Pro-Government militias and repressive violence against the free press
A test case for the Delegation argument
Till Frieling
s4462467
Master's Thesis
Political Science/ Conflict, Power & Politics Nijmegen School of Management
Radboud University Nijmegen, August 2019 Supervisor: dr. R.A.A. Malejacq
Abstract
Governments around the globe maintain relationships with Pro-Government militias (PGMs) This behaviour is often explained with the Delegation argument. The argument states that governments have a need to avoid accountability for human rights violations. Governments therefore delegate certain shameful acts, such as repressive violence against journalists, to PGMs in order to avoid accountability. One could therefore expect that official security forces wont participate in acts of repression, if governments delegate these acts to PGMs in order to avoid accountability.
I test this assumption with a comparative case study based on two cases, Venezuela and Iraq. The comparative case study is based on news media articles and NGO reports retrieved via LexisNexis. The findings show that militia violence against journalists cannot fully be explained by the Delegation argument. Instead, I turn to the concept of violence repertoires as a complementary explanations Links between PGMs and governments as well as militia violence against journalists can therefore be seen as the result of path dependency and routine behaviour.
Table of contents
• Chapter 1: Introduction 1
◦ 1.1 Why look at journalists? 4
◦ 1.2 Comparative method and
case selection 6
◦ 1.3 Data collection 7
◦ 1.4 The procedure of this 9
thesis
• Chapter 2: Theoretical background 11
◦ 2.1 Central concepts and
Definitions 11
◦ 2.2 Militias, P/A theory, and 12
the Delegation Argument
• Chapter 3: Iraq 16
◦ 3.1 Militias in Iraq 16
◦ 3.2 Violence against journalist 18
in Iraq
◦ 3.3 Analysis 19
• Chapter 4: Venezuela 26
◦ 4.1 Militias in Venezuela 26
◦ 4.2 Violence against journalists 27
in Venezuela
◦ 4.3 Analysis 29
• Chapter 6: Alternative explanation 39
• Chapter 7: Conclusion 44
Chapter 1: Introduction
A free and independent press is often regarded as a crucial cornerstone of democratic societies and as a necessity to ensure the protection of human rights (Gohdes & Carey, 2017, p.1). The media performs a critical role for societies, by providing news and information to the public and exposing potential misdeeds by the government (UNESCO, 2018, p.134). As metaphorical watchdogs, journalists scrutinize governments and regimes and therefore increase the level of accountability a regime has to face for any kind of misbehaviour. This can include cases of corruption, repression against political opposition, and even more severe violations of human rights. This function makes journalists and other members of the free media often a prime target for repression by authoritarian regimes. Regimes generally have access to a vast arsenal to repress critical journalists and media outlets. The justice system of a country for example can be turned against journalists and media outlets, so that critical members of the free press have to face lawsuits and prison sentences. Other regimes use security forces like the police and the military to intimidate or straight out harm
members of the press in order to repress critical voices and stop criticism. A common problem with these kinds of instruments is the hardly deniable connection to the regime itself, offering highly visible proof for wrongdoings from the regime side. This makes a regime highly vulnerable to political pressure from a variety of actors, for example through Naming and Shaming campaigns, a strategy widely supported by scholars and activists for human rights issues (Hendrix & Wong, 2012, p.652).
As an alternative and in order to minimize visible fingerprints in acts of repression, one can expect that regimes rely on armed groups that are loyal towards the regime, but operate outside of the state apparatus. Regimes and governments around the globe form and maintain ties to such groups and militias specialised in the use of violence (Carey, Colaresi & Mitchell,2015, p.851), potentially using them as proxies and defying the idea that states generally strife to establish a monopoly for the use of coercive force (Eck, 2015, p.926; Carey, Colaresi & Mitchell, 2016, p.59). While such militias can be found in countries and conflicts all around the globe, they often differ in size, visibility and relationship to the respective regimes and political leaders (Carey & Mitchell, 2016, p.16). Militias with links to a regime are in general referred to as pro-government militias, or PGM in short. Such PGMs often play a role in the repression of any opposition and other critical voices, including the free press, proving to be valuable for a regime. In this work, I use the terms PGM and militia interchangeably.
A good part of the academic literature explains the links between regimes and militias by referring to Principal-Agent theory (P/A theory), expecting a rational motive behind a regime's
decision to maintain these links. The regime acts as the principal in this equation, while the PGMs act as agents on behalf of the regime. Research suggests that the use of militias offers a range of benefits to a regime, for example by providing knowledge and intelligence about the local environment or by acting as a cheap force multiplier for an otherwise weak military (Jentzsch, Kalyvas & Schubiger, 2015, p.759). Also, maintaining links to PGMs is cheaper than maintaining an extensive security force, making the militias a cost effective alternative to official forces. A further potential benefit of PGMs some regimes may consider, is securing their grip on power, by distributing and thereby balancing the means of violence between different actors. Deniability, for example in cases of genocidal violence (Alvarez, 2006, p.17), is therefore only one supposed benefit among many. Deniability supposedly also applies to the avoidance or at least reduction of any liability and accountability for the use of violence against civilians and the political opposition (Carey, Colaresi & Mitchell, 2015, p.851). Regimes can plausibly deny maintaining links to PGMs or having any knowledge of their activities and any repressive acts committed by them. This would be way harder to achieve with state bound security forces like the police, military units, or
intelligence services (Byman & Kreps, 2010, p.6). This makes them a valuable asset, especially when the regime faces intensive scrutiny by domestic and international actors or depends on aid by democratic donors.
The assumed benefits of PGM indicate that militias are a valuable asset for regimes to have as an instrument against critical media outlets. PGMs therefore target journalists and other members of the press on behalf of the regime. Militias merely act as an agent of repression for a regime (the principal), making it possible for the regime to plausibly deny any participation in such repressive actions. The problem with this assumption is that by being identified as being pro government, the link between militias and the government can become quite obvious. Therefore,the claim that the deployment of PGMs helps to avoid accountability is less convincing in general. Why, then do authoritarian regimes still rely on PGMs to repress members of the free press? Looking at the P/A theory, several explanations are possible. The simplest answer is to assume that denial by a regime is still plausible, even if a militia is identified as pro-government, especially if other actors are willing to accept even weak claims of non-involvement (Byman & Kreps, 2010, p.1). A different explanation could be based on the information problem between principal and agent identified by P/A theory, where the principal has an information deficit compared to the agent (Miller, 2005, p.204).
