding of that reality from valuable perspectives: those at the top (of communications) of some of the largest international humanitarian aid organisations in the Netherlands. These practice-led perspectives complement the theory-led and case-study-based understanding of what NPOs should or should not communicate during transgressional crises.

The interviews have a two-fold purpose. First, the experts were asked to (unknowingly) reflect on the propositions to complement the literature research by exploring if and how interviewees think that crisis communication for NPOs differs from FPOs. Second, with the use of the hypothetical case (vignette) in the second part of the interviews, the interviews serve as a basis to analyse to what extent the response that is deemed appropriate by the NPO corresponds with SCCT. This way, a deeper understanding of what constitutes ‘good’ crisis communication for NPOs and whether SCCT is applicable to NPOs is gained.

Vignette study

Vignettes are hypothetical, plausible scenarios to which the interviewee or respondent is asked to respond (Finch 1987, 105; Hill 1997, 177). While vignettes are mostly used in quantitative research, they form an asset to qualitative research as well. Within qualitative research, vignettes are helpful in studying sensitive or controversial phenomena (Borell et al. 2006; Hughes and Huby 2004). It is found that people find hypothetical situations less threatening to speak about than their own experiences (Neale 1999). Communication policies for the aid organisations of the interviewees may be confidential. Likewise, interviewees might be reluctant to disclose their organisations’ experience with transgressional crises. Therefore, the vignette technique offers an opportunity for interviewees to share their knowledge without explicitly using their personal experiences.

The researcher developed, inspired by literature and the case studies, a hypothetical scenario based on real incidents and organisations for the purpose of credibility. The vignette centres around a fictitious organisation called YoungAid with the mission to help children form post-war communities. The organisation was confronted with proven allegations of sexual misconduct (see appendix 1). YoungAid NL must publish a press release as soon as possible.

The identity and mission of the fictitious organisation of YoungAid have been a combination of UNICEF, Save the Children and Cordaid. It lends inspiration from incidents of sexual misconduct within Oxfam UK, Save the Children, Red Cross and the UN. The offense, the timing, its relation to the #MeToo movement and the offenders (senior managers) have been taken from these incidents. However, the researcher ensured not to copy exact incidents and used a different context for the incident. Therefore, as location the researcher has chosen a fundraising event: an event which within the aid sector has no known connections to sexual misconduct

incidents but is relatable for all interviewees. Like with the real life incidents, both employees and external individuals (hostesses) were involved in the sexual misconduct in this hypothetical case. The vignette stated that the reader was responsible for developing a press release as communication director of YoungAid. Press releases in either video or written format were the focal point of analysis to study the crisis communication strategies of aid organisations. Press releases are the predominant means through which organisations inform the public and communicate their corrective action during a crisis and thus relatable for all interviewees (Choi and Park 2011).

Data collection and analysis interviews

To supplement the theoretical hypothesis on appropriate NPO crisis communication, the researcher has interviewed six practitioners from the communication or crisis management department of five different aid organisations. This includes former director general at Oxfam Novib (Farah Karimi); head of communications and MT member of the Red Cross (Marc Lamers); head of communications ZOA (KlaasJan Baas); former head of communications of Oxfam Novib and War Child (Robbert Bodegraven); current director of communications and advocacy War Child (Bart Rijs) and head of fundraising and communications at Care Nederland (Bas Klaassen)1_{. As all}

interviewees have a Dutch nationality and work for the Dutch branch of the international aid organisations, all interviews have been conducted in Dutch. While the perceptions of the chosen experts may not be representative or objective, the combined experiences and knowledge of the experts employed within some of the largest aid organisations in the Netherlands helps to gain a deeper understanding of appropriate communication for aid organisations.

Before the interviews were recorded, the interviewees were asked to fill in a consent form. Through the use of this form, the interviewees consented to being audio recorded and for the recording to be saved until final grading. The interviewees were asked if the researcher could use their names, the name of their organisation or job descriptions; or if the participants preferred to remain anonymous. In addition, the respondents were asked if the researcher could quote them (in consultation). All transcripts of the interviews have been sent to the experts to control for unintentional phrasings and misinterpretation.

