An Analysis of the Socio-Political Developments at
the Industry-Table in the Dutch Climate-Agreement
Climate Dragons & Industry Wizards
An Analysis of the Socio-Political Developments
at the Industry-Table in the Dutch Climate-Agreement
by
Marlou Peters
(s4819446)MASTER THESIS FOR THE MA ENVIRONMENT & SOCIETY AT THE NIJMEGEN SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
OF THE RADBOUD UNIVERSITY, NIJMEGEN
SUPERVISOR: DR. IR. J.D. LIEFFERINK
INTERNSHIP SUPERVISORS (PBL): DR. R.B.A. KOELEMEIJER & DR. B. DANIËLS SECOND READER: DR. R.C.M. ARNOUTS
S
UMMARYThe Dutch government implemented a Climate Act which lays down that greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) should be reduced by 49 percent in 2030 and 95 percent in 2050. To ensure the achievement of the reduction goals, a national Climate-Agreement was formulated. More than hundred parties, organized around five climate-tables ( klimaattafels ) that each represented one sector, discussed the content of the Climate-Agreement. This study focuses on climate policy for the industry sector. The aim of this research is to understand which discursive constellation influenced the process and the ultimate set of climate policy measures for Dutch industry.
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) served as a theoretical lens through which the Climate-Agreement process regarding the Industry-table was analysed. The primary unit of analysis in ACF is a policy subsystem, which is a subunit of a government or political system that is concerned with a certain policy issue (Weible & Jenkins-Smith, 2016). The ACF prescribes that like-minded people are mobilized in advocacy coalitions (ACs) against their common opponent to influence the policy subsystem. The belief system of each coalition involves value priorities and perceptions that are organized into a three-level hierarchy: deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary aspects. By identifying the belief systems, it becomes clear which beliefs are hostile between ACs. The policy core policy preference is the policy core belief that forms the glue of an AC. Sabatier (1998) identifies four pathways to policy change: (1) policy-oriented learning, resulting in a revision of beliefs; (2) internal events such as scandals and policy failures which gives policy actors the opportunity to intervene and alter the policy; (3) ACs reach agreement about a public policy; (4) external subsystem events which are outside the control of subsystem participants.
In order to analyse the industry climate policy subsystem, I conducted a qualitative research for which I have analysed 55 documents and have held 12 interviews. A coding framework was built by means of the collected data, which resulted in a structured overview of the belief systems and developments during the policymaking process. Two competing ACs have been identified in the industry climate policy subsystem: he ind r coali ion and he en ironmen al coali ion . The policy core policy preference of the industry coalition was to guarantee a level playing field (LPF) on which industrial companies operate. The en ironmen al coali ion policy core policy preference was a type of the polluter pays because this would be effective in achieving the reduction goals and result in a fair burden sharing of climate costs.
It turns out that the cabinet, which refers to the collective voice of the four coalition parties, adhered to the industry coalition for a long time. However, throughout the negotiation process the cabine made a rn in he direc ion of he en ironmen al coali ion. Thi rn compri ed he in rod c ion of a en ible carbon a for he ind r and he deci ion o hif he energ a from
households to business. Several key developments seem to have taken place that brought the cabinet to this tipping point.
During the negotiations at the Industry-table, industry and environmental advocates were unable to find consensus on three key points: (1) the introduction of a CO2-tax; (2) fair burden sharing; and (3) deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) (Greenpeace, 2018). Right before the presentation of the Concept Climate Agreement (OKA), the environmental NGOs (green alliance) decided to leave the negotiations. Subsequently, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, PBL) assessed the OKA and concluded that this policy plan would not result in the reduction target of 49 percent in 2030. These developments resulted in a policy failure of the industry coalition, because their beliefs (which dominated the OKA) were now openly rejected by the green alliance and PBL (pathway 2). The most important external subsystem events which influenced the pressure on politics to shift away from the industry coalition were the way the industry was framed in media and politics, and the advent of the provincial elections in March 2019 (pathway 4). Because of this, citizen interests received a more prominent role than before. It turns out that the environmental coalition promoted the citizen interests much better than the industry coalition because its plea for a fair burden sharing of climate costs would decrease the energy bill for households.
The identification of environmental politics discourses has been a deductive process, based on a two-dimensional categorization (reformist-radical and prosaic-imaginative) of discourses by Drzyek (2013). Reformist discourses have the common belief that environmental problems can be solved without the need to move away from economic growth (Hulme, 2009). Radical approaches advocate that fundamental changes in our relationship with nature, and in our mode of social and political life, are necessary to solve ecological problems (Carter, 2007). A prosaic discourse takes the political-economic situation as given. Thus, environmental problems are troubles encountered by the political economy which need to be solved, but do not require a new kind of society (Dryzek, 2013). Imaginative departures, in contrast, aim to redefine the political-economic context. Typical for these discourses is to view environmental problems as opportunities rather than threats (Dryzek, 2013). The four main discursive categories are: (1) problem-solving; (2) sustainability; (3) limits and survival; and (4) green radicalism.
I conclude that most discourses take part in the reformist discourse. Economic rationalism (problem-solving) is recognized in the industry coalition with the argument that industries cannot afford to financially contribute to the climate transition because of international competitiveness (LPF). The sustainable development (sustainability) discourse involves the belief that a global policy approach would be more efficient than implementing national climate policy (EU-policy). This finding confirms the criticism on sustainable development that interest groups are adopting this discourse because it allows them to postpone the need for real action. The boundary between true confidence in a future of
green growth or trying to pursue business as usual, is very blurry because sustainable development involves a high level of abstraction. Discourse analysis showed that other, more progressive beliefs which did not come to the fore at the Industry-table, are also represented in the industry coalition. These progressive industries adhere, instead of sustainable development, to the ecological modernization discourse because they believe that there is money in it for businesses to internalize environmental protection in their business case.
In contrast to the industry actors who are part of the economic rationalism discourse because of their liberal worldview, the environmental coalition actors take part in the economic rationalism discourse because according to them a carbon tax would be an effective approach to reduce GHG-emissions. Their presupposition is that environmental problems such as CO2-emissions can best be solved through market ends. Friends of the Earth (Milieudefensie) placed the fair distribution of costs emphatically on the agenda during the negotiation process, which is part of the climate justice discourse (green radicalism). However the global perspective this discourse generally takes, in the context of the Dutch Climate-Agreement it turned out to be driven by arguments of distributive justice on a national scale.