These explanations are still all based on the idea that regimes delegate violence to avoid being held accountable for acts of violence that violate human rights. However, there is some doubt about the general validity of this assumption. Cohen and Nordås, for example, focus on the use of
sexual violence in times of conflict and conclude that the Delegation argument in this specific case not a fitting explanation. Against the basic assumptions of the Delegation argument, they show that PGMs commit acts of sexual violence alongside with official security forces, contradicting the idea that regimes delegate such acts to militias in order to avoid accountability. Yet, they also
acknowledge that their findings are limited, because they only focus on the specific case of sexual violence (Cohen & Nordås, 2015, pp.879, 890). The Delegation argument could still hold up in other cases and explain for example the repression of journalists and other members of the press by PGMs. The underlying assumption of the Delegation argument would be that official security forces would not participate in the repression against the press, when the government is delegating
repressive acts to PGMs in order to avoid accountability. In contradiction to this underlying
assumptions, empirical findings seem to suggest that journalist have to fear repression from official security forces as well as from PGMs. Also, considering that regimes most likely would try to avoid accountability by foreign aid donors, one should expect an increase in relationships between militias and governments, when donors start to pay more attention to human rights issues. This, however, is not the case (Ash, 2016, p.708). Delegation argument and P/A based explanations for violence committed by militias against journalist are therefore called into question. This thesis therefore could help to determine if delegation is a fitting explanation for human rights violations by PGMs and if Cohen and Nordås findings are simply an exception, or if the Delegation argument is contradicted by yet an other cases. The question presented here is therefore; is the Delegation argument a reasonable explanation for the reliance of governments on PGMs, and if not, what else could explain the relationships between governments and militias?
Alternative explanations for the relationship between governments and PGMs are also discussed in the literature. Ahram for example offers an alternative explanation, or better a supplement, for the common explanations given by P/A theory. The delegation argument and P/A based explanations rely on the assumption that the relationship between regimes and PGM's exist purely because of rational interests on side of the regime as the principal in the equation. As Ahram points out, this explanation is at most partially satisfying. If PGMs are so effective as a tool for repression, why would any regime still rely on regular security and risk blame? Building on institutionalism, Ahram suggests to see PGM activities as part of a violence repertoire. “The initiation and continuation of repertoires of violence depend less on overall efficacy than on
familiarity, routine, and normative commitments to different kinds of power arrangements”.(Ahram, 2016, p.208).
If assumptions drawn from P/A theory and the Delegation argument are not suitable to fully explain why militias target journalists and use violence to repress free media outlets, Ahram's
insights on violence repertoires can eventually help to find a more fitting explanation. Therefore, it could offer a complementary explanation, and help to understand PGMs and their relationship to human rights violations. While the Delegation argument assumes that the relationship between PGMs and governments is a rational choice by government officials based on cost-benefit driven considerations, the concept of violence repertoires looks beyond such rational reasoning. The Delegation argument is therefore potentially a well suited explanation for why governments decide to deploy PGMs in the first place, but it fails quickly after the beneficial effect wears off or simply does not occur. In such a case, the concept of violence repertoires may help to explain why
governments tend to further rely on PGMs, even if no obvious benefit an be observed.
The here presented questions can also be of high interest for policy makers, considering that the safety situation for journalists is a central concern for them. The United Nations, for example, recognized the safety of journalists as crucial for the promotion of inclusive and peaceful societies, including it in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UNESCO, 2018, p.160). Assuming that PGMs play a major role in the repression of the press, it is crucial to offer a better
understanding of the reasons for why regimes may rely on militias to do this kind of work. If PGMs are indeed deployed by regimes to avoid accountability, policy makers have to understand how effective this is as a strategy and how regimes still can be held accountable for human rights violations. Otherwise, an implementation of effective policies and sanctions to limit the repression caused by PGMs is difficult to realize. In case that the Delegation argument offers no satisfying explanation for militia violence against members of the press, policy makers and international actors are still in need of suitable options to increase the safety situation of journalists. The current set of options consisting of aid, assistance, and intervention seems to have little impact on the conditions that motivate regimes to rely on PGMs (Ahram, 2011, p.129). Understanding the underlying systematic factors for why state's embrace PGMs beyond cost-benefit calculations, could therefore help policy makers entrusted with the task to counter militia activities and human rights violations (Ahram, 2011, p.129). This thesis may offers a small contribution to the greater understanding of the issue.
1.1 Why look at journalists?
Journalists are not the only group facing severe repression by authoritarian regimes and their agents. Social groups, protesters and opposition politicians all are targets of repressive actions by regime agents, including militias. Why, then look into the repression against journalists in particular? First of all, journalists are often a prime target when reporting stories and news critical of the regime. In
2015 alone 70 journalists were killed, many of whom had reported on politics (Gohdes & Carey, 2017, p.157). Moreover, journalists not only experience violence in the most repressive countries or situations of widespread conflict like civil war, but also in countries with a huge variety of human rights conditions (Gohdes & Carey, 2017, p.158). Also, journalists are often targeted very
intensively and often even before other oppositional actors experience violence. Gohdes and Carey argue that all this makes the violent repression against journalists an ideal precursor for a worsening in state-sponsored repression. The two authors use the analogy of a canary in a coal mine to
illustrate the concept (Gohdes & Carey, 2017, p.158). Therefore, repressive actions against
journalists and other members of the free press act as an ideal case and it is assumed that a regime will use militias against other critical voices if it has already used them against journalists.
Next to this precursor function is another reason to look at journalists in particular. Targeting journalists normally causes a massive outrage under international observers and actors, bringing a country into the focus of global attention. Using violence against journalists therefore can put a regime under severe scrutiny, making it even harder for a regime to deny any liability for human rights violations. Delegating violence towards any actor with visible links to the government, is therefore risky if a regime tries to avoid accountability and regimes may see a greater need for delegation. Any case of violence against members of the free press committed by a PGM is a strong case for the puzzle at hand.
Many NGOs for example focus on the issue of freedom of the press and the rights of
journalists, holding regimes accountable for violations of these fundamental rights. A strategy often seen as very effective by NGOs in order to hold regimes accountable for human rights violation is Naming and Shaming. By documenting human rights violations and raising awareness for the issue, NGOs can raise international awareness for any wrongdoings and increase political pressure a regime has to face. Naming and Shaming is therefore a strategy that can increase external accountability. However, some critical observers express doubts about the effectiveness of this strategy (Hendrix & Wong, 2012, p.652).
Research on militia violence frequently focuses on repressive violence against journalists in connection with PGMs. For example, Carey, Mitchell and Lowe focus on violence against
journalists as a dependent variable in their research with cross-national datasets (Carey, Mitchell & Lowe, 2012). However, their research misses out on deeper going mechanisms (Ahram, personal Communication, 22.07.2019). A different perspective at journalists and their experiences with militia violence may helps to create a better understanding of the issue.
