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“Yay or Nay? Changing lines of conflict and the Article 7 vote on
democratic backsliding in Hungary.”
Master Thesis - MSc Political Science (International Politics) – Leiden University
ABSTRACT
This research considers the factors of influence for MEP voting behaviour on sanctions against a member state of the European Union. It analyses the voting behaviour of MEPs during the plenary vote concerning the initiation of Art. 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government, which took place on September 12th, 2018. Using a dataset based on the results of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey which measures national party positions, this study conducts binary logistic regression analyses in order to examine the influence of several independent variables: views on EU integration, ideological distance to the target party, commitment to liberal democratic norms, and whether an MEP is from a post-communist member state. The results indicate that commitment to liberal democratic norms is the dominant influence on MEP decision-making concerning sanctions, while the EU integration dimension and left-right ideology dimension influence decision-making to a lesser degree. Lastly, the findings indicate that there is some support for the existence of a line of conflict between post-communist and Western member states when voting on the initiation of sanctions.
Word Count (incl. Reference List, excl. Appendices): 8.055 Words
Student: Jelle de Vries (S2299208) 1st Reader: Dr. Harmen van der Veer
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Introduction
In recent years, the decline of liberal democratic norms and institutions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has become a pressing concern for both scholars and policymakers. In several states, the values and institutions that serve as the foundation of liberal democracy are being eroded or rendered ineffective by national governments. Rupnik (2016) describes this as a democratic recession spanning “from the Baltic in the North to the Adriatic in the south” (p.
77). Although opinions differ on whether democratic backsliding in Hungary and Poland can be seen as illustrative for developments in the entire CEE region, it is true that Hungary was the first country to make “a sharp U-turn” away from liberalism with the election of the Fidesz party in 2010 (Kornai, 2017, p. 34). In 2015, Poland followed a similar course when the PiS party rose to power during the 2015 elections (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016). Both the Polish and Hungarian governments have attempted to undermine key components of liberal democracy in their countries through questionable and, in the case of Poland, outright illegal practices.
While the actions of the Hungarian government constitute a challenge to the foundational values of the European Union (EU), the European Union’s response has been characterized by many as lacklustre. Although the ‘Tavares report’ produced in 2012 by the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (henceforth LIBE-committee) addressed the actions of the Hungarian government and recommended an expansion of the European Union’s legal toolkit and a comprehensive approach towards backsliding in Hungary, the implementation of these recommendations has been limited. Moreover, it has been argued that a limited legal toolkit cannot be the only reason for lack of decisive action against the Hungarian government, as the Polish government became the subject of a ‘pre-article 7 procedure’ within the same year its attempts to undermine the Constitutional Court began (Fomina & Kucharczyk, 2016). Kelemen (2017) suggests that partisan incentives and balance of power logic in the European Parliament
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may provide a more comprehensive explanation: In the European Parliament, Fidesz is part of the European Peoples Party (EPP), a powerful Christian-democratic voting bloc at the centre of decision-making in the Parliament. Because of its position of power, the EPP has been able to shield Fidesz from inquiries by the European Union. Kelemen views this shielding action as the result of partisan incentive to tolerate Fidesz’ illiberal practices on the national level “in the interest of party loyalty and of maintaining [the EPP’s] majority in the European Parliament” (p. 225). In conclusion, scholars have presented several reasons for the lacklustre reaction of the European Union to the actions of the Hgarian government between 2010 and 2018.
However, the vote in the European Parliament on the ‘Sargentini-report’ produced by the LIBE-committee in 2018 constitutes exactly the kind of strong reaction to the developments in Hungary that has been absent until now. The report was adopted by a majority vote in the Parliament, and it formally initiated Art. 7 TEU procedures against Hungary. Specifically, the report called on the Council to determine whether there is a “clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded” (European Parliament, 2018). If such a
breach of the norms and values enshrined in Art. 2 TEU is found, Art. 7 TEU can be invoked and eventually result in sanctioning the target member state found by stripping them of their voting rights in the Council – the so-called ‘nuclear option’.
Kelemen (2017) has called for a research agenda focused on the democratic deficits that exist on the level of EU member states (rather than on the level of the EU institutions), and an analysis of how authoritarian enclaves persist within democratic unions. In this article, I aim to contribute to that conversation by examining the response of the European Union to the continued democratic backsliding within one of these authoritarian enclaves: Hungary. Specifically, I investigate the dominant dimensions that determine the voting behaviour of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) when asked to vote on the initiation of Art. 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government. This is especially interesting when
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considering that, after several years of shielding action, over half of the MEPs of the EPP party group voted in favour of sanctioning their erstwhile Fidesz allies.
The relevance of this issue for both scholars and policymakers is clear: it is important to know which factors influenced MEP voting behaviour on the initiation of Art. 7 TEU against the Hungarian Government. More broadly, it is important to know what causes MEPs to vote in favour or against the initiation of sanctions against a member state of the European Union. For scholars, this can provide a better understanding of the dominant dimensions influencing voting behaviour on sanctions in the European Parliament, a body which has steadily gained more decision-making power and influence within the EU. For policymakers, it is crucial to know which MEPs will vote in favour of sanctioning member states (and why they will do so) when attempting to combat democratic backsliding in member states of the European Union. Hence, I ask the following question:
What factors have influenced MEPs to vote in favour of triggering Article 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government, especially given Fidesz’ membership of the influential EPP party group?
