W.P. Veenendaal Pieter Kivits s1361732
Small States in World Politics 22 mei 2018
Words: 8.375
Small States
Seeking Security
Why Some Small States Join
NATO and Others Do Not
Introduction
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the world has had a large increase of the number of states that cover the globe. Due to the effects of decolonization, the collapse of the Soviet-Union, and the dissolution of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, the number of states in the world has been steadily increasing. Many of these new states cover only small
geographic areas or have populations of less than two million inhabitants. These new small states are part of the same international system as their larger neighbors, but due to their (relative) size, might have more difficulty in meeting the challenges the international system poses than their larger neighbors have (Long, 2017, 186-188). Whether they are economic, environmental, or security challenges, small states have to combat these issues with fewer resources than larger states. This research will focus on the issue of international security for small states, focussing mainly on the reasons and motives small states have for joining military alliances. By focussing on the reasons and motives of small states, an attempt will be made to be able to explain the contradiction in the existing literature which states that small states will on the one hand pursue neutrality, while on the other hand will seek to find protection with larger neighbors (Hey, 2003, 5). Not only is this therefore scientifically relevant but with the emergence of the many new small states the question of small state security has become more relevant than ever. This issue will be approached by first analyzing the existing body of literature on small state, and international security, theory. Next, the research question will be formulated and the expectations for the outcome of the research will be. The methodological basis for the research, and the motivation for the selection of Luxembourg, Montenegro, Malta, and Cyprus as the cases to be observed, will follow after the literature review. In this part of the research the selected cases will be presented and the case selection will be made clear and defended. This will be followed by the data analysis of policy choices by the selected cases which could influence the decision of joining, or not joining, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Lastly, the conclusion of the analyzed data, and research, will be presented
Small State Theory
The increase of small states has made them a more relevant object of study in the field of international politics in the last decades (Long, 2017, 185-186). Their behavior can be
different from the behavior of larger states, since smaller states generally lack the ability to project power in the same way larger states can. Larger states, therefore, often receive more attention in international relations theory than their smaller neighbors. This logic is, however, perhaps somewhat outdated. Long (2017) emphasizes that politically and economically small states are now just as relevant as larger states: "It is a good moment in history to be a small state." "Legal norms of sovereign equality give small states a voice in many international organizations. An open global trading order has allowed many small states to specialize and prosper" (Long, 2017, 185-186). Veenendaal and Corbett add to this, highlighting the
scientific relevance of small states in political science research by explaining that the size of a population should not matter when comparing political systems. Each case, no matter how small, can lead to new insights into how political systems function according to them
(Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015, 530). This argument is also emphasized by Cooper and Shaw when they state that: "What small states lack in structural clout they can make up through creative agency…small states matter not only in the more general domain but also in the domain of global governance" (Cooper & Shaw, 2013, 2).
When observing small state behavior, the system-level of analysis allows this to be observed on the international stage and analyzed along the lines of traditional international relations theories. Elman (1995) explains the importance of the system-level of analysis when studying small state behavior by focusing on the effects of the international system for small states, stating that they are more preoccupied than larger states with their own survival and will often face more external threats to their survival, thus resulting in a foreign policy focused on the survival of the state (Elman, 1995, 175-177). Browning (2006) further builds upon this, stating that power is used to measure a state’s ability to influence outcomes and when a state lacks power it is seen as therefore ‘weak’ (Browning, 2006, 670).
Using the term ‘power’ in an international relations context is quickly associated with a (neo-)realist inclined view of the international system. Walt (1987) uses the term ‘power’, or more correctly small state’s lack thereof, to show why small states will seek security from a more powerful neighbor. Walt argues that small states are forced to seek security from larger neighbors because of their vulnerable position on the international stage and their inability to provide adequate security against large external threats. Since according to a (neo-)realist view, the main goal of a state is survival, this ‘bandwagoning’ strategy is often the only viable security policy option small states have (Walt, 1987, 21-31). As a result of this policy option,
for their own ability to provide security by seeking a larger and more powerful ally who can provide them with the security they lack (Knudsen, 2002, 187). Knudsen (2002) hereby seems to show that a small state will need a larger state with ‘surplus security’ to augment its security in order to secure its survival. This clearly hints at a realist approach to small state security, where small states are dependent on, and perhaps at the mercy of their larger neighbors.
Taking the realist perspective into consideration, it is not unthinkable that small states will seek a way to limit the power of their larger neighbors in an attempt to lessen the threat larger states pose to smaller states. In a realist perspective small states do not have this option, however, and are at the mercy of their larger neighbors if they choose to remain neutral, or they choose to banwagon. In a (neo-)liberal perspective, however, small states have a means of trying to constrain the power of larger states through the mean of international organizations or institutions (Heywood, 2011, 54-66).