The interviews were semi-structured in nature. While the researcher prepared a list of questions beforehand as a guide for the interview, this nature allowed for the researcher to deviate from this structure. Therefore, interviewees were to certain extent free to highlight issues that they thought were of importance, but the researcher might not have thought of initially (Longhurst 2003). The transcripts have been coded based on the propositions put forward in chapter 6 chapters. For a more elaborate explanation method used to code these transcripts, see chapter 7.1.

Limitations

While vignettes can offer relatively close representations of reality, a hypothetical scenario cannot encompass all of real life’s complexities. Moreover, caution is needed to keep the hypothetical cases believable (Finch 1987), which is why they are based on real life crises. Another limitation in terms of validity is that one cannot determine with 100% certainty that specific elements within the survey trigger the reaction like the researcher interprets (O’Dell et al. 2012). Moreover, as normative associations are influenced by very personal experiences and environment, it is difficult to generalise the crisis response which is preferred by an individual to a broader population. This impacts the external validity of this research. However, these six interviewees are experts in their fields and carry or have carried the responsibility of (crisis) communication of some of the largest international aid organisations present in the Netherlands. While these six interviewees might thus not be representative of the attitudes towards crisis communication of all international aid organisations, they have valuable practice-led insights into appropriate and effective crisis communication for the Dutch branches of international humanitarian aid organisations.

The researcher intended to validate the findings of this thesis by investigating public perception of appropriate crisis responses for NPOs faced with a transgressional crisis. In order to do so, the researcher would have conducted a survey. However, as the Covid-19 restrictions hindered face-to-face recruitment of participants, the researcher has chosen to limit her research to corona proof online expert interviews and case study analysis.

4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK IN THE SETTING OF NPOS AND AID ORGANISATIONS

The theoretical framework demonstrated how organisational behaviour, public expectations and stakeholder trust affect the reputation of an organisation in a non-crisis situation. In a crisis, this interaction underlays the reputational threat to the organisation, a threat which crisis communication is able to mitigate according to Coombs. This chapter considers the theoretical concepts within the specific context of aid organisations and NPOs more in general. Applying the theoretical framework to NPOs forms a first step in identifying possible limitations to the applicability of SCCT to NPOs.

4.1 Public expectations of NPOs

Research (Neuman 2017; Gaskin 1999) suggests that these differences in organisational structure and purpose have translated into a different public image of NPOs. Gaskin (1999) argues that ethical behaviour of NPOs is of more importance to the public due to the difference in the ideological foundations of NPOs and POs. While profitable companies are profit-based, charities are value-based. In result, NPOs are generally more trusted but are also expected to uphold high ethical standards (Gaskin 1999; Herzlinger 1996). Accordingly, the public expects charities to adhere to society’s norms and values more strictly (1999).

Within the umbrella term of NPOs, aid organisations are subject to what Neuman (2017) and Walsh (2020) name the ‘hero myth’. Accordingly, employees and volunteers of charities are not seen as average humans but as heroes. After all, they are “not fallible; they don’t make mistakes. They are not involved in politics. They save” (Neuman 2017, n.p.). The image that aid organisations cannot make mistakes mirrors the high expectations of the public. Stakeholder expectancies for aid organisations are thus estimated to be higher than for profitable organisations.

4.2 Trust and NPOs

Related to expectations is the concept of trust. If an organisation does not fulfil public expectations, its credibility and therefore public trust decreases (Gaskin 1999). For NPOs, not only the alignment of promise and performance determines its trustworthiness, but also its ethics and cause. Moreover,

trust has proven to be one of the drivers of the decision to donate to NPOs (Atkinson et al. 2012; Sargeant and Lee 2004).

For NPOs in Western-Europe, public trust levels have been consistently higher compared to POs and even the public sector (Charity Commission 2010). Even though the charity sector consistently scores above average in trust levels according to the Charity Commission's reports, the level of trust has been declining in the UK (Seu, Flanagan and Orgad 2015). The causes to the deteriorating relationship between the public and the charity sector are multifaceted. Scholars such as Saxton appoint overcommercialisation of the charity sector as the culprit. As Saxton (2004) phrases it: “ironically, it is the very success of professionalization in delivering the good in terms of income and effectiveness, direction and impact that is the root of the problem”.

