EU border management in the Mediterranean during the migration crisis

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EU Border Management in the Mediterranean during the Migration Crisis

Author: Femke Minderman Student Number: 10149244 Supervisor: Dr. R. Sanchez Salgado Second Reader: Dr. J. Doomernik June 2018, Amsterdam Master Thesis Political Science, Public Governance and Policy

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Introduction

For a couple years, the news broadcasts regularly show images of the pain and suffering of migrants1 from the Middle East and Africa trying to get into Europe. One of the main points of entry of these migrants and refugees is situated in Italy. The Italian island Lampedusa is the closest Europe gets to African borders and therefore the destination for many migrants. On leaky boats they try to get to the shores of EU soil. This influx of people on the move spiked in 2015 and 2016 when tens of thousands migrants entered the European Union (EU) (UNHCR n.d.). The journey to Europe turned out to be quite dangerous and even deadly as thousands of migrants did not make it; either went missing or died (idem). The external borders of the EU became one of the deadliest borders in the world (Guardian 2017a). This migrant crisis was captured in a photo of a young, Syrian boy that drowned and washed up along the shore (The Time 2015). Next to the human suffering, concerns from national states arose on how to handle these numbers of migrants seeking asylum in their territories. This vast increase of migrants and associated tragic scenes spurred the EU, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and many more into action to make sure the situation at the external European borders would get better managed.

The responsibility for border management of EU’s external borders is shared by the member states and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, or Frontex. The EU established a European Agenda on Migration in 2015 to better regulate the flows of refugees and help lighten the burden on the southern member states in response to the human tragedy in the Mediterranean (Commission Communication (15) 240 final, p.2). Part of this Agenda was the tripling of Frontex’s budget to make the search-and rescue operations carried out by the agency in the Mediterranean more effective in helping the member states managing their borders and save lives (idem). A new regulation was set up at the end of 2016, following up the Agenda on Migration. Under this regulation Frontex and the border and coast guards of member states were prompted to work together to sufficiently manage crossings from external borders and address challenges and future threats and thereby ensuring a high level of internal security within the EU (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624). These changes in the structure and operationalization of the agency, combined with the emphasis the EU has put on the agency, made Frontex a key actor during the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean.

Next to the support for member states, Frontex also launched the operations Poseidon, Triton and their most recent Themis. These operations were set out to manage the flow of migrants on their way to Italy. The emphasis was on the undertaking of search-and-rescue operations, but Themis has a bigger emphasis on law enforcement. Frontex’s executive director Fabrice Leggeri said this new focus is needed to prevent criminal groups to enter the EU and that this is crucial for the internal safety of Europe (Frontex 2018).

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As we can see, Frontex keeps changing in size, objectives and capacities. But it is not the only actor present on the external borders of the EU. Eight NGOs were also present on the Mediterranean Sea to pick up migrants. Last summer these operations were discredited, when Frontex, the Italian government and other action groups claimed the presence of the NGOs encouraged traffickers and undermined Frontex’s work. Also, they criticized the way NGOs ineffectively work with Frontex and the Italian government to track down smugglers. NGOs responded saying this was not the case, and that stopping their operations would only lead to more deaths (The Guardian 2017b). Since then, the Italian government, Frontex and even action groups with opposite ideas stopped supporting, or even obstructed the search-and-rescue operations of the NGOs. One example of this is Defend Europe, an operation launched by a populist group called Generation Identity. They claim the refugees form a threat against the European identity and security and therefore stopped rescue boats from leaving the harbour (De Volkskrant 2017).

This is exemplary for the tension that exists in managing the migrant crisis in Europe. The influx of refugees on the one hand raise issues on fundamental rights and the lack of compliance of them on the EU external borders, and on the other hand it raises security concerns as Europe has had terrorist attacks happening more frequently. Now that IS is almost defeated the fear exists that members of IS will try to get into Europe (Frontex 2018). In EU policy on border management there is always attention for both concerns. The European Commission clearly states that human rights have to be respected, but also places a strong emphasis on controlling migration and improving internal security in the EU by securing the borders (European Commission 2018).

During the migrant crisis, there was and still is a lot of controversy on how to handle the influx of migrants and what the consequences are for the EU and its member states. The crisis opened up a whole debate on how to manage EU’s external borders. In this study, I will look at the different views that are present in these turbulent times and which view became the dominant narrative in EU policy on border management and the executing agency Frontex. My research should help gain a better understanding on how crises affect policy; more specifically how a contest between different frames can help explain the different policy outcomes that crises can generate. In the next chapters I will elaborate on theories underpinning this research question, clarify which research methods I will use to answer it and then present my findings.

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1. Literature, Theories & Methods

In this chapter I will set out theories on how a crisis can affect policies. Then I will look more specifically to the policy that will be analysed in this study, namely the policy of the EU on border management. This will give the basis for my research design and will consequentially lead to articulating my research question.

1.1. Policy Making in Times of Crisis

As Jean Monnet said: “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises” (Monnet 1978, p. 417). This statement underpins the idea that crises can have a great impact on the governing structure (Keeler 1993; Falkner 2016; Boin et al. 2009). The influx of migrants and all the consequences it generated, which are the events discussed in this study, could be one of these crisis Monnet talked about. To determine if this is in fact what has happened, first the concept of a ‘crisis’ should be established. Dyson & Hart (2013) propose the following definition:

“A crisis arises when events occur that communities and/or their political elites interpret as a serious threat to the basic structures or fundamental values and norms underpinning the status-quo, creating highly uncertain circumstances that call for urgent responses.”

The migrant crisis with the great influx of migrants and refugees accounts for the threat to the EU, either as a threat to the internal security or as a threat to fundamental values and norms. The threats caused by the migrant crisis asked for immediate action. The migration crisis presented multiple difficulties for the EU, which prompted them to undertake some serious action. The external borders of the EU were unmanageable during the peak of the crisis. This led to urgent responses on multiple levels of governance; European, national and subnational. Member states closed their borders (BBC 2015; The Guardian 2015), Italy threatening to give out thousands of EU visas to lighten the burden on them (Express 2017) after which other member states heavily criticized this action and even threatened to use force to keep migrants from crossing their borders (Daily Mail 2015).

