Taking the strategy to the streets, or the streets to the strategy? : current deradicalization stragies in the European Union analyzed and compared, using a Multi-level Governance approach

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Abstract

During the last five to ten years, jihadist terrorism in the European Union can be illustrated by an increasing severity of executed attacks and a shift towards homegrown perpetrators. Accordingly, this surge of internal violence has had consequences for the approach of terrorism in the European Union. The main result of this, is the appearance of deradicalization as the key aspect in protecting the European society from (especially Islamist) terrorist threat.

Numerous institutions, agencies and organizations are engaged in battling radicalization at different governmental levels. This thesis seeks to both untangle the web of active actors in this field and moreover address the question why so many different actors are engaged in combatting radicalization in the European Union. Analysing and comparing the deradicalization strategies of Europol, the Dutch intelligence agency and the Key Figure Programme (a currently active programme in Amsterdam) from the perspective of multi-level governance makes answering this question possible.

This research shows that varying levels of governance make for actors suited for different tasks concerning battling terrorism. Within the specific field of deradicalization it is found that a well-tailored approach is essential for progression. It is therefore argued that this variety of actors is necessary for addressing all aspects of radicalization.

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List of Acronyms

AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheiddienst

AQAM Al Qaeda and Affiliated Movements

BNV Burea Nationale Veiligheid

BVD Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CTG Counter Terrorism Group

CVD Centrale Veiligheidsdienst

EAS European Agenda on Security

EBCG European Border and Coast Guard Agency

EC European Commission

EIS Europol Information System

EMPACT European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats

EP European Parliament

ES 16-20 Europol Strategy 2016-2020

EU IRU European Union Internet Referral Unit

EU European Union

EUCS European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy

Europol European Police Office

EWP Europol Work Programme

Frontex Frontières Extérieures

IS Islamic State

JHA Justice and Home Affairs

KFP Key Figure Programme

MIVD Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst

MLG Multi-level Governance

NCTV Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid

NP Nationale Politie

OM Openbaar Ministerie

RIIA Royal Institute for International Affairs

RvdK Raad voor de Kinderbescherming

SIENA Secure Information Exchange Network Application

SNRP Strategic Network Radicalisation and Polaristation

TEU Treaty on European Union

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Introduction

Recently, the European Union (EU) has endured multiple terrorist incidents. Since the beginning of 2016, severe Islamist terrorist attacks in Brussels, Nice, Berlin, Manchester and London alone have cost 167 lives and left 668 people injured. This is only a limited number of attacks that turned out to be the most harmful. Many other ‘minor’ attacks took place during the same period of time as well (The Religion Of Peace, 2017). For a broader overview on the security situation in the EU, the most comprehensive source is the annually published TE-SAT report, conducted by Europol. These documents report on the situation in the agency’s operational fields during the preceding year. Since the last report was published in 2016, the figures below are concerning the situation in 2015. In this year, the EU endured 211 attempts to a terrorist attack. Although not all successfully executed, these attacks combined caused the death of 151 people. Especially the two series of jihadist attacks in Paris in January and November turned out to be chief constituents to this number, accounting for 148 fatalities (Europol, 2016c, p. 10).

Not only was Islamic influenced terrorism the main cause of severe inflicted harm, moreover it was by far the biggest group of arrestees linked to terrorism. During 2015, a total of 1077 people were arrested on these grounds. The 687 arrested Islamist radicals accounted for almost 64% of the total (Europol, 2016c, p. 10). This meant a significant increase both in actual numbers and as a share of the total compared to the previous year. In respect to 2014, the total number of jihadist arrestees grew with almost 74% from 395 to 687. At the same time, the share of jihadist linked arrests of the total grew from 51% in 2014 to the earlier mentioned 64% a year later (Europol, 2016c, p. 10).

Within this jihadist group, there are two more meaningful figures distinguishable. First, there has been a fierce increase in the number of ‘young’ suspects. While two years earlier only 87 arrestees were younger than 25 years old, this number rose to 268 in 2015, accounting for a quarter of all arrests (Europol, 2016c, p. 11). A second important observation deriving from the TE-SAT report, concerns the country of origin of those arrested in consequence of jihadist activity. A considerable majority of almost 63% of the arrestees was registered as an European Union citizen. Approximately 58% percent of them was both born and raised within one of the Member States (Europol, 2016c, p. 11).

Thus, one can conclude that the generally present reflex of connecting ‘jihadism’ to the more general term ‘terrorism’ is stooled on matching numbers. Jihadist incited terrorism is distinctly more violent than any other specific type at this time. One can identify two significant changes in jihadist terrorism in the EU during the last years. First and foremost, attacks became more harmful, whereas the number of casualties rose considerable. Secondly, there is a recognizable shift from jihadist terrorists coming to Europe solely for the execution of the attack, to networks of homegrown jihadist, based in the Member States. This combination causes a changing field in counter terrorism measures, since ‘radicalization’ became the key

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they were born, grew up and live. . It is therefore not surprisingly that the scope of counter terrorism policy focusses predominantly on the detection and prosecution of (potential) jihadist terrorists (Europol, 2016c, pp. 6–7).

Despite this political focus on the issue, a feeling of fear and intimidation is developing in Europe. This ‘intimidation’ has seen a significant surge in the Netherlands between 2015 and today. During the spring of 2017, the Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV), found that 47% of the Dutch population feared ‘terrorism’ (NCTV, 2017, p. 7). Just a year-and-a-half earlier, in November 2015, only 7% was fearing a terrorist attack (NCTV, 2016, p. 7).

A brief glance at the field of deradicalization policy, probably offers no direct relief either. It does not provide a clear overview of measures and programmes. On the contrary, within the European Union a true legion of agencies, institutions and organizations is engaged in countering radicalization. This results in a mere web of overlapping, overarching and interconnected active bodies battling the same issue (den Boer, Hillebrand and Nölke, 2008, p. 102).

This thesis analyses three of these organizations. More particularly it conducts an analysis of the deradicalization strategies of Europol, the Dutch intelligence agency (AIVD) and the Key Figure Programme (KFP) currently at play in Amsterdam. These strategies are assessed in order to evaluate their existence in respect to each other and their main goal; battling radicalization within the EU.

