EU and Turkish parliamentary discourses concerning Syrian refugees, each other and the EU-Turkey deal

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University of Amsterdam Amsterdam, The Netherlands Faculty of Political Science

M.Sc., Political Science, European Politics and External Relations

EU and Turkish Parliamentary discourses concerning

Syrian refugees, each other and the EU-Turkey deal

Master Thesis

Supervisor: Dr Dimitris Bouris Second reader: Dr Beste İşleyen

Author: Maarten Dinkelberg (10437185) Word count: 24970

Date of submission: 23/06/2017

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Statutory declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the enclosed Master Thesis by myself and have not used sources of any means without reference. Any theories, thoughts and literal quotations from others are clearly marked. The thesis has neither previously been presented to any institution for evaluation nor has it been published in parts or in its entirety. Moreover, I have taken note and accepted the UvA's rules in regard to plagiarism and fraud.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the people without whom I could not have finished this thesis. First of all, I want to thank my supervisor Dr Dimitris Bouris for his great and much-needed supervision. Secondly, I want to thank Dr Beste İşleyen for being the second reader of this thesis. Thirdly, I want to thank all of my previous teachers and supervisors for their support and guidance. Also, I want to thank my parents, relatives and friends for supporting me, and lastly, I want to thank my peer students for helping me during the time of writing. In a special note, I would like to thank those classmates and friends who have helped me with translations from their native language into English and other linguistic matters in order for me to be able to write this thesis.

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List of abbreviations

AK party Justice and Development party

ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe CEAS Common European Asylum System

CHP Republicans Peoples Party

CRSR 1951 Geneva Convention Regarding to the Status of Refugees DGMM Directorate General for Migration Management

EASO European Asylum Assistance Office

ECR European Conservatives and Reformists group EFDD Europe for Freedom and Direct Democracy ENF Europe of Freedom and Nations

EP European Parliament

EPP European Peoples Party

EU European Union

FRONTEX European Border and Coastguard Agency

GUE Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left GNAT Grand National Assembly of Turkey

HDP Peoples Democratic Party

LFIP Law on Foreigners and International Protection MEP Member of European Parliament

MHP Nationalist Movement Party

S&D Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament Verts/ALE Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance

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Abstract

Due to Turkey's unique position and its proximity to areas often prone to conflict, the Turkish government have placed restrictions on the rights afforded refugees fleeing from events not occurring in Europe, including the Syrian conflict. Such refugees are protected under the Geneva Convention Regarding the Status of Refugees, however, Turkey has refused to grant full refugee status, instead supplying only temporary protection. Because of the legal differences between Turkey’s refugee administration and that of the EU, it is relevant to analyse how the discourses between both the Turkish and European Parliaments differ concerning their position on how to manage Syrian refugees. Considering that between 2014 and 2016 both the Turkish and European Parliaments held substantial influence over refugee policy, while negotiating the eventual EU-Turkey readmission deal, it is important to also understand aspects of the discourse between the EU and Turkey themselves, as well as the cornerstone deal being negotiated. It stands out that within both parliaments securitisation and humanitarian discourses are observable, as well as substantial frames that depict the EU and Turkey as threats to one another’s respective parliaments. The securitisation discourses match within both parliaments and are based on threats of an overflow of the system and fear of crime and terrorism. Within the European Parliament, the humanitarian discourse is based on international law, human rights and a commonality of humanity. Within the Turkish Parliament, the humanitarian discourse is based on a bond between the Turkish and Syrian people making the Syrian refugees brothers and guests. Within both parliaments, there is a trend of dominance for the humanitarian discourse over the securitisation one.

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Introduction

The year 2016 entailed the first time the amount of displaced people globally exceeded that of the second world war. The ongoing war in Syria has produced one of the largest streams of displaced peoples, with millions of Syrians forced to flee their homes and seek shelter in foreign countries. One such stream of refugees has taken vast numbers of people through Turkey, on to the external borders of the European Union (EU). This refugee stream was one of the reasons political tensions in Europe rose and there became talk of a refugee crisis. In order to ease the tensions the EU and Turkey, after multiple attempts, struck a readmission deal called the EU-Turkey deal. When this deal and the context of both the EU and Turkey in relation to asylum policy are analysed one finds completely deferent systems and interpretations on how to handle influxes of refugees.

Turkey has signed the 1951 Geneva Convention, which forms international legislation in regard to asylum matters, with geographical limitations. Therefore Turkey does not grant refugee status to people fleeing Syrian and has no legal obligation towards them (CRSR, 1951). Turkey does not fit in the Geneva system whereas the EU does. Therefore, it is important to understand how, their narrative on Syrian refugees differ. The object of this thesis shall be the discourses in the European Parliament (EP) and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) pertaining to refugees and readmission. The analysis presented will cover Turkey’s most recent refugee policies, from the period of April 2014 when they were implemented, up until July 2016, after which a failed coup d’état led to restrictions over the power of the GNAT and a state of emergency.

The EP holds, since the Maastricht treaty (which was later expanded by the treaty of Amsterdam and Lisbon), co-legislative power placing it on equal footing with the Council. Besides the legislative, the Parliament is also responsible for the appointment of the President of the Commission giving it extensive powers of the executive. Irregular migration falls within this frame of co-legislation. The provisional measures to be taken in the event of a sudden inflow of third country nationals are adopted by the council alone but it must consult the Parliament (Novak, 2017; 1 & Raffaelli, 2017; 1). No regular policy concerning refugees can come into effect without the approval of the EP. The EU-Turkey deal itself is regarded a provisional measure in an event of sudden influx. The Parliament is therefore not the legislator but is consulted. The Parliamentary discourse is still highly relevant being that this shapes this consortium of the Council.

Turkey, within the time frame, is a secular, parliamentary, democratic republic (art 1-7). The GNAT is a unicameral parliament, the sole legislative body and source of legitimisation within the Turkish state system (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, 1995; 4). The GNAT has four main functions, upon which the legitimacy of the Turkish government is based. It has a representative function, being that its members are chosen through elections and is, therefore, the embodiment of the sovereignty of the Turkish nation as laid down in the constitution (art 6). The GNAT also possess a controlling function. The government is held responsible to the parliament through debate, questions and investigation. Lastly, the GNAT is responsible for the formation of the government (Umit, 2015; 175 & Turan, 2003; 165 & Kasim & Mehmet, 2012; 31). While the EP acts as a source of legitimacy for the EU and holds influence in matters concerning refugees, the GNAT acts as its counterpart in Turkey. The GNAT is responsible for implementing the EU-Turkey deal, on top of the general treatment of Syrian refugees. (Hoffman, Samuk, 2016; 6). Because both

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parliaments are influential for the policy concerning refugees and the eventual EU-Turkey deal it is highly relevant to analyse their discourses concerning these matters.