Thus, the events that happened have had great impact on the EU and its member states and this has created the call for urgent responses to alter border management policy in order to solve the crisis. The dynamics of how these alterations eventually happen and what the outcomes will be are hard to predict (Boin et al. 2009, p. 81). Several arguments are made in the literature on how crises can affect policy. Falkner (2016) also recognizes the affect a crisis can have on policies. The short amount of time available to act upon a crisis creates a de-stabilizing setting. Her hypothesis is that the more urgent and sizeable a crisis is, the more likely it will be a crisis actually leads to policy reforms. According to her, there are crucial intervening variables in this process, such as the various framework conditions and the policy-specific decision-making system (idem, p. 222). It is the latter one that she

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particularly looks at when she analyses the degree of policy change measured during different crises that tormented the EU. The decision making process could make it difficult to implement change if unanimity is required among all the EU member states with diverging interests, the joint-decision trap model. There could also be conditions present that allow for the EU to sidestep the joint-decision trap; for example in case of qualified majority voting, agency decision or when bureaucrats or experts decide de facto on lower levels (idem, p. 223). Her conclusion is that in almost all policies there has been ‘layering’ of the policy where new elements are added, instead of replacing old policies, which is called displacement (idem, p. 231).

This is one way to look at how crises can affect policies. In this study however, the emphasis will be more on the interpretative side of the crisis. The explanatory power of this approach will be discussed in the theoretical framework. Boin et al. (2009) look at what influence crises have on people’s understanding of the situation and how labels like ‘crisis’ make it possible for new social, political or administrative discourses to change the status-quo (idem, p. 81). They notice that crises do not have a similar effect on every situation and propose the process of crisis exploitation as an explanation. Crisis exploitation occurs “when various actors seek to exploit the crisis-induced opportunity (idem, p. 82). Boin et al. claim that in times of crisis the political space for actors inside and outside the government opens up to redefine the issue and to propose policy reforms. They propose the following definition of crisis exploitation: “…the purposeful utilization of crisis-type

rhetoric to significantly alter levels of political support for public office-holders and public policies”

(idem, p. 83).

The opening up of the political space during a crisis is explained more elaborate by Keeler (1993). He states that crises can create a window of opportunity for policy reforms or even an opportunity for exploitation. Firstly, he identifies the urgency mechanism. This mechanism permits a window of opportunity for reform as all political actors are keen on settling the crisis as quick as possible. The sense of urgency makes it so inaction is not an option; the situation could even deteriorate. This imperative call for action could also lead to a less critical acceptance of policy proposals. Next to the urgency mechanism, the fear mechanism is a powerful process that initiates policy change. In times of crisis the fear of endangering lives or property creates circumstances in which policy reforms are made more easily (idem, p. 441).

The political space that opens up can be exploited by the actors involved in that policy area. Boin et al. claim this exploitation of the crisis manifests in ‘frame contests’ between the different actors. These frames and counter-frames describe the crisis on the following aspects; the severity, causes, the responsibility for its occurrence or escalation, and implications for the future. The actors involved compete on becoming the dominant narrative (Boin et al. 2009, p. 83). There are two forms of frame contests that occur during a crisis.

The first one is about the significance of the crisis. Actors could either consider the issue as a top priority that needs immediate action or as a ripple that can be dealt with existing policies. In this

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range of possible reactions to the same set of events Boin et al. decipher three types. The significance of the crisis is minimalized (type 1), acknowledged (type II) or maximized (type III). Type I representations see the set of events as an unfortunate incident, so there should not be any political or policy consequences. Type II representations view the set of events as a critical threat of the status-quo, but one that can be managed by the incumbent agents and tools. Lastly, type III deems the set of events to be a critical opportunity for change (idem, p. 84). When there is no denying the crisis, another frame contest can develop. Here the contest is about the causality of the crisis: who or what drives the course of the crisis (idem, p. 87)? The dependent variables in this theory are the fate of the incumbent officials and prospects for existing policies, programs and organizations that deal with the crisis. It depends on who is pointed out as being accountable for the events. Was it something unforeseeable and uncontrollable? Did the events happen through the influence of people outside the governing sphere – outgroups – of the incumbent officials and existing policies? In those cases the accountability is exogenized and no fault is given to the policy makers. If factors that created the crisis did seem foreseeable and controllable, accountability is endogenized. These two possible causality frames influence the outcome of the policy reform as it either means the status-quo is kept or there is room for change.

In the definition of Boin et al., they explicitly make the distinction between political and policy impacts. The political impact is analysed through the political ‘game’, which studies the clash between government and opposition and how the crisis changes the support for the incumbent government. The policy impacts are studied through the game between the defenders for the regulatory and administrative status-quo, and advocates of change, to find out the nature and degree of policy change (idem, p. 88). These advocates for change could be oppositional politicians, the media, interest groups, or even victims. These two games can help analyse if and how crisis affected politics or policies. When looking at how the migrant crisis has produced consequences for Frontex, the policy game seems most suitable. Advocates of change can either press for a policy paradigm shift or incremental reform. Proponents of the status-quo have to judge if the crisis evoked a degree of destabilization or delegitimation that allows them to resist the cries for policy change or to contain the policy reforms to a level that they are comfortable with. Sabatier (1999) claims that policy makers are willing to change technical, instrumental, non-core aspects of policy, but not their core beliefs. He distinguishes three orders of change, based on the ideas of Hall (1993). Hall talks about first-order changes, which are changes that are made within the existing policy without altering the overall goals and instruments of that policy (idem, p. 278). Second order changes occur when the overall goals remain unchanged, but the instruments are adjusted to better manage the events based on previous experiences. Lastly, there are third order changes where even the overall goals of the policy change, also referred to as a paradigm shift (idem, p. 279).

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Table 1. Crisis exploitation: the policy game by Boin et al. (2009)

In times of crisis, these two sorts of actors and their framing contests can have four different outcomes, as can be seen in Table 1. In outcome I and II, either one of the parties can “win” the framing contests, depending on their ability to form a winning coalition. The other outcomes are more nuanced and are therefore more likely to happen (Boin et al. 2009, p. 91). This finding corresponds with Falkner’s conclusion that the most likely outcome is policy layering instead of displacement.

1.2. EU Border Management and Frontex

This study focusses on the EU policy on border management, more specifically on the EU agency executing this policy, Frontex. In the next paragraphs I will elaborate on the development of this agency and the broader context in which it operates. Over the years the policy on border management was more focussed on securitarian considerations, which leaded to a restrictive policy. Only later would humanitarian notions and compliance with human rights get more attention.

