Master’s Thesis
Violent Visuals: Effects of Terrorism News Imagery on Anti-Muslim Attitudes and Counterterrorism Policy
Catriona Leighton 11190027 Supervised by Rachid Azrout
Master’s Programme Communication Science University of Amsterdam
Graduate School of Communication
Abstract
Much has been said about how terrorism news is covered, and what the potential outcomes of fear-inducing coverage might be. Political pundits and academics alike worry that the expanse of terrorism news via mass media may promote fear amongst our populations and cause citizens to overestimate the likelihood of future terrorist attacks
.
In previous studies it has been shown that exposure to terrorism related news can lead to fear and anxiety, and can increase concerns and fear of terrorism. The current study analyses whether the same effect takes place in the case of static terrorism news imagery. In particular, we assess whether violent imagery has a more influential effect on peoples’ emotions and fear of terrorism. We carried out experiment to confirm whether exposure to such imagery, does indeed lead tonegative emotions and fear of terrorism. We investigated whether exposure to violent imagery could ultimately have other consequences, namely, negative attitudes toward Muslims, the acceptance of security policies that infringe on civil liberties, and also support for combative foreign policy. Our results suggested violent imagery did not incite greater levels of negative emotion than news articles alone but that emotions do play a role in generating terrorism fear and shaping their attitudes toward Muslims, security issues and foreign policy.
The recent attack targeting Muslims at Finsbury Park Mosque in London has raised concerns about levels of Anti-Muslim sentiment amongst the population of the United Kingdom (Dodd & Marsh, 2017). Less than a month prior to the incident, Islamic extremists carried out an attack at London Bridge and, in a separate event, a suicide bombing occurred at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester (BBC News, 2017). Inclusive of the incident at Finsbury Park, the weeks following these attacks saw the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes increase drastically (Samuelson, 2017). MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks) reported a 530% increase in anti-Muslim attacks the week after the Manchester attack and The Mayor of London’s office reported a fivefold increase in Anti-Muslim hate crimes (Mayor of London's Office, 2017).
In light of these events, there has been much discourse of whether news
coverage and the way in which terrorist news stories are covered foment anti-Muslim sentiment and desires for retaliatory action (Mandhai, 2017). In the past, much attention has been paid to coverage of major terrorist incidents such as 9/11 or 7/11. Dwindling traditional media audiences has provided great incentive for journalists and editors to cover terrorism incidents in an increasingly sensationalist fashion. Coverage using emotional language and powerful images are often adopted to acquire the public’s attention.
Such features in terrorism news coverage can intensify the public’s fear of terrorism by rousing their emotions, which in turn have been shown to influence attitudes toward particular politicians, governments or counter terrorism policies to name a few (Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Davis, 2007; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005; Nellis & Savage, 2012; Slone, 2000b). However, effects of terrorism news still require considerable exploration, most notably, the effects of images in terrorism news coverage. Much of the literature in
this area thus far has focused on citizens’ exposure to terrorism news in general or the effects of evocative imagery in television news. Gadarian (2010) argues that
television news coverage has greater emotional impact compared with print media. However, the sensationalization of the mainstream press, especially with regard to online news and tabloid journalism, has meant an increase in image use to attract attention and rouse peoples’ emotions. Journalistic images, especially in the case of terrorism, still remains under-researched and the potential effect of exposure to such images remains widely unknown.
Furthermore, terrorism news imagery might seem especially hostile and violent to audiences and as a result may have a substantial impact on their emotions.
Research has already suggested that terrorism news exposure may trigger stress responses, and has even been linked with posttraumatic stress disorder (Ofman, Mastria, & Steinberg, 1995). Therefore it is the aim of this study to discover how emotional responses to terrorism imagery, in particular violent imagery, might affect citizens’ feelings of fear regarding terrorism impacting attitudes toward Muslims and counterterrorism policy.
With the recent terrorist attacks or Manchester and London in the UK still fresh in peoples’ minds, alongside those in Paris and Brussels, in addition to most Western nations’ threat levels set at high alert, it would seem rather unlikely that we will see a reduction of terrorism news coverage any time soon. As such, it is important to understand the implications of terrorism news and features thereof. A more comprehensive understanding of psychological reactions to terrorism news
photojournalism should provide insight into how terrorism can generate a climate of fear and what concerns may rise from this for policy makers and wider society.
Theoretical Background
When one says 'terrorism' in a democratic society, one says 'media'. For terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which depends upon communicating a threat to the wider society. This, in essence, is why terrorism and the media enjoy a symbiotic relationship. (Wilkinson, 1997)
Terrorism utilizes human emotion to further an ideological cause. As described by Crenshaw (Crenshaw, 1986) “the political effectiveness of terrorism is importantly determined by the psychological effects of violence on audiences”. Terrorist groups appeal to our biological predisposition for self-preservation to generate a climate of fear and disorder. This biological predisposition is central to Terror Management Theory (TMT) (Pyszczynski, 2003). According to this theory, our awareness of the inevitability of death (mortality salience) leads to potentially overpowering feelings of anxiety and terror (Pyszczynski, 2003). Therefore, terrorist acts can trigger death-related thoughts, which congruently, induce feelings of fear and anxiety.
The way most individuals learn about terrorist acts is through their portrayal on mass media. And terrorist organizations are more than aware of the psychological influence mass communications can have on peoples’ emotions, attitudes and behaviors, using this to their advantage (Shoshani & Slone, 2008). Purposefully dramatic terrorist attacks ensure comprehensive media coverage, and enable them to spread fear in target populations (Jenkins, 1975; Wilkinson, 1997). An example of this is the strategy followed by Islamic State, which has disseminated online graphic footage of beheadings of Western journalists, activists and aid workers, adopt cinematic production techniques and theatrical, apocalyptic narratives (A. Rogers,
2014; Williams, 2016). The primary purpose of these activities is, as mentioned above, to provoke a fear response in the target population (Huddy et al., 2005).