There are two discourses to be expected in both parliaments because these are the main discourses on the subject within other contexts. These are the discourse of securitisation and humanitarianism (Bigo, 2002; 63 & Huysmans, 2000; 751 & Saunders, 2014; 69 & Dalakoglou, 2016; 180 & Andersson, 2016; 1056 & Balzacq, 2008; 75 & Chouliaraki, 2010; 108 & Barnett, 2014; 5 & Mortensen, Trenz, 2016; 343). The key issues and discursive concepts to be explored will be examined based on the following research question: How do the discourses concerning Syrian refugees, the EU-Turkey deal and each other differ between the European Parliament and the Grand National Assemble of Turkey?

This thesis has relevance in the social and academic sense. Socially it can provide more insight and understanding in how the current situation regarding Syrian refugees came to be. It can also explain how differences in understanding of what is an appropriate response towards these refugees creates different outcomes in refugee policy and misunderstandings between the EU and Turkey. It can also show how this has an effect on the lives of these millions of people fleeing war and terror. Furthermore, it can provide deeper insight and understanding into the already tense relationship between the EU and the Republic of Turkey. In the academic sense, this thesis can provide relevant insight in how to compare different contextual situations in which both securitisation and humanitarian discourses are competing for a hegemonic position and narrative which has had, to the knowledge of the author, little academic attention.

The thesis is structured as follows; the first chapter explains the methods and data used to analyse the alternative discourses. First, the concept of discourse shall be clarified, after which the specific data, method of data collection and data analysis (using the qualitative data processing software Atlas TI) will be explained. This is followed by an elaboration on the limitations of this thesis. Chapter two will contain an overview of relevant theoretical concepts used in this thesis. First, the concept of securitisation and theoretical schools of securitisation will be explained. Afterwards, the same will be done for humanitarianism. These concepts will be operationalised and used as theoretical tools throughout the analysis. Lastly, the broader implications of these concepts will be explained through the concept of othering. Chapter three consists of an analysis of the policy frameworks for both Turkey and the EU. These policy frameworks will be compared, and the actual EU-Turkey deal will be elaborated on. In chapter four the frames and discourses within the EP will be explained using the securitisation and humanitarian concepts. This chapter will conclude with a section on which discourse is dominant over the other. Chapter five will do the same for the GNAT. Chapter six will consist of a comparison of the parliamentary discourses. Lastly, there will be a short conclusion.

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Chapter 1: Methodology and Data

To understand how a discourse analysis works, one must first understand what a discourse is. The term discourse will be clarified. This will be followed by a section explaining the process of framing which in this thesis will be seen as the building blocks of a larger discourse. Afterwards, the data that will be used will be elaborated on. Hereafter the specific data processing method will be explained. Lastly, the limitations of the thesis will be clarified.

1.1 The Linguistic Turn, discourse and frames

The theoretical methods of analysis used in this thesis utilise the linguistic turn in social sciences and the ‘Habermasian’ interpretation of communication. The central focus here is on ontological and epistemological presuppositions focused on the interpretation of speech acts. The way we describe certain objects provides the object with meaning. Therefore, meaning and interpretation are at the centre of human action. A key aspect of this is the interpretive community of groups of individuals who share the same interpretations and meanings towards certain objects, creating a shared sense of social reality in a world of multiple social realities (Yanow, 2007; 113-115). Language provides meaning and is essential to the process of forming social realities. The combination of linguistic expressions which give meaning to the social world can be described as discourse.

Michel Foucault studied social knowledge as presented as truths, truths which underpin the thinking in government policy, thinking he described as 'governmentallity'. These truths create certain perceptions of what the problem is that needs to be solved and thus create a certain perceived treatment for this problem (Lemke, 2007; 34 & Bacchi, 2010; 9). Foucault wanted to uncover the grounding perceptions that people took for granted and on which they based their own ideas, shaped the way they acted and what they perceived as normal. His main question was how it was possible for certain policies to be put in place, which meanings were embedded in which social knowledges and how this could be taken for granted (Bacchi, 2010; 5). For his methods, Foucault looked at policy frames which create 'subject positions' that political subjects either assume or reject. Taking up this position means adopting a new way of thinking and changes identification towards the subject. The creation of policy frames and the relation between those who create it and those who adopt or refuse it is thus a relation of power, being that the idea changes the identity of the subject (Bacchi, 2010; 5 & Foucault, 1986; 12-13 & Foucault, 1980). Within this thesis, the interpretation of discourses allows multiple discourses to be coexistent in a situation in which multiple discourses are competing for a hegemonic position, all of which adds to the process of shaping social realities.

A concept closely related to discourse is that of framing. Framing is a concept originating from media analysis but has become more widely used in multiple fields of study. In general, the process of framing is seen in line with the focus on words, images and presentations that are used to construct new stories in order to describe social phenomena and apply meaning towards a succession of events which without this framework would be meaningless (Druckman, 2001; 227 & Gitlin, 1980; 21 & D’Angelo, 2002; 870). Entman states that “‘to frame is to select some aspects of

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perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” Important within the process of framing is the way in which the actor who applies the frame uses patterns of cognition, interpretation, preselection, emphasis and exclusion in order to make the selection of the perceived reality more salient. This framing process can have significant connotations in the application of meaning for the people or groups to whom the frame is applied, since it shapes their interpretation of social phenomena (Entman, 1993; 7 & 52). Frames are most commonly applied using metaphors that compare the object which is to be framed with something that is thought of in the direction the object should be framed, or by placing it in a similar narrative (Borah, 2011; 249).

In this thesis, framing shall be considered as the building block of a larger discourse. A frame, when accepted by the population towards whom it is created, can either set a certain event into perspective or force the perspective into a specific direction. When multiple frames align, and push the larger tendency of thinking in the same direction, while also combining and linking multiple social events, this creates a discourse based on these frames.

