The Use of Technology for Political Change:
An Analysis of the Promethean Argument
Jinne ter Weele
Thesis MA Philosophy
Universteit van Amsterdam, Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen June 2019
Student: Jinne ter Weele Studentnr: 11750960
jinneterweele@gmail.com
Supervisor: prof. dr. Beate Roessler Second Reader: dr. Thomas Nys
Contents
Introduction 5
Chapter 1: The Prometheans
12
The Classical Promethean argument: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865)
12
The Modern Promethean argument: Murray Bookchin (1921-2006) 16
Problems with the Promethean Argument
22
Chapter 2: Against The Prometheans
24
Michel Foucault
25
Langdon Winner
29
Shoshana Zuboff
38
Chapter 3: A Case study
44
A Case Study of Learning Algorithms
45
The Problem of Filter Bubbles
48
Neutral Tools 51
Political Consequences 54
Resistance to the Filter Bubble
56
Beyond the Promethean Argument
61
The Future
64
INTRODUCTION
When we speak of technological ‘progress,’ we often mean to point to developments in the field of technology and science. The word progress, however, is also applied in a political sense, where it refers to the betterment of different classes of citizens or humanity as a whole in terms of equality and wellbeing. In both cases, the meaning of the word progress follows the definition “to develop to a higher, better, or more advanced stage.” In both cases, there is a sense of an upward trajectory 1 towards new possibilities, towards a change in what can be thought of as possible. The connection can be made between political progress and technological progress, where new technological op-portunities can lead to a politics different from the established one, but also where political progress can be a factor in technological development. In other words, the development of tech-nology and the development of political practice are in close relation, and this raises the question of what kind of relation this is exactly. This is the question that I will delve into in this thesis.
Questions about the relation between the technological and the political are becoming more salient as our daily lives in the 21st century are becoming more dependent on technology. Social and poli-tical life have always been influenced by technological changes, but we are now at a point where technological developments have the power to cause upheaval at a global scale, which is why the-re is talk of particular technologies that could radically change how all aspects of life athe-re ordethe-red. It is therefore not strange that the revolutionary possibilities of particular technologies are reimagi-ned. As our everyday lives are structured to a large extent by algorithms, for example, the political and social consequences of this technological tool are worth examining. The idea that modern 2 technology opens up new avenues for a re-thinking of social and political life is made possible by
Merriam-Webster 1
progress verb
pro·gress | \ prə-ˈgres \ intransitive verb
1 : to move forward : PROCEED
2 : to develop to a higher, better, or more advanced stage https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
14 May 2019
I will examine the particular causes and effects of learning algorithms in chapter 3. 2
technologies such as the internet, but the internet is also welcomed as a technology that could change life in a radically new direction. What I am interested in specifically are the ways in which technology and politics influence each other, and ultimately the question of whether progress in technology is actually able to affect progress in political terms. Do new technologies have the abili-ty to create new, better political and social conditions? For example, does the availabiliabili-ty of the in-ternet allow for it to be used to effect progress in terms of equality among citizens?
This argument, the argument in favor of using technological devices to change society for the bet-ter, is probably as old as human invention itself. Especially since the introduction of the steam en-gine at the start of the industrial age, political progress and technology have been theoretically heavily intertwined, and have even become synonymous in some instances.3It was the invention of the printing press that led to political and religious upheaval. The new industrial age, from the 4 beginning of the 20th century on, provided common people with incredible new opportunities through the introduction of affordable technologies such as the personal car and the washing ma-chine. Since the introduction of the internet, these kinds of narratives have become even more 5 ambitious, speaking of the final stage of democratization, a means to create equality and freedom of speech and movement on a global scale. Importantly, the point here is not just that the internet 6 would increase the efficiency of an already existing political dynamic. Rather, the argument claims that certain technological breakthroughs in the 21st century will be able to fundamentally change our current political and social structures and hierarchies. This argument can be applied by people of different political strides, from anarchist utopians to all kinds of populists, and even totalitarians. Current neo-liberal, capitalist power dynamics, ingrained through power relations in most represen-tative democracies, could be changed through the ‘correct’ use of self-learning algorithms,
block-Gordon, Uri. Anarchism and the Politics of Technology (2009). 4 3
Zuboff, Shoshana. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. 4
London : Profile Books, 2019. 175 Zuboff 30
5
Ess, Charles. Democracy and the Internet: A Retrospective. Javnost - The Public, 25:1-2, 93-101(2018). 93 6
chain information sharing and currency transactions. Banks, governments and security and poli-cing institutions could be evaded and toppled if some recent inventions were used ‘for good.’
Of course, this argument already presupposes an idea of which goals are good and which are bad. For the purpose of this thesis, however, I will not be focusing on those conceptions, as these de-tails do not really matter for the broader point. However, what is important is that these utopian vi-sions are first and foremost focused on evading existing structures of power. The discusvi-sions on the possibility of revolutionary technology that I will be focussing on have been taking place within leftist anarchist circles. I will follow their lead when asking the question of the radical possibilities of technology because I am, at least on the surface, partial to their argument. I am friendly to many of their political views, which is precisely why I want to examine their arguments closely. A proponent of anarchism wants to accomplish a “stateless, classless decentralized society in which the splits created by propertied society are transcended by new, unalienated human relationships. An anar-chist or anarcho-communist society presupposes the abolition of private property, the distribution of goods according to individual needs, the complete dissolution of commodity relationships, the rotation of work, and a decisive reduction of the time devoted to labor.” My definition of politics as 7 such, however, will not be an ideological one. Rather, ‘politics’ refers to the practice of the govern-ing of peoples, the way in which societal power is organized in a practical sense.
A recent discussion of the role of technology in the anarchist tradition comes from Uri Gordon. In his paper Anarchism and the Politics of Technology (2009), Gordon discusses what he calls the Promethean argument. The paper also considers other anarchist views on technology, such as a primitivist view and Gordon’s own stance. Although Gordon himself does not wholly endorse the Promethean view, he is the one who gives a clear definition and description of the idea.
The Promethean argument consists essentially of two parts. Firstly, it states that human progress is a natural development, and that technological progress is part of this trajectory. Thus, technology
Bookchin, Murray. Post-Scarcity Anarchism. Ramparts Press, 1971. p 18 7
is a natural thing and will eventually be part of the inevitable occurrence of human progress. Every new technological development is in the end an “expression of the triumph of human creativity and ingenuity over an essentially hostile natural world.” Secondly, technology itself is not intrinsically 8 good or bad. Every new invention is neutral, although the ends for which it can be deployed can subsequently be positive or negative. The technology itself does not carry any values, and its role in the long arc of human progress makes that technology as such carries mostly positive connota-tions: “Anarchists - like their Marxist counterparts - constructed a contradiction between technolo-gy’s positive nature in principle and its dominating nature in practice, that is, once inserted into ca-pitalist relations of production.” Although certain (industrial) technologies have had some negative 9 consequences, and might have led to less instead of more political equality, these inventions as such were inventions that could also have been used to better political and social conditions.