Finally, the discursive struggle between democratic pragmatism and administrative rationalism (problem-solving) provides insight in the policymaking process. Discourse analysis revealed that PBL departs from a democratic pragmatism discourse, which means that researchers provide a nuanced report about a certain policy issue but stay away from public policy advices since these are often political choices. The government, however, sometimes used PBL reports beyond its intended purpose, by taking the findings of PBL research for granted. Politicians take refuge in the administrative rationalism discourse by giving experts the final disposition of political issues.
P
REFACE
This thesis, Climate Dragons & Industry Wizards: An Analysis of the Socio-Political Developments at
the Industry-Table in the Dutch Climate-Agreement, marks the end of the master Environment & Society
at the Radboud University (RU) Nijmegen. The title and illustrations at the frontpage of this thesis has been inspired by an article in newspaper De Telegraaf, in which influential policy participants such as Ed Nijpels, chairman of the negotiation process, were portrayed as climate dragons . To complete the picture and a i hin he domain of fan a metaphors I marked the industry negotiators as the
industry wizards , referring to the fact that they tried to get the best out of the climate policy.
It has brought me a great deal to write my thesis in collaboration with PBL. Without this I would never have had the opportunity to interview so many interesting people. Special thanks to my supervisors Robert Koelemeijer and Bert Daniëls for finding an hour each week to support me as well as they could. I want to thank them for their feedback on my draft versions, giving me confidence when I needed it, and being the link between the interview respondents and me.
Next I would like to thank Duncan Liefferink, my thesis supervisor at the Radboud University for his exceptionally good supervision. You gave me the feeling that I was not alone in this. I am impressed with your very quick mail responses, substantive feedback and ongoing enthusiasm about the research subject. Even when I was hopelessly lost, you could give me the feeling that writing a master thesis is fun. This has certainly benefitted the final result.
Finally, I have to thank Rob for his patience to explain certain philosophical concepts again and again. For his understanding when I was not the lively girlfriend as I am used to be, but also for his endless help. For giving very critical feedback, which has been useful in the end, but primarily painful throughout the process. Thanks to Loes and Charlotte to make life much better when writing a thesis in ime of corona. D e o corona e b il o r o n home office , here e orked hard and rned i into a pub at the end of the day on a regular basis.
In two weeks, I will start the master International Political Economy at the RU. It is little wonder that I have chosen to analyse the political process around the Climate-Agreement in the Netherlands, with an accent on the industry sector and economic arguments.
Marlou Peters,
L
IST OF
A
BBREVIATIONS
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework CCS Carbon Capture and Storage CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl [Christian Democratic Appeal] CU ChristenUnie [Christian Union]
D66 Democraten 66 [Progressive Liberal Democrats] ETS European Trading System
FNV Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging [Dutch Trade Union Confederation]
GHG Greenhouse Gas
GL GroenLinks [Green Party] MBI Market Based Instrument
NEPP National Environmental Policy Plan
OKA Ontwerp Klimaatakkoord [Concept Climate Agreement] PBL Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving [Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency]
RVO Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland [Netherlands Enterprise Agency]
SER Sociaal Economische Raad [Social and Economic Council]
UN United Nations
VHKA Voorstel voor Hoofdlijnen van het Klimaatakkoord [Proposal on broad outlines of the Climate-Agreement]
VNO-NCW Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy]
T
ABLE OF
C
ONTENTS
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ... 15
1.1RESEARCH PROBLEM STATEMENT ... 15
1.2RESEARCH AIM AND RESEARCH QUESTION ... 16
1.3SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE ... 17
1.4THESIS OUTLINE ... 18
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ... 19
2.1DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ... 19
2.2ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS DISCOURSE ... 20
2.2.1ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM SOLVING ... 21
2.2.2LIMITS AND SURVIVAL ... 24
2.2.3SUSTAINABILITY... 25
2.2.4GREEN RADICALISM ... 26
CHAPTER 3 POLICY ANALYSIS THEORY ... 29
3.1COMPARISON OF POLICY ANALYSIS THEORIES ... 29
3.2ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK ... 30
3.2.1CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ACF ... 30
3.2.2PATHWAYS TO POLICY CHANGE... 34
3.3DISCURSIVELY INFORMED BELIEF SYSTEMS ... 35
3.4OPERATIONALIZATION ... 37
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY ... 39
4.1ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITION ... 39
4.2RESEARCH STRATEGY... 39
4.3DATA COLLECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS ... 40
4.4VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY ... 42
CHAPTER 5 THE RESEARCH CASE... 43
5.1INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE ... 43
5.2RELATIVELY STABLE PARAMETERS ... 44
5.3POLICY SUBSYSTEM ... 46
5.4ADVOCACY COALITIONS ... 49
CHAPTER 6 ANALYSIS ... 55
6.1PHASE I:PROPOSAL OF OUTLINE CLIMATE-AGREEMENT ... 55
6.1.1INTRODUCTION PHASE I ... 55
6.1.2BELIEF CLUSTER TECHNOLOGIES SECONDARY ASPECTS ... 57
6.1.3BELIEF CLUSTER TECHNOLOGIES POLICY CORE BELIEFS ... 58
6.1.4BELIEF CLUSTER TECHNOLOGIES:DEEP CORE BELIEFS ... 60
6.2PHASE II:CONCEPT CLIMATE-AGREEMENT ... 62
6.2.1INTRODUCTION PHASE II ... 62
6.2.2BELIEF CLUSTER POLICY INSTRUMENTS SECONDARY ASPECTS ... 63
6.2.3BELIEF CLUSTER POLICY INSTRUMENTS POLICY CORE BELIEFS ... 65
6.2.4BELIEF CLUSTER POLICY INSTRUMENTS DEEP CORE BELIEFS... 68
6.2.5DOMINANT ADVOCACY COALITION PHASE II ... 68
6.3PHASE III:CLIMATE-AGREEMENT ... 72
6.3.1INTRODUCTION PHASE III ... 73
6.3.2BELIEF CLUSTER DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE SECONDARY ASPECTS ... 73
6.3.3BELIEF CLUSTER DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE POLICY CORE BELIEFS ... 74
6.3.4BELIEF CLUSTER DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE DEEP CORE BELIEFS ... 75
6.3.5DOMINANT ADVOCACY COALITION PHASE III:TIPPING POINT ... 75
6.4RESOURCES ... 78
6.4.1INDUSTRY COALITION RESOURCES ... 79
6.4.2ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION RESOURCES ... 80
6.5CONCLUSION ... 82
CHAPTER 7 DISCOURSES OF CLIMATE-AGREEMENT ... 85
7.1BELIEF SYSTEMS ARE DISCURSIVELY INFORMED ... 85
7.2DISCOURSES INDUSTRY COALITION... 87
7.2.1DOMINANT DISCOURSE ... 87
7.2.2PLURALITY OF BELIEFS OF THE INDUSTRY COALITION ... 88
7.3DISCOURSES ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ... 92
7.3.1DOMINANT DISCOURSE ... 92
7.3.2PLURALITY OF BELIEFS ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ... 93
7.4DISCOURSES OF POLITICS ... 94
7.4.1PROBLEM-SOLVING DISCOURSE:DEMOCRATIC PRAGMATISM VS.ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALISM ... 94
7.4.2USING THE LANGUAGE OF A DISCOURSE ... 96
7.5ROLE OF SCIENCE... 98
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION ... 99
8.1CONCLUSION IN RELATION TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ... 99
8.2CONTRIBUTION TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY... 102
8.3RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRAXIS ... 102
8.4CRITICAL REFLECTION ON LIMITS OF OWN RESEARCH,RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ... 103
REFERENCES ...105
APPENDICES ...109
APPENDIX 1 ... 109
APPENDIX 2 ... 110
C
HAPTER
I
I
NTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Problem StatementAlready at the time of the emerging of environmentalism from the 1800s, the environmental discourse came into existence. However, it was not until the 1970s that it started to politicize because Western democracies started to institutionalize environmental regulation (Feindt & Oels, 2005). The problem of environmental pollution has been on the political agenda since the Club of Rome published its report Limi o Gro h in 1972. Over the years several environmental issues entered the political field, of which well-known examples are climate change, loss of biodiversity, ozone depletion, acid rain, desertification, and resource depletion (Carter, 2007, p. 5). Along with the rise of environmental policymaking in politics, the concept became increasingly important in academia. When Maarten Hajer wrote his dissertation The Politics of Environmental Discourse in 1995, he was among the first to conduct discourse analysis on the politics of an ecological challenge, which, at that time, was primarily dominated by discussion on the problem of acid rain. Since then, discourse analysis has become a widely used approach to study environmental politics.
