EU INFLUENCE IN
TRANSNISTRIA
An analysis of the ways in which the EU influences the conflict between Moldova and
Transnistria through the use of border policies and geopolitics
Daan Ackema
Bachelorthesis Geography, Environment and Planning (GPE) Nijmegen School of Management
Radboud University June, 2018
TITLE PAGE
Daan Ackema
Bachelorthesis Geography, Planning and Environmental Studies (GPE) Nijmegen School of Management
Radboud University June, 2018
Supervisor: Dr. O.T. Kramsch Student number: 4503996
Number of words main text: 20.567
Source cover picture: Nationalia (2014). Romania calls to "accelerate" Moldovan access to the EU while Transnistria turns again eyes to
Moscow. Retrieved from
ABSTRACT
Within the large spectrum of border research, developed over the last few decades, this thesis focuses on the conflict between Transnistria and Moldova. This subject was combined with the idea of European border practices, through which the Eu tries to extend its governmentality outside of the European Union. In extending its governmentality, the EU tries to create a safe borderland with countries that act like the European member states. This safety is an issue in the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria, which makes it an interesting case to focus this research on.
The goal of the thesis is to describe the ways in which the European Union influences the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria through the use of bordering policies and geopolitics. In focusing on this goal, the European Neighbourhood Policy, with the Eastern Partnership as part of this, will be analyzed. Also, regarding the goal of this research, there is a focus on post-colonialism and neo-imperialism as theories. This way, the thesis aims at contributing to knowledge on European geopolitics from a neo-imperialistic approach. For this goal, the case of Transnistria is interesting because it is a rather unknown region in Europe, especially in the western world. Besides that, it also is an area where the geopolitics of the EU and Russia meet.
To get a clear view on the theoretical concepts involved in border research that are relevant for this research, there was a focus on several forms of border research in the theoretical framework. These concepts are Europeanization, nationalism, bordering and border perception. These were discussed as a starting point for the rest of the theoretical framework. After that border
policies/practices and geopolitics are discussed. The most important definition in this is the following definition by Dittmer & Sharp (2014): “geopolitics refers to the theory and practice of politics at the global scale, with a specific emphasis on the geographies that both shape and result from that politics. In other words, it is more than just the study of global politics; it is the study of how geography is implicated in that politics.” This definition has been used throughout the thesis when referring to geopolitics. Subsequently, the subjects of post-colonialism and neo-imperialism are discussed, in which both definitions are derived from Ashcroft et al. (2007). Here
post-colonialism is understood to be “the study and analysis of European territorial conquests, the various institutions of European colonialisms, the discursive operations of empire, the subtleties of subject construction in colonial discourse and the resistance of those subjects, and, most
been used to describe neo-imperialism is as follows. The term neo-imperialism is increasingly being used instead of neo-colonialism: With neo-imperialism, there is a focus on the ongoing control over developing countries by globalized capitalist economies such as the United States and Western European Countries (Ashcroft et al., 2007).
To create a good framework for the research, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the current state of Transnistria are added to the theoretical framework. The European
Neighbourhood Policy is created to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security of both countries in the EU as the neighbouring countries. The EU implements this ENP through different bilateral agreements with the EU’s neighbouring countries. For the eastern neighbouring
countries, the EU has created the Eastern Partnership, a multilateral cooperation policy through which six eastern neighbouring countries can help each other by sharing best practices, with a helping hand from the EU.
It is hard to elaborate on the current state of affairs in Transnistria in a short abstract, but the inhabitants of Transnistria consist for a big part out of Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians. Most of the inhabitants identify more with Russia than with Moldova, which is part of the fact that they declared themselves independent. Besides this, the economy of Transnistria is not able to function on its own and needs a lot of support from Russia. Furthermore, in the official statements,
Transnistria says to have a working government and a fully functioning country in general but it was declared not free by The Freedom House (2018) for multiple reasons, for example the Russian support, but also the fact that there is little political competition.
Moving on to the methodology of the research. Desk research was used as a method for this thesis since desk research is the most applicable. Desk research is characterized by the use of existing material, the absence of direct contact and the material is used from a different
perspective than at the time of its production. This desk research was executed through extensive literature research. The data used are official EU documents used for the ENP and Eastern
Partnership, and articles written earlier by scholars. Furthermore, the focus will be on postcolonial discourse analysis and critical geopolitics.
In chapter four, the history of Transnistria and Moldova is discussed, in which it becomes clear why Transnistrian people identify with Russia whereas Moldovan people identify with the west. Throughout history, Transnistria has only belonged to Moldova since 1944, after which Moldova was under Soviet-Regime for a long time. Subsequently, the armed conflict that erupted after the
progress in the negotiations to come to a lasting settlement for the conflict. These negotiations are led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is an institution
consisting out of different countries around the world, including a lot of European countries. Since the countries themselves cannot come to a solution, the negotiations are now held in a 5+2 format with representatives of the conflict parties, Moldova and Transnistria, mediators from the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, and observers from the European Union and the United States (Neukirch, 2012). However, up to now, this also has not led to even a partly successful solution.
In analyzing the ENP and Eastern Partnership, the geopolitical goals of the EU become clear. In the general goals of the bilateral documents it is often repeated that the parties, EU and Moldova, want to move beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration (European Commission, 2004), want to deepen trade and economic relation (European Commission, 2004) and want to ensure constructive and effective policy dialogue regarding the Transnistria conflict (European External Action Service, 2018).
Moldova does get more involved with the EU, which means that the geopolitics behind these general goals work. However, the goals regarding Transnistria are less successful. In almost every document, the conflict is said to be one of the main goals and that it has high priority. But when it comes to actual policies, often only one point is dedicated to the conflict. This point then exists out of general comments like the goal to ensure constructive and effective policy dialogue. There are no concrete aims in the partnership programs. This contributes to the fact that conflict resolution has been stuck for years.
In focusing on geopolitical agenda’s, the influence of Russia became clear. Russia has a lot of influence on Transnistria since Transnistria is very dependent on Russian money and Russia still has military troops on the ground in Transnistria, ‘to keep the region safe’. This Russian influence ensures that Transnistria does not want to belong to Moldova and the EU and even prefers to belong to Russia. However, not one country, not even Russia, has recognized Transnistria as an independent country. This way, Russia plays a smart game, by supporting Transnistria whenever it is necessary, but at the same time agreeing with Europe in the negotiations. That way, Russia wants to keep the conflict going as long as possible, as it can then influence the region the most. This is a big reason as to why there is no progress in the settlement for the conflict.
colonial map. This is the basis for the analysis in this last chapter. Russia uses the conflict to influence both Moldovan and Transnistrian politics and does this in a very clever way. As a former Soviet state, Moldova is forced to maintain the links with Russia, although Moldova would rather become an EU member state and get free from its Soviet history. However, Moldova also does not want to give up Transnistria, which feels a deep link to Russia and is not interested in the EU. Transnistria shows real ‘colonized’ behaviour in the way that it still feels connected to Russia and would like to become part of Russia.
