Between Moscow and Market
Political discourse in the Netherlands and
Germany regarding Nord Stream 2
Thesis MSc. Crisis and Security Management Paul van der Bas
S1607650 Word count: ~ 20.000
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. A.L. Dimitrova Second reader: Dr. J. Matthys
Introduction
3
Theoretical Background
7
Natural Gas and Geopolitics
14
Methodology and Case Selection
23
Findings and Analysis
29
Conclusions and recommendations
53
Introduction
1. Introduction
“Germany is totally controlled by Russia.” On July 11, 2018, U.S. president Donald Trump drew attention with this remark about Germany’s reliance on Russian natural gas. Trump’s remarks, given ahead of a NATO summit, referred to the construction of Nordstream II (Diamond, 2018; McBride, 2018). When finished, this pipeline, which runs parallel to Nordstream 1, will transport natural gas from Russia to Germany’s northern shore by way of the Baltic sea. Germany is the European Union’s largest consumer of natural gas, and 40 percent of its gas is sourced from Russia (McBride, 2018). Trump struck a sensitive chord: Germany is dependent on natural gas deliveries from Russia, but - as an EU member state - part of a union that has a tense relationship with Russia.
2. Geopolitical context
A few days prior to Trump’s statements, European Council president Donald Tusk expressed a similar opinion. During the Ukraine-EU Summit on July 9, 2018, he called Nord Stream 2 “a mistake” and said the project “is against our strategic interests, our security, and also our rules” (Emerging Europe, 2018).
The U.S. fear that additional pipelines will strengthen Russia’s strategic geopolitical position versus NATO (McBride, 2018). Indeed, the new pipeline comes at a time when relations between NATO and EU countries and Russia are at a low point. The United States believes that the new pipeline undermines American and European sanctions against Russia, which were introduced in response to its annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Nord Stream 2 doubles the amount of natural gas that can be directly transported from Russia to Germany. This additional capacity could be used to bypass the existing transit route through Ukraine, depriving the country of substantial transit fees (Reuters, 2015).
Eastern European countries have raised objections to the pipeline as well. In 2016, eight Central and Eastern European governments (the prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania and the president of Lithuania) signed a letter opposing the Nord Stream 2 project, arguing that it would pose a risk to energy security in Eastern Europe and influence the existing transit routes through Ukraine (Sytas, 2016).
Despite the objections to Nord Stream 2, Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel has insisted that the project is purely commercial (Gregory, 2019). Merkel has also opposed a separate mandate for the
EU Commission to negotiate with Russia regarding the project, arguing that EU approval is not needed (No need for EU mandate, 2017). Instead, Germany - as well as Russia - argued that only the states through whose territory Nord Stream passes need to give their approval: Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany (Keating, 2019). The Netherlands took a similar position to Germany, with Dutch companies Royal Dutch Shell and state-owned Gasunie participating in the Nord Stream project despite U.S. opposition (U.S. disappointed, 2019).
Germany’s position has put the country at odds with the European Commission, which seeks an increased role in energy policy. Moreover, Merkel’s stance has been described as a shift from Germany’s traditional support for European integration towards intergovernmental decision-making (Dempsey, 2017).
3. Research Subject
This thesis seeks to research the political discourse in Germany and the Netherlands regarding the Nord Stream 2 project, and analyze how the countries’ respective national political bodies view energy policy in relation to security. By analyzing the political discourses on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, this research seeks to discover what reasoning and which arguments shape decision-making in the field of energy policy. Specifically, attention will be paid to the influence of the neorealist security-first approach on energy policy in the context of political tensions between Russia and the EU.
The research question is formulated as follows: “To what extent are neorealist arguments present in the national political discourses about Nord Stream 2 in the Netherlands and Germany?”
4. Relevance of the Research
Societal Relevance
Researching political discourse in the Netherlands and Germany with regard to Nord Stream 2 will shed light on how these countries view natural gas trade. Among member states of the European Union, two main approaches towards natural gas trade can be distinguished: On the one hand, Central and Eastern European states have emphasized the geopolitical aspects of Nord Stream 2 and the risks that are associated with dependence on Russian natural gas supplies. On the other hand, Germany has taken the public position that the Nord Stream 2 project is purely commercial and that the pipeline is a responsibility of market parties rather than governments.
Energy policy is increasingly relevant to the public debate, as European countries are committed to significantly reducing their CO2 emissions in order to combat global warming. In the short to medium term, efforts to cut CO2 emmissions will not reduce dependence on natural gas. On the contrary, dependence on natural gas is projected to rise as coal power plants are phased out, given natural gas’s lower CO2 emissions compared to other fossil fuels. Moreover, the Netherlands is committed to ending extraction from the Groningen gas field, which used to be a source of natural gas supply for Western Europe. The debate on the energy transition usually centers on its economic and financial implications, but there are also strategic and geopolitical implications. Researching European Union countries’ energy policy discourse and the extent to which they take foreign policy into account, will add a perspective to the discussion about the energy transition and shed light on possible geo-strategic consequences.
Academic Relevance
Energy policy in the European Union is a shared competence between the EU-level and the member state level. This means that researching the political process within European Union member states (that is, on the national level) is relevant to the course of European Union energy policy in general. Little research has been conducted about the internal political discourse within EU member states regarding energy policy. Rather, studies have focused on the positions taken by national
governments, instead of discussing the domestic political debates that led to these positions. This thesis seeks to investigate the political discourse within EU member states to gain a clearer picture how member states of the EU arrive to their positions in the field of energy policy. Moreover, it will add to academic understanding of the term energy security. There is no academic consensus on the definition of the concept energy security, what it encompasses and what its limitations are. The International Energy Agency (2001) defines energy security as “the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices”, but this definition still leaves a room for differing interpretations. This thesis will contribute to the academic understanding of how energy security is conceptualized in contemporary political discourses on the national level in the Netherlands and Germany.
The influence of security thinking on energy policy (in particular its external dimension) is relevant to the field of Crisis and Security Management, given its implications for the European security agenda. Researching member states’ discourses on energy security contributes to an improved understanding of factors that may determine the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy. If the political discourse in these member states reflects the view that energy security should be approached from a geopolitical perspective, this means that energy policy should be taken into account in the academic study of European security.
