The EU
Organized Crime Threat Frame:
Assessing Externalization in OCTA
Rhetoric
By Sam Owens
Student IDNumber: 10862943
Word Count:18,051
Reader: Prof. Dr. Marieke de Goede
September 30, 2015
Table of Contents
Table of Contents I. Introduction 2 II. Theoretical Framework: Securitization “Both a Discourse and a Technology” 5 III. Making the Case for Europol: The Quintessential Security Professional 9 IV. Methodology: Framing Analysis 14 VI. The “(extraEU) Nationality of Organized Crime” Frame 18 6.1: The InternalExternal Dichotomizing Nationalities 27 6.2: The EU’s Tiered System of Othering Geopolitical versus Temporal Othering 29 VII. The “ExternallySourced Drugs” Frame 36 VIII. Conclusion 42I. Introduction
When considering the way in which the relevant EU agencies frame the threat of organized crime, there is, as I will explore, a discursive tendency to ‘ externalize’ this threat. I argue that the threat of organized crime is presented in such a way that overwhelmingly brings focus to its extraEuropean aspect or nature (Pastore, 2001: p. 2). Consider the following excerpt from a joint report published by Europol, Eurojust, and FRONTEX , identifying and assessing the nature of threats to EU internal security:
“Most threats to the internal security of the EU either originate outside Europe[emphasis original] or have a clear nexus to the other parts of the world. All heroin andcocaine consumed in Europe, for example, is trafficked here from a different continent. So, too, in the case of the estimated 900,000 illegal migrants entering the EU
each year, while Colombian, Nigerian, Russian, Albanian, Turkish, and othernon-EU groups have important roles
in organised crime activity in the region [all italics emphasis added].” (Europol, et. al, 2010: p. 3)
There are many problematic elements at play in the excerpt above. Namely, the boldly emphasized statement asserting a nonEuropean nature of most security threats embodies this notion of ‘externalization’ which I wish to explore. Additionally, drawing attention to the extraEU origin of certain narcotics as an exemplifier of this externalization is of particular interest when trying to understand the ways in which such threats might be subjected to such externalization. What is more, the mention of a host of nonEU nationalities in affiliation with organized crime (OC) points toward the fact that the threat of organized crime in the EU is largely framed as a domain of the “extraEU national”. Furthermore, we can see a breadth of threats of different nature, congregated within this one excerpt. What is noted here is an emergent nexus of threats, becoming discursively interassociated with one another. Lastly, and in reference to the authoring agencies that published the report, we can note that Europol enjoys an enhanced level of cooperation with other relevant ‘security elites’.
These problematic elements draw on central research question in which I seek to answer: Is the discourse surrounding EU organized crime one which can be characterized predominantly by externalizing language, one which ultimately underpinned by pervasive threat construction toward irregularly moving people? The concept of criminality is quite a broad and is
highly inclusive in the field of security of threats. That being said, the agencies tasked with managing the crime problem in the EU are afforded much flexibility in defining the what, how and who is of threat.
As we can see in the opening excerpt, there is a tendency to cluster several security threats together. This pervasive externalization in EU security discourses, suggests that one threat is clustered and interwoven with a particular major threat category: irregular movement of people. However, first let me momentarily digress, and discuss my case for the terminologic application of “the irregular movement of people” (IMP), rather than merely “migration”. I opt to use IMP because I believe it allows for a better understanding of the broader and increasingly complex picture that is IMP in Europe. IMP, is not synonymous with migration, although migration is a subcategory of IMP, as are asylumseekers/refugees, and human trafficking. The primary reason for which I see relevance in the use of IMP, in lieu of migration, is that it is in fact, an allencompassing and therefore accurate label. Take for example the scholarship pertaining to the the securitization of migration, or as some have titled it the “war on migration” (Léonard, 2010). What such a title does not lend proper attention to is the fact that it is not only migrants that are adversely affected (targeted) by the security discourse on migration, but also other ‘irregularly moving persons’, such as asylumseekers or human trafficking victims. Thus by employing this terminology, I hope to be better equipped to analyze the exact scope of the security discourse constructed around the topic of IMP.
The “spillover” of securitization from migration to asylumseekers, shows a nexus, or continuum between the two as security threats. Such nexi or continua stemming from migration, are nothing new or exceptional; in fact many EU security studies scholars have put forth similar concepts. Such examples would be the crimeterror nexus (Makarenko & Mesquita, 2014);
securitymigration nexus (Karyotis, 2007); crimemigration nexus (Leonard, 2011: 232); and
crimeterror continuum (Makarenko, 2004). These largely overlapping concepts can be attributed to what Didier Bigo (2002) refers to as the “professionals of security” (see also, Karyotis, 2007). Bigo (Ibid) posits that the professionals or agencies tasked with security management in the EU, are keenly interested in advancing their own agendas as a means to propagate both selfrelevance and attract other forms of capital (social, political, budgetary), such as enhanced transnational cooperation with national level security actors.
The concept of security professionals helps explain why migration, as a contentious and increasingly prominent issue, has attracted the attention of many security agencies at the EUlevel. These security professionals have taken it upon themselves to establish a.) why
migration or IMP is of relevance or concern for the European Union’s internal security in the first place; and b.) why their particular agency is of relevance or concern to the management of said threat, IMP. Furthermore, the various nexi/continua listed above, reveal two recurrent themes in constellation of threats to EU security: crime and migration
Europol, is one of the most prominent security professionals at the EU level, and is the chief agency for expertise on European crime, which it tackles primarily under the heading of “organized crime”. Organized crime, as presented by Europol , offers an idealistic point of analysis for understanding these emergent nexi of threats. In particular Europol addresses threats of IMP, drugtrafficking, cybercrime, counterfeiting and, at times, even terrorism through its organized crime discourse. Whereas past discourse analyses of migration security have focused more exclusively on the EU’s chief border management agency FRONTEX (Léonard, 2011: 234), I wish to make here the case for assessing the role of Europol in such discourses. The breadth of Europol’s scope and focus make it crucial in understanding how the security discourse of migration does not exist in singularity, but rather it is further, discursively interwoven or embedded into a host of other present threats to EU security.