Ingebritsen, Neumann, Gstöhl & Beyer (2006, 3-4) emphasize this when they highlight the importance of international institutions to small states. According to them, small states see international organizations as very valuable and useful because such institutions have
institutionalized and codified values and norms that force larger states to justify their actions, limiting the behavior and the actions of larger states (Ingebritsen et al., 2006, 3-4). Wivel (2005) employs the same logic, writing that: "Institutions constrain the actions of great powers, facilitate peaceful conflict resolution and provide voice opportunities for the lesser powers, i.e. international institutions cushion the effect of international anarchy by regulating the use of force and, thereby, reducing the importance of power asymmetries" (Wivel, 2005, 395). Cooper & Shaw (2013) agree, and argue that smallness compels states to seek external cooperation. This cooperation can come in the form of communication, development, environment, security, and technology cooperation and differs depending on each state’s needs. Nonetheless, small states are compelled to seek cooperation in fields they themselves lack capabilities and often find international institutions the perfect arena for cooperation with other (larger) states (Cooper & Shaw, 2012, 3). This approach to small state behavior is more along the lines of (neo)-liberalism, because these authors highlight the importance (and perhaps necessity) of international institutions for small state security.
Cooperation (influence)
Both grand theories thus underline the importance of security for small states. How small states pursue security differs, however, between the grand theories. The liberal
approach, emphasizing cooperation in international organizations, seems to provide the best explanation for the willingness of small states to become members of inter-governmental security organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the Peninsula Shield Force (military arm of the Gulf Cooperation Council). Wivel (2005) underwrites this analysis, stating that small states will adapt to, rather than dominate, the external security environment. They will furthermore seek to influence this environment through cooperation and membership of international institutions (Wivel, 2005, 395).
Wivel’s viewpoints are shared by Rickli (2008) who, like Wivel, shows that small states have two general options when it comes to security: autonomy or influence. When states choose to protect their autonomy they will seek neutrality and adopt a defensive security policy but they will not benefit from the protection of a larger state (Rickli, 2008, 310). Though autonomy is a viable option for many small states, it does not help to explain why many small states join military alliances such as NATO. When the other option small states have, which is influence, is taken into consideration, the motives for small states to cooperate and form security partnerships becomes more apparent. Small states can opt to maximize their influence by adopting a cooperative strategy. This leads to the state joining a military alliance leading to the state having two security policy options: bandwagoning, or balancing (Rickli, 2008, 308-311). Both these cooperation options provide small states with security they would not be able to provide themselves. There is a tradeoff, however, when states choose cooperation as their international security strategy. By cooperating, a state is able to benefit from the protection of a larger state, though its autonomy is compromised since it can become entrapped by the policy of its bigger partner and therefore risk fighting wars which are nog in its direct interest (Rickli, 2008, 309-310). Vaicekauskaitė (2017) makes a similar analysis as Rickli, by explaining the different options available to small states when it comes to international security policy. Vaicekauskaitė (2017) specifically focuses on the option of
neutrality (similar to Rickli’s autonomy) and cooperation.
Cooperation seems a very logical option for small states and can even be economically beneficial, since small states have the option to attempt to ‘free-ride’ meaning that they can
the alliance members) while still reaping the benefit of protection from external threats (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966, 1-3). Olson & Zeckhauser (1966) illustrate how small NATO members pay disproportionately little money while gaining disproportionately much more security when compared to the larger NATO members (Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966, 1-3). This notion is another motivator for small states to join military alliances, since they can gain much and have to offer up little, weakening the argument that neutrality is economically wiser for small states.
Neutrality (autonomy)
Cooperating and seeking influence still does come at a cost for small states, however, as mentioned earlier. Small states may lose some amount of autonomy when they decide to cooperate, as they can be forced into taking parts in conflicts that are not in their interest by larger and more powerful states within the military alliance. If they refuse to join in the conflict they could weaken the alliance or their own position within the alliance (Rickli, 2008, 308-311). There is ample empirical evidence, however, that small states choose neutrality when deciding upon their security policy (Graf & Lanz, 2013, 418-420). Switzerland is a well known example of small state continuing its policy of neutrality even after the Cold War (Graf & Lanz, 2013, 420). Interestingly, the analysis Hey (2003) makes of small state behavior shows some contradictions with the empirical evidence of small states joining military
alliances. Hey (2003) explains that small states tend to "exhibit a low level of participation in world affairs" (Hey, 2003, 5), "employ diplomatic and economic foreign policy instruments, as opposed to military instruments" (Hey, 2003, 5), and perhaps most contradictory to Wivel’s and also Rickli’s research that they "choose neutral positions" (Hey, 2003, 5). Maurice East (1973) similarly identifies several key positions small states take. East’s analysis seems to be in line with Hey’s when formulating expected behavior for small states, though East lists one other interesting behavioral pattern: "avoidance of behavior and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system" (East, 1973, 557). East’s point could indicate that small states are more inclined towards the autonomy-option when deciding on security policy as illustrated by Rickli (2008), since cooperation would "alienate the more powerful states in the system" (East, 1973, 557). But East’s analysis of expected state behavior again raises the question as to why small states do form military alliances and participate in them since the empirical evidence contradicts East’s statements in the cases of, for example,
Iceland, Luxembourg, and Montenegro as they are small states that decided to ally with the United States and NATO.
