The more things change : migrant labour regimes in South Africa from apartheid to today

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The More Things Change:

Migrant Labour Regimes in South Africa from Apartheid to Today

Dan Murphy

Student ID # 964923

May 4, 2016

Prof. Dr. Christoph Rass, Osnabruck University

Sonia Perreira, University of Deusto

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Declaration

I, Dan Murphy, declare that the work herein is my own, and nobody else has added to it. I have been informed of the completion and assessment rules of the MISOCO

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Acknowledgements and Preface

I would like to acknowledge firstly my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Christoph Rass, for guiding me through the process of making this thesis. I would also like to acknowledge my partner Taija and her support and encouragement during this time. I would like to thank my parents for supporting me throughout the course of my studies, and my father for refusing to become a conscript for Apartheid and ensuring a better life for his children.

I chose to study this topic not only out of a sense of connection with South Africa that comes from my parents, but also due to my history as an activist. I have been involved in various Communist groups in Canada and Germany. I organized a foodworkers union in my University. I planned and participated in student and community demonstrations. I have been arrested, beaten, watched police commit criminal violence and watched strong

organizations devolve into infighting and become ineffectual. I have spent years on the streets working with drug user organizations, some of it with the hospital performing HIV tests, and seen the consequences of liberal demoracy and capitalism first hand. I have followed South African politics for years, and it is out of my experience that I felt the need to connect the powerful modern struggles of South Africa with those in the rest of the world. I hope that people in Europe and North America may come to embrace militant social movement unionism and bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old.

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Acronyms

African National Congress – [ANC]

Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union – [AMCU] Black Economic Empowerment – [BEE]

Congress of South African Trade Unions – [COSATU] Economic Freedom Fighters – [EFF]

Growth, Employment, And Redistribution – [GEAR] Inkatha Freedom Party – [IFP]

National Development Plan – [NDP]

National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa – [NUMSA] National Union of Mineworkers – [NUM]

Non-Governmental Organization – [NGO] Pan-African Congress - [PAC]

Redistribution and Development Plan – [RDP] South African Communist Party – [SACP] South African Defence Force – [SADF]

South African National Defence Force – [SANDF] South African Police – [SAP]

South African Police Service – [SAPS]

Truth and Reconciliation Commission - [TRC] Umkhonto We Sizwe – [MK]

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Introduction

South Africa occupies an important and symbolic place in the global political imagination. Decades of international struggle against the racist Apartheid regime left Nelson Mandela a household name. His release from prison and eventual ascension to the presidency are some of the most important events in African history. However, recent history seems to tarnish the vision of a peaceful rainbow nation that was heralded at the time, and it is up to researchers and leaders to determine what has happened to bring South Africa to this point.

This paper aims to look at the ways in which the South African labour migration system was changed after the collapse of Apartheid to illustrate the difference these changes have generated in migrant workers' lives. The terrible nature of Apartheid South Africa is known the world over, with racial hierarchy defining social and economic life. When Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress [ANC] came to power in 1994, the expectation was that a new social and economic structure would be established that worked for disenfranchised groups. However, just over 2 decades later, one can see that events have not unfolded as hoped, and many of the practices common during Apartheid are continuing today.

Internal migrant labour (workers from within South Africa) is still commonplace in the mining sector, and international migrants from neighbouring states are also being employed in greater numbers since the borders are more open. Conditions are often poor and workers' wages are low (Steinbrink, 2010, pg. 37). The influence of neoliberalism and

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the cutting of government involvement in the economy after the transition to democracy is then the change that will be interrogated in this paper, with a comparison of the

characteristics of the Apartheid migration regime and the current migration regime showing us their separate products. Where the term product is used, this paper is referring to the conditions and livelihoods of migrant workers that are produced as a result of the regimes' structures.

These changes to the Apartheid migrant labour system have reproduced an

unsustainable lifestyle for the migrant workers employed in mines and other industrial sites in the modern Republic. Informal social networks replaced the previously state-mandated recruitment system of Apartheid that forced Africans into work (Steinbrink, 2010, pg. 36), so there is less guarantee of work when one migrates than before. Migrant workers are now faced with similar exploitation as during Apartheid, augmented by a neoliberal atrophy of the institutions that defend them in government. This in turn has led to renewed workers' resistance to exploitation, and violent demonstrations and strikes have increased

dramatically in the past few years (Demian, 2015). The response of the democratic Republic of South Africa to workers' resistance also echoes Apartheid, with a massacre of 34 mineworkers in August of 2013 showing that the ANC government is fully committed to upholding the rights of mining houses (Alexander et al., 2013, pg. 15).

Presented below is a historical comparative study of two models of labour migration regimes, the first being the authoritarian and racially-structured Apartheid of the past, and the other being the modern, liberalized, post-Apartheid Republic. South Africa offers a unique opportunity to study two polar opposites of labour market approaches in similar contexts, being as they are in the same country. By interrogating the differences and

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similarities of these two regimes, this thesis will also unpack how the systems are held together through structured relationships, and how these structures determine the type and quality of their product, the livelihood of migrant workers, that comes out.

This paper does not seek to paste the Republic migration regime over top of

Apartheid's as though historical context does not matter, but rather to show a progression of the actors between two freeze-frame moments. In this way, actors such as the ANC or the mining houses can be contrasted more meaningfully with their historical incarnations past, as even some individuals in these organizations are the same in the two cases. Indeed the development of actors over time is what causes a shift in interests or allegiance, and this is what is being interrogated here. It is not good enough to simply show two different

migration regimes for comparison when there is so much overlap between them, so their connections through history must be shown in order to make the process of the shift clear.

In order to get a better grasp of the labour market conditions, the scope of the paper will be narrowed down somewhat to focus on two key elements identified in research and South African political society more generally, which are housing and mines. Mines are a logical choice for getting a vision of labour relations and the conditions of migrant workers in both regimes, as the mines are overwhelmingly staffed with migrant labour while also being owned by multinational business interests (Crush and James, 1991, pg. 301). Housing is a logical choice when dealing with migration, as it is a hard measure that is objectively visible. More importantly, housing is often identified by various South African actors, from governments to unions to businesses, as a critical service workers need to interrupt the process of circular migration which has been proven costly not only to migrants but also business and the country's economic development (McDonald, 1998, pg. 449).