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Theoretical Framework
In order to give the reader the necessary insight into the matter at hand, the actions of the Fidesz government following the 2010 Hungarian elections will first be detailed. Secondly, the role of the European Parliament (EP) within the European Union (EU) will briefly be discussed, especially in relation to the circumstances and limits of its power of initiative. Then, a theory of the factors influencing MEP voting behaviour will be developed based on existing literature, from which the research derives several hypotheses.
As previously stated, the coalition formed by Viktor Orban - consisting of the
Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Alliance and the Christian Democratic People’s Party, henceforth referred to
as Fidesz - rose to power in 2010. Fidesz received 53% of the votes, which translated into a majority of 68% of the 386 seats in the country’s unicameral parliament. This provided the
party with undivided control over the legislative branch of government with a majority large enough to unilaterally amend the constitution (Kornai, 2017). This disparity between the share of votes and the share of seats in parliament is the result of a deliberate arrangement in the Hungarian Constitution: as it was being drafted during the transition away from Communist rule, the writers aimed at ensuring that the constitution could be ‘updated’ in order to remain a
good fit for the changing wishes of the country and its people. As such, the seat distribution in the Hungarian parliament is tilted in favour of the larger parties, so that a coalition reaching the threshold of two-thirds of the seats required for amending the Constitutions would remain within reach. (Bánkuti, Halmai, & Scheppele, 2019). After the 2010 elections, Fidesz
possessed such a two-thirds majority without needing to negotiate with other parties. As a result, the party has had complete control over the contents of the constitution ever since, and is able to amend it at will.
Fidesz used its power to amend the constitution no less than 12 times within its first year in office alone (Bánkuti et al., 2019, pp 139-140). Since it had undivided control over both the
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executive and legislative branches of government, the Supreme Court alone remained as the primary check on government power, and therefore it was the primary target of the new government’s power. Fidesz altered the system for nominating judges to the Supreme Court in
order to allow the ruling party to hand-pick its judges. Whenever the Court judged a government action to be unlawful, Fidesz used its power to amend the Constitution and revoke the authority of the Court over the matter at hand, steadily reducing its competencies.
Other early targets of the Fidesz government included the Election Commission, which was brought under government control, the mass media, which became subject to a regulatory body called the ‘Media Authority’, in which the ruling party holds decision making power
through a majority, and the powers of the presidency, which were limited. As a result of these actions during its first year in office, Fidesz was free to push through an entirely new
constitution in the following years: one that was drafted in April 2011 and went into effect in January 2012, without input from the opposition or a broad public discourse on its contents (Kornai, 2017, p. 35). As a result of these actions and several other changes made to electoral law, the disparity between the number of votes received and the number of parliamentary seats granted increased after the 2014 parliamentary elections. Moreover, only one in four eligible Hungarian voters cast their votes, resulting in a situation where Fidesz holds 66.8% of parliamentary seats despite only having the support of 26.6% of the electorate (Kornai, 2017, pp. 41-42).
As of yet, there is no consensus as to how the current state of Hungarian democracy is most accurately described. Kornai (2017) argues Hungary has already moved “from the subset of democracies into the subset of autocracies” (p. 43), although he does not consider Viktor
Orbán to be a dictator. Rupnik (2016) argues the result of this backsliding in Hungary is not an authoritarian state such as exists in Russia today, but an ‘illiberal democracy’ in which
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strong executive and weak checks on governmental power. The checks and balances of liberal democracy are seen as “imposing undue constraints on the sovereignty of the people” (p. 80) – the rule of law and liberal democratic norms are ‘victims of democracy’. Similarly,
Greskovits (2015) proposes that Hungary is only semi-authoritarian, through a process of creating ‘a patchwork of worldwide ‘worst practices’ to gradually weaken democracy” (p.
30). The result of this meticulous combining of bits and pieces of liberal institutions in order to create an illiberal state has most aptly been termed “a Frankenstate”: a state that meets the
checklist criteria of a liberal democracy but still shields the incumbent from any democratic contenders, and whose people are neither completely repressed nor entirely free (Scheppele, 2013).
But what role can the European Parliament play in safeguarding the liberal democratic norms and values presented in Art. 2 TEU? According to Hix, Noury & Roland (2005) the European Parliament has developed over time from “a weak consultative ‘assembly’ into one of the most powerful institutions in the EU” (p. 210). Indeed, Article 14 of the TEU gives the EP
joint legislative and budgetary functions with the Council, and states it will exercise functions of political control and consultation (van Ooik & Vandamme, 2013, pp. 1-21). Moreover, Buonanno & Nugent (2013) assert that the EP can in many respects be considered “a much more important policy actor with regard to EU policies than are most of the parliaments of the member states with respect to national policies” (p. 54). The EP vote on initiation of Article 7
against the Hungarian government is an example of the increased influence and political power that the EP has accumulated during its existence. The vote was based on a report submitted by the LIBE-committee rapporteur Judith Sargentini. This report was an ‘Own Initiative Report’, which the EP is permitted to submit based on rules 45 and 52 of the Rules
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direct ways in which the Parliament tries to influence the Commission’s right of initiative” (p. 102).
Given that the influence of the EP has increased during its existence, and that there are real consequences to a vote such as this, it is important to consider which dimensions structure its decision-making. Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) began the discussion on this topic by positing that the dimension best suited to explaining the forming of coalitions in the EP is that of left-right ideology. In political science, the view of ideology as a dimension goes back at least to the work of Downs (1957), who defined ideology as “verbal images of ‘the good society’ and of the chief policies to be used in creating it” (p. 141). This view is supported by the fact that MEPs organise themselves on the basis of ideology rather than on nationality or national party affiliation (Hix, Noury, & Roland, 2009, p. 821).