Lastly, the conflict is looked at from a European neo-imperialistic point of view. This perspective is based on an article by Borosz (2001), in which he describes the expansion of the EU to the east as a neo-imperialistic practice. He names this expansion the “Eastern Enlargement”. The expansion, Borosz argues, can be part of European politics to create a new imperium. With the EU trying to increase its governance in the Eastern Partnership countries, this can be seen as part of this European imperial program. Throughout the research, it becomes clear that this program succeeds in Moldova but definitely does not succeed in Transnistria.
It can be concluded that the gap between both sides of the Dniester seems to be too big to reach an easy settlement. Plus, the big western influences in Moldova and the big Russian influence in Transnistria makes it a conflict between the EU (and the US) on one side and Russia on the other side. A solution for such a conflict cannot be found through simple negotiations in OSCE-led sessions.
1. Introduction...1 1.1. Framework...1 1.2. Research goal...2 1.3. Research questions...2 1.4. Relevance...3 1.5. Thesis Outline...3 2. Theoretical Framework...5 2.1. Introduction...5 2.2. Border research...5
2.3. Border policies and geopolitics...8
2.4. European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership...9
2.5. Post-Colonialism and Neo-imperialism...11
2.6. De facto states and the current state of Transnistria...13
2.7. Conceptual Model...16 3. Methodology...18 3.1. Introduction...18 3.2. Research Strategy...18 3.3. Data processing...19 4. Transnistria...20 4.1. History...20 4.2. The Conflict...23
4.3. Afterwards – (lack of) progress since 1992...24
5. European Union policy regarding Moldova and Transnistria...30
5.1. Introduction...30
5.4. Analyzing geopolitics and border practices in partnership...44
5.5. The role of Russia...47
6. Post-colonialism and neo-imperialism in Transnistria...50
6.1. Russian post-colonialism...50
6.2. European neo-imperialism...53
7. Conclusion...57
1.
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Framework
On the 18th of November 2017, the Gura Bicului-Bychok bridge, which connects Moldova and the
de-facto state Transnistria, was opened for traffic after it was destructed during the armed conflict between the two sides in 1992 (OSCE, 2018). After a period of 25 years, this was the first sign of success after years of negotiations to create a settlement for the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria. As Ambassador Wolf Dietrich Heim said, “this is good news for the local population on both sides of the river. It opens a crucial civilian transportation artery, improves connectivity, can enhance trade, and helps to build confidence between the sides (OSCE, 2017).”
After the fall of the Soviet Union, several so-called de-facto states tried to become independent. Besides Transnistria, there is Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan (O’Loughlin et al., 2015). There are several institutions helping these de-facto states in negotiating with their old country from which they are breaking away. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe is the most active institution in doing this. However, over the last years, the European Union is also playing a bigger role in these negotiations and is becoming a serious actor in these issues.
In this thesis there is a focus on the role that the European Union plays in Moldova, and specifically Transnistria. Through bordering policies, the European Union tries to extend their power far outside of the Union to make countries act like their own member states. Besides that, it is an important way of keeping dangers away and keeping the Union safe (Bialasiewicz et al., 2009). This is also the case in Moldova, as Moldova has strong links with EU member Romania. Through the European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU creates a policy for member states’
neighbour countries. As the EU puts it, “the EU works with its Southern and Eastern Neighbours to foster stabilization, security and prosperity, in line with the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS, 2016).”
Within the ENP, there are several different more specific partnerships, like the Eastern Partnership, the Black Sea Synergy and the Northern Dimension (EEAS, n.d.). In this thesis, there will be a focus on the ENP and specifically the Eastern Partnership, since that is part of the ENP. This will be
looked at from a postcolonial point of view. Because of using postcolonial theory, there will also be attention for the role Russia plays in Transnistria, since that influence is very big.
1.2. Research goal
The goal of this research is to describe the ways in which the European Union influences the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria through the use of bordering policies and geopolitics. In focusing on this goal, the European Neighbourhood Policy, with the Eastern Partnership as part of this, will be analyzed. Also, regarding the goal of this research, there is a focus on
post-colonialism and neo-imperialism as theories.
To execute this research, extensive literature research will be used. Both official European
Neighbourhood and Eastern Partnership documents as well as articles by scholars will function as literature.
1.3. Research questions
This research will use the following questions to meet the research goal:
Main question:
How does the European Union use geopolitics, focusing on the European Neighbourhood Policy, in the Transnistria region in Moldova?
Sub-questions:
- How did the Transnistria Region originate and what is the current state of affairs? - In what ways does the EU involve geopolitics in cooperating with Moldova regarding
Transnistria?
o What is the European Neighborhood Policy and what is the Eastern Partnership? - What are the different EU-Moldova Partnership programs and how do they influence the
Transnistria region?
o What role does Russia play in these partnerships?
1.4. Relevance
Transnistria is still a rather unknown case in western Europe. Although there has been some research by scholars on the topic, and also some earlier theses on this university regarding Transnistria, not a lot of people in the western world know about this de facto country. Or any de facto country for that matter. The practical relevance of this research can be found here. To create a bigger understanding of the frozen conflicts in Eastern Europe in general and Transnistria specifically. Also, the European policies regarding its eastern neighbouring countries keep on renewing, which has as a consequence that research on the topic keeps renewing.
Besides, border research keeps renewing, especially over the last decades. That is why new knowledge on the topic is always needed, as the subject keeps evolving. For example, this thesis takes on post-Soviet post-colonialism for the analysis of the conflict from a Russian perspective. However, there is a lot of debate on whether Soviet colonialism should be part of post-colonial discourse. But, with an ever-growing and widening definition of post-post-colonialism, it is argued here, with respect to an article by Moore (2001), that it can be part of the post-colonial map.
Theoretically, the relevance of this thesis can be found in its contribution to the knowledge on the EU as a geopolitical actor. By focusing on the ENP and the Eastern Partnership as geopolitical documents and by looking at Transnistria from a neo-imperial point of view, it aims to expand the knowledge on European geopolitics and border policies.
1.5. Thesis Outline
In the next chapter, an overview will be given of the theoretical elements relevant to this research. To start off broadly, different kinds of border research will be shortly discussed. Then, border policies and geopolitics, post-colonialism and neo-imperialism will be discussed. In between, the framework of the research will become more clear by focusing on the ENP, the Eastern Partnership and the current state of Transnistria.
The third chapter will discuss the methodology used to execute the research. After this, in chapter four, a broad description of the history of Transnistria and Moldova will be given, before analyzing the armed conflict and the progress afterwards in coming to a solution for the conflict.