To clarify, technology as ‘natural’ refers to the fact that technological development in a general way contributes to progress. By way of definition, technology in this sense can be understood as the “practical application of knowledge.” New knowledge leads to new applications, which are a sign 10 of progress overall. Technology as ‘neutral,’ on the other hand, refers to particular technologies. The internet is natural in the sense that its invention as such is part of the trajectory of progress. However, it is neutral in the sense that the technology itself is not determined in how and by whom it is used. By this definition, the most important aspect of a technology is the use of the technical
Gordon 4 8 Gordon 4 9 Merriam-Webster 10 technology noun tech·nol·o·gy | \ tek-ˈnä-lə-jē \
1a : the practical application of knowledge especially in a particular area: ENGINEERING sense 2 b : a capability given by the practical application of knowledge
for the accomplishment of a particular task. Positive or negative consequences depend on indivi11 -dual implementations, which are not pre-determined. The invention of new technologies thus crea-tes new possibilities for change.
Crucially, technology is a symptom of progress, but progress does not automatically come with every new invention. Progress can be determined by many other factors. But when technology is becoming more advanced, this does suggest new possibilities for progress towards something bet-ter overall. According to the Promethean argument, there is a difference between a particular tech-nology and the historical development of techtech-nology in a general sense. It would thus be fair to say that, according to this argument, individual technologies can be understood as nothing more than tools for use. They are neutral in their individual application, which makes them available for use in both positive and negative directions. For example, the internet has created new possibilities for communication and information sharing that were unimaginable before the technology behind the internet was developed. However, the internet as such has had many effects, both positive and negative. But, according to the Prometheans, this is because the tool that has come available, the internet, has been used in different ways. And this use can be adapted to the needs of those who want political change.
The internet has brought us many new possible ways to communicate. It is therefore not strange to say that, in theory, the internet as such wields power over our political and social lives. I do attest that these new technologies seem to hold opportunities that were previously unavailable to many. In a broader sense, the Promethean argument is definitely appealing for several reasons. It es-pouses an idea of progress and change that seems to become more realizable as technological innovation advances. We are in an age of seemingly unlimited technological possibilities, which possibly points to new possibilities in other areas of life as well. Also, the simplicity of the argument
Merriam-Webster 11
technology noun
tech·nol·o·gy | \ tek-ˈnä-lə-jē \
2: a manner of accomplishing a task especially using technical processes, methods, or knowledge 14 May 2019
makes it very tempting to side with the Prometheans. There are inventions that can be used for different purposes, and if we have a purpose which is righteous, the technology will help us achieve it. The invention of the steam engine, for example, does not in itself account for its nega-tive consequences. Unfortunately, it has been ‘misused’ throughout history many times. The steam engine itself, however, can be considered apart from its historical and societal roles. If only some well-meaning person had gotten a hold of it sooner…
Some reservations with regards to the Promethean view are warranted. Although it is impossible to deny that technology and other societal forces have always been heavily intertwined, I can not help but think that it is not that simple. If the internet, blockchain, algorithmic prediction and other appli-cations for information sharing really hold so much potential to do good, then why does the idea of some do-gooder applying them on a large scale not sound like a viable solution to all problems? How come that the phenomenon of technological progress seems to never progress all of humani-ty in a real sense? One could suggest that the technology for progress is there, but that these technologies keep being hijacked by certain political and economic interests that do not use them for good. But even if this were the case, how can this keep happening? Although the Promethean argument seems to hold ground theoretically, its practical underpinnings are dubious. The immedi-ate connection between technological and political progress does not seem to have many real world examples, just as the use of technology for ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is hard to point to in recent history. Technology is here, and it has become more and more important in our social and political lives. But its role as described by the Promethean argument, and the seemingly unlimited possibilities it holds, is not clear when the relations between the technological and the political are held under a microscope.
In this thesis, I will try to answer the question of whether Gordon’s Promethean argument is plausi-ble. Technology has always played a role in social change in many different directions, but is this because technology is inherently neutral and applicable for any purpose or kind of progress?
I will first provide a more in-depth discussion of the different versions of the anarchist argument as introduced by Gordon. In order to do this, I will be looking at a classic anarchist author, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and at a well-known 20th century anarchist theorist, Murray Bookchin. Their writings about technology, together with Gordon’s summary, will give a clear overview of the origins and versions of the Promethean argument. I will also formulate my main questions and doubts in relation to these theories. After this, I will be discussing several authors that can help voice and strengthen my doubts about the argument as understood by the authors mentioned above. I will be leaning mostly on the work by Langdon Winner on the political power of technology, and by Michel Foucault on technologies of power. Furthermore, I will be discussing the development of technolo-gy in the 21st century specifically through the most recent work by Shoshana Zuboff. These three authors will provide a theoretical basis for the discussion of the real-world example in the chapter following it. In order to make clear what the problem is in practical terms, I will take a closer look at the example of self-learning algorithms. For this, I will be using examples from the work by Brent Daniel Mittelstadt and others. In order to look at the social impact of these technologies specifical-ly, I will again make use of work by Zuboff, as well as some other authors who have written on the topic of ‘filter bubbles’. I will show how the view of the Prometheans overlooks certain crucial as-pects of the way in which this particular technology operates, both in technical and social terms. Finally, I will discuss the question again, whether the Promethean argument is practical, and thus plausible.
CHAPTER 1: THE PROMETHEANS
In order to take a close look at the validity and practical value of the Promethean argument, It is important to first examine the work of its most theoretically renowned proponents. In this first chap-ter, I will be discussing two influential and well known anarchist theorists who both ascribe to a ver-sion of the Promethean argument. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was the first political theorist ever to call himself an anarchist, in order to stress to his readers that he was not a Marxist. His writings in the 19th century laid the groundwork for all anarchist versions of the Promethean argument that came after him. In the second half of the 20th century, collectivist anarchist Murray Bookchin was one of the most prominent defenders of this argument that started with Proudhon. For him, techno-logical progress is essentially a positive for social change on a large scale. Many present-day an-archists who argue for revolutionary political change through the use of modern technology are di-rectly building on his theoretical framework. Together, these two authors sketch a detailed view that was summarized later by Gordon, and dubbed the ‘Promethean argument.’12
The Classical Promethean argument: Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865)
“With the introduction of machinery into economy, wings are given to liberty. The machine is the symbol of human liberty, the sign of our domination over nature, the attribute of our po-wer, the expression of our right, the emblem of our personality. Liberty, intelligence - those constitute the whole of man.”13
Uri Gordon mentions Proudhon as one of the classical anarchist writers who put forth the argument that technology can be a tool for human progress. In his famous work The System of Economic
Contradictions or, The Philosophy of Poverty (1847), Proudhon gives an analysis of the
econo-It will be noticed throughout this chapter that the name ‘Promethean argument’ is not chosen at random. The charac
12
-ter from classical mythology is mentioned by both authors.