Ultimately, exposure to coverage of violent incidents deepens the public’s feelings of anxiety and risk perception, even when these very audiences are not under direct threat (Alison Holman, Dana, & Roxane, 2014; Bandura, 1986; Gadarian, 2010; Huddy et al., 2005; Slone, 2000a). These negative emotional responses are documented by a number of studies. Ofman, Mastria and Steinberg (1995) found that even without being directly exposed to the World Trade Center bombings in 1993 there was an overall increase in depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) amongst New York citizens who watched television coverage of the event. Exposure to news covering terrorist events like the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, 9/11 attacks or Boston Marathon bombings resulted in an increase of citizens’ general feelings of fear and anxiety as well as an increase in physiological stress related symptoms (Ahern et al., 2002; Alison Holman et al., 2014; Galea et al., 2002; Gurwitch, Sitterle, Young, & Pfefferbaum, 2002; Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003; Schlenger et al., 2002; Schuster et al., 2001; Shoshani & Slone, 2008; Slone, 2000b).
According to Gadarian (2010), powerful storylines and visuals increase the public’s sense of threat. Visual content in particular can prompt a more primitive response, our eyes believing what they see, before our minds can process what we have read (Goldstein, 1998). In accordance with TMT, negative images often conjure up thoughts of death. Thus photographs of terrorist incidents, in particular violent images, will trigger negative emotions (Landau et al., 2004)
Negative imagery is simple to understand, easily gaining audience attention, as well as enhancing the readability of news, and aiding information retention and retrieval (Gadarian, 2010; Neuman, 1992; Newhagen & Reeves, 1992; Zelizer,
1995). However, not all negative images have the same impact on the receiver (Fahmy, Cho, Wanta, & Song, 2006) Goldberg (Goldberg, 1991) argues that visuals of violence or death exist on a continuum, with personal experience on one end and violence as entertainment at the other. (Fahmy et al., 2006) found that more graphic images, such as photographs of corpses or people jumping from burning buildings stimulated intense negative emotions. Similarly, Gadarian discovered that individuals exposed to ‘threatening’ visual stimuli experienced an increase in terrorism threat perceptions compared to those exposed to ‘non-threatening’ stimuli. Gadarian’s study exposed people to TV footage of terrorist events, arguing that this would have a greater emotional impact on viewers than print media but does not discuss the impact of static images. Though Fahmy et al. (2006) explored the impact of static terrorism imagery, but they did not study the impact of different degrees violence in terrorism imagery.
Therefore the aim of this study to investigate how varying levels of violence in static terrorism-related imagery might affect audiences, bridging the gap between the work of Fahmy et al. (2006) and Gadarian (2010). Furthermore, these studies failed to isolate any single feature of the imagery, as image characteristics varied drastically between conditions. For example, in Gadarian’s study, although the story line
remained the same, it was not possible to clearly attribute effects found to any one feature of the imagery. Thus, we wish to investigate whether varying degrees of violence or threat can stimulate different emotional reactions.
As violent imagery is likely to act as a reminder of death, triggering mortality salience (Pyszczynski, 2003), it is expected that exposure to highly violent terrorism news visuals will stimulate more intense negative emotions than images with less explicit evidence of violence or absence of violence. Accordingly, to test this
assumption we classified terrorism-related imagery as non-violent (those images seemingly absent of violence), threatening (where an aggressor and victim roles are implied but there is no explicit act of violence taking place) and violent (graphic images where a victim is explicitly being subjected to violence). Thus, we hypothesize the following:
H1a: Exposure to terrorism news articles containing imagery will stimulate more negative emotions than terrorism-related news articles without images.
H1b: Exposure to news articles containing threatening terrorism-related imagery will stimulate more negative emotions than non-violent imagery
H1c: Exposure to news articles containing violent terrorism-related imagery will stimulate more negative emotions than those containing threatening images
The Impact of Emotion
TMT states that in order to reduce death-related anxiety, individuals engage in the formation of cultural beliefs and views of the world, which provide a sense of value, order and stability (Aly, 2013; Pyszczynski, 2003). Fear of death induces a need to cope and preserve our beliefs and values by reacting negatively to anything perceived to threaten them. This defense of our own worldview helps explain
hostilities among different societal groups or nations (Aly, 2013). Similarly, terrorism news can trigger death-related thoughts, which may be suppressed by adapting
worldview, easing anxieties (Das et al., 2009; Gordon & Arian, 2001; Landau et al., 2004).
Repercussions of our coping behaviors of terrorism threat are evident in numerous research studies (Cho et al., 2003; Crenshaw, 1986; Gadarian, 2010; Shoshani & Slone, 2008; Slone, 2000a; Wetherell, Weisz, Strolier, Beavers, & Sadler, 2013). (Fahmy et al., 2006) concluded that increased negative emotions, including worry and anxiety, contributed to increasing terrorism fears. Gadarian (2010) found that high levels of terrorism fear explained increased support for more militant foreign policy. She provides evidence that, in the context of television news, emotionally evocative terrorism imagery can have a significant impact on foreign policy attitudes.
On the other hand, a survey conducted by (Huddy et al., 2005), showed mixed findings. Individuals with high terrorism threat perceptions tended to be more
supportive of aggressive military action, whilst those who experienced high levels of generalized anxiety showed less approval for these policies. However, Huddy et al. (2005) did not link their findings with terrorism news exposure and showed only general trends of threat perception and anxiety in the population. Gadarian’s (2010) experimental design does provide evidence of a causal relationship, linking violent terrorism imagery to emotional response intensity, and foreign policy attitudes.