1.2 Data and method of analysis

The secondary literature used throughout the thesis is collected by first analysing general overviews on migration theory and the European migration crisis in general (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, et al, 2014 & Dalakoglou, 2016 & Thorburn Stern, 2016). When it became clear securitisation and humanitarian discourses would become central concepts in this thesis, general articles on these concepts were analysed (Bigo, 2002 & Balzacq, 2008 & Barnett, 2011 & Bourbeau, 2014). After this, the articles deemed relevant in the bibliography of the aforementioned literature were analysed. This process of analysing relevant literature in bibliographies was repeated multiple times in order for the author to familiarise himself with the literature.

As described in the introduction it is relevant to analyse the discourses in both parliaments being that these discourses shape the perceptions of the parliamentarians who sway extensive power over the eventual matters concerning refugee policy and the eventual EU-Turkey deal. In order to analyse these discourses, a variety of transcripts of parliamentary debates from both parliaments are analysed. These debates fall in the timeframe between April 2014 (being that the current Turkish refugee policy became valid at this point in time) and the 15th of July 2016 (being that the GNAT has restricted powers due to a state of emergency from that moment onwards). Details on these specific debates can be found under primary literature. For the analysis of the EP's discourse, transcripts of eleven debates were used. Within these debates, members of all political fractions present in the Parliament, as well as members of the Commission and Council are represented in speeches given in the parliament. These specific debates were chosen based on the agenda of the EP and its relevance to issues surrounding Syrian refugees and readmission-deals with Turkey. These are debates on creating a readmission deal with Turkey, the treatment of Syrian refugees in the EU, the situation in the Mediterranean regarding refugees and the situation in Turkey regarding refugees. These debates can be found in the bibliography of primary literature under the name: minutes of the EP.

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and seven transcripts of individual parliamentary speeches were analysed. These debates were collected from the GNAT website. This website does not provide an agenda for debates held on specific days in the English language. Because of these linguistic problems, the data has been collected by searching for documents within the relevant timeframe, using translated keywords deemed relevant to the subject in the content. These documents were evaluated and included in the analysis where the content was deemed relevant. The words used can be found under annex two. These debates mostly entail the ruling AK party defending its policy towards the opposition parties regarding the treatment of Syrian refugees and the creation of a readmission deal. These debates can be found in the bibliography of primary literature and annex three under the name: Minutes of the General Assembly.

The data collected was analysed using the qualitative data processing program atlas-Ti. Within this program, two types of analysis were carried out. Firstly, the words used to describe refugees were quantified and compared. Where the word illegal immigrant is used in abundance, in contrast to the use of refugee, this implicates a focus on illegality instead of human rights. Such tendencies highlight attempts within the discourse to shape a specific representation of the problem. This form of analysis could only be carried out for the documents of the GNAT, elaborated on in the next section.

The second type of analysis is based on the attribution of codes to certain segments of text. The transcripts were analysed and every quote which fell in line with an identified code was encoded. These codes were later quantified, making it possible to identify trends and dominance of certain frames and discourses over others. This coding was organised by political party/fraction, or by the member of parliament that stated the quote. Over time it became possible to identify trends within the frames and discourses and among individuals and party/fractional groups. These codes were created deductively and inductively. Deductive codes were created beforehand and applied while analysing the text. Inductive codes were created during the analysis, when certain unsuspected frames were identified. Larger discourses were analysed by grouping certain codes together, creating a holistic view of multiple frames which together create the larger discourse. The individual codes and code groups can be found in the codebook under annexe one.

1.4 Limitations of the thesis

The general subject matter of the thesis, as well as the methodology applied, contain certain limitations. The main limitation of the thesis consists of multiple language barriers for a non-Turkish speaker. Due to these barriers and the lack of available translated agendas, there is no way of knowing whether the sample chosen is complete and without missing elements. The sample collected does however contain speeches made by all parties represented in the GNAT during the timeframe in question. As such, the sample chosen can be considered sufficient. Secondly, the GNAT transcripts had to be translated from Turkish using translation software. The final text produced contained a small number of minimal linguistic errors. Where linguistic errors occurred in such a manner that the text could not be interpreted, a Turkish national associate was asked to translate the original segment of text to reduce translation errors where possible. There is, however, no way to ensure that context-specific translation errors did not occur. Thirdly, the EP does not supply translated versions of transcripts, in text format, for the period under investigation.

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Therefore, analysis was conducted using dubbed video documents from the EP. These documents could be coded and analysed, however the exact wording used to describe refugees could not be quantified. Thus, only the second method of analysis was applied to EP documents.

Besides linguistic limitations, the thesis consists of no intercoder reliability. Because the method of research entails the addition of codes to texts of which the interpretation of the researcher is vital for the decision to add a code, the research is subject to the researcher's interpretation. This limitation can be counteracted by letting multiple researchers code the same text, then measuring the differences in their application of codes. This, however, goes beyond the scope and resources available for this thesis. The coded documents used for the thesis are available upon request to reproduce the results.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

To understand policy concerning refugees in both the Turkish and the European setting, it is important to first clarify some important concepts and theoretical notions concerning the two main discourses surrounding refugee policy. These discourses are the humanitarian discourse and securitisation discourse. First, the securitisation discourse will be clarified, after which the discourse of humanitarianism will be assessed. Lastly, the larger tendencies and effects of both discourses will be compared using the term othering.

2.1 The concept of securitisation and securitisation discourse

The main discussion on refugee policy falls under the realm of securitisation and humanitarian discourse. Many scholars, from multiple backgrounds, have written about securitisation of migration. Securitisation has been examined on a European level, before and during the so called refugee crisis, with many scholars of migration concluding that it has indeed been securitised (Bigo, 2002; 63 & Huysmans, 2000; 751 & Saunders, 2014; 69 & Dalakoglou, 2016; 180 & Andersson, 2016; 1056 & Balzacq, 2008; 75). Securitisation of migration has also been the subject of extensive research at the national level in multiple states, with most conclusions drawn in favour of securitisation. Some of the national settings where research has shown migration to be securitised are, among others; Turkey, Hungary, Greece, Poland and Albania (Skleparis, 2016; 96 & Togral Koca, 2016; 73 & Szalai, Gőbl, 2015; 2 & Kruse, 2006; 115). A large range of theoretical backgrounds are represented in the literature on securitisation. These schools range from post-structuralist approaches (Balzacq, 2008, 2011), to less interpretive angles (Baele, Sterck, 2015). To gain a proper understanding of the debate on securitisation, these different positions, theoretical perspectives and conceptualisations should first be clarified. First, there will be explanations of different definitions. Afterwards, the two main theoretical schools, or as Bourbeau calls it “logics” (Bourbeau, 2015; 396), of securitisation theory will be explained. These are the Logic of exception, best explained by the Copenhagen school, and the logic of routine, explained in the Paris school. Third, the main criticisms aimed at these theories and conceptualisations will be explained. Lastly, there will be an operationalisation that will be used for this thesis.

