François Hollande, chef de guerre?
A neoclassical realist approach to France’s military intervention in Mali
Graduate School of Social Sciences
Our Changing Global Economic and Security Order after the Crisis Supervisor: G. Underhill 31 March 2016 Hanna Smit 6050700 / hannasmit90@gmail.com
LIST OF CONTENTS
1. Introduction ...0
2. Literature Review ...6
3. Theoretical Framework ...16
4. A Historical Background of France's Africa Policy...Fout!Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd. 5. Case Study: France's response to the Northern Mali Crisis . ...45
6. Conclusion...54 Bibliography...55 Appendix ...65
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AU African Union
CAE Central African Empire CAR Central African Republic
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DOM-‐TOM Départements d’Oûtre-‐Mêr – Territoires d’Oûtre-‐Mêr DV dependent variable
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EU European Union
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy FPE Foreign Policy Executive (Kitchen NCR) IDV independent variable
IV intervening variable
MNLA Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
RECAMP Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix [Reinforcement of African peacekeepers capacities]
UN United Nations
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNSC United Nations Security Council
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades international peacekeeping has experienced some major transformations. The changing international environment after the end of the Cold War and thereafter in a post-‐9/11 world has led to an increasingly complex security environment, which has forced states to adapt to a new approach to international crisis management that takes into account non-‐traditional and transnational security threats. The aftermath of the Arab spring resulted in a significant increase of security threats on Europe’s southern borders, the so-‐called ‘arc of instability’, which stretches from North Africa and the Sahel region to the Levant, the Horn of Africa and the Persian Gulf.2 Even though these security threats affect the entire European community, there is a strong imbalance when it comes to external crisis management (CSS, 2013). While the fight against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq currently attracts a lot of attention, it is important to bear in mind that the African continent hosts the greatest number of multinational peace operations and twice as many uniformed peacekeepers as a decade before. The crises in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Somalia and South Sudan led to the deployment of eight new peace operations in 2013 and four peace operations in 2014 (SIPRI, 2014b: 99).3
Despite the notion of African solutions for African problems, which emerged after a number of disastrous events in the 1990s as a result of failed Western crisis management, in particular the Rwandan genocide in 1994, there is one state in particular that has placed itself at the center stage of crisis management in Africa: France. The diverging strategic outlooks of EU member states regarding their willingness to participate in international military interventions is a great obstacle for an efficient security cooperation between the member states of the European Union (EU). Efforts to build an efficient Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to share the military burden have not led to the desired outcome due to, among other things, the
2 Zie figuur X
3 In 2013 four new peace operations took place in Mali: AFISMA (Jointly led by AU & ECOWAS); MINUSMA; EUTM Mali and
Operation Serval (French-‐led). Three peace operations were deployed to the CAR: MISCA (AU-‐led), Operation Sangaris (French-‐led) and BINUCA (UN-‐led). The eighth operation took place in Somalia: UNSOM. In 2014 the EU deployed a mission in CAR (EUFOR RCA) and Mali (EUCAP Mali Sahel). France deployed a military operation spread over the Sahel region (Operation Barkhane). In 2015 the EU launched a CSDP mission in CAR (EUMAM RCA). (SIPRI, 2014: 101; 2015)
fact that states continue to pursue their own national interests. Cooperation among states is therefore vulnerable to a collective action problem. The willingness of states to intervene in conflict areas depends on a broad range of factors, including the military capabilities, strategic cultures, the availability of alternative responses, the degree of domestic constraints and, last but not least, the perception of the level-‐of-‐threat to the national interests. Even though the normative rationales are widespread in the political discourse, economic and strategic rationales mostly take the upper hand (Tardy, 2012). France and the UK are known for their positive attitude towards international military interventions while Germany, a global economic power, is more sceptical towards the use of force. This phenomenon is also illustrated by the national defence budgets, which are significantly larger in France and the UK than in other European member states (SIPRI, 2015: 2).5
France has a long-‐established tradition of military intervention, especially on the African continent. Since the fall of its colonial empire, France has been the most active external military power. The accusations for neo-‐colonial practices and the changing international environment in the 1990s led to a number of major reforms in France’s Africa policy, including the promise of a definitive break with la Françafrique (the network of formal and informal interests that was left behind after the fall of the colonial empire), of which the military presence in the former pré carré (the exclusive sphere of influence in West and Central Africa), was the most important pillar. When François Hollande became president of France in 2012 he too promised a definite break with the traditional Franco-‐African relations and signalled a hands-‐off policy on former colonies (Hollande, 2013). The renewed Africa policies and Hollande’s focus on new partnership with Anglophone and Lusophone states outside of the former pré carré appeared to be an actual (attempt to) break with the traditional Franco-‐African relations. Along with the cuts in the defence budget (as a response to the Eurozone’s economic crisis), the promotion of multilateralism and Hollande’s reputation of being indecisive and timid on domestic affairs, he surprised the French public and the international community when he turned out to be, or at least acted like, a true chef de guerre.8 In January 2013 he sent 3,500 troops to Mali (Operation Serval) and in
