Resistance and conquest (1876–1883)

With the tensions in the southern part of Silindung having subsided by the end of the 1860s, the missionaries began to think of expansion northwards. In 1873 the missionaries Heine, Mohri, and Johanssen travelled on horseback over the Humbang plateau and looked down on Lake Toba and the numerous villages and extended terraced rice fields on its southern basin. They immediately grasped the rich promise the area offered for missionization (Warneck 1912b:121-2). Three years later the Mission opened its first mission station on Humbang plain in Bahal Batu. In the same year Nommensen and Johannsen visited ‘Great Toba’ for the first time, in the company of several rajas from Silindung and under the protection of other rajas in Toba. They came as far as the market of Balige and attracted huge crowds everywhere they went. On the way back, they met with a hostile crowd and had to take refuge in the village of Butar which was then besieged, allegedly by forces of Singamangaraja XII. Raja Pontas had to intervene to negotiate their safe return to Silindung.

The young Patuan Bosar Ompu Pulo Batu, who had succeeded his father as Singamangaraja XII in 1875, had good reason to be worried about the advance of the Batak Mission. His father’s orders about bius rituals were still being followed ten years earlier in Silindung, but this was no longer the case. He must also have been informed that the Batak way of life had changed beyond recognition in the valley. Villages were no longer fortified; churches had been erected, their bells ringing out with the confidence of the new faith. The former five-day cycle of markets had been changed, because the missionaries forbade the population to hold market on a Sunday.⁵⁷ Then—and this he perhaps found even more disturbing—even prominent members belonging to his own Sumba group, such as Raja Pontas, had converted to the new faith. Whether the Singamangaraja indeed took the decision to attack the Mission has been the subject of debate (see below). But this much is clear: at the end of 1877 rumours started to spread through the large markets (onan) in the region that Singamangaraja XII was gathering forces to attack the missionary stations and that he had hired Acehnese mercenaries who were stationed in his residence in Bakkara.⁵⁸ The rumours caused unrest as far south as Silindung, as well as among the missionaries. Informed about these, the Governor of West Sumatra E. Netscher and the Resident of Tapanuli, J.B. Boyle decided on an intervention, deliberately deviating from the official policy of abstention. In early February 1878 a small Dutch force (seventy-five soldiers

56 Viswanathan (1998: 75-117) describes in detail very interesting lawsuits of this kind involving Indian Christians, who were treated by the British colonial courts as legal Hindus. The application of Hindu law put female claimants at a distinct disadvantage (as appears to have been the case in the suit above) by applying customary law. The Christians were denied the legal status of Christians and access to the law applied to Christians, because the British administration wanted to keep the law applicable to the native and European populations separate.

57 This description is derived from A. Schreiber (1876), who returned to Sumatra as Missionsinspektor in 1876. He concluded that the old faith was in decay, even in regions where the population had not yet converted to Islam or Christianity. As an example, he mentioned that more than once no replacement was found for an old sibaso (medium for an ancestor) who had died.

58 Koloniaal Verslag 1878:10-3 (source for most of the following).

equipped with a mortar) under the command of Captain J.E. Scheltens arrived in Silindung from Sibolga.

This was considered a provocation by Singamangaraja XII, who shortly afterwards sent an official declaration of war to Controller G.W.W.C. van Hoëvell, who had accompanied the troops.

Scheltens then marched on to Bahal Batu, the most northerly mission post. In the following days, Batak forces consisting of a thousand to two thousand men besieged the missionary station and kept the Dutch locked in for two weeks. Confronted with such a numerically superior enemy, Scheltens asked for reinforcements, which hastily arrived from Sibolga and Padang. Boyle, the Resident of Tapanuli, came along as well. This time the government in Batavia had given its approval to march against the Singamangaraja’s forces. Nommensen and three other missionaries were also present in Bahal Batu, as well as Raja Pontas Lumbantobing and other rajas from Silindung, who had come along to act as mediators between the Dutch and the rajas of the hostile regions. By mid-March, the Dutch forces were ready for a major military expedition.

In the following two months, the Batak allies of the Singamangaraja and their men were confronted with war on a scale that was beyond anything they had ever witnessed before. Despite the fact that their forces were numerically far superior—the Dutch troops amounted to a little over two hundred soldiers—they found that, armed with rifles of an inferior quality, spears, and daggers, they stood no chance against the guns, grenades, and mortars of the Dutch troops. The Dutch subjugated Butar, where several villages were burnt down, subsequently marching against Lobu Siregar, which was chastized in the same way. These punitive expeditions each took a day or two.

