2 Master of Arts Thesis

1

MA Programme Euroculture Declaration

I, Lesya Yurchyshyn, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Culture as an Obstacle for Implementing EU Projects in Ukraine?” submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the List of References.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed Lesya Yurchyshyn Date December 15, 2011

2 Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture

University of Groningen (Home) University of Uppsala (Host)

Month and Year when submitted December 2011

Title of Master Thesis

“Culture as an Obstacle for Implementing EU Projects in Ukraine?”

Submitted by:

First name and Surname

Lesya Yurchyshyn

Student number S2074664

Contact details lesya@yurchyshyn.com

Supervised by:

Name of the first supervisor Dr. Nienke de Deugd

Name of the second supervisor

Dr. Benjamin Martin Place, date

Groningen, December 15, 2011 Signature

Lesya Yurchyshyn

3 Table of Contents

Introduction.………. 6

Chapter 1. Post-Soviet Ukraine and the Development of Relations with the EU. EU Programmes in Ukraine: Twinning ……… ………….. 12

1994-2004 ……… ………13

2004-2009.… ………17

2009 – to Date………..20

The Twinning Programme……… 25

The Twinning Initiation Procedure………..27

Key Twinning Actors………..28

Twin to Win……….28

Twinning in Ukraine……… 30

Twinning in Ukraine Assessment………32

Chapter 2. Implemented Twinning Projects in Ukraine by Sweden, Austria and France………...………..35

The Twinning Project “Assisting the Main Control and Revision Office in Implementing a New System of Public Internal Financial Control”. The Legal Basis for the Project’s Implementation………...………35

Public Internal Financial Control………36

The Twinning Project’s Implementation……….39

The Twinning Achievements………...40

The Twinning Project “Support to the National School of Judges of Ukraine”. The Legal Basis for the Project’s Implementation……… ………...41

The Twinning Project’s Implementation……….43

The Austrian Twinning Achievements………45

The Twinning Project “Support to Strengthening of Road Freight and Passenger Transport Safety in Ukraine”. The Project’s Background……...46

The Twinning Project’s Implementation……….47

The French Twinning Achievements………..48

Chapter 3. Obstacles for Implementing EU Projects in Ukraine. The Institutional Culture of Ukrainian Bureaucracy…..……….51

The Analysis of Obstacles for Implementing the Twinning Project “Assisting the Main Control and Revision Office in Implementing a New System of Public Internal Financial Control”………...52

Evidence Provided by Maryna Barynina, a Former Head of the Central Harmonisation Unit at the Main Control and Revision Office of Ukraine………..52

The Evidence Provided by Ruslana Rudnytska, a Resident Twinning Adviser Assistant………...54

Evidence Provided by Vilhelm Reuterswärd, a Resident Twinning Adviser…………..55

The Analysis of Obstacles for Implementing the Twinning Project “Support to the Academy of Judges of Ukraine”………..57

Evidence Provided by Tetyana Fuley, a Resident Twinning Adviser Counterpart…….57

The Evidence Provided by Kurt Weisgram, a Resident Twinning Adviser………58

The Analysis of Obstacles for Implementing the Twinning Project “Support to Strengthening of Road Freight and Passenger Transport Safety in Ukraine”………….61

The Evidence Provided by Iryna Kravchenko, a Resident Twinning Adviser Assistant………...61

The Evidence Provided by Vira Sida, a Translator………62

The Evidence Provided by Eric Hoyrup, a Resident Twinning Adviser……….64

4 Chapter 4. Understanding Twinning through the Policy Transfer Theory.

Interpreting the Ukrainian Case…...………...70

The Policy Transfer Theory……….70

The Ukrainian Case. Uninformed, Incomplete or Inappropriate Policy Transfer?...76

Conclusion…………...………...81

Bibliography………...………88

5 List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

BC Beneficiary Country CHU Central Harmonisation Unit DAI Ministry of Internal Affairs

DCFTA Deep Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement EaP Eastern Partnership

EC European Commission

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ESV Swedish National Financial Management Authority ITO Implementation of Twinning Operations in Ukraine KRU Main Control and Revision Service of Ukraine MoF Ministry of Finance

MS Member State

MTC Ministry of Transport and Communications of Ukraine NSJ National School of Judges

PCA Partnership and Co-operation Agreement PIFC Public Internal Financial Control

RTA Resident Twinning Adviser

SIGMA Support for Improvement in Governance and Management

TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

WTO World Trade Organisation

6 Introduction

Twinning is an initiative of the European Commission that was launched in 1998 in the context of the preparation for the enlargement of the European Union. It is conceived as an instrument to assist Candidate Countries to enhance their administrative capacity to implement Community legislation as future Member States of the European Union.

As the European Commission states, “Twinning provides the framework for administrations in the beneficiary countries to work with their counterparts in Member States in order to develop modern and efficient administrations to the same standards as in Member States.”

Twinning has been a helpful tool for the 10 Member States who joined the EU in 2004 - Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and in 2007, Bulgaria and Romania - in advancing the administrative capacity of their state sector institutions.

At the present time, Twinning is active in Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, as well as in the potential Candidate Countries of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo.

Since 2004, a growing number of Twinning projects have been launched in the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). One of the beneficiaries is Ukraine.

Following the events which led to the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004, under President Viktor Yushchenko Ukraine pursued an agenda of ambitious reforms in order to install democracy and a market economy in the country. Significant progress was made to deepen respect for democratic norms and human rights. National elections were conducted largely in accordance with international standards and civil society was established in some of the larger cities. Due to the emerging pluralism in media ownership, a certain degree of openness and objectivity in the media started to become

1European Commission, Institution Building in the Framework of European Union Policies. Common Twinning Manual. Revision 2009 (Brussels: 2009)

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/institution_building/final_version_of_the_manua l_2009_clean_en.pdf (accessed 1 December 2010).