Today, climate change gets much global attention as this is conceived to be among the greatest challenges for humanity. A breakthrough in international climate policies was the ratification of the Paris Agreement by 196 parties in 2015. For the first time this brought all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change (UN, 2015). The purpose of the Paris Agreement is to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels; and to pursue efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius (UN, 2015). This shows that climate policy is becoming increasingly important and prevalent around the world, and precisely for that reason a thorough knowledge on climate politics is appropriate.
Recently, many developments regarding climate policy have been going on in the Netherlands. In the Coalition Agreement of 2017, the Dutch cabinet announced the advent of a Climate Act and Agreement. This act lays down that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions should be reduced by 49 percent in 2030 and by 95 percent in 2050, compared to emission levels in 1990 (Klimaatwet, 2020). The Climate-Agreement is intended to formulate concrete climate policy that ensures the achievement of the reduction goals. More than hundred parties were invited to discuss the content of the Climate-Agreement, which was organized around five climate-tables [klimaattafels] that all represented one sector. This study focuses on climate policy for the industry sector, whose sector-specific target is a reduction of 14.3 megaton CO2 in 2030, addi ional o a ba eline le el, referring to an already existing emission path based on economic growth and intended policy.
During the negotiations at the Industry-table, tensions were running high between industry and environmental advocates, because they were unable to find consensus on three key points: (1) the introduction of a CO2-tax for the industry; (2) fair burden sharing between households and business; and (3) deployment of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) (Greenpeace, 2018). At the start of the negotiation process, the cabinet was particularly concerned with guaranteeing a level playing field (LPF) for Dutch industries, meaning that the industry cannot be burdened with extra costs for national climate policy. However, throughout the negotiation process the cabinet made a turn in the direction of the green alliance , referring to the environmental NGOs that participated at the negotiation process. This turn towards the polluter pays principle (PPP), translated into he in rod c ion of a en ible carbon a for the industry and the decision to shift the energy tax from households to business. Several key developments seem to have taken place that brought the cabinet to this tipping point. How can this policy shift of the cabinet be explained?
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) serves as a theoretical lens through which the Climate Agreement process regarding the Industry-table, will be analysed. According to Sabatier (1998), policy actors form advocacy coalitions (ACs) based on a set of shared beliefs, resulting in usually one to four ACs that each include a wide variety of policy actors. I identified two competing ACs: the ind r coali ion and he en ironmen al coali ion . The former AC was primarily concerned with the policy core policy preference that national climate policy should not deteriorate the LPF on which industrial companies operate. The en ironmen al coali ion polic core polic preference a the PPP, because a version of the polluter pays principle would be effective in achieving the reduction goals and would result in a fair distribution of climate costs.
1.2 Research Aim and Research Question
The aim of this research is twofold. First, I will try to understand how policy change occurred in the ind r clima e policy subsystem . This is done by reconstructing the negotiation process, and with the method of ACF to identify which belief systems were represented. Throughout the analysis it should become clear how policy change was realized (i.e. the cabinet policy shift). This comprises the core of Chapter 6. The analysis, however, will appear to leave some questions unanswered. Hence, I will look in greater detail at the ACs by identifying the discourses that inform the different belief systems. This will be the central point of Chapter 7.
The development of a national Climate-Agreement provides sufficient reason to analyse the policy process. On top of that, the decision of the cabinet to alter the course makes it an even more interesting research subject. This raises concrete questions like: Which factors influenced the government to decide to implement the carbon tax? How do stakeholders perceive the final set of policy measures? What do different policy actors think of the policymaking process?
Furthermore, it raises more abstract questions like: Which belief systems can be identified in the climate politics discourse? Do we observe a fundamen al hif in coali ion beliefs throughout the formation process of the Climate-Agreement? How could the Climate-Agreement process be linked to the broader climate politics discourses? Inspired by the questions as outlined above, the main research question shall read as follows:
Which discursive constellation influenced the ultimate set of climate policy measures for the Dutch industry sector in the Dutch Climate-Agreement (2019)?
This main question can be divided into two sub-questions which will be answered in Chapter 6, and Chapter 7 respectively:
1. Which pathways towards policy change can be recognized in the policymaking process that led to the policy shift of the cabinet regarding climate policy for the industry?
2. What has been the influence of different environmental politics discourses on the policymaking process?
1.3 Scientific and Societal Relevance
The policymaking process preceding the establishment of a national Climate-Agreement, has to the best of my knowledge not yet been explored. The scientific relevance can be manifold. The research could contribute to the literature about ACF. By taking an extensive look on this framework, I might have suggestions for improvement. In particular, the application of the ACF in a European political context has not been elaborated in much detail. Furthermore, this thesis could be considered as a test whether the ACF is applicable on a time frame of less than a decade. This study contributes theoretically to the policy analysis literature, particularly because it adds discursive elements to the ACF. Lastly, although I take a rather deductive approach in analysing the environmental politics discourses, I might find ne discourses which contribute to existing literature.