Once reinforcements from Padang arrived, Resident Boyle and the commanders of the troops marched against Bakkara, the village of the Singamangaraja’s residence, with the objective of capturing the priest-king. They took the village, which was burned down, but the priest-king had fled. The Dutch then followed the trail of the Singamangaraja to Paranginan and Gurgur, but they failed to get hold of the priest-king, who managed to escape over Lake Toba, where he found refuge with his bridegiver, Raja Babiat Situmorang. He was not pursued further. Instead, the troops were directed to one of his staunchest supporters, Raja Partahan Bosi of the marga Hutapea in Laguboti. To force his surrender, a number of villages in the densely populated area were burned down, and eventually he was killed (Sidjabat 1982:174,177,184). On their return to Bahal Batu, the troops passed by the marketplace Si Geanggeang, which belonged to one of the Singamangaraja’s fathers-in-law, who had already taken the dramatic step of burning down his own village.

The rajas on the Humbang plateau and the southern shore of Lake Toba who had sided with the Singamangaraja must have been terrified and outraged by the punitive measures of the Dutch. The first rajas confronted with Dutch demands were those of Butar. Some of them surrendered, but others thought it better to flee, which immediately brought about the burning down of their villages. The rajas who surrendered, however, found to their utter dismay that the Dutch kept them hostage until they had pledged their allegiance to the Dutch crown. This treatment deterred the rajas of Lobu Siregar, who faced the Dutch next, of further resistance:

they lost no time in offering their surrender and payment of war fines, the customary Batak way of acknowledging defeat. But they refused to meet Resident Boyle in person, fearing that they, too, would be taken hostage. To their despair, the reprisal for this was that their villages

Wikipedia

45. Drawing of Patuan Bosar Ompu Pulo Batu, Singamangaraja XII (ca. 1858–1907)

47. Two portraits of Guru Somalaing Pardede (1890)

a. RMV, no. A 56-18. Photograph by E. Modigliani b. RMV, no. A 56-16 Wikimedia commons

46. The Singamangaraja’s seal (in Batak script).(ca. 1858–

1906)

Early beginnings, Sipirok, and Pahae

47. Once one of Patuan Bosar’s staunchest supporters, Guru Somalaing Pardede defected after 1883 and was E. Modigliani’s guide for part of his journey in the independent Batak lands in 1890.

Wikimedia commons. Photograph by K.

Feilberg

48. War canoe on shore (1870)

TM, no. 60043981

49. Manned canoes on Lake Toba (1920)

TM, no. 10018655

50. Portrait of L.Ch. Welsink.

Controller of Toba; Resident of North Tapanuli.

TM, no. 10002025

51. Bivouac of a patrol in the Batak lands (before 1894). Welsink is seated. One of the Europeans standing is the Controller of Toba, P.A.L.E. van Dijk.

Toba Batak aborted attack on Balige from Lake. Toba using war canoes (solu)

The adversary: the Dutch

were burnt down anyway. Subsequently sixty-five rajas from Lintong ni Huta, who must have been intimidated by the fate of their neighbours, bowed immediately to the demand to pledge allegiance to the Dutch government. At the same meeting, several rajas from Butar came to pay the war fine imposed on them—the extraordinary sum of 3,865 guilders—for which their followers had to sell all their firearms, making them effectively incapable of launching any resistance in the near future. The rajas from Lobu Siregar followed suit.

The rajas of Bakkara, the Singamangaraja’s area, found that, besides the usual demands, they had to agree to additional conditions meanwhile set by Batavia, which included the abolition of slavery and abstention from cannibalism. The rajas of 156 villages in the Balige area also opted for subjection, paying their war fines to the Dutch in Butar, where the troops had gathered on their way back to the south. The village rajas of the marga Hutapea in the Laguboti area, who had seen their clan chief Raja Partahan Bosi killed, were the only ones who chose to disregard the Dutch demands: they left their villages, taking their belongings with them and fled with their families, probably to the mountainous region lying to the east.