2 European Commission Enlargement, “Pre-Accession Assistance for Technical Assistance – Twinning,”

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/technical-assistance/twinning_en.htm (accessed 21 November 2010).

3 Programme Administration Office, “Twinning with a Human Face,” Working Together, Twinning in Ukraine 2006-2009 (2010):7.

4 Ibid.

7 apparent.

However, political divisions and lack of responsibility within Ukraine’s leadership undermined most of the reform efforts.

The situation has not changed much under the new government led by President Viktor Yanukovych, who came to power in 2010. Despite some positive efforts to establish a framework for economic reforms, Ukraine has experienced a deterioration of basic respect for fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of speech (ea. Mass Media), freedom of assembly as well as other democratic standards.

After the generally acceptable conditions of the presidential elections at the beginning of 2010, the local elections in October 2010 were strongly criticised by international and domestic observers - particularly regarding the legal framework and the inadequate administrative electoral process and management.

The adoption of an election code which would meet European standards and which would be supported across the main political spectrum is crucial to the democratic legitimacy of future elections in Ukraine. According to the European Commission for Democracy through Law, or the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe’s advisory agency on constitutional matters,

“electoral legislation in Ukraine was quite often changed. Provisions of different laws were contradictory and subsequently undermined the stability of the electoral law. The adoption of an Election Code would contribute to the stability of the electoral legislation in line with the recommendations of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters

.”

According to the European Commission’s Country Report on Ukraine regarding the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010, the Yanukovych government has not made any strides in reforming the Constitution, strengthening respect for the rule of law through the essential judiciary reform, or conducting public

5 Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, National Indicative Programme for 2011-2013 (Kyiv:

2011), http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/2011_enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf (accessed 21 February 2011).

6 Ibid.

7 European Commission, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Paper. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010. Country Report on: Ukraine (Brussels, European Commission: 2011),

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2011/sec_11_646_en.pdf (assessed 30 July 2011).

8 Ibid.

9 The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters envisions guidelines on elections based on the

underlying principles of Europe’s electoral heritage: universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage. The Code was adopted by the Venice Commission in 2002.

10 Council of Europe, the European Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion on the Draft Election Code of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Strasbourg, Council of Europe: 2010),

http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)047-e.pdf (accessed 22 August 2011).

8 administration reform and fighting corruption.

Since 2004, these key challenges have remained untouched.

As stated in the National Indicative Programme for 2007-2010

and 2011-2013

in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, one of Ukraine’s reform priorities should be in the area of public administration and public financial management. Specific objectives of the Programme are “to promote the organisational reform of public institutions, developing a culture of transparency, inclusiveness and public accountability within” and “to improve institutional capacities for financial management and control systems, including fighting against corruption.”

It is with this in mind that the European Union provides Ukraine with substantial technical and Twinning assistance in order to try to stimulate the progress in the above-mentioned strategic areas.

The Twinning project between the Swedish National Financial Management Authority (ESV) and the Main Control and Revision Office of Ukraine (KRU) was initiated in 2007-2009. The project aimed at assisting the KRU in implementing a new system of Public Internal Financial Control (PIFC) and at fighting corruption and fraud in the central government. According to the PIFC manual, the concept of Public Internal Financial Control was developed by the European Commission in order to guide national governments in establishing a state-of-the-art control environment in their income and spending centres. In addition, a state-of-the-art internal control environment is an effective tool in preventing corruption and fraud.

The ESV managers focused on assisting the KRU to set the three pillars of the EU Public Internal Financial Control system, such as the introduction of managerial accountability for financial management and control, the development of independent internal audit services and the establishment of a Central Harmonisation Unit (CHU).

The CHU’s creation was designed to achieve harmonisation with internationally agreed

11 European Commission, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Paper. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2010. Country Report on: Ukraine.

12 Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, National Indicative Programme for 2007-2010 (Kyiv:

2007), http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_nip_ukraine_en.pdf (accessed 21 November 2010).

13 Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, National Indicative Programme for 2011-2013 (Kyiv:

2011).

14 Ibid.

15 European Commission, Welcome to the World of PIFC (Brussels: Publications Office, 2006).

9 standards and EU best practice for the control and audit of public income, expenditure, assets and liabilities.

As a result of the Twinning project, the Central Harmonisation Unit was established, but the concept of decentralised managerial accountability and internal audit were not introduced in Ukraine. This, in turn, hampered the move to a modern style system of Public Internal Financial Control.

The Swedish project leaders have identified the institutional culture of the Main Control and Revision Office civil servants as one of the obstacles for the successful implementation of the project. Vilhelm Reuterswärd, a Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA) from Sweden remarks that

“experience in implementing an EU-style system of Public Internal Financial Control in other countries has shown that a strong commitment from civil servants is an important condition for managing the PIFC reform project. Yet, crucial work elements such as responsibility, encouragement and promotion are extremely lacking in the culture of some Ukraine’s bureaucracy. To the contrary, they exert a culture of fear, punishment and distrust. This attitude cannot help install EU policy models in the country.”

However, there arises a question if this specific statement refers to every EU Twinning project that has been implemented in Ukraine. Or perhaps there have been

“exceptions to the rule”? In order to reveal to what extent other Twinning projects have been successful and what factors played a role in their success, the thesis will provide a more indepth review of some of these projects. More specifically, it will try to consider to what extent and how deeply the institutional culture of Ukraine’s civil servants impedes the implementation of EU Twinning projects in the country. In other words, this paper will argue that the institutional culture of Ukraine’s bureaucracy creates not only a challenge but represents one of the obstacles for European managers in their efforts to introduce EU policies in Ukraine. In doing so, it will indeed confirm the statement of the Swedish-Ukrainian Project Fiche

, that “cultural changes are needed in Ukraine, from top management down to junior officials, in order for them to effectively absorb Europe’s best practices.”