After that, in chapter five, the real analysis will start. Bilateral documents of the ENP and joint declarations of the Eastern Partnership, complemented with some less official planning documents will be analyzed to discover the geopolitics in these policies and to understand the European influence in the conflict. Here, also an analysis of the Russian influence in the Transnistrian conflict will start.
This Russian influence will be further analyzed in chapter six, where the Transnistrian conflict will be looked at from a Russian post-colonial point of view and a European neo-imperialistic point of view. This will be followed by some concluding remarks in chapter seven.
2.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Introduction
To get a clear image of what is going on in Transnistria, it is critical to understand the framework in which things are happening. Besides that, there are some concepts that need clarification before the substantive part of the research. That is why, in this chapter, the concepts ‘border research’, ‘border policies and geopolitics’, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership’, ‘postcolonialism and neo-imperialism’, and ‘the current state of Transnistria and de facto states’ will be explained by reviewing existing literature. This chapter will start broadly with looking at border research in general and work increasingly more specific towards the case of Transnistria.
2.2. Border research
Border research has been getting a lot of attention over the last decades. It is a very broad subject with lots of different angles to study borders from. One of the best examples of this is here at the Radboud University. The Nijmegen Centre for Border Research (NCBR, n.d.) exists twenty years and it has become “an internationally recognised expertise centre on borders, migration, cross-border cooperation and post-colonialism.” In this paragraph, some different sorts of cross-border research will be discussed, to understand where this thesis fits in. These forms of border research are Europeanization, nationalism, bordering, and perception of borders. Because of the
importance of border policies, geopolitics, post-colonialism & neo-imperialism, and de facto states, these concepts will be discussed in separate paragraphs.
2.2.1. Europeanization
To begin this paragraph, we will start with Europeanization. Ladrech (1994) provided a starting point by defining Europeanization as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC (European Community) political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national logic of national politics and policy-making.” From this, we can derive that Europeanization means that European decisions become a vital part of national policy. Bulmer and Burch (1998) appoint the intra- and inter-state of Europeanization:
“In its intra-state variant, it refers to the impact of EU policies, rules, practices and values upon member state activities in respect of both the making and implementation of policy. First, it refers to the extent to which EC/EU requirements and policies have affected the determination of
member states’ policy agendas and goals. Secondly, it refers to the extent to which EU practices, operating procedures and administrative values have impinged on, and become embedded in, the administrative practices of member states. …The inter-state process of Europeanization, by contrast, is concerned with the impact of the administrative practices and styles of individual member states upon each other and of the member states upon the EU.”
The focus in most Europeanization research is on the intra-state process, in which the influence of European institutions on its member states is key.
Scott & Liikanen (2010) combine the concept of Europeanization with Cross-Border Cooperation and the European Neighbourhood Policy. They state that “…the ENP is thus a means by which to maintain the momentum of Europeanization and promulgate the values of the EU without actually offering direct membership to third states.” The ENP is not the only policy through which the EU tries to cooperate with non-member states. Through all the policies they have with these countries, they extend their intra-state Europeanization.
2.2.2. Nationalism
To start off with nationalism, we take a look at the definitions of nationalism. A famous definition is that “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent (Gellner, 1983; Mylonas & Kuo, 2018).” However, there are lots of different definitions, all with different approaches to nationalism. That is why a general definition was created by Greenfeld (1992): “Nationalism as an umbrella term covering national identity, national consciousness, and national ideologies.” The nation in these definitions is “a group of people that recognize each other as forming a national unit with a claim to national sovereignty (Mylonas & Kuo, 2018).”
Along borders, nationalism is often an issue, since borders can create a boundary between a nation that does not naturally exist. On the other hand, borders can contribute to the growth of nationalism within a state, when the people in that state are able to create a shared identity. Cojacaru (2006) looked at nationalism in Transnistria. She interviewed Transnistrians to see if they think they belong to Moldova or feel Transnistrian. Most of the people felt Transnistrian and according to Cojacaru that means a “new identity is evolving on the Eastern side of the Republic.”
2.2.3. Bordering
From identities and nationalism, we move to bordering, a relatively new concept, mostly discussed during recent years. “At its most basic, the process of bordering can be defined as the everyday construction of borders, for example through political discourses and institutions, media representations, school textbooks, stereotypes and everyday forms of transnationalism (Scott, 2015).” Van Houtum (2005) declared that “The b/order is an active verb. Interpreted along these lines, a border is not so much an object or a material artefact as a belief, an imagination that creates and shapes a world, a social reality.” Van Houtum introduced the term b/ordering to describe the interplay between ordering and border-making (Van Houtum, 2005; Scott, 2015). From this point of view, borders have become a whole different field of research than before, when borders were thought of as rigid demarcations between two states. However “bordering processes do not begin or stop at demarcation lines in space. Borders do not represent a fixed point in space or time, rather they symbolise a social practice of spatial differentiation (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002).
Also, “Bordering practices are not confined to (inner)state spaces. In a transnational sense bordered places are produced and reproduced as well, leading to transnational places of refuge (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen, 2002).” The European Union is an important actor in bordering spaces. Scott (2015) sees border politics as a part of bordering. The EU uses these border politics in its programmes, policies and imaginaries of political community in which it uses borders as resources for different aims (Scott, 2015). More on these border politics will be discussed in paragraph 2.3 as part of border policies and geopolitics.
2.2.4. Perception of borders
Cross-border cooperation is increasingly being interpreted in terms of perception of borders as symbols and identity-constructing elements (Scott, 2016). This contributes to the fact that, as stated in paragraph 2.2.3, borders are increasingly seen as a creation instead of a rigid demarcation.
According to Bruter (2004), people’s European identity, the fact that they feel European, derives from their perceptions of Europe, which are themselves influenced by the images they form of Europe.
Applying this to borders, we can derive that borders contribute to the identity of people. This becomes part of their identity because of the images, and with that the perception they create of the border.
2.3. Border policies and geopolitics
As we have said in paragraph 2.2.3, the EU uses border politics as a resource for different aims. These border politics is a combination of border policies and geopolitics. Border policies are essentially the different policies an institution or entity has to regulate and control their borderland. The European Union has a lot of border policies, of which the European
Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and Frontex are good examples. Frontex “oversees the effective functioning of border control at the external borders of the EU and assists the Member States that require help at their external borders (Frontex, n.d.).” The European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership focus more on external relations and will be discussed further in the next paragraph. Through border policies, the EU tries to keep the Union safe and expand their governmentality outside of Europe.