After the campaign, the colonial government decided on permanent involvement in the region. A small military force was left behind in Sipoholon, where a fortification was planned for the protection of Silindung. In 1879 Silindung and surroundings were added as a new sub-district (onderafdeeling) to the residency of Tapanuli. G.W.W.C van Hoëvell, who had been the Controller at Sibolga, was transferred to the new administrative centre Tarutung. For the time being, no attempt was made to bring the Humbang plateau and Toba under colonial rule; but in this and the next year, many of the rajas from those areas came down to Tarutung to pledge their allegiance.⁵⁹ In 1881 the military force in Sipoholon crushed the resistance of four rajas in the region east of Silindung, Sipahutar and Pangaribuan, who had not reacted to Van Hoëvell’s summons.⁶⁰ The rajas were not captured but died shortly after this for unknown reasons. Their sons, sensing a new era had arrived, offered their allegiance, following the example of the son of the deceased Raja Partahan Bosi of Laguboti.

The uprooting of their priest-king by the Dutch must have made a deep impression on the adherents of the old faith throughout the region. This expressed itself in conversion on an unprecedented scale, although mainly in the southern parts, Silindung and Pangaloan. Between 1879 and 1882, the number of Christians rose from 3,402 to 7,586 (Aritonang 1994:152). Thus within three years, the number of Christians had increased more than during the entire previous period of missionization (1861–1879).⁶¹ These conversions reflected a change of mind among the rajas in the south who had still had kept to the old faith. For example, the branches from Ompu Somuntul and Aman Dari of the Lumbantobing clan embraced Christianity in 1881 (Hutauruk 1980:107-108). It should be mentioned, however, that the Christian community, amounting to approximately 3,500 persons in that year, still made up a small minority of Silindung’s population, estimated at 25,000 people at the time. Moreover, the Christians were still concentrated in the southern part of the valley: Pearaja alone, Nommensen’s station, counted 2,634 souls in 1882.

This made the village the main Christian centre in the region, a position it has kept until today.

59 In May 1879, three rajas from Bakkara came to Tarutung and swore allegiance to the Dutch king. An older brother of the Singamangaraja, Ompu Malapeeg, however, did not show up (Koloniaal Verslag 1880:8).

60 One of them, Guru Sumillam, was the government’s main target because he had stolen no less than 400 water buffaloes in the neighbouring region of Pangaribuan, part of the sub-district Silindung. The villages of the rajas were burned down (Koloniaal Verslag 1881:9-10).

61 Schreiber 1876: 396, 399; Koloniaal Verslag (1881:12) mentions 1,600 new converts and (1882:10) another 1,091.

In Toba the rajas faced a difficult choice. Many were still very attached to the Singamangaraja, some of them by marital alliance.⁶² Knowing that the priest-king was still alive and had a burning desire to defeat the Dutch, they kept their distance to the Dutch and the Batak Mission. But other rajas, notably from Balige, reasoned that it might be wiser to bet on the Dutch return. In 1879 and again in 1880, a delegation of rajas came to Silindung to ask Nommensen for a missionary.⁶³ The government, however, wanted to ensure the safety of a missionary and his family posted there and therefore set the terms for his permit very high: the rajas had to accept a military garrison and a Controller. In 1883 they accepted these conditions, and the new sub-district Toba was formed with a Controller stationed in Balige and a garrison in nearby Laguboti, a strategic location in view of the former resistance in that area. New missionary stations were opened in Lintong ni Huta, Meat, Huta Ginjang, Tangga Batu, and Huta Julu.⁶⁴

Thus the Batak Mission reaped the fruits of the military expedition. Besides the growing number of converts and the opening up of Toba, there were also other pay-offs. The presence of controllers in Tarutung and Balige eased communications with the authorities, and the safety of the missionary stations was guaranteed by the Dutch military forces in Sipoholon and Laguboti.

The Mission also received the generous gift of a thousand guilders from the government for its loyal assistance during the campaign; and the expenses for rebuilding the missionary station in Butar and the construction of a school there were covered by the government. More important of course was the official permission to open missionary stations in Toba (Koloniaal Verslag 1878:114; 1881:103; 1882:108).

The pace of administrative and missionary expansion in Toba after 1878 reflected the government’s confidence that the Singamangaraja would not be able to resume hostilities on a significant scale. This proved premature. After his retreat in 1878, he continued to rally support in the Batak regions outside the government’s jurisdiction.⁶⁵ In May 1883, only a month after the first Controller for Toba, L.C. Welsink, had arrived in Balige, he was ready for a large scale attack (Koloniaal Verslag 1884:11-15). On 18 and 19 July the Singamangaraja attacked the recently built mission stations of Lintong ni Huta, Meat, Paranginan and Muara, which were all destroyed.