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Below is the analytical framework section that lays out the criteria by which the two regimes will be analyzed as well as the general list of actors in each regime and their interests and relations with the other actors in their regime. This is followed by a literature review carried out in the style of history studies, with literature being grouped based on subject matter. Certain choice writings will be expanded on further to show what they provide to the study, as the nature of this paper means that there are dozens of articles and books to choose from and only some will fit. Afterwards, one chapter will be dedicated to each migration regime, although the Republic chapter will have to do the job of playing catch-up and explain some of the historical changes that shifted the various actors' positions after 1994. The final chapter will then compare and contrast the regimes in their entirety, focusing afterwards on political and union representatives of migrant workers.

The agency of migrant workers is also a critical element of this study, and their capacity to effect change in the regimes via their connections to other institutions and actors can sometimes be in search of conflicting goals within this single group. The impact of action and non-action by various groups shapes the context of migrant workers lives, but they also make choices and act for themselves. How did the Republic end up with a militant labour force and circular migration, both of which should have fallen away after Apartheid? What roles were played by which actors? These questions are answered below.

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Analytical Framework

This paper has a single research question that it will be exploring throughout its duration. “What are the similarities and differences between the Republic and Apartheid migration regimes that have produced migrant labour organizations that act in similar fashion in both cases?” The increase in violent demonstrations and the Marikana massacre have pushed this question to the forefront, and understanding the historical development of these events is valuable. In order to answer this question, the research method of document analysis will be used, with primary source documents, scholarly articles and media reports all being used to get a complete picture of the migrant labour regimes of both cases.

Although this paper is historical in nature, it is using the framework of migration regimes and so requires a sociological frame of analysis to be established, especially if particular actors within the broader regimes such as labour organizations are to be scrutinized more intensely. In order to achieve the goal of effectively and meaningfully comparing two migration regimes, an analytical framework will have to be developed that provides a lens with which to observe both migration regimes, and therefor look upon them in a fairly equal way. To that end, a structure of the web the actors in each regime will be built and then interrogated to determine the relations between them and show their individual interests.

Once these two structures are in place, it is a matter of asking how the economic, political and social factors all impact the migrant workers as a group. Some actors or institutions will be more directly important to the interests and actions of labour

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organizations and migrant labour, while others are more secondary and only have a

peripheral influence on migrant labour. In such cases, it is likely that the peripheral actor is influencing the choices of a more direct actor, and so having a notable influence on the labour market conditions faced by migrants as Aigner shows (2012, pg. 2). It is important to see what the labour markets look like in each regime and their positions in international trade markets because migrant labour is also an international phenomenon. It is important for each regime to have accurate knowledge of the state of their industrial sectors,

especially mining, so that they may better comprehend their economic capacity for social service policies. Starting with an overview of the Apartheid migration regime and moving forward to the Republic, the changing positions of these actors and functions will be tracked from their first to second locations. By analyzing the asymmetries of power that are at play between different regime actors as Kunz et al. (2011) show, various shifts in

positions will be better understood and contrasted, and questions about developments in the Republic regime can be explained.

The research for this paper will be asking specific questions of the source material in order to determine the differences and similarities between the outputs of the two migration regime cases. Of course not all the research material will be focused on the case of South Africa, as theoretical input is needed to provide guidance to the paper and show the broader relevance of these two cases. However, studies about various elements of the South African migration regimes will be the considerable majority of the research provided here. The material will be quizzed to see, among other things, which state or international actors are involved in a given situation, such as foreign states and multinational mining conglomerates in gold mining sector employment. Betts illustrates the importance of

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isolating the roles of each actor, as there is often overlap of influences and confusion about motives in the regime (2011, pg. 2). Knowing these roles will help develop a better

understanding of the ways in which actors' interests and positions within the regime shifted. The research will be framed in terms of authoritarian or liberal regime tendencies, as both state control and relinquishment of responsibility can be found to exist in each case, and it is important to not let the era being studied determine how the actors are viewed. The state of labour relations in each era will be revealed from the literature, and this paper will focus on what these labour relations say about class divisions within the migration regime more broadly. Finally, it is valuable when studying migration regimes to constantly look for the ways in which migrants themselves, as the primary actors in focus, are executing their own choices within asymmetrical power relations with the other regime actors.

Housing policy is a major element of the regime products analyzed in this study because South Africans determined through the transition that it was an important issue and academics generally agree on its relevance to migration studies. By looking at choices and actions by various actors around the issue of housing, the paper will show in material terms who is improving housing for poor workers and who is making it more difficult to achieve. There are several other measures that could be used to measure relationships between the actors such as social security payments, efforts towards racial reconciliation, or the development of rural womens' skills and market participation. Policies and actions by actors in these regards may show a different web of interests and relations than the one in this paper, but migrant labour is the centrepiece of this study and plays a crucial role in the rural livelihood of South Africans and workers from the wider region.

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the term social movement unionism as an analytical term. Social movement unionism is generally a more grassroots approach than formal organizing. It gives unions their agency in the labour market from an ideological unity and commitment to collective action on the part of their members (Aganon et al., 2009. pg. 40). Organizing tactics that seek to unite broader interests than just relations in the workplace are capable of acting in different fields of the economy and can build coalitions with other powerful actors and groups (Ibid., pg. 41). The relevance of this strategy is clear in both cases being studied. Social movement unionism and its cooperative nature with other actors that impact workers lives allow for such unions to identify issues and act in more diverse ways, able to react in more areas of the economy. This strategy was deployed during Apartheid and is still used today, in many places around the world, inherently increasing the international involvement and mindset of unions (Ibid., pg. 43).

This is where the primary focus of the paper comes into play, as labour

organizations in South Africa were and still are powerful collective actors representing large swathes of migrant labour, with many unions taking direction straight from the ground level migrants themselves (Marais, 2011, pg. 187). As a result, labour organizations'

choices, actions and interests are to be understood as generally representative of the choices, actions and interests of migrant labour as a whole. When there are found to be important distinctions between the two, where migrant workers' and unions' actions

clashed, these will be unpacked and analyzed to explain the roots of this diversity. Migrant workers are not a homogenous group, and are represented by a variety of organizations in the labour market. There are also political organizations representing migrant labour’s interests in both cases, and here too a diversity of choices and actions can be observed

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between the migrant workers themselves and the political organizations in both cases. So, while categorizing certain organizations or groups as “representative actors” on behalf of migrant labour as a whole, there are critical issues and instances that will show the times where migrant labourers objected. Even in neoliberalism, Cox shows the relevance of the state, companies and unions, so no single actor or group's agency is 100% (2004, pg. 8). The theoretical lenses above will help in the process of understanding the migration regime outputs by showing where and how migrant labour was able to affect policy, through organizing. By measuring those actions on their approach towards, and delivery of, quality housing to break the circular migration pattern, a more grounded understanding will be reached.

