An analysis of the mechanisms by which protests against the Orme Dam
and the Thirty-Meter Telescope succeeded in protecting Native American
land from external threats
Adam Cross (S2678659)
Master’s Thesis
Political Science: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Development (MSc)
Thesis Supervisor: Dr Simon Chauchard
Second reader: Dr Oda van Cranenburgh
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Abstract
How do some protest movements succeed in defending indigenous land against external threats where so many others fail? This question is addressed through an analysis of the mechanisms by which protesters succeeded in pressuring government decision-makers to abandon plans for the Orme Dam and Thirty-Meter Telescope in the USA. Novel findings from these cases contribute to literature on social movements by providing insights into the ways in which protesters successfully mobilise resources exploit structural opportunities to exert political influence. Analysis reveals how movements galvanise support beyond indigenous communities and reduce the practical and political viability of federal projects, especially by exerting leverage over government figures and through institutional decision-making mechanisms. The role of structural and contextual factors in shaping movement outcomes is also elucidated in these two cases, and findings demonstrate that movement success depends on the coincidence of multiple events and factors which are outside of the control of protesters. This study also provides a starting point for further research into social movement outcomes by proposing refinements to the concept of Political Opportunity Structure – the key theoretical tool used here to analyse the mechanisms by which protesters effect change – so that these recommendations may be used to generate more fruitful analysis of similar movements in future research.
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Introduction and research question
The research puzzle this study addresses is how, despite the overwhelming number of cases in which Native American protest movements have failed to protect indigenous land from external threats, some have succeeded in doing so. Research has been done into the struggles of Native Americans over their land, and the failure to protect it against resource extraction, development projects, and environmental degradation is well-documented (Rosser, 2005; Schlosberg and Caruthers, 2010; Whyte, 2017). However, relatively little research has been done into instances in which protest has succeeded in protecting indigenous land from such threats, and the processes which bring about these successful outcomes are therefore poorly understood (Grande, 2015; Champagne, 2016). This puzzle is made more perplexing by the general lack of research into the determinants of social movement
outcomes (Bosi et al., 2016), as well as the lack of scholarly consensus about the mechanisms by which protest movements influence politics and society more broadly (Amenta et al., 2010).
In order to address this research puzzle this study analyses two successful Native American land-based protest movements and provides insights into the processes which led to their success. The detailed analysis of these cases facilitates an assessment of the processes by which factors such as protest strategies, political incentive structures, and the co-option of activists into formal decision-making mechanisms influences movement outcomes in
different socio-political contexts. This analysis is undertaken primarily to increase our understanding of the mechanisms by which protest movements such as these effect change, but also to contribute to further research by refining theoretical tools for describing and analysing the processes by which movements interact with political structures to effect change. Therefore, whilst this study contributes to existing scholarship on social movements by providing novel insights, it also paves the way for further research in this relatively under-studied area by using those insights to make recommendations for carrying out more effective research into similar movements.
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Literature review
This study contributes to literature on protest movements, particularly that which examines how factors such as political instability, historical injustices, and resource availability shape movements and the types of strategies they adopt (Ramirez, 1982; Della Porta and Diani, 2006; Della Porta, 2015). It also draws on McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s conceptualisation of movements as “political performances” between protesters and states (Passy 2009, p.353), which emphasises the ways in which activists exploit structural conditions to contest authority (Flacks, 2004; see Tarrow, 1994; Giugni et al., 1998). This study contributes to scholarship on decentralised, issue-based movements such as feminism and environmentalism (Buechler, 1995; Della Porta and Diani, 2015), as well as research on the role of group psychology in social movements, especially in terms of the importance of shared grievances in shaping an “oppositional consciousness” (Morris and Braine 2001, p.20; Whittier, 2002). Whilst this study does not focus on the factors which shape movements, its reliance on assumptions about the influence of underlying structures and processes on
protesters’ capacity to effect change enables it to make a valuable contribution to this body of literature nonetheless.
More specifically, this study contributes to scholarship on the impacts of social movements and the mechanisms by which they bring about change, an area which has traditionally been neglected in the field (Giugni, 1999; Della Porta and Diani, 2015). Some have followed the example set by Kitschelt’s (1986) influential study into the reasons behind the variable influence of different anti-nuclear movements, but scholars have commented on the need for further analysis of the mechanisms “by which social movements provoke impacts on the establishment” (Giugni and Bosi 2012, p.17; Della Porta and Diani, 2020). Some have speculated that this type of research remains relatively scarce because of the difficulty of demonstrating causal mechanisms linking specific protest actions to societal change, as well as the range of potential intervening factors (Amenta and Caren, 2008). Nonetheless, existing research into social movement outcomes generally falls into the categories of personal consequences for participants, shifts in culture and social norms, and political changes (Bosi et al., 2016). The latter has received the most scholarly attention (Amenta et al., 2010), and tends to focus narrowly on the causes of tangible policy outcomes rather than broader institutional change (Giugni, 1998), and this is the field to which this study contributes most directly. Research has also found that movement outcomes are heavily
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influenced by external conditions such as political incentive structures and public opinion (Agnone, 2007; Olzak and Soule, 2009; Bosi et al., 2016). This reflects a recognition in the literature, which this study is designed to accommodate, that movements must be studied within their broader socio-political context in order to analyse the ways in which they bring about change (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004).