On a side note, an argument can be made that the presence of an independent press can actually limit the effectiveness of using PGMs as a tool of repression (Blad, 2017, p.14). An
independent press can arguably work as a control mechanism that keeps the government in check and defeat the intention to avoid accountability. Considering this assumption, it can be very interesting to see what happens if the free press is itself the target of repression.
1.2 Comparative method and case selection
In order to find a satisfying answer for the puzzle at hand, I do a comparative case study on two countries, Venezuela and Iraq, which both suffer from severe disrespect for human rights and frequently attract negative attention internationally for reports on violence against journalists. The two countries also have regimes that maintain links to PGMs. Venezuela and Iraq are interesting cases regarding the assumptions formulated above for the P/A theory and the related Delegation argument. Both countries offer interesting observable characteristics related to the existence and use of PGMs as well as regarding to the media landscape and the challenges and obstacles journalists and other members of the free press have to face in order to do their work.
Iraq has developed a diverse and vibrant media landscape since the fall of former dictator Saddam Hussain and the Baath party as a result of the US led invasion in 2003 (Ricchiardi, 2011, p.4). While this may sound like a positive development, the reality is grimmer. A lot of the media outlets are allied to the different ethno-political factions of Iraq and hold the potential to escalate conflicts inside the country (Ricchiardi 2011, p.4). The media landscape itself is also deeply affected by the ongoing violence. Over the last couple of years, Iraq has constantly been one of the most dangerous countries for journalists and members of the free press to work in. Also, Iraq faces sharp scrutiny by outside actors, increasing external accountability. Especially the United States, a major donor of aid, is increasing pressure for accountability on the Iraqi government. US aid is bound by law to respect and improve the human rights situation inside the aid receiving country. This should be a powerful incentive for the Iraqi government not to be linked to groups using repressive violence against journalists or to find other ways to avoid accountability.
Venezuela recently has also made negative headlines regarding repressive violence against journalists as well as against other oppositional voices. PGMs, namely the so called Colectivos, are often involved in attacks against journalists and are obviously a valuable asset for the Venezuelan government. The regime in Venezuela is, in contrast to Iraq, already facing severe sanctions for human rights violations and is also very much isolated from external actors like the United States, who traditionally value human rights. External accountability is therefore less of an issue for the regime in Caracas. The case of Venezuela forms therefore an interesting contrast to the case of Iraq. Looking at this contrast can help to get a better insight into the relationship between PGMs and the
use of repressive violence against journalists and other members of the free press.
Iraq qualifies as a case where it is most likely to find the conditions applied to the Delegation argument. One can expect that the dependence on aid by foreign actors, who usually value and defend press freedom, increases the need for delegation in order to avoid accountability for human rights violations for the Iraqi government. Sanctions by foreign donors are very likely a serious concern for government officials in Baghdad. It is therefore fair to assume that the
government tries to avoid the deployment of official security forces against journalists and members of the press and instead delegates repression to PGMs as a way to avoid accountability and negative consequences. It is therefore very likely to find evidence for the P/A theory and the Delegation argument in the case of Iraq. However, finding contradicting evidence could create serious doubt on the validity of the Delegation argument.
Venezuela in contrast qualifies as a case where it is less likely to find evidence in support of the Delegation argument. Unlike in the case of Iraq, the Venezuelan government is already very much isolated from foreign actors, who usually value rights like freedom of expression and press freedom. Also, the government in Caracas already faces harsh criticism and sanctions for the
violation of such rights. The need to avoid accountability for repression against the press in order to dodge sanctions by foreign actors is therefore most likely not very high. The Venezuelan
government has simply no need to delegate repression and can openly rely on official security forces, because it already faces the negative consequences for the very same thing. Venezuela can therefore be used as a control case and as a comparison to the findings of the Iraq case. Moreover, findings in the case of Venezuela that support and partially or fully confirm the delegation argument would make a strong argument for the theory.
1.3 Data collection
I base the two case studies on Venezuela and Iraq on news media reports and articles published by English speaking media outlets. News stories and media reports are a good indicator to test the formulated assumptions for the Delegation argument. They highlight the public knowledge of certain repressive acts. News reports can be a strong source for accountability, something that should be avoided by delegating violence to PGMs. The fact that I focus on English speaking news reports also highlights the international attention the issue of repressive violence against journalists attracts. Moreover, this international attention also undermines efforts to avoid external
accountability by foreign aid donors, whereas exclusively local media attention could easily be dismissed by the regime in question, assuming that internal accountability has less effect on the
regimes in question. Research related to other issues have shown that the media can have a significant influence on agenda-setting, for example for environmental issues (Curtin & Rhodenbaugh, 2001, p.180). An agenda-setting function of the media can also be expected for human rights issues. In the end, the public, local and international, relies heavily on the media to get access to necessary information on a certain issue. This counts for human rights issues in the same way as for environmental issues. By reporting on these issues, the media enables the public to form an opinion and eventually put it into in a position to demand accountability and force governments to take action. The media is therefore an important factor when it comes to the creation of
awareness, accountability and eventually the demand for political change. NGOs can enhance the effect. Naming and Shaming campaigns by NGOs and western media outlets can evidently
influence human rights conditions in autocratic countries, proving the impact of international media outlets (Hendrix & Wong, 2012, p.671).
I use LexisNexis as a database to find news reports relevant for the case studies. Relevant news reports should focus on issues connected to the repression of journalists. Carey, Mitchell and Lowe use a similar method in order to create their PGM database (Carey, Mitchell & Lowe, 2012, p.252). This makes me confident that this is a fitting method here as well. The articles can be published by news media outlets like newspapers or TV and radio broadcasters, who also publish written online articles, news agencies, or NGOs.
I use a number of terms and catchwords for the search. Examples for the used terms and catchwords are “journalist threatened/ killed/ arrested/ detained/ kidnapped”, “militias/ pro
government militias..., as well as ”security forces/ police/ military”. The articles and reports should focus on repressive acts committed against journalists and other members of the press by members of PGMs and/or by members of official security forces. I mainly look for news articles and NGO reports that in some way connect the government, government officials, or state institutions to repression against members of the press or government critics. News articles or NGO reports offering the most relevant evidence would verify a direct involvement of official security forces into political motivated repression on behalf of the government or even a direct order given by a
government official. Such a verification would directly contradict the Delegation argument.
However, the burden of proof for such an accusation is high and one cannot expect that many news media article can provide such evidence. Instead, reports may only indicate or assume an
involvement of official security forces and government officials in acts of repression, only offering circumstantial evidence for the claim. These kinds of reports are still of high relevance for the analysis, but have to be taken in consideration with caution. Reports and news articles that suggest or verify an involvement of PGMs in acts of repressive violence can be seen as support for the
Delegation argument, especially if a delegation by the government can also be verified or at least assumed. However, such reports would at the same time put the overall effectiveness of delegation in question. News articles and NGO reports that do not focus on violent repression caused by official security forces or PGMs, but focus on other circumstances that may affect the media's ability to work freely and independently, can be of interest, too. Such reports may help to get a better insight into how governments avoid negative press coverage for wrongdoings.