Knowledge gap
Although the position of E.U. member states’ governments regarding Nord Stream 2 is known, the question is whether any diversity of approaches towards natural gas policy (i.e. the approach that stresses geopolitical circumstances and the responsibility of governments to act, versus the approach that views Nord Stream 2 as a commercial project) is evident in the national political discourse. If the national political discourse reflects a diversity of approaches, this leaves the option that the Netherlands’ and Germany’s natural gas policy will shift towards a more geopolitics-focused approach in the future. On the other hand, if the entirety of the Dutch and German political spectrums has an economics-centered view of natural gas trade, this would suggest a more
fundamental difference of opinion vis a vis a security-centered approach. If the latter scenario is the case, the Dutch and German positions on Nord Stream 2 should be viewed not as an incidental difference of opinion with other EU member states, but rather as a fundamentally different approach with less likelihood to change in the future. Such a fundamentally different view on energy policy would have ramifications towards the Netherlands’ and Germany’s stance towards European integration in the field of energy policy. Moreover, it will be interesting to notice possible shifts or developments in the respective discourses in Germany and the Netherlands.
5. Research
The research consists of three parts. First, a theoretical background of the neorealist and neoliberal schools of international relations with regard to energy. Second, a historical overview of European-Russian gas trade as well as an explanation of the geopolitics associated with natural gas trade. The third part consists of a comparative case study of the political discourse regarding Nord Stream 2 in the Netherlands and Germany, conducted by a content analysis of parliamentary records from 2015 till 2018.
Theoretical Background
This thesis employs the theoretical perspectives of neorealism and neoliberalism to analyze the political discourse on energy security in the context of Nord Stream 2. The reason for using these theories from the field of international relations is that the Nord Stream 2 project has a clear external dimension, given its origin in a non-EU country. This is especially relevant in the context of the political tensions between Russia and the European Union after its annexation of the Crimea and its involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. It is this external dimension of energy security that this thesis seeks to clarify. Using only the neorealist perspective would lead to tunnel vision, as it would not take into account alternative perspectives and explanations. For this reason, the neorealist perspective is contrasted with the neoliberal perspective to gain an accurate insight into which of the two paradigms (if any) is dominant in the political discourse regarding energy security.
In addition to the aforementioned theoretical perspectives borrowed from the academic field of international relations, this thesis assumes the theoretical “black box model”, as developed by David Easton (1965). Easton argues that democratic governance is a continuous feedback system in which policy demands serve as input for government learning, resulting in political action as output. This output then influences demands among the population, pressure groups, and political parties. These new demands creates new input, making the policy process repeat itself. The “black box” refers to the in-between stage between input and output. The input and output are observable and thus known, but the process that happens in between - the throughput - cannot be known for certain. In the context of this research, this means that the political discourse that is analyzed (the input, according to Easton’s model) cannot be directly linked to policy outcomes as we do not know all variables that influence policy makers in their decision. Rather, by studying the political discourse we approach the ‘input’ part of Easton’s model as closely as possible, in order to gain an insight as good as possible. This is the reason that the focus of this thesis lies on political discourse in
parliament.
1. Realism and Neorealism
Realists characterize state behaviour as driven by a quest for power. States seek to maintain and expand their power, even at the cost of other states. According to classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau (1948), this quest for power is rooted in human nature. Because human nature is to strive for power, conflict exists. Neorealists, or structural realists, agree with classical realists that states compete with each other in the international system, but contend that this is caused by the
anarchic nature of the international system. After all, the world is not governed by a universal world power that regulates states’ behaviour. The international system is formed by competing states that try to improve their position relative to others. So, both schools of realism believe that state
behaviour is driven by states’ desire to expand their power, but whereas classical realists explain this phenomenon from human nature (placing emphasis on the character and ego of world leaders), neorealists find the explanation in the nature of the international system.
An important feature of neorealist thought is the ‘balance of power’, coined by Kenneth Waltz (1979). As states seek to maximize their power relative to other states, they will eventually reach an equilibrium where no state is strong enough to completely dominate the others. As long as this balance is maintained, neorealists contend, war is less likely. States will seek to preserve the balance of power by taking ‘balancing’ measures if a competing state is viewed as becoming too powerful and therefore disturbing the balance. ‘Internal balancing’ occurs when a state maximizes its own power when facing a threat (e.g. by spending more on military capabilities). ‘External balancing’ occurs when a state seeks allies to increase its security. The form of balancing depends on the polarity of the international system. In a bipolar world, with two clear world powers, ‘internal balancing’ within the respective power blocs is more likely than external balancing. In a multipolar world, where multiple great powers seek to expand their influence, external balancing is more likely as multiple world powers may unite against another power.
Waltz’s assumption that a balance of power is the natural outcome of the anarchic international system was challenged when the post-Cold War era saw the emergence of a unipolar system with the United States as its only hegemon. Stephen Walt (1987) revised Waltz’s theory by
reformulating the ‘balance of power’ to a ‘balance of threat’, meaning that states will only seek to ‘balance’ if a powerful state is viewed as a threat.
In the contemporary study of international relations, neorealist or structural realist perspectives are leading, alongside neoliberal perspectives. The following paragraph will outline the assumptions of the liberal and neoliberal schools in international relations.
Liberalism and Neoliberalism
Liberal explanations of international relations incorporate the basic realist assumptions that, firstly, the nature of the international system is anarchic, and, secondly, that states usually act in a rational way when making decisions. However, in contrast to realism and neo-realism, liberalism does not assume that states’ behaviour is driven by a quest for self-preservation and power expansion.
Liberalism places less importance on the role of security in relations between states and does not believe that a ‘balance of power’ is needed to prevent war. Rather, liberalism emphasizes
international cooperation and interdependence between states. In this view, cooperation between states offers mutual benefits. Moreover, conflict between states is unlikely if these states are economically interdependent.
Liberals believe that states can reduce the chance of conflict by forming international institutions. International institutions offer states a forum to resolve disagreements through diplomacy, and rely on international legal instruments to constrain states’ behaviour rather than military force. This is especially the case when institutions are highly formalized and integrated, such as the European Union.
Neoliberalism was proposed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) as a response to neo-realism. They posed the notion of ‘complex interdependence’ to dispute neorealist assumptions. Whereas neorealists view the state as the primary actor and force as the most effective instrument of foreign policy, the concept of ‘complex interdependence suggests that there are a multitude of connections between states that transcend the interaction between state governments, such as multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations. Moreover, ‘complex
interdependence’ challenges neorealists’ focus on force and security, as it assigns more importance to economic and cultural factors. All in all, neoliberal theorists contend that the separation between domestic and international politics in neorealism, does not correspond to international reality. The mixed-actor approach that neoliberals take assumes a variety of interests of which security is not necessarily the most important one.