This study also contributes to literature on state-movement relations and the structural mechanisms which incentivise government decision-makers to respond to protest action in particular ways, another area that has traditionally been under-studied in the field (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995). Many scholars conceive the political conditions within which movements operate as static and predetermined by rigid structural conditions (Bosi et al., 2016), and few have taken McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s notion of ‘political performances’ beyond immediate state and police responses to protests (Goldstone, 2004; Amenta et al., 2010). This has begun to change however, and this study contributes to literature which conceptualises the relationships between movements and institutions as dynamic and
contested, emulating research which focuses on the processes which shape state responses to social movements (Bartley and Child, 2014; McGarry et al., 2016). Studies of state responses to movements in non-authoritarian states, in particular Western democracies, tend to focus on the ways in which states police protests (Della Porta and Fillieule, 2008), integrate
movements into state institutions (Saurugger, 2006), or co-opt them for political gain (Bosi et al., 2016). This study’s focus on how social movements and structural factors interact to influence government decision-making is intended to address this gap in the literature and contribute to existing scholarship on state-movement relations, particularly by elucidating the mechanisms by which state actors are pressured into particular actions.
Pinpointing this study’s contribution is complicated by the theoretical eclecticism of social movement studies, which means that there is no paradigmatic theory, and therefore no easily-defined body of literature, analysing how movements influence society (Benski et al., 2013). Research tends to either prioritise the influence of internal movement characteristics or that of external factors on outcomes (Uba, 2005), a division broadly separating those who argue that protest movements themselves can effect socio-political change (Piven, 2006; Arce, 2016), and those who claim that structural factors play a more deterministic role (Amenta et al., 2010; Skocpol, 2013). Nonetheless, many scholars agree that successful movement outcomes are usually the result of “a coincidence of strategy and political context” (Amenta 2005, p.31), and there is substantial literature which combines an analysis of the
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influence of internal and external factors (Meyer, 2004; Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008; Della Porta and Diani, 2020). This study emulates this literature by drawing on theoretical perspectives from both camps, and its scholarly contribution is best understood as developing an understanding of how outcomes are shaped by the interaction between movements and the political structures within which they operate. Thus, by analysing the impact of movements themselves in comparison with the influence of other factors, this study makes a valuable contribution by addressing important “theoretical tensions in political sociology, stated broadly, between structure and agency” (Meyer 2004, p.125).
Through its specific focus on Native American activism, this study also contributes to scholarship on indigenous social movements and protests over land and environmental justice. This is a well-developed literature which primarily focuses on the struggles of indigenous communities in Latin America, Australasia, and North America with state and commercial actors over issues such as resource extraction, deforestation, and land
appropriation (Gedicks, 1994; Stocks, 2005; Coombes et al., 2012). In the U.S. context, scholars have focused on the surge in successful indigenous land claims made during the 1950s and the increased visibility of Native American activism through civil rights
movements of the 1960s/70s, which saw some advances in indigenous self-determination and land rights (Kotlowski, 2003; Champagne, 2016). Nonetheless, research in recent decades has sought to explain the failures of high profile protests to achieve environmental protection, with studies examining unsuccessful protest movements of Alcatraz (Sklansky, 1989), the Arizona Snowbowl (Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010), and the Dakota Access Pipeline (Whyte, 2017). Findings attribute failures to various factors including insufficient resources to launch effective legal claims, the disproportionate influence of commercial actors, a lack of political incentives to protect Native American interests, and their marginalisation from decision-making institutions (Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010; Perreault et al., 2012; McQueen, 2018). Studies on successful Native American movements are, like research analysing successful indigenous and land-based protests generally (Coombes et al., 2012), relatively scarce. This study addresses this gap in the literature by examining how particular movements were able to succeed in protecting indigenous land where so many others failed.
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Theoretical and methodological framework
The theoretical framework employed in this study draws predominantly from scholarship on ‘Political Opportunity Structure’ (POS), a concept used to explain how structural conditions create political opportunities which shape movements and their outcomes (Meyer, 2004). POS is often understood in terms of the access activists have to formal institutional channels and their capacity to influence decision-makers through strategic alliances or other forms of political leverage (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995; Wahlström and Peterson, 2006). Many scholars incorporate an analysis of extra-political factors such as media reporting and profit-driven commercial action in order to develop a more holistic understanding of the mechanisms which determine movement outcomes (Tarrow, 1996; McCann, 2004; Bengtsson, 2010). This study adopts a similar approach and conceptualises social movements as “situated in a dynamic relational field” of structures and actors which collectively shape their outcomes (Goldstone 2004, p.333). This study specifically draws on POS theory which examines how processes for public participation, including lobbying structures and legal defence mechanisms, incentivise particular movement strategies and determine their impact (Hilson, 2002; Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008). It also draws on research examining how cultural attitudes and popular opinion, which are themselves influenced by media and political rhetoric, shape the responses of decision-makers who are incentivised to manage their public image in the pursuit of political goals (Soule and Olzak, 2004; Agnone, 2007; McCammon, 2013). Crucially, this study uses a flexible,
context-sensitive approach that recognises the unique set of POS-factors of each movement which are determined by various social, political, and cultural influences (Oliver, 2017), and is mindful of the criticism that research often conceptualises POS in a rigid, abstract way that fails to capture this (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Amenta and Caren, 2008).