1.4 The procedure of this thesis
I continue with the theoretical background of this thesis and give a brief definition of the central concepts and definitions. This is followed by an overview of the P/A theory and the Delegation argument. The overview contains a general description of the general ideas behind the two concepts and how they explain militia violence against journalists and other members of the press. I also discuss any potential drawbacks and flaws of the P/A theory and the Delegation argument, in order to give a better understanding on how they might get contradicted by empirical findings latter presented in this papers. Based on the theoretical discussion, I draw two hypotheses for the Delegation argument and its implications for militia violence against journalists. I also briefly discuss an alternative theoretical explanation for the involvement of PGMs in repressive acts, in case that the Delegation argument offers no satisfactory explanation. The alternative
theoretical explanation is based on the concept of violence repertoires. A third hypotheses, based on the alternative theoretical explanation, is also formulated. I only give a very brief overview of the alternative explanation and give a deeper going explanation at a later point in this thesis, in case that the alternative explanation is really needed.
Following the theoretical background, I begin the empirical part of this thesis. The empirical part consists of a comparative case study, based on cases, Iraq and Venezuela. I start with the case of Iraq. In a first step, I describe the militia structure of Iraq in order to gain a better understanding of the PGMs that are active in Iraq. This should help to understand the role of militias in Iraq's security landscape, their relationship with the government, and their function in the repression of journalists. In a second step, I give a brief description of the safety situation for journalists, based on NGO reports, in order to determine the risks journalists and other members of the press have to face. The last step of the case study consists of an analysis based on reports published by news media outlets and NGOs. The following case study on Venezuela follows the same steps as the case study on Iraq.
The case studies are followed by the comparative analysis. I compare the findings of the two cases in order to find out in how far the earlier made hypotheses can be viewed as correct. The
comparison can also show crucial differences between the two cases, regarding the concept of accountability. I also discuss the alternative explanation that is based on the concept of violence repertoires, in case that the earlier made hypotheses for the Delegation argument are contradicted by the findings.
In the conclusion, I discuss the presented findings, their implications for the Delegation argument, and what can be concluded for the occurrence of militia violence against journalists. I also discuss any limitations this thesis may has and in how far these limitations affect the relevance of the findings.
Chapter 2: Theoretical background
2.1 Central concepts and definitions
The first central concept of this paper is PGM. Militias are in general trained in the use of violence, but lack any form of code of conduct, making them prone to be particularly deadly (Alvarez, 2006, p.2). According to a definition given by Carey, a PGM has four distinctive
characteristics: a PGM is a group that is either explicitly pro-government or even directly sponsored by the government, that is not embedded in the official security forces, that is armed, and that is in some way organised (Carey, Mitchell & Lowe, 2013, p.250). In contradiction to official security forces, the relationship between militias and governments is often more obscure (Alvarez, 2006, pp.5). Militias can be defined as semi-official or informal PGMs. Semi-official PGMs are often closer related to the respective government and enjoy some kind of approval and semi-official status form side of the government (Carey, Mitchell & Lowe, 2012, p.251). The links between informal militias and the respective government are often hardly visible and lack forms of official
acknowledgement (Carey, Mitchell & Lowe, 2012, p.251).
The second group taken in consideration by this paper are journalists and members of the free press. Due to the technological progress of the past decades, the abilities to engage in journalism have massively increased. The media environment has become more fluent and it has become difficult to define journalists solely based on occupational status (UNESCO, 2018, p.135). This also means that the difference between journalist and activist can be blurred in some cases and may overlap. I use a definition of journalists provided by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a NGO with a focus on press freedom and the rights of journalists. Based on this definition, journalists are “people who cover news or comment on public affairs through any media – including in print, in photographs, on radio, on television, and online” (CPJ, 2019a). This definition includes professional journalists and media workers as well as amateur journalists like bloggers or citizen journalists. The definition is kept relatively open and does not exclude individuals, just because they are not employed by a professional news organisation. Other definitions may exclude these
individuals. Moreover, the fact that the definition is retrieved from an organisation that is well known for its work in the defence of press freedom gives it a certain validity. Personnel associated with professional journalism, such as translators or administrative staff, have to be included in the definition as well (Gohdes & Carey, 2017, p.161). This staff is often vital for the work of
journalists and any attack on them can impair the ability of the press to report independently. I refer to all those persons as journalists or members of the free press.
Political repression can be understood as the threat or use of coercion by the government against political opponents and critics in order to enforce the government's will and weaken any kind of resistance (Henderson, 1991, p.121). More specifically, repressive violence against
journalists can be defined as the use of force against journalists and members of the free press with the intention to hinder and ultimately foreclose free and critical reporting. This includes the use of force with the intention to inflict physical harm like targeted killings, but also with the intention of intimidation. The assassination of journalists can be seen as the ultimate form of repression and censorship, but acts of repression can also comprise kidnappings, arbitrary detentions, or torture (UNESCO, 2018, p.134). Other cases, where journalists and members of the free press
unintentionally experienced a form of violence, are excluded from this definition. Any form of physical or psychological harm not caused intentionally, but in an accident is therefore not included by the definition of violence against journalists.
Accountability is a further important concept in this paper. The level accountability is often seen as a decisive factor for the respect for human rights in a country and limited accountability is often linked to a lack of human rights (Mitchel, Carey & Butler, 2014, p.815). Accountability can be defined as the requirement to provide information and explanations for someone's actions (Koop, 2009, p.3). An actor is therefore required to accept responsibility for her actions. Not all definitions of accountability include the option of sanctions (Koop, 2009, p.3), but in this work sanctions are crucial for the concept at hand. A lack of sanctions as consequence for human rights violations would significantly lower incentives to avoid accountability. Accountability mechanisms can work internal as well as external. Whereas democratic regimes often face internal accountability,
authoritarian regimes are generally less vulnerable for it. External accountability in contrast can affect authoritarian regimes through monitoring by international institutions and NGOs (Mitchel, Carey & Butler, 2014, p.815).