1.2.1. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders

The origins of border management of common, external borders lie in the European economic project as stated in the Single European Act (1986), where the objective was to create a single market by eliminating internal borders to advance inter-EU trade (Huysmans 2000, p. 752). The idea was that when internal border control would diminish, there had to be a harmonized and strong external border policy. With the establishment of the Schengen Area in 1985, policies concerning the management of borders became a European matter, because then free movement of people within the area was introduced and these border crossings demanded EU legislation. The first time the concept of ‘integrated border management’ was mentioned was in a Commission Communication from 2002. The Commission claims that common management of the external borders will boost security by making sure continuity in action undertaken to fight terrorism, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings (Commission Communication (02) 0233 final, p. 2). Part of this common policy was the Schengen Border Code, which consisted of rules on managing persons crossing the external borders of the EU in full compliance with European norms and values (Regulation (EC) 562/2006, p. 3). The enforcement of the Schengen Border Code is the responsibility of the member states, but the cooperation between member states was to be conducted by a European agency, called Frontex.

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Frontex was established in 2004 under the name of the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. The main role of Frontex was to support member states with external borders for better integrated border control management (Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, p. 4). The responsibility of border control still lay with the member states, but Frontex would help them to comply with European regulations. This was to ensure a high level of control and surveillance, and was needed to make free movement of persons within the EU possible and have an area of freedom, security and justice (idem, p.2). The specific tasks of Frontex were to assist member states on managing the external borders of the EU, to carry out risk analyses and set up a European Border Guard Team.

The legal framework of Frontex that was established in 2004 was amended a couple times. In 2011 a new regulation amended Frontex, as a Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights was established to make sure Frontex’s actions would comply with fundamental rights. In the Consultative Forum are permanent members, such as the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), a United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Council of Europe, and nine NGOs that are temporary members. The Consultative Forum has to publish an annual report of its activities and draw up a program of work for the next year (Regulation (EU) 1168/2011, p. 17). In 2015 it was amended again. The European integrated border management turned out to be unable to manage the unprecedented migratory flows in 2015 and a new regulation entered into force in 2016 and transformed Frontex to The European Border and Coast Guard Agency. This greatly expanded Frontex competence, with a supervisory role, the right to intervene in situations at the external border requiring urgent action, expand its operational tasks and its right to process personal data; and reinforce the emphasis on fundamental rights safeguards (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624).

1.2.2. Different Views on the Functioning of Frontex

The evolution of border management policy of the EU and correspondingly the functioning of Frontex can be explained through developments within the EU, but also on criticism from third parties. At first, border management was created to ensure the well-functioning of the Schengen area, but soon a security component was added. Huysmans (2000) claims that EU migration policy, of which border management policy is a part, is a spill-over effect from the security issues that arose with the abolition of internal border control. But in the 1980s the problematization of migration also occurred. The ideas of welfare chauvinism; the privileging of nationals from member states contrary to third-country nationals, and regarding migrants as a destabilizing or a dangerous matter, made for a restrictive policy concerning immigration and border crossings (idem, p. 753). There was the assumption that migration had a negative effect on domestic stability (idem, p. 756). When the internal borders fell away, the expectation was that it made it easier for criminal networks to cross borders. This created a linkage between border control, terrorism, international crime and migration (idem, p. 760). This focus on security shaped the restrictive migration and border management policies, claims Huysmans. The idea

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that migration policy and border policy is based upon securitarian considerations is widespread (Horii 2016, p. 243-244).

Another explanation for the restrictive border policy is given by Guiraudon (2000), who explains the development of migration control policy in the EU as a case of policy venue-shopping. Venue-shopping is a method for policy-making actors to find ways to adapt to institutional constraints in a changing environment. The establishment of the Schengen Area was one of these changing circumstances. National migration agencies exploited the new window of opportunity by using this policy venue to avoid national constraints on their objectives. These national migration agencies pursued remote control policy, because once migrants were on EU soil, they were under legal protection that made it more difficult and costly to send them back. The first EU policy instruments on migration were restrictive, to ensure migrants could not get to the EU. One example of this is the, earlier mentioned, common visa policy in the Schengen Convention. The migration control agencies focused on security issues and there for the EU policy was restrictive, focusing on internal safety, asylum fraud and smuggling. When placing Frontex in this framework, it seems logical Frontex’s policy foundation is built on the securitization of migration and border control. Frontex can be seen as a security actor that functions in the existing political discourse (Léonard 2011, p. 21).

But this did not happen without a countermovement. The European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles noticed this development, and concluded that the migration and border policy was heading in the wrong direction, with attention only for building a fortress, and not developing an appropriate response to the global dimension of the problem (Rudge 1989, p. 212). Moreover, criticism was given on the EU policy concerning migration and border control, claiming that European governments were barely fulfilling their international obligations and did not act in line with the humanitarian values that underpin their own democratic institutions (Joly & Cohen 1989, p. 11).

These critiques were also directed to way Frontex operated. The securitization of migration policy was met with a different unfolding process in which there came more attention for human rights and humanitarian concerns (Perkowski 2016, p. 331). There has been much research on the duality of border management, with the policing aspect on one side, and the humanitarian and human rights ideals on the other (Aas & Gundhus 2015, p. 13). These concerns were voiced in the discourse surrounding border policy, but also in practice (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, p. 54). The securitization was met with criticism from NGOs, the European Parliament, and international organisations. These actors questioned how fundamental rights were being respected at the European borders (Aas & Gundhus 2015; Pallister-Wilkins 2015). Numerous reports were written on EU border management and the functioning of Frontex, and how they both seriously lacked compliance with fundamental rights, like the right to life, respect for human dignity and the abidance of the non-refoulment principle (Amnesty International 2008, 2010, 2012; Human Rights Watch 2011, EU Ombudsman 2013). Next to these critiques, greater importance was given to human rights and humanitarian concerns that lie at the base of the European identity (Aas & Gundhus 2015, p. 3).

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These humanitarian notions have had their impact on Frontex, as they were partly why the Fundamental Rights High Officer and Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights were established. Pallister-Wilkins also claims humanitarianism is also used to frame policy and operational practices to institute best practices (2015, p. 54). In Frontex’s policy more attention is paid to the language of human rights, in its training courses for border guards, code of conduct, but also in its organizational structure as is mentioned above (Aas & Gundhus 2015, p. 13).