By analyzing Europol and its threat frame of organized crime, I wish to expand upon security studies of the EU crime problem in two distinct ways. First by exploring the broad range of topics which are the referent object of speech acts within this frame of organized crime, I wish to explore the ways in which multiple topics inclusive in the organized crime threat are not only securitized, but also how they are externalized . Second, I wish to draw attention to the way which these externalizing ‘speech acts’, often diverge from reality in favor of highlighting the threat posed by nonEU nationals.
The question which I am ultimately seeking to answer is: Is the discourse surrounding EU organized crime one which can be characterized predominantly by externalizing language toward irregularly moving people? And, if and how threats are both securitized and externalized by Europol, in its threat frame of organized crime? I argue that there is a pervasive tendency to externalize the threat of organized crime (and all other accompanying threats), and this is manifested in the way which IMP is interwoven throughout Europol’s discourse on organized crime (OC).
This is problematic, primarily, for two key reasons. Firstly, in midst of what has been dubbed “Europe’s migration crisis”, it is becoming increasingly apparent that a reassessment of current terminology is in fact needed. That is to say, the very label of migration crisis, reflects a halftruth of the extant situation. With the mass exodus Syrian asylumseekers, fleeing their
imminent peril at the hands of the Islamic State (IS) and arriving by the thousands on the shores of Europe daily, labeling the problem as merely a “migration issue” is a blatant terminologic injustice and detracts from the urgency of their (the asylumseekers) situation. Secondly, it presents a skewed image that may deviate from the reality of things. Aside from IMP, which is inherently external, other threats in the OC frame, such as crime on the whole, drug production/trafficking and terrorism are not in fact exclusively originating from beyond Europe. In many cases, which I will demonstrate to be the case with drug trafficking, the externalizing tendency of Europol rhetoric not only reinforces xenophobic attitudes towards outsiders, but additionally mars the image of reality. By drawing from the key considerations of both the Parisian and Copenhagen School’s “securitization theory,” as well as threat construction and identity politics, I will deploy a framing analysis to analyze the discourse of Europol’s Organized Crime Threat Assessment series as my central case study.
II. Theoretical Framework: Securitization - “Both a
Discourse and a Technology”
“In Europe, this governmentality unfolds at the national as well as the European level, and it even has a transatlantic level. It strengthens international collaboration between the different bureaucracies, maintaining a rhetoric about the danger in any weakening of territorial and sovereign technologies while being less interested in practice in the control of territory than in the control of population.” -Bigo, 2002: 83
In the following section I will unpack the theory of securitization and the concept of identity to demonstrate how and why the work of Europol is an appropriate case study for an analysis of the externalization of IMP in the OCTA series using this theoretical lens. By discussing the theoretical approach of securitization, I seek to demonstrate how the concept of security is used to justify technologies of control, as mentioned in the above quote by Bigo. First I will trace the history of securitization theory and discuss the relevant terms associated with the theory before moving on to the discussion of identity and its relevant terms.
The theory of “securitization”, has experienced a noted schism into two prominent strands: the Copenhagen school and the Paris School (Léonard, 2011: 235), however both strands of securitization are relevant for my analysis of the organized crime threat frame, as this
theoretical approach can explain both the subject of my analysis (Europol’s OCTA series) and my methodology employed (framing analysis). The first of these two strands is the Copenhagen School of security studies, in which securitization theory finds its original roots.
The Copenhagen School is a midlevel constructivist framework and this strand of securitization posits that security, or rather the ‘need’ for it, is not static, but instead a process discursively constructed by the relevant power elites (Buzan, et. al, 1998: 24). The creation of security as a product of urgency and necessity is largely manifested through what the Copenhagen school terms “speech acts” (Buzan, et. al, 1998: 26). A speech act consists of the discursive presentation of political ‘text’ by the relevant elites to a targeted audience; “it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words, something is done” (Buzan, et. al, 1998: 26). The speech act identifies an ‘’existential threat” (ibid.: 22) to the “referent object” (ibid.: 23), which in turn justifies special action. Existential threats are not bound by a strict definition, but like security itself, can be viewed as social constructions and therefore can vary depending on the referent object. In the case study of this thesis, our existential threat can be identified as that which is characterized as external to the EU. I also use the definition of the referent object by Buzan et.al as “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival” (ibid: 36). In our case, the referent object is the EU, but more specifically the construction of an EU identity. The discursive presentation of these speech acts, the acceptance by the public (or other targeted audience), and the establishment of a security threat is the process that is known as “securitization”.
Securitization as a process is relevant for analysis because it invokes exceptional measures or policies (Buzan, et. al, 1998: 23). Whereas politicizing an issue brings it into the realm of political procedure and response; securitizing an issue grants the license to carry out measures that exceed and even defy the established norms of political procedure or conventional policy making. Essentially, the securitization of an issue functions like a trump card in a card game, appealing for all actions by any means necessary in the name of public safety. Securitization is often framed as the spearhead of stability at best and a necessary evil at worst. In methodology, the use of the Copenhagen School’s securitization as a lens is relevant because it helps identify the underlying logic that fuels the securitization of particular topics, such as immigration (Buzan, et al, 1998: 41). However, the political discourse is not the only relevant discourse when trying to understand securitization, the analysis must also be expanded to people and institutions that practice security.