2.1.1 Definitions and theoretical approaches

Many scholars have written about securitisation. Here some definitions and the two main schools (Copenhagen and Paris schools) of securitisation will be clarified. An early definition of securitisation is given by Ole Wæver. He argues Securitisation is an intersubjective, socially constructed process, with which he seeks to understand how “an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object” (Wæver. 1995; 1). As a reaction to Wæver, Buzan et al create a framework which aims to gain a better understanding of who securitises, which issues are securitised, with what results and under what conditions. Important here is how the transformation of security is directly related to a security sector in which professional’s own

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interests and new technologies influence perceptions (Buzan et al, 1998; 31). Balzacq broadens the definition and uses a more post-structuralist perspective. He argues securitisation is “a set of interrelated practices, and the processes of their production, diffusion, and reception/translation that brings threats into being” This set of practices create heuristic expressions (metaphors, policy tools, symbols, stereotypes, etc) which are continually mobilised by the securitising actor. This is done in order to create a network of implications towards the object and the threat, “that concurs with the securitising actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject (the to population that has to adopt securitisation) with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customised policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development” (Balzacq, 2011; 3). On the other side of securitisation is de-securitisation. This is a reversed process in which certain acts can transform a concept previously thought of in the realm of security towards another realm (Buzan et al, 1998; 31).

The concept of securitisation follows two main logics. Despite much theoretical discussion between scholars of both camps, the two main logics are not mutually exclusive but be mutually reinforcing. The first logic is that of exception, classified within the social constructivist school of taught, which aims to explain the construction of security discourses. The logic of exception entails that a security threat is seen as an existential and exceptional threat, legitimising the use of exceptional measures and policies (Bourbeau, 2015; 395). Therefore, framing something as a crisis, or an abrupt, time sensitive threat, legitimises the use of measures which would normally not be treated as legitimate (Jeandesboz & Pallister-Wilkins, 2016; 316). The logic of exception is best described by the theory of the Copenhagen school, the main school on securitisation theory. Scholars within the tradition of the Copenhagen school focus mainly on speech acts and presume that labelling something as a security threat permeates it with a sense of importance. By labelling something as a security threat, it becomes one. This discourse is not only influenced by speech however. Non-speech acts influencing discourse has recently also been included in the line of thought of the Copenhagen school. One could think of more symbolic means of creating a discourse. Hansen argues that symbols, influenced by the visual itself, its immediacy and ambiguity, the strategies of depiction, the context of the image and the genre of the image, can influence and change the wider discourse surrounding the image (Hansen, 2011; 69). Within this model, one could identify two types of actors, The securitising actors and the functional actor. The securitising actor starts the securitisation process by claiming something is existentially threatened, while the functional actor is affecting the dynamics of a sector and ultimately changing it. The functional actor is thus securitised (in the terms of Balzacq the referent subject). For the securitising actor to be successful, the speech act must be accepted by the targeted securitised community. This is influenced by the internal rules of the community, the actor’s linguistic uses, the externalities of the community and social position of the securitising actor (Bourbeau, 2015; 396).

The other logic in the theory on securitisation is that of routine. The logic of route is embedded in the Paris school. This is based on a post-structuralist logic borrowed from Pierre Bourdieu. Central concepts here are field and habitus. A field is a structured system of social positions. Depending on its content, each field is characterised by a logic and structure, which both produce and reproduce the habitus of the field. This habitus, the system of dispositions and tendencies which organise the perceptions of the social world in certain fields, implies the appropriate way to act and how to perceive a certain situation (Jenkins, 1992; 53). The habitus and

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the field are reciprocal and have a relation of power. The field and habitus are constantly reinstated, transformed and reproduced (Williams, 2007; 28). Scholars following the logic of routine and the Paris school see securitisation as a process which inscribes meaning through governmentality (social knowledges which are presented as truths and underpin the thinking in government policy) and practices. Here, securitisation is the process of structured and routinised practices of bureaucracies and security professionals whom, in line with the use of new technologies and ideas, provide a permanent perception of threat (Bourbeau, 2015; 396). Within this tradition, security is not about the urgency for exceptional measures or the survival of a group. Instead, security is a concept divined by bureaucratic decisions and practises that create a sense of unease. In doing so, the field of security absorbs other fields and creates a continuum in which different agents of different fields create a new collective umbrella and habitus of security (Bigo, 2002; 67). The focus in this school lays not on speech acts of political leaders and other influential actors, but more on actions carried out by professionals in the field of securitisation (Bourdeau, 2016; 396).

The two schools differ in multiple ways. The Copenhagen school has a social constructivist theoretical background. The Paris school is more imbedded in the post-structuralist line of thought. Furthermore, the Copenhagen school sees security as a concept revolving around survival. The Paris school sees it as a collective feeling which is constantly reproduced in a Bordieusian sense. The absence of security is a constant feeling of unease and does not have to be about actual survival. The Copenhagen school and the logic of exception see securitisation as the legitimisation of exceptional measures that call for urgent action. The Paris school and the logic of routine see it more as a constant reproduction of a paradigm of unease and insecurity. The focus of the Copenhagen school is mainly on speech acts. The Paris school is mainly aimed at the actions carried out by certain professionals. Because of the inclusion of the field in the logic of routine, Skleparis describes the difference between the two schools as that of a focus on speech act and that of a field effect (Skleparis, 2016; 94). This is best explained as the difference between what the securitising actor says (Copenhagen school), and what the securitising actor does (Paris school).

2.1.2 Critiques on the schools of securitisation theory

Both the theoretical school of exception and that of routine have been the subject of criticism. The critique aimed at the logic of exception and the Copenhagen school comes, firstly, from the scholars who hold views more in line with the logic of routine. They state that because security is a routinised practice, the Copenhagen school lacks the focus on what the securitising actors do, as well as in what they say. They also claim that the Copenhagen school assumes that the studied entities hold a collective identity, while there is not enough attention given to the multiple different perceptions and assumptions within these groups. Furthermore, they claim the securitised entity is not fixed and that this provides the scholars of the Copenhagen school with a blurred view (Bourbieu, 2015; 396). Lastly, the focus and choice of actors under investigation is criticised from multiple theoretical perspectives. The Copenhagen school focuses on multiple realms of securitisation. Some of these are the securitisation in the military, political and societal sense. Many realists have argued that this is too large a scope, overcomplicating the concept of security. Supporters of the routine camp, on the other hand, have argued that this focus is too small and too elitist. This does not provide insight into securitised ideas of the larger population or smaller

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organisations (Williams, 2003; 513).