5 France and the UK rank #5 and #6 respectively when it comes to the world’s military expenditure.
8 Under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s military footprint on the African continent had slightly been reduced.
Sarkozy appointed more strategic importance to the Gulf region, which is illustrated by the opening of the first permanent military basis in Abu Dhabi in 2009.
December later that year he deployed 900 troops to the Central African Republic (CAR) (Operation Sangaris). In August 2014 Operation Serval came to an end to be replaced with Operation Barkhane, a large-‐scale French-‐led counter-‐terrorism operation spread over Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso (also known as the G5) to offer an efficient and durable solution for the transnational aspect of the non-‐traditional security threats, for which a regional response is required. This paper seeks to analyse the remarkable military comeback of the French army on the African continent shortly after Hollande pledged that France would cease to meddle in Africa’s affairs and that the continent should start to take charge of its own security. To this end, the following research question has been formulated:
What explains France’s expanding military presence on the African continent under the presidency of François Hollande?
The conventional wisdom in the literature suggests that the influence of the French identity and the colonial legacy are determinant for the decisions made by governing elites on military policy in Africa. This paper acknowledges that French foreign policy in particular is hard to explain without including its foreign policy of grandeur, based on ideational factors such as exceptionalism, nationalism and Republican values. However, it does argue that explanations for French interventionism in Africa under President Hollande cannot solely rely on constructivist ideational explanations. Structural realist explanations that suggest that military involvement is a means to advance or defend the national interests and thus ultimately a means for a state to advance its relative power in the international system, needs to be taken into account.
This paper argues that a broad range of factors, including national interests, universal values, strategic culture and responsibilities play an important role in French external action, which implies that both realist explanations as well as constructivist ideational explanations have to be taken into account to provide a comprehensive explanation for France’s military presence in Africa. The neoclassical realist approach proves that realist explanations on the one hand and constructivist ideational explanations on the other hand can be compatible, despite the fundamentally different views on international behavior and foreign policy. Since the predominant paradigm in this paper is realism, ideational factors are treated as intervening domestic variables
between systemic pressures and the foreign policy outcome instead of appointing them direct causal property. The neoclassical realist framework provides an integrative model of both systemic and domestic factors, including constructivist ideational factors at the domestic level, which makes it a useful tool of analysis for foreign policies with a broad explanatory reach. Especially for France this methodology is useful considering its unique foreign policies towards the African continent. Since the already abundant existing literature on the subject lacks a systematic analysis of France’s Africa policy within a neoclassical realist framework, it is here this study seeks to provide a (modest) contribution.
1.1 Case selection and methodology
France has a long-‐established tradition of military involvement on the African continent. Although it has decreased significantly since the changing international environment in the 1990s, its military presence has never really vanished. The current 3,100 prepositioned troops spread over four permanent military bases in Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti and Senegal demonstrate that France is still the major external military power on the continent.9 What indicates France’s expanding military presence under president Hollande were the state’s responses to the Northern Mali crisis and later that year to the humanitarian crisis in CAR in 2013.