The Research Puzzle
The empirical cases of small states that joined NATO mentioned previously, seem to conflict with the general theoretical assumption that small states will seek neutrality and do not focus on security in their international policy. Not only do these empirical cases show that the different theories on small state behavior explain different cases, there is ample conflict in the literature itself as to why small states would join a military alliance. It is still unclear why certain small states choose to cooperate and join military alliances, even when this may not be in their direct interest. This research aims to find out why small states join NATO and how this fits into the expected pattern of behavior for small states. This research therefore attempts to answer the following question: why do some small states join NATO and others do not?
The question posed will help create insight as to why small states join NATO while others do not and in what way this conflicts (or does not) with expected patterns of behavior for different small European states. Small states will more likely choose to cooperate when this provides them with more external security than they could ever provide themselves, but why they choose this is not always clear. One explantation could be, as Knudsen’s (2002)
statement that small states are net importers of security shows, cooperation is not only preferable for small states when deciding upon international security policy, in some cases they may not really have that much of a choice. When states do have a clear choice for one option or the other, their motivation for choosing either option is highly interesting as it may provide new insights into the behavior of small states.
Expectations
The body of existing literature, especially the work of Hey (2003), Rickli (2008), Wivel (2005), and Vaicekauskaitè (2017), shows the different policy options small state have when it comes to their security policy although they shed little light on the motivations small states have when making a decision as to which policy option to take. This research therefore, will focus on the motivations of small states for choosing either cooperation or autonomy.
It is expected that one motivation for small states, when choosing either policy option, is based on internal (domestic) economic structures. Since small states are more reliant on an open network of free trade and are less likely to be able to exploit sufficient resources of their own, choosing to join NATO can provide a small state with adequate security to be able to focus more whole on its economy (Vaicekauskaitè, 2017, 9-10). Second, the state’s geographic position in the world will influence its motivation for joining or not joining NATO. Third the perception the state has of itself as a small state will influence its motivations to join NATO (Hey, 2003, 4). Fourth, the incentive for choosing a cooperation strategy has been
strengthened by the current unipolar system. It is expected that small states will seek protection allying with the strongest state in the system provides as a motivator for joining NATO. Allying with the strongest state in the system allows small states to increase their power without being as concerned about the possible retaliations of other states (Rickli, 2008, 314). It would be interesting to see if these expectations are confirmed by the research, which would hopefully lead to the possibility to formulate a theory as to why exactly some small states join military alliance and why some do not.
Defining small states (conceptualization & operationalization)
When examining small states it is important to attempt to define what a small state is and which states do not fall into this category. With so many new small states emerging, especially in Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and as the result of decolonization in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean, it is important to select a clear cut-off point for this research when it comes to the selection of the cases, especially since small states with a population of less than one million people now make up 20% of the countries (i.e., cases) that can be researched in comparative international politics (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2015, 529).
Taking this into consideration, it is important to mention that the there is much debate within the existing literature as to how to define a small state (Hey, 2003, 1-3). No matter what thresholds are chosen for the definition of a small state, it is important to remember that these are always arbitrary and can always be challenged. The cutoff-point for this study has been
set at states with less than one million inhabitants in Europe who maintain a standing army. The matter of size, and the cut-off point for the case selection has been addressed, but what constitutes as a state needs to be further defined. A sovereign state is a state that has a
defined territory, a permanent population, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states, as stated in the Montevideo convention (T.C.M. Asser Institute, 2015). United Nations (UN) membership is not a criteria for a state to be seen as a sovereign state but does imply that it is capable of entering into relations with other states (United Nations, n.d.). A (sovereign) small state is thus a state that has a population of less than one million inhabitants, meets the criteria of the Montevideo convention and is a UN-member.
To answer the question posed for research here, however, it is important to define parameters within which fitting cases for research should fall.
Certain concepts used in this research will need to conceptualized in order to be able to operationalize them and measure them in the following research
Cooperation will be conceptualized as done by Rickli (2014) and Wivel (2005) as a small state actively seeking membership of NATO, participating in NATO, and showing willingness to join allies in a military conflict. Neutrality will be conceptualized according to
Vaicekauskaitė’s as a state that stays non-aligned, avoid taking sides in great-power conflicts, and demonstrating that they do not pose any threat to greater powers thus minimizing their risk of being involved in large-state conflicts (Vaicekauskaitė, 2017, 12).
The motivations of each case for joining, or not joining, NATO can be very different. It is therefore difficult to select indicators which could be used to measure each case’s reasons for choosing to join NATO or to remain neutral. However, some general indicators can be
selected that can be used as a guide along which the different motivations for each case can be analyzed. The indicators selected are the following: membership, or non-membership of NATO, military cooperation with allied states (within NATO or outside of NATO), participation in military exercises, and foreign, as well as domestic, military and economic policy.