The logic of routine and supporters of the Paris school have also received criticism. Scholars supporting arguments from the Copenhagen school have argued that the scope of the routine camp is too large. They argue that when security is defined separate from a logic of extremity, this creates a danger of blurring the difference between policy concerned with security and those that are not, making it impossible to distinguish between securitised policies and normal policy (Williams, 2011; 217). Furthermore, the logic of the routine school does not provide a guiding principle for how to explain variation in levels of securitisation. It does not identify who can or cannot be a securitising agent and does not depict a comprehensive view of his role. The routine model does not provide a way to distinguish between “having the authorisation to speak and having the ability to speak with authority”. Lastly, the model also fails to provide any framework on how securitisation within a certain context can change (Bourbeau, 2014; 190-192).

There are also some points of critique which apply to both logics. Baele and Sterck argue that the focus of both schools assumes to much unity in some entities and that they can be securitised in one setting but not in the other. In the case of refugees, they argue securitisation can take place in the political realm while there is no securitisation in the realm of skilled workers. Therefore, they see the concept of securitisation of groups as a generalisation (Baele and Sterck, 2015; 1123). Lastly, some argue that to create a comprehensive view of securitisation, one should also include non-discursive practices such as exclusion. It is insufficient to look at a discourse or the actions of influential and professional peoples alone. One must also look at what the entity that is claimed to be securitised does not do (Togral Koca, 2016; 55).

Taking all these criticisms into account it is highly relevant to look at the model created by Phillipe Bourbeau who tries to consolidate the logic of exception and that of routine into one model. His main argument is that both logics explain different stages of the same process. He argues the logic of exception perceives securitisation as a binary process. There is either high securitisation or no securitisation. The logic of routine understands it as flat. Perceived high points are merely patterned practices in this model. As a result, both models have limitations. When combined the new model has a much larger explanatory value. Bourbeau argues there are multiple ways in which both logics can compliment each other. The logic of exception explains the creation of a security discourse while the logic of routine explains the reproductive mechanisms once this discourse is established. On the one hand, speech acts in the forms of frames forming securitised discourses can initiate a process of securitisation which will later be locked in the habitus of relevant actors creating continued securitisation. On the other, security practices can be implemented before securitisation takes place in the discursive realm. In this case, the security discourse created later is the legitimisation of the institutional pre-existing situation. In both cases, the logic of both schools compliments each other and explain the occurrence, reproduction and difference in the level of securitisation (Bourbeau, 2014; 193-195).

2.1.3 Final definition and operationalisation

Securitisation processes can take place in multiple settings, with multiple actors able to be securitised. The scope of migration policy alone fails to capture these aspects of securitisation. The potential securitisation of religion, the environment, global health etc. demonstrates this. In some of

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these cases, securitisation occurs as a bottom-up or an interactive process. In this thesis, however, securitisation shall be identified as a top-down process, since the focus on the EU-Turkey deal implies policies enacted by groups of political elites. Because the policy requires adoption by both the EP and Turkish parliament, the object of study is thus their parliamentary discourses.

This thesis will adopt a definition of securitisation based on the logic of exception and the Copenhagen school. It should be acknowledged that the logic of routine offers some explanatory value and the Paris school helps to understand continued securitisation. Bourbeau’s framework also gives insight in to how the two logics interact. However, for the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to centre the analysis on how parliamentary speech acts create frames and discourses of securitisation that are adopted into policy. This narrowing is possible as the thesis focuses on parliamentary discourses, not acts carried out by the state itself. The main points of critique towards the Copenhagen school are not fundamental problems for this research. The points of critique rest on the fixed nature of groups under investigation and the collective identity that is assumed. The group under investigation (members of parliament) is fixed. Attention will be paid to the lack of collective identity. Parliamentary speeches by multiple political parties, both opposition and coalition parties, have been included for this reason. Concentrating on how policy came about it is irrelevant to study the reproduction of securitisation in this context. Therefore, the actions of security professionals shall be excluded from this thesis

Based on all the aforementioned and the purpose of this thesis the final definition of securitisation of Syrian refugees in the context of both the European and the Turkish parliament for this research states that: The securitisation of Syrian refugees is a socially constructed process that explains how Syrian refugees are presented as an existential threat to the populations of the EU and/or Turkey, to which their respective parliaments must adopt exceptional measures.

2.2 Humanitarianism and Humanitarian discourse

The concept of humanitarianism originates from a combination of historical events and scholarly theories. Many historians, political scientists and legal scholars have argued that the international community ought to adopt humanitarian practices to ease human suffering. Yet the concept has not remained free of criticism, much of which has attempted to frame humanitarianism as a western, neo-colonial idea that creates structures of dependence. Humanitarianism dates to eighteenth century efforts to ease the suffering of the American slave population. The concept has been developed over time and influenced by multiple historical events. In this section, the main definitions and theoretical schools of humanitarians will be summarised, followed by an explanation of humanitarian discourse. This will be followed by a presentation of the main criticisms of humanitarianism. Finally, the concept of humanitarianism as a discourse will be operationalised.

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2.2.1 Definitions; Allegorical and Emergency humanitarianism

One of the most widely accepted definitions of humanitarianism is that of Michael Barnett, who argues it is “the attempt to alleviate the suffering of distant strangers” (Barnett, 2014; 4). These strangers are not people close by like our neighbours or fellow citizens of our own nation-state but are people mostly from different cultural backgrounds. Action is perceived as urgent because the concept revolves around saving lives at risk. Humanitarian thinking is embedded in a set of assumed universal principles. These principles promote the belief that all human beings are equal and enjoy inalienable rights. Furthermore they consist of; the instance that those in need, need to be helped by the population the actor who tries to create humanitarian action sees as his/her in-group, that there can be no distinction between peoples in these matters and that the judgement of these matters needs to be objective (Barnett, 2014; 4-5 & Wilkes Karraker, 2013; 221). The field of humanitarianism has evolved from primarily concerning victims of slavery and war, to efforts to reduce human suffering caused by displacement of peoples, poverty or natural disasters. It has also become a way of legitimising military intervention through the responsibility to protect doctrine (Hasian, 2016; 13). It has, over the years, been institutionalised into an interlocking set of formal and informal institutions, laws, discourses, norms and actions, which are perceived to be the just way of acting (Barnett, 2014; 3 & Hasian, 2016; 1). Actors involved in humanitarian work now come from a wide array of societies and backgrounds. A network of humanitarian actors can include Government funded and supported projects, international organisations like the UN, NGO's, private persons and different commercial organisations (Barnett, 2014; 4 & Hasian, 2016; 8-15).