In the Netherlands, trust levels have fluctuated significantly since the early 2000s among donors. The Dutch Donors panel [Het Nederlandse Donateurspanel] (WWVAV 2020) measures trust levels in its quarterly donors trust research. Based on its questionnaire, it deducts the percentage of negative answers to questions from the percentage of positive answers. Between 2008 and 2-15 they scaled donors trust to be below zero. Between 2015 and 2018, donors trust rose above zero, with an all-time high at the end of 2017, beginning of 2018. From 2018, there is a rapid drop in donor trust, a development which coincides with the Oxfam crisis (WWAV 2020). Since 2019 stakeholder trust has been relatively stable, despite the corona crisis. The argument has been made that not only in the Netherlands, but worldwide recent crises have had severe consequences for the reputation of the charity sector. Along with the damaged reputation, trust levels automatically decline.

4.3 Solutions to Rebuild Broken Trust

Based on qualitative research with focus groups representative of the British population, Gaskin (1999) found 16 strategies to build trust for NPOs. The general pattern within the primary strategies concerns communication, with an improved focus on values; locality; and transparency in finances and action. Accordingly, an NPO should formulate in its communications clearly what it stands for and why. Secondly, a NPO should communicate how it spends donations and how financial contributions have helped their cause. In formulating how public support has enabled progress ‘bettering the world’, a NPO should be as specific as possible. By being transparent about financial

flows and undertaken action, it increases its accountability and gives donors ownership of their donations. A NPO should also promote local action and praise volunteers in order to bridge the gap between a large organisation and local communities as potential donors. After all, local branches are trusted more than international large NPOs, something that is reflected in the research of the Charity Commission too (2016). Both the emphasis on transparency and locality makes the NPO seem more relatable and accessible for the public (Gaskin 1999, 176-177). Since Gaskin’s strategies of 1999, little has been written on how to regain trust specifically for NPOs.

Yet, research on branding (which is proven to develop trust and loyalty among stakeholders (Ritchie et al. 1998)) suggests something similar. Stride (2006) calls for NPO-specific strategies in branding with a greater focus on the values that underlie the existence of NPOs. Value-based branding is a common concept in commercial marketing as well (Stride 2006). The difference between the role of values for NPOs versus that of POs is the following: as where values might be a marketing strategy to survive to POs, values are a non-negotiable raison d’être to charities (Stride 2006). As values are intrinsic to NPOs, the values should be the primary focus with branding. The brand of an NPO should closely reflect the values of the organisation and its overlap with the values of supporters (Saxton 1994; Dixon 1997).

4.4 Reputation

The traditional image of NPOs is that of “a good Samaritan” (Seu et al. 2015) or a hero (Neuman 2017) in which expectations and behaviour are aligned. Within this frame, NPOs are seen as selfless, heroic, accessible and altruistic (Neuman 2017; Venable et al. 2005; Sargeant et al. 2008). Simply put, “they are good people” that save and care for the people in need (Seu et al 2008, 217).

This image of charities as heroes still finds resonance in society, especially with regard to medical NPOs such as Doctors without Frontiers (Seu et al. 2015). However, for other types of NPOs this image has been damaged by increased competition; (inter)national crises and commercialisation have damaged it. Seu et al. 2015 detect a new image of NPOs, and international aid organisations in particular, that has become dominant in public perception: that of the

Marketeer by. As opposed to the public perception of NPOs as Good Samaritans, that of NPOs as

marketers is rooted in distrust. Accordingly, NPOs act as corporate businesses that are after the consumer’s money for personal gains (Seu et al. 2015). Seu et al. (2015) found that their respondents were suspicious of the true motives and financial flows of NGOs and international aid

workers in particular. More specifically, respondents were critical about the salaries of directors, the drive to expand at the expense of people in need and lack of accountability. They contend that the high salaries, the large size and expensive marketing mirror a market ideology rather than a wish to help people. In other words, the current public image of NPOs as marketeers holds that NPOs mirror behaviour that is associated with POs too much.

At the core of this new public image lies disappointment with the demonstrated behaviour of NPOs in contrast to public expectancies. Consumers are disappointed with the marginalisation and professionalisation of NPOs as it conflicts with their idea of “how NPOs should be”. While the expectancies differ significantly from that of POs, the public perceived the actual behaviour of charities as similar to corporate businesses (Seu et a. 2015).