2.2 Militias, P/A theory, and the Delegation argument
The existing academic literature on militias mostly focuses on the cooperation of militias and governments, or what Staniland refers to as collusion (Staniland, 2015, p.773). PGMs often lack in terms of professionalism and cannot be compared to regular armed forces, when it comes to overall effectiveness and reliability. State's reliance on such armed groups is therefore still a puzzling issue (Ash, 2016, p.704). One prominent explanation for government reliance on PGMs that is recently discussed in the academic literature, is the avoidance of blame by international aid donors for human rights violations (Ash, 2016, p.704). One could expect that the deployment of PGMs is a
strategic choice by the government (Steinert, Steinert, & Carey, p.251, 2019). This assumption is in line with the P/A theory
P/A theory divides regimes and militias into two functional groups, regimes as the principal and militias as agents, who act on behalf of the principal. Militias are therefore merely an
instrument at the disposal of a regime. The basic idea is that regimes rely on PGMs, because they offer a strategic advantage and delegate shameful acts to militias in order to avoid accountability (Cohen & Nordås, 2016, p.880; Alvarez, 2006, p.17). States nowadays face a severe amount of scrutiny by a variety of actors like foreign governments, international institutions, and NGOs. Any violation of international norms can therefore have serious consequences for a state (Campbell, 2002, p.13). States have to fear the withdrawal of international support, trade, investment, and aid (Cohen & Nordås, 2016, p.880). Regimes may delegate shameful acts like sexual violence or violence against members of the press to PGMs in order to avoid being held accountable and experience backlash for such acts (Raleigh & Kishi, 2018, p.4). If a regime delegates shameful acts of violence like repression against journalists to a militia to avoid accountability, one would expect that at the same time official security forces will not participate in such acts (Raleigh & Kishi, 2018, p.4). One would also expect that regimes will rely on informal militias, with less obvious links to the government, rather than on semi-official PGMs,so that they can plausibly deny any
accountability or knowledge.
Empirical support for the assumption that PGMs primarily take part in acts of repression while official security forces stay out of such acts is rather weak (Raleigh & Kishi, 2018, p.4). As explained by Cohen and Nordås on the case of sexual violence, the logic behind P/A theory and the Delegation argument fails when official security forces start to participate in acts of repression (Cohen & Nordås, 2016). Moreover, it can be argued that the logic also fails if the perpetrators are obviously linked to the regime in power. This counts for semi-official PGMs as well as in some cases for informal militias. Of course, these failures could possibly be caused by principal-agent related problems (Cohen & Nordås, 2015, p.880). Problems like information asymmetries between the principal and the agents that influence the payoff for both parties are frequently discussed in the literature on P/A theory and identified as the 'principal's problem' (Miller, 2005, p.204). As a
solution, one could expect that the principal uses some kind of incentive in order to keep the agent in check and brings the agent's self-interest in line with its own interests (Miller, 2005, p.204). However, if official security forces are involved in repressions against members of the free press, it is not to be expect that the regime is keeping its agents in check. In that case, the government is either not willing or not able to keep the agents in check.
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: When regimes delegate the repression against journalists to PGMs, official security forces will not participate in the repression
Hypothesis 2: When regimes delegate repression against journalists, they will rather rely on informal PGMs than on semi-official PGMs
In case that the assumptions made for the Delegation argument are contradicted in the cases of Iraq and Venezuela, an alternative explanation may offers a better insight. This work builds on Ahram's insights on violence repertoires that itself is drawn from contentious politics literature (Ahram, 2016, p.210). Ahram concludes that the relationship between PGMs and governments are not exclusively motivated by cost-benefit oriented considerations. Instead, factors like doctrine, routine, and training have to be taken in consideration (Ahram, personal communication,
22.07.2019). The term repertoire has to be understood as “a set of practices groups and individuals routinely engage in as they make claims against each other” (Ahram, 2016, p.210). Repertoires of violence are specific subsets of wider repertoires and involve violence specialists like the police or the military as well as rebel groups or PGMs that control the means to cause damage to others (Ahram, 2016, p.210). The skill to inflict violence requires training and practice, for example through military training and drill (Ahram, 2016, p.210). Through training and repetition violence specialists are getting used and acclimatized to the presence of violence. Repression in general and repression against journalists and members of the press in particular can therefore be understood as a way of behaviour and skill, acquired through training and repetition. It takes time for such
repertoires to form and get institutionalised as a core skill of an armed group. However, the longer such a repertoire is already used by an armed group, the more likely it becomes that it becomes established as a core skill by the armed group.
From this, it can be concluded that countries with a history of repression against journalists committed by militias are more likely to experience further repressions by militias.
Hypothesis 3: Countries with a history of repression against journalists by PGMs are more likely to experience more repression against journalists.
The literature on PGMs often turns to the P/A theory and the Delegation argument to explain the reliance of regimes on militias, presuming a cost-benefit based relationship. In conclusion, two
hypotheses can be made based on the Delegation argument. First, official security forces will not participate in repressive acts, if regimes delegate repression to PGMs. Second, to avoid
accountability, regimes prefer informal PGMs with less obvious links to the government over semi-official militias. As an alternative to these cost-benefit based explanations, violence repertoires offer an explanations based on routine, doctrine, and training. Through training and routine, a particular violence repertoire can be established over time. As a hypothesis, it can be concluded that countries with a history of repression by PGMs will very likely experience more repression.
The following chapter covers the empirical part of this thesis. I take a look at the two cases of Iraq and Venezuela in order to test the hypotheses made for the Delegation argument. Before an analysis is made for each case, the militia structure and safety situation for journalists gets described to gain a better insight into the cases. I start with the Iraq case.
Chapter 3: Iraq
3.1 Militias in Iraq
Iraq's militias are mostly formed around ethnic groups and all three major ethnic subcultures, the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shia Arabs, have formed their own armed militias (Mowle, 2006, p.41). The motivations to form these militias range from the need for protection to more criminal and sinister motives. The most prominent and successful militias with ties to the Iraqi government are formed by Shia Arabs. These militias can be roughly categorized into five groups: Shia militias that were already active in the time between 2003 and 2011 with the support of Iran; militias that operate as armed wings of political parties; newly formed Shia militias; smaller local militias that were formed around tribal lines; and a rather specific Turkmen militia (Abbas, 2017, p.4). Official budget figures show that in 2016 around 110.000 militia members were founded by the Iraqi government (Abbas, 2017, p.7; Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.12). In 2017, this number has even increased up to approximately 122.000 militia members (Abbas, 2017, p.7).
The Iraqi government, formed by the Shia Dawa Party that came into power after the US led invasion in 2003, was traditionally very reluctant to accept the existence of militias (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.5). The government under prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, in power between 2006 and 2014, initially saw militias as illegitimate and as a national security risk (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.5). At the same time, the states ability to use coercive power decreased drastically and the government had to increasingly rely on militias (Ahram, 2011, p.56). This may explain why the dynamic between Maliki's regime and non-state militias changed drastically. Maliki relied on militias to fight insurgents as early as 2008 (Ahram, 2011, p.91). In early 2014, after Iraqi security forces nearly faced a catastrophic defeat by the Sunni terror organisation the Islamic State (IS), the dependence on Shia militias increased once again (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.6). Originally, seven predominantly Shia militia groups formed a loosely connected umbrella organisation under the term Popular Mobilization Front (PMF). These paramilitary groups were mainly deployed to fight IS combatants, but also to enforce Maliki's control in predominantly Sunni regions (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.6). Maliki relied on these Shia militias because he saw them as more reliable and effective than the ethnically mixed Iraqi security forces (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.6) and relied further on them, even after his resignation as prime minister in August 2014 (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.9). For him, these militias were a useful political tool and he tried to bring them under his direct control. In his function as prime minister, Maliki first attached the PMF commission, an institution that overviewed the militias activities, directly to his office. After he resigned as prime
minister, Maliki guaranteed autonomy from the government for the militias and in the same step bound them closer to him personally (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.9).