He then moved on to Lobu Siregar and Bahal Batu, but was stopped by a military force from Sipoholon. His initial successes greatly increased his prestige, however, and several regions that had supported him in 1878 went over to his side. In Laguboti, the stronghold of his old ally, the late Raja Partahan Bosi, his men murdered Welsink’s secretary and seven others in the marketplace, and a police officer was wounded. They also murdered Ompu Batutahan of Balige, who had supported the Batak Mission in Toba (Warneck 1912b:36)

On 29 June the Singamangaraja showed up near Balige and Laguboti with about four hundred men, but this time his luck ran out. On the following morning he was taken by surprise by Welsink and a European sergeant, turning up with only twenty men: in the ensuing

shoot-62 For the Singamangaraja’s marital alliances see Chapter 3, pp. 54-55.

63 The Sumba conglomerate of clans, part of which populated the Balige area, had their own spiritual leader, the Sorimangaraja (Situmorang 1993:105). This perhaps explains the Balige rajas’ withdrawal of support for the Singamangaraja’s struggle against the Dutch after 1879 and their overtures to the Batak Mission and willingness to accept Dutch annexation.

64 Koloniaal Verslag 1883:8, 108. The sub-district (onderafdeeling) Toba encompassed: Lintong ni Huta (marga Sihombing), Si Lando, Huta Ginjang, Tangga Batu, Meat, Gurgur, Lintong ni Huta, Tarabunga, Balige, Lumban Pea Toruan, Lumban Pea Dolok; Huta Pea Si Raja Deang, Laguboti, Tandohan, Si Poki Pintu Bosi, Paik Sabungan, Lobu Siregar. The population of the new sub-district was estimated at 14,000–15,000 people, living in 388 villages.

65 These regions included Nai Pospos between the rivers Simpang Kanan dan Kiri (west of Toba), Pakpak (north of Toba), and Uluan and Si Gaol (east of Toba). The Singamangaraja even went as far as Deli and Asahan (Koloniaal Verslag 1884:100). See also Castles (1972:74).

out, eight of the Singamangaraja’s men were killed and several more wounded. More serious was that he was shot in the arm himself, because it proved he was not invulnerable, as Batak belief had it. He escaped on horseback. His backup, consisting of a large fleet of forty prows with about twelve hundred men on board, tried to land on shore the same day, but they were scared off by gunfire (Dietz 1885:429; Warneck 1912b:129-130).

Welsink had meanwhile asked for reinforcements, which arrived from Padang with over 500 men (including 350 forced labourers). The resident of Tapanuli, C.F.E. Praetorius, also came along. The Dutch troops punished the Batak rajas in the still-independent areas of Laguboti and Sigumpar, where the Singamangaraja’s forces had gathered again. The rajas of Lintong ni Huta, Naga Saribu, Paranginan, and Muara—who had sworn allegiance to the colonial government in 1878 but had immediately switched over to the Singamangaraja when he entered their regions—

were taught a hard lesson: they had to pay high fines. In Bakkara thirteen villages were burnt down. After that, the still-independent areas east of Laguboti were subjugated to ensure that no hotbed of revolt could develop there. Most rajas paid the demanded fines, partly in gold or livestock because they had not enough cash (Dietz 1885:630-640). By early September the Dutch troops returned, leaving a force of seventy-five soldiers in Laguboti, where the construction of a military fortification had already started. The choice of Laguboti for a military station was strategic: the population there, the majority belonging to the ruling marga Hutapea, had fiercely resisted the Dutch.

Later that month, the Governor of West Sumatra, H.D. Canne, summoned all the rajas of the Toba districts to Balige to discuss the purpose and results of the punitive expedition. Canne challenged them, saying that they could withdraw the oath of allegiance they had pledged in 1878. Prudently, they declined the offer. The rajas convened in Tarutung were asked to capture three alleged allies of the Singamangaraja who had been very successful in creating havoc in July and August 1883: they had burned down the church and fortification in Sipoholon, and a convention hall and the prison in Tarutung (Koloniaal Verslag 1884:14; Warneck 1912b:135). To strengthen the government’s hold on the region, Canne also ordered the construction of a six- to ten-meter-wide road connecting Laguboti with Tarutung, and minor roads to various other places, facilitating faster movement of military forces. With Canne’s visit, the third episode in the encroachment on the Batak world was brought to a close.