Further support for Gadarian’s (2010) results are provided by (Kim, 2016), whom after carrying out a correlational analysis found that individual and collective negative emotions can contribute significantly to an increase of support for military intervention. Research has also shown that anger about 9/11, especially exposure to images of the attack, can increase endorsement of military action (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). Hence, we hypothesize the following:
H2a: Individuals exposed to terrorism news articles containing imagery will be more supportive of combative foreign policy than those exposed to terrorism news articles without images
H2b: Individuals exposed to news articles containing threatening terrorism-related imagery will be more supportive of combative foreign policy than those exposed to terrorism articles containing non-violent imagery.
H2c: Individuals exposed to news articles containing violent terrorism-related news imagery will be more supportive of combative foreign policy than those exposed to articles containing threatening images
In addition to foreign policy attitudes, there is evidence to suggest that the resulting negative emotions from exposure terrorism news could increase prejudice toward Muslims. In fact, encouraging of in- and out-group formation is a fundamental strategy for most terrorist organizations. Construction of these divides, reinforces of in- and out-group identity constructs, endorses of out-group stereotypes, increases perceptions of out-group homogeneity as well as more biased behaviors toward the out-group (Ingram, 2014; Johnson, 2011).
(Das et al., 2009), demonstrated in an experiment, that exposure to terrorism news increases death-related thoughts and subsequently increases prejudiced attitudes toward out-group members, particularly Arabs. Real or perceived threats toward one’s group status can increase prejudice toward the hostile out-group and thus, highlights the possibility for terrorism news to increase anti-Muslim attitudes (Agustin, 2009;
Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001; Huddy et al., 2005; LeVine, 1971; Struch & Schwartz, 1989).
Research into the Islamic State’s magazine, Dabiq, revealed how narratives, imagery and counter-narratives are used strategically, to construct in- and out-groups identities between IS-affiliated Sunni Muslims and Western nations or Shia Muslims (Ingram, 2017). With the in-group clearly identified, members are encouraged to instill anxiety into the target out-group populations by carrying out violent attacks, by gaining the attention of the Western media.
It could therefore be understood that a cycle of polarisation occurs, whereby terrorist groups reinforce in- and out-group identification, heightening in-group solidarity amongst their followers, who carry out terrorist attacks to be covered by Western media. Thus, mortality salience is activated and anxiety is kindled in the targeted out-group, further reinforcing group dichotomies (Huddy et al., 2005; Wilkinson, 1997).
This strategy of threat and divided identity has been shown to initiate the rejection of out-groups, for example immigrants or other minorities, as well as
increasing levels of xenophobia (Lahav, 2004). Not only does the perception of threat foster out-group prejudice, but can also lead to support for retaliatory action against the threatening group, lending support to the aforementioned hypotheses on foreign policy (Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser, 1999; Huddy et al., 2005; B. Jentleson, 1992; B. W. Jentleson & Britton, 1998).
Much like the in- out- group mentality that has instigated anxiety and segregation in Northern Ireland for decades, Anti-Muslim attitudes have become a classic example in- out- group prejudice. As previously stated, media content can identify and reinforce ‘in’ and ‘out’ group constructs, and increase bias towards the
out-group. If the out-group is to be presented as being more hostile, those in the in-group will experience greater anxiety, compounding threat perceptions and increasing prejudice. In accordance with the findings of Das et al. (2009), we propose that
exposure to violent or threatening imagery, which may increase mortality salience and anxiety, ultimately increasing anti-Muslim sentiment. Thus, we hypothesise the following:
H3a: Individuals exposed to terrorism news articles containing imagery will hold more negative attitudes toward Muslims than those exposed to terrorism news articles without images
H3b: Individuals exposed to news articles containing threatening terrorism-related imagery will hold more negative attitudes toward Muslims than those to terrorism articles containing non-violent imagery.
H3c: Individuals exposed to news articles containing violent terrorism-related news imagery will hold more negative attitudes toward Muslims than those exposed to articles containing threatening images
Negative emotion and threat perception is not only associated with an increased in military intervention support and in-group solidarity. Research also suggests that negative emotion and feelings of threat stemming from terrorism news exposure can decrease support for civil liberties (Gadarian, 2013). Results of a national survey of American citizens analyzed by (Davis & Silver, 2004), showed that fear as a result of the 9/11 attacks increased support for sacrificing civil liberties
in the name of national security. In the year after September 11, when terrorism-related anxieties and perceived threat were at a high, (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005) found that these fears contributed to greater support for surveillance and restrictions on civil liberties.
However, support for civil liberties cannot be regarded as an attitude in itself; it is a construct symbolizing the choice between liberty and control (Gibson, 1985). Ultimately, civil liberties and security is a balancing act where there is an increase in support for civil liberties, there will be a decrease in support for order and security, and vice versa (Davis & Silver, 2004). (Rosenzweig, 2004), explains, “In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper balance between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance shifts in favour of order – in favour of the government’s ability to deal with conditions that threaten the national well-being”. Although (Davis & Silver, 2004) provide an excellent insight into how peoples’ threat perceptions can throw off this ‘balance’ of security and civil liberties, they do not account for what might contribute to an increase in threat perceptions.
As we have already seen, exposure to terrorism news coverage, especially fear-inducing visual cues can increase terrorism-related concerns and fear of terrorism (Gadarian, 2010; Gadarian, 2014; Huddy et al., 2005; Nellis & Savage, 2012; Slone, 2000a). We therefore wish to expand on the work of Davis & Silver (2004), and test whether the negative emotions associated with violent or threatening images and the subsequent fear of terrorism, impact acceptance of security policies that infringe on national civil liberities. As such we propose the following hypotheses:
H4a: Individuals exposed to terrorism news articles containing imagery will be more accepting of security policies that infringe on national civil liberties than those exposed to terrorism news articles without images
H4b: Individuals exposed to news articles containing threatening terrorism-related imagery will be more accepting of security policies that infringe on national civil liberties than those to terrorism articles containing non-violent imagery.