16 Sweden, the Swedish National Management Financial Authority, EU TACIS. Twinnning Project Fiche.

Assisting the Main Control and Revision Office (KRU) in Implementing a New System of Public Financial Internal Control (Stockholm: 2007).

17 Vilhelm Reuterswärd, interview by author, Paris, France, December 20, 2010.

18 Ibid.

19 Technical Twinning term for a document which lists projects specifications and requirements.

20 Sweden, the Swedish National Management Financial Authority, EU TACIS. Twinnning Project Fiche.

Assisting the Main Control and Revision Office (KRU) in Implementing a New System of Public Financial Internal Control.

10 The research question of the thesis-in-hand will be approached through the policy transfer theory developed by David Dolowitz and David Marsh. This theory offers an elegant framework that helps analyse to what extent the EU influences processes of integration and transformation that take place in Europe after the break-up of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Particularly, the policy transfer suggests that the EU, as a developed partner, can assist Ukraine, as a developing country, in the introduction of far-reaching changes; changes that would lead the latter to follow in the footsteps of the former.

Crucially, this is one of the goals of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership.

In other words, in the context of the recent enlargements the EU advocates the transfer of its policies across the new Member States, Candidate Countries and European Neighbourhood Policy countries. The policy transfer theory studies processes

“in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting.”

Policies are transferred on a volunatry and coercive basis.

Voluntary policy transfer, or lesson drawing, implies that political actors or decision makers in one country draw lessons from one or more other countries, and then apply them to their own political system.

Coercive transfers involve a supra-national institution that pushes another government to adopt certain policies as part of signed political agreements or programmes.

In case of Twinning projects, European policy models are transferred to the Ukrainian setting in the framework of European Neighbourhood Policy aiming at the development of Ukraine’s legislation and administration to the same standards as in the Community. On a side note, the policy transfer theory answers a number of questions such as what is transferred, who performs transfer, what are the different degrees of transfer and what factors constrain transfer.

Set in this manner, the policy transfer theory is applicable

21 Nienke de Deugd, “Policy Transfer between the European Union and Ukraine,” article under review, not yet published, 2.

22 David Dolowitz and David Marsh, “Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in

Contemporary Policy-Making,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 1, vol. 13 (2000): 5.

23 David Dolowitz and David Marsh, “Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature,” Political Studies 344, XLIV, (1996), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy-

ub.rug.nl/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00334.x/pdf (accessed 16 August 2011).

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

11 for the thesis in order to help understand the role Ukraine’s bureaucracy plays in implementing Twinning projects in Ukraine.

In the first chapter the paper will first present an overview of the development of relations between the European Union and Ukraine. The general description of the Twinning concept will follow. The chapter will conclude with the assessment of the performance of Twinning projects in Ukraine.

In the next chapter the thesis will review three Twinning projects that have been implemented in Ukraine: Swedish, Austrian and French. The paper chose 3 projects conducted in different fields and coordinated by different Member States. This will ensure accuracy of findings and prevent from their generalisation. First, the thesis will refer to the Swedish Twinning project called “Assisting the Main Control and Revision Office in Implementing a New System of Public Internal Financial Control”, 2007- 2009. The next section will address the Austrian Twinning “Support to the National School of Judges of Ukraine,” performed in 2008-2010. The last section will describe the French project “Support to Strengthening of Road Freight and Passenger Transport Safety in Ukraine”, 2009-2011. Each of the sections will fully describe the projects, focusing on concepts they aimed to introduce, objectives they intended, and managed to achieve.

The third chapter will identify factors that played a role in the Twinning projects’

implementation. This data will be obtained from first-hand sources through interviews with project managers and actors who implemented the projects. Depending on information received, the thesis will conclude to what extent and how deeply Ukraine’s bureaucracy can be regarded as an obstacle for the successful Twinning projects’

completion.

In the final chapter the paper will interpret the projects’ successes and failures

through the policy transfer theory. Particular attention will be paid to the theoretical

explanation of the factor of bureaucracy in general and its role in post-Soviet Ukraine in

particular. The thesis then will sum up the findings and hopefully the results of the

research will prove the question under consideration. To the extent the research is

indeed accurate, it will also support the Swedish Twinning Project Fiche’s statement

regarding the strategic necessity of reforming Ukraine’s civil service sphere.

12 Chapter 1

Post-Soviet Ukraine and the Development of Relations with the EU.

EU Programmes in Ukraine: Twinning

The chapter addresses the thesis subquestion about the development of EU-Ukraine relations after Ukraine regained its independence in 1991. In doing so, the chapter sets up the background that helps understand as to what circumstances the EU initiates its programmes in Ukraine. For a better understanding, the chapter divides EU-Ukraine relations into 3 periods based on the country’s leadership.

First, it analyses years 1994-2004. During this period President Leonid Kuchma served two electoral terms; 1994 and 1999. His first term seemed quite pro-reform and successful in terms of Ukraine’s relations with the West. Particularly, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the European Union was signed and ratified (1994, 1998). His second taking control of the presidency led to disappointment in the West due to a growing gap between rhetoric and reality in Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy. The Kuchma administration claimed its support for deeper political and economic reforms and “returning to Europe” foreign policy vector, whereas reality was extremely at odds with the announced policies. The thesis does not discuss Ukraine under the first independent President Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994), since he mostly focused on the state’s building policies vis-a-vis Russia

and not on implementing reforms or establishing cooperation with Brussels.