2. Absolute versus Relative Gains
A key distinction between neorealist and neoliberal approaches is that the former emphasizes the importance of relative gains, whereas the latter emphasizes absolute gains. In the neorealist worldview, other countries are always competitors. The quest for power is a zero-sum game, with winners and losers. To protect its interests, a state should expand its power relative to other states in order to stay ahead of them and protect its survival. Neoliberalism on the other hand, takes the position that cooperation between countries offers mutual benefits. As long as both states profit, both of them are winners. Therefore, absolute gains are what counts, not a country’s performance relative to others.
3. Neoliberalism and Neorealism and Energy
The neoliberal and neorealist schools can be tied to differing views on energy policy. In the neorealist paradigm, security is the most important aspect of policy which trumps all others.
Following this assumption, one would expect states to always consider the security consequences of trade relations with other states, especially when it comes to vital goods such as energy. Given that dependence on one trading partner poses a potential threat, one would expect countries to look for ways to reduce their energy dependence as much as possible.
In the neoliberal paradigm, which stresses absolute gains over relative gains and adheres
importance to international cooperation and trade, countries would be expected to view energy as a separate domain from security, or at least to ascribe equal importance to security and eonomic considerations. Furthermore, the neoliberal school argues that interdependence between states enhances stability, and believe that markets and trade are conducive to mutually beneficial
relationships. In the case of European countries and Russia, the mutual dependence (Europe’s need for natural gas and Russia’s need for revenues) would reduce the chance of conflict, according to neoliberals. Moreover, neoliberals stress the importance of international institutions and
international law to solve disputes. In the case of energy, this would mean a positive attitude towards mechanisms such as the energy charter treaty and the European Energy Union.
Correljé, Van der Linde et. al. (2004) apply the neorealist and neoliberal paradigms’ contrasting views on energy trade to the European situation. In their Study on energy supply and geopolitics (2004, p.81), they describe two contrasting scenarios of the development of European energy trade, which correspond to the neoliberal and neorealist paradigms described above.
The Markets and insitutions storyline corresponds to a neoliberal perspective. It is characterized by economic integration in the European Union, an expansion of the EU towards a stable Eastern Europe, and reliance on (European) institutions to resolve disputes. For Russia, the Markets and institutions storyline assumes multilateral cooperation in international organizations and the EU, and increased political pluralism and democratization on the domestic level.
The Regions and empires storyline describes global energy trade developing according to a
neorealist view: according to this storyline, integration in the area of energy policy in the European Union will proceed at a slow pace due to differences between EU member states’ interests. Due to disunity in the European Union, disputes between member states on energy policy cannot be
resolved by European institutions. Moreover, the Regions and empires storyline assumes an instable Eastern Europe in which Russia seeks to reassert its former influence.
Casier (2011) summarizes the two predominant narratives on energy relations: “One is a political narrative, in which the Neorealist approach is to be situated. Energy is tied to national interests: Control is seen as enhancing the national interest, dependence is seen as undermining the national interest. The second narrative is an economic narrative. Energy is in the first place a commodity, which is traded on the international market. Economic rules of supply and demand dominate the interaction and the ultimate interest is commercial profit.”
In the 2000s, the neorealist narrative has become increasingly dominant in the academic analysis of EU-Russia energy relations: “Energy relations are understood as a crucial element in the struggle of power between states. The possession of energy resources is seen as an essential latent source of power, increasing the relative capabilities of states vis-à-vis others” (Casier, 2011, p. 495). The main critique on the neorealist perspective is that it reduces energy relations to issues of geopolitics, power and security, while ignoring other factors. Indeed, the neorealist view of energy dependence as a national security risk, is in stark contrast with the neoliberal idea of complex interdependence, which contends that interdependence between states reduces the use of coercive power in
international relations and decreases the risk of military conflict.
4. Security and Energy Security
“Security” is a term that is most often associated with a neorealist position, as neorealists prioritize security over other issues. However, in the context of this study, the traditional neorealist
understanding of security is too narrow. Until the 1980s, ‘security’ was understood in a narrow sense – security studies traditionally viewed the nation state as the referent object of security, and military conflict as the sector/threat. Although security studies existed as an separate academic field of study, academics in the field paid little attention to defining security as an analytical concept (Baldwin, 1997, p. 9).
Buzan (1991) names five explanations for this conceptual neglect, including an apparent lack of interest in security among critics of realism – this, however, fails to explain why even security scholars themselves did not address the concept – and the alleged desire of policy-makers to keep the definition of security vague – which, Baldwin points out, does not explain the lack of attention for the concept in academia (Buzan, 1991, pp. 7-11, as quoted by Baldwin, 1997, p. 9). The exact reasons for the lack of academic conceptualization of ‘security’ until the 1980s are beyond the scope of this thesis.
Ullman is credited with opening the conceptual debate about the definition of security as an academic tool of analysis (Rønnfeldt, 1997, pp. 473-474). In his aptly named book ‘Redefining security’ (1983), Ullman criticizes the then-prevailing traditional definition of national security as being too narrow. In lieu of the traditional definition (“protection from military threats arising from beyond the borders of one's own country”), Ullman proposed the following, broader definition:
“[A] threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the governments of a state or to private, non-governmental entities (persons, group, corporations) within the state”
(Ullman, 1983, p. 133, as quoted by Rønnfeldt, 1997, p. 474).
Ullman’s definition broadens the concept of security in two ways. First of all, his definition
includes any threat to the quality of life of inhabitants of a state, rather than just military threat. So, the scope is widened to include more sectors than just violence - other threats, such as economic or environmental threats, may also threaten national security. Second, the definition expands the scope of referent objects (i.e. the level of analysis), to include private and non-governmental entities. This broader definition of security paved the way for the introduction of environmental issues, and the danger of environmental degradation, into the concept of security. The development towards a broader understanding of security was accelarated by the end of the Cold War, as a new
international system emerged and “national security experts and organizations [began] looking for new missions” (Deudney, 1990, p. 462). The term “energy security”, which is frequently used in academic and political discourse regarding energy policy, must be viewed within this broader understanding of security. Energy security lacks a clear definition: It has been variously described as the “low vulnerability of vital energy systems” (Cherp & Jewell, 2014) or the “continuity of energy supplies relative to demand” (Winzer, 2012).
According to Chester (2010) a standardized conceptualization of energy security is impossible due to the polysemic nature of the concept. For example, policy measures taken in order to improve the affordability of electricity will differ widely from measures taken to reduce a country’s energy import. Thus, the concept of energy security takes on a different meaning in different contexts (Chester, 2010).