1.3. Interpretative Approach on Analysing the Policy-Making Process

In this research I will look at how the crisis has affected EU border management policy, specifically the executive EU agency, Frontex. More specifically, I will conduct an interpretive policy analysis. In contemporary policy-making there has been more attention for the ideational side of the process. This differs from the classical-modernist government and the corresponding policy-making process where the state imposed its policy through different institutional arrangements like representative democracy, differentiation between politics and bureaucracy, the commitment to ministerial responsibility and the idea that policy-making should be based on expert knowledge (Hajer 2003).

Nowadays, there are more actors involved in the policy-making process. There is a network of state and non-state actors that collaborates on policies (idem, p. 31). Essential about this new mode of governance is the collaboration between actors. Bevir and Rhodes (2003) claim that the actions of actors in network governance can only be explained by their beliefs and preferences. When looking at this interpretative side of the process, one can study how actors construct situations and differ in the way they perceive a problem, and consequently how it should be solved. This mode of governance has to function in a time of uncertainty, where there is an overload of information and complex issues. According to Hajer and Laws (2006, p. 252) frames can serve as an ‘ordering device’. Next to beliefs, narratives and discourse, frames are a way to order reality in such manner that makes sense in the domain of the policy. With a frame, diffuse worries can transform into beliefs one can act upon (idem, p. 257). So framing involves shaping, focusing and organizing the world around us (Gray 2003, p. 11). A frame is constructed through sorting and categorizing the world around is. The way one frames the problem gives direction to the perception of why a conflict arose, who the adversaries are and also if and how it can be resolved. Additionally, Gray emphasizes the fact that frames do not have to be permanent. She clearly distinguishes frames from framing, which is the process of producing frames (idem, p. 12).

‘T Hart (1993) introduces frames as a ‘crisis handling device’. He claims the most important instrument of managing a crisis is language. By using specific language, exploiting data and arguments and forming ‘discourse coalitions’ actors try to impose their definition of what the crisis encompasses (idem, p. 41). When a crisis hits a country or region, the government or governing parties lose the dramaturgy of political communication. The mass media responds quicker and already paints

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of a specific picture of what is happening, which sticks with the public. Other parties also have the opportunity to expose hidden or controversial practices (idem).

In this study on the EU migration the focus will be on the explanatory power of the frames that were used as a handling device. Where frames in general categorize the world around is, Verloo proposes ‘policy frames’. These categorize policies in terms of what the problem and consequently, what the solution is. In this study I will use this specific definition of a frame.

“A policy frame is an organizing principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful policy problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly enclosed.”

(Verloo 2005, p. 20)

Thus, given that the interpretative side of the contemporary policy-making process could have an important explanatory character; this research will focus on the frames that were present during the migrant crisis. The research question will be: how did the different frames used to describe the EU migrant crisis affect Frontex? To answer this question, this study will be divided into two parts. First I will look at what different frames exist in this policy domain using texts from various actors that were involved. Then I will look at how these frames were used to influence the debate on the migrant crisis, and more specifically to the workings of Frontex. In this following paragraph I will further elaborate on what my sub-questions will be and how I am going to answer them.

1.3.1. Expected Frames of the Migration Crisis

The first sub-question will be: what different frames were used by the relevant actors? First I will specify who those actors are, and then I will state my expectations on what the answer to this sub-question will be.

Evidently, the EU institutions – Commission, Parliament and Council – and Frontex are relevant actors. How they perceive this problem is key for how policy on migration is made and executed. When looking at the debates of the Parliament, extra scrutiny will be given to the populist parties speaking, because they are very outspoken and reflect a growing public opinion (Huysmans 2000, p. 767). In the process leading to the new border management policy stated in the new regulation on Frontex, policy pro-migrant NGOs and business interests groups deposited their views on the matter, so their frame will also be analysed. These organizations and interests groups are Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Doctors Without Borders, Red Cross, and Business Europe.

When looking at the literature, in the framing contests in this particular crisis different frames are expected with different actors. I expect the frame used by the governmental institutions to be a

security frame. The securitization of the migration policy in the EU has been visible since the 1980’s

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can be found that represents these securitarian ideas. In this frame the problem of the crisis is the influx of migrants and the dangers they bear with them. These dangers are criminality, terrorism and being a threat for the welfare state. I expect the solution they propose to include a restrictive migration policy.

During this crisis, much attention has also been paid to the humanitarian side of it; the tragic deaths, the suffering and the lack of basic provisions (Perkowski 2016, p. 331). Humanitarianism assumes that there are no differences between people, only between people’s human qualities that are possibly diminished, incomplete or unexpressed. It is about humanity and saving the ‘absolute victim’ (Agier 2010, p. 30). As mentioned in this introduction, the picture of the young Syrian boy has become exemplary for the crisis. The increasing amount of humanitarian organizations active in the Mediterranean also account for the greater emphasis on the human suffering in this crisis. Eight NGOs have been active in the Mediterranean Sea performing search-and-rescue operations. At the EU external borders NGOs, active groups, local citizens’ initiatives and governmental agencies have been busy trying to meet the basic needs of the migrants (Perkowski 2016, p. 332). I will therefore also look for a humanitarian frame, where the emphasis is on the humane side of the migrant crisis.

Next to this frame is the human rights frame, where the emphasis is more on the individual migrant and compliance with human rights.2 The idea of human rights as something universal is quite recent, before only national citizenship gave people rights. According to Morris (2002) this could be the result of the globalization and post-national societies that emerged. As said before, there has been more attention for this side of the migration policy over time. I expect pro-migrant NGOs to use this frame, as in their organizations respecting human rights is seen as the most important value to uphold. The solution of the migration crisis in this frame will deal more with policies emphasizing on helping migrant get to Europe safe and getting a fair treatment. Some literature suggests that the language on rights may be outdated, and instead there is an increasing relevance of humanitarian reasoning and governance (Aas & Gundhus 2015, p. 13). I therefore expect the humanitarian frame to appear more frequently.

Next to these frames, I also expect an economic frame to be present. The EU integrated border management stems from the European economic project and these economic considerations still relevant. Moreover, economic interests groups have been involved in the process leading op to the regulation establishing the EBCG. Business interest groups were concerned with the effects of an unravelling Schengen Area that would damage European businesses. They favoured a reinforced Frontex to better protect the external borders and make sure the internal borders remained open (Niemann & Speyer 2018, p. 37). I expect that this frame will not be that prevalent in this crisis and be used almost exclusively by economic interest groups.