This expansion of their governmentality brings us to the geopolitics. According to Bialasiewicz (2009), the EU has an increasing role in governing its Neighbourhood, which results into people talking about a ‘European geopolitics’. We will come back to the expansion of governmentality in paragraph 2.5. In this article by Bialasiewicz et al., Felix Ciută (2009) describes the way in which the EU makes regions through their policies. The Black Sea Region, of which Moldova is also part, is subject to a European policy called the Black Sea Synergy. Without this Synergy, there would not be a Black Sea Region, but since the EU creates this partnership, it also creates, or makes, a region. Geopolitics has been defined as follows by Dittmer & Sharp (2014):
“Geopolitics means different things, in different times and places, to different people. But we think that all of these versions of geopolitics can fit under this umbrella: geopolitics refers to the theory and practice of politics at the global scale, with a specific emphasis on the geographies that both shape and result from that politics. In other words, it is more than just the study of global politics; it is the study of how geography is implicated in that politics.”
So, geopolitics are formed by geographies, but new geographies are also the result of geopolitical decisions. Borders play a big role in this since borders and borderlands are most subject to
changing geographies. As Brunet-Jailly (2011) puts it, “borders and borderlands have become geopolitical spaces of contentions where asymmetrical economic, social, and political forces are either serving or in conflict with the agenda of central governments; further to this, borders are shown as territorial markers being transformed into functional-fluid vector of demarcation.” Kuus (2011) researched the geopolitics of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which will be discussed in the next paragraph. In this article, Kuus understands geopolitics as the practices by which international politics is spatialized. Furthermore, she describes that we know most about national geopolitical practices, but that Europe uses more and more geopolitical language and gets increasingly involved in geopolitics over the last five to ten years.
Lastly, Kuus (2011) describes the EU as a geopolitical actor, which is difficult. The EU is a complex institution. Their policymaking involves a complicated web of supranational and
intergovernmental mechanisms. It is a polycentric and transnational institution, which makes it a very interesting example of transnational governmental geopolitics.
2.4. European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern
Partnership
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has been named in several of the above paragraphs. The ENP initiated in 2003, ahead of the big enlargement of the EU in 2004. At first, it was designed for illegal migration, cross-border crime and other threats that could come from the new Eastern neighbouring countries (Kuus, 2011). Now, the ENP has become an umbrella framework through which the EU tries to influence its neighbours without offering the incentive of possible
membership (Kuus, 2011).
However, at first, the ENP had the objective to avoid new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The ENP should strengthen the prosperity, stability and security of both countries in the EU as the neighbouring countries. The policy has been reviewed in 2011, after the Arab Spring and again in 2015. It was decided that the new objectives were stabilization of the region, in political, economic and security related terms (European Commission, 2016).
The ENP is funded by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and it focuses on the ‘Joint priorities for cooperation’. These are good governance, democracy, rule of law, human rights, economic development for stabilization, security and migration & mobility (European Commission,
2016). The ENP is a joint initiative, which draws on the involvement of the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and the EU member states.
To come back on earlier subjects in this chapter, the ENP contributes to the fact that borders are shifting. It is unclear where the real EU’s borders are. But, because of this, Europe’s borders also become fuzzy.
To get closer to the case of this thesis, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) will now be described. The Eastern Partnership consists of the EU and six neighbouring countries, namely Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This partnership is interesting because a lot is going on in this part of the world. Economically, these countries are underdeveloped compared with EU member states. Besides that, there are several bordering conflicts, of which Moldova-Transnistria is one. Besides that, there is the Crimea conflict in Ukraine, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. These are all regions that proclaim their own independence but are not recognized by other states, or only by a few, of which Russia is an important one in the case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Also, political stability is very low (Political stability index, 2016). These are all reasons why the EU would want to influence the region.
The Eastern Partnership “aims to deepen and strengthen relations between the European Union, its member states and its six Eastern neighbours (European Commission, 2016).” It has to work within the framework of the EU’s Global Strategy and the ENP. There are four key priority areas to work on (European Commission, 2016):
- Economic development and market opportunities - Strengthening institutions and good governance
- Connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change - Mobility and people-to-people contacts
The Eastern Partnership functions through bilateral agreements between the EU and its Partners (European Commission, 2016).
There is a lack of knowledge and literature in the contribution of the Eastern Partnership to the settlement of the Transnistria conflict and the ways in which it influences Moldova and
2.5. Post-Colonialism and Neo-imperialism
2.5.1. Post-Colonialism
When Europe is discussed from a postcolonial point of view, the focus is on space defined through understandings of power, imperialism and global trajectories (Kinnvall, 2015). In general,
postcolonial theory or post-colonialism focuses on the effects of colonization on cultures and societies. From the name you can derive that postcolonial theory is chronological and entails the post-independence period of the concerning colonies. Although the term ‘post-colonialism’ was in the beginning only used to refer to cultural interactions within colonial societies in literary circles, post-colonial theory now includes “the study and analysis of European territorial conquests, the various institutions of European colonialisms, the discursive operations of empire, the subtleties of subject construction in colonial discourse and the resistance of those subjects, and, most importantly perhaps, the differing responses to such incursions and their contemporary colonial legacies in both pre-and post-independence nations and communities (Ashcroft et al., 2007).” Regarding this thesis, Russia plays a critical role concerning post-colonialism. After the fall of the Soviet-Union, Russia still has a lot of influence in some of the countries, and often supports breakaway regions like Transnistria. There is a lot of discussion about whether post-Soviet states are subject to post-colonialism. However, when looking at the Soviet-Union as a former colonial power and with regions like Crimea, Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are all supported by Russia (O’Loughlin et al.,2015), we can speak of post-colonialism in those regions. That is why post-colonialism will be used in this thesis.
As Stuenkel (2015) puts it “Putin continues to engage in imperial pursuits in its ‘near abroad’, explicitly relying on the Soviet legacy to secure and expand its ‘spheres of influence’.
Contemporary Russian identity critically depends on its (post)imperial self-image as a great power, where greatness is still defined by referring to the Soviet past.”
2.5.2. Neo-Imperialism
The term imperialism is increasingly being used instead of colonialism. With neo-imperialism, there is a focus on the ongoing control over developing countries by globalized capitalist economies such as the United States and Western European Countries (Ashcroft et al., 2007).
The ways in which the EU is extending their governmentality leads to scholars claiming the EU is engaging in neo-imperial practices. As Scott (2015) puts it, European border practices lead to the upcoming question whether the EU is engaging in post-colonial or neo-imperial bordering practices. This could result in seeing the EU as a “quasi-empire, as a new supranational body that uses its considerable power to structure the world and, in particular, its more immediate region.” Besides that, Borocz (2001) points out that
“any analysis of the European Union’s behaviour vis-à-vis the surrounding world should seriously consider two empirical expectations: (1) that the formation of the EU might in fact represent a global imperial strategy of sorts, and (2) that the specific histories of colonialism and empire, with their deeply coded and set patterns of inequality, hierarchy, exclusion and power – and especially their techniques pertaining to the projection of that power to the outside world – are reflected in a deep and systematic form in the socio-cultural patterns of the governmentality of the European Union.”