H4c: Individuals exposed to news articles containing violent terrorism-related news imagery will be more accepting of security policies that infringe on national civil liberties than those exposed to articles containing threatening images
As previously explained, emotions stimulated by terrorism imagery may play a significant role in shaping attitudes, as a behavioral response to coping with threat. But those emotions may not be the closest predictor of those attitudes. The negative emotions experienced as a result of exposure to terrorism news are a reactionary response, where we will experience sudden feelings of fear or anxiety. However, evidence suggests that these initial primitive reactions can lead us to a more conscious awareness of the existence of external threat and subsequently more sustained feelings of fear and vulnerability. For example, (Slone, 2000b) found that people did indeed experience reactionary feelings of fear and anxiety after exposure to terrorism news. However, these initial anxieties were shown to have increased perceptions of sources of threat. This is supported by Gadarian (2010) who explained that experience of negative feelings during exposure to television news of terrorist attacks would establish a more general fear of terrorism. We therefore expect that initial emotional
reflexes from exposure to terrorism news will predict general terrorism fears and concerns and that, subsequently, this fear of terrorism will directly impact our perceptions of Muslims as well as increase support for counterterrorism efforts. We therefore propose the following hypotheses:
H5: Higher levels of negative emotion will positively predict levels of terrorism fear H6a: Higher levels of terrorism fear will lead to an increase in support for combative foreign policy
H6b: Higher levels of terrorism fear will predict more negative attitudes toward Muslims
H6c: Higher levels of terrorism fear will predict greater acceptance of security policies that infringe on national civil liberties
As described above, we expect that the emotions experienced during exposure to terrorism news imagery will lead individuals to develop a more general fear with regard to terrorism. This ultimately should impact attitudes toward Muslims as well as attitudes toward security policy, and attitudes toward foreign policy.
H7: The effect of terrorism imagery on attitudes toward Muslims, attitudes toward security policy, and attitudes toward foreign policy will be double mediated by emotion and fear of terrorism
Taking all of these hypotheses into consideration, we propose the conceptual model displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Conceptual Model
Method
Design. To examine the effects that violent terrorism imagery might have on
terrorism fears and subsequently negative attitudes toward Muslims as well as counterterrorism policies, a one-way online experimental design was adopted. A between subjects true experiment was carried out, operationalized as level of violence (violent vs. threatening vs. non-violent) as independent variable, negative emotion and fear of terrorism as mediators, and three dependent variables, namely negative attitudes toward Muslims (NAM), acceptance of civil liberty infringement (CLI)
support for combatant foreign policy (CFP). For the experiment design model see Figure 2.
An experimental design was adopted in order to be able to establish whether there was a causal link between terrorism news imagery and these dependent variables. High internal validity can be established by adopting an experimental design, making it ideal for establishing the effect of exposure to the various degrees of violence in news imagery by isolating the manipulation.
Figure 2 Experimental Design
Procedure
The online survey experiment was distributed by sharing a link to the survey via multiple social media channels including Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Reddit. Once participants had clicked the link, they were first exposed to information about the experiment and informed they could get in touch with any questions or comments about the experiment via email. A warning message was included which stated that they could be exposed to violent imagery. They were then asked to confirm they understood what was involved with regards to participation before continuing to the first questions.
Experimental Design Model
Group I R X O2 (text + violent image) Group II R X O2 (text + threatening image) Group III R X O2 (text + non-violent image) Group IV R O2 (control condition – text only)
Participants were first asked questions about terrorism and Islamic State as well as where they would place themselves on a scale measuring their political ideology (left-right).
Prior to stimuli exposure, participants were given an additional warning that they may be shown violent imagery. Respondents were then assigned randomly to one of three experimental conditions or the control condition (see Table 1).
Table 1
Violent Terrorism Imagery Experimental Design
Condition Text Image Visual Content
Control Y N N/A
Violent Y Y
Threatening Y Y
Non-Violent Y Y
Following exposure, respondents were asked about their emotions they experienced while reading the article. They were then asked to answer a series of questions related
to fear of terrorism, attitudes toward Muslims as well as questions on civil liberties and foreign policy. These questions were succeeded by the manipulation check questions and a set of demographic questions.
After completion, respondents were presented with a debriefing notification thanking them for their participation and also offered an opportunity to win a VVV voucher. They were also informed if they had any further questions they should use the contact details provided. The full questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. Sample. This study recruited participants in a non-probability sample via
convenience snowball sampling. Participants were recruited by opt-in on social media pages. Respondents were informed about the sampling process and requested to share the experiment further with their own networks. Respondents were recruited over the course of two weeks from June 15 and July 26, 2017. 326 responses were collected in total, of which 250 were complete and valid. Invalid responses were excluded from the final dataset, bringing the final response rate to 77%.
52.4% of the final sample was female, 52.4% were male and .4% identified as ‘other’. Responses were collected from participants between the ages of 18 years and 64, with an average age of 32. Around half of the respondents were from the U.K. (55%), and the majority of respondents were European citizens (84%). The sample also comprised of mostly highly educated people, with 68% of the sample having completed some form of university education. Over half of participants did not identify with a religion (66%), with Christians forming the second biggest group (28%). Full demographic descriptive information is provided in Appendix B.