This paper uses the neoclassical realist approach to provide a comprehensive explanation for France’s expanding military presence in Africa since 2013, by conducting a qualitative case study of France’s response to the crisis in Mali that broke out in 2012. The case study consists of an analysis of the decision-‐making process leading to France’s responses to the Northern Mali conflict. More specifically, it will analyse why France intervened in January 2013 and not earlier. The French response to the crisis in Northern Mali is a good case because it was the first French military intervention in Africa after President Hollande had said that African countries should be more responsible for their own security. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyse both military interventions. However, if it turns out that the neoclassical realist approach offers a good explanation for this case study, it could also be relevant and useful as a tool of analysis for the intervention in CAR.
9 For an up-‐to-‐date map of all the prepositioned French forces and permanent military bases on the African
In order to identify the origins and the impact of systemic and domestic factors on the decision-‐making process leading to the deployment of troops in Mali, it is important to employ an in-‐depth historical analysis of France’s Africa policy, which ought to explain why France’s current relation with the continent is unique and different than that of other former European colonial powers.11 A contextual background of François Hollande’s Africa policy and the domestic incentives and constraints he experienced in general should also provide a better understanding of the decision-‐making processes. Once the historical and contextual backgrounds are established, the applicability of the neoclassical realist framework will be tested through a comparative case study design with two distinct but complementary methods: Structured Focused Comparison (SFC) and Process Tracing (PT). These two methods ought to explore the commonalities across cases and capture the individual uniqueness within the cases. SFC is useful for observing differences between the different cases while the purpose of PT is to identify causal processes within the cases and between the variables (George & Bennett, 2005).
1.2 Motivations and outline
The fact that France has remained to be an important external power on the African continent, and that it has kept punching above its weight in the international system by maintaining its central role in international organisations, such as the UN Security Council (UNSC), is a remarkable phenomenon. The political discourse, in which a break with the past and the preference for multilateralism is regularly mentioned, offers a mixed picture of the reality, in which the opposite often appears to be the case. A situation of that kind occurred when President Hollande pledged not to meddle in Africa’s affairs, shortly before he launched two large-‐scale military operations in Mali and in CAR.
This study distinguishes itself from the existing literature on France’s Africa policy by applying a neoclassical realist framework, which will be outlined in the next chapter that also provides a review of the existing literature on France’s Africa policy. The third chapter will elaborate on the variables and causal mechanisms and hypotheses within
11 Historical analysis is a common method for neoclassical realists, who work with complex causal processes
this neoclassical realist framework. Thereafter, before conducting the case study, a historical and contextual background will be provided in order to fully understand the role of systemic and domestic pressures and in what way and to what extent these factors influenced the decision-‐making processes that led to the launch of Operation Serval in January 2013
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
As was indicated in the previous section, neither solely systemic factors nor solely constructivist ideational factors are able to provide a comprehensive theoretical explanation for France’s military policy on the African continent. The theory of this paper is constructed on the idea that the level of France’s military involvement depends on the level-‐of-‐threat posed by a crisis (in this case the crisis in Mali that started in 2012) on its national interests. However, domestic and constructivist ideational factors do play an intervening role in the causal link between the perceived level of threat and the level of military involvement. These complex and indirect causal links between systemic pressures and foreign policy outcomes are outlined in the neoclassical realist framework, which incorporates unit-‐level variables into a structural realist framework.
The next section provides a description of the origins of neoclassical realism and the reasons why it is a logical extension of structural realism. Thereafter an overview will be provided of the systemic and ideational explanations that are provided by the existing literature on France’s Africa policy since the 1960s.
2.1 Realist theories
The predominant paradigm in this paper – Realism – is a collection of assumptions that “suggest the main determinants of international conditions, and suggest a research agenda for further inquiry about International Relations. Thus realism provides guidance for where the truth can be found, but not the truth itself.” (Frankel, 1996: xiv-‐ xviii; Legro & Moravcsik, 199: 9; Van Evera, 1992:4).12 Robert Gilpin maintains that “Realism (…) is essentially a philosophical position; it is not a scientific theory that is subject to the test of falsifiability and, therefore, cannot be proved or disproved.” (Gilpin, 1996: 6).13 However, a number of testable theories have emerged from this
collection of assumptions, of which the most important are: classical realism, structural realism14 and neoclassical realism.15 The common ground of these theories can be found
12 The statement of Stephen van Evera about Realism as a paradigm is cited in Frankel, B.(1996), Realism:
Restatements and Renewal, xiii. The statement is also cited in Legro & Moravcsik (1999). Is Anybody still a realist?, 9.