Haider a-Abadi, replacing Maliki as prime minister in August 2014, was forced by the military success of IS to further rely on the PMF militias and also failed to integrate them into Iraq's official security forces (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.10). The attempt to transform the PMF into an independent part of the Iraqi security forces with the help of an executive order failed and the militias remain largely autonomous.
The PMF militias are very popular in Iraqi society, especially by Shia Arabs, and a vast majority approved the use of PMF militias against IS (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.10). This
popularity is on of the main reason why it is so hard for Iraq's government to challenge the militia's influential position (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.10). In fact, the PMF militias are so popular that ten times more volunteers were enlisted in the PMF militias than in the official security forces in 2016 (Mansour & Jabar, 2017, p.11).
Despite this high popularity in parts of Iraq's population, the PMF militias also face harsh criticism. Politicians, government officials, and high ranking military officials criticize the Iranian support for a number of Shia militias and fear the influence of the Ayatollah regime (Abbas, 2017, p.5). Moreover, officials are concerned with the political influence of some these militias (Abbas, 2017, p.8). For Iraq's other population groups, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds, the Shia militias can also pose a serious threat. Reports of human rights violations committed by the militias fuel fears and concerns among the Sunni minority and many Sunnis view the militias as a tool to expand Shia influence in Iraq's political landscape (Abbas, 2017, p.9). The Shia militias defend their use of force against the Sunni minority, claiming to fight supporters of terrorist organisations like the IS
(Abbas, 2017, p.9).
The nature of the militias operating under the PMF umbrella is quite ambiguous. Loyalties, motivations, and relations with the regime are quite obscure. The PMF militias have official ties to the Iraqi government and are deployed to counter the IS and other insurgents. Moreover, Iraq's government is officially financing and equipping at least some of the militias with weapons and other equipment. This can be seen as official approval by the government, giving the PMF the character of a semi-official PGM. The Shia militias are still not part of Iraq's official security forces, despite all attempts to integrate them. This may change in the near future, but the actual position outside of the official security apparatus is now a key characteristic of a PGM.
The relationship between the government and the PMF is quite complicated and ambiguous. Towards the end of his presidency, Maliki, for example, tried relatively successfully to bind the Shia militias to his regime. Despite this, the loyalties of the militias were still not exclusively oriented
towards the Iraqi government, but sometimes towards religious authorities or foreign actors, such as Iran. The confessional nature of the militias is decisive, strengthening their loyalty more towards the general Shia population, rather than towards the Iraqi state and government as a whole. The loyalty problem became even more complex after Maliki resigned and Abadi came into office.
The questionable relationship with the Iraqi government and complex loyalties towards religious authorities of the PMF militias do not contradict the categorization as PGMs. The militias are deployed on behalf of the government, act at least partly in its interest, and are financed and equipped by it, making the militias under the PMF umbrella a semi official PGM. Still, the
complicated relationship has to be taken into consideration as a factor that may helps to explain the militia's behaviour.
3.2 Violence against journalists in Iraq
Iraq has a reputation of being one of the most dangerous countries for journalists to work in. In 2018 Iraq was ranked 156 out of 180 on the World Press Freedom Index provided by Reporters without Borders (RSF, 2019a). According to CPJ, 186 journalists were killed in Iraq between 1992 and 2019 (CPJ, 2019b). Violence against journalists spiked after the US led invasion. Between 2003 and 2010 145 journalists lost their lives and Iraq ranked as the deadliest countries for journalists for six consecutive years (Ricchiardi, 2011, p.21). A high number of the fatalities, 93 in total, were classified as murders (Ricchiardi, 2011, p.21). The death toll reached its peak in 2006 and 2007, with 32 reported deaths in both years and then dropped to 11 in 2008 (Ricchiardi, 2011, p.21). Journalists and other media professionals had to face threats like beatings, kidnappings, torture, and eventually killings by various actors. Terrorist groups, militias, and criminal gangs targeted
journalist for a wide range of reasons. Official Iraqi security forces were also occasionally accused of being involved in attacks on journalists (Ricchiardi, 2011, p.21). Even more shocking is the fact that despite the high number of murders not one person was convicted and sent to prison for such a crime in the past years. Iraq suffers from a culture of impunity for violent acts against members of the press, deeply affecting the media's ability to report independently.
The dangerous situation for journalist in Iraq is at least partly a result of the violent conflicts that plague Iraq and not only journalists suffer from the violence. A deadly spiral of insurgencies and sectarian violence started with the 2003 invasion. The rise of the IS once again increased the level of violence experienced by both, journalists and civilians. But the highly politicised
environment in which journalists and other members of the free press have to work makes them a prime target for attacks and repressions. In its annual report of 2018 RSF mentions that: “Journalists
are often the victims of armed attacks, arrests or intimidation by pro-government and even government militias in all parts of the country”. (RSF, 2019a). These attacks remain generally unpunished by the country's justice system and in the few cases where investigations on violence against journalists are opened, these investigations do not produce any results and get dropped quickly (RSF, 2019a). Journalists are especially under threat when they investigate allegations of corruption and embezzlement (RSF, 2019a). Generally speaking, journalists and other members of the free media have to work in a highly violent and politicised environment in which the press is above all seen as a tool for the political ambitions of the various factions active in Iraq. Right now, it does not look like the situation for journalist will improve in the near future. New laws could restrict the work of the media even more and elected officials have made statements warning journalists not to disrespect religious or national symbols (RSF, 2019a).
3.3 Analysis Iraq
As already pointed out, Iraq is a dangerous country for journalists to work in. Correspondingly, news media reports and statements from NGOs like RSF or CPJ dealing with repression and violence against journalists and other members of the press are numerous. I focus on a time frame between 2010 and today, to take the most recent developments into account.
Iraq's media landscape has changed drastically after the US-led invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Many journalists made extensive use of new possibilities and
opportunities to report on political issues and express critical opinions. This can be seen as positive development, highlighting progress on issues like press freedom and the right of free speech. However, media and NGO reports suggest that journalists and members of the press still have to face serious threats while working in Iraq. The analysis of news media articles that deal with the issue has brought up numerous articles and cases that show de dangerous situation for journalists in Iraq.