I argue along the lines of the Parisian school that not only are speech acts themselves relevant when unpacking a security problem, but the “who” in security is equally important. In order to explain the security actorin this case, Europol I will use the the Paris School of security studies, and in particular the work of Didier Bigo. The Paris School is not as much concerned with the discourses of security politics, or the speech acts of which they are comprised, as it is with the securitizing practices which are employed by the security elite(s) in this process of securitization (Bigo, 2005; see also Léonard, 2011). Drawing from the Foucauldian principle of governmentality, Bigo identifies technologies of security, or rather “securitizing practices” as the central point of focus, in lieu of speech acts. Thus, while the unit of analysis in the Copenhagen strand is the “speech act,” in Bigo’s Parisian School, the unit of analysis is the “securitizing practice” (Léonard, 2011: 235). These securitizing practices are the cause of securitization, rather than the result (Bigo, 2002: 73). The “security professionals” that are responsible for these securitizing practices are agencies such as Interpol and Europol , whose mission scope and very existence is maintained by the need for security (Bigo, 2002).
I argue that these security professionals, the “managers of unease” (Bigo, 2002: 75), are the true propagators of the existentiality of security threats. According to Bigo, securitization does not stem from a significant increase in crime or terrorism, but rather securitization occurs when an environment is constructed as becoming increasingly insecure by security professionals via the constant calculation of risk and identification of threats. As their job is to determine what is or is not a threat, the security professionals are able to guide the security agenda, resulting in a “continuum of threats” (Bigo, 2002: 63). The various continua of security threats discussed illustrate how these resultant nexi of threats can occur. By creating an atmosphere of unease, security professionals are able to give legitimacy to their institutions and expand their territories of control. The practice of constructing threats can be identified as a “technology” of security professionals. Other technologies, or practices of securitization, can include (but are not limited to): surveillance systems, intelligence apparatuses or risk assessment reports (ibid). Bearing these in mind, Europol is an ideal subject for analysis when drawing from both the Paris and Copenhagen Schools of security studies.
Relating to my research question pertaining to externalization, when immigration is framed as a problem of security, security professionals, like Europol , give the impression that they are able to control and manage the problem. Immigration as a problem promotes the belief that in order to maintain security, the professionals must maintain the circulation of people, due to their “institutional knowledge” (Bigo, 2002: 74). In other words, immigration only becomes a
problem when institutions construct it as a problem in order to legitimize their work. The concept of immigration in relation to security has more to do with control than it does with protecting actual borders. This is especially clear in Europe after the creation of the Schengen zone, in which the internal borders of the EU were dissolved and presented as a zone of free movement of people. However, in much of the literature about the EU after Schengen, it is conveniently forgotten that many Europeans themselves are migrants (intraEU) and the Europe is not a homogeneous construction of people (Bigo, 2002: 80).
It is here that the construction of identity politics is relevant, because in order to understand the use of the word immigration, we must understand the concept of binary dichotomization. In order to build on fear and unease, an adversary must be identified first and this identification and classification of threats is a technology of securitization (Bigo, 2002: 81). By employing this technology of classification, differences are “generated” by othering (Diez, 2010: 320). When using the word “identity,” I am referring to it in a poststructuralist sense, meaning that it is a concept that is discursively constructed, unfixed, and understood through othering (Diez, 2010: 321).
Diez discusses the process of “othering”, drawing from the orientalistlens of identity politics (see also Said, 1977). Othering is concerned with how the self is constructed as a discursive identity, and posits that the self cannot exist without a counterpart “other”, as then there would be nothing from which to distinguish the determined self. Diez identifies two forms of othering occurring in contemporary Europe “geopolitical othering” (ibid: 328) and “temporal othering” (ibid: 325). Geopolitical othering is explained by dichotomous terms and an explicit sense of what is internal and what is external. Essentially, the geopolitical others can be described as places that have geographically never been considered a part of the European landmass, but may have some vested history with the continent because of proximity (i.e. Morocco). Thus geopolitical othering deals with a contrasted, stark form of othering, which is indeed dichotomous in ascertaining what is or is not Europe.
Temporal othering, on the other hand, is used to refer to the identity discourse constructed between Eastern and Western Europe (ibid: 327). The temporal aspect refers to the
mitteleuropa’s wartorn, nationalistic past, in which ‘’New Europe” is “Old Europe’s” other (Diez, 2010: 325). The ability of the EU to enact an order of peace and stability (even only if to achieve economic prosperity) that is all but a complete turnaround from past configurations of Europe, is indeed remarkable. This newly formed EU, a vanguard of integrationism, cooperation, and peace is often referred to as “New Europe”. However, when conflict erupted across the Balkans
in the 90s and early 2000s, it the was emergent peace across that region that brought into play the new, “New Europe” Central & Eastern Europe. It is Old Europe’s wartorn, nationalismladen past, or rather the fear of such a past repeating itself, in its essence that drives this temporal othering.
Both types of othering are useful to mention, because both types of othering can be identified in practices of security, as I will demonstrate in my analysis chapter. Although geopolitical othering is more common than temporal othering (Diez, 2010: 333), it is important to identify both types, because although temporal othering is more tacit and less aggressive, it is still divisive and undermines the concept of a single European identity.
By unpacking the theory of securitization and the concept of identity, I wish to identify both the practices of security and the logics that are used to justify these practices. More specifically, in the following sections, I hope to identify the ways in which security professionals, such as Europol, use the construction of European identity to justify exceptional security practices; by using externalizing discourse in their risk assessment reports in order to maintain (or rather, feign) control. In the following section I will briefly discuss Europol , the OCTA, and background history to explain why I use the institution for my case study and how their security technologies are fruitful for an analysis of the EU’s externalizing discourse
III. Making the Case for
Europol
: The Quintessential
Security Professional
Europol fits quite neatly into this concept of a security professional and in fact, the agency has been one cited by Bigo (2002: 71, 75) as fitting the mold for his notion of security professionals. By extending its range of security relevance into several fields, implemented through the use of a plurality of technologies, Europol has increasingly become a producer of security technologies through its development of an “intelligenceled” policing approach (Europol, 2013: 10).