Hereafter, he points out that the majority of the Western European countries were large imperial and colonial centres in the past. “Eastern Enlargement” is the name he gives to the geopolitical process “wherein the European Union explicitly and repeatedly rethinks the question of its borders and constantly refashions its relation to its immediate hinterland by a multidimensional system of dependence (Borocz, 2001).”
Regarding this thesis, neo-imperialism can be applied to the fact that the EU keeps on expanding to the east, with Moldova wanting to become an EU member state. Although Moldova is not at all a member state yet, the EU does have several policies through which they try and make Moldova act like a member state.
2.6. De facto states and the current state of Transnistria
2.6.1. De Facto States
After the fall of the Soviet Union, there were several former Soviet regions which declared themselves independent. However, these so-called de facto states are not recognized by other states, not taking into account several exceptions, which will be discussed later. There are also a lot of other names for de facto states, such as unrecognized states, para states, pseudo-states, and quasi-states (Kolstø, 2006). Kolstø (2006) distinguishes three criteria for regions to be called a quasi-state. “Its leadership must be in control of (most of) the territory it lays claim to, and it must
have sought but not achieved international recognition as an independent state. Finally, to eliminate a whole spate of ephemeral political contraptions, I exclude those that have persisted in this state of non-recognition for less than two years.”
Kolossov & O’Loughlin (1998) describe different classifications of categories of pseudo-states. Firstly, they differentiate between institutionalized- and non-institutionalized pseudo-states. Institutionalized pseudo-states “have all necessary attributes of a ‘normal’ state, and are in full control of their territories. However, these pseudo-states are not recognized by the international community or by most neighbouring states.” Transnistria is part of this category. The second category is the non-institutionalized pseudo-states. “These geopolitical black holes represent a conglomerate of areas under the authority of local chiefs, field commanders, big landowners and/or drug barons, etc. These local leaders can cooperate but cannot conduct a war of ‘all against all’, and are thus half-institutionalized since they are unlikely to control their territory
permanently.”
Another way of classifying pseudo-states is by genesis and functions. Kolossov & O’Loughlin (1998) identify the following examples: “1) self-identification of an area with a specific nationality; 2) the splintering of an empire or large multi-national state; 3) areas of conflict with no permanent control as a result of a civil war and/or a foreign military intervention; and 4) effective pirate states based on criminal-terrorist activities.”
According to O’Loughlin et al. (2015), “de facto” is now the consensus term for “political entities that have achieved enduring internal sovereignty but lack widespread external sovereignty in the international system. In the Soviet region, Kolossov & O’Loughlin (1998) saw the rise of de facto states after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a consequence of failed state-making in the countries that evolved out of this collapse. Minority groups who were and still are dissatisfied with the limitations on their cultural and economic expression have been trying to create their own states.
As has been said before, there are several de facto states near Russia. These are Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. The first three are all supported by Russia, which makes Russia their ‘patron state’ (Kolossov et al., 2015). However, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are recognized states by Russia, but Transnistria is not (Kolossov et al., 2015), which makes their situation even more difficult.
2.6.2. The current state of Transnistria
Transnistria, officially called The Pridnestrovien Moldavian Republic (PMR), has a population of 555.000 people, largely begin made up out of Moldovans (31,9%), Russians (30,4%) and Ukrainians (28,8%) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PMR, n.d.). However, these statistics are debatable, since Kolossov et al. (2015) stated that Transnistria had 505.000 inhabitants and that this amount was still decreasing, as can be seen in figure 1. However, it is notable that, looking at populations, Transnistria is the biggest of the four de facto states discussed in the last paragraph.
Figure 1 Summarizing data of the de facto states (Kolossov et al., 2015).
Transnistria borders Moldova to the west and Ukraine to the east and thus has no border with Russia, which Abkhazia and South Ossetia do have. The capital city is Tiraspol and, although there has been a lot of conflicts about the official language in the past, Transnistria now has three official languages which are Moldavian, Russian and Ukrainian (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PMR, n.d.).
Transnistria declares itself a “sovereign, independent, democratic, legal and secular state, with its own Constitution, controlled territory, legislation, market economy, developed financial and tax systems, modern communications infrastructure, army, militia, security service, national flag, coat-of-arms, and anthem (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PMR, n.d.).” Besides that, they claim to have a fully functioning government and civil service. However, in 2017, Transnistria scored 24/100 at the Freedom in the World Score, developed by Freedom House, which declared Transnistria’s
heavily dependent on subsidies from Russia, which maintains a military presence in the territory. Political competition is limited, and the dominant party is aligned with Sheriff Enterprises, a monopolistic business conglomerate that is Transnistria’s largest employer and taxpayer. Nearly all media outlets are controlled by the state or Sheriff Enterprises, and all civil society activities must be coordinated with local authorities. The justice system features arbitrary or politically motivated arrests, harsh prison conditions, and reports of torture. The ethnic Moldovan (Romanian speaking) minority faces discrimination, and same-sex sexual activity is illegal (Freedom House, 2018).” Economically speaking, Transnistria does not seem to be able to function on its own, due to low demographic potential, a small domestic market and the lack of raw material resources. They are very dependent on Russian funds and Russia is not interested in Transnistria’s economy to become self-sufficient because now they can keep their influence and control Transnistria. Besides that, their Transnistrian rouble is not recognized in any other country which makes it not exchangeable on the international market (Całus, 2013). The economy of Transnistria is based on four large industrial plants in different sectors, steel, textiles, cement and electricity. 95% of the production from these plants gets exported. The Sheriff Group takes a special place in Transnistria’s economy. It is the biggest employer, owning more than ten firms and plants (Całus, 2013). The biggest sources of income in Transnistria are exports, around 70% of Transnistria’s GDP, and remittances from people working abroad, often in Russia. A third big source of income is the money from Russia, received through gas subsidies and humanitarian aid. Gas subsidies are the incomes earned by the domestic sale of Russian gas (Całus, 2013).
Politically, it looks like there is a working political system, with changing presidents and regular elections. The political regime can be described as a hybrid regime, which is situated between an autocracy and a democracy. “Political competition does exist but it does not lead to clear patterns of alteration of power among various groups of the elite through the mechanism of free and fair elections. Hybrid regimes share a set of common practices intended to skew the results of competition in the electoral arena, as well as other arenas of public life. The politicization of the bureaucracy, control of mass media, and selective law enforcement are among the most frequent examples of such practices (Protsyk, 2012).” This is still not a democracy like we are used to in Western Europe, and the influence of the Sheriff Group on politics is not correct, but for the biggest part, the political side seems to work for Transnistria.
2.7. Conceptual Model
In short, this conceptual model represents the expectations for this research. The main part of this research is the influence that the ENP and Eastern Partnership have on the relationship between Moldova and Transnistria. This Moldova-Transnistria relationship itself is also influenced by Russian post-colonialism. On the other hand, the European policies are influenced by
neo-imperialism, as Borocz (2001) said in paragraph 2.5.2. Through its policies, Europe makes regions. For example, without European Policies, like the Black Sea Synergy, there would not be a ‘Black Sea Region’. It is created by European policy.