Breakdown of Regimes and Actors to be Analyzed

For this paper migrant labour will be at the centre of the regime analysis, with all other actors cast in terms of their relations, either direct or indirect, with migrant workers as mentioned above. What follows is a set list of the six main actors in each of the two

regimes, expanded to illustrate their relationships and interests with regards to other actors and migrant labour. The actors shown here will go on to be used in further chapters as the foundation for analyzing the migrant labour systems of each regime, and help understand the shifting arrangements between cases.

Apartheid Migration Regime Actors

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surely the totalitarian Apartheid State of South Africa, which controlled not only the international borders and migration through them but also the migration of labour from the domestic Bantustans to the sites of work (Steinbrink, 2010, pg. 38). Of course one interest of the state was the supremacy of whites in the economy and politics, but there was also a need for that economy to be stable and efficient. This means that the state needed friendly relationships with certain actors and controlling relationships with others.

2. Mining Houses – This is a term used to describe the various corporations which owned mineral extraction operations in South Africa. Companies such as Anglo-American Platinum, Impala Platinum, and De Beers are part of the mining houses, along with the dozens of other companies which either own or provide services to the mines themselves (Fig, 2005, pg. 608). Many of these companies were not headquartered in South Africa during Apartheid or afterwards, and are therefor not as interested in the domestic social landscape of the country as other actors. The primary concern of these companies is providing a positive return on investment and to generate an operating profit greater than the costs of running mines. This means that mining houses are often in conflict with their workers in a push for lower labour costs, but this is not always the case. In the final stages of Apartheid these mining houses were putting pressure on the state to allow them to provide better living conditions and wages for workers (Crush and James, 1991, 304). 3. Army and Police – These two groups represent the monopoly on violence possessed

by the state to be deployed in pursuit of the application of its policies. In relation to migrant labour, police had the duty to enforce laws around migration and thereby

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can be understood to have physically controlled the labour market's composition when using deportation and imprisonment of unwanted workers. The army is the extension of this function outside the borders of the state, and played a defining role in the conflicts that were ongoing within neighbouring countries that were

simultaneously sending migrant labour to work in South African mines (Crush, 1986, pg. 163). When dealing with labour organizations, both the South African Defence Force [SADF] and South African Police [SAP] would be deployed to prevent any worker action that might result in an unsanctioned and unacceptable loss of state control over the labour market.

4. Unions – As the collective expression of the interests of labour, unions during Apartheid were tasked with improving the working conditions for their members through negotiation with the state and mining houses. When negotiations were not fruitful unions would of course resort to more militant tactics, but with a focus on the needs and requests of the rank and file (Crush, 1991, pg. 311). This becomes an interesting process when the issue of race is considered, as there were white

workers' unions steadfastly opposed to racial integration in the workplace. They would actively work with the state to undermine other non-white unions, in order to preserve working conditions for their membership (Nattrass, 1995, pg. 863)

5. Political Representatives – For African labour, migrant or otherwise, several political organizations were active in pressuring the state in different ways. From the ANC and Pan African Congress [PAC] to the South African Communist Party [SACP] and Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP], several parties with various political ideologies and goals sought the support of migrant workers, and to support them.

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Some groups were operating across borders and with the support of other similar political groups in neighbouring labour-sending states, showing the relevance of migration and forming networks (Baines, 2008, pg. 219). In these situations the political parties would be interested in concurrently increasing their membership and therefor ideological clout among labourers, while also keeping activities covert and avoiding death and disorder from the SADF and SAP.

6. Human Rights Non-Governmental Organizations [NGO] – These groups are often internationally headquartered and not as visible to the state security agencies as domestic actors. They were primarily interested in achieving basic human rights for the people of South Africa. A natural focal point of human rights activism is the workplace, and so these groups were interested in supporting migrant labourers against the rigidities of the Apartheid regime as well as the practices of the mining houses (Risse and Sikkink, 1999, pg. 9). Housing was an important part of NGOs' work in this regard. Human rights groups would also be interested in supporting a fair and just political process and so be interested in supporting labour organizations and political parties that were either criminalized or diminished by the Apartheid state. Some NGOs were actively supporting political and labour actors in

partnership networks, and were an integral part of the new democratic society (Habib and Taylor, 1999, pg. 74).

Republic Migration Regime Actors

1. The State – After the transition in 1994 to democracy, the ANC won elections and the state dropped its authoritarian institutional approach, removed strict racial

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hierarchies, and focused on reintegrating into the global community politically, socially and economically. To that end, international borders were opened up to a comparatively free flowing migration of persons, as well as the free flowing migration of capital (Marais, 2011, pg. 111) The need to provide minerals and resources on the competitive global market meant that the state has reduced its role in the economy, following the prescription of neoliberalism, even as it rolled out a new social expenditure system. In the democratic era, the state is interested in attracting the mining houses and other firms to invest in sites of labour. This is to keep capital growth accumulating and make sure that products are cheap enough for international trade to keep the relationship going. This has manifest itself in

continued diminishing conditions for workers, as international companies are no longer obligated to perform certain actions or provide guaranteed levels of

employment by the state, and enforcement of regulations lags (Fig, 2005, pg. 603). 2. Mining Houses – No longer beholden to the strict racial economic structure of

apartheid, mining houses typically enjoy much more freedom to hire and fire workers, and to invest or divest from different projects than during Apartheid. Mining houses enjoy privileged relations with the state of South Africa due to their important economic position, as well as neighbouring labour-sending states who seek remittances, even if there is mutual distrust on some levels. For migrant workers this means that they have a more agile and connected employer that is able to change their working conditions rapidly in response to market fluctuations, which other more friendly actors such as unions and the state are increasingly unable to respond.

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3. Army and Police – South Africa is not currently at war with any of its neighbours. The Army has been transformed into a force that is not used to violently influence regional politics any longer, represented in the name change to South African National Defence Force [SANDF]. The police force has also been transformed to remove racial hierarchy, renamed the South African Police Service [SAPS] while still performing the task of enforcing state laws. In the context of the Republic this means providing mining houses the security of property they need in order to continue operations and compete on the international market. This has resulted in a continuation of Apartheid-era relations with migrant labour whereby organizations that stage militant protests such as strikes are attacked by the police to ensure that the law is enforced and mines stay competitive (Alexander et al., 2013, pg. 21). 4. Unions – Unions have maintained a strong presence in the workforce of the

Republic. The largest confederation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU], is a member of the tri-partite alliance that currently runs the country on the legislative level, giving them unprecedented access to legislative decision making (Marais, 2011, pg. 437). However, not all unions are pleased with the direction that the ANC-led legislature has taken, and the largest member of COSATU has begun the process to split from the organization (Mngambi, 2014). This means that unions in South Africa are again divided today, not along racial lines but political ones, with some supporting COSATU and their powerful position and others wanting to challenge the status quo. In relation to migrant labour, unions are still all devoted to providing improved working conditions and wages for their members, but they are split on the issue of how to achieve this goal, and so once

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more unions are not a homogenous group in their relations with migrant workers. Inter-union violence has flared in recent years, showing the dramatic differences that can exist between groups (Chinguno, 2013, pg. 4).