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1.3.2. Crisis Exploitation during the Migration Crisis

When I will have clarified which policy frames occurred in the migration crisis, I will analyse how these frames manifested in the framing contest as Boin et al. describe. My second sub-question therefore will be: how does the framing contest between the policy frames affect Frontex/border management policy? I will use the theory on crisis exploitation to analyse how policy concerning border management, specifically the executing agency Frontex, was affected by the framing contest between security, human rights, humanitarian and economic frames.

In the case of the migration crisis and border management policy, the expectation is that almost all actors feel the need to change the policy in some way, which corresponds with Boin et al. type II representation of the unscheduled events. The difference between those actors will probably be the degree of change that is perceived as needed, so either acknowledge event significance or maximize it. Whereas EU institutions and Frontex try to build on existing policies, NGOs want to see a drastic change in policy, namely border management focused on humanitarian and human rights considerations. Populist parties are expected to want less involvement of the EU and more sovereignty for the member states. This will be established during the first framing contest.

The second framing contest centres on the question of causality. I expect the security frame to exogenize the accountability, as it presumably sees the migrants as the force that drove the course of the events. This assumption leads to the idea that the existing policies cannot be hold accountable, as it was something that could not have been foreseen. I expect the humanitarian frame to have a different stance on the matter. They seemingly do not see the incoming flow of migrants as the problem, but the way EU is handling it. I therefore expect them to endogenize the accountability as they see the existing set of policies as inadequate for handling the situation. The human rights frame would probably agree with this as I foresee them not agreeing with EU policy as it is not in line with the human rights. As for the economic frame, they probably also endogenize accountability. They do not want internal borders to be closed and see EU policy on that matter is not properly executed.

After the two framing contests, the policy game commences between the status-quo players and advocates of change. My expectation is that the EU, Frontex and business interests groups will embody the status-quo players, and the NGOs to be the advocates for change. I expect the outcome to be that the security frame became the dominant narrative for two reasons. One is the historical background of migration policy and the establishment of Frontex. When managing the external borders, the EU has always had a great emphasis on security. Secondly, today’s society is much more risk averse and priority is given to internal (national) safety. West-wing populist parties thrive well on this tendency and blame migration for much of the problems that exist, including criminality and the erosion of national identities (Oesch 2008, p. 352).

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1.4. Methodology and Data Collection

This study will focus on the case of Frontex and how the migrant crisis affected the agency. Gerring (2004) describes a case study as “…an in-depth study of a single unit where the scholar’s aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena.” This research focuses on Frontex in times of crisis to gain a better understanding on how crises affect policy, more specifically on the situation in the Central Mediterranean, because there the largest number of people tried to cross the sea (Frontex 2015, p. 2). This will be a critical case study, used for testing Boin et al.’s theory on crisis exploitation and potentially theory building. It is a critical case, more specifically a ‘most likely’ case, for two reasons.

Firstly, Boin et al. talk about crises when events occur that threat the core values and structures of a community. These criteria are most applicable to the migrant crisis. The hundreds of thousands of migrants that tried to get into Europe since 2013 turned out to be very difficult to manage for the EU and the member states. This was most visible at the external borders where there were alarming situations. This crisis is seen as a threat to European core values and structures, but various actors have different views on what it is that is threatened. This leads us to the second part of Boin et al.’s theory, namely the framing contest as an explanatory factor for different policy outcomes in times of crisis. This crisis has seen a variety on reactions on how this crisis could happen, on who is to blame and what the solution to it is. It is about a highly controversial topic, with lots of different actors with a wide range of opinions and these are the preconditions for a framing contest to occur (Boin et al 2009, p. 84). This study concentrates on EU’s border management policy and how changes in this policy over the years can be explained through the outcome of the framing contest that has occurred between those actors. If the outcomes of this study can be explained with Boin et al.’s theory, this will increase the ability of the theory to generalize. Because when one selects a most likely case, this will permit a logical deduction: if this is not valid for this case, it will not be valid for all cases similar.

Following the theory of crisis exploitation, it is necessary to first get a clear picture of what frames are existing in this crisis. Boin et al. do not discuss extensively how this should be done. So to establish the different frames present during the migrant crisis, I will use the Critical Frame Analysis as proposed by Verloo (2005). She uses a set of Sensitizing Questions that analyse the different positions on the dimensions of Diagnosis, Attribution of Responsibility, Prognosis and Voice given to various actors. For the different actors I carefully selected texts about this topic, different types of documents, dependent on the nature of the actor. For all actors I searched their websites for texts on ‘migrant crisis’, ‘refugee’ and ‘Mediterranean’. This gave me an overview of all documents available on the subject. When looking for suitable texts to analyse I first searched for documents on the subject of the migration crisis and then selected the parts specifically about Frontex and/or border management in the Mediterranean.

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Type of actor Name of Actor Amount of words

EU agency Frontex 128.426

EU institutions Council of the EU 18.821

European Commission 68.292 European Parliament 73.217 EU publications Regulations/Agendas 58.150 Human Rights NGOs Amnesty International 101.941

Human Rights Watch 56.311 Humanitarian NGOs Doctors Without Borders 38.357

Red Cross 68.700

Economic interests groups Business Europe 4.887

Table 2. Data collection

Frontex’s documents consist of their Annual Reports, Annual Risk Analyses, the Consultative Forum Working Programs and press releases on their border management policy. Documents of EU institutions consist of official policy documents, reports, debates and proposals. Included are both the EU Agenda on Migration and the EU Agenda on Security. The EU Agenda on Security has close links to the Agenda on Migration and has a large influence on the border management policy of the EU. I have analysed thirteen plenary debates of the European Parliament between 2014 and 2018. I have selected debates that were either on ‘Frontex’, ‘migration’, ‘refugees’ or ‘border’. I will pay extra scrutiny to the populist parties in the European Parliament. Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) and Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) are the two parties in the Parliament that are considered to be populist, made up from national parties like Front Nacional from France, UKIP from the United Kingdom, Party for Freedom from the Netherlands, Five Star Movement from Italy, Flemish Interest from Belgium and Alternative for Germany.

The NGOs’ documents comprise press releases and reports on the subject. I have made a distinction between humanitarian and human rights NGOs, because the two have a different conception on why and how they should help in the Mediterranean. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch were selected for NGOs with a human rights perspective. These two NGOs were the most outspoken during the migration crisis, both in their coverage in the press and written reports on the subject. Amnesty International is also part of the Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights of Frontex. The NGOs with the humanitarian perspective were chosen because of their broad coverage of the subject, but also because of their presence in the Mediterranean Sea and their efforts to curb the migration crisis, by providing medical aid and performing search-and-rescue operations. These are Doctors Without Borders (originally Médicins Sans Frontières; MSF) and Red Cross EU3.