3.
METHODOLOGY
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the way in which this research is conducted will be described. That way, it becomes clear how the questions named in paragraph 1.3 will be answered. The focus of the research is on in-depth knowledge on the influence of the EU and Russia on Transnistria, so this asks for a qualitative research. How this will be done further will be described below.
3.2. Research Strategy
According to Verschuren & Doorewaard (2010), there are five major strategies that can be followed in executing a research, namely a survey, an experiment, a case study, grounded theory approach and desk research. Of these five, desk research is the most applicable to this thesis. Desk research is characterized by the use of existing material, the absence of direct contact and the material is used from a different perspective than at the time of its production.
There are three categories of material which can be used for desk research. These are literature, secondary data and statistical material. Literature can be books, articles, conference proceedings and works that contain knowledge products of social scientists. Secondary data means empirical data compiled by other researchers or by yourself during previous research. These can be records, interviews or databases suitable for, in this case, a qualitative analysis. Official statistical material is data gathered periodically or continuously for a broader public (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2010). Regarding this thesis’ research goal and questions, desk research is the most appropriate form of executing the research since researching the ENP and Eastern Partnership is very much a
literature-bound research subject. In executing the research extensive literature research will be exercised. The data used for this will mostly consist out of articles by scholars and EU policies regarding Moldova, like ENP policies, Eastern Partnership policies and the EU-Moldova Association Agreement.
3.3. Data processing
To process the data collected through literature research, this thesis will use a combination of critical geopolitics and (postcolonial) discourse analysis. According to Kuus (2010) “critical
of world politics. It seeks to illuminate and explain the practices by which political actors spatialize international politics and represent it as a “world” characterized by particular types of places”. For the main research question of this research critical geopolitics is the best possible research method. It investigates world politics from a geographical point of view, which is essentially what this research tries to do, looking at the fact that the main point of research is the influence of European policies in other regions’ politics.
This will be combined with (postcolonial) discourse analysis. “A discourse analysis is based on the details of speech (and gaze, gesture and action) or writing that are arguably deemed relevant in the context and that are relevant to the arguments the analysis is attempting to make (Gee, 2010).” However, colonial discourse is largely derived from Foucault’s view on discourse. “For Foucault, a discourse is a strongly bounded area of social knowledge, a system of statements within which the world can be known (Ashcroft et al., 2007).” Discourse is important from a colonial view because it combines power and knowledge. “Those who have power have control of what is known and the way it is known, and those who have such knowledge have power over those who do not (Ashcroft et al., 2007).”
A combination of these two will mean that there will be a focus on discourse analysis through extensive literature research. This will be looked at from a postcolonial or neo-imperial angle. In doing this, critical geopolitics will be stressed, since that way the postcolonial and neo-imperial actions can be explained by focusing on world politics. This concept was explained by Müller (2008). “Geopolitical discourse is drawn upon and used by officials and leaders to constitute and represent world affairs in strategies of power that always require the use of space and, thus, the use of discourse. Global space is incessantly reimagined and rewritten by centres of power and authority through discourses that are historically constructed and imposed on people. A critical geopolitics is, therefore, called upon to deconstruct, unravel and expose discourses in order to lay bare the schemes of power operating beneath them.”
4.
TRANSNISTRIA
In this chapter, the history of Transnistria before the end of the Soviet-Union, the way the conflict with Moldova started and the progress, or the lack of it, that was made in the last twenty to twenty-five years will be discussed.
4.1. History
4.1.1. Moldova
After the Russo-Turkish war from 1806-1812, the Moldovan area between the rivers Prut and Dniester was annexed by Russia and became known as Bessarabia. This area can be seen in figure 2. After this, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, this part of Moldova – which does not include Transnistria – became ‘Russified’. Russian became the official language and the ethnic Moldovan population got reduced by the influx of Russians and other ethnic groups. In 1918 the Sfatul Tarii, a national political assembly voted for Bessarabia to unite with Romania, and in doing so, forming ‘Greater Romania’. However, Russian influence during the 1920’s and 1930’s was still dominant in the area (Roper, 2001).
In 1940, the Red Army captured Bessarabia and by joining Bessarabia with the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR, see figure 3), which included Transnistria, the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) was formed. In the MSSR, ethnic Russians had a disproportionate amount of people in important political and economic positions, giving them an advantage in the way they were represented (Roper, 2001).
Figure 2 Map of Moldova including the Prut River and Dniester River as natural borders. (Source: Worldatlas, n.d. https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/c ountrys/europe/moldova/mdtimeln.htm)
Figure 3 The MASSR. (Source: Wikipedia, Spiridon Ion Cepleanu own work, n.d. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moldavian _Autonomous_Soviet_Socialist_Republic# /media/File:Romania%2BMASSR_1924-40.jpg)
At the time, the MSSR did not have an official language, but Russian was dominant in urban culture, economics and politics. However, in 1989, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, the highest political organ, proclaimed Moldovan to be the official state language. Transnistrians were the group most opposed to this switch to Moldovan language because it was the most important sign of the shifting away of the power from the Russians and Transnistrians to Romanian-speakers (Roper, 2001).
In March 1990, the first relatively fair Supreme Soviet elections were held. A government, almost only existing out of ethnic Moldovans came to power. Mircea Snegur was elected President and Mircea Druc, a strong advocate of uniting with Romania, became Prime Minister.
4.1.2. Transnistria
In 1812, when Bessarabia was incorporated into the Russian empire, the empire was divided into different Guberniya’s, different governorates. Transnistria belonged to two Malorossian
(Malorossia is roughly current Ukraine) Guberniya’s, named Kherson and Podol’e. Bessarabia, on the other hand, became its own Guberniya. Afterwards, when Bessarabia came to belong to Romania, Transnistria belonged to the MASSR (figure 2) (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998). In 1940, Bessarabia was captured by the Soviets and the MSSR was proclaimed. However, from 1941 to 1944, this was occupied by Germany and Romania. Afterwards, when the war was over, the situation from 1940 was re-established (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998).
So, only since 1944 has Transnistria practically been part of Moldova. However, even though the people on the left and right bank of the Dniester river now lived in the same country, their identities stayed the same and there was still a big difference between them. Nevertheless, Transnistrians did not have to feel neglected. The majority of Moldovan leadership after the war came from the left bank of the Dniester. Only when Gorbatsjov introduced his Perestroika, the leadership of the country shifted to the right bank, former Bessarabia (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998). During Perestroika, the Moldovan Popular Front began to look at a Moldovan reunification with Romania. In the meantime, Moldovan became the only official state language. This caused trouble in Transnistria. On August 11th 1989, the United Council of Work Collectives (OSTK) was
established. This organization organized a political strike against the “discriminatory laws” of the official state language. This is also the time that territorial self-rule cropped up for Transnistria. Between December 1989 and August 1990, several referenda were held to see if an autonomous
Transnistrian republic was desirable. According to the OSTK, more than 80% of the possible voters participated and 90% were in favour. OSTK was also still active in the Moldovan politics. However, in 1990, repeated threats and acts of violence against them by Popular Front supporters made them withdraw from the Chisinau politics (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998).