Second, the chapter discusses years 2004-2009 when the Orange Revolution brought Viktor Yushchenko to the country’s presidency in January 2005. Yushchenko’s political demeanor fuelled expectations that Western-oriented democracy would be established in Ukraine.

Yet, much of this optimism quickly faded. The Orange government was alleged of corruption and in-fighting. As a result, the European Union did not embrace Ukraine as a candidate country.

Third, the thesis sketches the current situation of EU-Ukraine’s relations under the Viktor Yanukovych administration (February 2010-to date). All Ukrainian presidents have routinely claimed their support for European integration while doing everything to undermine European values at home.

But of Ukraine’s four presidents it

27 Paul Kubicek, “Problems of Post-Post-Communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution,”

Democratization 234, volume 16:2 (2009), http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy- ub.rug.nl/doi/pdf/10.1080/13510340902732524 (accessed 17 October 2011).

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

13 is the Yanukovych administration that has excelled its predecessors in violating the rule of law and undermining democratic values by, for instance, detaining former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

Having critically reviewed political regimes in post-communist Ukraine, the thesis comes to introduce policies that the EU initiates in Ukraine in the framework of singed agreements, namely the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the European Neighbourhood Policy. More specifically, the chapter focuses on Twinning projects in Ukraine, since they are a central research question of the paper-in-hand. The chapter contains general information about the Twinning concept as an instrument of the European Neighbourhood Policy as well as more specific information about the Twinning programme’s implementation in Ukraine, including the Twinning overall assessment from its inception in 2006 to the present day.

1994-2004

When Ukraine emerged from the Soviet Union, it became an important but difficult political partner for the EU to cooperate with. Relations between the two factions are strained due to several factors, amongst which are attributed to Ukraine’s poor economic performance, the lack of transparent democracy and an overall unstable internal situation. Nevertheless, the EU seeks “a close relationship with Ukraine, going beyond mere bilateral co-operation, to gradual economic integration and a deepening of political co-operation.”

Prior to 2004 the European Union and Ukraine developed their relations on the basis of the principles set out in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which was finalised in 1994 and came into effect in 1998. A year later the European Council adopted the Common Strategy as a supplement to the PCA to strengthen the strategic partnership between the EU and Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine became the first of the former Soviet republics to sign such agreements with the European Union and its Member States.

The main goals of the PCA were actually in support of Ukraine’s intention to conduct internal reforms, which were necessary to consolidate its democracy, to nurture the development of its nascent economy and finally to complete

30 “Act Now before It Is Too Late,” Eposhta, volume 12, no. 12 (2011),

http://www.eposhta.com/newsmagazine/ePOSHTA_110903_CanadaUS.html#fo7 (accessed 31 October 2011).

31 European Union External Action, “Ukraine,” European Union, http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/index_en.htm (accessed 1 April 2011).

32 Deugd, “Policy Transfer between the European Union and Ukraine,” 2.

14 the transition to market economy. The PCA also provided the foundations for mutual economic, social, financial, community, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between Ukraine and the EU.

Yet, with the Ukrainian leadership unwilling to introduce the necessary (but painful) changes, the results of this particular cooperative arrangement were disappointing.

On 4 July 2002 Copenhagen hosted a Ukraine-EU summit that failed to resolve the poor relations between Ukraine and the EU.

The summit statement reaffirmed that the EU still only looked to the PCA (not an Association Agreement) as the basis “for developing our relations further”.

Why did Ukraine again fail to convince Europe of its right to join the EU in Copenhagen? Renowned scholar and expert in Ukrainian politics Taras Kuzio points out that “for the EU it is highly convenient that Ukraine’s domestic policies simply re- affirms the deeply held view in Brussels that Ukraine is not part of Europe.”

Bertel Haarder, Danish Minister for Refugees, Immigration and Integration, laughed off President Kuchma’s (1994-1999, 1999-2004) assertion to gradually move into the EU by 2011. This is very reminiscent of Soviet era declarations that communism was on the verge of being reached, but never actually was.

He advised Kyiv that “instead of statements and expectations for clear signal, the Ukrainian authorities should switch to fulfilling arrangements and fulfilling their declarations.”

The fact that Ukraine constantly shifted and changed domestic and foreign policies, gave an image of a country that was unable to decide its foreign orientation.

Particularly, Ukraine’s foreign policy was seen as being in crisis and became more confusing to both domestic elites and foreign governments.

The Kuchma government constant wavering in every direction, one day pro-Western, the next pro-Russian,

33 Michał Tudorowski, “The European Neighbourhood Policy towards Ukraine,” Biuletyn Opinie, Fundacja Aleksandra Kwaśniewskiego AMICUS EUROPAE 18 (2009): 3.

34 Deugd, “Policy Transfer between the European Union and Ukraine,” 3.

35 Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Relations with the West: Disinterest, Partnership, Disillusionment,” European Security 27, no. 2 (2003),

http://www.taraskuzio.net/International%20Relations_files/ukraine_west_relations.pdf (accessed 29 August 2011).

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., 30.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., 26.

15 damaged Ukraine’s international credibility by giving it an image of an unreliable partner, except in Moscow.

Notwithstanding, the Ukrainian leadership ignored the crisis as they continued to not accept the situation happening around them, as seen in Kuchma’s 2002 claim that,

“the year that is passing consolidated the strategic plans of our country and confirmed its European choice. Step by step Ukraine is moving towards the goal of integrating into the European community.”

According to Taras Kuzio, a major problem causing the crisis is the Soviet-era culture of duplicity of Ukraine’s ruling elite. Those are oligarchic groups who emanated from the Soviet-era Communist Party of Ukraine. Duplicity of foreign policy is simply a tool for the elite to adjust the country to short-term changes in the international environment that affected their clannish and financial interests.