In order to analyse how POS influences successful movement outcomes, theoretical tools for analysing the role of internal movement characteristics such as mobilisation
capacity, framing techniques, and protest strategies are also used. This study uses elements of ‘Resource Mobilisation Theory’ (RMT), which posits that the ways in which resources - material and technological, but also cultural and “socio-organisational” (Edwards and McCarthy 2008, p.117) - are employed by movements are causally related to their outcomes (Kelly-Garrett, 2006; Kolb, 2007; Taylor and Van Dyke, 2008). This study draws particularly from theory explaining how resources are used in “transforming mass and elite publics into
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supporters” (McCarthy and Zald 2017, p.19), and that which analyses how movements mobilise resources through disruptive strategies, such as strikes and online campaigns, to effect change (Edwards and McCarthy, 2008). This study uses Luders’s (2006, p.991) concept of ‘Economic Opportunity Structure’, which asserts that state-actors “weigh the financial impact of disruption and concession costs” when responding to protest activities, to examine the causal link between movement strategies and outcomes. Furthermore, the concept of “mediated disruption” is used to examine how protest action influences the
response of corporate- or state-actors by influencing their public image (King 2011, p.491), in conjunction ‘Frame Theory’, which posits that the cultural and moral references used in movement messaging influences how decision-makers perceive and respond to activists (Oliver and Johnston, 2000; Johnston and Noakes, 2005).
This study employs a case study methodology to produce an in-depth analysis of the causal mechanisms by which internal characteristics and POS-factors of each protest
movement contributed to their success. Case studies are appropriate for this type of research because they facilitate an analysis of multiple variables and mechanisms within holistic “systems of action” (Snow and Trom 2002, p.150), which is required to account for the complex causal pathways which led to success in each case (George et al., 2005). This is achieved through the “triangulation of multiple sources”, such as press articles, government reports, and movement-authored materials, in order to corroborate causal inferences and increase internal validity (Snow and Trom 2002, p.147). The analysis of causal mechanisms within each case is undertaken using a process-tracing methodology to make causal
inferences from the “hypothetical empirical fingerprints” (Beach and Pederson 2013, p.4) left behind when actors create socio-political change (Bennett, 2010). In order to capture the complex pathways of “micro-correlations” (Chandra 2006, p.7) by which this occurs, this study therefore doesn’t just examine causal chains, but also “causal conjunctions” (Blatter and Heverland 2014, p.64), in which mechanisms intersect to exert a combined influence on the outcome in question. Following Beach and Pederson’s (2013) framework, this study employs conceptual and theoretical tools to produce fine-grained descriptions of events and targeted analyses of causal relationships, which are then used to generate “inferential leverage” (Collier 2011, p.823) in order to draw conclusions from these novel findings.
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Analysis
First case: The Orme Dam
In order to analyse how activists influenced the U.S. Government’s decision to
abandon plans for the Orme Dam in November 1981, it is important to understand the context surrounding the project. The dam was proposed in the mid-1950s for domestic, agricultural, and flood defence purposes (Zuniga, 2000), in 1968 construction was approved by Congress, and by 1973 the Bureau of Reclamation (BoR) was investing heavily in planning the project (BoR, 1984). The Yavapai tribe were excluded from official planning processes despite the fact that the dam would flood their land (Coffeen, 1972), continuing the long tradition of their marginalisation from political decision-making (Espeland, 1998). Between 1976 and 1981 the Orme debate became increasingly prominent in public and political spheres (O’Sullivan et al., 1984; Schilling, 2000), and this period was also characterised by the heightened visibility of environmental and minority-rights protests across the country (Sklansky, 1989; Olzak and Soule, 2009). This context, along with institutional changes such as new environmental legislation and requirements for public consultation on federal projects (Castile, 2006), played a pivotal role in influencing the viability of Orme and ultimately contributing to the project’s abandonment.
1 - Delays and public scrutiny create political opportunities
The first major barrier to Orme came in March 1976 when the Yavapai rejected a $33.5 million offer to relocate, thereby publicly demonstrating the “incommensurability” (Espeland, 1998, p.225) of their ancestral land with financial compensation (U.S. Senate, 1977a). The Yavapai leader asserted that their exclusion from formal political channels meant that this was their only means of exercising agency (U.S. Senate, 1976), and the timing was calculated to delay construction until a federal review in spring 1977, which the tribe’s leader hoped would lead to the project’s abandonment (Richards, 1976). The message that the only way to build the dam was to condemn the land and force them to move was reinforced by a referendum on September 25th in which the Yavapai voted 144-57 not to relocate (Arizona-Republic, 1976g). The widespread reporting of this, with over 60 stories published in 15 states (Newspapers.com, 2020), increased awareness of the tribe’s struggle and made it less politically viable to forcibly relocate them, especially as a Presidential election was occurring that autumn (Kuhn, 1976). The BoR announced plans to investigate alternative sites days
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after the vote (BoR, 1982), and the inference that this was influenced by the Yavapai’s
actions is supported by the fact that condemning the land would have delayed construction by 15 years (Arizona-Republic, 1976b), providing a strong incentive for the agency to pursue more immediately-viable alternatives.
Evidence suggests that the tribe’s refusal alone did not bring about this decision, but rather that it instigated other processes which pressured the BoR to pursue alternatives. Crucially, it prevented construction from beginning before the publication of a legally-required Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) into the project (CEQ, 2020), which found that Orme would cause extensive ecological damage (BoR, 1976). Years later BoR
representatives recognised the significant barrier this posed to construction because the flooding of Bald Eagle habitat could have provided the basis for a strong legal case against them for violating the 1973 Endangered Species Act (BoR, 1984). This barrier was
compounded by a Bureau of Mines (BoM) report published simultaneously highlighting structural dangers of construction due to geological instabilities and the related public-health risks (U.S. Senate, 1977a). The BoR were being pressured to continue with plans anyway by some local officials and Congressmen (Casa-Grande-Dispatch, 1976), but evidence suggests that public pressure and media scrutiny incentivised them not to do so. Legal transparency requirements led the BoR to hold a public meeting to discuss findings (Arizona-Republic, 1976e), creating an opportunity which over 500 protesters, most of whom were non-Yavapai environmentalists, fiscal conservatives, and recreationalists from the anti-Orme coalition, took advantage of by attending (BoR, 1984). 45 of the 60 speakers criticised the project, including a BoM representative (Arizona-Republic, 1976f), and the hearing was widely covered in the media, with even pro-Orme newspapers reporting environmental and public-safety concerns (Arizona-Republic, 1976a; Boardman, 1976). A BoR representative later conceded that this unexpected media scrutiny influenced the agency’s management to pursue alternatives (BoR, 1984), demonstrating how targeted protest action successfully drew public attention to the government’s own findings and pressured the BoR to revaluate the project.