Stimuli. Stimuli materials were created especially for the purposes of the experiment
using the text from an impartial news article and three images varying in their levels of violence (violent, threatening, non-violent) to construct the conditions required.
The text selected for use in the experiment stimuli described the beheading of British aid worker, Alan Henning, at the hands of Islamic State and the events that followed. The text was chosen on the basis that it did not exhibit any features that would indicate the opinion of the journalist. It was purposefully selected from the BBC news website, as impartiality is one of the main features in their editorial guidelines (BBC, 2017).
The independent variable, ‘violent terrorism imagery’ (VTI), was
operationalized by utilising images depicting varying degrees of violence (Violent, Threatening and Non-Violent). This was achieved by selecting two existing images, which had both featured in British media coverage on Alan Henning’s death. The images were very similar to each other in colour and composition. This was due to the fact they were both screenshots of video footage released by Islamic State. Both images displayed both the victim and the terrorist, the first of which had the victim simply kneeling next to the terrorist, and the second of which depicted the terrorist beginning to cut the throat of the victim. The first of these images was used as the ‘threatening’ condition in the experiment, as to investigate whether the terrorists’ presence was sufficient to stimulate a fear response, and the second was used as the ‘violent’ condition. The final ‘non-violent’ condition was created using Photoshop to edit out the terrorist, leaving only the victim.
Both the text and images were used to establish four conditions for our experiment, text only (control), text and violent image, text and threatening image, and text and non-violent image.
The use of both the text and the image meant that the conditions were more lifelike, just as if they had been exposed to a genuine news article, and thus would ensure greater ecological validity. Internal validity was improved by ensuring all
images were almost identical, with only slight differences between them minus the varying degrees of violence. This was to ensure as much as possible that the only difference would be the manipulation (See Appendix A).
Measures.
Violent Terrorism Imagery. The independent variable of violent terrorism imagery is a nominal variable, with varying degrees of violent imagery consisting of the
following categories: (1) Control - No Image violent, (2) Non-Violent, (3)
Threatening, (4) Violent. To test hypotheses between the control condition which did not include an image, with the articles that included an image, a new variable of ‘Image Presence’ was computed (0 – No image, 1 – Image).
Negative Emotion. Emotion was measured by using seven negative emotions from (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS scales). Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed that the article they had been exposed to made them feel scared, nervous, fearful, worried, bored anxious and angry. This was measured by means of a 5-point Likert scale (from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”).
A principal component analysis was conducted to determine which negative
emotions from the aforementioned PANAS scale loaded on the same factor. Our findings revealed that that the scale loaded on two factors (eigenvalues= 4.07, and 1.1), which explained 58.2% and 15.6% of variance respectively. Component 1 consisted of five items (‘scared’, ‘nervous’, ‘fearful’, ‘worried’ and ‘anxious’) whilst the remaining two loaded on Component 2 (bored’ and ‘angry’). Component 2 was rejected on the basis of low scale reliability. Component 1 showed high reliability with a Cronbach’s α = .93 (M=19.38; SD =7.38). The items in the scale seem to be
emotions associated with fear responses. Loadings for these items can be found in Appendix D.
Fear of Terrorism. Participants’ were also asked to evaluate how much they worry about being affected by terrorism. Individuals were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed on a 5-point Likert scale (from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). The four statements in this scale (which can be found in Appendix A) were from a study by (May, Herbert, Cline, & Nellis, 2011), who validated the index with a Chronbach’s alpha of .887.
A principal component analysis was conducted to ensure the validity of the 4-item scale. Results showed that all elements loaded on the same factor (eigenvalue 3.07), explaining 76.4% of the variance. As the loading for the item ‘I worry about terrorism in my country’ was considerably lower than the other three items in the scale, it was removed to increase scale reliability. Cronbach’s showed high scale reliability of .9.15 (M=10.57, SD= 4.97). The factor loadings can be found in Appendix D.
Foreign Policy Attitudes. The final dependent variable measured the attitudes of respondents’ toward foreign policy. The scale was developed to aligning with Gadarian’s (2010) description of foreign policy positions, with softer positions such as dropping humanitarian aid constituting as ‘dovish’ whilst support for actions such as using drones or sending in troops indicating a more ‘hawkish’ foreign policy stance. Items were adapted from a scale from a 2014 YouGov report on British
attitudes to defence and security (J. Rogers, 2014). Participants were asked to indicate whether how strongly they would oppose or support each action listed on the scale on a 5-point Likert scale (From “Strongly Oppose” to “Strongly Support”). Details of the scale can be found in Appendix A.
A principal component analysis was carried out to check the validity of the foreign policy attitudes scale. As expected, the items loaded on two factors, the first reflecting more combative foreign policy preferences and the second softer foreign policy. The first component accounted for 45.77% of variance
(eigenvalue = 2.75) and the second component explained a further 19.29% of variance (eigenvalue = 1.16). Cronbach’s indicated that the combative foreign policy scale was reliable ( = .82, M=16.31, SD= 5.53) however the softer foreign policy scale was found to be unreliable and therefore this component was not used in further
analysis ( = .358, M=11.77, SD= 1.67). Factor loadings can be found in Appendix D.
Attitudes toward Muslims. The first dependent variable, attitudes toward Muslims, was measured on a scale based on the Islamophobia scale created by (Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, & Timani, 2009). Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements adapted from the aforementioned Islamophobia scale. Responses were measured on a 5-point Likert Scale (From “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) on items that predicted hostility toward Muslims. The items for this scale can be found in Appendix A.
To check the validity of this scale, a principal component analysis was conducted. Before analysis three items were recoded to mirror the direction of the other items in the scale. Analysis showed that the items loaded on one factor with an eigenvalues of 6.09, explaining 60.86% of variance. The scale showed a high level of reliability with a Cronbach’s of .93 (M=23.91, SD= 12.51). Full details of the results are included in Appendix D.