Proudhon, translation 1972 of The Philosophy of Poverty. In: Gordon, Uri. Anarchism and the Politics of Technology 13
mics of labor of his time, both influenced by and in critique of Marxist thinking. His most famous theories consisted of the understanding of private property as always leading to despotism (“Pro-perty is theft!”), and the realization of true liberty as only possible under conditions of anarchy. 14 When discussing modern technology, Proudhon writes about the modernizing machines of his time, the machines that speed up production and which are regarded as examples of the force of human progress. He writes about the power of machines in relation to labor and the larger capita-list system of production. Crucially, according to Proudhon, the machine will be able to change the conditions of the laborer for the better:
“Every machine may be defined as a summary of several operations, a simplification of powers, a condensation of labor, a reduction of costs. In all these respects machinery is the counterpart of division. Therefore, through machinery will come a restoration of the parcel-laire laborer, a decrease of toil for the workman, a fall in the price of his product, a move-ment in the relation of values, progress towards new discoveries, advancemove-ment of the ge-neral welfare.”15
For Proudhon, the use of machinery under industrial conditions of labor is similar to the craftsman using tools in order to speed up or simplify his work. In this way, more technology can serve to help the individual worker. He compares this relation between the worker and the machine to that of the use of methods of analysis and argumentation by the scientist and the philosopher. In the following passage, Proudhon also conveniently mentions Prometheus, the mythical figure who gave the technology of fire to the human race, and thereby helped them (in defiance of the will of the gods) fulfill their wish to release themselves from their oppressed and brutish way of life. By way of pu-nishment, Zeus orders Prometheus to carry a boulder up a mountain for the rest of eternity. As Gordon explains, “The Prometheus myth thus encapsulates a progressive and anticapitalist
attitu-Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government. 1840. transl. 14
Benjamin R. Tucker, Humboldt Publishing Company, 1890.
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. The System of Economic Contradictions or, the Philosophy of Poverty (Volume I) 1847. 15
de to technology - human ingenuity and its products are goods in themselves, whereas the heavy cost they carry is imposed from the outside.” At the same time, the myth contains “the expectation of technology eventually being released from its chains,” just as Prometheus eventually defies 16 the will of the gods.
To quote Proudhon: “The man who labors proceeds necessarily and by turns by division and the aid of tools; likewise, he who reasons performs necessarily and by turns the operations of synthe-sis and analysynthe-sis, nothing more, absolutely nothing. And labor and reason will never get beyond this: Prometheus, like Neptune, attains in three strides the confines of the world.” 17
Just like in the myth of Prometheus, the availability of certain technologies to modern workers gi-ves them the tools to advance their liberty by removing difficulties from their path. Machines will aid the worker in becoming more free from ‘nature,’ the situation he is in serving under the power of others.
“
man, in inventing a machine, serves his liberty, not, as we express ourselves, because he determines it, but, in M. Dunoyer’s style, because he removes a difficulty from its path.”18However, as Proudhon admits, machines can just as well be “a continual cause of pauperism” : 19
“Machines promised us an increase of wealth; they have kept their word, but at the same time endowing us with an increase of poverty. They promised us liberty; I am going to prove that they have brought us slavery.” 20
Gordon 5 16 Proudhon (1847) 84 17 Proudhon (1847) 86-87 18 Proudhon (1847) 92 19 Proudhon (1847) 95 20
Proudhon does acknowledge that the introduction of new technologies into the capitalist system has not brought liberty to the workers, but it is important to understand that he attributes this to the use of machines by the state and the industrial class. Crucially, he does not mean to say that the existence or introduction of these machines caused this negative development as such. Rather, the machines themselves are what will aid the worker when he embarks on a revolutionary path to become free from slavery. The fact that the machine has up to now brought with it enslavement and exploitation is not due to the machine itself, which holds a potential for freedom, but rather to the use of the machine by the forces of the capitalist establishment. In the chapters that follow the above passages, Proudhon goes on to show how the system has used technological tools to ex-pand its own power over the economy and the common people. However, he attributes this histori-cal fact not to the technology, but to the fact that the worker is unaware of his own predicament. What needs to be done in order to change the system is to educate the masses, to teach them how to use the tools, the machines, available to them. At the same time, by teaching the worker how the technology can be used for good, new inventions might follow that could speed up the process of liberation even more. Once the educated worker is able to take over the machine from the capitalist who currently operates it, the machine will be used to advance the goal of progress. The existence of the machine as such is thus a prelude to the freedom of the working class:
“But the equilibrium of capacities, the prelude of which we have seen in the division of la-bor, does not fulfill the entire destiny of machinery, and the views of Providence extend far beyond. With the introduction of machinery into economy, wings are given to LIBERTY.
The machine is the symbol of human liberty, the sign of our domination over nature, the at-tribute of our power, the expression of our right, the emblem of our personality.” 21
Proudhon (1847) 85 21
In this version of the Promethean argument, the machine as such is an instrument of human libera-tion and progress. The machine in itself is a sign of a positive development in the long arc of hu-man progress. What is prohibiting this progress is the social and political establishments, which have used them to oppress and exploit. In one way, for Proudhon, the social and the technical are completely separate entities: the machine as such holds a power, an inherent possibility of liberati-on. At the same time, however, this same machine is used as a tool by those who wish to hold po-wer over others. Thus, if the technology, which is not capitalist or elitist in itself, po-were to be employ-ed by members of different social classes in order to reach a different social reality, its progressive power could be put to full use. Consequently, when Proudhon calls for revolutionary change, he is calling on workers to take up the tools of industry and wield their power to create a new world of liberty and prosperity. This is the classical Promethean argument.
Proudhon has laid the groundwork for later anarchists to advance this argument and adapt it to their own times. As one might have noticed, the technologies referred to by Proudhon were life-changing at the time of writing, but they are no longer relevant for those who want to use technolo-gy in order to effect change in our present. This is why I will now discuss a more recent example of this same anarchist argument.