5. Political Representatives – With the ANC in parliament alongside the South African Communist Party [SACP] and COSATU, labour is well represented in the

legislature of South Africa. However, policies chosen by the tri-partite alliance have made workers question their government's devotion to their livlihoods, and even the SACP has lost much support among the working people (Marais, 2011, pg. 112) In the face of a political vacuum for labour representation in parliament, a new party led by an ex-ANC Youth League president has emerged, the Economic Freedom Fighters [EFF]. For migrant workers, the political representatives in South Africa provides a cornucopia of approaches towards the labour market.

6. Human Rights NGOs – In the democratic era these groups are less directly involved in the migration regime, but still play an important role in the functioning of a healthy democracy. Without the international spotlight that Apartheid had put on South Africa's socio-economic ailments, and the loss of funding and influence in the neoliberal era, NGOs are often left producing reports and then hitting a dead end without broader public support for change. Nelson Mandela himself questioned the effectiveness of NGOs in his time as president due to their foreign interests (Habib and Taylor, 1999, pg. 80). Nevertheless, these groups have identified some troubling processes going on in South Africa, and have been important to getting an objective analysis out into the public discourse after the Marikana massacre of 2012 that cannot be discredited as labour propaganda.

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Literature Review

In this section of the paper, the relevant academic literature covering different aspects of migration regimes and labour markets will be analyzed to garner a more

grounded understanding of the process of labour migration. Studies from the disciplines of political science, sociology and history will all play a role informing the analysis in the later sections of this paper. It will summarize the relevant information from the research and show how it relates to the issues of shifting labour migration regimes and authoritarian or liberal policies. This literature review will also give an insight into the angle of analysis that will be used later, by developing the theoretical framework which will be applied. When considering the data below, it must be emphasized that it is only representative of the theoretical and case study work that has been done in academia, and that more data concerning modern events will be needed and provided as the paper is developed in later chapters. As the sources used in this paper are the sole source of data, the bibliography is much too long to summarize here. Instead, the method of literature review used by history studies will be utilized, whereby literature will be grouped into categories to illustrate the related fields, and individual articles will be singled out for further interrogation. In five sections, literature on neoliberalism, housing and the labour market, one each for the history of the Republic and Apartheid, and migration regimes will be summarized and applied to this study. What will not be covered in this literature review are the various primary sources and news reports that will make up part of the Republic's overview as well as inform the analysis, conclusion and discussion chapters, as these documents are typically

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self-explanatory in their content and subject matter.

Neoliberal Economics and Workers

The first section will look at the research into neoliberalism and livelihoods of workers, whether at home or in the workplace. Authors such as Cox (2004) look at the phenomenon of the diminished importance of borders in globalization, while Piazza (2005) will inform the analysis of labour organizations as they try to adjust to the new market contexts across many states. Below is one article dealing with the instability that labour market reforms can bring to the lives of workers by Matouschek et al. (2008).

Matouscheck et al. are trying to develop a research model that ties labour market reforms to job instability by looking at the case of separation, or dismissal, during worker-firm negotiations. When worker-firm and worker both have private information, that is aspects of the economic function of the operation as a whole that only they can know and don't share with each other, this can lead to separation of worker and firm that is objectively

economically inefficient for both parties (Matouscheck et al., 2008, pg. 2). This is true even if one or both think it is beneficial. Ideas about the rules of bargaining need to be

challenged, as both parties can fail to realize the gains of their relationship, especially later on in the employment contract when productivity shocks can cause private information to be held tightly by either group (Ibid., pg. 2). When costs of separation are reduced for the firm then instability of the worker can increase, and such separation can be privately inefficient even as it disproportionately affects some groups more than others (Ibid., pg. 3). In order to counter this effect, the authors claim rigid contracts should be established at the

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point of starting the employment relation, as this would anticipate future inefficiencies and stabilize the relationship (Ibid., pg. 25). Agreements about stability, such as severance payments, increase the market friction involved in separation, and governments may be best suited to impose these measures rather than private contracting (Ibid., pg. 28). Firms and workers may also self-impose rigidities to compliment the outside influence of the state, such as perpetual rather than fixed-term work contracts which guarantee separation, although this is only effective in markets which already have high friction blocking firm actions (Ibid., pg. 28).

This article is closely related to the phenomenon being identified in the changing regimes of South Africa, primarily that the new dynamics of globalization and

neoliberalism in the labour market have threatened the livelihood of workers through unemployment, poor conditions and precarious migratory work. Workers are recognized as having their own interests that they are cognisant of, and as having the agency to influence negotiations on the same level that firms can, particularly relevant given the structure of South Africa's tri-partite government. Liberalizing measures that allow easier capital flows and remove worker protections are identified as harmful reforms in the article, although not applied to a particular case as this paper is. The authors believe that state regulation of firms and labour is capable of reducing instability and unstable negotiations, identifying the relevant actors as firms, workers and legislators. They do not consider the political aspect of composing state legislatures and establishing certain laws, so that is where this paper will pick up later. The take away message is that firms and workers need each other, and the relationship can be determined by incentives to either struggle or compromise, with

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friction is removed.

Housing and the Labour Market

In the next section, literature on the subject of housing and the labour market will be covered. A valuable author on the South African context is Crush, who has studied

Apartheid-era migrant labour housing (1991) as well as the Republic's transition to a new migration regime (1999). Crush's work on migrant labour housing will be expanded below, but many other authors will also be used in this paper as housing is indeed tied to migration and the labour market. Fairburn et al. (2004) show the effects of welfare programs like pensions for rural Africans on the labour market participation of youth. Lalloo (1999) shows how large scale property ownership can hamper the development of urban planning efforts and continue settlement patterns that reinforce circular migration. There are also other authors on housing and the labour market in both eras that will be used in this paper later on, such as Wilkinson (1998), McDonald (1998), and Lohnert and Steinbrink (2005). Now Crush & James and Natrass will be analyzed to show their contributions to

understanding housing and the labour and financial markets during Apartheid respectively. Crush and James write a late Apartheid-era analysis of the economics of migrant labour housing, particularly housing in the gold mining industry. 97% of workers were migrants, 40% international, who lived in single-sex hostels or barracks (1991, pg. 301, 311). These were quickly becoming breeding grounds for class consciousness due to close quarters, great distance between worker and home, and segregation of ownership (Ibid., pg. 302). The dual impact of circular migration and a lack of control over housing influenced

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worker militancy, and mining houses wanted to prevent this by having workers own family-appropriate homes near the mines and cut the cycle of migration (Ibid., pg. 302). It was expected that housing and service delivery would divide and depoliticize the workforce, but due to the continuing nature of capital accumulation and a lack of funding for new homes, this process ultimately collapsed, which the authors predict in the paper (Ibid., pg. 303).