The indicator ‘NATO-membership’ is a rather straightforward one and will quickly indicate if a case chooses a cooperation policy (by being a NATO member) or a neutrality policy (by not joining NATO). Beyond that, the indicator ‘military cooperation’ will help indicate if a small state still actively seeks military cooperation outside of NATO, or with NATO while not being a NATO member. This could show that a small state could still pursue a cooperative policy strategy without being a NATO member, or by not seeking cooperation indicates neutrality. Examining each case’s motives for its actions based on these indicators will help show the motives each case has for joining, or not joining, NATO.
Methodology
The research method chosen for this thesis is a qualitative research design, namely a comparative case study with a most different systems design (MDSD). A comparative case study design is highly suited to test the theories about small state security policy as well as small state behavior. Bryman (2012) confirms this, by stating that by comparing two or more cases, the researcher will be in a better position to determine the circumstances under which a theory does, and does not, hold (Brynam, 2012, 74). Furthermore, a comparative case study of two or more cases may play a crucial role in the relation to the understanding of causality building, since researchers are more likely to be sensitive to factors that influence causality beyond only the observed patterns within a specific context. (Bryman, 2012, 74).
The MDSD design is therefore highly suited to compare these cases. They differ in several ways but all are small states in Europe.
Case Selection
The cases are selected on the basis of purposive sampling as defined by Bryman (2012). Bryman notes that samples chosen on the basis of purposive sampling are chosen in a
strategic way so that the chosen cases are relevant to the research question being posed (Bryman, 2012, 418). The selected cases, being Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, and Cyprus have all been selected for their relevance to the research question.
They are four different types of cases. Luxembourg is the exemplary case as
Luxembourg is a founding member of NATO and therefore an example of a small state that chose cooperation as its foreign security policy. Montenegro is a typical case since it chose cooperation by joining NATO in 2017 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2017), being small state in Europe that joined NATO after the founding of NATO (as many other Central and Eastern European states have done). Malta can be categorized as a typical case in the category of neutral states, being a small state in Europe, with historical ties to the United Kingdom, but opting not to join NATO. These case types, are used as they are defined by Bryman in Social Research Methods (Bryman, 2012, 70). Lastly, the case of Cyprus is an interesting case since it has a unique political situation. The island is partly controlled by Turkey (Northern Cyprus), and partly by Republic of Cyprus, which is a European Union member and has a strong and historical tie to Greece (Bahcheli & Rizopoulos, 1996, 27-29).
Both Greece and Turkey are NATO allies but that does not mean NATO membership is a logical step for the Republic of Cyprus.
Iceland was not selected as a case to be examined as it does not maintain a standing army (Ingimundarson, 2007, 8). Though Iceland is a founding member of NATO, the absence of Icelandic armed forces excludes Iceland from a most similar systems design as all cases compared maintain a standing army.
The selected cases differ in the aforementioned areas but are equal enough in several indicators to be able to make assumptions about the causality of choice to either join NATO, or remain neutral. The most different systems design is based on this notion. The similarities in the cases are: that they are sovereign states, maintain a standing army, they have a
representative democracy, and are European states. Also, two of the four states share either the similarity of being NATO members (Luxembourg and Montenegro) while three of the four state are European Union members (Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta). These similarities are enough to show that a most different systems design is best used to find the differentiating variable(s) that led to Montenegro and Luxembourg becoming NATO members while Malta did not. The differences between these cases will hopefully help show the causality of small states in Europe joining NATO.
Data analysis
In this section each case will be examined and analyzed in an attempt to find reasons for either joining, or not joining NATO. Analysis will be done based on government publications, news media publications, press releases by the governments of the examined cases or by NATO, publications by political parties, and existing scientific literature.
The data analysis was done using a content analysis of the above mentioned sources to find the main motivators for each case to base its choice of membership of NATO or non-membership on. Many (scientific and news) articles were analyzed and read to come to a conclusion of the main motives for each case after which these motives were presented in the data analysis of each case.
Luxembourg (cooperation)
By observing Luxembourg’s actions and behavior, as well as statements made by
military and government officials, it is possible to measure what the main motivators were that Luxembourg had for joining NATO. By being a founding member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d.) the first indicator, membership of NATO, hints at a cooperative policy strategy from Luxembourg. Their motivations for choosing this will be further explored in the following section.
Luxembourg, along with the eleven other founders of NATO, singed the Atlantic Treaty on April 4th 1949 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d.). The speech given at the
occasion by Joseph Bech, Luxembourg’s Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, and shows that Luxembourg’s small size is an important factor in its motivation to join NATO. Bech states: "I set the signature of my small country beside those of so many friendly nations at the bottom of this instrument of peace, the Atlantic Pact" (Bech, 1949, 2). The fact that Bech mentions the smallness of Luxembourg points to Luxembourg perceiving itself as small and needing support from others, especially the United State, to guarantee its security.