Kisel, Hamburg et.al. (2016) describe four layers of energy security. First of all, the short term operational resilience entails the capacity of a country’s energy infrastructure to deal with short term disturbances such as extreme weather circumstances or power outages. The second layer, technical vulnerability, deals with the ability of the national power infrastructure to sustain operations in the long term, up to 10 years. A country’s energy system should be capable to cope with long term trends, such as a projected increase of energy consumption or an expected
diversification in energy supplies. The third layer is economic dependency. This entails the degree to which a country’s economy is dependent on its energy sector. A high degree of economic depencency means that economic circumstances such as price fluctuations can have a substantial impact on a country’s economic well-being. The third layer is closely related to the fourth layer of energy security as described by Kisel, Hamburg et.al. (2016), which is the layer of political
affectability.
Political affectability describes the openness of a country’s energy policy to (geo)political influences. “This layer is usually not measured, though it has a vast impact to the energy sector developments. The openness to political corruption, instability of governments and potential geopolitical interests may have very clear influence to the energy policies and to the investments in the energy sector.” (Kisel, Hamburg et.al., 2016). This fourth layer approaches the neorealist understanding of energy security, as it links energy to geopolitics and national security.
Given the ambiguity of the concept, this thesis approaches the subject matter by contrasting the neorealist and neoliberal approaches rather than through the lens of energy security.
Natural Gas and Geopolitics
In order to understand the European Union’s policy with regard to gas imports from Russia, it is important to understand the unique character of natural gas as an energy source, the (historical) context of European-Russian natural gas trade, and the current structure of natural gas supply to EU member states. This chapter will first explain why and how natural gas trade differs from other energy sources, secondly, how the natural gas trade between Russia and Europe developed since the 1970s, and, thirdly, how EU member states currently meet their energy needs, including how much they rely on natural gas from Russia.
1. Natural Gas Trade
The supply of natural gas differs from the trade in other sources of energy, such as oil or coal. In contrast to oil, which is transported globally by oil tankers with relative ease, the transport of natural gas requires a pipeline infrastructure. The construction of pipelines carries significant financial costs, takes a long time, and (in the case of pipelines that cross multiple borders) requires approval from the countries through whose territories it runs. Furthermore, due to the rigid physical infrastructure that is needed to transport natural gas and the high costs associated with the
construction of new pipelines, it is difficult for consumer countries to switch to another supplier, and supplying countries cannot switch to a different customer from one day to the other.
Due to the geographical and financial constraints of natural gas trade, it is more susceptible to being influenced by geopolitics and international relations than other sources of energy, as this chapter will point out. Gas trade requires a long-term commitment from producer, transit, and consumer countries. Due to the regional nature of gas trade, which increases the relevance of geopolitical issues, and the high level of government intervention in the sector, this thesis will address the developments in natural gas trade between two European member states and Russia from the perspective of international relations theory. A purely economic perspective would not do justice to the politicized nature of the gas sector and its implications for national security and international relations.
2. LNG as an Alternative to Pipelines
An alternative to pipelines for the transportation of natural gas is found in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). By liquefying natural gas in dedicated facilities, it can be transported internationally by ships or trucks, much like oil. This way, natural gas can be transported without pipelines. Upon arrival at its destination, the LNG is re-converted to gas in regasification terminals so that it can be transmitted to consumers using the existing gas infrastructure. The advantage of LNG is that it
opens up the possibilities for a global (instread of a regional) market for natural gas, which increases competition in the sector. However, the liquefaction and regasification processes are expensive and require special facilities, which hurts LNG’s competitiveness compared to natural gas that is transported through pipelines.
Poland and Lithuania opened LNG import terminals in 2015 and 2014 (Sheppard, 2017),
respectively, in order to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas. Both countries have since imported LNG from Norway and the United States, but the LNG capacity will not suffice to achieve complete independence from Russian gas. The Polish LNG regasification terminal has a capacity of 5 bcm (billion cubic meters) of natural gas per year (Bieliszczuk, 2017). In comparison, Poland imported 10.47 bcm of natural gas from Russia in 2017 (“Gas Supplies to Europe,” 2017).
In short, the advent of LNG could potentially contribute to a more global and flexible gas market (as it enables transporting natural gas in the absence pipeline infrastructures). However, in order to be competitive compared to Russian natural gas, significant investments are needed (Hoellenbauer, 2017).
LNG offers advantages with regard to flexibility and competition compared to pipelines, but it still requires an expensive physical infrastructure in the form of LNG terminals. Because of this, natural gas projects are only worthwhile if the gas producer has the guarantee that its natural gas will be purchased. To ensure this “security of demand”, the trade in natural gas to Europea is done through long-term supply contracts (LTSCs) that cover periods of 20 to 30 years. These contracts use a fixed price (usually indexed to the international oil price) and stipulate a minimum quantity of natural gas that consumer countries have to purchase (so-called Take-or-Pay provisions). These take-or-pay contracts oblige the consumer countries to pay for a minimum quantity of gas, even if they do not use it.
Aside from the regional character of the natural gas trade in comparison to other sources of energy, natural gas can also be distinguished from other traditional (fossil) energy sources by its
environmental impact. Natural gas is seen as a key element in the energy transition, meaning the transition to a low-carbon emission economy. The carbon emissions of natural gas compared to other fossil fuels are low, causing it to be described as the bridge to a sustainable energy system (Correljé & Van der Linde 2004 p. 264). As the European Union is committed to significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions, shown by its ratification of the Paris Climate Agreement, and renewable energy sources are as of now not a suitable alternative to replace fossil fuels completely,
natural gas is expected to increase in importance as EU countries seek to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. Needless to say, this expected increased importance of natural gas in the EU’s energy mix complicates efforts to diversify European consumption of natural gas away from Russian supplies.
3. Historical context of European-Russian Natural Gas Trade
The first natural gas delivery from Russia (then still the Soviet Union) to a West European country was in 1968, when the Soviet national gas company Soyuznefteexport signed a contract with the Austrian national energy company ÖMV to deliver natural gas from Western Siberia to the Baumgarten station. The West European country to purchase Russian gas was West-Germany, in 1973. The deliveries were managed by a subsidiary of the Soviet Ministry of Trade, and arranged by long-term contracts with take-or-pay provisions. Moreover, the contracts included specific destination clauses, meaning that gas purchased by one country from the USSR could not be sold to a different country under these contracts.