For international aid organisations, the public image is even more complicated. While the hero myth is most persistent for these organisations, international charities are also from all charities deemed as the less effective and trustworthy (Hendrik Beerda 2018). These evaluations can partly be explained by the tendency of people to trust local initiatives more than “impersonal, large corporations-like'' charities (Hendrik Beerda 2018; Gaskin 1999). Yet, there might be another reason for the mistrust towards international aid organisations. While the hero myth thus creates high expectations, other voices (Flaherty 2016; Walsh 2020) highlight the downside of the hero myth. They consider the ‘heroism’ of Western countries in helping Southern or Eastern countries within its tradition of colonialism and racism. Accordingly, ‘helping’ others becomes problematic when “you want to help others but are not open to guidance from those you want to help”. The mentality that it is the West’s ‘duty’ to save the ‘poor and barbarous rest of the world towards civilisation’ has been coined white saviourism or like Walsh (2020) names it ‘the hero narrative’. These frustrations, especially in the face of new Black Lives Matter and anti-racism protests, still linger in public perception of international aid organisations. Some (Bakar 2019; Young 2019) accuse white volunteers of a white ‘selfie’ saviour complex. Their posts on social media of themselves helping poor, black children would perpetuate existing stereotypes.

Illustrative for this sensitive topic within the development aid sector is the change in vocabulary in the Netherlands. Formerly, ‘development aid’ was commonly used to refer to financial support from the Netherlands to ‘third world’ countries. Even the minister's post was called “development aid” [ontwikkelingshulp]. However, the word “aid” implies a certain

passivity of the receiving country. The paradigm with regard to development aid changed into a belief that such ‘aid’ should be an interactive cooperation that should foster the financial independence and self-sufficiency of receiving countries. Hence, the wording changed from ‘development aid’ to ‘development cooperation’ [ontwikkelingssamenwerking]. Moreover, discussions have roared on if international aid actually ‘works’ or benefits those in need in the long run.

International aid agencies are thus situated in a discourse of expectations to ‘do good’, of concerns for racism and of criticism for the effectiveness of their work. In contrast to POs, aid organisations thus walk a thin line between heroic expectations and severe criticism. If an aid organisation fails to fulfil the expectations, it lets down proponents and risks giving reason for more criticism from opponents. In the face of higher expectations and severe criticism on coloniality, aid organisations will thus likely face greater moral outrage when in a transgressional than POs will.

4.6 Conclusion

The non-profit and profitable sector differ greatly with regard to expectations and trust levels. Yet, recent developments show that NPOs have started a process of commercialisation and professionalization. While this was needed to manage the growth and competition among NPOs, it has damaged public perception of the NPOs. The convergence of the NPO and PO sector has caused concerns with respect to the ethicality and trustworthiness of NPOs.

Meanwhile, research reveals that charities operate within a public discourse of high moral expectations which POs are confronted with only to a lesser extent. Within the charitable sector, aid organisations find themselves in a delicate position: a part of the public sees them as heroes and another part scrutinises their ‘heroism’ for being stereotypical and colonialist. In comparison to POs, aid organisations are thus expected to behave more ethically; are generally more trusted to do so; and to reinforce public trust they are counted upon to communicate transparently and honestly. In other words, the (not-for-profit) nature of these organisations holds implications for public expectations of these organisations in a non-crisis state.

Crisis communication aims to influence public perception of the crisis and the organisation and SCCT has proven to be effective for POs. This chapter finds that these very perceptions and expectations through which aid organisations need to manoeuvre differ significantly from POs.

This suggests that international aid organisations might require a different framework for crisis communication than is validated for POs which takes the high moral standard into account.

5 LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST NPO-CRISES

Having characterised public expectations, trust and image of NPOs in a non-crisis state, the question is: what can international aid organisations expect when an organisational crisis arises? Crisis communication aims to limit the future damage of a crisis. As such, it is important to highlight the consequences that NPOs can expect when faced with a transgressional crisis. In answering the sub research question, this chapter aims to map the consequences that are specific to international aid organisations in an organisational crisis. It does so by building on the consequences in the Netherlands of three NPO transgressional crises: FPP Netherlands during the adoption crisis of 1999, KWF in a money flow crisis in 2013 and Oxfam (Novib) during the Haiti crisis of 2018.