Barnett describes two schools of humanitarianism; Emergency and Allegorical humanitarianism. Emergency Humanitarianism concerns the provision of aid and relief to those in immediate danger. Core principles of Emergency Humanitarianism are the principles of neutrality, impartiality and interdependence. The school refrains from engaging in politics and aims to provide relief to war victims without adopting a moral stance on what party in the conflict is right or wrong. Their main aim is to preserve human life. Agencies that provide aid in this sense are the International Committee of the Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders and a large scope of the humanitarian activities carried out by the UN. Alchemical humanitarianism, on the other hand, involves addressing the root causes of suffering and therefore does engage in politics and does take a political stand. Organisations and scholars of the allegorical camp operate with a less binding set of principles and seek to eliminate human suffering altogether (Barnett, 2014; 13 & Barnett, 2011; 8). Organisations who work in the Alchemical tradition of humanitarianism are among others, OXFAM, CARE, Amnesty International and some of the UN's conflict resolution efforts.

The main differences between the two views of humanitarianism are the focus on root causes of human suffering and the political stance of the alchemical camp, versus the principles of neutrality and focus on fighting the symptoms of human suffering maintained by the emergency camp. The difference in focus has also resulted in a difference in scope of who, when and how to help those in need. The emergency camp often needs more time to determine who needs help and often has a more narrow view of the victims who need to receive aid (Barnett, 2011; 5).

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2.2.2 Humanitarianism as a discourse and its critiques

Humanitarianism can also be considered a discourse that changes the frameworks of thought. Chouliaraki describes humanitarianism as: “the rhetorical practices of transnational actors that engage with universal ethical claims, such as common humanity or global civil society, to mobilise action on human suffering” (Chouliaraki, 2010; 108). When actors claim something to be a humanitarian problem, the problem is being pulled into the realm of humanitarianism, where the broader public accepts this humanitarian problem, not acting upon this puts the actor at fault. The humanitarianism discourse dictates how to act and perceive certain situations and provides the actor with a clear responsibility towards the victims of the humanitarian problem. This discourse is embedded in the formal and informal institutions, laws and norms which shape the specifically dictated reaction and responsibility. This humanitarian discourse is created and reproduced by a focus on the agency of the victim and the common humanity of the actor that must adopt the humanitarian discourse. Methods used to create a humanitarian frame are speech acts, but also more visual depictions of the human suffering or symbolic means of communicating. In the realm of speech acts, this includes notions stressing the responsibility of the actor or the 'never again' notion (Barnett, 2014; 5 & Mortensen, Trenz, 2016; 343).

Pallister-Wilkins has noticed multiple trends in the discourse and surrounding acts of humanitarianism. Firstly, she argues there is a growing willingness to help those defined as at risk. Secondly, there is a greater ability to actually help those who are defined as the victims of a humanitarian tragedy. The third trend undermines the two previously mentioned ones. Many humanitarian acts are carried out by state-agencies having multiple interests. Besides acting in such a way to alleviate the suffering of a group which in the discourse is defined as the victim of a humanitarian tragedy, the state has an interest in the management of these people who become “problematic peoples”. The management of these problematic peoples becomes linked to the humanitarian concept legitimising certain practises discursively as humanitarian while they are in fact not based on the alleviating of suffering. In this sense humanitarianism and policing/managing become inherently linked (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; 59). This creates a discussion on what is humanitarian and what is not.

Humanitarian discourse has received criticism. This is not based on the notion that the authors would find it morally objectionable to help others, but is aimed at addressing the western bias and assumptions. In Foucaultian terms, humanitarianism has become part of the 'archive of knowledge' produced and reproduced in the western parts of the world. There are, however, different notions of what humanitarianism is or should be (Pacitto, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013; 7). Some scholars argue that humanitarianism is a neo-colonial mechanism (Pacitto, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013; 8). Parekh argues that humanitarianism is based on the Western idea of universal liberalism, which abstracts the person from his or her “contingent and external” relation (Parekh, 1992; 162). Therefore, arguing that humans have rights because they are human, is accepting a dominance of Western ideas over others. Esteva and Prakask argue that accepting this Western idea of individualism threatens the foundation of cultures, ideas and organisations, which are centred around the notion of communal obligations, commitment and service (Esteva, Prakask, 1997; 282). In reaction to this criticism, Oman created a more postmodernist perspective arguing for the respect for pluralism of values and that humanitarianism should not be an either-or discussion on Western

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values (Oman, 1996; 528).

2.2.3 Final definition and operationalisation

For the purposes of this thesis, it is relevant to see humanitarianism as a discourse. Because the focus of this thesis lays in the parliamentery discourse on Syrian refugees, whether they are treated as security threats or a humanitarian issue, it is relevant to look at the discursive acts of those parliaments. For this purpose, both the definition of Barnett and Chouliaraki will be used. When combined, one can create the following definition: Humanitarian discourse is the rhetorical and discursive practice of the respected parliamentarians that engage with ethical claims, such as common humanity or global civil society, to mobilise action of the respected parliaments in order to create an attempt to alleviate the suffering of Syrian refugees (Barnett, 2014; 4 & Chouliaraki, 2010; 108).

2.3 Humanitarian and securitisation discourses, the politics of life and othering

Both the securitisation and the humanitarian discourse are related to and can have an influence on, two concepts. These are the politics of life and othering. The politics of life is a concept created by Didier Fassin. This concept revolves around a link between lives to be saved and lives to be risked. This in the sense that when it is perceived as a risk to safe lives there is a political selection determining which life it is legitimate to be saved and for which the risk becomes too high (Fassin, 2007; 500-501). Here the discourse determining what is perceived as a humanitarian or security problem thus also determines whether it is worth saving a life or not.