Europol, the AIVD and the KFP are just three actors in the mentioned web of participants in deradicalization policy. Nevertheless, they can provide valuable information whereas they operate at three different governmental levels. By assessing their role in the total policy field this research attempts to formulate an answer to the question: Why is deradicalization policy in the European Union designed and implemented by a multitude of different actors operating at varying governmental levels?

This main question is answered with the building blocks supplied by the answers to five sub questions: (i) How can EU policy be analysed and explained? (ii) What is (de)radicalization? (iii) How has (de)radicalization evolved in the EU? (iv) How can deradicalization strategies be orderly analysed? And (v) How can the place/role of actors in the current field or deradicalization policy be explained?. Each of these sub questions addresses a distinctive part of necessary information.

In order to analyse and explain the current field of radicalization policy, this thesis builds on multi-level governance theory. This theory can fulfil such a role whereas it reveals why this cluttered policy field is a rather logical consequence of efficient policy making (Bache, 2012, p. 1). This theory will therefore be used to interpreted the three different deradicalization strategies as presented by Europol, the Dutch intelligence agency and the KFP.

For the sake of coherently analysing the three strategies, this thesis proposes the use of a tailored analytical framework which is referred to as the analytical framework for deradicalization strategies (AFDS).

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This framework consists of six components which, when combined, present the role of the actor within the field of deradicalization policy.

Chapter 1 thoroughly analyses the use of MLG theory in this thesis. It presents the history of the theory and the critiques that it has encountered along the way. The following Chapter 2 discusses (de)radicalization. Here both radicalization an deradicalization are assessed in individual sections, focussed solely on the explanation of the term as such. The same chapter delivers two brief sections on the development of radicalization and deradicalization in the European Union. Chapter 3 embodies the methodological approach of this research. Used documents and other choices in the research process are both introduced and legitimized. Furthermore, the mentioned analytical framework used for the analysis of the three deradicalization strategies is presented and discussed. Chapter 4 introduces the three actors and their deradicalization strategies. The sections in this chapter aim to fill in as completely as possible the AFDS for each individual strategy. Chapter 5 presents the analysis of the strategies. The three AFDS’s are compared and interpreted from a MLG perspective. After these five chapters, all elements necessary for answering the sub questions are available. These will be briefly summarized in the concluding remarks after which the main research question is answered.

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Chapter 1. Multi-level Governance

Multi-level Governance (MLG) theory is inseparably connected to the studying of developments within the European Union. Especially since the early eighties, when the appointing of competences to supranational institutions such as the European Commission (EC) and the European Parliament (EP) spurred the process of European integration. This called for a ‘new’ approach regarding the relation between the various actors involved. Previously popular theoretical approaches to the European project lost their momentum. Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism in particular were no longer suited to grasp the complexity of European politics (Bache, 2012, p. 1).

The first mentioning of the MLG approach to the integration process regards the cohesion policy and in particular the policy concerning so-called structural funds (Stephenson, 2013, pp. 819–820). During the eighties, the European Union (EU) worked on the establishment of an internal market. This was an expensive operation and therefore a form of compensation was offered to economically underprivileged member states. The compensation was offered in the form of a significant raise of structural funds which were supposed to ‘assist the development of disadvantaged regions within member states’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, p. 3).

The allocation of the funds was managed by ‘partnerships established within member states’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, p. 3) to achieve the most effective distribution of these financial resources. Especially this type of partnership, which operates at the sub-national level, illustrated the fit of MLG to the (new) design of the European political field (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, p. 3). The main architect of the theory, Gary Marks, saw MLG as:

‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional and local – as the result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/reginal level’ (Marks, 1993, p. 392).

In later work, Marks (in cooperation with Liesbeth Hooghe and Kermit Blank) highlights the connection between the funding scheme spurred by the establishment of the internal market and MLG theory. They emphasize that the reform of the cohesion policy in 1989 encouraged and even required other levels of government to engage in the policy making process. Or in their words:

‘The 1989 reform prescribes the involvement of Commission, national, regional, local and social actors on a continuing basis in all stages of the policy process. (…) Partnership is implemented unevenly across the EU, but just about everywhere it institutionalizes some form of direct contact between the Commission and non-central government actors including, particularly, regional and local authorities, local action groups and local businesses.’ (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, pp. 368–369)

One could thus distinguish MLG as the solution to the search for a more fitting approach to a changing European political field with a ‘new’ set of actors. Throughout the following years, the theory grew from its infant state to a more sophisticated one, better applicable to a wider set of issues than merely the structural

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funding policy (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011, p. 35). However, during this same period, critical analyses of the theory pointed out several ambiguities as well.

This chapter will further investigate MLG theory as such. First of all, the work of its main founders Marks and Hooghe is analysed. This is done by setting out both the origin and the theoretical body of the theory. After their definition and explanation of the MLG-theory, the most heard critiques and criticisms are identified and analysed. Moreover, this section refutes these criticisms from the perspective of the scope of this research. Including critiques and their opposing arguments creates a more developed version of MLG theory as it is used in this thesis. Finally, MLG theory is convened with the specific issue in this thesis: deradicalization measures within the European Union. This last step allows one to construct a solid base for the analysis of the deradicalization strategies from Europol, the AIVD and the municipality of Amsterdam.

1.1. A changing political field in Europe

The main urge for a new approach towards governance in a changing European political field, found its birth in the negotiations regarding, and especially the execution of the structural funding policy in the second half of the eighties. The efficient allocation and administration of these funds turned out to be served by a more local approach rather than on an European or even national level. MLG theory delivered a theoretical approach to this phenomenon (George, 2004, p. 107).

Thus, Marks mentioned social cohesion policy as the first event inciting the emerge of MLG theory. In total there are three events that can be identified as such. Besides the structural funding programme, European politics were also reorganized by the establishment of both the single market and the Treaty on European Union (TEU) during the early nineties (Stephenson, 2013, p. 819). The single market as instituted within the so-called ‘1992-programme’ spurred the activity and influence of interest groups. The economic European integration lead to more access points to present preferences and persuade policy makers on different levels of governance (Stephenson, 2013, p. 819). Given the institutionalization of comitology, caused by the process of European integration, the field of policy making increasingly involved state actors (Stephenson, 2013, p. 819).