Civil Liberty Policy Attitudes. To measure the second dependent variable, attitudes toward policies affecting citizens’ civil liberties, a scale was adapted from a PEW research study, which weighed up peoples’ willingness to give up civil liberties in order for the government to investigate terrorism (Pew Research Center, 2013). Again, participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements on a 5-point Likert scale (From “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). The statements for this scale are also listed in Appendix A.
A principal component analysis was also conducted to check the items on the Civil Liberty Policy scale. Before analysis one item was recoded to align with the other items in the scale. Results showed that all four items loaded on the same factor (eigenvalue = 3.19) accounting for 79.7% of variance. Reliability analysis suggested high reliability for the scale, with a Cronbach’s of .915 (M=16.24, SD= 6.8). Factor loadings can be found in Appendix D.
Demographic and Control Variables. Several additional variables were included in the survey experiment. Participants were asked a few simple questions regarding Islamic State to establish their level of knowledge on the subject. Furthermore they were also directly asked to indicate how knowledgeable they thought they were as well as demographic traits such as age, gender, education and nationality (See Appendix B). These were used to check whether the randomisation of participants among the conditions was successful.
Randomization Check. In order to check participants’ characteristics were
comparable across all conditions, we carried out a number of randomization checks. A one-way ANOVA was run using Experiment Condition as the independent variable and Age as the dependent variable. The analysis indicated that there was no main effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable of age, F(3,239)=2.15,
p=.094, η2
= .162, confirming there were no statistically significant differences
amongst the experimental conditions with regards to age. Thus, randomization for age is deemed successful. A one-way ANOVA was also conducted to check the
randomization of education level across the experimental groups (F(3,240)=.255, p=.857), as well as Political Affiliation (F(3,246)=.99, p=.394), Terrorism News Self Efficacy (F(3,246)=.52, p=.667), Terrorism News Knowledge (F(3,246)=.07, p=.078) and religiosity (F(3,240)=.1.31, p=.27), Further Chi square analyses were conducted to ensure effective randomization between the experimental conditions for nationality (X2(96)= 103/43, p = .221), religion, (X2(18)= 17.47 p = .491,) and gender, , (X2(18)= 17.47 p = .491). All scores suggest that randomization was successful.
Manipulation Check. When completing the survey, respondents had been asked some much they agreed or disagreed with two statements, “The image presented was violent”, and “The image presented was intimidating” on a seven point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. Both questions were combined into the same scale, with a Cronbach’s α of .764 indicating acceptable reliability.
A one-way ANOVA analysis was carried out as a manipulation check of whether images from the experimental groups had been interpreted as intended. The Levene’s test indicated that the requirement for the equal variances between the groups had been met and analysis showed statistically significant differences between groups F(2,179)= 65.18, p <.001. A Bonferroni post-hoc test suggested that those in the Violent condition (M=5.88, SD=1.14) perceived the image they were exposed to as significantly more violent and intimidating than those who were in the Threatening (Mdifference = -1.43 p<.001) or Non-Violent conditions (Mdifference = -2.65, p<.001). A statistically significant difference was also found
between Threatening (M=4.48, SD=1.30) and Non-Violent conditions (Mdifference = -1.22 p<.001). These results suggest that the manipulation was successful, and that those in the Violent condition indeed perceived the stimuli as most violent and intimidating, followed by those in the Threatening condition, and finally those in the Non-Violent condition. The full table of descriptives for the scale as well results for the distinct questions by Experimental Group can be found in Appendix C.
To check ensure those in the control condition did indeed recognize there was no image included in their article, participants were asked the question ‘Thinking back to the article, did it contain an image?’ Chi square revealed that a significant majority of people had recalled the presence of an image correctly (X2(248)= 221.37 p<.001, φ = .945). Only five participants reported incorrectly they had been exposed to an image when they had not and vice versa.
Results
To test Hypothesis 1 (a, b & c) to establish if there were differences in negative emotional response between conditions, a one-way ANOVA was carried out. We expected those in the violent condition to report most negative emotions, followed by those in the threatening image condition, then those in the non-threatening group, and with those in the text-only condition reporting the least negative emotions. Experimental conditions were selected as the independent variable (1-Text Only, 2-Non-Violent Image, 3- Threatening Image, 4-Violent Image), and the negative emotion scale was selected as the dependent variable. Homogeneity of variances was confirmed with a Levene’s test (p=.117) and the data revealed there were no significant differences between any of experimental
groups or control group with regard to self-reported negative emotional
response (F(3,246)=.86, p=.463, η2= 0.1). A Bonferroni post hoc was interpreted
to establish whether there was any significant difference between conditions with and without images, confirming that there were also no significant
differences. We therefore reject Hypothesis 1a, b, and c. Our results suggest that exposure to terrorism imagery does not stimulate significantly different negative emotional responses than to text alone, nor does violent imagery stimulate a more negative emotional response than less violent or non-violent images of terrorist events.
A one-way ANOVA was also run to investigate whether exposure to terrorism imagery, particularly violent imagery, had any effect on peoples’ attitudes toward foreign policy. We expected that those in the violent terrorism imagery condition would be mores supportive of combative terrorism policy than those in the other groups. Threatening imagery was expected to report less support, reducing further for those in the non-violent condition and again for the text-only condition. Homogeneity of variances was again confirmed with a
Levene’s test (p=.65). Results showed no significant differences between conditions with regard to their support for combative foreign policy, thus Hypotheses 2a, b and c are rejected. This suggests that exposure to terrorism imagery did not increase support for combative foreign policy.