5.1 Background to the transgressional crises

Foster Parents Plan (FPP)

One of the first organisational crises within the charity sector in the Netherlands involved FPP the Netherlands, now called Plan. FPP aimed to improve the living conditions, education and rights for children. So-called ‘Foster Parents’, the donors, could remotely financially support an individual child, paying 540 guilders per year. The money was used to support the community in which the child was living. FFP relied financially entirely on the donations of Foster Parents and was, with 27500 donors, one of the biggest aid organisations in the Netherlands. (Koch 2001; “The Organisation” n.d.).

In 1999, an investigation was started after lawyer Tomlow claimed that FPP neglected children in the slums of Haiti. A committee led by Magreeth de Boer, former minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, formally investigated the alleged incidents in Haiti. Eventually it was found that FPP had not been fraudulent. However, the investigation brought to light the fact that not all of the money went to the communities of children. It unveiled that unlike Foster Parents marketed, only 50 cents of every guilder from Dutch donors was spent on its cause. The rest was spent on overhead: the standard business expenses of operating an organisation that do not directly contribute to its product or service. The investigation concluded that the campaigns sketched a misleading understanding of the flow and purpose of donations. This was the main reason for the dissent of the media and ‘foster parents’ (those who financially supported individual children) (Koch 2001).

KWF

KWF is the Dutch Cancer Society that aims to fight cancer through funding research, educational campaigns and patient support since 1949. Prior to 2013, KWF was steadily rated the strongest brand. In 2013, a national television programme Nieuwsuur discovered that the founder of the foundation Alpe D’Huez used its finances for his own travel expenses. While KWF was not directly involved in the crisis, it did subsidise the foundation with 3 million euros and faced much backlash for its involvement.

Oxfam:

In 2018, the Times published that during an aid mission after the Haiti Earthquake of 2010 “Top Oxfam Staff Paid Haiti Survivors for Sex” (O’Neill 2018). According to this article, senior staff of Oxfam GB had hired locals as prostitutes and organised ‘sex parties’ where underaged Haitian girls were present (O’Neill 2018). The article even implicated the then-director of operations Roland van Hauwermeiren in its accusations of sexual misconduct in Haiti. In the face of the #MeToo movement, the incident could count on worldwide media attention (Perkins 2018; Cooper 2019). While this crisis did not involve the employees of the Dutch Oxfam Novib, Oxfam GB received Dutch tax money for its mission in Haiti. According to Kaag (2018), then-minister of development cooperation, 8,3 million euros of the 15 million euros that Oxfam received from the fundraising campaign “Help Slachtoffers Aardbeving Haiti” was spent through Oxfam GB. The money raised from the fundraising campaign was in part constituted by tax money. Already in 2012, an investigation found that the money was not used fraudulently in Haiti (Kaag 2018). Yet, in traditional and social media the ethicality and corporate culture of the Oxfam Novib was questioned.

5.2 What can emergency aid organisations expect in a transgressional crisis?

Short term

1. Donations

A transgressional crisis has direct financial retributions for charities. All three organisations saw a significant decline in donation. Following the report of De Boer, FPP Nederland lost 10.000 donors in a period of three months. Before, 2000 donors per month on average would cancel their financial

contribution. The financial damage amounted to 5,4 million guilders in total. KWF received circa 16 per cent less donations during its yearly offertory week in 2013 compared to 2012. During the economic crisis other offerting charities also saw a drop in donations, but they only amounted up to 8 per cent. KWF itself estimates that 8 per cent of the fall in donations can be explained by the uproar following the incident (KWF 2013). Oxfam international saw a decline in donations from the cancellation of 7000 donors. Within a month after the publication in the Times, Oxfam Novib lost over 700 donors in the Netherlands (“Honderden abonnees” 2018).

Donors give money to charities from their discretionary income, which refers to the part of a household’s income that remains after paying for essential goods and services like housing, food and mortgage. In other words, discretionary income is the income that is either spent on luxury or used for savings. In financial uncertainty, households economise on discretionary income firs (Crouch et al. 2007; Kagan 2018). With charities, households (either consciously or subconsciously) balance the worth of their investment: is the organisation and their monthly investment in a charity worth saving less for a new television? If they are not satisfied with the output of the organisation which they support, they will instead spend their money on a holiday, another charitable cause or that new television for example. Private donations are thus very vulnerable (Gordon and Khumawala 1999; Hankinson 2001, 209; Roberts-Wray 1994). Hence, charities in a transgressional crisis can expect an immediate drop in donations from individuals.

