Dit onderzoek richt zich op de aanwezigheid van vrouwelijke directors en het effect daarvan op de prestaties van grote Europese banken. Er is zowel onderzoek gedaan naar de aanwezigheid op zichzelf – wel aanwezig versus niet aanwezig – als de ratio van vrouwelijke directors ten opzichte van de totale board grootte. Ook is de Critical Mass Theory onderzocht die dicteert dat het effect van de aanwezigheid van vrouwelijke directors het sterkste zal zijn vanaf 30% of meer vrouwelijke directors. Concluderend kan worden vastgesteld dat de aanwezigheid op zichzelf een positief effect heeft op de prestaties van de banken. Verder is de relatie van de ratio van aantal vrouwelijke directors met de prestaties van de banken niet eenduidig daar het eerste model wel een positieve relatie laat zien maar het tweede model niet. Er wordt echter wel een positieve relatie aangenomen, wegens twijfel over de prestatie indicator van het tweede model. De Critical Mass Theory kan echter niet bevestigd worden voor de grote Europese banken. Voor aanbevelingen tot verder onderzoek verwijs ik naar de voorgaande discussie sectie.
37
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APPENDIX A: Univariate analyses
Tabel 5a: Frequentie resultaten Aantal vr. leden 0 (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid 0 238 74,4 81,2 81,2 1 55 17,2 18,8 100,0 Total 293 91,6 100,0 Missing System 27 8,4 Total 320 100,0
Tabel 5b: Frequentie resultaten Aantal vr. leden >0 tot 10% (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid 0 219 68,4 74,7 74,7 1 74 23,1 25,3 100,0 Total 293 91,6 100,0 Missing System 27 8,4 Total 320 100,0
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Tabel 5c: Frequentie resultaten Aantal vr. leden 10 tot 20% (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid 0 198 61,9 67,6 67,6 1 95 29,7 32,4 100,0 Total 293 91,6 100,0 Missing System 27 8,4 Total 320 100,0
Tabel 5d: Frequentie resultaten Aantal vr. leden 20% tot 30% (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid 0 240 75,0 81,9 81,9 1 53 16,6 18,1 100,0 Total 293 91,6 100,0 Missing System 27 8,4 Total 320 100,0
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Tabel 5e: Frequentie resultaten Aantal vr. leden 30% of meer (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 0 276 86,3 94,5 94,5 1 16 5,0 5,5 100,0 Total 292 91,3 100,0 Missing System 28 8,8 Total 320 100,0
Tabel 6: Frequentie resultaten Aanwezigheid Vr. Directors (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid 0 56 17,5 19,1 19,1 1 237 74,1 80,9 100,0 Total 293 91,6 100,0 Missing System 27 8,4 Total 320 100,0
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Tabel 7: Frequentie resultaten Controle variabele Total Board of Directors leden
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent Valid 8 11 3,4 3,8 3,8 9 9 2,8 3,1 6,8 10 14 4,4 4,8 11,6 11 12 3,8 4,1 15,7 12 31 9,7 10,6 26,3 13 24 7,5 8,2 34,5 14 26 8,1 8,9 43,3 15 28 8,8 9,6 52,9 16 19 5,9 6,5 59,4 17 15 4,7 5,1 64,5 18 10 3,1 3,4 67,9 19 19 5,9 6,5 74,4 20 13 4,1 4,4 78,8 21 9 2,8 3,1 81,9 22 7 2,2 2,4 84,3 23 9 2,8 3,1 87,4 24 2 ,6 ,7 88,1 25 5 1,6 1,7 89,8 26 4 1,3 1,4 91,1 27 7 2,2 2,4 93,5 28 4 1,3 1,4 94,9 29 3 ,9 1,0 95,9
46 30 4 1,3 1,4 97,3 32 2 ,6 ,7 98,0 34 3 ,9 1,0 99,0 36 1 ,3 ,3 99,3 37 1 ,3 ,3 99,7 38 1 ,3 ,3 100,0 Total 293 91,6 100,0 Missing System 27 8,4 Total 320 100,0
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Tabel 8a: Frequentie resultaten Controle variabele Geogr. Ligging Noord-Europa (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid
0 280 87,5 87,5 87,5
1 40 12,5 12,5 100,0
Total 320 100,0 100,0
Tabel 8b: Frequentie resultaten Controle variabele Geogr. Ligging West-Europa (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid
0 260 81,3 81,3 81,3
1 60 18,8 18,8 100,0
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Tabel 8d: Frequentie resultaten Controle variabele Geogr. Ligging
Zuid-Europa (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid
0 200 62,5 62,5 62,5
1 120 37,5 37,5 100,0
Total 320 100,0 100,0
Tabel 8c: Frequentie resultaten Controle variabele Geogr. Ligging Oost-Europa (1=ja, 0=nee)
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid
0 220 68,8 68,8 68,8
1 100 31,3 31,3 100,0
49
APPENDIX B: Scatterplots met outliers RAROC en ROC
50 Figuur 2: Scatterplot met outliers ROC
51
APPENDIX C: Correlatiematrix
Tabel 9: Correlatie Matrix
Aantal Aantal Aantal Aantal Aanwezig- Regio Regio Regio
vr. leden vr. leden vr. leden vr. leden Ratio heid Grootte West- Oost- Zuid-
RAROC ROC 0%> tot 10% 10% tot 20% 20% tot 30% 30% of
meer vr. leden vr. leden board Jaar 2008 Jaar 2009 Jaar 2011 Jaar
2012 Europa Europa Europa
RAROC 1
ROC 0.914** 1
Aantal vr. led. 0%> tot
10% 0.04 0.018 1
Aantal vr. led. 10% tot
20% 0.063 0.050
-0.403** 1
Aantal vr. led. 20% tot
30% 0.002 -0.008 -0.273** -0.326 1 Aantal vr. led. 30% of meer 0.014 0.002 -0.140** -0.167 -0.113 1**
Ratio vrouwelijke leden 0.058 0.018
-0.331** 0.074 0.552 0.577** 1 Aanwezigheid vr. leden 0.134* 0.072 0.263** 0.337* 0.228 0.116** 0.601* 1 Grootte board -0.032 -0.024 0.159** 0.093 -0.009 -0.113** -0.012 0.213 1** Jaar 2008 0.016 0.000 0.012 0.010 0.015 -0.043 -0.022 0.020 0.038 1 Jaar 2009 0.004 -0.015 0.011 -0.014 -0.023 -0.050 -0.063 -0.071 -0.016 1 Jaar 2011 0.123 0.11 0,016 -0.008 0.025 -0.009 0.003 0.032 -0.022 -0.250 -0.250 1 Jaar 2012 -0.049 -0.055 -0.083 0.034 -0.003 0.150 0.117 0.038 -0.001 -0.250 -0.250 -0.250 1 Regio West-Europa -0.038 -0.041 -0.003 0.053 -0.025 -0.041 -0.003 0.016 0.471 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1 Regio Oost-Europa -0.111 -0.064 -0.175 -0.104 0.311 0.170 0.333 0.091 -0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.324 1 Regio Zuid-Europa 0.142 0.119 0.254 -0.035 -0.333 -0.189 -0.443 -0.207 -0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.372 -0.522 1