In relation to voting in the EP concerning sanctions against member states, Sedelmeier (2017) argues that illiberal parties on the left of the political spectrum are more likely “to be met with widespread opposition in the EP” (p. 341). This is because right-wing parties will support
sanctions against their ideological rivals, whilst leftist parties will support sanctions despite being ideologically closer to the illiberal party. Although the problems with this statement will be discussed below1, it can be said that moderate left-wing parties are more willing to initiate sanctions against a norm-breaking member state than right-wing parties. This view of left-wing parties is supported by an example given by Kelemen (2017):
“In June 2015, when the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning Orbán’s statements on the death penalty and his migration consultation and calling on the
Commission to launch the Rule of Law Framework procedure against Hungary, only parties of the left voted in favour…”
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Based on the theory and examples provided by previous works, it is reasonable to assume that the left-right ideology dimension has influenced MEP voting behaviour during the September 2018 vote on the initiation of Art. 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government. Specifically, I derive the following hypothesis:
(H1) Left-Right Ideology hypothesis: MEPs who are positioned towards the left of the
ideological spectrum are more likely to vote in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government.
However, the ‘yay’ votes in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU procedures were spread across the ideological left-right spectrum: in almost every party, there were multiple MEPs who voted differently from the majority in their EP party group. Clearly, the left-right ideology
dimension alone cannot explain this scattering of ‘yay’ and ‘nay’ votes across party groups.
Therefore I consider several other influencing factors.
The EU integration dimension is one of these other factors that might have an influence on the voting behaviour of MEPs when considering the initiation of sanctions against a member state. Otjes & Van der Veer (2016) have found that this dimension gained greater importance during the Eurozone crisis at the cost of the left-right ideology dimension, but emphasised that its increased influence on voting behaviour might wane again after the crisis was dealt with. Van der Veer (2018) further specified the conditions that allow a conflict line to become more important as circumstance (the parliamentary instrument being used, e.g. roll call vote), time and subject matter. The subject matter, initiation of sanctions against a member state, lends itself well to making the EU integration division a more prominent line of conflict. It is reasonable to expect that a party opposed to further EU integration and influence will be less willing to support sanctions against a member state, whereas a party in favour of EU
integration will have fewer problems with supporting sanctions. A parallel can also be drawn with international organizations; where countries persistently object to certain actions “to try
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and prevent any emerging norm of customary international law resulting from the organization’s … practice from binding the state” (Sarooshi, 2005, p. 110).
Hence, it is likely that the EU integration position MEPs take has an influence on their willingness to vote in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU against the Hungarian government. The strength of this influence is underpinned by the awareness of MEPs that their decision could result in the imposition of sanctions against a member state. This awareness was further confirmed by Judith Sargentini, LIBE-rapporteur for this report, in an interview.1 From the theory, I derive the following hypothesis:
(H2) EU Integration hypothesis: MEPs who are in favour of further EU integration are more
likely to vote in favour of initiating Art. 7 procedures against the Hungarian government.
Sedelmeier (2014) also identified MEPs’ commitment to liberal democratic norms as a factor of influence for their voting preferences when it concerns invoking sanctions against a transgressing government. He considered leftist parties to be more strongly committed to liberal democratic norms (p. 341). This assumption should be considered critically, as it is only true up to a point: on both the right as well as the left, parties on the ideological extremes have historically had very little affinity with liberal democratic norms. However, in general it can be assumed that parties between the centre and extreme left of the ideological spectrum, the ‘moderate left’, are more committed to liberal democratic norms than their counterparts
positioned more towards the right.2
Reasonably, MEPs who are more strongly committed to liberal democratic norms are more likely to vote in favour of initiating sanctions against a member state government that
transgresses against these norms. As has been shown previously, Fidesz substantially diverged
1 See appendix 2 for the interview transcript.
2 In order to ensure that the validity of the research results, the commitment to liberal democratic norms and
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from the liberal democratic norms enshrined in Art. 2 TEU. Hence, we can expect MEPs more strongly committed to these norms to have voted in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government.
Furthermore, variations in commitment to liberal democratic values between individual MEPs of the EPP could also explain the ‘rebellious’ actions of the 115 MEPs that voted in favour of initiating article 7, despite the EPPs previous policy of shielding Fidesz from scrutiny.
According to Kelemen (2017, p. 225), this shielding took place because democratic actors in the European Parliament are incentivized to protect illiberal members in their midst in order to safeguard the votes they deliver. In other words, partisan politics of power in the European Parliament create a quid pro quo relationship that causes the democratic actors to protect an illiberal actor from scrutiny and intervention by the overarching EU authorities.
(H3) Liberal Democratic Norms Hypothesis: MEPs with a stronger commitment to liberal
democratic norms are more likely to vote in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government.
It is also possible that there is a statistically significant difference in the voting behaviour of MEPs from post-communist states as opposed to their Western European counterparts. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, scholars have debated whether post-communist states could attain equal levels of democratic success as their Western European counterparts. The initial
narrative was one of optimism, which dismissed comparisons with South American states as faulty and considered the trajectory towards democratization to be irreversible (Ekiert & Kubik, 1998; Greskovits, 1996; Linz & Stepan, 1996). However, more recent works have often highlighted the important differences produced by diverging historical trajectories, including for example the substantially lower citizen participation rates in post-communist democracies (Kostelka, 2014). The rapid democratization of CEE states was very different from the slow evolution in Western Europe, and mostly skipped the step of large, fairly stable
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cleavage-based parties (Brigevich, Smith, & Bakker, 2017, p. 7). It has been argued that this lack of stable democratic party competition and strong commitment of political elites to democracy has led to the assertion of political monopolies and oligarchic exercise of state power for private gain in many post-communist member states of the EU (Innes, 2014). This narrative of democratic decline is now so prevalent that some scholars are willing to state that democratic regression spans the entire region, “from the Baltic in the North to the Adriatic in the south” (Rupnik, 2016).