This arrangement benefited both the Soviet national gas exporting company and the European national gas companies. The Soviet national gas company had more leverage in price negotiations if the price for each country could be different. European national gas companies had the advantage that they could build up a consumer base at home. After the demise of the USSR and the subsequent creation of Gazprom as the national state-owned gas company, the model of long-term supply contracts with take-or-pay provisions and oil price indexing remained. This system split the risks of natural gas trade between the supplier, Gazprom, on the one hand, and the European consumer countries on the other hand. The price risk lied with Gazprom (as the natural gas prices as
determined in the contracts could fluctuate with the oil price) and the European consumer countries carried the risk that they would have to pay for more gas than actually needed due to the take-or pay provisions. The advantage for Gazprom lied in guaranteed steady exports, and the advantage for European consumer countries was that they were ensured of a steady gas supply.
While long term supply contracts with take-or-pay provisions remained the standard model after the demise of the Soviet Union, there were significant ramifications for natural gas transmission. The break-up of the communist bloc meant that there were suddenly a lot more countries through which natural gas had to be transmitted before arriving to its West European consumers. In order to continue to serve this market, Russia had to make agreements with the newly independent transit countries.
The most important of these is Ukraine, which received significant discounts on Russian natural gas for its own market, and charged transmission fees for letting Russian gas flow through the pipelines on its territory. Up until the end of the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin (2000-2004), natural gas prices for Ukraine (and other former-Soviet states) were on the same level as in Russia itself, about 20% of the actual world market price. The dependence of CIS countries on Russian natural gas enabled Russia to exert influence over these countries by using energy as a foreign policy tool. In turn, countries like Ukraine have used their position as transit countries to counter the Russian influence. The interdependence between energy supplier Russia and energy transit country Ukraine can be described by two ‘energy weapons’ (Nygren, 2008).
Russia enjoys the ‘tap weapon’, meaning that it can stop energy deliveries to a country if it does not conform to the Kremlin’s wishes. Ukraine, on the other hand, has the ‘transit weapon’ at its
disposal: transit countries can refuse to transmit Russian energy to European buyers if Russia were to suddenly charge higher prices.
Today, Ukraine is still the most important transmission country for Russian natural gas destined for European Union member states. It should be noted that gas from Russia remains Russian until it reaches its delivery points, most of which are still placed along the borders of the former ‘Iron Curtain’. So, gas destined for West European customers does not become Ukrainian as it passes the Russian-Ukrainian border, but remains Russian until it reaches its final destination.
4. Energy Supply Security in the European Union
The steady supply of energy is vital to a country’s economic functioning and its national security. Even a short interruption of energy supply can have far-reaching economic or humanitarian consequences, as was the case in Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary, who had to close factories and schools during the 2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute. The concept of ‘energy security’ has been variously described as the “low vulnerability of vital energy systems” (Cherp & Jewell, 2014) or the “continuity of energy supplies relative to demand” (Winzer, 2012). The view of energy supply as a security issue relates to geopolitical concerns, as energy supplying countries have leverage to exert political pressure on countries that are dependent on their energy deliveries.
Countries whose energy sectors heavily rely on a single supplier or a single source of energy, are especially vulnerable in this regard. For example, the Baltic states, which receive the majority of
their natural gas from Russia (Hoellerbauer, 2017), would be hit harder in the case of a Russian gas cut-off than Germany, which receives about a third of its natural gas from Russia.
5. Energy mix
An important factor in energy security is the ‘energy mix’. This is the combination of primary energy resources that are used to meet the energy needs in a given geographic region. The composition of a country’s energy mix depends on a number of factors, including domestic availability of resources, the ability to import resources, the type of energy needs, and policy choices taken for environmental, social or geopolitical reasons (“About the energy mix,” 2015). As a result, energy mixes can vary widely from one country to another. For example, in 2015, the energy mix of France consisted of 46.2% nuclear power, 28.8% oil, 14.2% natural gas, 3.6% coal and 9.2% renewable energies and waste (“Total primary energy supply by source,” 2018). In
comparison, Germany’s energy mix rests more heavily on natural gas, which makes up 21.2 percent of its gross inland energy consumption. In addition to natural gas, Germany’s energy mix consists of oil (31.1%), coal (25.8%), renewables and waste (13.8%). Nuclear energy (7.8%) is much less important in Germany’s energy mix than in France’s (“Total primary energy supply by source,” 2018).
As the above numbers show, the dependence on a given energy resource can differ significantly between countries. Moreover, some energy sources are more vulnerable to interruptions in supply than others (e.g. due to geopolitical factors or technical specifics of a power source). Generally, a diverse energy mix will reduce threats to energy security. The concept that diversification improves energy security, is borrowed from portfolio management in finance. By spreading risk, potential losses are minimized (Cohen, Joutz & Loungani, 2011).
6. Electricity and Flexibility
It is important to distinguish the energy mix from the ‘power generation mix’, which includes only those energy sources that are used to generate electricity. Some resources, such as nuclear power, are solely used to produce electricity. Natural gas may be used to generate electricity but can also be applied directly, e.g. for heating homes or for cooking. Oil products are mainly used in direct applications (e.g. for cars) and less in electricity generation.
The more reliant a country is on electricity (as opposed to direct usage of oil products or natural gas), the more flexible its energy system will be. For example, a building that depends on natural gas for its heating will always be dependent on natural gas. A building that uses electrical heating
can be supplied with a variety of energy sources, as all sorts of energy sources can be used to generate electricity. Flexibility increases the potential for diversification in energy sources, which increases a country’s energy security.
Moreover, a higher share of electricity in the total consumption of energy facilitates the transition to renewable energy. This is one of the reasons given for the Netherlands’ transition away from
natural gas for heating and cooking. Newly built houses are not connected to the natural gas grid, and home owners are incentivized to replace their gas heating systems with electrical heat pumps (Rijksoverheid).
7. Reliance on Russia
As mentioned above, a diversified energy mix, in general, will contribute to a country’s energy security. However, a final conclusion about a country’s energy security would need to take into account not only the diversity of its energy mix, but also its diversity of supply. A country that depends on a single supplier for natural gas is more vulnerable to an interruption of supply than a country that imports its natural gas from a variety of supplying countries.
For example, the share of natural gas in Italy’s energy mix is 36,2%. In Latvia’s energy mix, natural gas makes up 25,8% of the total. However, all of Latvia’s natural gas is imported from Russia, while Italy imports its natural gas from a variety of suppliers including Russia (51%), Algeria (13%), Qatar (13%), the Netherlands (8%) and Norway (5%). Despite natural gas making up a lower share of its energy mix, Latvia’s dependence on Russian gas imports to fulfil its energy needs is 25.8%, whereas Italy relies on Russian gas for 18.4% of its total energy needs.