The next step is to run these documents through Atlas.ti. This programme will count specific words or markers and allow me to get a first grasp of the content. I will use different markers for

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different frames. I selected these markers based on the focus of the different frames and that are most pertinent in describing those frames. These groups of words will be analysed with Atlas.ti. These markers are just for the preliminary analysis only, and do not give an exhaustive display of the frames. To get the most comprehensive results I also included abbreviations from these words. These include plurals, but also ‘secure’, ‘criminal’, ‘medication’ and ‘economic’ to name a few.4

False quotations were removed from the list to get clean results. I will also provide the relative percentages of how many times the markers were used compared to the total amount of words. With the results from Atlas.ti I will give a preliminary analysis of the documents to get insight in the different focusses from different actors.

marker I marker II marker III marker IV Security frame security military terrorism crime Human Rights frame right violation justice

Humanitarian frame humanitarian aid health medical

Economic frame economy market profit

Table 3. Markers for frames

I will then answer the Sensitizing Questions to analyse the dimensions of the frames. Verloo uses those questions to decipher the framing on gender equality; I slightly adjusted the questions to better fit my research. I follow the set-up of the questions, but leave out the ones that are not relevant as they focus on power relations in policy texts.5 The Sensitizing Questions most relevant to this study are the ones about Diagnosis – What is represented as the problem? Why is it seen as a problem? What is seen as a cause of what? –, and Prognosis – What to do? How to achieve goals? The answers on these questions together make the policy frame that is used by the actors. During this part of the analysis, I will use qualitative sampling, so actively select the most productive samples to answer the research question, to further develop the frames (Verloo 2005, p. 27). With help of the markers mentioned above, different segments from the texts will appear and these will be read and analysed until the analysis reaches the point of saturation (idem).

When the different frames are established, the next step in this study will commence. Here these frames will be analysed through the previously discussed theory of crisis exploitation from Boin et al. They describe how frame contests can account for different outcomes in times of crisis. As mentioned before, in this study the frames of various actors are analysed and the expectation is to find a security frame, a human rights frame, a humanitarian frame and an economic frame. Boin et al. first identify three different postures regarding a crisis, to see it as an unfortunate incident, a critical threat or a critical opportunity (Boin et al. 2009, p. 84).

The framing contests can have political and/or policy consequences, played out by either the political or the policy crisis exploitation game. Political consequences could be the staying or removal

4

For an overview of all words that were counted per marker, see Annex 2.

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of incumbent officeholders. In the case of the EU, this political game seems less likely to happen. The policy game on the other hand seems very relevant. In the policy game Boin et al. state that the conflict arises between status-quo players and advocates for change (idem, p. 90).

To analyse the framing contests between these actors, I will use the already selected documents and interview actors to correctly position them in the theory. The interviews will be with a representative of Frontex, a member of the ENF group, a policy advisor of the ALDE group and a senior advisor of Business Europe. These actors were selected based on the amount of information already present, which in the case of the ENF and Business Europe was not so much. I also tried to arrange interviews with the NGOs, but they did not have the capacity to speak to me. The interviews will be semi-structured, the interview guide can be found in the appendix. With the information gathered from the interviews, together with the documents I will position the frames and actors in the policy game. I will also look at the degree of change that has occurred in border management policy, using Sabatier’s taxonomy on degree of crisis-induced policy change. With this data, I will come to the conclusion which frame has become the dominant narrative and therefore exploited the crisis in terms of affecting policy outcomes on border management in the EU.

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2. Policy Frames during the Migration Crisis

In this chapter, I will answer my first sub question; what different frames were used by the relevant actors? Firstly, I will give a preliminary analysis on the concurrence of the markers used to describe the four frames. This will give a first insight on the data that was retrieved from Atlas.ti. Then I will go further into the different frames that were uncovered during the analysis, using the Sensitizing Questions of Verloo.

2.1. Preliminary Analysis

To grasp the different frames that appear in the documents, the table below shows the absolute and relative word count per frame and group of actors.6 At first sight, all the different frames seem present in the selected documents. Economic markers are used the least, followed by the humanitarian frame. The human rights markers are used the most, followed by the security frame with roughly three-quarters of the total amount of markers. Furthermore, there are considerable differences between the concurrences of markers per frame that are used by the actors. Frontex focusses more on security and human rights, which seems similar to the EU institutions. This contrasts with the NGOs, who have a higher score on human rights and humanitarian considerations. The economic interest groups logically show a great interest in economic aspects and not so much in the other frames.

Table 4. Actors and frames, with relative percentages of occurrence

As mentioned before, the percentages show the presence of the markers relative to the total amount of words per actor. The clear difference between EU actors, NGOs and economic interest groups remain. EU actors all have a high score on the security frame markers, and almost all on the human rights markers as well, except for the Commission and Council. Instead, the Council shows a higher score on the economic markers. NGOs have a very clear emphasis on human rights and humanitarian markers,

6

For a more detailed table with an overview of the word count on all the markers, see Annex 5. Human Rights frame Security frame Humanitarian frame Economic frame Frontex 607(0.47) 374(0.29) 32(0.02) 63(0.05) Council of the EU 41(0.24) 113(0.67) 37(0.22) 61(0.36) European Commission 79(0.12) 265(0.39) 30(0.04) 34(0.05) European Parliament 216(0.30) 237(0.32) 58(0.08) 65(0.09) EU Publications 181(0.31) 332(0.57) 18(0.03) 68(0.12) Amnesty International 452(0.44) 74(0.07) 101(0.09) 14(0.01) Human Rights Watch 227(0.40) 57(0.10) 93(0.17) 11(0.02) Doctors Without Borders 42(0.11) 44(0.11) 382(0.99) 10(0.03) Red Cross 416(0.61) 7(0.01) 320(0.47) 57(0.08) Economic interest groups 7(0.14) 6(0.12) 5(0.10) 84(1.72)

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except for Doctors Without Borders with only a high score on humanitarian markers. As mentioned before, economic interest groups logically only show high scores on economic markers. Now that the overall picture is clear, I will further specify the amount of markers present in texts from the different actors.