Cianetti, Dawson and Hanley (2018) have pointed out that the treatment of the Hungarian and Polish cases as paradigmatic for democratic regression in the entire CEE region is
problematic, and call for more attention to be paid to the actions of other post-communist member states without viewing them “through the prism of the Hungarian and Polish experiences” (p. 245). I believe there is space in this paper to contribute to this conversation
by investigating the voting behaviour of MEPs from post-communist states when considering the initiation of Art. 7 TEU procedures against Hungary. While this is still related to the main topic of this paper, this directly addresses the voting behaviour of MEPs from other post-communist member states.
The possibility that MEPs from different countries voted differently is further enhanced by the fact that studies have shown party groups in the EP are still less cohesive than many of the member states’ national parties ( Attinà, 1990; Quanjel & Wolters, 1993; Bay Brzinski,1995
as cited in Hix et al., 2005, p. 210). Similarly, Hix has found that national party affiliation does have a significant influence on the likelihood of MEPs to ‘rebel’ and vote contrarily to
the majority group position: most notably British, Spanish and French parties strayed from the majority position of their EP groups (pp. 676-680). Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) found that national delegations have even voted against each other despite being in the same party group:
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“…Italian Socialists disagree with the Germans more frequently than do British Labour MEPs” (p. 961).
The existing literature makes it impossible to dismiss nationality as a role of influence on voting behaviour in the EP, and the literature on the democratisation of post-communist EU member states suggests that the different historical trajectory of these countries may have led to a statistically significant difference in voting behaviour. Under the designation ‘post-communist’, I include the following EU member states: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. To investigate this, I derive the following hypothesis from the literature on democratisation and democratic regression in post-communist member states:
(H4) Post-communist hypothesis: MEPs from post-communist states are less likely to vote in
favour of initiating Article 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government than non-post-communist MEPs.
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Methods
This research is examining a dichotomous choice made by MEPs between voting either in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU, or voting against. The appropriate method to use for this type of research is a binary logistic regression analysis. As I am researching a dichotomous choice between voting in favour of sanctions or voting against, I use binary logistic regression analyses (Halperin & Heath, 2017), which enables us to draw meaningful conclusions from the data by transforming it into the probability that an MEP will vote in favour (Barakso, Sabet, & Schaffner, 2014). In order to take into account the abstentions, I conduct a separate binary logistic regression analysis in which the abstentions are contrasted with both the votes in favour and against. In doing so, I hope to discern whether the influence of the independent variables differs when considering the choice to abstain instead of the choice to vote in favour.
The most relevant vote to analyse in this research is that on the text of the ‘Sargentini report’ as a whole (ID number 7678), as its acceptance by the EP entailed a formal initiation of Article 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government. In other words, real-life consequences hinged on the outcome of this vote: while the Art. 7 procedure contains the ‘nuclear option’ of sanctions only as a last resort, a request for its initiation does entail the
possibility of these sanctions being used against a member state. Therefore, the influence of the independent variables on MEP voting behaviour in relation to the initiation of Art. 7 is expected to be most apparent in this specific vote.
The unit of analysis for this binary logistic regression is the voting behaviour of the individual MEPs. However, collecting data for the MEPs’ views on left-right ideological position, EU
integration position, and commitment to liberal democratic norms on an individual level is unfeasible given the constraints of this project. Therefore, the most effective method of data
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collection is to use the positions of national parties as proxies for the positions of individual MEPs.
This paper uses a dataset by van der Veer (2018) as a source for the MEPs positions with regard to the independent variables. The data in the dataset of Van der Veer originated from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2012), which estimates national party
positioning on a range of issues, including EU integration, general left-right ideology, and the GAL/TAN scale (p. 144). I choose to use the dataset by Van der Veer rather than using the data of the Chapel Hill Survey directly because it has already been organized and prepared to be used to analyse the influence of the independent variables on MEP voting behaviour. In this paper, general left-right positioning will be used as an indicator for distance to the target party, and positioning on the GAL/TAN scale will be used as indicator for commitment to liberal democratic norms. The positioning of national parties along the scales for these three variables was collected by Bakker et al. (2012) through an expert survey completed by
academic experts in all the researched countries, the results of which were subsequently cross-validated by comparing them to two other commonly used sources for party positioning (pp. 148-150).
The use of GAL-TAN, also known as the ‘social’ dimension of party competition, has been criticized because it deals with a wide range of social issues and there is no exact definition of its boundaries (Brigevich et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the GAL-TAN dimension has been adopted by many researchers as a means to measure the influence of non-economic issues on party competition. In this research, GAL-TAN is used as an indicator for commitment to liberal democratic norms. Liberal democratic norms, as written into the Treaty of the
European Union in Article 2, cover a wide range of topics: from the rule of law to respect for human dignity, from democracy to minority rights and pluralism. The concept itself is more diffuse than any one constituent part of the GAL-TAN dimension. Hence, using the entirety
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of the GAL-TAN dimension as an indicator rather than just one aspect is more effective for measuring commitment to liberal democratic norms. This is explored in the robustness check by measuring the influence on voting behaviour of indicators in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey that come closest to capturign the individual aspects of GAL-TAN1.