However, in this process decentral (or sub-) state actors likewise found their way into policy making. Member States’ governments needed expertise on the often highly technical policy issues. Therefore they had to rely on sub-national or local actors (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996, pp. 346–347). These interest groups were (and are) not bound to a certain level of governance. They are able to address their activities towards the influential political actors at a specific policy terrain. This in turn showed the fragmentation of the policy making process in Europe.

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‘The Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’ (Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012)

In short, the principle implies that policy should be made at the lowest possible level. For this level of policy making one should look further than the ‘original’ governmental levels of the state and international institutions. Sub-national or local actors are ought to be included if they provide additional efficiency to the process (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, pp. 235-236). This contributes fairly to the fit of MLG theory on the field of European policy making.

Thus one can distinguish the organizational architecture of the structural funding programme, interest groups displaying the fragmentation of policy making and the institutional principle regarding this fragmentation in the form of subsidiarity as contributing to the rise of MLG theory. However these three events mentioned above should not directly be interpreted as pure ‘causes’ for the development of MLG. Rather they should be seen as illustrative for the changing political playing field in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. The initial defining of MLG by Marks and Hooghe should therefore primarily be seen in the light of these events.

1.2. The maturing of MLG

MLG theory in its most primal state is profoundly based upon the work of Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe. They first published a writing titled ‘Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC’ in 1993 (Marks, 1993). Although later mildly contested, many scholars agree upon this writing as being the ‘first mentioning’ of the phenomenon of multi-level governance. This dispute will be discussed further in a later section of this chapter where criticism on the theory will be analysed. For now, this 1993 article will be the starting point of the life cycle of MLG within political science.

Marks argued that the then conventional perspective regarding the development of the institutions of the European Union was missing a ‘critical element’ (Marks, 1993, p. 392). By solely focussing on supranational and national approaches, the debate was missing ‘the increasing importance of subnational levels of decision making and their myriad connections with other levels’ (Marks, 1993, p. 392). According to Marks, this lack of an inclusive overview, urges for the MLG-approach.

From this base, more scholars started considering and applying MLG in their work. Accordingly the theory expanded and became more solid. One of the first goals for these scholars was showing that MLG was not merely a tool to explain European integration in that period of time, but rather a ‘new wave of thinking about the EU as a political system’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, p. 2). Especially the possibility of an alternative approach of European politics instead of the state-centric model, attracted others to delve deeper into the ideas fundamental for Mark’s theory. This attention for and working with MLG likewise brought Marks to intensify his work on the matter. This resulted in a further development of MLG theory

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(Stephenson, 2013, p. 820). This development embodies the establishment of two different ‘types’ of MLG. Joining forces with Liesbet Hooghe, Marks published two more articles (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a; Marks and Hooghe, 2004), building on this refined essence of MLG.

1.2.1. MLG Type I

The most eye-catching addition to MLG theory is the recognition of two different ‘types’ of MLG being referred to as Type I and Type II (Bache, 2012, pp. 4–5). Type I is the more conventional approach of cross-border politics and is based on a somewhat federalist approach, or in other words: the recognition of ‘power sharing among a limited number of governments operating at just a few levels’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2003, p. 236). Governance is organized in appointed jurisdictions. Most often these are local, intermediate and central. These jurisdictions are focussed at a fixed number of policy fields and ought to serve a more general purpose. By general is meant that they are not established for a specific task, but rather to be serving the broader public good within an demarcated area. This means that, within the jurisdiction, multiple specific tasks are executed (Hooghe and Marks, 2003b, p. 236-237).

These jurisdictions overlap neither territorially nor between different tiers (higher or lower levels) of governance. This can be seen in the territories appointed to a certain governmental body (Hooghe and Marks, 2003b, pp. 236–237). For example in the case of municipal leadership. The mayor of one municipality has no powers in the next one.

Additionally, jurisdictions are rarely newly created or disestablished since such reform would be an expensive procedure. For example, one could consider the different ministries within the Dutch government. When a ‘new’ phenomenon emerges (such as cyber security), this will be fitted in within the agenda of an already existing ministry, rather than creating a new one (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, pp. 236– 237).

1.2.2. MLG Type II

The second type of MLG - Type II - varies in several elements from Type I. First of all the jurisdictions are task-specific rather than serving a general purpose. Practically this means that ‘the government’ as such is not always delivering the governance on an specific policy area. Instead multiple specialized public service industries adopt governmental tasks (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, p. 237). Furthermore, Type II MLG is characterized by the interconnection between jurisdictions. This means that there is horizontally (territorially) interaction, but also that there is less vertically (between levels of governance) hierarchy in this approach’, causing jurisdictions to cover multiple levels of governance in a potentially overlapping nature. This governmental construction is in the United States (US) also referred to as polycentricity, and condominio. The European Union is therefore seen as such in the US (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, pp. 237– 239). In a condominio there are multiple individually and locally governing bodies that overlap each other’s

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service is provided, since this should be in accordance with the most efficient implementation and the preferences of citizens. This leads to many different levels and jurisdiction on topic-specific scale. Subsequent to these many levels (if this term still makes sense), jurisdictions are easily and regularly adapted to topical demand (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, pp. 237–238).

Whereas there are thus several distinctive differences between Type I and II MLG, the latter is most commonly an addition to the former. Countries often still rely on the Type I levels of governance with the official government of the state in a most meaningful position. Nevertheless, one can identify several fields in which there are overlapping policy agreements on the same territory, especially in the context of so-called international regimes. One of the most illustrative fields for such Type II governance is environmental regulation, with many agreements on different levels of governance (reaching from local to global) though undeniable overlapping each other regarding both goals and territory (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, pp. 238– 239).

1.3. Critiques on and limitations of MLG

As one will notice further on in this section, MLG is used (or at least tested) in an increasing number of academic (sub-)fields (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, p. 9). This leads to a broader and more extensive stress-test for the theory itself. Nevertheless it accordingly incited criticisms regarding the applicability of MLG in other fields than European integration. This section identifies the core critiques developed concerning the theoretical approach: (i) its vagueness, (ii) its lack of applicability, (iii) the avoidance of so-called ‘high politcs’and (iv) its problematic legitimization. Each of these critiques is thoroughly reflected upon afterwards. In other words: the section discusses whether a critique is (a) reasonably deserved and (b) of relevant influence on analysing deradicalization within the European Union?