2.2. Securing External Borders and Ensuring Internal Security

The Executive Director of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, speaks about a ‘security crisis’ faced by the EU and its external borders (Frontex 2017, p. 2). Correspondingly, the relative number of security markers present per actor is distinctively higher for documents of Frontex, but also of the EU institutions, in comparison to the other actors. This probably indicates that the security frame is used mostly by those actors and therefore I will use their documents to carry out the frame analysis on the security frame.

The first dimension of the frame analysis is the diagnosis of what the problem encompasses. What is represented as the problem in this policy frame? What can be drawn from the texts with a high score on security markers is that the main issue during the migrant was the unprecedented migratory flows that resulted in a new record of illegal border crossings (Frontex 2016a, 2016c; Council 2016a; Commission Proposal (15) 671 final). During the height of the crisis in 2015 and 2016, Frontex started its Annual Reports with mentioning the illegal border crossings. They used this statistic as the basis for the evaluation of their activities and as the main impetus to act. The Commission also identifies the ‘extraordinary pressures’ at the external borders to be the illegal border crossings (Commission Proposal (15) 671 final). In the proposal for the EBCG the Commission states that these movements have shown that there is inadequate ability to respond to such a large influx (idem).

The next aspect of the diagnosis is the question of why these illegal border crossings are perceived as problematic. In the analysed documents multiple reasons are given. The highest level of urgency is given to the threat it poses to the internal security of the EU (Frontex 2014, p. 10). Frontex states in its Annual Risk Analysis of 2015 that many of the migrants that have entered illegally did not get detained and thus are able to move freely within the EU. Related to these concerns is the problem of document fraud, which is mentioned by both Frontex and the EU. The European Commission identifies failing document security as a threat to the internal security, which is identified as a high risk for border and internal security (Frontex 2014). Frontex agrees by stating combatting document fraud is one of its priorities, as it can undermine the internal security. The secondary movement of illegal migrants, or irregular migrants as they are often referred to, is also perceived problematic since it resulted in EU member states reintroducing border controls at the internal borders (Commission Proposal (15) 671 final; Frontex 2014; Council 2015). The Schengen acquis is referred to numerous times in the documents, mostly when pointing out the strain the illegal border crossings put on the agreement.

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Box 2.1. Diagnosis of the problem of the migrant crisis

“With record numbers of migrants crossing the border illegally, resources are devoted to their immediate care, rather than screening and obtaining information on their basic characteristics such as nationality. After they are rescued, they continue their journey to other Member States and not knowing who is travelling within the EU is a vulnerability for EU internal security.” – Frontex, Risk Analysis 2015

“In response to the migration crisis facing the EU, the objective must be to rapidly stem the flows, protect our external borders, reduce illegal migration and safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area.” The Council, 2018 “Secure travel and identity documents are crucial whenever it is necessary to establish without doubt the identity of a person. Better management of free movement, migration and mobility relies on robust systems to prevent abuses and threats to internal security through failings in document security.”- European Commission, 2016

Another argumentation on why the illegal border crossings are problematic involves the threat of terrorism. Frontex expresses its concern for this in its Annual Risk Analysis of 2014, 2015 and 2016. One of the reports states that the routes used by irregular migration and their facilitation networks can be used by terrorist organizations as costs could be lower than traveling legally (Frontex 2014, p. 68). In the EU Agenda on Security much attention is given to fighting terrorism and the cross-border threat it entails. Together with Europol and Eurojust, the EBGC plays a key-role in detecting cross-border crimes like terrorism (Commission Communication (15) 185 final, p. 5). Frontex’s Executive Director Leggeri also refers to the tragic attacks in Paris to remind the EU that the growing threat of terrorism calls for strong border management (Frontex 2016b, p. 5). This is illustrated by Frontex’s new naval operation Themis, which has a significant security component. This will include the objective to detect foreign fighters and other terroristic threats at the external borders (EU Observer 2018). The phenomenon of foreign fighters occurs more often in Frontex’s documents. In their Risk Analysis of 2015 they notice the conflict in Syria has attracted hundreds of foreign fighters, including EU citizens.

Box 2.2. Threat of terrorism

“Overall, there is an underlying threat of terrorism-related travel movements especially due to the appeal of the Syrian conflict to both idealist and radicalized youths…Irrespective of whether avoided or promoted by terrorist structures, it is possible that irregular migration routes and/or facilitation networks could be utilized especially if the associated risks and costs are perceived to be low in comparison to other legal travel options.” – Frontex,

Risk Analysis 2014

“The intensified security concerns following the terrorist attacks of this year have added to citizens’ concerns. Whilst borders can never provide complete security, they can make a significant contribution in terms of increasing security and intelligence and thwarting future attacks. This function has become even more important in the light of the increasing phenomenon of foreign fighters involved in terrorist attacks.” – The Commission,

2015

“In relation to external borders, an additional safeguard will be provided as of next month, when the amendment to the Schengen Borders Code to reinforce checks against relevant databases at external borders in light of the increased terrorist threats will enter into force. Member States will have to carry out systematic checks on all persons – also those enjoying the right of free movement under EU law – when they cross the external border,

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both at entry and exit, against databases and in order to verify that those persons do not represent a threat to public order and internal security.” – The Council, 2017

The last dimension of the Diagnosis is on causality; what is seen as the cause? First of all, the turmoil in neighbouring states is evidently seen as the rout cause of the migration crisis, due to the fact it caused the flow of people fleeing from their country. But there are two different views on why this flow of migrants has become problematic, which I will refer to as the security light frame and the

zero-tolerance security frame. The light frame can be found in documents from Frontex and EU

policy. Frontex (2015) states that the proximity of the conflict areas and the economic divergence between the EU and neighbouring countries will ensure this flow of migrants will continue. The cause of the crisis at the external borders is perceived to be the enormity of the influx of migrants (Commission Proposal (15) 671 final; Commission Communication (15) 240 final). This scale of oncoming migrants and the challenges they bring, is not something the existing structures of the EU and member states could handle. The volume of arrivals has reached the limits of local reception capacities and processing facilities. For example, the intense migratory pressures make it difficult for border guards to determine if migrants that have no papers are political refugees or economic migrants (Frontex 2015, p. 53). The zero-tolerance frame on the other hand, found almost exclusively in contributions from members of the ENF and EFDD that participated in plenary debates of the Parliament, directs the question of causality to the way the EU has reacted on the migration. By leaving the borders open, the zero-tolerance frame considers the EU as the cause for the crisis (Parliament 2015a, 2015c, 2015d, 2016, 2017b).