The resulting halt to plans by the BoR in September 1976 was hugely significant because it was a key motivator in President Carter’s decision to withdraw funding for Orme in April 1977, which shaped the decision-making environment surrounding the project for years to come (Kaufman, 2006). Carter generally followed the recommendations of the BoR on federal projects (BoR, 1984), suggesting that their pursuit of alternatives to Orme heavily influenced his decision. Furthermore, the environmental public-safety concerns cited by the
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BoR provided substantial justification for the President to abandon Orme (Arizona-Republic, 1976b) which, evidence suggests, he was already predisposed to do upon his inauguration in January 1977. In the 1976 election campaign Carter proclaimed the “historic, legal, and moral right” of Southwestern tribes to land (U.S. Senate 1977b, p.50), and his passage of the
landmark 1978 American Indian Religious Freedom Act suggest that he was motivated to appear supportive of Native American communities (Castile, 2006). There is some evidence that Carter was influenced directly by the actions of protesters in summer 1976, as suggested by opposition to the project expressed by himself and senior Democrats based on the tribe’s survival and environmental concerns shortly after the public hearing and Yavapai vote (Arizona-Republic, 1976b; Arizona-Republic, 1976c). It therefore appears that the potential violation of environmental law and public-safety highlighted by BoR findings, and the consequent media scrutiny and public outcry, made Carter’s withdrawal of funding for Orme much more likely, whether it directly influenced his attitude to the project or simply provided additional justification for his opposition to it.
2 - Anti-Orme voices are brought inside the tent
Another turning point came in 1978 when the federal government bowed to pressure to restore funding for Orme after flooding in nearby Phoenix but co-opted the Yavapai and other anti-Orme groups into structures established to review the project, creating
unprecedented political opportunities for activists (Cole, 1978). In April 1978 the Democratic State Governor established a committee to assess the evidence and decide whether to pursue Orme, and he included Yavapai leaders and environmental activists, as well as local citizens and businesspeople (BoR, 1981). He justified this by claiming that Orme was not viable “without firm community support” (Zarbin 1978a, p.9), and the inclusion of staunch anti-Orme campaigners suggests that the committee was established knowing that it was unlikely to provide this support. Furthermore, the public opposition to Orme of President Carter, who had been pressured by Congress to reopen the project (Cole, 1978; Hickey, 1978) and who worked closely with the Governor to establish the committee (BoR, 1981), suggests that it may have been established with the intention of legitimising anti-Orme arguments and reducing the viability of the project. Predictably, activists used their newfound institutional access to campaign against the project, including by soliciting over 600 anti-Orme letters from concerned citizens (U.S. Senate, 1978), leaking findings to the press that Orme would in fact offer no flood defences for Phoenix (Arizona-Republic, 1978), and voting 19-1 to
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activists into decision-making structures thus played a major role in amplifying their messaging and legitimising their position as officially-recognised political actors.
However, the consequent shift in the Orme debate was not brought about by the committee alone. In April 1978 the federal government commissioned a $1.8 million study into Orme and possible alternatives, funding an analysis of sociological impacts as well as the environmental and public-safety implications of construction (Zarbin, 1978a). Given the controversial findings of previous reports and accusations that the BoR had withheld evidence of geological dangers in the previous EIS (Gallup Independent, 1976; Arizona-Republic, 1976d), this study, like the committee, seems to have been commissioned with the knowledge that it would likely strengthen the case against Orme. Furthermore, the BoR predicted that the study would take four years, and the Arizona Governor maintained that he would not make a decision on Orme before then, indicating a costly delay which would increase pressure on the government to pursue a more immediately-viable alternative (Zarbin, 1978b). The Yavapai collaborated with researchers to provide extensive evidence that their relocation would decimate their community, and anti-Orme campaigners used the opportunity to collect evidence of the potential social and environmental damage of construction (BoR, 1984; O’Sullivan et al., 1984). The commissioning of this report demonstrates another mechanism by which institutional structures implemented by the federal government shaped the POS surrounding the anti-Orme movement and significantly influenced the viability of the project.
3 - A foregone conclusion?
Between 1978 and 1981 there was continued discussion of Orme in public and
political spheres, but little progress was made towards a resolution (Schilling, 2000). Three of Arizona’s four-member congressional delegation remained in support of Orme until October 1981 (Ravashiere, 1981), and pressure to begin construction grew from politicians,
businesspeople, and concerned citizens following more flooding (Meissner, 1981a). Nonetheless, following the predictable committee vote against Orme in October, the Governor announced his support for an alternative (Arizona-Daily-Sun, 1981), suggesting that his promise to abide by their vote made Orme’s abandonment a foregone conclusion (Espeland, 2002). The Reagan Administration was not required to uphold the Governor’s decision, however, and the fact that it did suggests that other factors influenced the newly inaugurated President’s decision (Wynn, 1981). A poll by a pro-Orme newspaper in October
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1981 found that 76% of local respondents were opposed to the Orme Dam (Avery, 1981), suggesting that popular opinion had shifted significantly from earlier that year when multiple sources reported majority public support for the project (Arizona-Daily-Sun, 1981; BoR, 1984). This supports the inference that the committee’s decision alone did not pressure Reagan to abandon Orme, and that other processes influenced the perceived viability of the project from the perspective of both the President and the broader public.