Results & Analysis
In this section, I discuss the results of the tests that have been conducted. Several logistic regression models were designed: model one through four considered the influence of each variable on MEP voting behaviour individually, while model five measured the relative effects of the independent variables on voting behaviour by measuring their influence simultaneously. Firstly, some general analysis and background data will be given in order to situate the findings and give context to the reader. Then, the support for each hypothesis is considered and it will be confirmed or rejected, before I discuss the relative influence of the variables and which dimension is dominant for shaping MEP decision-making in this case. Lastly, I include the MEPs who abstained in the scope of the research by conducting the same logistic regression analysis with the decision to abstain as dependent variable.
Out of 750 MEPs, 645 MEPs cast a vote (448 in favour; 197 against), while 48 MEPs chose to abstain (which, in the EP, is an active rather than passive decision that requires selecting a third option). Furthermore, 21 MEPs were present but neither voted nor abstained, and 36 MEPs were absent (Votewatch, 2018). Although the dataset used for this research was
extensive, data on the indicators for the independent variables was not available for all MEPs. This reduced the sample size for the logistic regression analyses concerning MEPs who voted to 547, with 377 MEPs who voted in favour and 170 who voted against, and the sample size of MEPs who abstained to 32. The results of a T-test comparing the mean left-right
1 See robustness check (appendix 1) for comparison of scores of the individual aspects as compared to GAL-TAN
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ideological position of MEPs who voted on a scale from 0 to 1 show that there is a difference of .283 between the MEPs who voted in favour and MEPs who voted against. The mean score of MEPs who voted in favour is .465, slightly left of the ideological centre, while the mean score of MEPs who voted against is .749, solidly towards the ideological right. In other words, MEPs who voted against the sanctions were in general positioned more towards the right of the ideological spectrum than those who voted in favour. However, this result also indicates that the left-right ideological dimension by itself cannot account for the diversity of voting preferences within almost every EP party group. To explain this, I turn to the
hypotheses.
As the results of the T-test foreshadowed, the results of the logistic regression analysis show that the likelihood of voting in favour of initiating Art. 7 drops sharply as MEPs are
positioned further to the ideological right (see table 1, model 1). Furthermore, for MEPs positioned on the extreme right, probability of voting in favour drops to ,000. Conversely, MEPs on the left of the ideological spectrum are more likely to vote in favour. Based on these results, I consider the left-right ideology hypothesis to be confirmed. We can infer that the ideology dimension identified by Kreppel and Tsebelis (1999) specifically influences whether or not an MEP is willing to vote in favour of sanctioning a norm-breaking member state.
When analysing the influence of the EU integration dimension on MEP voting behaviour, the results of the analysis indicate there is statistically significant support for the EU integration hypothesis (see table 1, model 2). The likelihood of voting in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU increases as MEPs are more in favour of EU integration. Based on these results, I consider the hypothesis to be confirmed. Generalizing from this finding, one could argue that voting on the initiation of Art. 7 TEU procedures, and more broadly voting on the initiation of sanctions against a norm-breaking member state, is another issue in which increases the importance of the EU integration division. Whether this has happened at the expense of other lines of
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conflict in the EP will be discussed when comparing the relative influence of the independent variables. Furthermore, the influence of EU integration position provides support the
supranational integration hypothesis proposed by Sedelmeier (2014): a strong normative commitment to EU integration increases the willingness of EP party groups to support
sanctions against member states. It could also be theorized that MEPs with a negative view of EU integration are unwilling to set a precedent in which the EU takes strong measures against a member state, for fear of establishing a precedent.
Furthermore, the logistic regression analysis has also indicated there is strong and statistically significant support for the liberal democratic norms hypothesis. There is a very large drop in the likelihood of voting in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU procedures as MEPs are positioned further towards the TAN extreme of the spectrum (see table 1, model 3). From this result, we can infer that MEPs commitment to liberal democratic norms has a significant influence on their voting behaviour when they are asked to decide whether or not a member state violating those norms should be sanctioned. Within the EPP party group, commitment to liberal
democratic norms also provides an explanation for the voting behaviour in two ways. Firstly, variations in the level of commitment explain why roughly half the party voted in favour of initiating Art. 7 TEU: they were more uncomfortable with the situation in Hungary than their colleagues. Secondly, the lower overall level of commitment to liberal democratic norms allowed for partisan incentive to play a larger role. In an interview, MEP Judith Sargentini illustrated this by pointing out that many EPP MEPs, despite being uncomfortable with the situation in Hungary, were in her view additionally motivated to vote in favour because of the troublesome prospect of explaining their partnership with Fidesz to unreceptive domestic audiences in the run-up to the 2019 European elections.
This finding also provides support for the theory that norm-breaking parties on the left of the ideological spectrum are more likely to be sanctioned than those on the right: MEPs on the
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moderate left that are more committed to liberal democratic norms1 are more likely to vote in favour of sanctions than their less committed colleagues on the right, even against a party that is ideologically close to them. When this effect is combined with a partisan incentive to vote in favour of sanctions if the target is ideologically distant from the voting MEPs, illiberal parties on the left may indeed be more likely to face scrutiny in the EP than equally illiberal parties on the right.
Lastly, I turn to the Post-Communist hypothesis. The results of the binary logistic regression analysis are statistically significant, and suggest that the likelihood of voting in favour of Art. 7 TEU decreases somewhat for MEPs that are from post-communist countries (see table 1, model 4). To generalize, this provides some support to the theory that nationality still plays a role in MEP voting behaviour, and that there is a meaningful, statistical difference between the member states of the East and West where it concerns the initiation of sanctions. In that case, Cianetti, Dawson and Hanley (2018) are correct to point out that scholars must not see the Polish and Hungarian cases as paradigmatic for all post-communist member states: if democratic regression were so uniform across the CEE region, one would expect the results to indicate a much stronger effect.