13 The statement of Robert Gilpin about Realism as a paradigm is cited in Frankel, B. (1996), Realism:
Restatements and Renewal, xiii.
14 Structural realism is also known as neo-‐realism, based on the work of Kenneth Waltz. (1979). Another
important contributor to the structural realist school is John Mearsheimer who is known for his offensive realist views.
in their emphasis on states as power-‐ and security maximisers and on their self-‐reliance in the anarchic international system (Frankel, 1996: xiv-‐xviii; Gilpin, 1996: 6-‐8).16
The theories differ in their level-‐of-‐analysis17, their unit-‐of-‐analysis and their
method for explaining causality. Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics elaborates on the different levels-‐of-‐analysis: “System theories explain why different units behave similarly and, despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall within expected ranges. Conversely, theories at the unit level tell us why different units behave differently despite their similar placement in a system.” (Waltz, 1979: 72). This implies that structural realist theories treat states as “black boxes” and that a system-‐level-‐of-‐ analysis cannot explain variances in foreign policies of states that experience the same systemic imperatives.18 For this reason Waltz would deny that a structural realist approach is able to explain the motives behind a particular military intervention, which belongs to foreign policy, and not international politics. A number of scholars, including Randall Schweller, disagree on this point:
“(…) all self-described realists share the conviction that anarchy is a persistent condition that cannot be transcended, and that states will continue to struggle, as they have always done, for material capabilities, political influence, security, prestige, and other scarce material and social resources. Seen in this light, political realism is not only a predictive and explanatory theory about international politics but also a prescriptive theory of
15 The realist paradigm is influenced by the political thoughts of Thucidydes, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò
Macchiavelli.
16 The similarities between realist theories can be found in the following key realist assumptions. First of all,
the state – rather than individuals or international organisations -‐ is the most important and central actor in the anarchic international system: there is no supranational authority and states can only rely on themselves to safeguard their survival (self-‐help). In order to survive states seek to maximise their security and power, which can be a means for security or an end in itself. States strive to advance their national interests and are not reluctant to the use force if this leads them to more relative power. The distribution of power and security in the international system is a so-‐called “zero-‐sum” game, which means that an increase in power and/or security is always at the expense of others states; states seek relative power and not absolute power (Frankel, 1996: xiv-‐xviii; Gilpin, 1996: 6-‐8).
17 Kenneth Waltz distinguishes the level-‐of-‐analysis between three levels: 1. The individual – the behavior of
individuals is intertwined with the actions of states; 2. The state – state behaviour is influenced by its domestic structure; 3. The international system – state behaviour conforms to the power position in the anarchic system (Dyson, 2010: 97). This study distinguishes two levels-‐of-‐analysis: the unit-‐level, which comprises both the individual and the state, and the system-‐level for the international system.
18 Realist theories differ in their unit-‐of-‐analysis: whether they want to explain international politics or foreign
‘pragmatic’ foreign or external policy.” (Schweller & Wohlworth, 2000: 72; Schweller,
2003: 329).
Furthermore, Colin Dueck’s analysis on US interventions demonstrates that “because the international system is anarchic, states are forced to rely upon their own devices in order to survive. One of these devices is military intervention.” (Dueck, 2009: 140-‐141). Therefore, this study claims that the decisions to launch military interventions are influenced primarily by systemic pressures, despite the fact that structural realists argue that a system-‐level-‐analysis cannot explain foreign policies, including military interventions. Domestic politics have an influence on the exact form of the intervention, but cannot be seen as its primary cause. At the same time a system-‐level-‐of-‐analysis cannot explain foreign policies, including military interventions. A dichotomy between system-‐ and unit-‐level factors would provide a solution to offer a comprehensive explanation for France’s military involvement on the African continent. It is here where neoclassical realism, a term coined by Gideon Rose in 1998, serves as a logical extension, and not a replacement19, of the structural realist approach:
“It [neoclassical realism] explicitly incorporates both internal and external variables, updating and
systematising certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical.” (Rose, 1998: 146).