1.3.1. Vagueness

Starting with the first, several scholars have argued that MLG theory is only applicable in some cases because it is lacking explanatory power. Bache and Flinders see this caused by overambitious expectations. They state: ‘As concepts become more widely applied, they can become devoid of meaning’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004a, p. 197). When one turns this logic around, a situation arises where an explanatory shortcoming (or vagueness) results in an easier applicable theory. Bache and Flinders indeed claim that this vagueness makes the theory more widely applicable (making for a ‘better’ theory). (Bache and Flinders, 2004a, pp. 204–205).

One of the issues where scholars are missing this explanatory power is regarding the results of altering policy arrangement. They recognise a lacking explanation on whether the arranging of policy making at different (and ‘new’) levels is changing the outcomes of these policies. Or put differently: does policy outcome change when sub-national or non-state actors are being involved in the process (Bache and Flinders, 2004b, p. 204)?

Furthermore, MLG seemed to have omitted explanation when it came to so-called ‘multi-level involvement’ and ‘multi-level governance’. Following this critique, Stephenson claims the need for a

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difference between these two terms. The former (involvement) is merely claiming access to the process with an opportunity to stress ones preferences for an actor and is therefore less influential. The latter (governance) implies a rather decisive role in the process. Due to a lack of this division, MLG fails to explain why some governmental levels are increasingly important while others are losing powers (Stephenson, 2013, p. 825).

1.3.2. Applicability of MLG theory

In contrast with the critique by Bache and Flinders that MLG theory is ‘to vague and (only) therefore applicable’ there are also scholar who question this very applicability. This problem arises predominantly within close by but different academic fields such as international relations and European studies. In the field of international relations and even more specific the issue of terrorism, Stephen Welch and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe voice deep concern regarding the usefulness and fitness of MLG theory. They identify ‘some crucial ambiguities even in its general usage’. This is noticeably the case when it comes to international relations (Welch and Kennedy-Pipe, 2004, p. 127).

Welch and Kennedy-Pipe analysed the field of transnational threats, including terrorism. In this case they argued that states actors (or put differently; national governments) answer those issues. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the US proclaimed the ‘War on Terror’. The invasion of both Iraq and Afghanistan was legitimized on the grounds of terrorist threat. This is illustrative for the state activity incited by such threat. State building, or at least an attempt to this, was a part of the military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan. Especially in the later phases of the conflicts, it became a fundamental element in the US military’s strategy. Welch and Kennedy-Pipe recognize the possible role of non-state or sub-national actors in such a state building phase. However this role is seen as marginal. Additionally, these sub-national actors played little top no role in the war itself. This contradicts their central position within the MLG theory (Welch and Kennedy-Pipe, 2004, pp. 140–141).

MLG is first and foremost connected to explaining policy making within the European Union (George, 2004, p. 107). However, even in academic work regarding this geographical area there are concerns about the theory’s applicability. Paul Stubbs’ work on South East Europe is the leading example for these concerns (Stubbs, 2005). In his publications, Stubbs points out the mere mutual disregard between the region and MLG. In other words: MLG analyses hardly ever concern South East European areas and in this region political research likewise chooses to oversee MLG as an approach.

Stubbs therefore concludes that ‘the concept of multi-level governance does not derive from political, policy and practical realities in South East Europe’ (Stubbs, 2005, p. 69). He claims a certain Western European or Western European Union bias. MLG theory is solely applicable when the analysis focusses on policy making models in the member states of the early hour (Stubbs, 2005, pp. 70–73).

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1.3.3. Avoidance of ‘high politics’

Despite its diffusion, MLG theory has been accused of avoiding policy areas that would proof more difficult to explain. One of the scholars who claims such is Paul Stephenson. He argues that MLG theory is primarily deriving its explanatory powers in the analysis of so-called ‘former first pillar areas (Stephenson, 2013, p. 828). This first pillar refers to the European Community in the three-pillar structure as decided on in the Maastricht treaty dating from 1992. The pillar concerns ‘the domains in which the Member States share their sovereignty via the Community institutions’ (EUR-Lex, 1992). In these fields of policy making, sub-national levels were heavily involved in the process. This makes for a strong base of ‘evidence’ for MLG theory (Stephenson, 2013, p. 828).

In this argument Stephenson is building on work by Andrew Jordan (Jordan, 2001) published about a decade earlier. Jordan approaches MLG as a theory that is only able to address ‘the low politics of policy development and local-level implementation in a small number of sectors’ (Jordan, 2001, p. 204).

However, as Stephenson continues, the theory struggles to account for ‘more complex (high politics) issue areas, such as foreign policy or trade development’, whereas sub-national levels have little to no influence in these processes (Stephenson, 2013, p. 828). Jordan went even further, accusing scholars publishing (positively) on MLG of short-sightedness, since ‘little effort has been made to apply MLG to more ‘difficult’ policy areas of high politics’ where they knew it would not fit well (Jordan, 2001, p. 204).

1.3.4. Legitimization of policy

Albeit not necessarily a true ‘body’ of critique on MLG theory, a fourth and last concern deserves attention. This regard the issue of legitimacy of policy. MLG theory states that increasingly more actors at several different levels engage in the policy making process in order to increase the efficiency of such policy. Therefore one can argue that the role of ‘new’ actors, is legitimized by a gain in efficiency. Nevertheless, the predominant share of sub-national and supranational actors are not composed through democratic procedures such as elections. According to this line of thought, more non-eligible actors means less democratic influence on policy. Therefore, MLG theory encounters a legitimization or accountability deficit (Bache and Flinders, 2004a, pp. 204–205).

1.4. Critiques and limitations answered

MLG has been criticized on several issues and profoundly on vagueness, (a lack of) applicability of the theory, the avoiding of so-called ‘high politics’ or problematic legitimization of policy. However, not all these critiques are as problematic as proposed by their arguments when it comes to the specific use of the theory in this research. In this thesis, MLG theory will predominantly be used to make sense out of the web that counter terrorism policy has become with its overlapping strategies and numerous actively involved institutions. Moreover, MLG theory is used to explain the role of each of the strategies within this field and their interconnectedness. It is conceivable that this research will primarily have to do with Type II MLG, since single threats have to be responded upon by the most capable institution. This approach of governance would fit rather nicely onto the ever changing programmes and strategies in the European Union on all

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sorts of governmental levels. Therefore either vagueness and applicability do not seem to be hazardous issues concerning the to be conducted research.