The Modern Promethean argument: Murray Bookchin (1921-2006)
Murray Bookchin is one of the most published anarchist writers of the 20th century. His main work on technology and post-scarcity anarchism asks the questions of how to use technology to help forward the anarchist cause, and how to prevent modern anarchists from reverting to individualism and types of primitivism that will only subvert attention from the problems of class and oppression.
In “Self-management and the new technology” (1979) Bookchin writes about the tendency in mo22 -dern workplaces to ask for a level of self-governance by the workers, which is allowed by the em-ployers. Bookchin complains that this kind of power is supposed to free the worker, but in the end it still forces the worker to be part of the system where he is only someone operating the machines. This is why Bookchin links self-management and technology together: “When we talk about ‘self-management’ at this time” “We are, in short, talking about technology” 23
He voices his critique of technology as it is positioned and used within the capitalist system as he describes it, and he asks: “Can present-day technology largely remain as it is, while the men and women who work with it are expected to change as human beings?” 24
He speaks, in the case of the modern factory worker, of “technology which is very exploitative in character.” Because the worker is nothing more than a machine-operator, the machine, and the 25 worker as an extension of this machine, is nothing but a tool for the capitalist running the factory. Like Proudhon, whose point was that the machine does not oppress, but capitalism does, Book-chin’s critique is pointed at the institution of the factory, not at the machines used. Once the worker (and the machines) are able to escape from the environment of the large-scale factory, they will be able to use modern technology to become masters of their craft again. The problem with modern 26 technology is its oppressive environment. By way of solution, Bookchin offers what he calls “volks-technologie:” “These alternative technologies offer a new, maybe even historic framework for
so-Bookchin, Murray. Zelfbestuur en de nieuwe technologie. transl. Bas Moreel (1980). Self-management and the new 22
technology. Telos Nr. 41, fall 1979.
I was unable to find the original English text. All quotes used are translated by me, The original quotes are in the footno-tes.
Bookchin (1979) 2 23
“als we het op het ogenblik over ‘zelfbestuur’ hebben” “Wij denken dan, kort gezegd, aan techniek.” Bookchin (1979) 4
24
“kan de huidige techniek in hoofdzaak blijven zoals zij is, terwijl van de mannen en vrouwen die ermee werken, verwacht wordt dat zij als mens sterk zullen veranderen?”
Bookchin (1979) 4 25
“techniek met een extreem uitbuitend karakter” Bookchin (1979) 22
cietal change. They supply the tangible possibility for self-management in all its rich aspects, as it was known in previous times, without actually returning to the past.” In relation to this, Bookchin 27 also mentions the importance of education, just as Proudhon did. Technology can lead to further education of the common people, which will in turn lead to increasing technological advancement.
This reading of Bookchin, as an advocate for the use of modern technology for social goals other than neoliberal capitalist ones, is consistent with what Gordon states about Bookchin’s Prome-thean stance: “Bookchin’s optimism for technology led him to state that it carried “the prospect of reducing toil to a near vanishing point,” if only a new balance was reached between society and non human nature.” In short, Bookchin’s view is that technology can be used to both free and op28 -press people, which means that the technology itself can be regarded as a neutral tool. At the same time, the use of technology as a tool can be a means to further the end of human liberation. This also closely resembles, at least in tone, the idea of technology as an instrument for broader human progress. Technology represents a force of its own, which together with human will and in-genuity, will be a force of liberation in the long run.
When writing on the struggle between different types of anarchism at the end of the 20th century, most elaborately in Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm (1995), Bookchin stresses the importance of technology for the advancement of social anarchism. In his view, the move towards the promotion of a ‘primitivist lifestyle’ is nothing more than a bad-faith at-tempt to let the individual feel like they are resisting social forces through individual consumer choices. In order to affect real change, one must first admit that the scale and force of the modern capitalist system cannot be matched by small personal changes. Bookchin thus already admits that a solution to the problem, just like the problem, must be larger than the individual. He propo-ses that “the very machines that the bourgeois employs to reduce ‘labor costs’ could, in a rational
Bookchin (1979) 22 27
“Deze alternatieve technieken verschaffen een nieuw, misschien historisch kader voor maatschappelijke verandering. Zij verschaffen de tastbare mogelijkheid om weer tot zelfbestuur te komen in alle rijke schakeringen die dit in het verleden kende, zonder echter tot het verleden terug te keren.”
Gordon 5 28
society, free human beings from mindless toil for more creative and personally rewarding activities.” Once we admit that the scale of the solution must be similar to the scale of the pro29 -blem, modern technology as a means to the end of liberation makes a lot of sense. The tools for mass-change have already been invented and put into practice, just not with the right goals in mind.
In addition to the critique of lifestyle anarchism, Bookchin states that the conflation of capitalism and technology, which leads to the conclusion that both are inherently oppressive, is faulty. Tech-nology is only directly related to the oppression of many because it is deployed for the advance-ment of capitalism. The deployadvance-ment of technology outside of this system does not automatically 30 result in oppression. He thereby again endorses the view of the technology itself as a neutral tool. In order to make this point relevant for his particular day and age, Bookchin focusses on the cau-ses of climate change and environmental decline, which many anarchists have attributed to the use of harmful technologies. His argument is that this explanation identifies technology as the culp-rit, while in fact “it was capitalism — the commodity relationship expanded to its full historical pro-portions — that produced the explosive environmental crisis of modern times.” He ends the chap31 -ter on technology by emphasizing that technologies in fact hold the potential to “offer the hope of a rational and emancipatory dispensation of social affairs.”32
Bookchin’s revolutionary stance is most clearly spelled out in his 1971 work Post-Scarcity
Anar-chism. In there, he does identify the problems capitalism has caused, but he expresses an almost
naive belief in the possibilities that the new generations have at their disposal. Although capita33 -lism has wrecked the environment and has created a sense of alienation and exploitation for many,
Bookchin, Murray. Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm (1995) 22 29 Bookchin (1995) 24 30 Bookchin (1995) 25 31 Bookchin (1995) 26 32
In the introduction to the 1971 edition Bookchin does admit that some of the earlier parts of the work might have been 33
a little forbearing, and he seems aware that it could take a while for history to catch up. Nevertheless, his ideas remain positive about the future in his work after 1971.
there is still a way to proceed towards a post-scarcity world without the negative effects of modern capitalism. Although many are skeptical about the nature of new technology, Bookchin believes that new technologies themselves do not pose a threat. Rather, it is the use of technology for the sake of mass production, and its effects, which engenders skepticism about technology as a who-le. The understanding in capitalist society of technology as positive in a material sense (in terms of the reduction of scarcity) but destructive in a social and environmental sense is only justified be-cause technology has been applied to reinforce hierarchies through the organization of society ac-cording to capitalist values. An application of these same technologies in a non-hierarchical and 34 non-capitalist setting would show that they are not dangerous in themselves. Rather, the fact that technology can provide a social reality without scarcity makes it applicable as a tool for a more equal global order.