Naturally, the independent variables did not exert their influence on MEP voting behaviour in a vacuum: in real-life, each is in play simultaneously as MEPs make their decisions. As such, a last logistic regression model was designed to measure their relative influence on MEP voting behaviour (see table 1, model 5). The results from this model show that the dominant dimension influencing MEP voting behaviour when voting on the initiation of sanctions against a member state is that of commitment to liberal democratic norms: When positioned as far as possible toward the TAN-end of the scale, there is only a .008 likelihood of voting in
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favour. This variable seems to influence MEP voting behaviour despite the effects of partisan interest and balance of power logic, which Kelemen (2017) has previously proposed as motivating factors for the previous strategy of shielding Fidesz from criticism employed by the EPP party group. The influence of the EU integration dimension was also strong, somewhat at the expense of the influence of the ideological left-right dimension. From this, one could infer that the vote on whether or not to initiate Art. 7 TEU against the Hungarian government met the three criteria which allow for the conflict lines in the EP to shift. While the left-right ideological dimension still influences MEP voting behaviour, the importance of commitment to liberal democratic norms and position on EU integration can explain the variety of voting preferences within EP party groups. National parties cooperating in EP groups can hold very diverse positions in these dimensions. Lastly, the effect of whether or not an MEP was from a post-communist country was relevant, but it is far less influential than the other dimensions.
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Conclusion & Recommendations
In this research, I have studied which factors influence MEPs to vote in favour of sanctions against an EU member state, specifically by investigating the EP vote on the initiation of Art. 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government. By conducting a quantitative analysis of relevant influencing factors structuring decision-making in the EP – the left-right ideology dimension, the EU-integration dimension, commitment to liberal democratic norms, and whether an MEP is from a post-communist member state – this research has contributed to the academic conversation by applying these influencing factors specifically to the issue of
initiating sanctions against an EU member state. Considering that illiberal enclaves not only continue to exist within the EU, but are actively being created through the undermining of liberal democratic norms and institutions, gaining a better understanding the voting behaviour of MEPs, which ultimately shapes (part of) the EU response to illiberalism within its borders, remains a very relevant topic. Furthermore, by investigating the influence of whether or not an MEP is from a post-communist state, this research contributes to the study of backsliding in other CEE countries by examining their actions without viewing it through the lends of backsliding in Hungary and Poland.
The analysis has shown that the dominant influence structuring MEP decision-making when asked whether or not to initiate Art. 7 TEU against the Hungarian government was that of commitment to liberal-democratic norms. Furthermore, according to the results the EU integration- and left-right ideology dimensions are also important factors shaping MEP decision-making. The increased influence of the commitment to liberal democratic norms and the EU integration dimension explains the spread of “yay” and “nay” votes within EP party groups across the ideological left-right spectrum. Furthermore, the influence of whether or not an MEP is from a post-communist country, although smaller than the other variables, was still
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relevant: MEPs from post-communist countries had a significantly smaller likelihood of voting in favour.
Beyond the scope of the initiation of Art. 7 against the Hungarian government, the results of this research contribute to the academic conversation in several ways. Firstly, they help to give insight into the factors that influence MEP voting behaviour when they vote about the initiation of sanctions against a member state. The heightened importance of the liberal democratic norms and EU integration conflict lines at the expense of the left-right ideology dimension show that the three necessary conditions for changing conflict lines set out by Van der Veer (2018) are not only met when voting on the Eurozone crisis, but also when sanctions are the topic at hand. The diffusion of “yay” and “nay” votes across the ideological left-right spectrum that accompanies this shifting of the conflict lines in the EP means that both scholars and policymakers cannot simply rely on coalitions of party groups when predicting whether the EP will vote in favour of initiating sanctions, but must consider MEPs views on EU integration and commitment to liberal democratic norms as well. Furthermore, the influence on voting behaviour of whether or not an MEP is from a post-communist member state also carries some significance for future academic discussion of the initiation of sanctions against member states: although the EU member states are united in diversity, this result hints at the existence of a meaningful line of conflict between those MEPs who are from post-communist countries and those who are not.
Based on the findings of this research, there are several further avenues for future research that would be interesting to explore. Firstly, I question how the influence of commitment to liberal democratic norms is affected when the norm-breaking party is part of an EP group whose MEPs have a high commitment to these norms. Although Sedelmeier (2014) theorizes that these MEPs would still vote in favour of sanctions despite being ideologically close to the target, the inclusion of a dynamic of partisan incentive might nevertheless affect voting
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behaviour. Furthermore, the significant difference between MEPs from post-communist member states and the other MEPs emphasizes the need for research into the actions of other post-communist states independently from the events in Hungary and Poland. Why does this discernible difference in voting behaviour exist? Furthermore, this vote saw the importance of both the EU integration dimension as well as the commitment to liberal democratic norms increase. Although it is plausible to assume that the influence of commitment to liberal
democratic norms would not be increased if the EP voted on the initiation of sanctions against a member state for a reason other than transgressing liberal democratic norms, it would be better if future research could support this assumption with research results – if a suitable test case is available.
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Appendix 1: Robustness check
In this appendix the reader can find the results of several robustness checks that were carried out. These include a separate binary logistic regression model for MEPs who chose to abstain, a multicollinearity test of the GAL-TAN and left-right ideology indicators, and a breakdown of the influence of individual aspects of the GAL-TAN indicator as compared to their combined influence.