Evidence suggests that Reagan’s decision to endorse an alternative was influenced by the release of findings from the Orme study on September 22nd, which detailed the
ecological and social damage of construction and, crucially, revealed unexpected costs (BoR, 1982). The report revealed that it would cost $70 million to forcibly relocate the Yavapai and that safety provisions would cost an additional $400 million, four times the national budget for such measures (Meissner, 1981b). The inference that this increased cost incentivised the fiscally-conservative Reagan Administration to abandon Orme is supported by evidence that the President began pressuring federal agencies, including the BoR, to cut costs on
infrastructure projects shortly after his inauguration (BoR, 1984; Copeland, 2008). Furthermore, the opposition of the Democrats, who still controlled the House of Representatives, created additional pressure to pursue the alternative endorsed by the Democratic Arizona Governor and would have made it difficult for Reagan to get
Congressional support for Orme (Maxey and Starler, 1987). Whilst the government may have been influenced by the 100-strong anti-Orme march in September 1981 (Meissner, 1981b), as well as the heightened publicity the movement had gained throughout 1981 as it gained support from civil rights groups and religious organisations (BoR, 1981; Casserly, 1981), evidence suggests that political circumstances and fiscal concerns had a greater influence on the President’s decision. The report left the federal government with little incentive to pursue Orme, and the environmental and safety concerns it articulated provided substantial reason for the Reagan Administration to abandon the plan (BoR, 1984; Medvescek, 1981; Meissner, 1981b). Whilst some argue that the march and the associated media scrutiny directly
influenced government decision-making (see O’Sullivan et al., 1984; Espeland, 1998), evidence suggests that the involvement of anti-Orme activists in the committee and the second viability investigation made the abandonment of Orme in autumn 1981
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Second case: The Thirty-Meter Telescope
In order to understand how protesters successfully prevented the construction of the Thirty-Meter Telescope (TMT) in Hawaii, it is important to understand the context
surrounding the project and opposition to it. The TMT was designed as the world’s largest visible-light telescope by a consortium of research partners from countries including China, France, and Canada (TMT, 2017). The site of Mauna Kea mountain was chosen in 2009 and protesters disrupted ground-breaking ceremonies in 2015, initiating a legal challenge that delayed construction until July 2019, after the Supreme Court reissued the permit (Kelleher, 2019a). Protesters were initially mobilised by the threat to cultural practices of Native Hawaiians, for whom Mauna Kea is sacred (Kahanamoku et al., 2020), but the movement became increasingly associated with broader minority-rights and environmental movements, which was arguably central to its popular appeal (Witze, 2015; Ladao and Nakaso, 2019). This legacy of the 2015 protests, combined with the influence on public attitudes of the 2017 Dakota Access Pipeline protests, President Trump’s divisive treatment of indigenous
Americans, and other political developments, was influential in shaping the POS within which the 2019 anti-TMT movement operated.
1 - A blockade delays construction and draws media attention
The anti-TMT movement exerted considerable influence from its first day of action, Monday 15th July, on which 200 activists prevented construction equipment from reaching the site with a physical blockade (Jones and Kelleher, 2019). Police responded with threats of arrests but withdrew later that day after officially closing the access road to all traffic
(Hurley, 2019d). On Tuesday 16th the Hawaii Governor granted emergency powers to give police additional “flexibility and authority” in dealing with protesters, which were used to arrest and forcibly remove 36 Native Elders (Cocke 2019b, p.1; Ige, 2019). The defiance of this core group of indigenous protesters, whose refusal to back down was instrumental to the power of the blockade, was motivated by a sense of ongoing colonial injustice and saw damage to the sacred Mauna Kea as incommensurable with economic or scientific benefits (Kelleher, 2019a; Kahanamoku et al., 2020). The following day, all 13 existing astronomical facilities on Mauna Kea closed citing staff safety concerns, despite the protesters’ insistence that they would allow staff to pass peacefully (Kelleher and Jones, 2019). The blockade continued with numbers surging to around 1,000 by Wednesday 17th (Cocke, 2019b), and musical performances and lectures at the site marking an increasingly celebratory atmosphere
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(Ladao, 2019). No more arrests were made and the police presence actually declined after the arrests on the 16th, with the Governor announcing on Friday 19th that authorities would not forcibly remove protesters and would instead engage in peaceful negotiations (Cocke, 2019c).
This reversal in law enforcement tactics occurred after videos of Elders being forcibly arrested were shared widely through social media and news outlets on the 16th (Associated Press, 2019; Ōiwi TV, 2019; NBC, 2019), suggesting that this publicity may have
incentivised authorities to exercise caution. Evidence indicates that it helped to increase support for the movement, as demonstrated by the anti-TMT petition which gathered over 70,000 signatures in 4 days (Hurley, 2019a; Change.org, 2020a), and the fact that around 800 new protesters arrived on the 17th (Cocke, 2019b). Although it is difficult to determine whether the shift in police response was motivated by the increased scale of protests or by the media response to arrests, it appears that Governor Ige, who was responsible for law
enforcement, responded pragmatically to a politically volatile situation by attempting to defuse tensions. One pro-TMT newspaper warned of the “wisdom in taking the long view” by maintaining good relations with protesters (Honolulu Star-Adviser 2019d, p.A12) and others advocated a peaceful response (Dayton, 2019d), demonstrating the pressure from voices outside of the movement not to use state force. Ige may also have been incentivised by TMT-partners who advocated a cautious approach because they had already invested $450 million and construction was scheduled to take 10 years, so they wanted to avoid further delays stoked by hostility at all costs (Hurley, 2019c). Furthermore, the use of emergency powers and riot police to prevent protest was unprecedented in Hawaii’s history (Kelleher, 2019a), as was the forcible arrest of Elders (Cocke, 2019b), suggesting that this was an uncharacteristically hostile “alarmed response” (Dayton 2019d, p.A12) which the negative publicity and scale of opposition pressured Ige to revaluate.