Due to the top-down nature of the implementation of the new housing approach and the confluence of rising domestic skills and withdrawal of foreign workers, worker

militancy continued while the Chamber of Mines was not unified in its approach (Ibid., pg. 306). The government barred more than 3% of the workforce being settled, and it took the mining houses until 1986 to get this changed. The Mines and Works Act segregated the well paying skilled jobs and made African settlement harder, while the concept of career

minework was being increasingly pushed on migrant labour to keep them coming back to work (Ibid., pg. 305). This eased the pressure to settle workers permanently but also increasing political consciousness among the workers. Boss-boys, African workers given privileges such as management positions and higher pay by mining houses, were targeted by the National Union of Mineworkers [NUM] during labour actions and so were housed in separate quarters, having been effectively co-opted by management in order to divide labour (Ibid., pg. 306). Requests were made by mining houses for the state to subsidize construction costs and mortgages of permanent homes (Ibid., pg. 310). Prohibitive costs for lower tier workers required stronger housing market controls to make this work (Ibid., pg. 306). The state instead clashed with mining houses over taxes which were needed to keep a bloated bureaucracy alive, and laws about “orderly urbanization” which required a slow trickle, or no trickle, of Africans settling in areas occupied by whites (Ibid., pg. 310).

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This article exposes many aspects of the complicated relationships between mining houses, the state, and migrant labour during the end of Apartheid. Conflict between the state and mining houses gave rise to solutions in which workers or labour organizations were not consulted, and skilled migrant labourers were privileged by firms in order to break solidarity among workers. Mining houses could determine the composition of their labour against white state interests, even as the state directly controlled settlements and used laws to obstruct progress.

This article is tied directly to my chapter analyzing Apartheid, and illuminates some of the conflicts between allied groups in the regime at the time. Migrant workers rarely bought homes due to lack of income and legal obstruction for internationals, so their agency was greatly diminished while mining houses also struggled against a state that was slow to move on the issue. While the state was powerful and capable of determining market conditions, it was limited in its scope of actions as the issue was unfolding in the late 1980's. Many actors played a role in the housing issue, from Anglo-American and other mining houses to the state, international and internal migrants, boss boys, white unions opposed to any skilled employment or permanent settlement of African labour, and the underdeveloped foreign states and Bantustans from where migrant labour was drawn. Domestic worker settlement is banned, while international migrants are used to suppress wages, so the mining houses want to develop the skills of the domestic worker. The unions and mining houses were locked in a struggle to achieve their respective goals, while also having to pressure the state. This was something firms could do more easily while unions were being repressed, although neither party would get what they wanted. Companies were attempting to influence South Africa more broadly as a society, to change the labour

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patterns that defined life for many. Unions were playing the long game of developing solidarity and better conditions, and the state seemed indifferent or unaware of the damage that was occurring around it.

Natrass looks at the gold sector crisis in late-era Apartheid, at a time when

international prices were falling and workers were increasing productivity, resulting in the Apartheid state taking a loss of tax revenue (1995, pg. 860). Market dynamics are important for mining houses as the providers of work contracts for labour, and this article provides an examination of the state's role in providing and shaping the economic context of their actions. The state's multi-tiered tax rates for different qualities of raw ore caused mining houses to go after lower-quality product to save on costs, and once the state discovered this was a deliberate act it cut off subsidy support for the gold industry (Ibid., pg. 859). This decline in income caused a profit squeeze as costs became overwhelming, and labour costs were blamed as the main cause (Ibid., pg. 864). While tons of ore milled per worker increased, the deliberate drop in grade by management along with a damaged Rand currency hurt real income for mining houses. Employment had been rising for white and black until 1987, and the mining sector was used as a safety net for white employment until white unions failed in their push to keep skilled jobs away from Africans in 1988 (Ibid., pg. 863). There was a small drop in migrant labour during this time, from about 88% to 83% of the industry, and mostly domestic migrants from the Transkei or Eastern Cape (Ibid., pg. 862). This drop was caused by the fact that skilled jobs were opened up to African workers at exactly the time that skilled jobs were being shed by the mining houses, and so the NUM led a strike in 1987 which would go on to collapse under market pressure (Ibid., pg. 864). Thereafter NUM was relatively powerless, taking a conciliatory tone and agreeing to

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measures such as performance-based bonuses and lower wage increases in order to increase overall employment (Ibid., pg. 864). The goal was winning other important battles like working standards and funeral coverage by having more members (Ibid., pg. 864). In the transition period during and after Apartheid many unproductive gold mines went bankrupt, which balanced the domestic market and gave productive mines more space to expand and take over (Ibid., pg.865). The authors predict that gold prices will never rise to their previous heights, as investors had other financial tools to securely store their wealth and global finance was opening up foreign banks to domestic capital (Ibid., pg. 865). They end with a call for increased refining and manufacturing domestically, although there will be costs of opening new export channels and labour groups' demands for production for domestic needs may be an obstacle (Ibid., pg. 865).

The subject matter of Natrass' article is useful for this paper in that it lays out the market context for the position and decisions of actors in the Apartheid labour migration regime. It looks at the continued dependency on foreign labour during a period of increased production and tax losses where workers produced more yet were only promoted at a time when jobs were being lost, so wages stagnated. Neighbouring states had broken out of the Apartheid regime, but they still dealt with the same mining houses as before and sent their labour forces into Apartheid out of need for remittances. While this article is focused primarily on gold mining, a broader observation will be made in the later stages of this thesis about various sectors of South Africa's migration regime and the industrial sectors involved. Migrants were able to organize with NUM and membership increased in this time, showing migrant agency and analytical prowess, but banks and traders made conditions poor for strike actions that were taken in the context of economic decline. The

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recognition of a need for shifts towards refining and manufacturing within the country is intuitive, especially given the onset of neoliberal deregulation and surrender of the

domestic economy to global markets. The relationship between labour and mining houses was obviously exploitative and oppressive, and NUM's choices were shaped by this reality even as an independent actor with its own agency. When actions were taken without proper economic security it hurt their capacity to influence change within their relationship.