The example cited above shows that both the diversity of the energy mix and the diversity of supply contribute to a country’s energy security. In addition to diversification, there are other factors to take into account when deciding on a country’s energy security, such as: the political stability of supplier countries and possible transit countries, the size of a country’s total energy consumption (the larger, the more difficult it will be to switch to a different supplier in case of an interruption) and the distance between the supplier and the importing country (the larger the distance, the greater the risk of a supply interruption).
It should be noted that energy security is not only relevant to countries that import energy but also to energy exporting countries. For them, it is not security of supply, but security of demand that matters. A stable security of demand is necessary for energy supplying countries to make long-term investments in production capacity. Contrary to popular belief, energy security is not equal to
energy independence. Actually, a move by energy importing countries towards more domestic production may lead supplying countries to invest less in creating additional production capacity, potentially leading to a shortage in energy supply. (G. Cohen et al, 2011, p. 4868). Furthermore, a country may improve by diversifying its energy imports, which does not increase its energy independence but instead spreads the risk of a supply interruption among more suppliers.
8. Current situation of Russian energy imports
Natural gas accounts for 22 percent of total energy consumption in the European Union. The EU depends on countries outside the EU for its natural gas supply, of which Russia and Norway are the most important ones (Eurostat, 2017). In 2017, 37 percent of natural gas imported by EU countries from outside the EU came from Russia. As mentioned before, the share of natural gas in a country’s energy mix varies from country to country, and countries’ dependendence on Russian supplies also varies widely. Yet, for the European Union as a whole, Russian natural gas imports are
indispensable and will be for the time being.
The following paragraph will describe the various (possible) routes that deliver natural gas from Russia to European Union member states.
9. Ukraine route
The majority of Russian gas is transported to European Union members through Ukraine. This route has been in operation since the communist era. As Ukraine became an independent county after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had to negotiate agreements with the Ukrainian government to ensure the secure transmission of its natural gas to West European customers. In exchange for transporting Russian gas through Ukrainian pipelines, Ukraine received transmission fees and significantly lower prices for natural gas from Russia.
10. Nordstream 1
The majority of Russian natural gas that is exported to Europe, is transmitted through pipelines in Ukraine. Another transit route is the Nordstream pipeline, which transports Russian natural gas directly to Northern Germany by way of the Baltic sea. The Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom initiated the project in 1997, and owns a majority share in Nordstream AG, the pipelines operator. The pipeline was inaugurated in 2011, a parellel pipeline (doubling the transport capacity to 55 BCM) was finished in 2012.
11. Southstream
In 2007, another alternative to the Ukraine transit route was announced by Gazprom. The alternative route, dubbed ‘SouthStream’, would transport Russian gas to Bulgaria by way of an offshore pipeline through the Black Sea. Like the NordStream pipeline, the SouthStream route would transmit Russian gas directly to the European Union, and would bypass Ukraine as an
important transit country. In 2014, Russia’s annexation of Crimea caused a deterioration in relations between Russia and the EU. Political tensions and European Commission objections with regard to Gazprom’s alleged non-compliance with European anti-trust directives, led to the discontinuation of the SouthStream project.
12. Nordstream 2
Even though Russia had been officially designated as an ‘unreliable’ partner, this did not immediately put a hold on the Nord Stream 2 project. This proposed pipeline would be routed parallel to the existing Nord Stream pipeline (from here onwards: Nord Stream 1) that runs through the Baltic sea and transports Russian natural gas directly to Germany and the rest of Europe. US-imposed sanctions against Russia may endanger the Nord Stream 2 project, but energy companies support the initiative (Paraskova, 2017). Moreover, all transit countries except for Denmark had given their approval to the pipeline. The European Commission opposed the new pipeline and sought to apply European Union regulations from the Third Energy Package to the Nord Stream project.
13. Costs and benefits of new pipelines
One poignant risk associated with the construction of pipelines that transport Russian gas directly to European Union member states, is that this would enable Russia to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine. When Russia did this in 2009, Ukraine nevertheless satisfied its domestic energy demand by
appropriating gas flows that were originally meant for EU-countries. If Ukraine loses its importance as a gas transit country, it will not have access to gas destined for EU-countries – these countries would be supplied by other pipelines.
This means that a Russian gas cutoff towards Ukraine will not impact European countries further West, lowering the costs and risks for Russia to stop the gas supply. In a situation where Ukraine is the most important transit country for natural gas, cutting off the gas supply means that Russia will lose revenues on gas destined for European consumers. New pipelines that would reduce Ukraine’s importance as a transit country would lower the bar for Russia to use gas deliveries as a geopolitical weapon and increase Ukraine’s dependence on Russia.
The European Union is committed to establishing the so-called energy union, one goal of which is to enable the EU to ‘speak with one voice’ regarding energy matters. In February 2015, the
European Commission released a communication outlining the need for a European Energy Union (European Commission, 2015). According to the Commission, a central dimension of the Energy Union is to ensure energy security for EU member states. Although the communication does not mention Russia by name, it does refer to the European dependence on Russian energy supplies:
The political challenges over the last months have shown that diversification of energy sources, suppliers and routes is crucial for ensuring secure and resilient energy supplies to European citizens and companies, who expect access to affordable and competitively priced energy at any given moment.
The European Council of Foreign Relations affirms that the partial aim of the Energy Union is to reduce the EU’s dependence on gas from Russia, as this country has proven to be an “unreliable partner” (Chyong, Slavkova & Tcherneva, 2015). The German and Dutch position regarding Nord Stream 2 is at odds with this stated goal. Analyzing how these countries decided to take this position will reveal whether the underlying reasoning will pose a challenge in building the Energy Union, and will reveal possible differences between EU member states in their approaches to energy policy.
Methodology and Case Selection
This study investigates the driving factors of energy policy in the European Union. It seeks to research which narrative of energy relations prevails in EU member states’ decision-making in the field of energy policy. The neorealist narrative focuses on security, geopolitics and is characterized by the desire to reduce energy dependence. It views energy as a strategic and political issue. On the other hand, the economic narrative views energy as a commodity which is subject to the laws of the free market. The research question is as follows: “To what extent are neorealist arguments present in the national political discourses about Nord Stream 2 in the Netherlands and Germany?”
1. Case Selection
The study focuses at the case of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This pipeline, announced in 2015 and set to be finished by 2019, will double the current direct natural gas transit capacity between Russia and Germany to 110 billion cubic meters per year. Nord Stream 2 will follow the same trajectory as the existing Nord Stream pipeline. The project has been criticized by the European Commission, the United States and Eastern European countries, as it would increase EU natural gas dependence on Russia. Critics contend that this harms energy security in the European Union. Moreover, the project has been criticized for reducing Ukraine’s importance as a natural gas transit country, thereby harming its economic and geopolitical standing. Proponents of the project argue that it is a commercial project carried out by private companies, and see no reason for specific government involvement except for enforcing existing obligations under national, European and international law.