2. Political involvement

Taking a closer look at the consequences of the three crises reveals that in the aftermath of a crisis a stakeholder is introduced which POs are less frequently confronted with: politics. While institutional donors are somewhat more forgiving towards charities (Zainon et al. 2011), charities should be prepared for political backlash when facing a transgressional crisis, which will be demonstrated below.

When the De Boer committee published its conclusions on FPP, the then minister of Development Aid, Eveline Herfkens, was asked by the standing committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to react to the report. FPP had just been granted the status of a co-financing organisation (“medefinancieringsorganisatie”) which entails that the emergency aid organisation received a budget from the ministry of Development Aid. As now FPP was partly financed through public money, several political parties questioned whether FPP was still deserving of those

subsidies. Therefore, the crisis did not only harm private donations, but also risked its status to receive institutional donations from the government. Moreover, the public questions within the parliament brought even more negative publicity for FPP (“Foster Parents” 2000; “Herfkens staat” 2001;).

With Oxfam Novib, the minister of development cooperation had to answer questions of parliamentarians on Novib’s involvement in - and knowledge of - the scandal in Haiti (Kaag 2018; “Tweede Kamer” 2018). Farah Karimi, former director general of Oxfam Novib together with the directors form the 6 largest aid organisations in the Netherlands were questioned in a round table discussion [rondetafelgesprek] (“Rondetafelgesprek Inzake Misstanden” 2018). The fact that international aid organisations are partly financed through governmental subsidies means that political actors can and will hold them to account.

From the case study analysis of short term consequences from the FPP, KWF and Oxfam crises follows that public moral outrage translates into cancellations of donations and political demands for accountability.

Long term

1. Effect on the Organisation’s Reputation

After the organisational crisis, FPP changed its name to Plan (International). In 2018, Plan was number 13 on the list top 100 list of strongest charity brands, having made significant recovery since 1991. KWF remained ranked as the number one strongest charity brand within the Netherlands. Despite the dropping donation, the incident seems to have had but little effect on the actual reputation of KWF.

2. Spill over effect

In the Charity Brand Research, Hendrik Beerda Consultancy (2018) states that the rapid recovery of KWF shows that the average Dutchman “quickly forgets which organisation caused the commotion” (translated, 2018). Consequently, while individual organisations seem to recover quite rapidly, zooming out to the reputation of the sector reveals a different development. With Oxfam, an incident that took place in Haiti under the lead of Oxfam GB, led to investigations into and reports on sexual misconduct in the entire aid sector. Consequently, the scandals gave rise to

the coin phrase #AidToo in reference to the #MeToo movement. Even the organisation which did not face allegations of sexual misconduct, were associated with sexual misconduct with headlines like “Aid organisations do too little against abuse” (translated, Zierse 2018) and “#MeToo strikes aid sector as sexual exploitation allegations proliferate” (Beaumont and Radcliffe 2018). As such, the #AidToo movement damages the public image of emergency aid organisations (Cooper 2019). A poll of the UK Charity Commission showed that of those who donated to “humanitarian charities such as Oxfam”, 52 percent would be less likely to continue to donate humanitarian causes (in Elgot and McVeigh 2018). The Oxfam crisis thus spilled over to other aid organisations (Save the Children, the Red Cross) and eventually to the entire sector of emergency aid organisations.

Trust in charities in general has been declining. According to the Charity Brand Research (Hendrik Beerda Consultancy 2008, Goede Doelen Merkenonderzoek) among 10.000 Dutch citizens, the popularity of the largest charities that operate in the Netherlands has declined with 16 percent from 2000 to 2018. From 2014 to 2016, this decline even amounted to nine percent. This development has been linked to the negative publicity on charities over the past years (Hendrik Beerda Consultancy 2018). In contrast to individual charities that might be able to restore their reputation, the charitable sector as a whole is confronted with serious image issues and a steady decline in popularity.