In the meantime, on August 19th 1990, Gagauzia declared its independence (Roper, 2001).
“Gagauzia is an autonomous territorial unit within the Republic of Moldova with a special legal status” (Legal code of Gagauzia, 1998). The region is situated in the south of Moldova. This declaration of independence helped the Transnistrians in creating their own Dnestr Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (DMSSR) on September 2nd 1990. The Transnistrian authorities saw this
DMSSR as the reestablishment of the old MASSR, to which Transnistria belonged from 1924 until 1940 (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998).
These two sovereignty proclamations in a short time worsened the political situation in Moldova. Violent encounters between the supporters of the Popular Front and Moldovan police on one side and Gagauz and Transnistrian paramilitary on the other side started in the fall of 1990. In an attempt to influence the situation, Gorbatsjov declared the sovereignty declarations of both Gagauzia and Transnistria null and void on December 22nd 1990. After that, on April 1991, the
USSR Supreme Soviet passed a resolution on the situation in Moldova, but the Soviet authorities were not in the position to exert influence in the republic, so the Moscow decisions were ignored (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998). This Soviet coup demonstrated the division between Transnistria and Moldova. The Moldovan leadership denounced the coup leaders, while Transnistrian leaders supported the coup (Roper, 2001).
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldova declared its independence on August 27th 1991.
Transnistria was soon to follow when on the 2nd of September the Pridnestrovian Moldovan
Republic was proclaimed (OSCE, 1994). After this, Igor Smirnov, head of the OSTK, declared that “the referendum on independence should in no way be seen as an ultimatum … our proposals for a reorganization of the Moldovan state system will remain in force. But now two completely equal partners will sit down at the negotiation table (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998).” In Moldova, Mircea Snegur became president and Igor Smirnov was the winner of the elections in the PMR.
4.2. The Conflict
Both Moldova and the PMR saw a military conflict as a solution to the ongoing struggle. So, several Transnistrian cities (Roper, 2001) began to form paramilitary organizations such as the republican guard and the Black Sea Cossack Voisko (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998). The first real signs of conflict came before the declarations of independence of both Moldova and Transnistria, when on 2 December 1990, three civilians were killed during armed clashes between Transnistrian
separatists and Moldovan police in Dubossary, a city located on the left bank of the Dniester River. However, the real conflict started when PMR proclaimed their sovereignty. The paramilitary formations started to take over Moldovan institutions such as police offices, schools,
administrative bodies, radio stations and newspapers (OSCE, 1994). At first, Moldova did not interfere with force (Vahl & Emerson, 2004) and all the institutions were only defended by human chains of unarmed Moldovans (OSCE, 1994). However, this changed on December 13th 1991.
Moldovan police returned fire for the first time in defending the local government building in Dubossary (Vahl & Emerson, 2004; OSCE, 1994). Then, from March 1992 on, the conflict became increasingly heavier and escalated into a full-scale war (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998). The Transnistrian paramilitary forces were enforced by the transfer of men and arms from the Russian 14th army
(Roper, 2001). These clashes were followed by a declaration of state emergency on the 28th of
March (Vahl & Emerson, 2004; OSCE, 1994). However, in May and June, fighting intensified again, ending in a decisive battle in Bendery from June 19th until June 21st. This city is situated on the
right bank of the Dniester river, but was claimed by Transnistrian authorities, and is still the only city on the right bank that belongs to Transnistria (OSCE, 1994). On the 21st of June, PMR won the
battle over Bendery, with help from the Russian forces. The war caused several hundred up to a thousand deaths and around 100.000 refugees, including internally displaced people (OSCE, 1994; Roper, 2001; Vahl & Emerson).
During the war, Russia played a significant part, but Romania and Ukraine were also of some importance during the conflict. That is why, during March and April 1992, the foreign ministries of Russia, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine met on several occasions to discuss a cease-fire and a framework for negotiations (Roper, 2001). “On the 23rd of March, these ministers adopted a declaration in which they laid down a number of principles for a peaceful political settlement of the conflict, and agreed to create a mechanism for political consultations to coordinate their efforts (OSCE, 1994).” In following meetings in April and May, they decided to create a ‘Quadripartite Commission’ and a group of five military observers per country to monitor the
implementations of an eventual cease-fire. However, due to the heavy fighting in June, the plans for this Quadripartite mechanism failed to seriously take off (OSCE, 1994; Vahl & Emerson, 2004). Immediately after the war, the Transnistrian Supreme Soviet passed some laws on the de facto independence of the PMR, like laws on Transnistrian citizenship, state organs, and organs of state security (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998). However, this was of course not the way to irrevocably end the conflict. So, on July 21st, Yeltsin and Snegur – in the presence of Smirnov, who did not sign – signed
an agreement for a peaceful solution of the conflict and an immediate cease-fire. Besides, they decided to create a demilitarized security zone between the parties, ten kilometres left and right of the Dniester river (OSCE, 1994; Roper, 2001). Furthermore, it was agreed that the left bank of the Dniester needed a special status, that Transnistrians could decide on their own future if Moldova was to reunite with Romania and that a tripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) was to be established to implement the cease-fire. This JCC should consist of Moldovan, Russian and PMR delegations assisted by a group of thirty military observers, ten from each party (OSCE, 1994). The JCC was authorised to take urgent and appropriate measures in case the cease-fire was broken to re-establish law and order (Vahl & Emerson, 2004). From July 29th onwards, approximately 6.000
peacekeeping forces, consisting of six Russian, three Moldovan and three Transnistrian battalions were deployed (Roper, 2001; Vahl & Emerson, 2004).
4.3. Afterwards – (lack of) progress since 1992
Immediately after the cease-fire was established, the OSCE got engaged in Moldova (Wolff, 2011) “to facilitate through peaceful negotiations a comprehensive settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova with a special status for Transdniestria within Moldova (OSCE, n.d.).” The OSCE started a ‘Mission to Moldova’ in February 1993 and opened offices in Chisinau in April. Two years later they also opened offices in Transnistria (Wolff, 2011). The objective of the mission was as follows (CSO Vienna Group, 1993): “Bearing in mind the CSO decision and this commitment, the objective of the Mission is to facilitate the achievement of a lasting comprehensive political settlement, on the basis of CSCE principles and commitments, of the conflict in the Left-Bank Dniester areas of the Republic of Moldova in all its aspects.”