2 - A shift in government rhetoric indicates more fundamental change
As protests continued the following week, multiple factors incentivised decision-makers not to clear the blockade, and Governor Ige was motivated to withdraw from the TMT debate altogether. Ige delegated responsibility for negotiating with protesters to local Mayor Kim on the 23rd (McAvoy, 2019b), days after high-profile Democrats Bernie Sanders and Tulsi Gabbard declared their support for the movement, with Gabbard demanding the removal of the remaining police officers from the site (Cocke, 2019c; Dayton, 2019i). This
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demonstrates an attempt from Ige to publicly distance himself from the protests, which was not present days before when he demanded that activists back down upon visiting the blockade (HNN, 2019). The inference that this was motivated by a desire to manage his public image and not contradict popular Democrats is supported by the fact that his withdrawal coincided with increased personal criticism, including an online petition demanding his impeachment (Change,org 2020b), and media reports attacking his use of force (see Daranciang, 2019; Hurley, 2019e). Pressure also came from state lawmakers, who launched a claim against his use of emergency powers (Ladao and Nakaso, 2019), and Hawaii’s Lieutenant Governor, who declared that the TMT should find an alternative site if a peaceful solution couldn’t be found (Hurley, 2019e), both of which occurred the day before Kim’s appointment as unofficial envoy to protesters. Ige’s delegation of responsibility to Kim, with whom he did not have a close working relationship (Cocke, 2019a), demonstrates the extent to which he sought to dissociate himself from protesters, also indicating an attempt to maintain conflicting political commitments, both to fellow Democrats and to
TMT-backers.
Official rhetoric shifted substantially once Governor Ige withdrew from the debate, marking an important turning point that coincided with the reduced policing of protests. Mayor Kim made increasingly conciliatory statements regarding the blockade, referencing the “splintered community” (McAvoy 2019b, p.C5) and the need to find “common ground” (Dayton 2019i, p.A9), before openly condemning the use of force within a week within his new role (Hurley, 2019c). There is evidence that Kim was already sympathetic towards protesters, particularly as public opinion amongst his constituents appeared to shift in favour of the movement (Dayton, 2019h; Mason-Dixon, 2019), suggesting that Ige appointed Kim knowing that this would appease protesters. The shift also coincided with multiple displays of support for protests across the state, including the shut-down of local businesses in solidarity with protesters (Ladao and Nakaso, 2019), and the march of around 1,000 anti-TMT
campaigners on the State Capitol on 21st July (Gomes, 2019). Not only might this have encouraged politicians to adopt a tone that would not alienate voters, by demonstrating the potential for further disruption it may have incentivised political decision-makers, who were motivated to avoid conflict after the 4-year delay caused by hostilities in 2015 (Honolulu Star-Adviser 2019c), to adopt a more ameliorative approach. It is difficult to demonstrate a causal relationship, but the timing of these events, especially in relation to displays of support from celebrities such as Dwayne Johnson who visited the site on the 24th (McAvoy 2019b),
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certainly suggests that Ige and Kim were incentivised by these events to position themselves as sympathetic, or at least not openly hostile, to the movement.
Whilst this shift in rhetoric is indicative of broader attitudinal change amongst
government figures, the actions of key decision-makers appear to have been directly affected by the decision on July 30th that Ige’s use of emergency powers was unlawful (Honolulu Star-Adviser, 2019a). This led him to announce that there were no immediate plans to start construction, which he knew would be impossible without additional police support (Ibid). That day the TMT-director publicly referenced the danger of ongoing protests and a lack of community support to the viability of the project (Hurley, 2019c), and on August 5th it was revealed that he had requested permission from the Spanish government to construct the TMT there (Wilson and Jones, 2019). It therefore appears that this legal decision precipitated a change of heart amongst TMT-backers who now saw the viability of the project as
significantly reduced. This was shortly followed by the official announcement on August 9th that an agreement had been reached to reopen existing facilities on Monday 12th (McAvoy, 2019a). This was facilitated by assurances by Ige that construction would not begin without warning (Hurley, 2019b), and evidence suggests that Ige bowed to pressure from staff at existing facilities, which had suffered huge costs by closing for 4 weeks and losing over 2000 hours of observing-time (McAvoy, 2019a). It appears that the rejection of emergency powers was the catalyst for a rapid change in attitudes towards the viability of building the TMT at Mauna Kea, which ultimately led to the TMT-backers pursuing an alternative site and the Governor forming a truce, which soon became a deadlock, with protesters.