The European Police Office, or Europol , presents itself as the primary law enforcement agency for the EU, marketing itself not only as the the center of expertise among European law enforcement agencies, but additionally as the EU’s hub for criminal information ( Europol , 2010: 3). The latter, which it considers one of its primary functions, is facilitated through what it refers
to as its ‘intelligenceled’ approach to policing ( Europol, 2010: 3). Intelligenceled policing is supported by the technologies of intelligencegathering and exchange of criminal information among European law enforcement agencies. Europol analyzes the data that it collects and presents its own interpretation of the analysis in the form of risk assessments or reports. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the licensing of intelligence measures is both a technological practice of security and one which is exceptional.
Because intelligence has traditionally been a domain of the national defense sector (military, but also more globalized agencies of exceptionalism such as the CIA), its incorporation into the arena of “domestic” law enforcement is indeed noteworthy. As Europol is now seen as the highest level of internal EU policing, their positioning as an intelligence center makes Europol’s activities interesting for an argument of securitization. Intelligence as a concept invokes the notion of power because it inherently represents the most privileged and classified echelon of information held by agencies, governments, or even the state. Applying the Parisian School’s theory of securitization to Europol, we can see that Europol acts as a security agency that not only seeks to ensure the security of the area it is in charge of policing, but simultaneously identifies and defines the meaning of security for the EU in the form of intelligence. The Parisian School’s governmentalitybased approach to security studies can be applied to Europol as a lens because this approach brings focus to the technologies implemented by security professionals in order to control the security environment.
Europol’s reliance on intelligence based tactics of policing can largely be traced to its intergovernmentalist nature and limitations. Founded by the European Council as the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) in 1993, the EDU marked the first real shift towards concerted international and intergovernmental cooperation as a united law enforcement agency across Europe (Europol, 2010: 3). Its more specialized beginnings in the drug subsector of law enforcement are testament to just how far the agency has come in expanding its scope of relevance and thus its fields of ‘expertise’. Europol was formally established as a standalone agency and the EU’s chief apparatus of law enforcement, under ArticleK3 of the Maastricht Treaty , in 1995 ( Europol , 2015: 1).
Since the days of its inception,Europol has never been equipped with any true ‘powers
of arrest’ ( Europol , 2015: 1) and Europol instead can be characterized by the capacity to merely assist or support nationallevel law enforcement agencies (ibid.). This void of competences needed to be filled somehow, and thus naturally lent itself to the creation of a niche for Europol ; one in which Europol could provide national agencies with what Europol determined to be
relevant information on the criminal groups or individuals which the nationallevel agencies were trying to combat. In turn, the law enforcement agencies within the individual member states, could adapt strategies based on the information or intelligence provided by Europol. Thus, despite Europol’s lack of certain other competences or practices typically reserved for law enforcement agencies (namely the power of arrest), Europol constructed and expanded its
raison d'être for this intelligenceled approach to law enforcement. Thus, we can now identify that Europol’s current prowess and prominence as a security professional likely emerged as a result of its original lack of competences. Now Europol’s power position as a security professional means that Europol has considerable clout as an agenda setter in European security politics.
The plurality of securitizing practices that rest within Europol’s framework lend themselves to the agency’s proficiency as an agenda setter. Much of Europol’s intelligence is obtained by its “Shared Information Exchange Network Application” or SIENA (Europol, 2015: 1). SIENA serves as an interface database of intelligence which can be submitted by the relevant agencies of the individual member states, as well as affiliated thirdparty agencies. Thus, SIENA is a security practice which largely facilitates the gathering and consolidation of intelligence for Europol.
Within SIENA, the two broader categories or threat frames in which Europol rest its mission scope are, “serious international crime” and “terrorism” ( Europol , 2010: 3). Indeed the former, which is discursively tackled in its Serious & Organised Crime Threat Assessment or SOCTA, formerly “OCTA” series, has comeas will be demonstrated in the analysis sectionto incorporate a plethora a crime threats. Despite the fact that Europol was initially formed to address the EU’s drug problem, Europol’s scope of influence has expanded to include IMP within the same frame of organized crime. This suggests that Europol has been proficient not only in expanding its scope of relevance, but also in consolidating threats under one banner or framework and thus contributing further to ambiguity of what may or may not be included within this threat frame of organized crime. The concept of “crime” functions as an idealistic banner into which security discourses can be coopted, because most security threats, in addition to being ‘securitized’, are also ‘criminalized’.
Though the OCTA is the key point of analysis for this paper, it is worth mentioning that it is not the only report currently in Europol’s repertoire. In addition, Europol publishes assessment reports addressing the threats of both terrorism or the TESAT report and cybercrime or the IOCTA report (Europol, 2013: 6). Such risk or threat assessments can also be identified as
technologies of security as their production is driven by the collection of intelligence. The continued production of these risk and threat assessments can be concretely defined as presentations of security over time, meaning that these risk assessment reports function as very neatly defined security discourse (and thus subject of analysis) of Europol.
Before I continue on to the methodology and analysis of Europol’s OCTA series, it is important to understand how the OCTA series was developed. Understanding the history of OCTA will reinforce my use of the theory of securitization, because I can demonstrate how Europol uses its assessment reports to anticipate threats. Europol’s Serious & Organized Crime Threat Assessment ( SOCTA) series, was preceded by the Organized Crime Situation report (OCS). In the early 90s, when organized crime came to the forefront of domestic security issues in Europe, the European Council responded by calling for the publication of an Organized Crime Situation report, which was based around compiled empirics, submitted by member states in an effort to help identify and take stock of emerging crime threats.
In 1994 the first annual OCS report was published, however the report was largely
constrained by staunch inconsistency among data submitted by the various member states, to the point that its integrity as a true ‘methodology’ was compromised (Van Duyne & Vander Beken, 2008: 273). Because the OCS report focused primarily on identifying present and past problems, it was seen as inefficient in helping Europol and member states effectively anticipate
organized criminal activity (Ibid.). During the Belgian Presidency in 1999 and 2000, it was proposed by the Swedish delegation, to alter the structure and setup of the OCS series, to one vested more in foresight (Van Duyne & vander Beken, 2008: 270). Such a report would then be utilized by Europol and the Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) in their creation of betterinformed policymaking formulations, and in proactively combating organized crime. The conclusions of the Hague Programme , reached by the European Council in 2004, ultimately became the basis around which this anticipatory model of organized crime reporting was drafted (ibid).