Othering is a discursive act determining who is in-group and who is out-group. The actions of social entities are based on certain perceptions of the self and on how to act based upon a socially constructed image, an image that shapes how we perceive others and our sense of self. This self-image is not fixed and can be changed by rejection or conformation of this perception by other groups and members of the in-group (Haller, 2003; 228). When the discursive act which aims at creating a narrative of someone or some group as the other is successful, there has been a successful process of othering (Diez, 2003; 320). Relations between social groups are largely formed by the perception of the self and the other, who is in and who is out. Therefore, for a social group to realise who they are, they should also know who they are not, and how to act towards the other (Haller, 2003; 229).

The parliaments themselves are groups who hold these narratives and are influenced by ideas of the self and others. They also represent the ideas of in and out-group for their respective populations. Because these parliaments influence the eventual policies, it is relevant to see how their discourse of who belongs to the us and who belongs the other is reflected in eventual policy. It can also be assumed that both parliaments influence their respective populations during processes of adopting such narratives concerned with who is in and who is out. Both securitisation and humanitarian discourses have an implication for the concept of othering. When both discourses compete to dominate perceptions of what can be considered an appropriate reaction to the situation, the outcome of this competition becomes highly significant. The securitisation discourse is in this

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sense a large conceptual othering attempt. By arguing that Syrian refugees are a security threat to the population, the parliament creates the idea that the Syrian refugees are others, not a part of their population. This is therefore a discursive exclusion from the in-group. Besides creating a sense of the refugee as the other the securitisation discourse relates to the politics of life. When refugees are seen as a threat to the self, saving the lives of these refugees becomes a threat as well. Risking the self in order to save the other creates a strong incentive in the politics of life not to legitimise saving them and thus not to act in a way as to save the lives of the refugees but secure the own safety instead. The humanitarian discourse on the other hand creates a reverse effect. Stressing that other people need to be protected on the grounds of commonality of humanity (They are also human and enjoy the same human rights as us) creates an in-group narrative. Because of this, acting humanitarian is no longer perceived a risk which makes it easier to legitimise humanitarian action in the framework of politics of life.

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Chapter 3: Different legal frameworks

Due to Turkey's unique position and its proximity to areas often prone to conflict, the Turkish government have placed restrictions on the rights afforded refugees fleeing from events not occurring in Europe. Such refugees are protected under the Geneva Convention Regarding the Status of Refugees, however Turkey has refused to grant full refugee status, instead supplying only temporary protection. Because of the legal differences between Turkey’s refugee administration and that of the EU, it is relevant to analyse how the discourses between both the Turkish and European Parliaments differ concerning their position on how to manage Syrian refugees. Before this can be done, these differences in policy frameworks should first be clarified. This will be done in the following chapter. First, the legal framework and evolution of refugee protection will be explained within a global context. Secondly, the policies of the EU will be examined. Thirdly, there will be an assessment of the Turkish refugee context and the Turkish refugee policies. Fourth, there will be a comparison of both systems and lastly, the EU-Turkey deal will be examined.

3.1 The international refugee regime and the Geneva system

The literature on migration law and refugee protection is extensive. The protection of refugee rights can be traced back to the interwar period, during which the League of Nations tackled refugee rights and sought to protect certain groups of people who had become stateless. After the second world war, the first act of the United Nations (UN) concerning refugee protection was the establishment of the International Refugee Organisation and the creation of conventions which would create treaties to protect refugees (Guy & Goodwin-Gill, 2014; 2).

The first reference to refugee protection relevant to the current international judiciary system can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that refugees have the right “to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in accordance with the legislation of the state and international conventions” (UDHR, 1948; art 14). This statement was later backed by a more holistic definition and granting of rights established at the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR). A refugee, per the Convention, is a person unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group, or political opinion (CRSR, 1951; 3). This definition does leave some space for interpretation. Multiple states question whether an individual solely fleeing war can be classified as a refugee. Many states do accept them to be, but some do not. Important to note is that within the EU people fleeing the war in Syria do receive refugee status (International Summit, 2016; 1).

The CRSR grants multiple rights to refugees and multiple obligations to the state of residence. Refugees do, for instance, have the right of access to courts (art 16), enjoy freedom of movement (art 26) and cannot be imposed penalties for having been on the territory illegally when they were coming directly from a territory in which they experienced danger. This applies until they present themselves to the relevant authorities, to be enacted immediately upon arrival (art 31). Moreover, the hosting state cannot expel a refugee without going through the proper legal procedures (art 32). Furthermore, refugees enjoy the right of employment (art 17). Lastly, the state

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is prohibited from expulsion or return. This is called the principle of non-refoulement, which entails that no state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner to the frontiers of territories where his or her life, or freedom, would be threatened, taking into account the grounds conceptualised in the definition (art 33),(CRSR, 1951; 23-20).

The CRSR was later extended by the UN declaration on Territorial Asylum of 1967. This declaration regulates that before authorities have ruled on the application for asylum, the person is an asylum seeker. For this person, the principle of non-refoulement is also valid (UN general assembly, 1967; art 3). Since 1951 there has been much discussion over the principle of non-refoulement, which states that a state may not close its borders to refugees or prevent them from entering their territory. After much discussion, the main consensus on this issue was that a state cannot prevent a refugee from applying for asylum due to the declaration of 1967. This is valid within the territory but also at the border. Therefore, a state under the CRSR and the 1967 protocol cannot legally close its borders to refugees (Goodwin Gill, McAdam, 2007; 207 & UN general assembly, 1967; art 3 & Long, 2010; 10).

3.2 The common European Asylum policy and the Dublin regulations

The UDHR is referenced in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as well as the treaty of Amsterdam. Furthermore, all documents mentioned are part of the EU’s Acquis Communitare, which requires all member states to sign and respect these treaties (European Court of Human Rights, 2010; 5 & Dublin Regulation II, 2003; art 2 & Directive of the EP and of the Council, 2008; 13 & European Communities, 1997; 29).

The EU's member-states had been free to judge and interpret the judiciary framework of refugees until 1999. In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force. The main amendments made by the treaty were the devolvement of certain powers of national governments and the transfer of these powers to the European level. These transfers were in the realm of civil and criminal laws, foreign and security policies and migration, which includes refugee policy (European Communities, 1997; 1-10). The Amsterdam Treaty laid the foundation for a later to be conceptualised policy. The treaty specified multiple conditions to which the policy must meet (European Communities, 1997; 8). This policy was to: align with the aforementioned CRSR and Protocol of 1967, create criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member-State is responsible for considering applications, the minimum standards of reception, how to qualify someone as a refugee, when refugee status can be withdrawn, when temporary protection can be granted, how a balance of efforts can be reached, who receives displaced persons, when long term visa's should be granted and what to do with illegal immigrants, including repatriation.