In other words, strategic foreign policy objectives (such as EU membership) were merely rhetoric to mask foreign policy that was only there to protect the interests of the corrupt elite. As one Ukrainian commentary explains,

“the Ukrainian leadership lie all the time with or without reason. Their words and deeds are as far apart as the people and the government of this country. Foreign policy is constantly changing, documents are kept secret, there is an inability to determine the country’s national interests, and ‘return to Europe’ rhetoric is undermined by non-European domestic policies.

Ukrainian foreign policy has become unpredictable, unreliable, mistrusted.”

A French newspaper addes, “it is constantly repeating its desire to draw closer to Europe, but is not taking measures to implement the reforms such a partnership requires.”

Kuzio identifies other factors that contributed to even deeper damage of Ukraine’s international image on democratisation in 2000s. First, there were increasing restrictions on the media. The Committee to Protect Journalists ranked President Kuchma in 1999 and 2001 in the top ten worst enemies of press freedom.

Plus, the body of murdered opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze was found in November 2000. The tapes recorded in Kuchma’s office between 1999 and 2000 by Mykola Melnychenko, a

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 25.

44 Ibid., 27.

45 Ibid., 28-29.

46 Ibid., 23.

16 presidential guard, included conversations ostensibly confirming Kuchma’s involvement in the Gongadze murder.

Second, a growing evidence of high-level corruption. In 1999 Transparency International also began to rank Ukraine as one of the world’s most corrupt states.

However, no high ranking oligarchs have ever been placed on trial in Ukraine. Corrupt oligarchs were left untouched because they remained loyal to Kuchma in the pro- presidential parliamentary majority.

Third, Kuzio defines Ukraine’s orthodoxy as one of the constraining factors for its application for the Association Agreement. As the EU finds it difficult to accept Turkey, a Muslim country as equal, it may take just as long for the EU to accept that the Eastern Slavic countries, Ukraine included, are also part of Europe.

However, it is a disputible matter, since Greece, Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU as Eastern Christian states.

In a similar vein, according to Kuzio, the EU and the Council of Europe have placed Ukraine and Russia in one group on questions of membership.

The French Foreign Ministry typically agued that Ukraine could not be regarded as a potential EU member, as this would isolate Russia.

On a visit to Moscow in May 2002, EC President Romano Prodi said, “neither Russia, nor Ukraine would become EU members in the foreseeable future”.

Yet, Russia has never expressed an interest in EU or NATO membership, whereas Ukraine has claimed its “return to Europe” vector in foreign policy.

All in all, by the end of 2004 the poor EU-Ukraine relationship became in dire need of an overhaul. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed between Ukraine and the EU in 1994 and ratified four years later, and the 1999 EU Common Strategy on Ukraine, were both inadequate and outdated.

Until then the EU and Ukraine have only undertaken virtual policies towards one another. This situation of Ukraine’s de facto isolation in the West was hoped to be resolved after Kuchma retired from office in October 2004.

47 Joseph Sywenkyj, “Criminal Case Relaunched into Melnychenko Tapes,” KyivPost, 24 June 2011, 1.

48 Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Relations with the West: Disinterest, Partnership, Disillusionment,” 24.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., 28.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid., 29.

17 2004-2009

While the 2004 enlargement grew close, the European Union came to realize that it would be confronted with a new set of neighbouring countries.

In an attempt to develop “a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood - a ring of friends - with whom the EU will enjoy close, peaceful and co-operative relations”, new policy instruments were initiated, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy.

According to the Strategy Paper, the European Neighbourhood Policy

“is designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation. […] The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.”

Influenced by the 2004 Orange Revolution and the subsequent coming to power of Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-Western president, Ukraine became an active participant in the European Neighbourhood Policy.

After years of stagnation under Kuchma, there were high hopes that Yushchenko as Ukraine’s first reformist president would lead to a breakthrough in EU-Ukraine relations.

He indeed challenged the EU to embrace the new Ukraine. Yushchenko announced that the EU should recognise Ukraine as a market economy, a step the EU took in December 2005 and the United States took two months later.

Second, he said the EU should support Ukraine’s membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), a step that would allow Ukraine to create a free-trade zone with the EU. Ukraine became the WTO’s 152

member on May 16, 2008.

Third, he said the EU should upgrade Ukraine from its European and Neigbourhood Policy to the

55 Ibid.

56 Tudorowski, “The European Neighbourhood Policy towards Ukraine,” 4.

57 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy, European Neighbourhood Strategy Paper (Brussels, EU Commission: 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf (accessed 29 April 2011).

58 Deugd, “Policy Transfer between the European Union and Ukraine,” 3.

59 Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?,” The Washington Quarterly 89, volume 29, no. 3 (2006), http://www.taraskuzio.net/International%20Relations_files/international-eu_ukraine.pdf (accessed 10 September 2011).

60 Ibid., 89-90.

61 World Trade Organisation, “Accessions. Ukraine,” World Trade Organisation,

http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_ukraine_e.htm (accessed 10 October 2011).

18 Association Agreement.

In the final step, he stated that Brussels should offer Ukraine EU membership.

Yushchenko, however, was unduly optimistic, considering the EU’s inability and unwillingness to establish a new policy toward Ukraine. The EU had already a full agenda on the 2004 and 2007 enlargement processes and it was in a deep crisis following the failure of referendum on the draft EU constitution in France and the Netherlands.

With regard to Ukraine, the EU argued that it should first prove its commitment to reforms before any talk of membership could begin.

Put differently, Yushchenko lost sight of the fact that Ukraine still had a long way to go in terms of political and economic reforms. As Barroso duly notice that “the EU door remains open, the future of Ukraine is in Europe. The best way to get there is not to talk about EU membership all the time but achieve concrete results, show commitment to European values and standards”.