Thus, “the system is not determinative in the sense that it does not do state’s work for them.” (Rathbun, 2008: 305). Neo-‐‘classical’ realism embraces the role of human agency of chief policy-‐makers and replaces the Waltzian realist focus on international politics with a focus on foreign policy or specific historical events. By “bringing the state back in” it finds common ground with the classical realist approach.20 Brian Rathbun
19 Their work has also been called the “next generation of structural realism”. (Rathbun, 2008: 296).
20 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1948 and later editions). Other traditional (classical) realist works are E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919– 1939 (London: Macmillan, 1946) and Reinuld Niehbur and Carl von Clausewitz.
elaborates on the similarities with the structural realist approach and argues, “At their core, all neoclassical realists are structural realists as well. It is not what neoclassical realism is called but what it does. A rose by any other name is still a rose.” (Rathbun, 2008: 297). The emergence of the new realist approach is primarily based on the inability of structural realism to explain foreign policy. The purpose of neoclassical realists is to “explain variation in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints” (Taliaferro, 2009: 21).
2.2 The relevance of neoclassical realism
A general conception of unit-‐level variables associated with neoclassical realism is that they should only be added to structural-‐systemic theories when state behavior deviates from the expected outcome (Schweller, 2003: 346).21 This condition is problematic for the analysis of French military policy in Africa, since structural realist assumptions alone (without adding domestic factors) are able to explain France’s need to protect its national interests on the continent, which means that France’s behavior is not necessarily “dysfunctional” with regard to the systemic pressures. However, a structural realist explanation for France’s military policy would undermine its highly institutionalised and culturally embedded ideational factors, such as its exceptional role as the promoter of universal values and the Gaullist legacy of grandeur. These factors cannot be ignored in the case of French interventionism (Bourmaud, 2011: 44).
Jeffrey Taliaferro on the other hand claims that the framework is also applicable in case there is “little information about the optimal types of strategies states should pursue to respond to these constraints and incentives.” (2009: 283-‐284). Since for France the level-‐of-‐threat posed by the African crises to the national interests are unambiguous, an optimal policy response is less clear, and therefore it is problematic to determine dysfunctional behavior.22 For structural realists it is obvious that states react
However, classical realists explain international politics as a result of human nature, which means that their level-‐of-‐analysis is at the unit-‐level, whereas neoclassical realists treat systemic imperatives as the primary causal factor for state behavior. Thus, classical realism -‐ the theory of which it derived its name from -‐ is less relevant for this study.
21 “Rather than explaining merely surprising deviations from structural realist expectations, as Schweller
suggests, we contend that it is a useful approach for understanding foreign policy more generally.” Taliaferro, 2009: 283-‐284)
22 The continuation of major military involvement could annoy African partners who are tired of France’s
influence on the continent and revitalise neocolonial accusations. Also, military involvement in another case as the Rwandan genocide would be catastrophic for France’s reputation, which means that the launch of
when the national interests are at stake. However, if systemic imperatives provide unclear information about the optimal response, it is up to foreign policymakers to choose the patterns and shape the nature of the response (Kitchen, 2010: 133).
It is here that the neoclassical realist framework offers a broad theoretical explanatory range. First, it explains why states should react (systemic pressures) and second, it incorporates intervening domestic factors to explain how the eventual response is formed. Accordingly, anarchy is a “permissive condition, rather than an independent causal force” and domestic factors “serve as an opaque filter through which systemic imperatives are filtered.” (Taliaferro, 2009: 7; Kitchen, 2010: 133; Callan, 2011: 17)
Critics and responses
Neoclassical realism is often criticised by non-‐realist scholars who charge the incorporation of domestic and ideational variables as a form of reductionism. However, as is stated in the previous section, neoclassical realists do not simply add variables at the unit-‐level to fill a gap in the anomalies of structural realism. The ideational and domestic factors are merely a guideline to understand how states respond to international constraints, and are not treated as having direct causal property (Rathbun, 2008; Taliaferro, 2009). A second charge is that neoclassical realists undermine the theoretical core of the realist approach, which is that states act rationally in pursuit of their intended goals (Vasquez, 1997; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999). This notion of state rationality as a key realist assumption is argued ungrounded. Not all realists view states as rational actors, including Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. This assumption should therefore not be treated as an essential tenet of the realist paradigm (Taliaferro, 2009: 22). Brian Rathbun explains that “structural realism argues that the system constraints but does not determine state action and where foreign policy departs from what would be ideal behavior given a state’s structural position, domestic politics and ideas are generally the cause.” (2008: 294).23 For this reason neoclassical realism, that
unilateral military interventions should be reconsidered cautiously. Thus, a more multilateral approach and less the attitude of chef de guerre, could have been an alternative response. Why François Hollande chose for the role of chef de guerre can be explained by incorporating the intervening unit-‐level variables.