There were different activities that the Mission had to fulfil to live up to the goal they had set, like “facilitating the establishment of a comprehensive political framework for dialogue and
negotiations; assisting the parties … in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political settlement of the conflict; gathering and providing information on the situation, encouraging the States
concerned in pursuing negotiations on an agreement; providing advice and expertise and initiating a visible presence in the region and establishing contacts with all parties to the conflict (CSO Vienna Group, 1993).”
In 1993 and 1994, the OSCE tried to establish conversation between Transnistria and Moldova, but that was not successful, so, in order to make some progress, the OSCE advised the two sides two establish ‘expert groups’ that were responsible for the negotiations. However, this did not help either, and the head of the OSCE mission in 1994, Philip Hahn, said it would take six to ten years for both sides to talk to each other again (Roper, 2001; Bahcheli et al., 2004).
In the rest of 1990’s, some bilateral and multilateral initiatives took place. In 1995, it was decided that Ukraine would also become a mediator in the conflict and in January 1996, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova signed a Joint Declaration that stated the territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova (Belitser, 2013). Then, on May 8th 1997, the Memorandum on the Bases for
Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria (The Moscow Memorandum) was signed by Moldova, Transnistria, Russia and Ukraine. The last point of this Memorandum, point 11, states that “The Parties shall build their relations in the framework of a common state within the borders of the Moldavian SSR as of January of the year 1990” (OSCE, 1997). This Memorandum looked to be the first serious attempt at a serious decision after eighteen months of negotiations. However, point 11, the common state clause, caused much concern. Transnistrians interpreted the clause differently than Moldovans (Roper, 2001). Because of this, further negotiations were blocked and there was never a discussion about the division of competences between Moldova and Transnistria (Belitser, 2013). The Memorandum had no lasting influence and throughout 1997, meetings of the JCC or expert groups occurred infrequently. All in all, during the 1990’s, little progress was made. Some minor bilateral agreements and statements were signed by both Moldova and Transnistria, but there was no serious implementation of any rules. The most important decision was made in November 1999, when Russia committed itself to withdraw all Russian troops and equipment in Moldova by the end of 2002 (Belitser, 2013). However, when Putin came to power in January 2000, the Russian Foreign Ministry backtracked from the commitment (Roper, 2001), so in 2003, the peacekeeping operation still consisted of around 1.000 troops. These peacekeeping troops maintained the
status-quo in Moldova and were part of the reason why negotiations were unsuccessful (Belitser, 2013).
Meetings between Moldova and Transnistria were resumed after the elections in 2001. Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin became president of Moldova and a new law on territorial and administrative reform was approved, with Moldova existing of 31 regions and 2 autonomous regions, Gagauzia and Transnistria (Vahl & Emerson, 2004). At a meeting in Kyiv from July 1st to 3rd 2002, a new agreement was presented and it was the most detailed up to then.
However, again, there were some key issues on which there was a difference of interpretations between the two parties. The document proposed a united federal Moldovan state, but it was not clear how the constitutional system would be formed and the list of joint competencies between Moldova and Transnistria was too long for the agreement to be successful (Vahl & Emerson, 2004). However, according to Belitser (2013), this Kyiv draft agreement should have been discussed more widely, since it had supporters on both banks and among international experts.
But, instead, a new federalisation plan, referred to as the ‘Kozak plan’, named after Dmitri Kozak, part of Putin’s staff, came to the table in 2003. This proposed the principles for a new constitution for the come to be Federal Republic of Moldova. It proposed a federal territory and two ‘subjects’ of the federation, Transnistria and Gagauzia. Because of the unequal status between the territory and the subjects, it was called the ‘asymmetric federation’. Competences would be divided into three categories: those of the federation, those of the subjects and joint competences (Vahl & Emerson, 2004). However, again, critiques were large and as Dov Lynch wrote, “the Kozak plan, as it is now known, was so riddled with problems that one wonders if the Kremlin seriously expected it to succeed (Belitser, 2013; Lynch, 2004).”
So, until 2004 there was still hardly any progress, despite the amount of negotiating and proposals made. General problems are that, however very detailed, practically every plan has some points with unclear formulations. Also, in every plan up till 2004, there are a lot of joint competences, which was not desirable for both Moldova and Transnistria. Another problem is that in a lot of plans one of both parties is or feels preferred over the other. Especially in the Kozak plan, the power that Transnistria would get was not proportionate to the power Moldova would have. Large demonstrations against the Kozak memorandum took place in Chisinau and Moldovan parties joined forces to let the EU, US, Romania and Ukraine participate in the process of
negotiating (Vahl & Emerson, 2004). This changed in September 2005, when the sides agreed to invite the European Union and the United States to participate in the negotiations. With these 5+2 talks, the OSCE thought they would reach a breakthrough in the settlement process. The 5+2 talks meant that there were representatives of the conflict parties, Moldova and Transnistria, mediators from the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, and observers from the European Union and the United States (Neukirch, 2012). At the same time, the fact that so many parties were needed for negotiations to be even a little successful shows how difficult the situation was and still is. However, even with the 5+2 talks, no progress was being made. To illustrate that: in February 2006, Moldovans’ chief negotiator walked out of the meeting and in April 2006 the Transnistrian side cancelled its participation in the meeting. At the end of 2006, the settlement process had hit rock bottom. Because of this, the OSCE realised that common ground for discussions was missing. This made OSCE focus on confidence building, both to tackle upcoming conflicts and to create grounds for serious negotiations (Neukirch, 2012). In April 2008, the first Joint Expert Working Groups on CBMs (confidence building measures) between Chisinau and Tiraspol were established to discuss health and social protection, education, economics and trade, infrastructure, and the environment. But again, the parties only met to show their goodwill to the international
community and no concrete results were produced (Neukirch, 2012). This changed when Vlad Filat became Prime Minister of Moldova in September 2009. Under his rule, the chief negotiators of Moldova and Transnistria agreed “to have regular bilateral meetings to resolve problems that affect the lives of people on both banks of the river and erode confidence between the two sides (Neukirch, 2012).” The Alliance for European Integration, as Filat’s coalition was called, was much more pro-western and much more willing to deal with Transnistria than the Communist Party which had been ruling Moldova since 2001. About the same happened in Transnistria in 2011. Long-standing Igor Smirnov lost the elections and Russia’s favourite Kaminsky also failed to be elected. A large majority of the Transnistrians elected the younger leader of the ‘Revival movement’ Yevgeny Shevchuk (Belitser, 2013). With this election, people hoped for a positive momentum in the settlement process. To some extent this happened, because for the first time after six years of informal talks, official negotiations were opened in November 2011. After that, six more meetings were held in 2012. However, this was still mostly about the Confidence Building Measures and not about substantial political decisions (Belitser, 2013). Also, the Working Groups on CBMs became more successful. In 2012, eleven Working Groups were actively discussing economy, agriculture and environment, transport, railways, civil status acts, social and