Furthermore, when considering the critique of MLG avoiding issues in ‘high politics’, one can place some remarks. Initially it was troublesome to connect MLG theory and the second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Additionally it was even difficult to connect the theory with ‘lower’ politics in the third Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. This is no longer the case. The Lisbon Treaty, dating from 2009, made an end to the pillar structure. Combating terrorism became a so-called ‘shared competence’ issue, incorporated in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) (European Union, 2007, p. 47). These shared competences meant that ‘The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence’ (European Union, 2012, p. 50).

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, member states were no longer (close to) exclusively responsible for the approach of terrorism. Being covered within the umbrella-term ‘terrorism’, deradicalization policy became a part of the European policy making process. In this process, subsidiarity plays a key role. Policy making from institutions of the EU can be explained and interpreted with MLG theory and these institutions now played a fundamental role in the process. Thus one could argue that higher political issues became explainable by MLG theory.

Lacking democratic accountability of policy deriving from multi-level policy making is the fourth and final critique. Indeed it is true that national governments are the most eye catching democratically steered governmental bodies. However, that does not mean that sub-national levels are lacking all democratic influence whatsoever. In the Netherlands, city councils are formed by municipality elections. Despite the fact that turn-outs for municipal or local elections are considerably lower than national ones (Morlan, 1984, pp. 468–469), these elections give democratic legitimization to the policies conducted and executed by the city.

At the same time, one should recognize the fact that participants in the Key Figure Programme (sub-national) and Europol (supranational) are indeed important and influencing actors that are not eligible. Albeit a sincere legitimacy concern, the focus of this particular research will not be troubled by it. In this case MLG will primarily be used to assess the fragmentation of deradicalization policy on multiple levels of governance.

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Chapter 2. (De)radicalization in the European Union

Before connecting the three aforementioned deradicalization strategies with MLG, one should first consider looking into deradicalization, both as such and within the European Union. By analysing both the academic and political field, one can set out a context in which the three strategies can be analysed. To create such well-informed context, this section looks into the deradicalization policy in the European Union since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. In this broader overview of the field, I will deliberately be brief concerning the role of Europol. The main reason for this scarce attention will be the fact that as an actor directly engaged with one of the three strategies, the institution itself will be more thoroughly analysed and described in the section regarding these strategies. When such information is ‘postponed’ to this later section, it is noted.

When entering the field of deradicalization in Europe, it is first key to set some significant boundaries to this area of research. Although some of them might seem to be stating the obvious, it is important to reflect on these self-proclaimed limitations, whereas these define the scope of the to be conducted analysis. First of all, ‘European’ strategies and programmes are predominantly coming from institutions of the European Union. This means that other European countries who are not (yet) a member state of this union, are not considered in this research. Furthermore there is need for a more thorough look into the meaning of ‘radicalization’ and ‘deradicalization’. Therefore the following chapter consists of four sections regarding radicalization, radicalization in the European Union, deradicalization, and deradicalization in the European Union.

2.1. Radicalization

The term radicalization is not straightforward. The term can imply several different things, so it is key to first propose a demarcated definition. In a nutshell, the most common approaches are based on a cognitivist or violence based definition (Pisoiu, 2014, p. 3). The former is stating that radicalization means the process in which one learns to appreciate a radical ideology, the latter points out the need for violence to ‘complete’ this process (Pisoiu, 2014, pp. 3–4).

Along the path of finding a feasible and indiscriminate definition of radicalization, it is likewise important to stress that Islamic or Salafist radicalization is only a sub category. In other words, radicalization does not necessarily have to do with Islamic extremism (Pisoiu, 2014, p. 2). However, since the majority of the recent deadly attacks on European soil have been executed in the name of a radical form of Islam or jihad (Europol, 2016c, p. 6), this religion is often seen as the most acute threat (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 798). Illustrative for the short-sightedness of such a definition is the fact that one of the most deadly terrorist attacks in the last decade was executed by right-wing extremist Anders Breivik. On 22 July 2011 that day, he killed eight people with a car bomb in the city centre of Oslo and 69 (mostly young) people at the island Utøya (Carle, 2013, p. 395). On an additional note, having mentioned and agreed with this distinction, it is equally important to stress that this thesis does not regard any other radicalizing groups than Islamic related

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ones. This is a deliberate choice whereas the Key Figure Programme in Amsterdam focusses solely on Islamic youth.

However, the objective of this section is to explain what is referred to as radicalization in this research, rather than what is not. The main goal of deradicalization projects is to prevent terrorist attacks from happening. Since the ‘need’ for violence in radicalization means that there is already harm inflicted, this implies it is already too late for preventative measures. It is therefore that for the conducting of this research I will use a definition of radicalization as proposed by Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen. She states that:

‘radicalization is understood as a growing readiness to pursue and support far-reaching changes in society that conflict with, or pose a direct threat to, the existing order’ (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 798).

In this definition there is no violence involved yet (although not explicitly excluded either), so preventative measures are still an option. Furthermore, the ‘growing readiness’ indicates an process and therefore a time period in which these measures can be employed in order to intervene in this process.

2.2. Islamic radicalization in the European Union

In the general definition, radicalization does not exclusively concerns the radical Islam. Neither is it a phenomenon which solely occurs within the borders of the European Union. Nevertheless, this research, and more explicit this section, focusses on the specific manifestation of Islamist radicalization in the union. As published by RAND, an American policy think tank, in a report dating from 2011 (Vidino, 2011), the appearance of jihadist or Islamic radicalization can be roughly divided into four stages: late eighties to 1995, 1995 to 2000, 2000 to 2005 and 2005 and later.

The first stage thus covers the late eighties and first half of the nineties. Radicalized groups were present in the EU at that time, however they were barely interconnected. Furthermore these groups had little to no interest in executing violent acts towards their country of residence (Vidino, 2011, pp. 1–2).

Following this first phase, one could distinguish a significant spurring of cooperation. This process was guided by Al Qaeda in a role of overarching organization. During the second half of the nineties this resulted in a shift from western-based terrorist cells targeting governments in their countries of origin to targeting the western world and in particular the United States (Vidino, 2011, pp. 2–3).