Luxembourg also viewed NATO as a logical continuation of the Western European Union. Seeing that Canada and the United States would now join the Western European states in a defensive alliance, made it so that the security of Luxembourg was better guaranteed in the coming decades (Bech, 1949, 1). "The North Atlantic Pact is the logical supplement to the Brussels Pact" (Bech, 1949, 1), shows that already being a member of the Western European Union motivated Luxembourg to also participate in NATO. Another important motivator for Luxembourg for joining NATO was the lack of a coercive force belonging to the UN: "In the absence of any coercive force belonging to the United Nations, the treaty of assistance and mutual aid among the twelve western countries constitutes the most effective guaranty possible for them" (Bech, 1949, 1). This shows that Luxembourg did not believe the UN would be sufficient in keeping peace in the world and that it needed another, stronger, guarantee for its security.
These motivations Luxembourg had for joining NATO in 1949, are still relevant today and further built upon by the contemporary governments of Luxembourg. In the report,
Luxembourg Defense Guidelines for 2025 and Beyond (2017), the Defense Directorate sets out
Luxembourg’s defense policy for the near future. In the introduction, the inability for most small states to influence global events on their own is are named as an important reason for
states to seek cooperation. This is then coupled with the small size of Luxembourg and its limited defense capabilities, stating that it is crucial for Luxembourg to seek partners for its national defense (Directorate of Defense, 2017, 8-9). Luxembourg’s emphasis on cooperation is specifically mentioned in the document in the following words: "cooperating with partners and maintaining a calm and stable national and international environment has always been a priority for Luxembourg" (Directorate of Defense, 2017, 9). Furthermore, the documents states that Luxembourg cannot single-handedly preserve its territorial integrity, the safety of its population, its prosperity, its independence, and its sovereignty (Directorate of Defense, 2017, 12). These statements by the government of Luxembourg prove that Luxembourg actively opts for cooperation and adopts a cooperative security policy, choosing
bandwagoning with the United States within NATO (and against the Soviet-Union in 1949 (Bech, 1949, 1)) as its main security policy option. The statement by Ingebritsen et al (2006) that small states greatly value international institutions (such as NATO) also seems to be confirmed by these statements.
When looking at the essential security interests of Luxembourg, several points are made. Most interestingly it is clearly stated that, "a strong transatlantic link" (Directorate of Defense, 2017, 14) is a crucial security interest for Luxembourg. This is clearly an example of a
cooperation-based security policy with an emphasis on bandwagoning since it shows that Luxembourg looks towards the other side of the Atlantic (the United States) as the main provider of its security. Rickli’s analysis of small state security policy is therefore correct in the case of Luxembourg, showing a clearly defined policy of influence-seeking through
cooperation within NATO by Luxembourg by using a bandwagoning strategy.
Luxembourg aims to contribute to a large number of NATO operations and missions in the near future. Luxembourg has participated in NATO peacekeeping operations and aims to continue doing this in the future (Directorate of Defense, 2017, 20-21). Luxembourg is clearly involved in operations of NATO.
The free-rider issue raised by Olson & Zeckhauser (1966) comes into play in the case of Luxembourg and is relevant to note. Luxembourg spends the lowest percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense of all the NATO members, 0,44% (NATO.int, 2017, 3). As a highly developed Western-European state, Luxembourg’s low defense spending is interesting, especially when compared to other small states like Montenegro, which spends 1,66% of its GDP on defense (NATO.int, 2017, 3). This is in line with Olson & Zuckhauser’s
ride’. This is may well explain one of the reasons Luxembourg had for initially joining NATO, as they can choose security through cooperation, without paying the high cost. Luxembourg is clearly involved in NATO operations, participating in several large military exercises in 2017 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2017) and supplying 23 soldiers to SFOR in 1999 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1999). This contradicts the free-rider issue small states raise according to Olson & Zeckhauser.
Luxembourg was initially motivated to join NATO by its small size and inability to provide its own security. The strengthening of the already existing military cooperation in Europe by having Canada and the United States join the military alliance motivated Luxembourg as well to join NATO. These are still the main motivators for Luxembourg’s NATO membership to date. As stated by the Directorate of Defense (2017), Luxembourg is unable to guarantee its security on its own but these figures show again that Luxembourg is pursuing a policy of bandwagoning, relying on the larger and more powerful NATO members for security.
Montenegro (cooperation)
Montenegro joined NATO as late as 2017, choosing to seek influence through
cooperation in much the same way as Luxembourg has done. Similarly, as in the late 1940s for Luxembourg, the presence of predatory neighbor may have been the main motivater Montenegro to join NATO as late as 2017.
Shortly after gaining independence from Serbia in 2006, Montenegro joined the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program (in which non-NATO member cooperate with NATO on international security) showing that it choose a cooperation-strategy in its foreign- and
military policy (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2017). It further showed signs of
cooperation indicators by actively supporting the NATO-led operations in Afghanistan (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2017).