Based on the research of Hendrik Beerda Consultancy (2018), Hoogkamer (2018) suggests that the difference in recovery between individual organisations and the sector can be explained by public conflation of the plethora in charities. Consumers forget which exact

organisation is responsible for a crisis and instead attach negative connotations to the sector as a whole. To combat the steady decline in sector reputation, charities should differentiate

themselves more actively from others (Hendrik Beerda Brand Consultancy 2018).

The phenomenon that the consequences of a crisis transcend to similar organisations of the same sector is coined ‘the spill over effect’. It refers to when a customer’s perception and evaluation of one particular brand influences their perceptions of another brand (Janakiraman, Sismeiro and Dutta 2009). Attributions to a brand can be transferred to parent brands, competing brands or entire sectors (Balachander and Ghose 2003; Anderson and Simester 2013). The degree to which consumers perceive the brands to be similar determines the scale of the spill over effect (Wu et al. 2020). These attributions can be either positive or negative (Wu et al. 2020, 80). Research on the corporate sector has found the negative spill over effect is also apparent especially

between banks in financial crises and companies in product-harm crises when competing in the same product category (Anderson and Simester 2013). Simplified, this means that when it is discovered that the strawberry popsicles of Company A contain chemicals, consumers are likely to leave the strawberry popsicles of other brands. As such, Company B that might sell strawberry popsicles without these chemicals, can expect a drop in sales and revenue because of the product harm crisis of Company A (based on Wu et al. 2020, 80). The cases of Oxfam, KWF and FPP show that like Company B, charitable organisations can expect a spill-over effect from the reputational damage of another organisation within the same sector.

The cases of FPP, Oxfam and KWF show that reputations of individual organisations recover relatively quickly. Transgressional crises seem to affect the concerning organisation’s reputation therefore only limited or temporary. However, the sector does suffer from the spill over effect as a transgressional crisis within an individual aid organisation affects the entire sector in terms of reputational damage.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has mapped the consequences within Dutch society of three major charity crises. Note, the conclusions based on these three case studies serve to illustrate ‘what might follow’ rather than to prove ‘what per definition follows’ a crisis within a charity. Of course, these three cases are very much different in the nature of the incidents. These illustrative case studies of the most high profile crises in the Netherlands (Hoogkamer 2018) show that NPOs when faced with a transgressional crisis can expect that moral outrage of stakeholders translates into a significant drop in donations. Moreover, they can be held accountable and be asked to answer critical questions. Because NPOs are funded through public money and taxes, they owe justification to the parliament. These cases also demonstrate that while the public image and donations may be temporarily distorted by the crisis, the reputation of the organisation often does not suffer significantly. Yet, the temporary reputation damage seems to spill over to the rest of the aid sector in a longer lasting fashion.

Similar to the previous chapter, these case studies demonstrate that aid organisations experience different expectations and outcomes when faced with a crisis. This confirms the expectation from the previous chapter that the different social context of aid organisations requires

a new, fitted framework for crisis communications to effectively restore the organisations’ reputation. Afterall, when familiar with the particular consequences one can expect, aid organisations can anticipate this already in their initial crisis communication strategy.

6 PROPOSING CRISIS RESPONSE STRATEGIES FOR NPOS

The previous chapters have demonstrated that international aid organisations operate within a social context of high expectations and public demand for accountability. Being subject to high ethical expectations means that NPOs thus function under a high amount of pressure to behave like the heroes people think they are. It was argued that appropriate crisis communication should anticipate these foreseeable circumstances.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the extent to which the existing framework Situational Crisis Communication Theory can appropriately address the social context specific to NPOs. First, this chapter examines the determinants of an appropriate crisis response strategy as proposed by Coombs. It will explicate if differences can be expected for non-profits. Second, it analyses the individual strategies that are recommended in SCCT. More specifically, it answers the question whether the literature research of the previous chapters raised any indications that individual (sub)strategies might not be applicable for international aid organisations. Third, it assesses whether the SCCT framework falls short in addressing circumstances specific to NPO crisis response. The chapter will explicate propositions which are incorporated and tested in the interviews, as discussed in the next chapter.