3 - An increasingly costly deadlock
The informal truce did not lead to a reduction in the scale of protests as Ige may have hoped, and numbers surged to around 3,000 the following week (Dayton, 2019b). However, there was still considerable pressure, particularly from the scientific community, to complete the project (Hurley, 2019c; King, 2019), which incentivised authorities to seek alternative ways to remove protesters. This helps to explain why police began patrolling the area around the blockade, now that additional officers were banned from the site itself (Burnett, 2019a), launching a campaign that saw 7241 citations in 4 months, mostly issued to non-protesters for traffic offences (Kailua-Kona, 2019). This was justified by claims of drug-abuse and anti-social behaviour (Cataluna, 2019), but very few citations were made for these offences from August to December, suggesting that this was untrue and the actual motive was to threaten
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protesters and reduce their numbers (Burnett, 2019b; Dayton, 2019e). That law enforcement felt the need to use this excuse, which they maintained until late November (Dayton, 2019f), suggests that the blockade itself was no longer seen as a publicly-acceptable justification for increased police intervention (Kailua-Kona, 2019). This is evidenced by a well-publicised poll revealing a drop in support for the TMT from 70% before the protests to 50% in
September (Dayton, 2019h), with just 29% now in support of clearing the blockade (Mason-Dixon, 2019). Combined with the peaceful actions of protesters which left authorities with no legal basis for removing them (Shapiro, 2019), and the endorsement of public figures which made forceful tactics politically contentious (Dayton, 2019b), this appears to have pressured police into this low-profile but ineffective strategy. One commentator also speculated that elected officials such as Ige likely wanted to stop the TMT from dominating public debate in 2020, an election year (Borreca, 2019), which helps to explain why the impasse “degenerated into a paralysis” amongst decision-makers reluctant to take unpopular action (Honolulu Star-Adviser 2019b, p.A12).
The most important consequence of this deadlock was, however, its spiralling cost, which played a pivotal role in creating discord between local and state authorities and ultimately tipped the balance in favour of protesters. The blockade had already cost around $3 million to police by August 22nd (Honolulu Star-Adviser, 2019c), and this rose to $11 million by December, largely because of the amount of overtime officers were paid for (Dayton, 2019f). As the deadlock continued key decision-makers expressed their
reservations, including the TMT-director and a state Senator who voiced concerns about the viability of the project if such expensive measures were necessary to pacify protesters (Dayton, 2019a). In an attempt to break the deadlock Mayor Kim offered protesters a concession in the form of a greater role in managing Mauna Kea park and a cultural centre, which they rejected (Brestovansky, 2019; Shapiro, 2019), and by December there was little evidence that protesters were willing to back down, especially because of the popular reaction they had received so far (Dayton, 2019g). The deadlock was finally broken because the county council voted unanimously not to pay for increased law enforcement, citing anger that they had only been refunded 80% of the $5.18 million promised by Ige and a lack of local support for police tactics, which one retired Lieutenant claimed were unconstitutional
(Dayton, 2019c; 2019f). Immediately following this the Governor, who was clearly unwilling to pay for the entire cost out of the state budget, announced that construction would not begin for the foreseeable future and protesters had 7 days to leave the site (Kelleher, 2019b). Kim’s
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comment that it was “fine with me” if protesters saw this as a victory (Dayton, 2019j) and the fact that no further action has been taken as of June 2020, suggests that this truce may be a lasting one.
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Discussion and conclusions
Now that the processes by which each protest movement successfully protected Native American land from external threats have been analysed, further discussion of results is required to draw conclusions and frame the academic contributions of this study. The Yavapai successfully influenced the decision to abandon Orme by using a limited POS to create barriers to construction and shape public attitudes towards the project, which then enabled them to gain access to institutional channels and exert a more targeted influence on government decision-making. The tribe used the instrumental power they wielded through their occupation of land which would have been flooded to delay construction, and this was central to repositioning them as influential actors who needed to be cooperated with in order to complete the project. Their unity in refusing to relocate, which was motivated by distrust of federal government and their continued political marginalisation, was pivotal because barriers such as environmental and public-safety concerns may have been more easily overcome if construction had begun without delay. The tribe used this momentum to build support from other anti-Orme activists, develop decisive messaging against the project, and draw negative publicity to findings at the federal hearing, all of which helped them to pressure the BoR to withdraw their support for Orme. Once President Carter had withdrawn funding for the project in 1977 the decision-making environment surrounding the project shifted substantially in favour of protesters, and the Yavapai found themselves uniquely positioned to exert influence through a radically altered POS.
The mechanisms through which the Yavapai exerted political influence from then on were largely internal to government decision-making, such as federal investigations and the review committee, but they continued to campaign publicly and influence public discussion by leaking findings to the press. Once they had been co-opted into these structures their influence over the perceived viability of Orme substantially increased, and the intersection of their objectives with those of environmentalists and other campaigners was central to their success in increasing awareness of the multiple barriers to the project. Whilst the
effectiveness of the movement in generating media attention and public support was
important in enabling them to access these structures in the first place, other factors such as the willingness of President Carter to work with protesters and their recognition that the project could not begin without the Yavapai’s agreement appear to have played a greater role. The Yavapai used their newfound institutional access to make Orme much less politically
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viable, the abandonment of the project appears to have been caused as much by unforeseen costs, safety concerns, Reagan’s fiscal conservatism, and the presence of less
environmentally-damaging alternatives as the actions of protesters. Furthermore, the severity of the environmental and public-health risks revealed by federal reports, which the BoR was legally required to publish, may have been sufficient to render Orme unviable even without the media furore and public scrutiny generated by activists. This suggests that the actions of the Yavapai and other anti-Orme activists were successful because of the coincidence of a range of events and political incentive structures beyond their control, which may have led to the abandonment of Orme even without some of their strategic interventions.