The societal relevance relates to the contribution to the policymaking process. Understanding policy processes, and particularly policy change, captures the interest of a wide range of people. Political scientists and public administrators study policy processes to be able to formulate theory about policy change. This simplified representation of reality is helpful for societal actors such as businesses, politicians, and civil organisations in understanding the policy domain, which enables them to intervene in the process and steer policy towards their interest. In terms of ACF, this study gives insight into how policy core beliefs become dominant. This study addresses contentious policy issues such as a carbon taxation or a fair burden-sharing of climate policy. Understanding how policymakers cope with these issues may be interesting for policy actors. Moreover, since the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving; PBL) is deeply involved in the climate policymaking
process of the Dutch government, they might be interested in the political dynamics that influences their research and advise. Approached from the other angle, understanding how PBL reports influence the policymaking could also bring new insights. The perception of interview respondents about the role of PBL is potentially valuable for this agency to decide on its attitude in the political and popular discourse.
1.4 Thesis Outline
In this section I have introduced the subject of this research. The remaining of the thesis will be divided as follows. Chapter 2 provides an extensive overview of the environmental politics discourses that have been identified in the literature. I will adopt a four-dimensional categorization as developed by John Dryzek (2013). Chapter 3 is dedicated to the elaboration of the ACF, also in relation to other conventional policy analysis theories. In the second part of that section I will substantiate why the belief systems of ACs are discursively informed, which in turn will provide the argument for integrating discourse analysis. Chapter 4 is used to discuss the methodology of this research, including the ontological and epistemological position, research methods and the approach to data collection and analysis. I will introd ce he ca e d in Chap er 5, hich incl de a de crip ion of he rela i el able parame er and polic b em . Chap er 6 i comple el de o ed o he anal i of he policymaking process through the ACF. I will identify the belief systems of the ACs through three phases and conclude with the internal and external events that influenced policy change. Chapter 7 adopts the environmental politics discourses as formulated in Chapter 2 on the case study. I will show how discourses have influenced the policymaking process. Chapter 8 is the concluding section in which I will discuss the results of the analysis, the limitations of this research and recommendations for further inquiry.
C
HAPTER
2
L
ITERATURE
R
EVIEW
The central subject of this research is the climate politics discourse. First, I will discuss the concept of discourse in section 2.1. Subsequently, in section 2.2, the most prominent environmental discourses that have been identified in the past, will be described. Since climate change is one of the many environmental issues, much useful literature derives from environmental discourses. Therefore, the basis of climate politics should be found in environmental politics discourses.
2.1 Discourse Analysis
What are discourses? How do they function? How can they be analysed? A wide range of practices classify themselves as discourse, and therefore a thorough understanding of the concept is necessary. Discourse analysis considers how written and spoken language enacts social and cultural perspectives and identities, which is often referred to as language-in-use (Gee, 2011). Aside from the fact that language enables us to say things, it also allows us to do and be things. Language as doing, means that it allows us to engage in actions and activities like for example arguing over politics or playing a game. Language as being, refers to the allowance to take on different socially significant identities. For example, we can speak as experts or as everyday people , which illustrates that one and the same person could be both things at different times and places (Gee, 2011). Words can sometimes be the same, but they mean quite different things depending on the context, which only becomes clear when we know who we are and what we are doing when we say things. Furthermore, the choice to say one thing and not the other is crucial in the message conveyed i.e. the words that are chosen (and left out!) affect the way arguments are formulated, and this in turn constitutes reality. Discourse is thus a way of constituting a certain view of social reality. Gee (2011) concludes that language in saying (informing) follows from doing (action) and being (identity). Action and identity thus give meaning to language, and that is what discourse analysis emphasizes.
Discourse analysis is sceptical toward claims of one single rationality and the objective truth, and hence builds on constructivist perspectives. The constructionist and interpretative tradition assume the existence of multiple, socially constructed realities, instead of a single reality, governed by immutable natural laws (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). The premise of discourse analysis is the notion that our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them (Jørgenson & Phillips, 2002, p.1).According to Hajer & Versteeg (2005), the terms discourse and discussion are often used interchangeably, and even though he are rela ed o each o her, i doe no mean he ame. Hajer (1995) define di co r e a a pecific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a
par ic lar e of prac ice and hro gh hich meaning i gi en o ph ical and ocial reali ie (p. 44). The discussion, on the other hand, is the object of analysis. Discourse analysis clarifies a discursive structure that might not be immediately obvious to the people that contribute to the debate (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005). An analysis of the storylines gives insight in the varieties of meaning and arg men a ion in he deba e. According o Hajer (1995), or line are narra i e on ocial reali through which elements from many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding (p. 62). John Dryzek (2013) has formulated various storylines which are categorized in four main environmental politics discourses.
2.2 Environmental Politics Discourse
In this section I will discuss some of the key discourses in the environmental politics debate. The way through which environmental issues are framed, fundamentally affects the way in which it is governed, the type of policy measures that are sought, and the actors that will be involved (Hulme, 2009). Thus, identifying the discourses clarifies how public policies are produced. Ever since a wave of popular concern about environmental issues swept across the developed world during the 1960s, the environment started to emerge as a policy field (Carter, 2007). The focus will be on the discourse of environmental
politics since this deepening is primarily relevant to answer the research questions. Below I will discuss
the main environmental discourses.
In order to identify the main environmental discourses, I adopt the widely used classification of Dryzek (2013, p. 14). He classifies environmental discourses based on two dimensions: (1) reformist vs. radical; and (2) prosaic vs. imaginative (see TABLE 1). The tension between reformist and radical approaches lies at the heart of environmental politics.
Reformist discourses have the common belief that environmental problems can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or patterns of production and consumption. Change is sought through legislative institutions and the use of conventional forms of political activity (Carter, 2007, p. 83). Reformist discourses, moreover, desire to combine the achievement of social goals with economic growth (Hulme, 2009). These discourses are usually part of political ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism, socialism, and feminism. Those existing ideologies thus included environmental challenges in their ideas, which led to the emergence of concepts like eco-socialism and eco-feminism (Carter, 2007).
Radical approaches criticize the ability of reformist discourses to be effective considering the urgency, complexity, and scale of the task to combat climate change (Hulme, 2009). At the other end, the radical discourses state that fundamental changes in our relationship with nature, and in our mode of social and political life, are necessary to solve ecological problems (Carter, 2007). Radical discourses
are often regarded as a distinct political ideology since their beliefs have originated from ecological challenges.