This new approach called for new terminology and methodology, in order to mitigate the shortcomings of the OCS series. The idea of a situation report was dropped and instead replaced with the concept of ‘threat assessment’ . On October 3, 2005 it was determined that from 2006 and on, the OCS report would be phased out, in favor of the new OCTA format (Van Duyne & vander Beken, 2008: 271). This new OCTAformat, was to be vested in intelligenceled policing and policy cycles ( ibid.). The notion of policy cycles means that the intelligence put forth in an anticipatory fashion by the OCTA, would then be redistributed among various police chiefs and other relevant EU policy makers in adopting “proactive rather than reactive” policy
measures against the threat of organized crime ( Europol, 2007: 3; see also Van Duyne & Becker, 2008: 277). As mentioned previously in my theoretical framework, Europol is able to guide the security agenda by classifying and identifying threats. As we can see from its history,
Europol’s production of these threat assessment reports promotes the image that Europol is able to identify threats before they even materialize.
Beginning in 2010, Europol added this new technology of policy cycles to its security resumé, with the OCTA series functioning as a cornerstone of these policy cycles. Europol
identifies four key steps in its process of policycycles as generated through the production of the SOCTA report. The first step is the publication of the SOCTA itself, and its subsequent presentation, to a multitude of elite audiences. These audiences include the Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF), and the Council of Justice & Home Affairs (JHA). The SOCTA, is assessed and received by the JHA (namely ‘the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security; or “COSI”) using the Multiannual Strategic Action Plans (MASPs) as a framework for setting priorities in crimefighting and implement the measures to do so.
This is facilitated through the designation of ‘operational action plans’ (OAPs). In turn these OAPs develop a European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), these EMPACT findings are manifested as longterm, multiannual projects. The EMPACT assessment and construction mechanism is a technology of these policycycles, creating a clearly defined and concise audience in the reception of an equally definitive discourse that is produced in the OCTA report. Thus, while the OCTA report is indeed also produced and made available for public consumption, it can be reasoned here that because of the primary audiences of distribution, that the OCTA as a discourse is one produced primarily for the “elites” of security. Lastly, the practice of implementing EMPACT projects based on the recommendations of
Europol, demonstrates the discursive processes of audience reception, acceptance and agenda setting, which is an important identification for an analysis of discourse.
Not only do these policy cycles allow us to envision relevant audiences of the OCTA discourse, they also show how Europol’s positioning as a security professional has expanded over time. In line with Bigo’s conceptualization of security professionals, we can see through the history of the risk assessment reports how Europol has expanded their role in the monitoring of security, and therefore reinforced their place as an EU institution. Now that I have established my choice of analysis, by demonstrating how Europol functions as a security professional, in the next chapter I will explain my methodology of framing analysis in my attempt to understand how Europol contributes to externalization.
IV. Methodology: Framing Analysis
Framing analysis is a wholly interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological approach, rather than one which is confined strictly to the field of security politics (Watson, 2012: 283). Framing analysis, which finds its roots in the broader constructivist school of thought, is concerned with how “schemata of interpretation” are constructed and communicated to wider audiences (Goffman, 1974: 21). Such ‘schemata of interpretation’ serve as the basis for what are known as “frames” (Pan & Kosicki, 1993: 56). A frame can be conceptualized as a “central or organizing idea or storyline that provides meaning to events related to that idea” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987: 143; see also Pan & Kosicki, 1993: 56). Thus at its essence, it can be suggested that framing is first and foremostly concerned with how discourses are constructed and presented to referent objects for further interpretation (Pan & Kosicki, 1993: 56; see also Goffman, 1974). The constructivist application of framing theory to analyses of security discourses bears a stark resemblance to that of the Copenhagen School’s “securitization theory”, since methodologically speaking, the Copenhagen School is chiefly concerned with discourse analysis, (Watson, 2012: 284). Indeed, framing analysis can be seen as a substrand of discourse analysis (Pan & Kosicki, 1993).
Because framing analysis is such a broad and multidisciplinary methodological approach, or a framework of a framework, I wish to briefly rationalize my reasoning for employing it in lieu of a more conventional discourse analysis. I put forth two primary reasons for choosing to employ a framing approach to methodology. First and foremostly, my analysis will draw heavily from a quantitative contentassessment based on counting the repetition (frequency of mentions) of certain keywords. I base this on Robert Entman’s principle of “magnitude” which he uses to help explain audience acceptance and resonance (discussed below). The second reason for opting to utilize a framing analysis, is the idea of “master frames” put forth by prominent framing scholars Snow & Benford (2000). Watson (2012: 285), further explains that the field of security studies, when analyzed through framing, can function as what is known as a “master frame” (see also Snow & Benford, 2000). Snow and Benford describe such master frames as “very broad in interpretive scope, inclusivity, flexibility and can incorporate a number of specific issue frames” (Snow & Benford, 2000: 619).
Bearing in mind this definition of master frames, I put forth the notion that organized crime, as discursively constructed and presented by Europol in its OCTA report, fits the bill for
this idea of master frames; and accordingly, I will operationalize it as such in my analysis. I posit that organized crime’s ability to encompass and subsequently warrant discussion of such a breadth of issues, in one neatly defined security discourse the OCTA report substantiates my claim that it can function as a master frame. This is line with a third and less prominent reason, that this concept of frames allows me a structure to better streamline, and divide my analyses by identifying the common themes, or frames present in the discourse.