Protesters successfully prevented the construction of the TMT by using different strategies within a different context and POS, but there are similarities between the
mechanisms by which each movement achieved success. Anti-TMT activists created a literal barrier to construction with their blockade which, as with the Yavapai’s refusal to relocate, forced authorities to engage with protesters and positioned them as key actors with a direct influence over the viability of the project. Peaceful tactics were central to the movement’s influence because they meant that when Governor Ige reacted to the blockade with state force, protesters were able to use videos of arrests to frame themselves as pacifists and victims. Along with the effective use of online petitions and targeted recruitment campaigns, this messaging helped to increase the scale of the blockade and gather support from beyond the local community. Whereas anti-Orme activists were co-opted into official decision-making structures, government actors had little incentive to collaborate directly with those protesting against the TMT, meaning that they had to use more traditional protest strategies to influence change. Nonetheless, protesters applied pressure to key political actors, for example by criticising Governor Ige’s use of force and by framing the project as another form of colonial violence against Native Hawaiians. The effective use of these strategies enabled the movement to gather support from diverse groups locally and nationally, including senior Democrats and celebrities, which brought scrutiny to the state response and pressured government figures including Ige to exercise caution, not least for fear of negative publicity and political repercussions.
Combined with the legal case which ruled emergency powers unlawful, this meant that the authorities felt that the only option to remove the blockade was to extensively patrol the nearby area in order to reduce the numbers of protesters at the site. The fact that
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managers who had lost money from being closed and TMT-backers who were heavily invested in the project demonstrates the strength of the public and media response in
pressuring figures like Ige not to act against protesters. The resulting deadlock was ultimately broken by the capacity of protesters to incur costs of over $11 million through increased police presence, which local authorities and state government were unwilling to pay. Unlike the anti-Orme case, these protests appear to have more directly influenced the viability of the project, specifically through creating strong political incentives not to act against them and by exploiting the Economic Opportunity Structure which enabled them to create a hugely costly deadlock. Whilst structural factors out of the control of activists, such as the political
motivations of Governor Ige and public sympathies for indigenous marginalisation in Hawaii, played a pivotal role, evidence suggests that they contributed to the success of the movement to a lesser degree than that of anti-Orme protests.
Not only do the conclusions drawn from this analysis enhance our understanding of social movement outcomes by revealing how protesters exploited unique POSs to influence government decisions, findings can also be used to refine theoretical tools for analysing how movements achieve successful outcomes in future research. A key implication of these findings for the refinement of POS-theory is that POS should not be conceptualised as static but should instead be understood as a dynamic combination of factors that change over time. The importance of this can be seen in the Orme case, because the way in which the POS changed between 1976 and 1981 as activists were co-opted into decision-making institutions was central to how they collaborated with different actors to exert political influence.
Similarly, the POS within which the anti-TMT movement operated shifted significantly when Mayor Kim became unofficial envoy to protesters, and this was symptomatic of changing public and governmental attitudes towards the project. These findings also suggest that POS-theory should include extra-political phenomena such as media reporting, economic
incentives, public opinion, and legal decisions, all of which are central to understanding how the anti-Orme and anti-TMT movements achieved success but may be left out of some POS analysis. This is not to argue that POS-theory should simply be broadened to include this wide range of actors, events, and factors, but rather that a responsive approach should be adopted in which elements of POS are included on a case by case basis. The emphasis should be on only introducing elements which provide insights into the specific processes through which change is created in particular contexts, and these cases suggests that this will include factors beyond the limited scope of traditional POS-theory.
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A second implication is that POS-theory should be used in conjunction with elements of resource-mobilisation theory, or another set of conceptual tools for understanding how movements galvanise support and engage with other actors through different protest
activities. The findings from these two cases demonstrate that it is difficult to understand how social movements influence government decision-making without integrating an analysis of how they employ socio-organisational, technological, and material resources in their attempt to do so. Employing POS-theory in conjunction with an analysis of resource mobilisation strategies, as this study does, also enables research to better understand why government decision-makers and other key actors respond to protest action in particular ways, which is essential in understanding how movements exert political influence. For example, analysing how anti-TMT protesters used cultural and technological resources to frame themselves as victims of police brutality and colonial violence in order to mobilise support from key public figures facilitates an understanding of why authorities responded with caution, something that POS-theory alone may be unable to do. Similarly, the insights this study provides into the mechanisms by which the anti-Orme movement succeeded are facilitated by the analysis of how different resources, such as land, alliances with other activists, legal procedures, and knowledge about the impacts of construction, were deployed strategically within a shifting POS.
A final implication for the development of more refined POS-theory is that the role of factors outside of the control of protesters should not be underestimated, and the influence of different resource mobilisation strategies and protest activities should not be overstated by ignoring the influence of such factors. In each of these cases the presence of an alternative project site with significant benefits, such as being cheaper, less environmentally-damaging, or less politically contentious, was central to finding a solution to the debates provoked by protesters. Similarly, systems of political incentives meant that President Carter and the Arizona Governor were predisposed to support indigenous and environmental protesters against the Orme Dam, and the priorities of Hawaiian voters, which were shaped by complex histories of colonisation and state-minority relations, meant that the Democratic Governor was more easily-influenced by displays of public opposition to the policing of protests. In order to use POS-theory effectively researchers must therefore analyse the ways in which social movements exploit these structural conditions and the actions of others to influence change in a way that does not come at the expense of recognising the contingency of success on the presence of these factors. The fact that success in each case depended on a unique and
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delicate balance of structural conditions and strategic actions helps to explain why indigenous land movements so rarely succeed, and may provide a valuable lesson for future research in understanding the limited circumstances within which protesters are able to effect change.
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