The armed forces of Montenegro are relatively small, numbering roughly 2,000 troops. This in combination with Montenegro’s strategic location on the Adriatic coast makes it a target for potential threats from abroad making it seek NATO security (Luhn, 2017).
A possible motivation for Montenegro to join NATO is the threats that direct neighbors and large powers, somewhat farther away, pose to Montenegro’s short independence. The Balkan region has seen terrible conflict throughout the end of the twentieth century and it
remains a volatile region to this day (Derwett, n.d., 1-3). By joining NATO, Montenegro is offered protection from Serbia which may be a predatory neighbor to Montenegro (Derwett, n.d., 4). Russia, though farther away, is also a threat to Montenegrin sovereignty and security. Russia sees the Balkans as its own sphere of influence and does not like to see the Balkan states actively seeking NATO and European Union (EU) membership (Kurečić, 2017, 74-75). This points to Montenegro being a case that actively seeks cooperation within NATO to be able to better protect itself agains much larger external threats.
This position has been affirmed by statements made by Montenegro’s Prime Minister Duško Marković, stating that NATO membership is a guarantee for Montenegro’s future security, economic progress and regional stability: "Nato and the EU have always been, and remain, a guarantee of stability and security and cooperation and the main basis for peace in Europe" (The Guardian, 2017). Montenegro’s Prime Minister further continued that joining NATO will prevent violence from ever again erupting in the Balkan region sparking another Balkan war.
This shows that even as late as 2017, there is still plenty of incentive for the government of Montenegro to take the step to join a military alliance such as NATO. Clearly the security provided by NATO membership is the most important aspect of membership for
Montenegro as stated by the Prime Minister of Montenegro himself. This clearly points to an active cooperation strategy by Montenegro as explained by Rickli (2008). Montenegro joins NATO not because it faces an immediate threat, but uses its NATO membership as a means to guarantee its future security, knowing that it is a small and vulnerable state in a strategic location along the Adriatic coast, in a region that was known for its high ethnic tensions and saw the last major war on the European continent (Derwett, n.d. 3-6).
Several Montenegrin politicians have expressed their support for Montenegro’s NATO membership and have framed it as a necessity for Montenegro’s future security. Speaker of the Montenegrin Parliament, Ranko Krivokapic, ́ gave a speech in 2014 in which he expressed the need for Montenegro to become part of the NATO alliance, making several statements about Montenegro’s future security (Kovacevic, 2017, 45). Krivokapic ́ talks about the NATO umbrella and how being under this umbrella will protect Montenegro from external threats. He further highlights how Montenegro is the last piece of the NATO ‘puzzle’, being the last part of European coastline from Lisbon to Istanbul to become part of NATO (Krivokapic ́, 2014). This shows that Montenegrin Politicians are aware of Montenegro’s
Montenegrin security, making sure it will be protected from external threats that would want to take advantage of Montenegro’s relative inability to defend its own sovereignty. Though not mentioned anywhere as a direct threat, it is not hard to imagine that a neutral
Montenegro would be a vital strategic location of interest to Russia, looking to secure a location on the Adriatic coast. A ‘Crimean scenario’ would perhaps not be unthinkable (Kovac, 2014). This would even further fuel the desire for Montenegro to become a NATO member.
Though the external pressure Montenegro faced may have also contributed to it becoming a NATO member, Fillip Kovacevic (2017) points out that several
non-governmental agencies had been actively campaigning among Montenegrin members of parliament for NATO membership. These non-governmental agencies received USAID funding and were sponsored in their campaign by the both the German and American embassies in Podgorica (Kovacevic, 2017, 45).
Montenegrin motives for joining NATO are therefore based on self-preservation and the perceived presence of a possibly hostile neighbor. This in combination with its strategic location and small sized military lead to Montenegro adopting a cooperative policy strategy.
Malta (Neutrality)
Not Unlike Montenegro, Malta too occupies a strategic location. The island state is located between the Northern African coast and Italy in the Mediterranean. Though, as opposed to Montenegro, Malta has chosen to remain neutral and not join NATO. Malta chooses the neutrality policy option, in regard to its international- and external security policy, as explained by Rickli. What makes Malta interesting is why it chooses this policy option when similar small European states such as Luxembourg and Montenegro have chosen a cooperative security policy
In its foreign policy, Malta is very aware of its strategic location in the Mediterranean and positions itself as the link between Europe and the European Union and the southern Mediterranean states in North Africa and the Middle East (Malta Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 3-5). In Strategic Objectives of Malta’s Foreign Policy (2006) it is stated that Malta, as a small country, is reliant on foreign trade and most importantly seeks trade relations with its
immediate neighbors. Malta makes no distinction as to with which neighbors it does and does not seek economic cooperation (Malta Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 3-5). A point that
again is mentioned in Strategic Objectives of Malta’s Foreign Policy (2006) as follows: "Malta’s foreign policy is directed at ensuring strong and stable relations with such countries, particularly our neighbors and, in partnership with the private sector and relevant
government agencies, to further all existing opportunities to maximise the potential for trade and investment" (Malta Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 5). Malta’s neutrality is highlighted here, with Malta choosing not to turn exclusivly to Europe and the EU for trade but, realizing that keeping close ties with its non-EU neighbors is important to the Maltese economy. It can be argued that Malta’s choice to pursue a neutrality policy option is therefore partly
economically motivated since remaining neutral makes trade with states in the Middle East easier.