The Nord Stream 2 project is especially salient as it was announced just one year after Russia annexed the Crimea territory from Ukraine, after which EU countries introduced economic sanctions against Russia. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline is built against a backdrop of continuing political tensions between Russia and the European Union.
It has been mentioned that energy policy is a field of multilevel governance in the European Union (Talus & Aalto, 2017). Further integration in this policy area, such as through the Energy Union, can only occur with the consent of member states. For this reason, it is relevant to research how energy policy is viewed at the member state level. Different views among member states exist concerning the role of energy policy on the EU level. For example, Poland believes that an
integrated European Union energy policy should focus on energy security and reducing dependence on Russia, while being “technology-neutral”, that is, allowing for shale gas exploration. Other
countries, such as Germany, believe that the Energy Union should focus on fostering the single European market in energy (Talus & Aalto, 2017). This thesis aims to find out to what extent different views on energy are prevalent at the member state level, focusing on the contrast between a geopolitical, neorealist view on energy on the one hand, and the economic narrative on the other hand.
The political discourse is studied in two countries, namely the Netherlands and Germany. For practical purposes, the scope of this thesis is limited to two countries. First of all, this allows for in-depth research of the two discourses. Secondly, studying two countries offers the opportunity to compare results, which is helpful in the analysis. Thirdly, I am fluent in German as well as in Dutch, which made these countries sensible subjects for the case study.
2. Research Design
The research consists of three parts. First, a review of the theoretical perspectives of neorealism and neoliberalism, and the theories’ applicability to energy policy. Second, an overview of the historical background of European-Russian energy trade and its current status. Third, a comparative case study of the political discourse in Germany and the Netherlands regarding Nord Stream 2.
3. Methodology
The study researches parliamentary documents concerning Nord Stream 2 from its announcement in 2015 through the end of 2018. These documents include parliamentary debates, legislative
proposals, motions, questions and letters sent to parliament by the executive branch. Content analysis was used to investigate the occurence of a neorealist or economic view on energy policy. This content analysis is carried out using indicators of the neorealist and economic perspectives. Other perspectives, such as an environment-focused view on energy policy, are not within the scope of this research. The documents have been selected by using the search term ‘Nord Stream 2’ in the databases of parliamentary documents.
The documents are studied and color-coded for instances of a neorealist position being expressed, and instances when a neoliberal, market-oriented position is espoused. In the analysis of the
findings, attention will be paid not only to the occurences of neorealist and neoliberal positions, but also to the parties that take these positions, the venue through which an opinion is expressed (for example, debates, written questions submitted to the executive branch, motions), and, if applicable, to the subsequent responses to these positions.
4. Indicators
To conduct a content analysis of the selected documents, indicators of neorealist considerations will be used. Neorealist considerations are contrasted with the economic narrative on energy. Indicators of a neorealist perspective include: mentioning the term ‘geopolitics’ or ‘geopolitical’ when
discussing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, or equivalents thereof such as mentioning the consequences for Ukraine and/or Eastern Europe (which implies a geopolitics-oriented perspective). Other indicators of neorealist considerations are mentioning ‘dependence [on Russia]’ as a negative consequence, and bringing up the tensions between the European Union and Russia as a reason to oppose the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Indicators of an economic narrative are: describing the Nord Steam 2 project as a ‘commercial’ project, expressing a desire to unlink energy policy from foreign policy considerations, and arguing against state intervention.
Indicators of a neorealist perspective
State responsibility to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas
The first indicator of a neorealist perspective on energy policy regarding Nord Stream II, is arguing that government action is needed to reduce the country’s dependence on natural gas from Russia. This indicator has only been used if two ingredients are present: First, the call for increased government intervention in the energy sector for reasons of security. Second, Russia is explicitly mentioned as a reason for additional government intervention. This reasoning is used as an indicator for neorealism, given its underlying assumption that market regulations alone do not sufficiently address the security implications of Russia’s involvement in the European natural gas market. It assumes that energy is a security issue, and dependence on Russia - an unreliable partner - is a potential security threat. The current involvement of Russia in the energy market is a market failure, and government intervention is needed to address this problem.
Given the fact that this research consists of textual analysis, context is key. The context of a given statement must always be considered in the decision whether to count any statement towards an indicator. While I was researching the parliamentary records on Nord Stream II, I frequently
encountered statementst that - when judging by their literal meaning - could be classified as arguing for a “state responsibility to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas”. But, given the context of these statements, it would have been unwise to count them as instances of neorealist reasoning. For example, a call for decreasing the imports of natural gas from Russia and other countries because of environmental concerns related to fossile fuels, does not indicate a neorealist perspective. Such statements have not been counted so as not to blur the focus of this research.
Mentioning geopolitical concerns as an argument against Nord Stream II
This is a clear indicator of a neorealist perspective of energy policy. The mention of geopolitics related to energy corresponds to the Regions and Empires storyline as described by Correljé and Van der Linde. It considers energy to be an instrument of geopolitics, including the associated risks and consequences, rather than a market commodity. The mention of geopolitics as an argument against Nord Stream II firmly places energy in the domain of security policy and zero-sum power politics.
Drawing attention to the consequences for Ukraine
This last indicator could be controversial at face value. After all, drawing attention to Nord
Stream’s consequences for another country does not fit into the definition of neorealism that places the national interest at the forefront. Yet, it has been taken as an indicator of a neorealist perspective on energy in the context of this research. Naming the pipeline’s consequences for Ukraine as an argument against Nord Stream II assumes a politicized view of energy. It considers Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian conflict as a factor in weighing the merits of the Nord Stream II pipeline. The consequences for Ukraine’s security are often mentioned in relation to the security of the European Union bloc. This implies a geopolitical perspective on energy, which pays attention to the possibility that Russia uses the Nord Stream II pipeline to use its “natural gas weapon” by bypassing Ukraine for political reasons. So, even if it does not explicitly mention the national interest, the indicator does entail a perspective on energy policy which is guided by foreign policy and security arguments.
Indicators of a neoliberal perspective
Delinking energy policy from foreign policy
This is the most obvious indicator of a neoliberal approch towards energy. In short, it considers energy to be a commodity rather than an instrument of power politics in international relations. This approach draws a strict separation between the foreign policy domain - governed by the state - and the commercial domain, which is governed by the market. The political tensions with Russia should not be a determining factor in deciding energy relations, according to this argument. This
corresponds to the mixed-actor approach found in neoliberalism, which states that security is not necessarily the first priority of a state.