In Post-Scarcity Anarchism we find the most explicit version of the Promethean argument in Book-chin. In the introduction, he states that “the seeds for the destruction of bourgeois society lie in the very means it employs for its self-preservation: a technology of abundance that is capable of provi-ding for the first time in history the material basis for liberation.” In other words, the technologies 35 that have been developed in a bourgeois capitalist system will be the tools that anarchists can use in order to get rid of this very same system. Bookchin here sees a possibility for changing the sys-tem from the inside, using the tools that the syssys-tem has here fore used to sustain itself.
In particular, Bookchin speaks of the unique possibility posed by what he calls the “cybernation.” 36 What is interesting about this is that, at the time of writing, the internet was not in any way some-thing that people were thinking about in their everyday lives. According to Bookchin, the ‘unique-ness’ of the current situation and the possibility for global revolution comes from the scale of the modes of production. In short, globalization of capitalist structures has also brought with it the
pos-Bookchin, Murray. Post-Scarcity Anarchism. Ramparts Press, 1971.17 34
Bookchin (1971) 12 35
Bookchin (1971) 33 36
sibility for global change in a non-capitalist direction. He explicitly states that “technological revolu-tion, culminating in cybernarevolu-tion, has created the objective, quantitative basis for a world without class rule, exploitation, toil or material want.”37
Two things should be pointed out here: firstly, it is clear that, although the severity and destructive power of environmental deterioration was very much on Bookchin’s mind, the speeding up of the process of climate change was not. The destructive nature of the mass production of food and other goods, the scale of the modes of production, is something which not only resulted from a global capitalism, but which in itself has already managed to undermine capitalism, as it points to the scarcity of necessary resources, and thus to the impossibility of endless accumulation. Book-chin is very optimistic about the possibilities of total change without mentioning the damage alrea-dy done to the resources available. If someone were to make the same argument today (current technologies can be used for world revolution), they would at least have to mention the fact that climate change has become irreversible. Secondly, I think it is fair to say that Bookchin would be very optimistic about the early internet, as it is the first means of communication that is hypotheti-cally available and affordable on a global scale. If we transpose this argument from the early 70s onto the example of 21st century technologies, it would work even better than what Bookchin had imagined up to this point. 38
These two remarks are only made here to acknowledge the historical position of Bookchin’s wri-ting, and to say that there are limits to this argument just because we are looking back at it from almost fifty years in the future. The gist of the argument, however, is almost identical to what many using the Promethean argument would say today: We have all these technological tools at our dis-posal, and we can use them to start a revolution ‘from the inside.’ The technologies themselves are only as good or bad as those who use them want them to be. If technology has caused misery up to this point, why not use it to release us from this misery? In particular, the scale and the reach of
Bookchin (1971) 33 37
I was unable to find any texts by Bookchin in which he discusses the internet specifically. 38
modern capitalism has led to such amazing downsides (mostly environmental in Bookchin’s wri-ting), that large-scale change in a different direction must also be possible. Technology has enab-led humanity to overcome scarcity, and it can help it overcome more in the same way.
Problems with the Promethean Argument
After diving into the two different versions of the Promethean argument I would now like to discuss some of my own questions and doubts. Most of these issues are concerned with the conception of technology as a neutral tool and the power of this tool with regards to a larger social context. The Promethean argument is powerful because of its uncoupling of technology and current and histori-cal politihistori-cal structures. The question is whether this uncoupling is realistic, and whether the power of technology as such is not overestimated or underestimated.
A prominent problem concerns the neutral nature of technology: can we regard actions and their results performed through technology as objective or neutral? As we have read, for both Proudhon and Bookchin the machines and technologies that have amplified the negative sides of life in capi-talist societies were not the real culprits. Rather, the machines themselves are powerful only inso-far as someone is willing to use them as a means to an end. The Promethean argument only works if one assumes that machines in and of themselves do not hold any political power or value.
A different question is whether a technology can be regarded as separate from its original purpose and initial use. As Gordon also pointed out, “the accelerating series of technological waves in histo-ry were backed by powerful economic and political interests.” Does this histohisto-ry shape the techno39 -logy just as much as the techno-logy is able to shape the future once it is introduced? Is it fair to uncouple the technology from its makers, or is its initial purpose crucial to its further development? When Proudhon spoke of the relation between technology and freedom, does this mean that the
Gordon 7 39
future of any invention is open-ended? In other words, the question is whether the history of a par-ticular technology can be disregarded when it is used to change the future.
Related is the issue of the outside/inside difference: can technology be regarded as something outside of social and political relations, only to be influenced and used through them in positive or negative ways? This question pertains to the importance of societal dynamics for the development of technology. Does a society decide how it uses a technology, or does a technology rather decide the direction of social and political change? Do certain technologies always hold a bias because of the way they operate, and if so, does this mean that it is impossible to work around the social and political implications of any given technology, as the Promethean argument would have us believe? Bookchin admits that the inequalities in capitalist societies have in the past been amplified and shaped by technological developments, yet he is also able to see these technologies as separate from the system which they have helped create. In his view, they could overturn this very same sy-stem. In short, is it possible to pull apart society and its products?
These questions all help to take a more detailed look at the main assumption of the Promethean argument: that technology is a neutral tool which can be used to help humanity in its progress. Technology in a way operates in a different realm from politics and society, but can be picked up and used to help advance them. I will expand on the questions of neutrality in operation, the ques-tion of a technology’s origins, and societal context in the coming chapter. I will base this discussion on the views of Langdon Winner, Michel Foucault and Shoshana Zuboff on society and the impact of technology. Their theories will form the basis for a critical analysis of the Promethean argument as discussed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 2: AGAINST THE PROMETHEANS
At the end of the previous chapter, some concerns were voiced about the assumptions underpin-ning the anarchist Promethean argument. They pertained to the neutrality of the different technolo-gies themselves, to the notion of technology as free from its original context and to technology as being independent from social context. These questions are closely related, as they all ask in diffe-rent ways after the exact relation between the technological and the non-technological. The tech-nology and its user, the techtech-nology and its creator and the techtech-nology and its social and political origins and effects are all relations that need to be examined. For, if the Promethean argument is to hold up, it must be able to convincingly argue that the effects of technology are determined by its user, and separate from the political and social forces behind it.