Under Yushchenko, results were achieved in implementing the constitutional reform and emerging pluralism in media ownership. The 2006 constitutional reform transforming Ukraine from the presidential system to a parliamentary one was a step forward to Ukraine’s democratisation. In transitions from communism, Eastern European countries with parliamentary systems have been more successful at democratisation than those with presidential regimes.

Second, the success of the 2006 parliamentary elections contributed to the establishment of an independent and freely competitive media environment in the part of the world where the freedom of media is regularly stifled.

Nevertheless, despite the success of the constitutional reform, the pace of other reforms in Ukraine was significantly undermined by political instability.

Dismay and uncertainty surrounding the sustainability of the reform process has centerned on the collapse of the Orange revolutionary camp in September 2005 following corruption charges levelled against Yushchenko’s entourage and the removal of Yulia Tymoshenko

62 Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?,” 89.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., 90.

65 Ibid., 93.

66 BBC News, “Ukraine Told that EU Door is Open 5 October 2005,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4313906.stm (accessed 27 September 2011).

67 Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?,” 102.

68 Ibid., 103.

69 Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, National Indicative Programme for 2011-2013.

19 government.

As a result, the political parties that supported the Orange revolution ran the 2006 parliamentary elections separately. Another contentious issue was Yushchenko’s failure to implement the Orange Revolution’s pledge to put “bandits in prison.”

“Bandits” included oligarchs from the Kuchma regime who were accused of power abuse, the Gongadze murder in 2000 and election fraud in 2004.

In this situation at most the European Union could offer Ukraine was the establishment of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as a supplement to the European Neighbourhood Policy. Involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the newly emerged Eastern Partnership seeks to enhance the European Neighbourhood Policy by calling on both the European Union and the new neighbouring countries to bring their relationship to a new level. The EaP countries are obliged to reaffirm the need to continue with political and economic reforms with the EU promising more substantial forms of (technical and financial) cooperation, plus offering - if all goes well - to conclude Association Agreements.

To sum up, Yushchenko had come to power optimistic that European values and standards would be introduced in Ukraine, after which Ukrainians would see “Europe knocking on our door.”

There certainly are no doubts about his personal commitment to European values. This was demonstrated when he allowed free and fair 2006 parliamentary elections, which permitted the Party of Regions, led by defeated presidential candidate Yanukovych, to participate.

However, as a post-Soviet state, to be able to absorb European values and standards a full democratic transition has always been required in Ukraine. This, in turn, requires reforms that are quite difficult to implement, since they are unpopular with the ruling elite in the country. Subsequently, the uncertainty about Yushchenko came to rest on his political strength to implement these inevitable domestic reforms that would clash with interests of ruling parties. Therefore, to a great disappointment of the Orange electorate, Ukraine’s first reformist president failed to demonstrate his political will in order to break the dead lock the country was in.

70 Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?,” 102.

71 Ibid., 103.

72 European Commission, European External Action Service, Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership (Brussels: 2010), http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_en.pdf (accessed 29 April 2011).

73 Ibid., 105.

20 2009 – to Date

With Viktor Yanukovych coming to power in February 2010, the situation has not changed but to the contrary deteorated significantly in its democratic framework.

Western experts assess that in the 18 months of Viktor Yankovych’s rule all civic freedoms in Ukraine have shrunk, corruption has skyrocketed, and justice has descended from low to zero.

These processes are accurately reflected in the annual reports of reputable international organizations like Freedom House, Reporters without Borders, Transparency International, and some others. All of them have significantly downgraded Ukraine’s score in every area.

Former President of the Czech Republic Vaclav Havel identifies the most worrying factors underlying Ukraine’s anti-democratic turn. First, after Yanukovych’s election last year, he pushed the Constitutional Court to rescind constitutional changes made by Viktor Yuchshenko. By doing so, Yanukovych reversed a consensus to reduce the presidency’s powers and move toward a more parliamentary system. Instead, Ukraine’s president is now increasingly consolidating his control over the executive, the legislature and the judiciary.

Put differently, he is slightly converting Ukraine into a Belarus type state with the authoritarian rule.

Second, corruption is endemic in the government. Foreign direct investment is falling and the European Union has currently frozen $100 million of financial assistance as a direct result of the administration’s failure to combat corruption in public-sector procurement.

Subsequently, Ukraine’s economic performance is lagging behind despite all promising declarations of the Yanukovych government.

Third, harassment of opposition parties and independent media. Political trials with absurd criminal accusations against the leaders of the opposition and members of the former government seem to have caught most of the attention in Europe. The arrest and detention of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko that most of the West has deemed politically driven, confirms that the rule of law in Ukraine is being ignored.

74 Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukrainian 3-B Politics: Blackmail, Bullying, and Bluff,” Eposhta, volume 12, no.

12 (2011), http://www.eposhta.com/newsmagazine/ePOSHTA_110903_CanadaUS.html#fo7 (accessed 1 October 2011).

75 Ibid.

76 Vaclav Havel, “Ukraine is Losing its Way,” Eposhta, volume 12, no. 12 (2011),

http://www.eposhta.com/newsmagazine/ePOSHTA_110903_CanadaUS.html#fo7 (accessed 1 October 2011).

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

21 With regard to harassment of the independent media, it ranges from administrative obstruction to much worse. Most television channels are in the hands of four groups that have close links to the ruling Party of Regions and impose censorship on television production.

Fourth, increased activity among security organisations. Individuals, non- governmental organisations and journalists have been either overtly threatened or placed under surveillance.

Fifth, oligarchs’ power. Large elements of Ukraine’s economy - including exports, energy and the media - are controlled by a small number of people who often experinced a criminal past or have direct connections with “Regionnaires” (the Party of Regions).