The attacks on the 11th_{of September 2001, caused a true shockwave in the Western world.} Accordingly this can be said concerning the situation regarding radicalizing individuals and organizations in Europe. Vidino identifies this moment as the beginning of the third phase (Vidino, 2011, p. 4). Although most of the terrorist cells in the EU remained ideologically loyal to Al Qaeda, they became more sovereign as well. This means these cells started acting in an increasingly independent manner. More and more cell members were born and raised in an European country. This caused a changing attitude within the radical organization. During the early 2000’s the focus on European targets emerged. Albeit in a somewhat

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illustrative for this period. One could therefore distinguish this third stage primarily as the phase in which homegrown terrorists made their appearance.

The final phase as described by the RAND report developed itself from the second half of the 2000’s on. Autonomous networks of (mostly) homegrown radicals found ways to stay connected with Al Qaeda and affiliated movements (AQAM). Access to and connection through internet played a profound role in this process. AQAM delivered the expertise necessary for planning and executing attacks, which was the final push in the back needed for the European-based terrorist networks (Vidino, 2011, pp. 5–6). Although the report was published over half a decade ago, this ‘final’ phase is still recognizable in the current situation. The linkage between radicalized networks and (most often) Islamic State (IS) results in the spread of both ideology and practical knowledge. This is still remarkably similar to the situation as indicated by RAND in 2011.

Probably even more important than the emergence of Islamic radicalization that can be witnessed in western Europe, is the question why this happened in the first place. In answering this question, scholars find common ground regarding one thing: there is no single answer. There is no single defining factor, but rather a myriad of interconnected ones. Maha Azzam, associate fellow at the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) in London, states: ‘radicalism does not emerge in a vacuum’ (Azzam, 2007, p. 124).

Indeed, radicalization is an interplay of a multitude of different aspects including, but not limited to, political alienation or xenophobia (Azzam, 2007, p. 124; Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010, pp. 38–40; Murshed and Pavan, 2011, pp. 272–273). Furthermore ideological grounds based on an interpretation of the Islam, or Salafism play an important role (Azzam, 2007, p. 130; Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010, pp. 40–42). However, segregation in areas such as education, the labour market and residence (Murshed and Pavan, 2011, pp. 273–274) and the influence of (charismatic) peers within reach of communication (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 810; Dawson, 2017, p. 9) need to be recognized too.

In deradicalization activity one should consider a ‘personal’ approach. Even within single terrorist networks, individuals are likely to have different reasons and legitimizations for their acting (Schuurman and Horgan, 2016, p. 61). This brief synopsis is not exclusive in describing ‘reasons’ accepted by scholars to explain radicalizing Muslims. Nevertheless, these grounds are considered to be the bedrock of any counter-measures in practice, since these can only be effective when directed to fundamental motives for radicalization.

2.3. Deradicalization

Deradicalization taken literally means the undoing or reversing of radicalization (Dechesne, 2011, p. 287). An interpretation of deradicalization is therefore heavily dependent from the interpretation of the term radicalization. Whereas this thesis uses Dalgaard-Nielsens’ (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 789) definition of radicalization in which one looks into the ‘readiness’ to act or support, it is important to stress once more that this means that someone can be radicalized, but has not yet engaged in violent activity. This is captured

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by research fellows at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) in The Hague, Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf. They state that ‘all terrorists are radical but that most radicals are not terrorists’ (Bakker and de Graaf, 2010, p. 5). This means that deradicalization can be practiced on potential terrorist in order to prevent them inflicting harm.

Analysing preventative measures cannot be done without recognizing that deradicalization is not necessarily a purposely incited process. Mark Dechesne identifies an overkill of peer pressure and self-doubt as possibilities for unguided deradicalization. Such reasons do not come from the adversary side. Thus Dechesne concludes that ’deradicalization may arise spontaneously’ (Dechesne, 2011, p. 288). While spontaneous deradicalization is a possibility, the main question for governments remains: what can we do to incite such a deradicalization process? If they are able to answer this question, their deradicalization programmes could be increasingly effective compared to a situation in which they have to rely on trial and error. The remaining part of this section therefore seeks to investigate whether an to what extend such an answer is available.

In combatting radicalization, policymakers face a field in which research is difficult to conduct. Accordingly, it is not surprising that recent research on counter-terrorism and deradicalization in particular has been focussed on scrutinizing the effects of different approaches towards radicalized individuals or groups. Froukje Demant and Beatrice de Graaf are actively involved in this type of research (Demant and de Graaf, 2010). They articulate the idea that governments (or affiliated organizations) should recognize the danger of the framing of their responses to radicalization (Demant and de Graaf, 2010, p. 410). Radical organizations can use governmental activity (policy, law, press statements) for their own advantage by twisting the message in a way that confirms their own ideology. In this way, activity that was supposed to frustrate processes of radicalization, can eventually generate more momentum for this same radical movement (Demant and de Graaf, 2010, pp. 410–411).

Since this results in counter-effective measures, any organization that is seeking to tackle radicalization issues should prevent such framing. Therefore they have to build on so-called ‘neutralizers’. This term is used by Demant and de Graaf to describe ‘governmental actions that counteract or undermine existing legends and serve to neutralize the injustice frames that legitimize radical ideology’ (Demant and de Graaf, 2010, p. 411). Examples of such alleviating acts are public apologies by the actors involved, expressing the willingness to engage into dialogue, or showing that governmental organizations are concerned with grievances felt by potential radicals (Demant and de Graaf, 2010, p. 411).

Thus, counter actions regarding radicalized individuals or groups face several problems which would not appear evident at first sight. Especially the fact that deradicalization activities are not a straightforward cure to radicalization remains noticeable. With this acknowledgements it is interesting to see how the European

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2.4. Deradicalization in the European Union

This thesis is not so much interested in already executed attacks (although they will prove useful to set out the current situation and its gravity), but primarily in the preceding stage. In the following section it is therefore essential to stress that the mentioned activity undertaken by governmental organizations at different levels is not a complete overview of counter terrorism in Europe. Rather it is a brief reflection on their efforts regarding deradicalization. This section focusses on four main decisive moments in the development of an European approach towards radicalization. This will be done by discussing the ‘Declaration of Combating Terrorism’ (Council of the European Union, 2004), the ‘European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy’ (EUCS) (Council of the European Union, 2005), the ‘Stockholm Programme’ (European Commission, 2010), and finally ‘The European Agenda on Security’ (European Commission, 2015).