Similar one-way ANOVAs were run to test differences in the experimental conditions for attitudes toward civil liberty and attitudes toward Muslims as dependent variables. Levene’s tests confirmed homogeneity of variables for both civil liberty policy (p=.80) and attitudes toward Muslim (p=.18). We expected that those in the violent condition would indicate more support for policies
reducing civil liberties in the name of security, and also increase negative attitudes toward Muslims. Acceptance of these security policies, as well as negative attitudes toward Muslims would be less in the Threatening condition, and less again for the Non-Violent condition, with those in the text-only
condition reporting the least acceptance and negative attitudes. Our hypotheses however, had to be rejected as our analysis revealed that there were no
statistically significantly differences between our experimental conditions for either dependent variable. Thus hypotheses for civil liberty policy attitudes (4a, b and c) are rejected, (F (3,245)=.75, p=.521, η2= 0.1), as well as the hypotheses
3a, b and c for attitudes toward Muslims (F (3,245)=1.2, p=.33, η2= .12).
A linear regression analysis with fear of terrorism as dependent variable and negative emotions as the independent variable was conducted. The
regression analysis found the relationship between negative emotions and fear of terrorism to be significant (F(1,247)=43.24, p<.001). Negative emotions
significantly predicted fear of terrorism (b=.39, t=6.58, p>.001, 95% CI [.29, .54]). Per each additional unit on the scale of negative emotion, fear of terrorism
increases by 0.39. Negative emotion accounts for 15% of variance in fear of terrorism (R2=.15) and suggests the more negative emotions someone feels the more likely it is that they will experience high levels of terrorism fear. Thus, hypothesis 5 is accepted.
Further linear regression analyses were run to test whether fear of terrorism predicted negative attitudes toward Muslims, as well as attitudes toward civil liberty policy and support for hawkish foreign policy.
Linear regression results with attitudes toward Muslims as the dependent variable, and fear of terrorism as the independent variable revealed the
relationship between the variables were significant (F(1,247)=23.76, p<.001). Fear of terrorism significantly predicted negative attitudes toward Muslims (b=.3, t=4.87, p>.001, 95% CI [.14, .33]). Per each additional unit on the scale of fear of terrorism, level of negative attitudes toward Muslims increases by .3. Negative emotion predicted 15% of variance in fear of terrorism (R2=.15). These results suggest the more negative emotions someone feels the more likely it is that they will experience high levels of terrorism fear, thus Hypothesis 6b is accepted.
Linear regression analysis also proved significant with fear of terrorism as independent variable and civil liberty policy attitudes as dependent variable (F(1.247)=68.36, p>.001). Fear of terrorism significantly predicted greater acceptance of policies infringing on civil liberties in the name of security (b=.47, t=8.27, p<.001, 95% CI [.392, .637]. For each additional unit on the scale for fear of terrorism, support for such policies increased by .47. Fear of terrorism
accounted for 21.7% of the variance in support of security measures infringing on civil liberties (R2=.217). The results suggest that the more terrorism fear an individual experienced, the more likely they would be to support security policies that could infringe on civil liberties. Thus, we accept hypothesis 6c.
The linear regression conducted with support for hawkish foreign policy as dependent variable, and fear of terrorism as the independent variable showed there was a significant relationship between these variables (F(1,246)=31.31, p=.001). Fear of terrorism significantly predicted greater support for hawkish terrorism policy (b=.34, t=5.59, p<.001, 95% CI [.190, .396]Each additional unit on the scale of fear of terrorism, support for hawkish foreign policy increases by .34. Fear of terrorism predicted 11.3% of variance in support for hawkish foreign
policies. Our results suggest that the greater the level of terrorism fear experienced, the more likely hawkish foreign policies will be supported. We therefore accept hypothesis 6a.
Lastly, to test hypothesis 7, double mediation analysis was conducted using model 6 in PROCESS macro by Hayes (2014). The analysis was run using each of the dependent variables in turn against each experimental condition testing for the total mediation effect of negative emotions and fear of terrorism. An outline of the model with the variables tested is shown in Figure 3. 1
Double mediation analysis was first run with attitudes toward Muslims as the dependent variable. The first requirement for the double mediation to take place was not met as regression analysis between the independent variable and the first mediator, emotions, was not significant for any of the conditions: Violent, F(1,247)=1.7, p=.193; Threatening, F(1,247)= .09, p=.89: and Non-Violent F(1,247)= 1.43, p= .23. Accordingly, results showed that double mediation did not occur for any of the conditions. This was evident from the confidence intervals for indirect effects, all of which crossed 0 and are displayed in Table 2 . From this we can conclude that negative emotions and fear of
terrorism did not doubly mediate a relationship between terrorism imagery and negative attitudes toward Muslims. Therefore we reject hypothesis 7. The
mediation analysis was also carried out for attitudes toward civil liberties and support for hawkish foreign policy. However, as the path between the
independent variable and the first mediator had proved non-significant, double
1Three dummy variables were created for use in double mediation analysis for each of the
mediation could not occur as the figures in Table 3 and 4 reflect. Thus, hypothesis 7 is rejected.
Figure 3 Double mediation Model
Bootstrapping (10,000 samples) M1 Negative Emotions M2 Fear of Terrorism X Imagery (a) Violent (b) Threatening (c) Non-Violent Y Dependent Variable
(a) Attitudes toward Muslims (b) Civil Liberty Policy
Attitudes
Table _______ Indirect Effect of Negative Emotion and Fear of Terrorism on Attitudes toward Muslims
Table 3 Indirect Effect of Negative Emotion and Fear of Terrorism on Civil Liberty Policy Attitudes
Condition Indirect effect of the double mediation SE Percentile 95% bias corrected and accelerated CIs Lower Upper Violent .0107 .0089 -.0032 .0327 Threatening .0002 .0076 -.0159 .0148 Non-Violent -.0101 .0095 -.0329 .0057 Bootstrapping (10,000 samples) Condition Indirect effect of the double mediation SE Percentile 95% bias corrected and accelerated CIs Lower Upper Violent .0159 .0128 -.0061 .0449 Threatening .0015 .0113 -.0200 .0247 Non-Violent -.0155 .0136 -.0467 .0085
Table 4 Indirect Effect of Negative Emotion and Fear of Terrorism on Foreign Policy Attitudes
Conclusion and Discussion.