The difference between a prosaic or imaginative discourse derives from its point of departure. A prosaic discourse takes the political-economic situation as given. Thus, environmental problems are troubles encountered by the political economy which need to be solved, but do not require a new kind of society (Dryzek, 2013). Imaginative departures, in contrast, aim to redefine the political-economic context. Typically for these discourses is to view environmental problems as opportunities rather than threats. For example, environmental challenges are treated in harmony with economics, instead of opposing it. Th , in ead of ie ing he en ironmen a a o rce of diffic l ie (Dr ek, 2013, p. 15), it brings the environmental into the heart of society. TABLE 1 summarizes the four main discursive categories, including the discourses that are covered by it. They will be discussed in more detail below.
TABLE 1-Classification of Environmental Discourses
Reformist Radical
Prosaic Problem Solving:
- Administrative Rationalism - Democratic Pragmatism - Economic Rationalism
Limits and Survival: - Survivalism - Promethean Environmentalism Imaginative Sustainability: - Sustainable Development - Ecological Modernization Green Radicalism: - Green Consciousness - Green Politics SOURCE:Adopted from Dryzek (2013, p. 14), expanded by author
2.2.1 Environmental Problem Solving
Problem solving discourses take the status quo of liberal capitalism as given and state that environmental problems need to be institutionalized through public policy (Dryzek, 2013). The central idea is that nature is subordinated to human problem solving, which usually means that existing problem-solving capacities are used to address environmental issues. Within this discourse, most disagreement arises about the appropriate way to solve (environmental) problems. Dryzek (2013) identified three ways to coordinate environmental problem solving: through bureaucracy, democracy, and markets, which is called administrative rationalism , democratic pragmatism and economic rationalism , respectively.
Administrative Rationalism
Administrative rationalism emphasizes the role of the expert rather than the citizen or producer/consumer in environmental problem solving (Dryzek, 2013, p. 76). It is concerned with two kinds of hierarchy: (1) people are subordinated to the state; and (2) experts have an important place in
he a e o n hierarch (Dryzek, 2013, p. 89). This is manifested in the development of various research institutes and practices. Most countries have established pollution control agencies and resource management bureaucracies, which acquire authority through the scientific expertise they possess (Dryzek, 2013, p. 78). Thus, politics has been dominated by science in administrative rationalism. Right-wing conservatives and postmodernists have criticized the claims to impartial expertise, since they believe that all science is ideologically coloured (Dryzek, 2013, p. 79).
Administrative rationalism is known for top-down planning, meaning that targets are centrally set and then means are sought to achieve them. This type of top-down planning has also been recognized in the Climate-Agreement process, but I will come to that later. Regulatory policy instruments in combination with fines when certain pollution standards are not met, are most popular. Research institutes are often asked to prepare a systematic environmental impact assessment, such as cost-benefit analysis, risk analysis and technology assessment. The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, PBL), of which environmental discourse theorist Maarten Hajer was the director, appears to be the Dutch agency that represents administrative rationalism. However, as Dryzek (2013) argues, PBL is facilitated but not controlled by the government, meaning that PBL and politics are supposed to be stand-alone institutes in the Netherlands. Throughout the analysis it will become clear why PBL fits more into democratic pragmatism, where politics and science are more separated domains. (Dryzek, 2013)
Democratic Pragmatism
The second problem solving discourse is that of democratic pragmatism. The term pragmatic refers to a practical chool of ho gh here life i mo l abo ol ing problem in a orld f ll of ncer ain (Dryzek, 2013, p. 99). The central idea is that problem solving should be flexible and pluralistic because the relevant knowledge to solve complex problems cannot be outsourced to any individual or any administrative state. Democratic pragmatists advocate a high degree of participation, to involve many voices and to take account of democratic values (Dryzek, 2013, p. 100). Democratic pragmatism is an interactive problem-solving approach, involving government agencies, environmental groups, interested corporations, and ordinary citizens in the decision-making process. Various forms of public consultation can be thought of like committee meetings, legislative debates, legal disputes, project development, media investigations, etc. (Dryzek, 2013, p. 108). It can proceed with being tied to particular legislation, ch a he in erne con l a ion concerning he ind r CO2- a Ac , which will be discussed in Chapter 6 (Rijksoverheid, 2020), but this also includes consultative efforts to organize participation platforms such as the climate-tables preceding the formulation of the Climate-Agreement. Democratic pragmatism is often associated with governance rather than government . As mentioned under administrative rationalism, government implies that goals and principles are set top-down. Governance
instead focuses less on authority and more on networks, by involving actors like public officials, NGOs, lobbyists, journalists, and corporations (Dryzek, 2013, p. 109). The types of policy instruments vary from market-based instruments (MBIs) to voluntary agreements.
Critics argue that public consultation often involves uninformed participants, unrepresentative activists, or specific interests (Dryzek, 2013, p. 102). First, discussion is prompted about what is in the public interest. This varies between economic efficiency, distributional equity, ecological integrity, social harmony (Dryzek, 2013, p. 120). Secondly, public interest is often confused with material interest, for example, when anti-environmental business target public opinion by considering and communicating heir ma erial in ere a a p blic in ere . Ma erial in ere refer o corpora ion and ind r associations concerned with maximizing profit and avoiding environmental controls on their operations, or labour nion concerned i h he income and emplo men of heir member (Dr ek, 2013, p. 102).
Economic Rationalism
A he hear of economic ra ionali m lie he deplo men of marke mechani m o achie e p blic end (Dr ek, 2013, p. 122). In contrast to administrative rationalism, government administrators should take a rather passive role in environmental management except for establishing the basic parameters of markets. The idea is that environmental degradation arises when governments fail to assign adequate property rights to natural resources. Economic rationalists state that environmental goods will be more efficiently allocated if they are treated as economic goods. By incorporating environmental externalities through pricing, also called market based instruments (MBIs),1 the market
will address environmental degradation and the inefficient use of resources (Bakker, 2005; Bailey, 2007). This approach is considerably anthropocentric, because environmental issues are seen as a problem that should be solved to satisfy human wants and needs (Dryzek, 2013, p. 135).
According to Dryzek (2013), economic rationalism does not merely get support from people with a right-wing orientation. Environmentalists could also be attracted to economic rationalism because they are confident in the capacity of MBIs to solve environmental problems. The environmental impact of MBIs depends on how industry groups perceive and respond to the environmental policy (Bailey, 2007). No wonder that, from a neoliberal perspective, governments have strong incentives to involve nonstate actors (e.g. the industry) in the climate policymaking process, because the final goal is to prevent serious damage to national economies.