In order to examine this closely, I will be discussing three authors who have all written extensively about the relation between the technological and the political. Michel Foucault (1926-1984) has used the term ‘technology’ to characterize a particular force in the hands of the larger system of power. For him, technology and power are always interlinked in their productivity. Langdon Winner (1944- ), a philosopher of technology and politics, has written extensively about the political and social implications of the use of technology. Most recently, Shoshana Zuboff (1951- ) has written about the forces behind technological change and the social workings of technology in the 21st century. Her most recent work on surveillance capitalism gives an account of how different social actors work with technology in order to sustain a larger system of capital. The three authors above relate to one another in their similar conceptions of the relation between technologies and social and political structures. For them, technology is not a tool but a function. Possible uses of techno-logy depend on existing and prevailing social structures, not just on the technotechno-logy itself. When conceptualizing the relation between technology and society, many authors in the 20th century, such as Martin Heidegger and Herbert Marcuse, have come to understand technology as separate from the human sphere. However, many recent authors have pointed out that there are no clear
boundaries between the technological and the social or political. Michel Foucault, Langdon Win40 -ner and Shoshana Zuboff are all part of the second category of thinkers. They discuss historical, present day and future examples of technologies that both originate from and influence the politi-cal, each in their way ”affirming that interconnections are important, and not the primacy of either a technological or a human sphere.”41
In this chapter, I will give a detailed history of how these writers have understood technology and its social operations. In short, they all explain in different ways why technology is not just a collecti-on of devices that can be used independently of their social and political background. Technology is a political force in its own right. A theoretical overview of this stance is necessary to pose a coun-ter narrative to that of the Prometheans. My question at the beginning of this thesis was whether the Promethean argument is plausible. The following history of positions will pose a counter narra-tive to the Promethean argument and will form the theoretical basis for further investigation. The order in which I will discuss the authors is chronological, but their basic theoretical views are based on very similar assumptions.
Michel Foucault
Foucault is an author who has made a necessary connection between technology and politics. In his many works, technology refers to “the ways in which modern social and political systems con-trol, supervise, and manipulate populations as well as individuals.” This perspective is fruitful be42 -cause it regards different technological inventions as political tools, while at the same time high-lighting the inextricable connection between these tools and the larger political power structures. In short, technological inventions for regulating, surveilling and steering groups and individuals are always used by political forces, and these forces decide the limits of their functionality. Foucault
Dorrestijn, Steven. Technical Mediation and Subjectivation: Tracing and Extending Foucault’s Philosophy of Technolo
40
-gy. Philosophy & Technology, 2012, Vol.25(2), pp.221-241, 227 Dorrestijn 231
41
Behrent, Michael C. Foucault and Technology. History and Technology, 29:1, 54-104, 2013. 55 42
argues against the neutrality of technology because every example of a technology depends on power relations for its existence and functioning. 43
Crucial to understanding how this view differs from the Promethean stance is the fact that “Fou-cault contends that most power forms (if not technology per se) cannot be reduced to or explained in terms of individual intention.” Particular inventions are not the work of individuals, nor can they 44 be used and adapted by individuals. Although, technically speaking, individual actors use and mo-dify devices, their implementation and functioning with respect to others does not depend on indi-vidual intention and application. Technology is used and shaped by a system, which makes it im-possible for the rebellious individual to pick it up and use it as a tool for purposes other than those the system commands. As put by Dorrestijn, the relevance of Foucault’s work on the subject of technology “is exactly this approach of revealing the role of (hard) technology for governing and fashioning human subjects.” 45
By way of example, in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977), Foucault gives a de-scription of the Panopticon, an architectural design for a new kind of prison by Jeremy Bentham. The prison was constructed in such a way that the individual prisoner in his cell could at all times be observed by a guard. For Foucault, this design is an example of a technique, or a technology, of disciplinary power.4647 Disciplinary power is the power wielded by the modern nation state, and it is characterized by its focus on the individual subject as a subject to be disciplined.48
Behrent 55 43 Behrent 65 44 Dorrestijn 223 45
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. transl. Alan Sheridan. Penguin Books, (1977)1991. 46
200-201 Dorrestijn 221 47
In Discipline and Punish, and several other works, Foucault details the historical development from societies led by 48
Technologies of power are introduced in order to effect discipline. New inventions become more sophisticated ways of controlling populations and capital. They are invented to discipline a particu-lar, previously undisciplined, stratum of society, and they keep functioning as such, even in diffe-rent variations. Thus, both their existence and their use depend on the structures in which they ful-fill particular functions. Power introduces technology in order to solidify its own power, which means that technology and its creators cannot be thought separately. For Foucault, individual technologies can be handled in various ways, but their possible uses are limited. The panopticon, for example, is a technology developed by a powerful apparatus of state surveillance, and this is what it is used for. This conception of technology runs counter to that of the Promethean argument, because it regards every technology as determined in its possible applications by the political structures in which it is initially developed and introduced. Foucault also explains how disciplinary power has implemented the technique of the panoptic view in other institutions, such as mental hospitals and schools. In this respect, there is not so much one building called the Panopticon, but rather a “panoptic machine” working through different social categories. 49
Foucault regards the panoptic schema as a “generalized function,” which means that its techno50 -logy is already determined in its application through its very implementations. The instrument itself embodies the function. The goal can be attained through possible other technologies, but this par-ticular technology cannot be used for anything else. One way in which this could be understood is that the panopticon could be used by other forces of power, but under that new regime it would still fulfill the same function. It is a type of machinery that “assures dissymmetry, disequilibrium, diffe-rence. Consequently, it does not matter who exercises power.” When one’s goal is to create a 51 society free from hierarchies of surveillance and oppression (such as the penal system), the pa-nopticon could not be used, because its only function is to surveil. There are very real limits to the possible applications, and in extension to the open-ended nature of any new invention.
Foucault 217 49 Foucault 207 50 Foucault 202 51
Historically, Foucault understands the development of technologies such as Bentham’s panopticon as inherently political. Political and economic forces needed certain tasks to be fulfilled. Especially during and after the industrial revolution, technology started playing a crucial role in political and social organization:
“it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital.”52
The introduction of new technologies of accumulation have been crucial to the shaping of modern industrial society, and to the politics which encouraged these developments. In turn, modern poli-tics was necessary for the development of new technologies. What is important here is that these technologies were not created in a vacuum: there was a need for them. Politics and capital reinfor-ced one another through the increased use and development of technology. And, as discussed above, the possibilities of the technologies introduced were limited to the functions they were me-ant to fulfill.
This does not mean that technology is inherently oppressive, but rather that the power structures that control the technology always determine its possible implementations. If the power structures were different, the technologies that would be developed within this new system would lead to dif-ferent outcomes. Subjectivation takes place through the introduction and use of technology, which means that different technologies would create different political subjects. In order to change the 53 political role of technology, in order for technology to create different subjects, the power dynamics
Foucault 221 52
Dorrestijn 222 53
behind the development of technology must first be modified. Changing power relations through the use of these technologies is not possible within the Foucauldian framework.