Emphasizing the commercial nature of Nord Stream II
This indicator is similar to the indicator described above, albeit less explicitly neoliberal. While the first indicator is used for statements that literally express the view that energy policy and foreign policy should be viewed as separate domains, this second indicator applies to statements
emphasizing the commercial nature of Nord Stream II that do not include a general statement on relationship between energy and foreign policy. The emphasis on Nord Stream’s commercial aspects usually occurs in response to questions or arguments addressing the foreign policy aspects of the pipeline. To respond to such arguments by stating that Nord Stream II is a commercial project - and thus not subject to government intervention for foreign policy considerations - is an indication of a neoliberal approach in which the market is a separate governing force.
Highlighting the positive consequences of interdependence
Among the indicators for a neorealist approach is the argument that the state should reduce or even avoid dependence on Russian gas due to the political concerns and security risks associated with such a dependence. The opposite view has been taken as an indicator for neoliberalism, namely that interdependence has positive effects. This ties into the neoliberal idea that trade relations further peace and stability. From this perspective, it is beneficial to be dependent on Russia, as this supply dependence results in a demand dependence on Russia’s part. The reasoning is as follows: Russia is dependent on European consumers’ using its natural gas and wants to protect its costly investments in pipeline infrastructure, which is an incentive for cooperative and friendly relations.
5. Validity
The research focuses at political discourse in the Netherlands and Germany. The other member states of the EU are not within the scope of this study. The literature suggests that especially
Eastern European member states, such as Poland and the Baltic states, have a neorealist perspective on energy policy, and seek to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas. In general, the Eastern European member states of the EU tend to view Russia as an adversary, caused in part by their closer proximity to Russia and their history under Russian domination in the Warsaw Pact. Given that these perspectives are not taken into consideration in this study, the applicability of the results to other EU member states is limited.
The study’s focus on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project is a possible limit to its validity, given that it involves Russia during a time of political tensions between Russia and the European Union. The geopolitical considerations involving this project would not apply to, for example, importing natural gas from Norway - a country that conforms to European market regulations, and is not seen as a risk
factor in terms of stability or political tensions. The findings of the study will give an insight of how European Union member states view their relationship with Russia in the field of energy supply. These findings could be applicable to other countries that are viewed as possible geopolitical adversaries, such as Turkey.
A limit to the study’s validity is the relatively large number of political parties in Dutch parliament compared to other EU countries. During the timeframe studied, thirteen parties were represented in the Dutch Tweede Kamer. The large number of parties could result in a more diverse range of opinions being expressed in parliament compared to other countries, limiting the study’s applicability to other Moreover, there is a high degree of party discipline. This means that that members of parliament vote along party lines most of the time. Deviation from the party line is rare (Van der Hout, Lucardie et.al., 2007). It is, therefore, possible that a higher number of parties represented in parliament will result in an increased range of opinions that are expressed in the political discourse. This could mean that differences between Germany’s and the Netherlands’ political discourses are the result of the high German voting treshold, which limits the results’ applicability to other EU member states.
6. Reliability
The reliability of the study is high, as the study could be conducted using the same indicators in other member states of the European Union. The content analysis’s being conducted by only one person (the author) is a limit to reliability. Content analyses conducted by multiple researchers are considered more reliable as it reduces bias on the researcher’s part.
Findings and Analysis
This chapter will present the research findings and analyze them for each year. First, the German discourse will be discussed. After that, the Dutch discourse will be analyzed. Finally, the two countries’ discourses will be compared.
1. Findings on the German political discourse
The following paragraphs will discuss the findings about the German political discourse, categorizing the findings by year.
Findings in 2015
In total, four statements in German parliament in 2015 counted towards one of the indicators. Only two parties were involved, namely the Green party and federal Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel. The Green party twice referred to the government’s responsibility to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas and once mentioned Ukraine’s security as an argument against Nord Stream 2. Gabriel emphasized the project’s commercial nature on one occasion. Figure 1 gives an overview of the findings in 2015 in the German discourse.
Figure 1
2015 Greens Minister of Economic Affairs
State responsibility to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas
X X Geopolitics mentioned as argument
against NS2
Consequences for Ukraine X Delinking NS2 from foreign policy Emphasizing commercial nature of NS2
X Interdependence as positive aspect
In the federal parliament of Germany, Nord Stream II was first mentioned on 7 September 2015 by the Green Party. The Green Party refers to a meeting between German Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel (a member of the SPD party) and Gazprom CEO Alexej Miller. Green M.P. Jürgen Trittin argues against the pipeline as it would increase dependence on Russian natural gas, which should be reduced.
The second mention of Nord Stream II occurs on 2 November 2015. Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel argues that Nord Stream II is a commercial project, stating that decisions in this regard are up to private market parties as long as they conform to the relevant national and European
regulations. Which is the case, for “natural gas pipelines are outside the scope of the European sanctions regime against Russia”. Furthermore, Gabriel states that “the building of new pipelines should be welcomed” as they “increase competition” in the natural gas market. The same Green party M.P. that stated his concerns about dependence on Russian natural gas on 7 September repeats this argument on 2 November.
On 20 November 2015, the Green party again argues against the Nord Stream 2 project, mentioning its consequences for Ukraine’s security. The party also states that the project contradicts the goals of the European Energy Union “which include diversifying our energy supply sources and a greater independence of Russian natural gas”. In response, State Secretary Rainer Sontowski says that Nord Stream 2 contributes to the diversification goals of the Energy Union as it creates a new natural gas supply route. Sontowski’s statement is not within the scope of the indicators that were used and is not counted towards a neorealist or neoliberal perspective, but is mentioned here for purposes of context and clarity.
In total, four statements in German parliament in 2015 counted towards one of the indicators. Only two parties were involved, namely the Green party and federal Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel. The Green party twice referred to the government’s responsibility to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas and once mentioned Ukraine’s security as an argument against Nord Stream 2. Gabriel emphasized the project’s commercial nature on one occasion.
Findings in 2016
In total, eleven statements in the federal German parliament in 2016 counted towards an indicator, which is an increase compared to the previous year. 2016 also marked the first time an SPD politician (Sigmar Gabriel, Economy Minister) acknowledged the Nord Stream project’s
consequences for Ukraine’s economy. Furthermore, it was the first (and only) time that the Left party took a stance in the Nord Stream discussion, criticizing the project for its impact on Ukraine. Figure 2 shows an overview of the times each indicator was counted in 2016.