23 According to Rose, world leaders have to deal with the constraints of both international and domestic
politics, “but the same is always true of neorealism. Therefore, the incorporation of domestic politics and ideas in neorealism is not automatically theoretically inappropriate.” (Rose, 1998: 152). Also quoted in: (Rathbun, 2008: 306). Several neoclassical realists refer on this point to Jennifer Sterling-‐Folker’s felicitous phrase:
systematically incorporates a state’s internal characterics, is the logical and necessary extension of structural realism.
Furthermore, Legro and Moravcsik criticise the lack of predictive power and theoretical rigor that is caused by the inclusion of both systemic and domestic variables (1999: 27-‐34). However, parsimony must always be balanced against explanatory power, and it is there that neoclassical realism performs relatively well compared to other international relations theories (Taliaferro, 2001: 158). After all, “theoretical ‘degeneration’ [does not hinder] (…) our understanding of real-‐world phenomena.” (Taliaferro, 2001: 158). Finally, critics might argue that neoclassical realism violates the structural logic by incorporating unit-‐level variables, which makes it similar to a constructivist approach (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999: 21-‐25). Neoclassical realists reply to this argument by emphasising the major disagreements between constructivism and realism by arguing that despite embracing the influence of domestic and ideational factors on the foreign policy outcome, they maintain the causal primacy of structural variables and that it is their goal to demonstrate that “these constraints are real, even if they are not determinate”, which is the greatest challenge for neoclassical realism (Rathbun, 2008: 319).
When it comes to existing literature on France’s Africa policy since the fall of the colonial empire in the 1960s, and in particular on French interventionism on the continent, there is a lack of literature that embraces a neoclassical realist framework.24 It is there this study seeks to provide a (modest) contribution to the already abundant existing literature on the subject.
2.3 Academic literature on France’s Africa policy since 1960
“Actors are free to act as they wish, pursue any goal they desire, and to allow their interests and behaviors to be determined by the processes in which they are engaged. They are also free to die but it is the choices they have made vis-‐à vis themselves and others that determine that outcome, not anarchy itself” (Sterling-‐Folker: 1996: 19) in (Rathbun, 2008: 311; Chafer & Cumming, 2011: 17).
24 Apart from the study on Anglo-‐French security cooperation in Africa by Gordon Cumming and Tony Chafer,
the neoclassical realist approach has not (yet) been used to provide a comprehensive theoretical explanation for France’s Africa policy (Cumming & Chafer, 2011). Tony Chafer contributed a useful geopolitical analysis on François Hollande’s Africa policy, which is explained by France’s security, strategic and economic interests and the role of national imaginations held by governing elites on foreign policy outcomes (Chafer, 2014: 520). While this study is empirically useful, it cannot be considered as a blueprint for the neoclassical framework in this paper, since Chafer treated the domestic and systemic factors as equally important instead of appointing an intervening role to the domestic factors.
The uniqueness of France’s Africa policy and the remarkable continuity of France’s military interventions in Africa have been widely studied among both French and Anglophone scholars. For the sake of this study the literature will be divided into “systemic” explanations and “ideational” (domestic) explanations for France’s Africa policy.
Realist explanations
During the Cold War it was generally adopted among scholars that the continuity of the French military activity in Africa was part of a Gaullist grand strategy of global defense.25 President Charles De Gaulle, whose foreign policies were strongly influenced by humiliating military defeats in WW2, Indochina and Algeria, emphasised the necessity of France’s national independence and the importance of sub-‐Saharan Africa for France’s relative power in the international system.26 Realist explanations for France’s Africa policy are the vital strategic importance of the continent for France’s relative power in the international system and the threat of other external powers in its exclusive sphere of influence, either the communist threat during the Cold War or the increasing interests of the US, China and other emerging powers since the 1990s (Dabezies, 1979; Chaigneau, 1984: 20 & 2005: 126-‐7). However, ignoring the ideational explanations would lead to an incomprehensive explanation for the French interventionism on the African continent: “If it is cut off from its cultural and ideological pillars, France’s Africa policy simply cannot be understood”. (Bourmaud, 2011: 44).