The field of counter terrorism within the European Union has predominantly been formed by reactive impulses (Coolsaet, 2010, p. 857). Whereas the 9/11 attacks ignited the ‘war on terror’ for the United States, one can identify other decisive events in the EU. Especially the bombings of the public transport in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 marked a tipping point in the approach of the issue of deradicalization (Coolsaet, 2010, p. 857). Admitted, the European Union already reacted on the attacks on US soil. However, in these policy proposals and declarations was no attention for (de)radicalization yet (Bakker, 2015, pp. 288– 289). It is therefore, that the development of deradicalization measures in the European Union has its origin in the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid and London.

The first reaction was the adoption of the ‘Declaration of Combating Terrorism’ (Council of the European Union, 2004) and an accompanying action plan by the European Council (Bakker, 2015, p. 289). In this action plan, the Council of the European Union set out its ‘strategic objectives’, including objective six which stated: ‘To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism’ (Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 6). This can be seen as the offspring of deradicalization as an approach towards terrorist threat in the European Union.

The next significant progress was made a year later with the implementing of the European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2005). This strategy stretches across four different pillars, being: prevent, protect, pursue and respond (Council of the European Union, 2005, p. 6). Of those four, the first pillar, prevent, is most interesting for the scope of this research. Within this pillar, there are seven so-called ‘key-priorities’. (1) Signalling the ‘misuse of internet’ in order to identify behaviour potentially related to radical thoughts, (2) making ‘incitement and recruitment’ illegal, (3) explain EU policy to the people, by using understandable communication, (4) emphasizing the positive sides of the EU like education, prosperity and democracy, (5) creating an ‘intercultural dialogue’ both in the EU and across its borders, (6) implementing a non-emotive lexicon to prevent segregation by discussion and finally (7) conducting and sharing of research results (Council of the European Union, 2005, p. 9). Following these developments, one can identify a serious consideration of radicalization, and therefore of deradicalization strategy.

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The third major step towards tackling the issue of radicalization in the Union, was the formulation of the Stockholm Programme in 2010 (European Commission, 2010). This programme offered nineteen ‘actions’ with both the responsible party for implementing or achieving the goal, and a time frame in which this should be completed. Three of these nineteen proposed actions are directly within the scope of radicalization. They call for the ‘implementation of the EU Action Plan on violent Radicalization’, the ‘further development of the external aspects of radicalization’, and ‘communication on a strategy for a holistic approach of radicalization’ (European Commission, 2010, p. 40). Especially the last one is interesting, since this ‘holistic approach’ is ought to be based on a form of best practices. By evaluating different national policies, the EC seeks to formulate such an approach (European Commission, 2010, p. 40).

Finally, in April 2015, the European Commission published the European Agenda on Security (European Commission, 2015). This document presented the ambitions regarding security of the EC for the coming half decade and can be seen as a fourth decisive adjustment to the development of counter terrorism in the European Union. The strategy included a section concerning the approach of terrorist threat which was named: ‘Tackling terrorism and preventing radicalization’ (European Commission, 2015, p. 13). This section urges to ‘address the root causes of extremism’ while avoiding ‘stigmatization of any one group or community’ and by providing a ‘strong counter-narrative’ (European Commission, 2015, pp. 13–14). Thus, compared to the strategy dating from 2005, one can distinguish a true surge in attention dedicated to radicalization and the tackling of it (European Commission, 2015, pp. 13–16)

These four pivotal moments are not grasping the full body of active policy in the European Union, however they bring across an important point. Approaching issues concerning terrorism from the perspective of radicalization is a rather recent development. In these roughly twelve years, numerous organizations and institutions have been established in order to be able to combat radicalization. This thesis analyses three of them thoroughly. However, first the outline of this analysis and other methodological issues are assessed in the next chapter.

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Chapter 3. Methodological approach

This chapter sets out the basic elements of the research as is conducted in the following chapters 4 and 5. Before engaging in the analysis of deradicalization strategies, it needs to be defined what is sought for. How is the data analysed and which sources are assessed for the gathering of such data? This thesis analyses the deradicalization strategies of three different organizations or agencies; Europol, Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) and the Key Figure Project (KFP). Both for the sake of clarity and comparison, these strategies are studied conform the structure of a framework. In order to work with such a framework, it is essential that its key components are reconsidered. Thus the first section of this chapter elaborates on these elements and connects them to the MLG theory. In other words: what are the main issues that will be focussed on while assessing the analysis of each individual strategy and why are they important features of any deradicalization strategy?

However, without the use of the right data, such a framework would not be adding much value to the research. Therefore, the second section of this chapter discusses the selection of this data. Accordingly, for each actor, the key documents are identified and evaluated.

3.1. Building an analytical framework for deradicalization strategies

Analysing deradicalization strategies of organizations with significantly varying areal scopes makes comparison at least somewhat troublesome. Before engaging in the actual analyses of the strategies themselves, it is therefore indispensable to focus on developing a framework that would make such examination possible. This thesis therefore proposes the use of an analytical framework for deradicalization strategies (AFDS). The following section explains the different elements of this framework and their role in identifying comparable features of the different strategies.

The AFDS consists of a total of fsix components, each strategy will be checked for. These components are (1) the definition of (de-)radicalization that is used by the institution, (2) the goals of the strategy, (3) a timeframe in which these goals should be achieved, (4) the actors involved in the strategy, (5) the resources available to achieve the strategy’s goals, and finally (6) the expected results of a strategy. Each of the following sub-sections considers the reason behind the inclusion of one of the components in the AFDS.

3.1.1. Definition of (de-)radicalization

Chapter 2 discussed the definition of radicalization and its consequences for research purposes. The main controversy between ‘types’ of strategies can be found in dispute regarding the definition. What are the requirements for a case to be defined as connected to ‘radicalization’? Practically all definitions regarding radicalization are either cognitivist or violence based (Pisoiu, 2014, pp. 3–4). It is likely that deradicalization strategies are based on a cognitivist approach, whereas this implies the possibility of engaging in action ‘before the bomb goes off’ (Neumann, 2008, p. 4).