1 Examples of MBIs are eco-taxes or the cap-and-trade principle. The latter means that emission allowances are allocated to
polluters, who can then trade those permits to one another (Bailey, 2007). The European Trading System ETS is world’s first and biggest carbon market which works on the cap-and-trade principle. It limits emissions from more than 11.000 energy-intensive companies in the EU and covers around percent of EU’s GHG-emissions (European Commission, 2016).
The critique on economic rationalism i primaril abo he commodifica ion of he en ironmen . By solving environmental issues through market ends, the environment is considered as a tradable commodity. This avoids the need to confront questions of justice and equity. Thus, although it might be economically efficient to invest in emission reduction projects against lowest cost, those investments rarely pay attention to principles about justice (Hulme, 2009).
2.2.2 Limits and Survival
Survivalism
The discourse of limits and survival departs from The Limits to Growth report, published by the Club of Rome in 1972 (Dryzek, 2013, p. 25). The authors of this report conclude that the Earth has ecological limits to economic and population growth which will be reached sometime within the next one hundred years (Meadows et al., 1972). From this perspective, environmental problems are often defined in terms of planetary boundaries or limits. The discourse shifted from limits to boundaries through the years. Where limi refer o an o er hoo or collap e, bo ndar refer o he arning ha h mani i p in danger when boundaries are crossed (Dryzek, 2013, p. 35). Its main concern is that economic growth and population growth will eventually exceed the available natural resources of the planet. This discourse is radical because it calls for drastic action to curb human demands on the natural environment. Moreover, it advocates a redistribution of power within the political economy, moved away from perpetual economic growth, more in the direction of steady state economics. Yet, it sees solutions within the options set by industrialism (status quo), like for example greater control of administrators, scientists, and other people in charge. (Dryzek, 2013)
Promethean Environmentalism
The discourse of limits and survival immediately received a counter-reaction from defenders of infinite economic gro h (Dr ek, 2013). Dr ek called hi co n erarg men he prome hean re pon e . The erm prome hean comes from the Greek mythological story of Prometheus who stole fire from Zeus to give it to man. It refers to human capacity to manipulate the world through technological progress, economic growth, and the conquest of nature (Dryzek, 2013). In contrast to the limits and survival discourse, prometheans ha e nlimi ed confidence in he abili of h man and heir echnologie o overcome any problems incl ding en ironmen al problem (Dr ek, 2013, p. 52). By emphasizing the need for growth, prometheans slightly ignore that economic growth is usually related to environmental degradation. For example, prometheans usually deny that climate change is a problem and are sceptical towards science that proves otherwise (Dryzek, 2013, p. 69). They criticize the limits and survival adherents to take too little account for technology and pricing, while including these parameters would result in much more optimistic models about infinite growth and resources.
2.2.3 Sustainability
Discourses i hin hi ca egor r o di ol e he conflic be een en ironmen al and economic al e ha energi e he di co r e of problem ol ing and limi (Dr ek, 2013, p. 16). As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the sustainability discourse is reformist and imaginative, because it supports economic growth and considers it as a chance to reconcile economic desires with ecological challenges. The discourse of sustainable development and ecological modernization are discussed below.
Sustainable Development
The concept of sustainable development has been defined in many ways, but the most frequently quoted definition is from the Brundtland Report Our Common Future, in which it is referred to as de elopmen that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their o n need (WCED, 1987). Dryzek (2013) argues that sustainable development is the dominant global discourse to address ecological challenges. The image is that economic growth, environmental protection, and distributive justice can be mutually reinforcing (Dryzek, 2013). This means that the structure of the political economy requires a shift in power from hierarchy to cooperation. Dryzek (2013) compares it to a shift from administrative rationalism (top-down governance) to democratic pragmatism (network governance). There is much focus on the global, resulting in a marginalization of the perspective of national governments.
Radical critics of the Brundtland Report claim that the notion of sustainable development is merely a strategy for sustaining development rather than addressing the causes of the ecological crisis (Hajer, 1995). It is true that the sustainable development discourse considers nature rather as something essential for humanity, instead of respecting nature itself. Sustainable development believes that environmental and economic values can be reconciled, but this has not truly been demonstrated. Ecological modernization, instead, gives more meaning to the way environmental protection could be beneficial for economic growth and business profitability. (Dryzek, 2013)
Ecological Modernization
Ecological modernization elaborates on the pathway towards sustainable development. Hajer (1995) define ecological moderni a ion a he di co r e ha recogni e he r c ral charac er of he environmental problematique but none the less assumes that existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalize the care of the environmen (p. 25). The central idea is that economic growth should be decoupled from environmental degradation, which has been realized in some cases, but this is certainly not enough yet (Dryzek, 2013). In contrast to economic rationalism, ecological modernization is more sceptical of the efficacy of MBIs. Instead of focusing on correcting the market alone, he approach eek o green echnolog and o red ce a ef l con mp ion hro gh direc
regulation of various industrial and consumption practices (Hulme, 2009). On the other hand, the market should not only be interpreted as a force that disturbs the environment, because market institutions can also work in favour of environmental reform (Mol & Jänicke, 2009). According o Dr ek (2013), he key to ecological moderni a ion i ha here i mone in i for b ine (p. 170). Thi ould mean that business supports ecological modernization rather than resists, provided companies adopt a long-term perspective.
Moreover, corporatism and consensual politics is a key feature of ecological modernization (Dryzek, 2013). The result is that environmental degradation becomes a management problem, where cooperation between state, business and civil society is sought. The Netherlands is listed as one of the countries that successfully integrated environmental criteria into its operations, as for example the National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP) in 1989 where 250.000 businesses made agreements with the government (Dryzek, 2013). The most recent example in the Netherlands is the national Climate-Agreement (2019), which is subject of analysis of this research. Sustainable development through ecological modernization manifests in policy measures that promote energy efficiency, increase resource recycling, and stimulate technological innovation (Hulme, 2009).
2.2.4 Green Radicalism
Green radicalism rejects the basic structure of industrial society and the way the environment is conceptualized therein (Dryzek, 2013, p. 16). A key feature of green radicalist discourse is its radical and imaginative perspective. A wide variety of ideologies, parties, movements, and groups can be found in green radicalism, making it more difficult to classify this discourse than the other three. Green radicalism includes green parties, ecofeminists, deep ecologists, social ecologists, climate justice ad oca e , po moderni , and more. Dr ek (2013) made a di inc ion be een green con cio ne and green poli ic . I ill onl di c he la ter, because green consciousness has practically not been part of the Dutch Climate-Agreement.