Hey’s (2003) hypothesis that small states will be greatly in favor of international organizations is exhibited in the case of Malta. Malta favors enlargement of the EU and wishes to actively use its location on Europe’s south-eastern border to form relations with both the African Union and the Arab League while at the same time advocating for more transatlantic cooperation (Malta Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 7-8). This is another indicator of Malta’s neutrality, seeking cooperation with several different international organizations, pursuing a strategy of bilateral and multilateral discourse instead of active military cooperation within NATO (Malta Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 7-8).
In this regard Malta also sees itself as neutral state in the middle of the Mediterranean. As part of its foreign policy agenda, Malta places itself in the position of neutral territory, promoting Malta as a location suitable for international dialogue and conflict resolution (Malta Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 18). This is comparable to Sweden’s position during the Cold War, when it too pursued a neutral foreign policy and promoted itself as a location for international dialogue and conflict resolution. Malta is aware that its location in the Mediterranean puts it in an ideal position to fulfill such a role and that by joining NATO it may loose this position and thereby the international recognition( the role being seen as an important mediator in international conflict) that accompanies such a position.
Malta’s neutrality policy is perhaps most clearly stated in Strategic Objectives of Malta’s Foreign Policy (2006) under the heading "Promote respect of the International Rule of Law and the prevention and peaceful resolution of conflict". In this part of Malta’s foreign policy strategy explanation, Malta’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs writes: "Malta will continue to promote respect of the International Rule of Law rather than the use of military force and
Foreign Affairs, 2006, 21). This is perhaps the most direct statement of Maltese neutrality, wishing to not use military means to resolve conflict.
NATO also acknowledges Malta’s choice for neutrality. Although Malta does participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PfP), NATO writes: "Participation in the PfP program is compatible with Malta’s commitment to the principle of neutrality" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2017).
This is further strengthened by both of Malta’s major political parties, the Maltese Labour Party, and the Nationalist Party, stating that Malta should pursue further cooperation with states in the region beyond the EU. No mentions are made of NATO or the need for Malta to join the military alliance in either party’s election manifesto (Partit Laburista, 2013, 20 & Partit Nazzjonalista, 2013, 8-9).
Malta clearly opts for a foreign security policy more in line with Rickli’s (2008)
description of a neutral small state. Malta shares behavioral characteristics with Hey’s theory on small state behavior as well, therefore being in line with the existing literature. Malta chooses the neutral policy option mostly for economical reasons, as stated in Strategic Objectives of Malta’s Foreign Policy (2006). Joining NATO would therefore be against Maltas’s direct interests and may harm its position in international trade. Malta’s choice for neutrality is therefore explainable through the economic arguments mentioned earlier. Malta is therefore a state, in line with the neutrality policy theory presented by Rickl (2008) and Vaicekauskaitė (2017).
Cyprus (Neutrality)
The Republic of Cyprus is a rather different case from the rest of the cases analyzed in this research as it is a country, literally divided, in much the same way as Germany was during the Cold War. The Republic of Cyprus, which is an EU member, controls part of the island of Cyprus. The northern part of Cyprus is controlled by The Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), an unrecognized state. Both the Republic of Cyprus and TRNC claim the entire island of Cyprus as their legitimate territory. This has caused a situation where two NATO members (Greece and Turkey) are intertwined in a ‘proxy-conflict’ on the island of Cyprus (Bahcheli & Rizopoulos, 1996, 27-29).
With the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1959, there was talk of Cyprus becoming a NATO member. The British (the colonial power governing Cyprus until then),
however, did not view it necessary to let Cyprus join NATO as it was a small state and could contribute little to the defense of (Western) Europe. This position by the British is considered surprising as the issue of smallness did not seem to matter in the cases of Luxembourg and Iceland (Papadopoulos, 2015). The government of the United Kingdom (UK) already had two military bases on the island and felt that the bases were adequate options for NATO in South-Eastern Mediterranean and that membership for The Republic of Cyprus was not necessary in order to protect NATO’s Southern flank (Papadopoulos, 2015). Later attempts, in the mid 1970’s, by Cypriot governments to join NATO were again denied by the other allies (United Kingdom, Germany, United States) as this would be blocked by Turkey (Papadopoulos, 2015).