6.1 Determinants of appropriate communications strategies in the context of NPOs

According to Coombs (1995), the extent of reputational damage depends on three factors: the initial crisis responsibility, crisis history and prior relational reputation. Initial crisis responsibility refers to the extent to which consumers hold the organisation responsible for the incident. If, for example, an organisation is unable to deliver its products due to a Tsunami, customers will not consider the organisation to be at fault and little reputational damage can be expected. Coombs argues that the type of crisis thus affects the reputational damage. Transgressional crises, the focus of this thesis, is the type of crisis that has an internal cause and has developed intentionally rather than naturally (Coombs 1995). People ascribe high responsibility to an organisation in a transgressional crisis as these crises are deemed preventable (Claeys et al. 2010; Coombs 2007a). Examples of transgressional crises include recalling defective products, withholding safety information and violating laws (Coombs 1995, 457). Secondly, whether or not the organisation has had a similar incident determines the reputational damage of a crisis. This factor Coombs named ‘crisis history’. Stakeholders are less likely to forgive an organisation if they detect a

repetition of similar incidents. In that case: the organisation seems to have a large, more systemic problem (Kelley and Michela 1980; Coombs 2007, 167). Thirdly, Coombs considers the reputation of an organisation prior to the crisis key to the extent of reputational damage. After all, a good reputation functions as a buffer in a crisis as discussed before.

Situational Crisis Communication Theory holds that the characteristics of a crisis determines the appropriate crisis response strategy: determinants. According to Coombs, an incident that might harm an organisation’s reputation severely, asks for a different approach than an incident that is estimated to have less impact (Fediuk et al. 2010). In the SCCT model, Coombs identifies 5 factors besides that help determine which communication strategy then is appropriate: 1) the type of crisis, 2) the evidence, 3) the material damage, 4) the affected victims and 5) the organisation’s performance history (Coombs 1995). As this thesis only focuses on transgressional crises, it only considers the latter four factors: evidence, damage, victims and performance history and their impact on the appropriate strategy for organisations in a transgressional crisis (see figure 1).

Strategy

T

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nsg

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Positive Mortification, Ingratiation

Negative Mortification

Non-Victim

Positive Mortification, Ingratiation

Negative Mortification

Minor

Victim

Positive Mortification, Ingratiation _{and Justification}

Negative Mortification

non-victim

Positive Justification, Mortification

Negative Justification False Positive Non-existence Negative Clarification Reputation Victims Damage Evidence Crisis type

Coombs catalogues evidence as either true or false. If accusations towards a company are based on false evidence, like with ungrounded rumours, an organisation should combat the mis- or disinformation. When the incident has truly happened, this calls for another approach (Coombs 1995). The damage and victims and third attributes that determine the appropriate crisis response strategy relate to how severe the stakeholders perceive the crisis to be. They evaluate the severity of a crisis on the basis of the damage that has been caused (Fediuk et al. 2010). ‘Damage’ can range from financial losses, material damages to properties, and the impact on a community or the number of victims. Logically, Coombs assumes that the greater the consumers estimate the damage caused by the organisation, the more severe a crisis is perceived, and the greater reputational damage will be (Fediuk et al. 2010). He differentiates the damage between ‘damage’ and ‘victims’. A crisis can cause great damage but will not be perceived as bad as when it would have victims: an explosion in a factory is bad, but an explosion in a factory that led to casualties is worse. In Coombs reasoning, the first calls for a different approach than the latter situation. The last defining characteristic for the appropriate crisis response according to Coombs is the organisation’s performance history. The performance history both takes crisis history and the reputation of an organisation into account. In Coombs flow chart, an organisation’s performance history is either positive or negative. As explained in the previous paragraph a positive performance history will result in less reputational damage and a quicker recovery from any reputational damage made.

Worst case scenario, an incident thus involves true evidence, major damage, victims and a negative performance history for the organisation in question. Best case scenario, the transgression only involves evidence proven to be false and a positive performance history: rumour for an organisation with a good reputation. In Coombs’ SCCT, the assessment of each determinant leads to another strategy recommendation (to be discussed below). As the previous two chapters have not signalled any reason to doubt that evidence, damage, victims and performance history affect the appropriate, this research assumes for now that it also applies to aid organisations. From this follows:

Proposition 1: No difference with SCCT is expected: the evidence, damage and victims in addition to the organisation’s performance history determine the appropriateness of crisis response strategies.