Green Politics
A diverse collection of ideologies, political parties and social groups can be identified under the green politics discourse. First, green political parties are found here, of which GroenLinks (GL) is the green party in Dutch parliament. Second, ecologism is among the green politics discourse, which refers to a distinctive green political ideology encompassing those perspectives that hold that a sustainable society requires radical changes in our relationship with the non-human natural world and our mode of economic, ocial and poli ical life (Carter, 2007, p. 6). Ecologists challenge the way in which conventional investments are made, business are run, and markets conduct their affairs (Hulme, 2009). It is characterized by: (1) a rethinking of the ethical relationship between humans and the natural world, and (2) the belief that there are natural limits to growth (Carter, 2007). Third, the environmental justice
movement is among the green politics discourse. The concept emerged in the United States where, primarily people of color, sought to address the inequity of environmental protection in their communities. Globally, environmental justice is concerned with the degree to which pollution generated by industrial society is accounted for by developing countries, either by means of environmental disasters or rising climate adaptation costs (Dryzek, 2013). In conclusion, environmental justice movements have been concerned with justice between developed and developing countries, intergenerational justice, and justice regarding racism. However, distributive justice between industry and households, or between low- and high-income households, has hardly been incorporated in the environmental justice discourse. It is evidently an important discourse in the Climate-Agreement debate.
C
HAPTER
3
P
OLICY
A
NALYSIS
T
HEORY
To analyse the debate around the formulation of the Climate-Agreement in the Netherlands it is essential to determine the appropriate policy analysis tool. The academic field of policy research and theory is too extensive to entirely discuss here. The area of interest and the purpose of the analysis determines what type of analysis is most suitable, because every theory has specific features, with different strengths and weaknesses. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) appears to be most suitable for the kind of research that I aim to conduct, because this framework explicitly focuses on policy change. The case study of this thesis clearly exemplifies a change in the policy direction, so it makes sense to adopt a model that is designed to analyse this. There are, however, a few other policy models that do emphasize the role of policy change in their policy theory. In the first section I will compare the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) and the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) with the characteristics of the ACF. Secondly, I will provide the details of the ACF. Thirdly, the general critique on empiricist policy frameworks, and particularly on the ACF, is discussed and refuted. Lastly, I will argue for a conceptual framework in which ACF is complemented with discourse analysis.
3.1 Comparison of Policy Analysis Theories
The MSF is a powerful tool to understand policymaking and agenda-setting. According to Kingdon (1984), three process streams flow through the policy universe: streams of politics, policy, and problems.2 Normally those streams run independently and parallel through the policy universe. As soon
a o or more ream in er ec each o her, a indo of oppor ni ari e for polic maker o change the policy (Kingdon, 1984). MSF is particularly relevant for agenda-setting policy processes. The agenda-setting process, however, already occurred before the start of the Climate-Agreement negotiations. As will become clear in Chapter 5, the level of ambition (reduction goals) was already laid down in the Climate Act.
The PET posits that policy processes exist in extended periods of stasis but may be punctuated by sudden shifts in media attention, leading to radical policy change (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). The authors argue that policy is formulated in a closed system, consisting of the most important actors of a certain policy domain. 3 This policy monopoly prevents interruption from other actors and is, as a result,
of stable nature for a considerable time. If more critical attention is given to a certain policy subject, the 2 The politics stream derives from public opinion and the political actors. The policy stream consists of the policy problems.
Policy entrepreneurs are particularly active in this stream by creating solutions to the policy problems and bringing forth those problems to the agenda. Lastly, the problems stream includes the information of a policy issue, including political attention, level of solvability, and the extent to which the issue has been recognized (Kingdon, 1984).
3 The policymaking process regarding the Dutch Climate-Agreement exhibits no characteristics of a closed system since
consequence is that the closed policy monopoly is broken up and new actors get the opportunity to enter the policy monopoly (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). The formulation of the Climate-Agreement received relatively much media attention, making the PET a viable alternative. Nevertheless, PET is focusing too specifically on the link between media attention and policy change, while I assume that the Climate-Agreement was incited by more than that. Furthermore, the PET assumes that long periods of stability are punctuated by short periods of radical change. This dynamic is not what I have observed because climate policy in the Netherlands has been implemented rather slowly and step-by-step than radically.
ACF differs from MSA and PET by analysing policy processes through the lens of policy subsystems, instead of one policy domain or one set of important political actors respectively (Sabatier, 1998). This enables the researcher to form hypotheses but limits the ability to analyse complex policy processes. The uniqueness of ACF lies in its potential to analyse complex policy subsystems, because it unites policy actors into manageable ACs. Moreover, ACF has significantly expanded the discipline in the direction of policy debate and argumentation (Fischer, 2003). This feature of the ACF is essential to adequately analyse the policy formation process of the Climate-Agreement. A complex network of actors was, after all, involved in the negotiation process. It is obvious that the Climate-Agreement was not formulated solely b poli ical ac or , e peciall beca e of he e abli hed climate-tables .4 The
climate-tables, together with the societal and political attention, gives considerable ground to adopt a model that underlines the argumentative role in the policymaking process.
3.2 Advocacy Coalition Framework
The framework that will be utilized in this thesis is one of the most established and widely applied frameworks to study policy processes. The ACF was originally developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith in the 1980s and has been revised several times since then. It is an alternative for the traditional phase model of policymaking. It integrates a political approach (power and interests) with a policy-analytical approach (knowledge and technical information). Here I will discuss its characteristics.
3.2.1 Characteristics of the ACF
Firstly, the primary unit of analysis in ACF is not a government agency or a single policy but rather a policy subsystem. A policy subsystem refers to a b ni of a go ernmen or poli ical em anchored by an issue, a geographic scope, and policy actors, who are people regularly attempting to influence go ernmen deci ion (Weible & Jenkin -Smith, 2016, p. 18).
Secondly, any actor that directly or indirectly seeks to influence the policy subsystem, is included in the analysis (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible & Sabatier et al., 2014). Not only the
4 In fact, all policy change in the Netherlands is concerned with large sets of actors from different institutions since the
legislative committee, the government agency and the interest group matter, but it may also include academics, journalists, business representatives, members from non-profit organisations, private consultants, and bureaucrats (Carter, 2007; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014).