These people mostly come from Donbas and are placed in various leading positions all over Ukraine, primarily in Kyiv and especially in the courts, the police, the taxation administration and prosecutors’ offices.

Finally, a weak civil society. The operating environment for civil society organisations remains extremely difficult and they have no opportunities for genuine inclusion in policymaking in the country.

Under these circumstances Ukraine has reached a crossroads. One signpost points toward democracy, while the other toward autocracy.

The current theme is “no democracy in Ukraine; no integration with Europe”. A group of distinguished Ukrainian and Western analysts

have recently argued that Europe should make Ukraine’s integration into European institutions conditional on the Yanukovych regime’s adherence to democratic principles. This has come into question because both Ukrainian

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Riabchuk, “Ukrainian 3-B Politics: Blackmail, Bullying, and Bluff.”

83 Havel, “Ukraine is Losing it Way.”

84 Ibid.

85 Professor Dan Hamilton, an executive director of the American Consortium on European Union Studies and director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Taras Kuzio, a senior fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Professor Lucan Way, the University of Toronto.

Edward Chow, a senior fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Nico Lange, a director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Ukraine.

Mykola Riabchuk, a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy.

Professor Yaroslav Hrytsak, the Ukrainian Catholic University.

Professors Olexiy Haran and Serhiy Kudelia. the Kyiv Mohyla Academy University.

Yuriy Lukanov, an independent journalist and civil society activist.

22 and EU officials raised hopes that they would sign a free trade agreement by the end of 2011,

perhaps during December’s EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv.

The deal with Ukraine is designed to stimulate trade worth estimated 22 billion euros a year with special clauses for energy trade to secure imports of Russian gas through Ukraine to the EU, as well as for agricultural trade.

However, there is a contradiction between the EU’s intention to sign the free trade agreement and Ukraine’s move away from European values. The EU’s policy guidelines define deep and sustainable democracy

“as nations with free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial; fighting against corruption;

security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.”

Ukraine has regressed in all five areas. Thus, the analysts insist that the EU should advance free trade and political agreements with Ukraine only if the Yanukovych administration demonstrates its clear commitment to European values. “The EU needs to be tougher with Ukraine now,” announce the policy makers

At the same time, American political scientist Alexander J. Motyl argues that these experts are wrong to demand the European Union should take a tougher approach against President Viktor Yanukovych and experienced democratic regression under him.

Motyl believes that the strategic factor of denying Ukraine to Russia and the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus outweighs any democratic failings and that, even an authoritarian Ukraine should be integrated into European institutions.

86 Dan Hamilton et al., “EU Should Get Tough Now with Yanukovych,” KyivPost, 16 June 2011 http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/106920/ (accessed 1 October 2011).

87 When the thesis was written, the EU-Ukraine summit in Kyiv has not yet taken place. However, when the thesis was finally reviewed, the summit had already happened, on December 19, 2011. Therefore, even though the EU-Ukraine summit “overshadowed all other political events in Ukraine over the past few months, its actual results were close to zero”, states Mykola Riabchuk

(http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/119999/). The EU refused to initial the Association Agreement which includes the free trade agreement. According to the thesis’ line of reasoning, these results were rather predictable since the Ukrainian government did not indicate any intention to ease its multifaceted pressure on civil society with the EU not ready to condone Kyiv’s increasingly authoritarian behavior (ibid).

88 “EU Sees Ukraine, Georgia Trade Progress This Year,” KyivPost, 22 September 2011,

http://www.kyivpost.com/news/business/bus_general/detail/113340/#ixzz1ZWRMPOml (accessed 1 October 2011).

89 Hamilton et al., “EU Should Get Tough Now with Yanukovych.”

90 Ibid.

23 Once inside the free-trade zone, the EU will have leverage over Kyiv and be able to gradually Europeanise Ukraine.

According to Motyl,

“if Ukraine signs the free-trade agreement with the EU and moves toward associate membership, its chances of becoming democratic, market- oriented, modern, and Western will grow. If it does not move toward Europe, Ukraine will either remain isolated in that no-man’s-land between Russia and the EU or, far more likely, move toward the Russia-led Customs Union, membership in which guarantees that Ukraine will become authoritarian, oligarchic, backward and anti-Western.”

The suggested “either / or” approach, however, is not a right solution to the given situation. Leading Ukraine’s poitical analyst Mykola Riabchuk contends that “this tricky alternative is exactly what the regime wants to sell to the EU - either you accept us as ugly (authoritarian and corrupt) as we are, or we move away to Russia.”

This could be regarded as a cynical blackmail or bluff, since the Ukrainian oligarchs are not going to Russia anyway because they know well - and even Mr. Yanukovych seems to have learned this already - that Russia would never be satisfied with whatever concessions they make, until they are suffocated completely.

Put differently, the threat by Yanukovych to “go to Russia” if they cannot have their cake and eat it in Brussels is an empty threat, as Ukrainian officials know that a dialogue on equal terms with Russia is impossible.

Riabchuk suggests to forget about “either / or” arguments and radically change the discourse. He states that the only efficient and viable negotiation paradigm is simple:

more for more, and less for less.

Experts call it the “sticks and carrots” approach, meaning if Kyiv sticks to the rules, it will get more carrots and if it keeps breaking the rules, it wil get more sticks.

Apparently Viktor Yanukovych and his “Regionnaires” are transforming Ukraine into another Belarus, however, with a fake pro-European rhetoric. If the EU accepts this, it may ultimately face the problem how to impose Lukashenko-style sanctions

91 Alexander J. Motyl, “Integrating an Authoritarian Ukraine into Democratic Europe?,” World Affairs, July/August 2011,

http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/motyl/Integrating_an_Authoritarian_Ukraine_into_Democ ratic_Europe (accessed 1 October 2011).