In my following analysis, I argue along the lines that the conceptualization of securityand simultaneously that of insecurityis a social construction and not a fixed entity or state. Security is fluid and produced through discourse, therefore if the goal is to “understand” security, the discourse must be analyzed. When using the term “discourse,” I use the term to mean “a series of practices, representations, and interpretations through which different regimes of truth are reproduced” (Peoples & Vaughn, 2010: 65). This understanding of discourse is particularly useful when trying to unpack the construction of identity and the production of threats by a security actor.
Following Derrida as inspiration, I argue that when reading documents for analysis, the discourse is not only confined to what is said in written language, but there is also meaning assigned to “what is not” written or said (Peoples & Vaughn, 2010: 64). The usage of framing analyses for assessing security discourses is known as “threat construction” (specifically “threat framing”). Securitization theory too is unpacked around this process of “threat construction”. Cavelty states threat construction is the process “whereby particular agents develop specific interpretative schemas about what should be considered a threat or risk, how to respond to this threat, and who is responsible”, (Cavelty, 2008: 21). Thus framing analysis offers a compatible form of methodology when assessing security discourses and their relevant content. Particularly, the notion of different frames, or “interpretations” of the text allows me to more neatly streamline my analysis of the relevant text, by putting drawing on framing as a conceptual toolkit. I can break my points of analysis into three prominent frames of externalization.
What I am assessing in this paper is the threat frame of organized crime, as constructed in EU discourses, and more specifically, by Europol . I will demonstrate that this threat frame of organized crime in Europol rhetoric is one which acts as a convenient banner of collectivity among various threat categories. That is to say, as discussed in the introduction of this paper, the threat frame functions as a threat nexus bringing together a multitude of threats of different natures and artificially connects the dots between them. This in turn, is driven by Europol’s previously discussed need to assert its broad reaching relevance across the field of the EU’s
security. Additionally this threat frame of organized crime, as presented in OCTA discourse, is one which is largely externalizing in nature.
In particular I have identified three recurrent themes, or subframes found within the OCTA text, to which I will draw attention to. These three frames, which I term “frames of externalization”, are: i) the “international dimension” frame; ii) the “(extraEU) nationality of organized crime” frame; and, iii) the “externallysourced drugs” frame. Ultimately in attempting to both qualitatively and quantitatively assess the relevant content and thus externalizing nature of the OC threat frame, I will draw largely on what Entman (2004) says about “magnitude” in the framing process:
“The words that make up the frame can be distinguished from the rest of the news by their capacity to stimulate support or opposition to the sides in a political conflict. We can measure this capacity by
cultural resonance and magnitude….Magnitude taps the prominence and repetition of the framing
words and images. The more resonance and magnitude, the more likely the framing is to evoke similar thoughts and feelings in large portions of the audience.” (Entman, 2004: 6; emphasis original)
It can be deduced that prominence is concerned with the emphasis vested in certain keywords or phrasings, meaning that prominence can be conceptualized through my qualitative assessment of content. On the other hand, repetition is concerned with the frequency and reassertion with which such keywords or phrasing may be presented to audiences, and can therefore be identified through my quantitative assessment of key terms. Ultimately, by looking at the externalizing magnitude of various threat ‘subframes’ within the OC frame, we can identify subframes of externalization present in the text, and speculate on their “capacity to stimulate support or opposition” (Entman, 2004: 6).
In particular for my frames on nationality and drugs, I will perform a direct quantitative assessment for the keywords, by counting out and thus quantifying their repetition , and ultimately their magnitude, in the OCTA discourse on organized crime. Magnitude suggests that repetition can act as a mechanism of reinforcement in the presentation of security discourses. For the nationality subframe, I will compare several extant points of pressure. First I will count mentions of all 28 current member states, against extraEU nationalities mentioned. This functions as a means to quantitatively assess the directly internal and external pressures, between the nationalities which are linked to criminal activity in OCTA rhetoric. For my second
quantitative assessment of the nationalities of OC frame, I will compare mentions of the “EU15, +2” member states, against those of the A8, +3” member states. 1
While this may seem somewhat counterintuitive given the “internal” nature of these nationalities, I will draw from the conceptual lens of orientalism, namely the distinction between geopolitical and temporal othering (Diez, 2010), to help explain how externalizing nature of text pertaining to these ‘postenlargement’ EUnationals. In my process of searching for these words, I will using a computerbased query search in the individual documents, to accurately 2 count the number of mentions of such words, from editiontoedition of the OCTA report. I will count only the use of nationality in a direct denomyn context and only when such a word is used in a criminal context. By demonym, I mean in the adjective form (i.e. Italian, Spanish, Moroccan, Polish, etc.), when such nationallyidentifying language is used to directly assign national identity to individuals or groups. Thus, for example mention of the word “Italian”, from a sentences such as the following:
“...many human smugglers use the Italian coastline…”
would not be counted per my criteria. That is because it is referring to a geographical feature, rather than identifying an individual or group of persons. On the other hand, an example like the following statement, would aptly fit my applied rubric here:
“...Italian organized crime groups have become increasingly prominent in the intra-European heroin trade…”
This is because demonyms are inherently descriptors of nationality or ethnicity, and thus assign identity and, in certain cases, culpability to individuals or groups. It is not the geographical territories themselves which are adversely affected by such text, but rather the groups or individuals bound to both the identities and discourses constructed around such national descriptors (demonyms). One last note, when I say nationality, I largely refer to it in the Westphalian sense formally recognized nations of modern nationstates. There are a few exceptions to this, “nations” which are de jure stateless (i.e. Kurdish, Chechen or Palestinian). The consideration and inclusion of such words in my assessment is because of a.) the
1 The “EU15” is what some media analysts and scholars have used to term the preenlargement member states, the “+2”, refers to Cyprus and Malta who, unlike the “A8” (and their “+3” counterparts), were immediately incorporated into the EU’s free movement of labor acquis. 2 Query search here means a using the Google Chrome browser’s “command + f”, find feature. I use this computer based method because it allows for more accuracy than a long count by hand. In addition, the words yielded in my search results are scrutinized meticulously for context; for example, whether or not they actually associate the given nationality with criminal activity,.
specificity of identity carried by naming out such distinct ethnicities; b.) in recognition of the plight of such stateless in nations in their struggle for statehood. On the other hand regional language (i.e. West African, Eastern European or Central American, etc.) is also prominently found in OCTA text will not be considered because it is more ambiguous in assigning identity and does not offer as direct a point for comparison because there is no fixated level of politics or governance ascribed to most of these types of regions.