Thirdly, although individuals are rationally motivated, they are bound by their limited cognitive ability to process information about a complex world. Having cognitive constraints, individuals deal with biases when they try to make sense of the world (Weible & Jenkins-Smith, 2016). This means that individuals simplify the world by filtering or ignoring information that challenges their beliefs and easily accept information that supports their beliefs (Weible & Sabatier, 2007). If Sabatier speaks about coali ion belief , he refer o he indi id al i h imilar belief ha comprise one coalition (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Coalitions arise because individuals are facing the devil shift , referring o he tendency for people to demonize their opponents by viewing them as more powerful and malicious than he ac all are (Weible & Jenkins-Smith, 2016, p. 20). As a result, like-minded people are mobilizing in coalitions against their common opponent. The belief system of each coalition involves value priorities and perceptions that are organized into a three-level hierarchy (see TABLE 2): (1) deep core
beliefs are not policy specific and therefore applicable to multiple policy subsystems. They are extremely
difficult to change; (2) policy core beliefs are bounded by a policy topic or territory, and stable but susceptible to change; (3) secondary aspects relate to a specific part of the policy subsystem and are most likely to change (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). I would like to pay extra attention to the policy
preferences in the policy core. This refers to a policy core belief that is critical for binding coalition
actors together (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). According to Sabatier (1998), policy preferences are broad in scope, highly salient and the source of conflict between ACs.
Fourthly, since any actor who attempts to influence the policy process is part of the policy subsystem, the amount of policy actors becomes too extensive to analyse all of them separately. The context has been simplified by viewing policy actors as members of coalitions (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Weible & Jenkins-Smith, 2016). On the right of FIGURE 1 the policy subsystem is illustrated, herein ac or gro p in o ( all one o fo r) compe ing ACs (AC ), each compo ed of ac or ho share a set of normative and causal beliefs, and coordinate their actions in a non-trivial manner (Sabatier, 1998). Weible & Jenkins-Smith (2016) argue that the ACF is most applicable to contentious policy issues, because in such situations it becomes ever more visible which beliefs and identities are hostile between ACs.
Fifthly, public policies reflect the belief systems of policy actors (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). In this regard, public policies are more than just what a government does or does not do, it also represents causal theor . Ca al heor refer o he eq ence of ep , linking of an icipa ed e en , or de ired proced re ha de cribe he rea oning for achie ing o p and o come of a p blic polic (Weible
TABLE 2 Three-Level Hierarchy of a Belief System
Type Defining characteristics Examples Deep core Fundamental normative
and ontological axioms
1. The nature of man
i. Inherently evil vs. socially redeemable ii. Part of nature vs. dominion over nature iii. Narrow egoists vs. contractarians
2. Relative value priorities (freedom, security, power, knowledge, health, love, beauty, etc.)
3. Basic criteria of distributive justice: whose welfare counts? Relative weights of self, primary groups, future generations, nonhuman beings, etc.)
Policy core Fundamental policy positions concerning the basic strategies for achieving core values within the subsystem
Policy preferences Normative:
1. Orientation on basic value priorities (relative importance of economic development vs. environmental protection)
2. Identification of groups or other entities whose welfare is of greatest concern
Empirical:
3. Overall seriousness of the problem 4. Basic causes of the problem
5. Proper distribution of authority between government and market 6. Proper distribution of authority among levels of government 7. Priority accorded various policy instruments (regulation, insurance,
education, direct payments, tax credits) 8. Method of financing
9. Ability of society to solve the problem (e.g. zero-sum competition vs. potential for mutual accommodation, technological optimism vs. pessimism)
10. Participation of public vs. experts vs. elected officials
Secondary aspects
Instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to implement policy core
1. Seriousness of specific aspects of the problem in specific locales 2. Importance of various causal linkages in different locales and over time 3. Most decisions concerning administrative rules; budgetary allocations;
disposition of cases, statutory interpretation, statutory revision 4. Information regarding performance of specific programs or institutions SOURCE: Adopted from Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1998)
& Jenkins-Smith, 2016, p. 192). So, besides the simple fact that policies represent the actions or inac ion of he go ernmen , he al o pro ide a ran la ion of polic ac or belief em . A fundamental aspect in the ACF is the premise that policies reflect for the most part the beliefs of the AC that dominates the subsystem (Sewell, 2005). Hence, the central claim of the ACF is that an understanding of policy change requires a focus on factors that encourage shifts in the beliefs of coalitions (Carter, 2007).
ACF has originally been developed to political systems in the United States, featured by a separation of power system, where change in the government is immediately clear (Sabatier, 1998). In Europe, however, most countries deal with a multi-party parliamentary system, like the Netherlands, making it much more difficult to determine when change in the systemic governing coalition occurs. As a result, Sabatier (1998) developed a criterium in which 60-70 percent of the legislative seats should go to parties that previously did not take part of the government coalition, to speak of change. Since the period of this case study took part within one government term, the governing coalition did not change at all.
Sixthly, belief systems do not just represent values and priorities that derive from day-to-day experiences, as described in the previous assumption. Scientific and technical information also shapes the polic ac or belief system. This does not mean that policy actors use such information rationally for learning and problem-solving, it rather means that scientific and technical information is used to inform political debates (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Weible & Jenkins-Smith, 2016).
Seventhly, since policy processes are ongoing, it makes sense to adopt a long-term perspective to understand policy change. Sabatier (1998) argues that a timespan of ten years or more is necessary to get an understanding of policy impacts. Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014), however, emphasize that it should not be misinterpreted as that researchers applying ACF should study ten years of longitudinal data to analyse policy processes. It only means that researchers should be conscious of the fact that coalitions often have been around for longer periods of time. It can, therefore, be helpful to trace back events and activities in the past (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). This study only adopts a period of two years, however, since the negotiations were extremely intensive, I still consider it relevant to apply ACF. Moreover, the discourses as described in Chapter 2 give an (historical) overview of what has been going on in the world regarding environmental politics. At least this can serve as a frame of reference to understand where the ACs in the case study originate from. At the end of Chapter 3, I will discuss in more detail the relation between environmental politics discourses and belief systems.
3.2.2 Pathways to Policy Change
Policy change is perceived because of changing events occurring either inside or outside the policy subsystem. FIGURE 1 contains a flow diagram which shows the relations between certain concepts discussed below. Within the policy subsystem: (1) Coalitions can revise their beliefs from inside the subsystem because of policy-oriented learning. Policy oriented learning refers o he al era ion of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and are concerned with the attainment or re i ion of he precep of one belief em (Saba ier & Jenkin -Smith, 1993, p. 42). (2) Internal events such as scandals and policy failures give policy actors the opportunity to intervene and alter the policy. These internal events often result in a frame that either confirms the belief system of minority coalitions or increase doubts about the dominant coalition beliefs (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). (3) ACs reach agreement about a public policy. This occurs particularly when opposing coalitions do not have alternatives to influence public policy and the status quo is perceived as unacceptable (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014).
The policy subsystem can also be affected from outside. (4) The exogenous variables are divided into (i) relatively stable parameters and (ii) external subsystem events, respectively listed in the upper left and bottom-left corner of FIGURE 1. The former is extremely difficult to change and seldom subject to coalition strategies; chapter 5 elaborates on the relatively stable parameters of this case study. The latter
FIGURE 1 Flow Diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