The Republic of South Africa

This next section of the literature review will look at the Republic of South Africa's migration regime and labour market. Malte Steinbrink's (2010) work on the influence of social networks in the migrant labour process shows the shift from authoritarian state control to a liberalized labour market that requires workers to manipulate their social networks to find employment rather than force them to work. Manson (2013) illustrates the new relationships between business and the state, using the decision to not nationalize the mines in 2012 after of the Marikana massacre to show a complex web of actors in conflict. Fig (2005) touches on similar notes when analyzing the theoretical and practical

implications of corporate social responsibility in the Republic. Tying the transitionary economic reforms to the influence of the Apartheid bureaucrats in the public service, Fig shows how firms face little enforcement of state laws as the government requires their investment to continue operating (2005). Steinbrink's study of amateur football networks and circular migration will be analyzed below.

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in contemporary rural South Africa, and uses the example of soccer leagues to explain how social networking is needed to acquire employment and income in the post-Apartheid era. Due to the changes in the way that companies acquire and exploit migrant labour, it is no longer a matter of coerced recruitment and state-facilitated migration but rather one of social connections and often indebtedness that drives the circular labour migration

(Steinbrink, 2010, pg. 36). The removal of a state mandate in employment strengthens the importance of informal social networks, leading to chain migration based on common origin, increasing the value of migrant agency in the new arrangement (Ibid., pg. 43). A lack of economic vitality in the rural areas and racial distribution of income creates dependency on migrant labour and remittances for community survival (Ibid., pg. 41). In this context, the author looks at soccer as a tool for building social networks in the place of origin, and also for building local social capital at the site of migration (Ibid., pg. 48). The nature of this chain migration, based on soccer, means that there is a localization of social capital in the destination which is rooted in the home, a trans-local social network capital development (Ibid., pg. 48). This has disadvantages however, as migrants are expected to play for certain soccer teams in order to maintain their social networks which are so vital to the process of remittances (Ibid., pg. 52).

This article is useful not only for its data on the current state of South Africa's migrant labour market but also for the way in which it exposes and expands on the difficulties of the new system of circular migration. The article identifies the areas of a migrant worker's life where there have been changes and a diminished state involvement in their lives, and what this means practically for their communities' economic viability. While sports and social network development are not fundamental parts of this thesis paper, the

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processes of migration that they represent are important in understanding how the new migration regime perpetuates itself. The continued circular migration that was predicted to end in permanent rural-to-urban settlement after Apartheid has instead been driven on by lack of rural economic activity, meaning this remains an African situation that does not impact whites in their strongly entrenched economic positions. While authoritarian Apartheid legislation established the circular pattern with state force, the Republic has maintained similar owner-worker relations and circular migration without formal state involvement. This has been accomplished by making the migrant worker the main agent in their own migration, utilizing social network chains while the state backs off and provides space to do so without pass laws and other controls. The state has also continued the economic need of the rural areas which mining bosses can more easily exploit. This article did not look extensively at employers' roles in this process, but it is clear that their goals are cheaper labour costs and more pliant workers. The relationship between the migrant

workers and the state means that their choices are shaped by economic need and a new ability to “freely” migrate (ignoring the economic costs). The actors have clearly shifted positions since Apartheid. The state is simply withdrawing from this relationship and allowing a more direct interaction between employers and labour, which has allowed migrants to develop their agency within the pre-existing union sphere, but also provided employers with the ability to continue old patterns of employment.

Apartheid South Africa

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migrant labour system. Here again Crush (1986) is a valuable author on the subject of international migrant labour and will be analyzed below to show its application in the mining sector at a crucial time in the regime that was full of international conflict. Sparks (1995) was a journalist covering the transition from Apartheid, and wrote about firsthand experiences and important events that helps give context to the transition. Covering issues from economic negotiations to racist violence, Sparks' book provides the kind of layered understanding of the interplay of actors that a migration regimes study needs to understand.

Crush analyzes the continued use by Apartheid South Africa of foreign labour in mines in the 80's, during a time when there were great surpluses of domestic migrant labour. While South Africa has always relied on foreign migrant labour since the 1800's, no source has been stable or reliable so supplier areas have always been in flux (Crush, 1986, pg. 162). By the 1960's, domestic African workers were rejecting the working conditions in mining, and soon manufacturing jobs became an option for them while mining remained reliant on 80% foreign labour into the 80's (Ibid., pg. 163). By the 1980's the surrounding states were newly independent and hostile, and many had withdrawn their labour forces in the 70's (Ibid., pg. 164). Even though Bantustans were purposefully underdeveloped and economically disadvantaged to make the population wage dependent, rural peasants from foreign states could always be used to drive the wage down further and continue the

dependency cycle of rural homelands. While mining houses were forced to turn to domestic labour in the 70's, a combination of factors including unemployment, forced re-settlement of Bantustans and mechanization on farms created mass reserves of labour within the country (Ibid., pg. 166). The absence of choice, combined with efforts from industry, stabilized a labour source. Companies utilized harsh contracts and a media recruitment

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drive to keep workers arriving (Ibid., pg. 167). A greater control over the labour force was achieved not as much by mining policy as it was by the context of a huge labour surplus, with companies employing domestic novices to replace foreign workers and create a new domestic rural economic strata, which the authors predicted would empower unions further with fertile recruitment grounds (Ibid., pg. 169).

This article is a valuable resource for looking at the domestic/international dynamic of migrant labour in the end stages of Apartheid. It lays out the labour market of the time, looking at ballooning labour supply domestically and changing partner states along with technological advances in the workplace and increased rural poverty. By looking at forced migration based on race, which depended on persistent efforts to keep large numbers of Africans in the proletarian class, this article also sets the stage for the analysis later in this paper which will observe the links between poverty and continuing circular migration. This article had an eye towards the use of force by Apartheid to build its economy, and the ways in which independent states reacted, with not much of a look at the agency of migrant workers which was diminished in the midst of state to state relations. International workers are largely at the whim of mining houses, but their respective foreign states were able to impact the supply and demand equilibrium in opposition to the wishes of the mining houses. This left domestic South African migrant labour with arguably the least agency of all in this multifaceted relationship. The information in this article, focused on one industry, can be related to migration dynamics of Apartheid and the internal impacts of the networks between actors in the regime. The use of force by Apartheid generated a backlash from foreign states which forced the mining houses to look inwards, and prepared the ground for labour organizing and unrest domestically, which was ultimately the result.