The case of Hadi al-Mahdi is a good example that caught the attention of several English speaking news media publications. Al-Mahdi was the host of a political radio show. The show enjoyed extreme popularity in and around Baghdad back in 2010. Mahdi's radio talk was praised as “arguably the most breathtaking exercise of free speech in a place where its limits are still being established” (Myers, 14.05.2010). Mahdi was very outspoken in his critique and did not hold back with harsh words or polemic, openly calling government officials corrupt or even “illiterate” (Myers, 14.05.2010). What could have been the story of a champion for the right of free speech in a country that had experienced repression and persecution of critical voices for decades, has a more
than bitter aftertaste. Mahdi's controversial radio show attracted a lot of negative attention from government officials and in response the hosting radio station received anonymous threats (Myers, 14.05.2010). His harsh criticism also reportedly led to beatings and detentions (Gowen,
09.11.2011). Mahdi himself expressed publicly that he felt threatened. “I have lived the last three days in a state of terror,” he posted on his Facebook page. Someone was sending him threatening messages via Facebook, saying that the government would do something to him (Gowen,
09.11.2011). How real these threats were, became clear just shortly after he posted the message. Mahdi was found shot dead in his own house on the 8th
of September 2011 (Huffington Post, 08.11.2011). Who exactly shot Mahdi was never clarified, but his death is for many observers a reminder of how dangerous the work of the media in Iraq still is (Gowen, 09.11.2011). A
spokesperson for Human Rights Watch stated that “the killing of Hadi al-Mahdi sadly highlights that journalism in Iraq remains a deadly profession” (Huffington Post, 08.11.2011). Moreover, he demanded that Iraq's authorities should immediately start an investigation into the assassination of Mahdi.
The articles on the case of Hadi al-Mahdi have set an impressive example for the situation regarding repressive violence against journalists in Iraq and the coverage the issue gets in
international news media outlets. The articles all highlight Mahdi's role as a champion for the right of free speech and press freedom in Iraq and the consequences he had to endure for his outspoken criticism of the Iraqi government. Several aspects of these articles are especially interesting for the points raised in my thesis. First of all, Mahdi's case confirms that repressive violence against journalists exists in Iraq and that the issue can attract the attention of the international media, at least in such a high profile case. Though it was never determined who was responsible for Madhi's assassination, it is more than likely that he was killed for political reasons. This supports the
assumption that journalists and media personalities have to face severe repressions and violence for voicing critical opinions against the government. Moreover, the fact that no obvious perpetrator could be identified fits the assumption that the Iraqi government did not want to be hold responsible for such an assassination (however, this is speculative as long as the perpetrator stays unknown). It can be doubted that the Iraqi government is able to totally avoid responsibility in this specific case. All three discussed media articles draw at least an indirect link between Mahdi's public criticism of the government and government officials and the reason for his assassination. The attention by media outlets like the New York Times, the Huffington Post or the Washington Post itself is also of high interest for my thesis. All three media outlets are internationally respected and attract a broad readership. This means that an article about Mahdi or his assassination and the possible links to the Iraqi government potentially gets high attention from an international public. A broad and
international readership increases the pressure on Iraqi government officials and makes it even more unlikely that the government can effectively avoid accountability. The delegation argument
becomes less valid.
Mahdi's violent death is not the only case of violence against journalists in Iraq that received attention in internationally published media outlets. One issue that received attention from the international media was the nationwide “Day of Rage” protest in 2011 and the violent reactions by Iraqi security forces. The protests, inspired by other protests in the Arab world, were directed against the government and president Maliki, and protesters spoke out against problems like corruption, and demanded reforms. Most of the protesters were members of Iraq's Sunni minority, which is politically marginalised. Iraq's security forces answered the protests with force and extraordinary violence. According to media reports, the security forces used live ammunition and fired directly into crowds of protesters, causing the death of at least 29 people (McCrummen, 26.02.2011). Security forces not only targeted protesters, but also journalists who were on site of the protests. A Washington Post article for example cites four journalists, who had been arrested in Baghdad after leaving the site of a protest: “They said they were handcuffed, blindfolded, beaten and threatened with execution by soldiers from an army intelligence unit”. (McCrummen,
26.02.2011). According to eyewitness reports, journalists were treated like criminals and al-Qaeda operatives. This escalation of violence against journalists and civilians who express criticism against Maliki's government was seen by international news media reports as a new quality of repression. Hussam al-Ssairi, a journalist that was interviewed for the Washington Post article, voiced his concerns and stated: "Yesterday was like a test, like a picture of the new democracy in Iraq”. (McCrummen, 26.02.2011).
The “Day of Rage” protests and the reporting of the issue demonstrate some crucial points. First of all, a clear link between outspoken criticism against the government and repressive violence can be observed. Protesters and journalists experienced repressions and violence on the part of the security forces, because they voiced criticism and demanded changes and reforms. In contrast to the assassination of Mahdi, where a political motive is likely but speculative, a political motivation to silence any kind of criticism is hardly deniable in the case of the “Day of Rage” protests. What is even more interesting, is the fact that Iraqi security forces were openly involved in the violence. This kind of open violence against journalists by official security forces was new Iraq, a country that has undergone major conflicts after the US invasion of 2003. The government evidently turned to more authoritarian strategies to counter protests and criticism. The Washington Post article illustrates that with the statement given by Hussam al-Ssairi. The case of of the “Day of Rage” protests has severe implications for the Delegation argument. The general assumption of the
Delegation argument is that a government relies on agents like PGMs to avoid accountability for acts that violate human rights. This basic assumption gets contradicted by the fact that Iraqi security forces were so openly involved in the violent repression of the protests. In fact, there is no evidence that some sort of delegation to an agent outside of the official security forces has happened in this case. It would be premature to conclude that the Delegation argument has lost its validity, just because of this one example, but it certainly weakens the core assumption of the argument.
The “Day of Rage” protests are not the only example for Maliki's increasingly authoritarian style of governance and the increasingly repressive behaviour against critical journalists and others who expressed criticism and dissatisfaction. Reports of incidents of repression and violence against journalists and government critics frequently made it to English speaking news media outlets. The Christian Science Monitor, a US media outlet, for example reported that the free press had to faced increasing political pressure by the Maliki government in 2012 (Peterson, 13.06.2012). An article published by the Christian Science Monitore directs the blame for the precarious situations of journalists and other members of the free press on Maliki's leadership. This explicit accusation of the Iraqi government further defies an effective attempt to avoid accountability.