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Nevertheless it is interesting to see if the definitions used by Europol, the AIVD and the KFP are clearly stated and in how far they coincide. A different definition of radicalization could influence the meaning of a proposed policy issue or an activity based upon this definition. This could cause confusion during comparing the goals and expected results. Moreover, Europol can be argued to have a political role. As the face of EU’s counter terrorism efforts, it has an exemplative role. Therefore their definition should be applicable to all member states. The AIVD and KFP are further restrained from practicing politics and can focus on a definition that best fits their objectives. This contrast could be the cause of differing definitions since at political level there is also the importance of ‘selling’ the strategy. Or as Mark Sedgwick states:

‘at the political level it is necessary not just to take appropriate measures but also to be seen to be taking appropriate measures. At the intelligence level, in contrast, visibility is generally not desired’ (Sedgwick, 2010, p. 485).

The definition is thus depending on the role of the actor. Is an organization or agency trying to influence others, or is it being influence by another actor? This should be considered when assessing the operationalized definition for each of the three strategies. This is decisive for the applicability of MLG theory on the topic of terrorism since it identifies if a certain idea or interpretation is imposed or that actors are setting their own course. This last element is an essential condition for ‘continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers’ as Gary Marks stated in the early 1990’s (Marks, 1993, p. 392).

3.1.2. Goals of the strategy

After identifying the way a strategy approaches radicalization, the next step is to analyse the goals that are set by the program. Whereas ‘strategy’ is described by the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) as ‘a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim’. This aim can be identified by highlighting de goals that are presented within a strategy. These goals probably overlap each other to some degree since each strategy’s main interest is to prevent or reverse radicalization all together. Notwithstanding, it is interesting to examine how broadly such aims are expressed. Are actors striving to achieve specific goals or rather serve the broader public good? For example, is a strategy’s objective to engage in conversation with a certain number of potential radicals, or rather to ‘seek engagement’ with this type of persons? This is a determining factor for the fitness of either Type I or II of MLG theory (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, pp. 236–239). These sub-sections will thus primarily focus on the more specific goals that are presented (or absent).

3.1.3. Timeframe of the strategy

The goals aspired by a strategy may seem lacking ambition or on the contrary seem overly ambitious. Yet making statements about a strategy’s ambitions can only be done when the period of time these goals should be achieved in is considered. Not all three strategies have the same span, and therefore this issue should be

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The timeframe of a strategy can be seen from the perspective of the temporary or structural nature of policy making entities (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, pp. 236–239). Admitted, this concerns primarily the actors themselves rather than the strategy, though these can be seen in mutual context.

3.1.4. Actors involved with the strategy

When analysing the different actors that are involved in implementing the strategy there are two issues to consider. First of all, who is targeted? In other words, which individuals or groups do the strategies seek to deradicalize? One can imagine that this changes significantly when the scope of the organization, and accordingly the area in which it operates, becomes more substantial.

Furthermore, it is interesting to see which partnerships are established. Does the strategy mention other organizations and coordination with them? Are these actors traditionally involved in deradicalization and on which governmental levels do they operate? Such partnerships could signal the fitness of MLG theory (Marks, 1993, p. 392). In this case the actor’s role in respect to these other partners is analysed in particular.

3.1.5. Resources available for implementation and execution of the strategy

In order to be ‘truly effective’, an organization needs both power and resources (Keohane, 2008, p. 129). The field of deradicalization is no exception is this. Most organizations combatting terrorism are relying on governmental funding. Such budget allocation comes with both responsibility and accountability. In this case it is therefore not sufficient to simply compare resources.

This research is notably curious for the ‘demands’ that comes with these resources. Does the money come from higher or lower levels, and how strict are budgets controlled by the distributor? If for example resources go from national governments to local organizations, it is important to acknowledge whether these receiving organizations remain autonomous (Marks, 1993, p. 392). In other words: whether the organization is merely executing the government’s tasks or is funded to develop their own approach.

From the MLG perspective, it is primarily interesting to see whether the funding comes with imposed activity as well. In other words, is the receiving party free to allocate this money according to own insights? Such conditional funding would imply a strong central power. The lack of such power is essential in multi-level governance theory (Hooghe and Marks, 2003a, p. 235).

3.1.6. Expected results of the strategy

The sixth and final component needed to establish an AFDS considers the expected results of the strategy. Is it likely that an organization achieves its goals when its resources are accordingly taken into account? This thesis deliberately does not seek to express a degree of ‘success’ regarding the strategies, whereas this would lead to the ever-existing troublesome definition of success. Or as Allan McConnell puts it: ‘policies framed as successful by some political actors may be framed as unsuccessful by others’ (McConnell, 2010, p. 346).

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However, the results that are expected (or already achieved) shed light on the efficiency of that actor. Since efficiency is, according to MLG theory, the fundamental reason to reallocate decision making (Marks, 1993, p. 392) this is an important element in the analysis of the strategies.

3.2. Selection of Data

The AFDS in only adding value to the research when it is filled in with the right data. The three organizations that are examined in this thesis (Europol, the AIVD and the Municipality of Amsterdam) rely on governmental funding. Therefore they are obliged to account for what they expect to achieve with the allocated resources. They have made their objectives clear by establishing strategies.

However, these strategies alone are not always adequate or exhaustive in supplying the necessary data for the AFDS. The following sub sections identify which documents are used to establish this ‘complete’ data set. They do so for each individual actor. Furthermore the sub sections discuss why these particular documents are essential sources and if there are any remaining difficulties regarding the gathering of the data.

3.2.1. Europol

For the collection of the right information regarding Europol, there are two documents that stand out. First of all the agency published the ‘Europol Strategy 2016-2020’ (Europol, 2016a). In this five year strategy Europol expresses its main task: ‘to support law enforcement authorities in their fight against serious and organised crime and terrorism’ (Europol, 2016a, p. 5). Although this five year plan supplies important ideas about Europol’s objectives, a strategy for such an extensive period lacks specification.

Analytical framework deradicalization strategies (AFDS)

Component What to analyze? MLG

Definition Literally stated definition

Which (other) documents/actors supply the definition?

Source of definition

Goals Objectives presented in strategy

How ‘broad’ are the objectives? Specific goals vs. broader public good Timeframe What is the timeframe set for the

strategy?

What is the timeframe set for the actor?

Temporary nature vs. structural nature

Actors Who is targeted?

Identifying partnerships Nature of actors Ongoing negotiation Levels of governance Resources Budget allocation

Manpower Dependency/conditional funding