Box 2.3. Zero-tolerance frame on causality

“What is amazing is that the EU’s own actions helped cause the problem in the first place. When Chancellor Merkel and the Swedish Government committed the equivalent of cultural suicide and invited everyone who had a Syrian passport to come to the continent, it was obvious to all of us what was going to happen. People would attempt to come in their droves, people would die in the seas, there would be migrant camps overflowing, Member State would be pitted against Member State, the Schengen Agreement would collapse, and it would be a golden opportunity for the Islamic fundamentalists to bring damage to our continent.” - Paul Nuttall (EFDD) in

plenary debate of the Parliament, 2016

“So you should ask your socialist colleagues what they are saying about having open borders. That is sending the wrong message to Africa and the rest of the millions that want to come as migrants to our countries and that we cannot afford.” – Janice Atkinson (ENF) in plenary debate of the Parliament

In the Prognosis of this frame there is a difference in the dimensions of what to do. The divergence lies in the extent of rigor of the measures that should be taken. The less rigorous prognosis can be identified in EU regulations, texts from EU institutions and also Frontex. The more rigorous prognosis can be found in the opinions of populist parties, which I will discuss hereafter. The security-light frame has a few possible solutions in mind to solve the migrant crisis. Primarily, they aim to set

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common, high standards of border management as this is of common interest to all member states (Commission Proposal (15) 671 final, p. 2). It is believed that the crisis has shown the need for European coordination of border management (Commission Communication (15) 185 final; Regulation (EU) 2016/1624). The objective is to develop and implement European integrated border management at the national and EU level. In the regulation on the EBCG, this ambition is disclosed as it is deemed necessary to maintain the free movement of persons within the EU, as well as it is a fundamental component of an area of freedom, security and justice (2016, p. 1). By creating integrated border management, migratory pressures and cross-border crime can be dealt with. This will ensure a high level of internal security in the EU. To achieve a high standard of border control, the security-light frame sees an expansion of Frontex’s capacities and provide the agency with additional resources (Council 2016b; Commission Communication (15) 240 final).

Box 2.4. Need for a common response

In recent years new and complex threats have emerged highlighting the need for further synergies and closer cooperation at all levels. Many of today’s security concerns originate from instability in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and changing forms of radicalisation, violence and terrorism. Threats are becoming more varied and more international, as well as increasingly cross-border and cross-sectorial in nature. These threats require an effective and coordinated response at European level. – EU Agenda on Security, 2015

“Today is a milestone in the history of European border management. From now onwards, the external EU border of one Member State is the external border of all Member States - both legally and operationally. In less than one year we have established a fully-fledged European Border and Coast Guard system, turning into reality the principles of shared responsibility and solidarity among the Member States and the Union. This is exactly the European response that we need for the security and migration challenges of the 21st century.” - Dimitris

Avramopoulos, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship 2016

Another part of the solution the security-light frame foresees is externalization, where the objective is to prevent migrants from getting to the EU external borders. The way to achieve this is through cooperation with third countries. This plan of action constitutes a considerable component of EU policy. This was confirmed during the Valletta Summit. Here the points of action concerning the countering of irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings are all about strengthening the countries of origin or transit in Africa in tackling those problems (Valletta Summit Action Plan 2015). The policy of externalization is quite similar to the remote control policies that countries in the EU used since the 1970s (Guiraudon 2000, p. 259). Then, the objective was to screen possible migrants before they arrive at the receiving country to separate the ‘unwanted migrants’. In this frame, the policy of externalization is based on this same principle. With better coordination with third countries, migrants can be screened before they come to the EU and this would reduce the illegal border crossings. The EU-Turkey deal is one example of this, and also the cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard falls under the externalization policy (Council 2016b).

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Contrary to the security-light prognosis, there can also be distinguished a more rigorous prognosis that is linked to the zero-tolerance frame. In plenary debates of the European Parliament this prognosis comes along frequently, again from members of the ENF and EFDD. This prognosis is based on the policy goal of closing the borders completely. By closing the borders, the problem of illegal border crossings and consequently the threat of terrorism will no longer occur, according to the zero-tolerance security frame. Many references are made to the model that Australia enforces (Parliament 2015a, 2015b, 2016, 2017a). There the migration policy is very restrictive. They have offshore detention and processing of migrants, perform boat pushbacks and if a migrant enters Australia illegally he or she precludes an asylum application. Another aspect on which this prognosis differs completely with the security-light prognosis is the Europeanisation of border management policies. The enforcement of Frontex and the IBM policy is the opposite of what is aimed in the zero-security prognosis. Multiple times in plenary debates populist parties mention their wish to have national borders reinstalled for example members of the UKIP who refer to the Brexit (Parliament 2015c, 2016b, 2016c, 2017a). By leaving the Schengen Acquis, each member state can decide for them what their policy on migration and border management will be. They do not want Frontex to gain more capabilities as it only decreases national sovereignty.

Box 2.5. Prognosis security frame – zero tolerance

“All Muslims are not fundamentalists and terrorists, but the more Muslims you have in a population, the more Islam you will get, and the more Islam you have, the more terrorism you will get. Our arrogant and illiberal political elites of Western countries have created the problem by their open-door immigration policies and the doctrine of multiculturalism. I very much look forward to hearing how the EU is going to solve that problem and address the fundamental issue. But somehow I doubt that you will.” – Gerard Batten (EFDD) in plenary debate

of the Parliament

What is the European Union offering to solve this problem? The answer is more of the same: more concessions, more EU, more money, more misery, not only for the migrants but for many of its own citizens. We have to put a stop to this madness, and the answer is not making the same mistakes over and over again: it is restoring proper border controls, just as the Australians have done for the past five years. However, for the UK to achieve this goal, we must vote to leave this organisation in the up-and-coming referendum. – Paul Nuttall (EFDD) in

plenary debate of the Parliament 2016

2.3. Human Rights as the Foundation of EU Policy

The human rights frame has the most markers occurring in the texts and this would concur with the growing emphasis on human rights in the last decades (Perkowski 2016, p. 331). The relative percentage of human rights markers is highest for Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Frontex. Amnesty International mentioned the migrant crisis, which they refer to as ‘refugee crisis’, in their International Report of 2015/16 and describe the migrant crisis as the failing of the EU to come up with a coherent and rights-respecting response to this challenge (p. 42). The challenge they refer to are the large numbers of migrants that entered the EU irregularly. So contrary to the security frame

EU border management in the Mediterranean during the migration crisis