Abstentions in the EP are often strategically motivated choices by MEPs attempting to avoid taking a position on issues that subject them to competing demands (e.g. differences between national party stance and EP party group stance) (Mühlböck & Yordanova, 2017). These abstentions are not included in the logistic regression models analysing why MEPs voted one way or another, but still constitute the indication of a clear preference. When asking why MEPs vote in favour or against the initiation of sanctions, it is prudent to append to that question: why do they abstain? Hence, a separate logistic regression model was also used to measure the influence of the independent variables with a dependent variable of abstention (see Table 2).
When analysing the relative influence of the independent variables on MEPs choice to abstain (see model 5), there are both comparable outcomes and several noticeable differences
between their effects on voting preference (“yay” or “nay”) and abstentions. The GAL-TAN
dimension remains the dominant dimension, being most influential in both voting preference and abstentions. As MEPs are positioned closer to the TAN-end of the scale, the likelihood of abstaining increases rapidly; if an MEP is positioned on the extreme of the TAN-end, the likelihood of abstaining is 456 times higher. The influence of the left-right ideological dimension and whether or not an MEP is from a post-communist country are not statistically relevant when taking the influence of the other variables into consideration. This is
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variables (see model 1, 4). The reverse happens when analysing the influence of the EU integration dimension: the result is not statistically significant when tested independently, but when measuring its influence relative to the other variables, there is a statistically significant effect: the likelihood of abstaining increases for MEPs who are more in favour of EU
integration.
The finding that a more favourable view of EU integration and a higher TAN-score are related to a higher likelihood of abstaining seems paradoxical. However, the results of this analysis provide support for the theory that MEPs abstain because they strategically refuse to take position while there are multiple competing influences. Abstentions by MEPs in the ECR, S&D, and EPP party groups can be explained by looking at the competing interests of the majority position in the EP party group and the influence of GAL-TAN position and EU-integration views decided at the national level. Additionally, there is a second dynamic of partisan interest for MEPs of the EPP: they are asked to vote in favour or against initiating sanctions against a government with whom they are in the same EP party group. This could explain why no fewer than 28 of the 48 abstaining MEPs belong to the EPP.
A test for multicollinearity was also conducted, in order to ensure this did not negatively affect the research results. Multicollinearity occurs when 2 or more of the independent variables are highly correlated (Ho, 2006, p. 248). As a result of this correlation between independent variables, the conclusions of a regression analysis may be skewed, and their validity can be undermined. The risk of multicollinearity in this research is greatest when considering the indicators GAL-TAN and general left-right ideology, used as proxies for commitment to liberal democratic norms and distance from the target party respectively. Sedelmeier (2014) considered this same problem when attempting to make inferences about the role of ideological distance from a target party compared to the role of MEPs’ GAL-TAN
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orientation. In order to establish whether or not this has affected the research results of this article, several tests aimed at detecting multicollinearity have been conducted.
A linear regression between the variables was also conducted in order to investigate the possibility of collinearity. The collinearity diagnostics of the linear regression shows that both the tolerance- and VIF-values remain well within their acceptable ranges (respectively, at ,410 and 2,439), and do not point towards a suspected collinearity. While the results are not perfect, indicating that there is a small amount of overlap between the two variables, no multicollinearity could be established. Based on this test, it can be concluded that multicollinearity has not skewed the results of our statistical analyses.
Lastly, this robustness check deals with the issue of the accurateness of the GAL-TAN dimension as an indicator for commitment to liberal democratic norms. As discussed in the methods-section, one might argue that the use of only one aspect of the GAL-TAN scale as an indicator for commitment to liberal norms is preferable, because of the ill-defined borders of the GAL-TAN dimension. The most relevant indicators in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey that could be used to represent the individual aspects of GAL-TAN are civil liberties versus law and order, social lifestyle, and cosmopolitanism. In the dataset used for this analysis, all are coded from 0 (civil liberties, alternative, cosmopolitan) to 1 (law and order, conservative, not cosmopolitan).
Of these variables, civil liberties versus law and order perhaps comes closest to independently capturing the essence of commitment to liberal democratic norms. However in my opinion it fails to do so, because this line of conflict also exists between politicians who are committed to liberal democratic norms: politicians who desire stricter policing to ensure law and order exist in many democracies, and they are often committed to the rule of law (a core liberal democratic norm) and do not necessarily mean to infringe on liberal democratic norms.
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The results of a binary logistic regression analysis produce several insights. Firstly, out of the three individual indicators the civil liberties vs. law and order indicator does have the most influence on MEP voting behaviour (see table 3, model 1): as MEPs are positioned more towards the law and order-end of the spectrum, the likelihood of voting in favour drops sharply. Crucially, the results of the regression model indicate that the other two indicators also have a substantial and statistically significant influence on MEP voting behaviour (see table 3, model 2, 3): as MEPs are positioned further to a conservative lifestyle and non-cosmopolitan worldview, the likelihood of voting in favour drops only a little less sharply than in model 1.
The results of a logistic regression model indicate support for the use of the GAL-
TAN dimension as an indicator for commitment to liberal democratic norms rather than only one of its constituent aspects (see table 3). In all variables, as MEPs are positioned more towards the 1 (law and order, conservative, not cosmopolitan) the likelihood of voting in favour drops. The strongest and most statistically significant influence belongs to the civil liberties versus law and order indicator (see model 1, 4). However, it must be noted that the significance of each indicator and their influence on MEP voting behaviour is lower when tested than when combined into the overarching GAL-TAN dimension. This finding confirms that using the GAL-TAN dimension as an indicator for commitment to liberal democratic norms is more appropriate, and captures the variable more fully, than using only one
constituent part. Even when the relative influence of the variables is measured (see model 4), the effect of these variables remains of influence on MEP voting behaviour. Based on the previous explanation, and on the results of the logistic regression, I conclude that it is preferable to use the entirety of the GAL-TAN dimension as an indicator for MEPs’ commitment to liberal democratic norms rather than just one of its aspects.