Ideational explanations
The end of the Cold War resulted in a shift away from the realist tradition towards more liberal and ideational explanations for state behavior. The vital strategic importance of sub-‐Saharan Africa decreased significantly with the collapse of the Soviet Union and therefore the end of the “communist threat” in Africa. With the changing international
25 De Gaulle, the creator of the Fifth Republic, emphasised the necessity of France’s self-‐reliance when it
comes to its own security. His Africa strategy was part of a greater defence strategy based on three levels of priority: national defence, European defence and a global or “geopolitical” defence. The latter includes securitising French national interests in the overseas territories, also known as les Départements d’Outre Mêr / les Territoires d’Outre Mêr (DOM-‐TOM).
26 After all, France obtained a permanent seat in the UNSC in 1945 despite its significant decline of relative
power because of the strategic importance of the African continent. Furthermore, France’s nuclear deterrent is dependent on African resources. Without the existence of the deterrent France’s rank in the world would significantly drop.
security environment and a number of impactful events in the 1990s, including the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the conventional wisdom in the literature moved away from realist explanations towards ideational explanations.27 According to these scholars, explanations for the continuity in France’s military policy in Africa are to be found in France’s colonial legacy and the French identity, which is based on exceptionalism and republican values (Griffin, 2009: 56; Dumoulin, 1997: 10-‐19).28 The role of being responsible for global security and human rights, also known as the mission civilisatrice, contributes to the notion of grandeur and nourishes the French obsession for its rank in the international system compared to other states.29 This foreign policy of grandeur was implemented and actively promoted by Charles De Gaulle: “Toute ma vie, je me suis fait une certaine idée de la France. Le sentiment me l’inspire aussi bien que la raison. (…) Bref, à mon sens, la France ne peut être la France sans la grandeur.” (De Gaulle, 1954: 7) 30 It is important to mention that the public debate from the 1990s was largely dominated the activist organisations Agir ici and Survie, which heavily criticised the foundations of France’s Africa policy and accused the government of neocolonial practices (keeping Francophone Africa economically and politically dependent) as a strategy to maintain the French grandeur and rayonnement (Griffin, 2009: 32).33 The work of Glaser, Smith and Verschave and their critique on la Françafrique, the formal and informal networks that were left behind after decolonisation, were politically biased but represented the general opinion of the controversial character of France’s African policy and shared common ground with more objective analyses regarding the influence of ideas rooted in
27 Most scholars, especially among French scholars, treat ideational factors as determinate for France’s Africa
Policy and refute the importance of systemic pressures. However, a number of scholars (for example Chipman, 1989: 6-‐30; Domergue, 1998: 118-‐119; Pascallon: 2004; Bourmaud: 2004. Quoted in Griffin, 2009: 45) do include both realist and ideational interests/ power elements (prestige; the exceptional role as promotor of universal values, including human rights; and strong personalities, as is exemplified by De Gaulle). Although providing useful empirical work and analyses, their explanations have become theoretically reductionist by treating domestic and systemic factors as equally important (they both have direct causal property).John Chipman for example argued that France’s Africa policy was based on both geopolitical / material power elements – France’s veto on the UNSC and its nuclear deterrent and the ideational power elements mentioned above (Chipman, 1989: 6-‐30).
28 This mind-‐set among political leaders finds its origins in the French Revolution and is still existent in a
modified form, 200 years later (Chafer, 2014: 524)
29 The events of the 1990s and the increasing interest in humanitarianism also created an ambivalent attitude
of France’s mission civilsatrice in Africa (Omballa, 2004: 54-‐55). For this reason this study will not use the concept in the analysis of the military interventions under François Hollande’s.
30 Own translation: All my life I have had a certain idea of France. Both sentiments and reason inspire me (…) In
sum, France cannot be France without greatness.