As shown, Cyprus did not initially wish to take a neutral foreign-security policy path, but was interested in joining NATO and pursuing a cooperation strategy much like
Luxembourg had done. Cyprus appears to have be forced into the role by the other NATO members denying it membership as a result of Turkey’s NATO membership. This has led a difficult situation in which Turkey blocks Cyprus from being included in NATO operations and programs (such as PfP), while Cyprus prevents Turkey from taking part in EU security operations in the Mediterranean and beyond (Politicio, 2010). It is therefore not a matter of choice for Cyprus.
The government of Cyprus wishes to participate in NATO and therefore follow the same path as Luxembourg and Montenegro. Cyprus realizes that it is in a strategic location, but mostly seeks protection against Turkey, which it sees as a predatory neighbor. As a result, The Republic of Cyprus blames Turkey for not being able to join NATO, or to participate in EU-NATO cooperations stating:
"Furthermore, Turkey refuses to agree to the expansion of EU-NATO dialogue with the participation of Cyprus, based on the pretext that Cyprus has chosen not to participate in the Partnership for Peace, nor has it concluded a Security of classified information Agreement with NATO. The problems and complications in EU-NATO cooperation stem from the steadfast refusal of Turkey to accept that the EU consists of 27 member-states and that Cyprus constitutes an integral part of any EU cooperation with other international
organizations" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).
agreements sees itself forced into a neutrality policy. Cyprus is therefore not neutral because it wants to be, or because it is to its economic benefit (such as with Malta), but it is forced into its role because of exclusion. Cyprus can therefore not be used to formulate a conclusion to the research question because it does not have a choice between neutrality or cooperation but is forced into neutrality.
Conclusion
Having analyzed all four cases using various indicators as guidelines to help pinpoint why certain small states choose neutrality and why other small states choose cooperation has helped shed light on their motivations for choosing either policy option. With such different cases, different conclusions were reached for each case, but still with a general grounding in the existing literature.
The expectation that the motivation for states to join NATO would be based on domestic economic factors was not met. Vaicekauskaitè’s (2017) analysis that small states are more reliant on an open network of free trade was not disproven, but this reliance on free trade did not lead to the researched small states seeking security within NATO. Interestingly, the one case in which domestic economic factors most influenced the policy decision was Malta. In Malta’s case the importance of the domestic economy actually resulted in Malta choosing neutrality instead of cooperation. In the other three cases, domestic economic factors were not nearly as important a motivator when choosing wether to join or not join NATO.
The expectation that geographic location and perceived smallness of states would influence the decision to join NATO turned out to be correct in two of the four cases. In the cases of Luxembourg and Montenegro it is mentioned by government officials and
government documents that both states are too small to provide their own security and must supplement their own lack of security with security provided by larger states. For
Montenegro, its geographic location bordering Serbia and the Adriatic coast resulted in a decision to join NATO as it occupied a strategic location and borders a predatory neighbor. For Luxembourg, its geographic location in Western Europe saw it be part of the Western European Union before the founding of NATO. Luxembourg saw NATO as a natural next step after the Western European Union and it signing the Atlantic Pact was a logical next step in furthering military cooperation and security in Western Europe. For Malta, geographic
location motivated it to choose a neutral policy option as it actively pursues relations (economic as well as political (Malta Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006, 5)) with states throughout the Mediterranean.
The research shows that the incentive for choosing a cooperation strategy because of the current unipolar system is true in the case of Montenegro. Montenegro actively sought protection under the NATO ‘umbrella’ and was highly motivated to join NATO because of the protection the strongest state in the system (the United States) could provide. This expectation is somewhat true in the case of Luxembourg as well, although at the time of the founding of NATO there was very much a bipolar world system. In the case of Luxembourg the United States was the most logical option however to provide it with security. Joseph Bech (1949) mentioned in his speech that having the United States join in a military alliance with the Western European states adds to their security in a divided Europe (Bech, 1949, 1-2). In the case of Malta, the existence of a unipolar system has not created greater incentive to join NATO. Malta seems to have not been motivated by the unipolar system to actively pursue NATO membership and choose to continue its neutral policy.
The research question (why some small states join NATO and others do not?) can not be definitively answered but this research shows that geographic location of the state is of
influence in each case. Domestic economic factors were only of influence in one case,
smallness and self perception in two cases, and a unipolar system only influenced one case in its decision.
Critical in reaching these conclusions have been the government publications put forward by Luxembourg (Luxembourg Defence Guidelines for 2025 and Beyond) and Malta (Strategic
Objectives of Malta’s Foreign Policy) which gave good insights into what each state’s perceptions of
themselves are and where they see themselves in the world.
It is somewhat difficult to place these findings in the light of the existing literature on small state security policy. Not much research has been done into why states choose either neutrality or cooperation. This is perhaps also the greatest weakness of this research because it makes it very difficult to compare results to the findings of other researchers. Specifically the motivations for small states to choose either cooperation or neutrality is difficult to analyze without being able to compare the findings with those of others. It is therefore highly
recommend that more research is done into the motivations for small states to join NATO or to remain neutral, specifically into which domestic policy decisions or structures led to opting
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