Finally, for my frame of externallysourced drugs, I will look at the prevalence of drugrelated terms that can be ‘directly’ attributed to extraEU origin against those which can be seen as produced in the EU (e.g. internallysourced drugs) by the own admission of OCTA rhetoric. For example, I will consider the prevalence (mentioncount) of cocaine and heroin, against that of MDMA/ecstasy. By comparing the recurrence of such drug terms, in contrast to the actuality of the situation presented using drug usage statistics within the EU, I aim to find if the prevalence of one drug, or drug category in favor of another, obscures the reality of an underlying drug problem in the EU. This is an attempt to reveal if Europol is in fact opting to capitalize on externalizing language (in lieu of shedding light on internal drug production or culpability), when assessing and describing the state of the illicit drug trade in the EU. As stated above, the rationale behind the quantitative assessment as such is Entman’s principle of
magnitude used in framing analyses.
Magnitude is vested not solely in the idea of repetition (of the keywords), but also in their
prominence. Therefore, I will also consider the contextual presentation of the text using paragraph and sentence as examples relating to my three outlined subframes of externalization, as is relevant in a traditional discourse analysis. This can be anything from a certain threat warranting its own subsection or chapter, whilst another is seemingly mentioned in passing; even if the the latter is a more present and relevant threat.
V. The “International Dimension” Frame
The first frame of externalization, which I wish to assess here, is what I term the “international dimension” frame. This frame could also be titled the “communities” frame, because such select terminology plays an equally prominent role in a discursive construction of the externallysourced threat constellation. This frame of the international dimension attempts to analyze the process of externalization in its most essentialist state. By providing examples of
how the OC threat frame is presented as external, I will highlight the ways in which threats are characterized or qualitatively assumed to be risks based on their affiliation (or level of affiliation) with, territories beyond the EU.
In contrast to my second frame pertaining to explicitly mentioned nationalities, the international dimension frame is concerned with the way in which an external identity is constructed for criminals or criminal activities, but in a more general sense, without the drawing on the mention of specific nationalities. Thus, a more direct dichotomy of “us” and “them” is invoked, using a geopolitical othering between the EU and thirdcountries (Diez, 2010). With that in mind, this frame will also consider the inclusion of dichotomous terms as part of my quantitative contentassessment.
The terminology of an ‘international dimension’ first makes appears in OCTA text in the inaugural 2006 edition of the report, where it is stated that this ‘international dimension’:
“...can be captured asinternational co-operation, between non-indigenous groups, or between an indigenous and a non-indigenous group, or as international operations carried out directly by an OC group” (Europol, 2006: 11; emphasis original).
Relating to my overarching research question, the use of the term international dimension matches up quite favorably with the way which Pastore describes this phenomenon of externalization, in which: “...the external (extraEuropean) aspect or dimension of each of them (security threats) is emphasised…”, (Pastore, 2001: 2). Thus this frame of the international dimension functions as an ideal point of departure for unpacking and understanding this concept of externalization in OCTA text.
The first point worth referencing is the mention of “international” cooperation between “indigenous” and “nonindigenous” criminal groups. This suggests that the context of “international” is in this instance being utilized to reference exchange between the EU internally, and beyondthe externalnonEU (indigenous/nonindigenous, in this case). Thus, for example this international dimension is exclusionary in that it does not allude by any means to international in the intraEU context; but rather it refers more distinctly to the international sense of the EU as a singular political entity, contrasted against external thirdstates.
It is important to consider such a contextual shift in the use of the term international. On one hand, it can be seen as a testament to European integrationist spirit; while on the other hand, it marks a discursive shift in linguistic terms that puts thirdcountry nationals at a distance
via externalization. Additionally, the use of terms such as ‘indigenous’ posed directly against antithetical counterparts as ‘nonindigenous’ are a blatant form of ‘othering’ and thus externalizing discourse. Europol furthers the qualitative threat status presented by this international component, by employing superlative terms of as can be seen with the following statement:
“The situation where a criminal group resorts to international operations, exploiting its presence in source, transit and destination countries, presents themost threatening feature” (Europol, 2006: 11; emphasis added)
Such superlative terms can also be seen here:
“...thehighest threat seems to be linked to non-indigenous criminal groups which aim at managing the distribution phase within the EU markets…” (Europol, 2006: 11; emphasis added)
What is problematic here is the description of this international dimension, in qualitative terms as a “most threatening feature.” This exact phrasing is again repeated in the 2007 OCTA report (Europol, 2007: 8), but is eventually abandoned and omitted from all subsequent editions. The recurrence of these externalizing themes is indeed the mark of discursive construction of such external threats as being inherently the most dangerous to the EU. This kind of texts underpins the notion that the most dangerous threats are in fact external in nature, or at the very least can be characterized by their strong linkages to the world beyond the ‘walls’ of the EU. The direct invocation of the word ‘threat’, especially when used in tandem with superlative terms, offers a clearcut example of securitizing language. These kind of speech acts thus establish themselves from the beginning of OCTA rhetoric, ensuring that the pervasive externalization of threats has taken root.
Within this international dimension frame, we can further break down the analysis into three recurrent themes or subframes in the text: i.) group structure/typology ; ii.) communities of reference; iii.) criminal hubs . The next three subsections of this chapter will outline the discursive inclusion of these frames into OCTA text, and highlight the externalizing nature which they attribute to OCTA report series.