Langdon Winner
“Prometheus: I caused mortals to cease foreseeing doom.” 54
“Prometheus's problem is something
like
our own. Modern people have filled the world with the most remarkable array of contrivances and innovations.If
it now happens that these works cannot be fundamentally reconsidered and reconstructed, humankind faces a woefully perma-nent bondage to the power of its own inventions.” 55Langdon Winner is a 20th century philosopher of technology who has made an appealing case for the understanding of technology as a social and political force, rather than as a straightforward tool for use. In his 1986 work The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High
Tech-nology, Winner discusses several historical examples of technologies that have been regarded as
‘progressive’ and ‘modern,’ but that have had oppressive political and social impacts from the mo-ment of their conception up to the present. Just as Foucault has done with the example of the Pa-nopticon, Winner mentions infrastructure and energy (in particular nuclear power) as powerful technologies that have been used and developed by powerful political forces. His argument is that the narrative of ‘progress’ is only applicable to very basic technical innovation. As soon as a parti-cular technology is introduced into a larger political and social system, the technology can no lon-ger be understood as standing on its own, and the progress that comes with it is no lonlon-ger guaran-teed.
Winner, Langdon. Luddism and Epistemology. In: Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition, an Antho
54
-logy. ed. Robert C. Scharff & Val Dusek. Blackwell, 2003. 609 Winner (2003) 610
Winner writes that “technologies are not merely aides to human activity, but also powerful forces acting to reshape that activity and its meaning.” His mentioning of Prometheus and his discussi56 -ons of Marxist and other social activist arguments make him an ideal candidate for posing a coun-ter argument to the Promethean argument from chapcoun-ter 1. Winner does not try to hide is skepti-cism with regards to the general Promethean argument: “Scarcely a new invention comes along that someone doesn’t proclaim it as the salvation of a free society.” He acknowledges and ex57 -plains that his problem with this argument lies with its assumption of the relation between society and technology. For example, Winner suggests that the optimistic view of technology common with Marxists, the view that “while capitalism is a target to be attacked, technological expansion is enti-rely good in itself, something to be encouraged without reservation,” misunderstands the funda58 -mental relationship between technology and society. For Winner, the focus should not so much be on the possibilities of technologies, because these possibilities do not stand on their own. His view is rather that “social activity is an ongoing process of world-making.” What makes this view diffe59 -rent is that it shifts the emphasis from the technological to the social. Technology is not just a tool for making the social, the social is always in the process of making a ‘world,’ which means that the development and use of technology is part of a social process of creation and adaptation. The task of the philosopher of technology is therefore to focus on the “production of psychological, social and political conditions as a part of any significant technical change.” Changes in technology are 60 not a sign of progress per se, but rather of the change in a social world, which is always in the ma-king.
As the quote at the top of this section indicates, Winner wonders about the dangers of regarding technology as a force in itself. If we argue that technology is a powerful tool necessary for the
ad-Winner, Langdon. The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology. University of Chica
56 -go Press, 1986. 6 Winner (1986) 20 57 Winner (1986) 17 58 Winner (1986) 17 59 Winner (1986) 17 60
vancement of society, we risk giving it an agency of its own. When technology becomes a power in itself, it is easy to disregard its social connections and therefore its function as a tool for establis-hed powers. It moves the argument away from social forces and towards a kind of techno-utopia-nism that dismisses political and social systems that operate in the background of technological advancement. World-making is a social process primarily, not a technological one. Winner does not, however, argue for an understanding of politics as something completely human, and that technology operates independently on a lower level. According to Winner, this view is also not ac-curate because “taken literally, it suggests that technical things do not matter at all. Once one has done the detective work necessary to reveal the social origins - power holders behind a particular instance of technological change - one will have explained everything of importance.”61
Winner acknowledges that technologies and their different applications also have an influence on political life. But his point is that these applications always have a political or capitalist strategy be-hind them, in addition to their social power as technological appliances. The more we depend on technology, the more these technologies will be used by the powerful to delineate, entrench and expand their power and influence. This strategy is becoming more prevalent as humans become more dependent on technology. In short, the fact that the social world is becoming more technolo-gical means that it is also becoming more vulnerable to manipulation and ‘world-making’ by way of these technologies. In this light, Winner suggests that “we pay attention to the characteristics of technical objects and the meaning of those characteristics. A necessary complement to, rather than a replacement for theories of the social determination of technology, this approach identifies certain technologies as political phenomena in their own right.”62
According to Winner’s theory, technical artifacts can contain political properties in two different ways:
Winner (1986) 21 61
Winner (1986) 22 62
1. “invention, design, or arrangement of a specific technical device or system becomes a way of settling an issue in the affairs of a particular community.” 63
Examples of this would be the introduction of machines and conveyor belts in factories. There was a societal demand for more cheaper products, and technology stepped in to provide. Winner would say that most inventions that are used in daily life fall into this category. Crucially, even inventions like the coffee machine or the mobile phone are thus already political in this schema.
2. “Inherently political technologies”: “Man-made systems that appear to require or to be strongly compatible with particular kinds of political relationships.”64
This category often pertains to more large scale technologies, such as Foucault’s panopticon or the building and operating of nuclear reactors. These technologies rarely change much in the daily lives of individuals, but they do influence and steer the social sphere more broadly. I would argue that, although personal computers fall into the first category, the internet and its many applications in the social and the financial spheres fall into this second category. The fact that I can go onto the internet and pay for something depends on a certain form of capitalism and a political will to orga-nize networks and the financial system in a particular way. Whether I as an individual choose to use these options is less relevant: the technology has been implemented in such a way as to regu-late a particular kind of social order.