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Appendix 2: Interview Transcript
I: interviewer
JS: Judith Sargentini
I: Hello Mrs. Sargentini. First, do you agree if I record this conversation and send the
transcript by your office before handing in my thesis?
JS: Yes.
I: Alright. I am a masters’ student at Leiden University and currently working on my thesis,
which is about your report and the vote about it which took place in the European Parliament. The research question is What factors have influenced MEPs to vote in favour of triggering Article 7 TEU procedures against the Hungarian government? I’ve prepared 8 questions, and I hope we have time for them all, as I understood from your assistant Maayke that you don’t
have a lot of time.
JS: Let’s just begin, most of the time it works out fine.
I: Alright, the first question is a broad question: during the vote, you received support from
MEPs from many different parties, across almost the entire political spectrum. According to you, what is the reason that these MEPs with diverse backgrounds were able to get behind your proposal?
JS: Yes, many members on the progressive side, almost everyone on the progressive side, has
been asking critical questions since 2010. It was much more important what our colleagues on the Christian democratic side would do, because Fidesz is part of the EPP. And many
Christian Democrats have started to feel very unhappy with the situation in Hungary, so eventually many of them voted in favour of my report.
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I: Yes, okay. So my research is specifically about the factors that motivate MEPs when they
vote about sanctions against a member state, and it has been written that this vote was largely symbolic. Was there, according to you, before and during the vote a realization among the MEPs that this could really lead to the start of Art. 7 procedures or was it more symbolic?
JS: Certainly. No, no, this has been a very intensive process and I don’t think there was a
single MEP who was not aware of what was going on. You could see it in the [emotional] discharge afterwards, and of course there had been a vote in the [LIBE] committee, and in other committees, so no it was very clear that people understood. See, the symbolism… it can
sometimes matter a lot more in politics.
I: Yes, I agree. But it is good to know that the MEPs were attentive of the consequence of
their vote.
JS: Yes, but they always do that, with every vote. That is our work.
I: Of course, of course. A third question: There are developments in Poland as well, where the
PiS began with an attack on the rule of law in 2015, and there the EU began a procedure against that in 2015 as well, the Rule of Law Framework. But as you said, in Hungary Fidesz has been working since 2010, and despite there being worries about this, it has taken pretty long before there was such a breakthrough as your report delivered. Why do you think it took so long in the case in Hungary?
JS: Because Fidesz is part of the Christian Democratic family [the EPP party] and the
PiS-party is not. Because of this, there was not enough support in the European Parliament, in the European Council, and in the European Commission to act against Hungary.
I: Yes, and as you said yourself, the EPP has made a rather large shift in this, and during your
vote over half of the MEPs in the EPP chose to vote in favour. Do you think this is really because they are uncomfortable with the situation?
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JS: Yes, but not only because they are very sorry for what is happening in Hungary – which is
the case, for many – but also uncomfortable because the European elections were closing in and just because it is troublesome for them at home when they have to explain that they are functioning in a group together with Viktor Orbán’s party. So Fidesz became a liability for
these clubs.
I: Okay, so you believe it has also been a lot of self-interest for these parties?
JS: Yes, also. Yes.
I: And do you also believe that the recent suspension of Fidesz [in the EPP] would also be
motivated by this?
JS: Certainly. Certainly
I: Okay. So as you said, MEP’s being uncomfortable with developments in Hungary is a
motivating factor, but another important position that MEPs take is of course in the area of EU integration, and how that should continue? Do you think this was also important for MEPs when they had to decide whether to vote for or against the sanctions?
JS: Yes, well it’s all a part of it. See, the Polish government is blocking a lot in the Council,
but I do not think that is their first consideration.
I: Okay, so you believe it played a secondary role, then?
JS: Yes, but I am from a different party, I cannot see into everyone’s motivations.
I: No, no, of course not, but I am mostly interested in your opinion as, yes, an MEP with 10
years of experience in the European Parliament – you know the waters, so to speak. So we have reached the final question; until now, after the vote, the EP has officially requested the start of an Art. 7 procedure, but until now not much action has been taken – as far as can be seen from the outside. If that does not happen, such concrete action as the initiation of art. 7
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procedures, do you believe there are other consequences still linked to the vote of last year – for example the symbolic value.
JS: Well, see, the procedure has begun. We have started it with the vote. It has not been
followed through on in the Council, just as the procedure against Poland has not really been followed through on. And that is because there is just insufficient political will to do this, and between the Member States. And that is very bothersome, but the fact that the European Commission has now acted very firmly against Romania is because it has been made clear that there is a political will in the Council to act against states that do not respect the rule of law. Also the fact that the Fidesz party has been suspended by the Christian Democrats is a result of the vote about my report. So there are clear effects, but what is not happening – and that was to be expected – is a firm approach in the Council. And that is because when I put the proposal to vote, the Austrians were chairman of the Council- well, you’ve seen last week what kind of government that is, Christian Democrats and the extreme right. And now, until June, we have the Romanians, and they are inspired by the Hungarian example. So the crucial point is political will in the Council. And we have known that for forever, but that is not a reason not to begin the process, because then these effects would not have been there at all.
I: Yes, personally I agree with you. Well, thank you for this short interview. I hope it did not
take too much of your time. And lastly thank you for 10 years of service in the European Parliament for the Greens.
JS: Thank you, that is very nice of you. Good luck with your studies! Bye.