Starting from the beginning in the 2006 edition of the OCTA, Europol attempts to assess the criminal groups active in Europe, based on their “structure”. Although in the 2006 this is done in the most essential of means (i.e. discussing hierarchy), the international dimension of these groups as discussed above, is still a prominent part of how they are assessed. Starting from the 2007 OCTA onward, an attempt to classify these OC group structures into “typologies” is introduced. In particular, four distinct group structures or ‘typologies’, are identified in the 2007 report i.) “oriented clusters”; ii.) “nonEU celllike criminal groups”; iii.) an “intermediary situation”; iv.) “loose networks”, ( Europol , 2007: p.910). Of particular note are the “ nonEU celllike criminal groups”, and the “intermediary situation”. Aside from the obvious implications in the term “nonEU”, these groups are characterized by their ability to be controlled from outside of the EU (ibid.). The intermediary situation on the other hand is described as the following:
“...when one or more criminal groups, mainly ethnically-based, try to exert influence over a non-integrated ethnic community residing in the EU.” (Europol, 2007: 9)
The most interesting aspect of this attempt to categorize different types of criminal groups is the emphasis placed on classifying these “group structures” or “typologies” in reference to their level of affiliation (or not), with the “extraEU”. The first emergence of such paradigmatic terms can be seen in the 2007 OCTA report in which t. Typology and group structure are used as overlapping concepts, both within and between the various editions of the report. It is interesting as these groups are yet again assessed and ‘graded’ based on their level of “Europeanness” on one end of the spectrum, and their “otherness” on the other end; with others being described as “most threatening”. Not only are these groups assessed on a European spectrum, but such groups are assessed on their level of affiliation with established diaspora communities of thirdcountry nationals throughout the EU.
The following text taken from the 2008 report exemplifies the prominence of such rhetoric in OCTA discourse:
“Another factor defining the groups’ strategic centre of gravity is to consider whether and how the groups hinge on anethnic community of reference to facilitate their criminal activities.” ( Europol, 2008: 13; emphasis added)
The 2009 OCTA on the other hand, which was the last edition to emphasize group structure or typology, attempts to put together a more purely methodological and process based assessment group structure. In this 2009 edition, groups are envisaged through the tactics which they employ to gain a foothold in EU society and assert the influence in the European Union. It is particular worth, to pay attention to the context of society, which I will return to shortly. Four “strategies” are identified as OC group structures: i.) VISO strategy ; ii.) INLE strategy; iii.) VILE strategy ; iv.) INSO strategy ; and, v.) ELLE strategy , ( Europol , 2009: p. 1415). All of these are described in rather vague terms, pertaining to their usage of ‘compliance’, ‘evasion’, ‘violence towards’ or ‘corruption’ or ‘influence’ of both law enforcement agencies and “society”. Particularly the INSO or “influence societies” strategy is the point of interest here. Society, is important because is an important part of dichotomous terms of othering in the text. Society, refers to EUsociety on the whole, or more specifically to the “indigenous” population. The juxtaposition of said communities, against society, helps to affirm that notion:
“...communities that are not integrated with the surrounding society.” (Europol, 2009: 15)
Thus, community (them) and society (us), can be seen in OCTA text, as antithetical counterparts. A dichotomous set, however this pair does is not suitable for being matched headtohead (mention count) in my quantitative assessment. This is due to the fact that the mention of society is used almost exclusively used in a context of victimization. Thus, greater magnitude of ‘society’ in the text, would thus mean more externalization, rather than less. The victimization of these societies is ascribed to not only these various organized crime groups, and the ‘strategies’ they employ; but as well to the “communities” which we have seen to be prominent in the quoted excerpts, most recently examined. Whereas these at these attempts at conceptualizing group structure are temporarily dropped from favor, for the 2011 OCTA report; the subframe of the “communities of reference” is one which is both present and pervasive throughout all editions of the OCTA. Furthermore as demonstrated in the subsequent section, I will show that it is one which ensnares a variety of other threats within the OCTA discourse.
Communities of Reference
As the text above has indicated significant populations of thirdcountry nationals, residing within the EU, figure prominently into facilitating domestic criminal activity.These “communities of reference” ( Europol, 2006: 20), as they are termed, present an idealistic means for the foreign OCGs to infiltrate the EU, establish roots, and embed themselves and their criminal ways within EUsociety, according to OCTA. Consider the following:
“The development of significant communities of third countries’ nationals can represent an opportunity for non-indigenous OC groups in their struggle to gain a stable foothold in the EU criminal markets while benefiting in full from their transnational links.” (Europol, 2006: 20)
What is problematic is that these communities are being directly presented to the audience here as a threat to public security and, in addition, as serving as a facilitator of criminal activity. Right here we see the quite a direct security continuum being constructed between IMP and criminal activity, since these communities are, in theory, exclusively comprised of irregularly moving persons. This sort of generalizing language ascribes criminal affiliation, not only to the individual migrant, or his (or her) family, but also to his (or her) entire community. Europol elaborates on that the emergence of such communities across the EU:
“...may unwittingly become the disguising background for the criminal group, because: ...a) The presence and movement of third country nationals becomes usual”. (Europol, 2006: 21)
And in addition:
“...this community can represent a pool from which new members [ of OCGs] can be recruited, because of, for instance, marginalisation, common cultural background or family ties.” (Europol, 2006: 21, bold text in parentheses added)
Here Europol is first stating that the mere normalization (societalacceptance) of thirdcountry nationals and their residency in the EU, inherently poses a criminal threat. Furthermore, suggesting that they serve as key recruiting grounds for OCGs, while saying nothing of that fashion about, EU‘society’, and its inhabitants, reaffirms the external nature of criminality in the text. In the most recent edition of the OCTA, the 2013 SOCTA report, “diaspora communities” were in fact discussed on the subheading of “crime enablers” ( Europol , 2013: 13). Such language is notable on one hand because it clearly configures the threat of these diaspora