The newly re-emerged sectarian violence caused an increase of violent deaths of journalists from 2013 on. An article published by the New York Times on the 23th of December 2013 describes
how journalists were hit by a wave of violence. The assassinations and suicide bombings on TV news stations marked a new escalation of violence against the press (Ghazi, 23.12.2013). What makes this new wave of violence especially tragic, is the fact that the safety situation of journalists had improved at least a little in the previous months (Ghazi, 23.12.2013). Many of these attacks were committed by militant Sunni groups and were the beginning of a new violent campaign against journalists and the media in general. The Iraqi government cannot be blamed for these attacks. Yet, some observers still put some blame on the government. Salar Ahmed, a cameraman from Mossul, for example expressed anger with the government for not offering the needed protection and safety for journalists. “The government and the security forces are incapable of protecting us. They haven’t been able to catch one person involved in any of the killings so far.” (Ghazi, 23.12.2013). Iraq's journalists clearly see providing a secure environment for the media to work in and prosecuting those those who threat and attack journalists as the government's
responsibility. Without this safe environment, journalists are simply not able to do their job and report honestly on the political situation in the country. The high risk for physical harm and the lack of safety and protection by the state is a serious problem and can potentially discourage journalists from reporting on certain issues. This seriously disrupts the media's ability to report free and independently, eventually undermining the existence of a free press in Iraq altogether. This is not
the same as committing the atrocities and could just be seen as simple neglect by the Iraqi government. Yet, it has to be considered that the government and pro-government organisations, who often have their own media and propaganda outlets, could indirectly profit from a decline in freedom for independent media outlets. Less diversity could mean that partisan media outlets have the opportunity to reach a broader public. Neglect to provide protection for journalists can therefore not be compared to the use of repressive violence, but it most certainly can be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the media's ability to report independently. However, such a claim is difficult to verify, it is hard to determine if the neglect is intentional or not.
The government itself claimed that Sunni militants were to blame for the rise in sectarian violence in 2013 and 2014, which deeply affected journalists. According to government officials, Sunni militias were trying to provoke violent reactions from Shias by committing acts of violence and terror. President Maliki, at this point still in office, announced a crack down on all illegal armed groups, who were held responsible for the violence (Mandi & Benzhan, 20.06.2013). This
announcement was not directed against Shia militias who had links to the government. Officials from Iraq's security forces stated that Shia militias with links to the government did not join the violence (Mandi & Benzhan, 20.06.2013). The government's official standpoint was indeed, that no PMF militia had committed any kind of crime or human rights violation. This is practically an absolution for any crime potentially committed by a PGM. Reports by international media outlets and NGOs contradict this standpoint. Amnesty International published a report that accused Shia militias of abductions and assassinations of Sunni civilians (Amnesty International, 2014, p.15). An article published by the Seattle Times picked up the issue. Amnesty International's were based on interviews with relatives of victims and survivors, stating that prominent Shia militias like the Badr Brigades and the Mahdi Army were responsible for the kidnappings and killings of many Sunni civilians (Salama &Yacoub,15.10.2014). Once again the Iraqi government denied these accusations and any form of responsibility. A military official stated that Iraq's government would “in no way be an accomplice for killing its own citizens”, adding that the government “do not support any group, including militias, which work to kill innocent people” (Salama & Yacoub, 15.10.2014). This statement once again implies that the Shia militias associated with the government were not
involved in any kind of human rights violations, whether committed against journalists or against civilians. By consequently denying any wrong doings by the PMF militias, the government is in a sense avoiding accountability. Instead of delegating an act of repression to another actor with less obvious links to the regime in power, the Iraqi government simply ignores and denies any
accountability, even if media reports directly associates it with the violence. The reporting by NGOs and media outlets is apparently not enough to increase accountability for acts of repression against
the press. The Iraqi government has apparently no reason to fear any negative consequences for human rights violations caused by militia activity. The ignorance and denial of accountability can potentially be seen as a different strategy, used by governments instead of delegation. This strategy, however, presupposes that the claim of denial is either very plausible, or that other actors simply are willing to accept weak claims of denial.
The security situation for journalists continued to deteriorate, mostly because of the brutal fightings between Iraq's security forces and IS militants. Global Voices Advocacy, a NGO
concerned with press freedom, for example described the situation in Mossul as a deathtrap for journalists after the city was captured by the IS (Abrougui, 10.04.2017). The IS militants kidnapped 48 journalists in and around Mossul and executed 13 of them (Abrougui, 10.04.2017). Even more journalists were killed while the Iraqi security forces fought IS militants to recapture Mossul. It is important to highlight that not only the IS was responsible for the physical harm and death of journalists. Various militias and armed groups posed a great threat to the free and independent work of Iraq's media. Most surprisingly, a militia's relationship with the government seems to be
irrelevant for the threat the militia poses towards the press (Abrougui, 10.04.2017). Armed groups in general have a negative impact on the media's ability to report freely and independently. As put by Mustafa Saadoon of the Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights:
“You find Iraqi journalists trying their best not to address anything that could harm the interests of those armed groups or powerful people who were complacent in abusing any journalist covering
them to reveal their [involvement] in corruption or human rights violations”. (Mustafa Saadoon; Abrougui, 10.04.2017)
Iraqi journalist Afrah Shawqi was kidnapped by a group of men that claimed to be part of Iraq's security forces in December of 2016, after she had published a critical article about militia activities (Abrougui, 10.04.2017). Allegedly, Shawqi's name appeared on some sort of black list of
undesirable journalists (Abrougui, 10.04.2017). The actual existence of such a blacklist would highlight the fact that journalists are in the cross hairs of violent militias. What is definitely highlighted by this case and by Saadoon's statement, is the fact that militias target journalists to protect their own vital interests and act beyond the government's control.
An issue that recurs again and again is the impunity and lack of governmental action when it comes to crimes committed against journalists. Impunity for violence against journalists can have a negative impact on the exercise of freedom of expression. A culture of impunity not only motivates perpetrators to engage in further acts of violence, but also promotes self-censorship, limiting the
reporting on sensitive topics (UNESCO, 2018, p.142). The government can profit from the self-censorship of the media, limiting critical reporting without the need to actively participate in repressive acts. This explains why a regime may has an interest in maintaining such a culture of impunity for for repressive acts against the press. The case of Mahdi's assassination has shown that perpetrators are practically safe from any kind of persecution and punishment. Other cases have highlighted this issue as well. The lack of persecution is an issue for which the Iraqi government is often held accountable. NGOs as well as Iraqi journalists complained frequently about the inaction of the Iraqi government and security forces, making them responsible for the fact that crimes went unpunished and cases like Mahdi's assassination were never solved. The lack of investigations into crimes and violence against journalists could be seen as a lack of interest by the government or even an attempt to avoid accountability, because potential links to the government or its officials stay unknown to the public.