Besides the treaty of Amsterdam, the Tampere summit was also held in the same year. During the summit, leaders of member states discussed how to kick-start the policies of the third pillar on justice and home affairs. The need to form a common asylum and migration policy formed one of the main points of discussion at the summit. The main points necessary to form a coherent policy were a focus on cooperation with countries of origin, a common asylum policy, fair treatment for asylum seekers in line with the CRSR, management of migration flows and the sanctioning of illegal trafficking (European Council on refugees and exiles, 2000; 6 & Directorate-General Justice and Home Affairs, 2002; 2).

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The European asylum policy was later conceptualised in the Dublin II regulations. The main aim of the Dublin II regulation was to fill in the policy guidelines established by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice, open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the EU based on the CRSR and the 1967 protocol (Council Regulation, 2003; 1). The main points of Dublin II are: Member-States shall examine the application of any third-country national who applies at their border or on its territory (art 3.1), Any Member State shall retain the right, pursuant to its national laws, to send an asylum seeker to a third country, in compliance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention (art3.3), And where it is established that an asylum seeker has irregularly crossed the border into a Member State within the last 12 months, the first Member State shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum (art 10). Dublin II is later amended with Dublin III in 2013. This entailed some minor changes. Asylum seekers are now informed on the Dublin process before it is carried out, have a right of appeal, plus states cannot have applicants transferred back to a country where the asylum system has collapsed (Regulation No 604, 2013).

The Dublin regulations form the legal basis for the eventual Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The CEAS is the asylum policy of the EU. This is a bilateral policy in which both European and national organisations share responsibility. This entails that the EU sets out the policy framework and national governments implement it. Governments do however receive help in their territories from European organisations such as FRONTEX (the European border agency) and the EASO (the European Asylum Assistance Office)(Nancheva, 2015; 442). The basic layout of the CEAS is conceptualised by The Hague Program and aims to create a common level playing field within European Asylum policy (Council, 2005 & Green Paper, 2007; 2). The eventual CEAS sets out minimum standards for the processing of Asylum claims. The first state in which the asylum seeker claims asylum is responsible for the processing of the claim. The state can however still transfer the asylum seeker to the member-state through which he or she travelled first. Asylum seekers do not have the duty to claim asylum in the first EU state they reach. Furthermore, they can ask for their claim to be processed in another EU state based on relations with this country or the fact that family members already reside in this country (Commission of the European Communities, 2008; 8).

The refugee crisis of 2015, with its large influx of refugees, mainly coming from Syria, was the first test of the CEAS. The system could not handle the sudden impact of the crisis, with the Dublin system temporarily suspended. As a result (also respective to situations occurring before the crisis), the CEAS has been highly criticised. The main point of criticism has been levelled at member-states for picking and choosing how many asylum claims to handle, failing to uphold their full commitment. Furthermore, some member-states have failed to implement the broader European standards, making the CEAS redundant. Furthermore, some states have opted to resist the implementation of the policy outright (Nancheva, 2015; 443). Another key point of critique is the uneven burden-sharing dictated by the CEAS. Because Asylum claims are handled by the first state entered by refugees, other states can return Asylum seekers to the first EU state they passed through. Those member-states with external EU borders have therefore faced a much larger burden than others. The mechanisms through which Asylum claims can be rerouted to others are only valid when the Asylum seeker meets certain criteria, which do not lead to a reliable system of burden sharing (Nancheva, 2015; 444). Lastly, it stands out that the policy and implementation of the

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CEAS differs between the member-states. Some member-states award refugee status more often and some refugee packages are more generous than others, which creates differences between the member states and thus the reverse effect of what the CEAS had tried to establish (Nancheva, 2015; 445).

As a reaction to the refugee crisis, the EU adopted the European agenda on Migration. The agenda includes a series of measures which are to be picked up by the EU and its member-states to cope with the crisis. In the agenda on migration, the commission proposes guidelines in four policy areas: reducing incentives for irregular immigration; border management, saving lives and securing external borders; developing a stronger common asylum policy; establishing a new policy on regular immigration, modernising and revising the ‘blue card’ system, setting fresh priorities for integration policies and optimising the benefits of migration policy for the individuals concerned and for countries of origin. Furthermore, the idea of setting up EU-wide relocation and resettlement schemes was launched and a hotspot approach, documenting migrants on the ground at the EU’s external borders, was created (European Union, 2017; 1-3).

The last policy relevant to the analysis of the refugee and asylum policy of the EU is the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). The GAMM is the overarching policy framework which conducts policy dialogues and cooperation between the EU and non-EU countries regarding migration. The GAMM came into being in 2005 and was revised in 2011. Where the policies and treaties previously mentioned have aimed at creating an internal asylum policy for the EU, the GAMM focuses on the external dimension of asylum and migration policy. The GAMM considers the interests of the EU, the partner countries and the migrants themselves. The main goals of the GAMM are to create legal paths of migration, combat illegal migration and human trafficking, promote international protection, and enhance the external dimensions of asylum policy (European Commission, 2014; 2 (Com 96)). The GAMM is supplemented by pre-existing migration agreements between the EU and sub-regional partnerships such as the Prague and Budapest processes. The GAMM entails the cooperation with countries of origin or transit countries as laid down in the Tampere summit (Collyer, 2012; 506 & European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2011; 4).

3.3 Turkey; an exception to the Geneva system and its reaction to the refugee crisis

Many countries have signed the CRSR, which creates the basis of the international refugee regime. Turkey, however, has only signed the agreement upon the guarantee of geographical preconditions. This entails that Turkey is only obliged to use it as a legal framework to refugees coming from the west. It does not grant refugee status to people eligible for refugee status when they come from countries east of Turkey, and thus people fleeing the war in Syria (Rygiel, Baban, Ilcan, 2016; 317). Turkey’s restriction must be understood in a historical context. Until recently, Turkey had no need for strict asylum policies, since the country represented a net exporter of migrants. Most migrants making their way to Turkey were interested in transiting to the EU. The fact that Turkey did sign the Geneva convention regarding people from the west is a reminder of the Cold War. Turkey, as a buffer state, aligned with the west and, as a NATO member, needed a framework to receive people fleeing Communist repression from European states under Communist rule (Hoffman, Samuk, 2016; 6).

EU and Turkish parliamentary discourses concerning Syrian refugees, each other and the EU-Turkey deal