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Migration Regimes

Lastly, a summary of literature on migration regimes will keep a sociological view of migration at the centre of this paper's analysis and shed light on how the regimes of each case should be understood. Aigner et al. (2012) write about France and the UK's citizenship and welfare regimes, and show the clear influence of multilateral institutions such as the UN as well as regional and bilateral institutions between states. The various levels of power at which certain actors operate is crucial to understanding a migration regime as complex as South Africa's, and Kunz et al. (2011) show the fundamental power asymmetry between actors in terms of rule makers and rule takers. The two cases in this paper will illustrate interesting dynamics of this rule maker and rule taker dichotomy, as the positions of power switch dramatically in South Africa after the transition. Chen et al. (2010) take a specific look at the agency of Chinese labour migrants to South Africa over history, showing the diverse types of networks that have emerged at different periods since the 1980's to allow Chinese migrants to create their own space and identity in South Africa. Icduygu (2008) helps understand the fluid nature of migration regimes by explaining that they are loose regulatory systems that distribute power and privilege for certain interests. This paper will take this concept further to show how interests have changed in South Africa and what that means for the migrant workers. Below, an article on migration regimes by Sciortino will be analyzed.

Sciortino is a well respected author on migration regimes, and writes that the

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extending beyond just the state (2004, pg. 21). While the state can determine how it chooses to classify migrants and determine who is “regular” or “irregular” in its own eyes (Ibid., pg. 21), this is different from having the ability to sculpt the social phenomenon of migration within state borders. He goes further to show that the nature of irregularity is a consequence of disunity between the states' legal entry slots for migrants and the conditions of the labour market, which the state cannot control (Ibid., pg. 22). Irregular migration must be understood as a consequence not of a single actor's classification, but the interplay of multiple states, employers, and others as a whole in a migration regime (Ibid., pg. 33). The social relationships of migrants themselves play an important role as well, virtually

invisible to the state, and indeed there is an incentive for irregular migrants to keep their social networks small to be less visible, thus they must survive on little social capital (Ibid., pg. 41). Social capital is still important though, and migrants working in irregular situations may find that social capital can replace legislative protections for their working conditions, which otherwise may deteriorate as they are increasingly isolated without support (Ibid., pg. 42).

The work above is important for this study because it shows the nebulous relationships that facilitate the actual migration of bodies for work from one place to another. By making it clear early in the article that the state is not capable of total control, Sciortino also shows that the legal categorization of irregular or regular is entirely reliant upon how well the state's migration policies fit with the labour market, which is relevant to the issue at hand in this paper. Categorization of workers has been a hallmark of South Africa's labour migration regime, not only racial categories but also domestic and

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and depress wages and conditions.

Sciortino's work provides sociological support to this historical study, and the theoretical lens of migration regimes used in his study will be emulated in this one. Without a solid understanding of where and why different actors' interests become reality or not, identifying relationships between groups is just that and nothing more. With a broader comprehension of the inter-related nature of each actor's agency and relations, the foggy structures that allow for the practice of migration will be made more clear, as will their consequences

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Apartheid South Africa

Migrant labour system/regime

By the late 1970's and early 1980's, Apartheid had become a fully developed state policy with total control of all facets of life, and yet would be ending soon. Circular migration was fully established, and the congregation of powerful actors including mining houses, police enforcement and state policy-making was starting to bicker about the particulars. This was a labour migration pattern whereby rural African males would travel immense distances to work for low wages on large industrial sites, often mines where skills were difficult to achieve. They would be housed in single-sex hostel-barracks near the worksite for the duration of their employment, and sent back to their “homeland” once they were no longer needed so the state and industry could offload the costs of labour

reproduction onto African women (Steinbrink, 2010, pg. 38).

It is obvious that such migration patterns disincentivise the training of a skilled workforce that could market its skills, and thereby any economic mobility or stability for the migrant worker. It was in this time that economic cracks started to appear in the structure, as the balance between production and consumption was being warped too heavily towards a minority's luxury needs and foreign sources of labour had started to push back. Political instability simultaneously caused security to decline and states of emergency were declared in 1985 and 1986 to deal with unrest from angry groups with various causes (“State of Emergency in the mid-1980's”, n.d.). Mining houses were quick to react to the

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shifting realities on the ground, as they were perhaps in the best position to notice and address the needs and demands of the labour market.

There were many instances of friction with mining houses seeking to make the economy more efficient, often against the interests of migrant workers that comprised the vast majority of workers in mines by the 1980's, as well as with the government of the National Party which was mandated to enact rigid racial divisions in the economy. Indeed, there was both political and economic opposition to the order of Apartheid. Both labour organizations, which held strikes and engaged migrant workers in their living spaces, and the ANC which worked domestically and internationally in exile to pressure the state to end Apartheid, were struggling for migrants. In response, the state engaged in many well documented abuses of opposition members across the 80's. Union members or members of banned political parties such as the SACP were targeted, using the SADF abroad while domestically police forces kidnapped political dissidents and violently suppressed demonstrations (Baines, 2008, pg. 215).

The Apartheid state was notorious for its use of geography to maintain the oppressive conditions of its economy. By carving various regions out of Indigenous territories and creating the Bantustan system, the state allowed for many workers from South Africa to be classified as foreign and therefor not eligible for certain cost-incurring benefits, such as home ownership (Crush and James, pg. 305). Given these violent divisions between a wide selection of socio-economic institutions and political organizations,

migrant workers found themselves in the middle of a clash of interests, and they were also rarely unified in their decisions or actions as a group.

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single social location, and so homogenizes them and their interests. Even a cursory glance at the history of migrant labour in South Africa shows a diverse and divergent list of races, classes, cultures and interests at play. Near the end of Apartheid, the IFP was popular in certain areas of the country, and its members were capable of visiting violence upon unionists and ANC members. Several massacres occurred in the turbulence of the transitionary period, including the infamous attack at Boipatong (Simpson, 2012, pg. 7). Even on the worksite mining houses were able to exploit the different interests of migrant workers through a system of promotions and other benefits, such as house ownership. This was based on the category of migrant, domestic or international, including Bantustans (Crush and James, 1991, pg. 306). The ability of the mining houses to achieve this segmentation of labour was dependent on the state's good graces. It is likely that the dangers posed by the state to organizing labour within the barracks was a strong disincentive to many workers thinking about opposing them. Mining houses sought to internalize at least some labour reproduction among the small portion of skilled African labour by letting them purchase homes. The state was pushing back and trying to appease the white unions who demanded a racial monopoly on good-paying skilled employment (Crush and James, 1991, pg. 304). Ironically, this was also influenced by the increasingly violent labour unrest in the barracks that required so much state intervention from police and army in the first place by maintaining the existing conditions that caused it.