By way of example of the second category, Winner discusses the bridges built around 1936 by New York architect Robert Moses. His argument is that this kind of technology can be understood 65 in two ways. On the surface, these bridges were meant to enable traffic between one part of the city and another. However, in the second sense, these technologies served a more obscure social purpose. The bridges were relatively low above the streets, and this design was deliberate. Becau-se of the short distance between traffic below and the bridge above, large city busBecau-ses would be unable to pass underneath. And busses were primarily used by low-income black citizens. In this
Winner (1986) 22 63 Winner (1986) 22 64 Winner (1986) 25 65
way, the design was meant to keep the lower classes away from particular areas. This example helps one see “the importance of technical arrangements that precede the use of the things in question.” With regards to the individual, they can choose to drive under the bridge or to take the 66 bus and go around it. But in a broader sense, this particular technology was built to further en-trench a form of social segregation. The overall position states that “a given device might have been designed and built in such a way that it produces a set of consequences logically and tempo-rally prior to any of is professed uses.”67
Although individual appliances are political in only a minor sense, large-scale technological infra-structure and availability requires political backing and organization. This might sound obvious, but it is easy to overlook the consequences of this fact for all kinds of technology commonly used in society. Moser’s bridges can neither be regarded as simple artifacts, nor can they be fully explai-ned through political and social motives. The technology itself carries certain characteristics that are both practical and politically significant. I would suggest that every technology would fall into Winner’s first category, while the larger technological structure and organization falls into the se-cond category. Every example from the first category, however, is directly or indirectly dependent on technology in the second category. Everyday appliances depend on their compatibility with and access to power or another type of underlying network. Every road and bridge depends on public money and organization. At the same time, every policy decision requires the technological tools and expertise to implement and sustain it. In this way, technology and politics are inextricably lin-ked: “one must say that the technological deck has been stacked in advance to favor certain social interests and that some people were bound to receive a better hand than others.” 68
“The things we call “technologies” are ways of building order in our world. Many technical devices and systems important in everyday life contain possibilities for many different ways
Winner (1986) 25 66 Winner (1986) 25 67 Winner (1986) 26 68
of ordering human activity. Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, so-cieties choose structures for technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time. In the processes by which structuring decisions are made, different people are situated differently and possess unequal degrees of power as well as unequal levels of awareness.” 69
Winner’s argument thus regards technologies not just as tools, but as structuring devices. And even if an individual can use a particular device as a means to an end, the use of this technology is only possible when the world is structured in a way that enables this individual application. A parti-cular technology requires a partiparti-cular social and political environment, just as our modern societies require technology to organize this environment efficiently. In terms of political power and control, as with Foucault, the power of the technology starts with its implementation, and is expanded or adapted from that point on:
“By far the greatest latitude of choice exists the very first time a particular instrument, sys-tem, or technique is introduced. Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equipment, economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes once the initial commitments are made.”70
When taking the panopticon as an example of a technology of power, it is clear how its first intro-duction was as a political tool. Afterwards, different versions of the same basic structure were im-plemented throughout society. However, the power behind it did not change. Once the technology existed and became part of the social structure, its essential function remained the same. This is due to the fact that “Technological development is an accumulative process that fixes social relati-ons into material reality. As opposed to tool use, which solves one problem, technology is a
recur-Winner (1986) 28-29 69
Winner (1986) 29 70
sive application in which the result of the application is (re)utilized on the same space.” This un71 -derstanding of the role of technology explains why both Foucault and Winner would be skeptical of the Promethean argument: technology fulfills a certain function, and this function is as much part of the technology as its material characteristics. Technologies are often not very flexible, and “to choose them is to choose unalterably a particular form of political life.”72
By way of example, Winner discusses Friedrich Engels’ view of technology. For Engels, authorita-rian government is a necessary condition for the functioning of the technologies used in modern industry. The mechanical means of production require a hierarchical structure of management 73 and control in order to produce efficiently. Engels himself, as a communist, was obviously not too pleased with the conditions in and workings of the factory in capitalist society. However, he was also skeptical of the anarchist argument that industry could produce in the same way in a more egalitarian society. Engels believed that the way the factory works demands an authoritarian sys-tem in order to function according to its design. Winner judges Engels’ view to be somewhat ex-treme. However, he states that “If we examine social patterns that characterize the environments of technical systems, we find certain devices and systems almost invariably linked to specific ways of organizing power and authority.” 74
In summary, “What appear to be merely instrumental choices are better seen as choices about the form of social and political life a society builds, choices about the kinds of people we want to be-come.” Winner's version of Engels’ argument would be that, in order to change the dynamics of political and social life and to replace the capitalist system of exploitation, the role of technology must also be taken into account. And if certain technologies require a particular (authoritarian)
Gordon 8 71 Winner (1986) 29 72 Winner (1986) 30 73 Winner (1986) 33 74
government structure in order to function or a (capitalist) system in order to be used to full potenti-al, the question is whether these technologies should be used at all.
“Just as Plato and Aristotle posed the question, What is the best form of political society? so also an age of high technology ought to ask, What forms of technology are compatible with the kind of society we want to build?”75
In this view, the Promethean argument is presenting the options in an incorrect order. The question should not be how to use existing technologies to create a different world, but rather how we wish to organize our world in order to know which kinds of technologies to use and develop. Because, according to Gordon’s reading of Winner, “technologies both express and reproduce specific pat-terns of social organization and cultural interaction."76
In terms of possible futures, Winner in his time observes a “growing alienation with the organizati-onal forms of both politics and technology.” This is because the distance between the individual 77 and the technological systems running in the background has become larger as the process of technological development has increased in speed and size. He mentions the paradoxical situation modern societies are in, as there is the expectation that relief from this estrangement, caused by technology, will also be reached through technological advancement. I would say that the notion 78 that ‘the internet will save us’ falls into this category of paradoxical reasoning. Winner describes this belief in the power of technology as an easy way out:
Winner (1986) 52 75 Gordon 7 76 Winner (1986) 94 77 Winner (1986) 95 78
“The emancipation proposed by decentralist philosophers as a deliberate goal requiring long, arduous social struggle has been upheld by technological optimists as a condition to be realized simply by adopting a new gadget.”79
If social and political change is the goal, then technology is not going to be an easy fix. In order for technology to be effective in the creation of equality and new kinds of political organization “any significant move to decentralize would amount to retro-fitting our whole society, since centralized institutions have become the norm.”80
As our societies have become technologized with the help of and in concurrence with existing poli-tical structures, the call for change through the use of these same technologies in somewhat cyni-cal. The technologies are effective because the underlying systems want them to be. If we want these technologies to be effective in a different direction, the political structures must be changed first. And although Winner wrote all of this before the introduction of smartphones and online ban-king, he does warn of the tacit acceptance of further technological solutions to non-technological problems. Dependence on technology implies dependence on particular political structures. And as we become more dependent on both, it becomes harder to imagine a way to change either one of them.
Winner even discusses the relatively novel (in his time) view of digital techno-utopianism, voicing his doubts about the possibilities of the new personal computer to change society. He terms these views “mythinformation: the almost religious conviction that a widespread adoption of computers and communication systems will automatically produce a better world for human living.” Winner 81 does admit that computers will have a significant effect on social life, but he judges this optimism to be a misrepresentation of the direction that these new kinds of social relations will move society
Winner (1986) 95-96 79 Winner (1986) 96 80 Winner (1986) 105 81