In this study, the effect of exposure to terrorism news imagery was examined. More specifically, we investigated whether emotions and fear of terrorism stirred by violent visual cues could influence peoples’ attitudes toward Muslims as well as support or acceptance of security-related policy and combative foreign policy. The findings of
this suggest that peoples’ emotional response to terrorism news remains fairly
constant regardless of the presence or absence of violent imagery. This challenges the findings of (Fahmy et al., 2006) who claimed that graphic death or violence-related images stimulated intense negative emotions and also the work of Gadarian (2010). The differences in findings between this study and the work of Gadarian could however be explained by the fact that her use of TV news included other elements that had a greater impact on people’s emotions, such as moving images and sound. Through the lens of terror management theory, we can certainly make sense of these findings, as television news exposes us to visual cues and sound like we would in the real world. It is therefore possible that these sensory stimuli more closely imitate reality, making an instinctive response more likely.
Bootstrapping (10,000 samples) Condition Indirect effect of the double mediation SE Percentile 95% bias corrected and accelerated CIs Lower Upper Violent .0092 .0077 -.0032 .0283 Threatening .0009 .0067 -.0121 .0151 Non-Violent -.0088 .0080 -.0283 .0042
In the same vein, it could also be argued that static terrorism imagery could still have a significant impact on our emotions and concern with terrorism, but that in this case, the images selected were perhaps not close enough to our cultural reality. This area could be investigated further by researching how cultural closeness in terrorism imagery affects our responses to it, for example, the impact of the pictures from the terrorist attack in Manchester on people from the UK, European countries or other culturally close nations.
Though no differences were found with regard to exposure to violent
terrorism imagery, we did find that those reporting higher levels of negative emotion did indeed express greater concerns when asked about their concerns regarding terrorism. It is possible, as suggested by TMT’s evolutionary perspective, that some people might be predisposed to feeling more fearful or anxious when confronted with terrorism related news in general, regardless of the format. This could go some way to explain the lack of differences between the experimental groups and control
condition, which could be another area of exploration for future research.
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Questionnaire Briefing
Dear Participant,
I would hereby like to invite you to participate in a research study to be conducted under the auspices of the Graduate School of Communication, a part of the University of Amsterdam.
I am researching the effects of exposure to news relating to the Islamic militant group Islamic State or Daesh.
In the following online study, you may be exposed to graphic terrorism imagery. The violent imagery utilized is publicly available and has been retrieved from UK mainstream news webpages. You are free to click out of the survey at any time.
This online study should not take longer than 10 minutes to complete. If you wish, you may enter yourself in a prize draw at the end of the study. From those who entered, one winner will be selected at random to receive a VVV giftcard valued at €25 (or alternative if not in The Netherlands). Your e-mail address will NOT be linked to your responses.
As this research is being carried out under the responsibility of the ASCoR, University of Amsterdam, we can guarantee that:
1) Your anonymity will be safeguarded, and that your personal information will not be passed on to third parties under any conditions, unless you first give your express permission for this.
2) You can refuse to participate in the research or cut short your participation without having to give a reason for doing so. You also have up to 24 hours after participating to withdraw your permission to allow your answers or data to be used in the research. 3) No later than five months after the conclusion of the research, we will be able to provide you with a research report that explains the general results of the research. For more information about the research and the invitation to participate, you are welcome to contact the researcher, Catriona Leighton
(email:catriona.leighton@student.uva.nl) at any time.
Should you have any complaints or comments about the course of the research and the procedures it involves as a consequence of your participation in this research, you can contact the designated member of the Ethics Committee representing ASCoR, at the following address:
ASCoR Secretariat, Ethics Committee, University of Amsterdam, Postbus 15793, 1001 NG Amsterdam; 020-525 3680; ascor-secr-fmg@uva.nl. Any complaints or
comments will be treated in the strictest confidence.
I hope that I have provided you with sufficient information. I would like to take this opportunity to thank you in advance for your assistance with this research, which I greatly appreciate.
Kind regards, Catriona Leighton Consent
I hereby declare that I have been informed in a clear manner about the nature and method of the research, as described on the previous screen.
I agree, fully and voluntarily, to participate in this research study. With this, I retain the right to withdraw my consent, without having to give a reason for doing so. I am aware that I may halt my participation in the online study at any time.
If my research results are used in scientific publications or are made public in another way, this will be done in such a way that my anonymity is completely safeguarded. My personal data will not be passed on to third parties without my express
permission.
If I wish to receive more information about this research, either now or in future, I can contact the researcher Catriona Leighton (email: catriona.leighton@student.uva.nl) at any time.
Should I have any complaints about this research, I can contact the designated member of the Ethics Committee representing the ASCoR, at the following address: ASCoR secretariat, Ethics Committee, University of Amsterdam, Postbus 15793, 1001 NG Amsterdam; 020-525 3680; ascor-secr-fmg@uva.nl.
I understand the text presented above, and I agree to participate in this research study by checking the box below.
Yes, I agree. Continue to survey. Self-Efficacy
Before we start the survey, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statement:
Q1: I feel well informed about the Islamic militant group known as Islamic State or Daesh