International pressure from the newly-independent surrounding states, combined with market frictions in the form of sanctions, made the circular migration system (and Apartheid in general) untenable. One of the main reasons identified during the transitionary period for the economic malaise in the country was the great housing market imbalance.

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Housing and permanent settlement in the form of urbanization was seen at the time as the obvious counter to circular migration and the instability and unrest it generated, even by migrant workers themselves (Ibid., pg. 308). As a reflection of this, much of the literature and indeed much effort from the state and NGOs was centred around housing issues and development. It was natural for the ANC and its allies in the labour movement to develop policies around housing that represented the interests of labour in keeping with the Freedom Charter's demands (African National Congress, 1955). What follows is a closer look at the actions of labour and political representatives of that section of migrant workers in opposition to the interests of mining houses, the state, and the armed forces.

Actions and relations of labour organizations

By the late 1980's, a wide variety of organizational tactics had been employed by those opposed to the Apartheid regime, from violence to pacifism to strikes, and a wide variety of organizations had taken part. Of interest to this paper is the actions of the ANC as the political wing, and COSATU as the labour wing, of migrant labour interests. It is important to focus on these organizations, not only due to their historical importance in the struggle against Apartheid but also their grassroots location within society which gave them a unique opportunity to envision solutions. Below is a quick summary of the ANC,

COSATU, and their affiliates in the end stages of Apartheid.

The ANC by the late 80's had been involved in a low-level civil war with the Apartheid state for decades, with a fully-fledged armed group called Umkhonto We Sizwe [MK] that had support from the independent surrounding states (Mutomi, 1994, pg. 1). On

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the labour front, there was increased strike activity in the mines and other industries as workers tired of poor conditions. The NUM had begun targeting workers within the hostel-barracks that had been promoted by the mining houses, which precipitated the push for segregated housing for higher-skilled Africans and further homogenized the socio-political makeup of the workers barracks. Natrass shows above that while NUM may have led an ultimately doomed gold-sector strike in 1987, the resulting crackdown on workers was manipulated in such a way as to increase overall employment. Wages suffered, and so there were more potential members for the future. It was these sorts of solutions that were the result of such organizations' location among migrant workers themselves, as this

perspective gave them better capacity to react even to their own missteps. Even circular migration was not just a consequence of state policy. The economic environment plays an important role, where a huge labour surplus and wage dependency in the rural homelands had allowed mining houses to continue employing people who were largely opposed to them (Crush, 1986, pg. 164).

In this context, the ANC and COSATU alongside the SACP, which had generally been allied to the ANC throughout the struggle, developed policies and strategies that would alleviate the ills of Apartheid as they saw them. One of the fundamental policies developed at the end of Apartheid with the support of unions, to address the flagging economy and housing inequality, was the Reconstruction and Development Plan [RDP] (Marais, 2011, pg. 78). It is clear that mining houses had also recognized the need in their workforce for economic redistribution and had taken steps to provide more permanent housing and break up circular migration. However, these actions were aimed at diminishing the capacity of labour to organize resistance to their other activities in political and social

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spheres. What was being proposed by the opposition alliance was, in contrast, an attempt to address the economic sluggishness of Apartheid's inequality through the direct

redistribution via the state of goods, skills, and other structural foundations of the economy, particularly housing (Ibid., pg. 78). The plan was to radically change the structure of the whole regime, not just some actors. In providing a forward-thinking plan, designed to bring South Africa into the international community both politically and economically using a development-oriented state, the alliance proved that they had a grasp on the needs and desires of the majority of migrant workers and were prepared to deliver. This was also a way for the Alliance to address the asymmetry of power that was sure to be left over after Apartheid.

Shifting arrangements of actors at end of Apartheid

During the transitionary period between 1990 and 1994 the ideals of the RDP fell under attack by the global community, particularly on economic grounds (Ibid., pg. 100). Policies from gold-sector mining houses to keep profit margins high and cost of product affordable on the international market, realistically having begun in the 1980's, had quite the opposite of a redistributive effect in the economy. By manipulating the state's tax code, mining houses had found a way to stay competitive internationally, extremely important given that domestic consumption of valuable metals was obviously minimal for the poor majority. This would have also left the state during transition in a deficit of funding, unable to effectively plan service provision and development projects in the country while having to hound companies for revenue.

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The ANC was also dramatically influenced by the pressures of the Apartheid state and international community to moderate its plans for of economic redistribution in favour of more neoliberal attitudes. This was evident in the unveiling of a new economic plan to replace RDP that had been developed almost entirely without COSATU and SACP, the ironically or insultingly named Growth, Employment and Redistribution [GEAR] plan (Ibid., pg. 112). GEAR allowed for a large number of mining houses to move their assets abroad and capped tax revenue at 25% of GDP, further hampering the state's coffers from lost revenue and lost influence over the no-longer domestic companies, nailing the RDP's coffin shut. The response from the ANC's allies was relatively weak on action, and they still remained part of the tri-partite government even though there was a great anger felt among the rank and file (Ibid., pg. 112).

The police and army were essentially dissolved and reconstituted during the transition, and no commanders or ranking officers were ever tried for their roles in the crimes of Apartheid (Baines, 2008, pg. 220), even as the violence ramped up in this period with the tacit consent of the authorities. The army and police were de-racialized, enlistment was opened to the public, and their names were changed to the South African National Defence Force [SANDF] and the South African Police Service [SAPS].

As Apartheid came to a close the consequences of circular migration were at the forefront of economic efforts in the country, and organizations within migrant labour communities were prepared to address the legacy that was sure to follow Apartheid's end. Housing needed dramatic development in order to sever the dual cyclical effects of

industrial hostel migration and rural dependance on remittances that served to reinforce the poverty of African migrant workers. Mining houses were able to sculpt the economy to

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their liking, and as the old Apartheid autocrats fell away to the democratic idealists of the Alliance, the mining houses were able to make their move with the support of the

international political community to pressure the RDP out of existence (Marais, 2011, pg. 106).

It is important to remember that throughout this period there was inter-African and inter-migrant worker violence between opposing groups within these communities. Migrant agency does not mean that every migrant holds the same vision for the future in mind. With the blind-eye of the armed forces and police, certain groups such as the IFP were able to exploit the security vacuum of the transition to engage in violent activities, as a result of new found agency (Simpson, 2012, pg. 7). The unrest divided the foundations of the new state, especially the membership and executive of the labour organizations that joined COSATU, and will figure heavily in the following chapters. This recurring process of labour division, opposition and conflict is the impetus for the study.

The more things change : migrant labour regimes in South Africa from apartheid to today