92 Ibid.

93 Riabchuk, “Ukrainian 3-B Politics: Blackmail, Bullying, and Bluff.”

94 Ibid.

95 Hamilton et al., “EU Should Get Tough Now with Yanukovych.”

96Riabchuk, “Ukrainian 3-B Politics: Blackmail, Bullying, and Bluff.”

24 upon leaders who are associate members of the EU and ostensibly adhere to the same values.

Even though Ukraine should not be rejected outright, the process of integration must be more clearly and unambiguously stated. No final decision on the free trade agreement is advisable until the current negative trends are reversed

(see footnote 87).

Brussels hardly criticized the unconstitutional establishment of a parliamentary coalition led by the Party of Regions and the reintroduction of a presidential republic by a single decision of the Constitutional Court.

European reaction was again quite moderate when the Yanukovych administration started political repressions against members of former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s government, until the former Prime Minister herself received a seven year prison sentence.

All across Europe the message is that if President Yanukovych fails to revisit the sentence, it will have profound implications for EU-Ukraine relations

(and already partially had, see footnote 87).

Nevertheless, Yanukovych seems resistant to Western demands that he releases his main political opponent, thereby announcing an array of new investigations to be conducted. It is with this in mind, political analysts call on Brussels to find a proper balance between increasing the links with Ukraine through the free trade agreement and applying measures to counter the government’s increasingly authoritarian behaviour.

After Yushchenko came to power, there was widespread optimism in Ukraine and the West that a breakthrough in Ukraine’s prospects for integrating into the EU would quickly take place. Now that the country is under President Yanukovych, Western political experts argue that Ukraine’s political system is likely to decline into a semi or even full authoritarian status along the lines of Russia and Belarus. This kind of status independent Ukraine has never held.

As first Kuchma and then Yushchenko reiterated that Ukraine’s geography, culture, and history are European. Now we hear a different story. Now Ukraine’s President considers it incorrect and unjust to announce the Holodomor (Great Famine) a fact of genocide of a certain people. Now Ukraine’s students are not able to learn about the Great Famine, since Education Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk has rewritten history

97 Ibid.

98 Nataliya Shapovalova, “Beyond Tymoshenko,” Euobserver.com, http://euobserver.com/7/113929 (accessed 3 November 2011).

99 Ibid.

100 Marina Danilova, “Ukraine’s Ex-prime Minister Gets 7 years in Jail,” the Associated Press, http://www.ajc.com/news/nation-world/ukraines-tymoshenko-sentenced-to-1198352.html (accessed 3 November 2011).

101 Shapovalova, “Beyond Tymoshenko.”

25 textbooks used in schools in order to downgrade the significance of the Holodomor. On top of that, he curtailed the Ukrainian language education in order to promote Russian.

With this ideological bias, the Yanukovych government not only harms Ukraine’s position in the EU but he also divides the country.

Ukraine has always been in dire need to unite and rally the nation together, the process that Taras Kuzio calls “nationhood building transition.”

The country inherited heavy Soviet-Russian political culture and population with a strong Russian presence.

Therefore, Ukraine is different from other post-Communist countries that joined the EU, i.e. the Baltic states were always treated differently and never joined the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ukraine’s imperial and totalitarian legacies make its transition to democracy more difficult.

The country is undergoing not only political and economic transition but also state and nation building, two processes that were largely absent in the transitions of post-Communist EU Member States.

It would be unfair to deny, there was some democratic and national conscience development under the Yushchenko administration. However, those incremental Orange revolution achievements are now being destroyed by the Yanukovych government.

The Twinning Programme

Holding the line of the discussion, Ukraine has always been a challenging partner for the European Union to cooperate. Ukrainian leaders, particularly Presidents Kuchma and Yanukovych, only espouse the rhetoric of seeking EU membership while undertaking non-European policies at home. Even though the EU hardly believes that Ukraine is genuinely committed to seeking EU membership, they support its intentions to pursue European integration. First, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was established in 1994. Then in 2004 the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched and in 5 year advanced into the Eastern Partnership. The latter introduces a new cooperation framework based on four policy platforms, particularly on democracy, good governance and stability; economic integration and convergence with EU policies;

energy security; and contacts between people, with the aim of bringing the partners

102 Taras Kuzio, “Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?,” Politics 21 (3) (2001):

168.

103 Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future?,” 101.

104 Ibid.

26 closer to the EU.

One of the tools to fulfil the objectives of the Eastern Partnership as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy is an instrument called Twinning.

The Twinning programme was first introduced in 1998 in the 12 countries of the 5th Enlargement in order to strengthen their administrative and judicial capacity in the preparation for membership of the European Union. Since then more than 1000 Twinning projects have been implemented playing a vital and successful role in this context.

The European Commission and EU Member States have mobilised significant human and financial resources to help the Candidate Countries meet the challenge of strengthening their institutional capacity and adapting their administration to implement the acquis communautaire.

The acquis is the entire body of European laws including all the treaties, regulations and directives passed by the European institutions.

The term is used in connection with Candidate Countries to join the Union. They must adopt, implement and enforce all the acquis to be allowed to enter the EU.

After the 2004 enlargement, Twinning guidelines have been set in a common Twinning manual to cover the ten new Member States, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, Turkey, the Western Balkan and Mediterranean basin countries, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. To illustrate, in Bulgaria and Romania, Twinning has focused on the further refinement of the acquis implementation.

The approach to Croatia and Turkey as Candidate Countries is “accession driven“, concentrating on supporting priority areas which will help these countries to become EU members in the future.

In Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia, and Montenegro the priority for the EU remains the promotion of stability and

105 European Commission, European External Action Service, Vademecum on Financing in the Frame of the Eastern Partnership (Brussels, European Commission: 2010),

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_en.pdf (accessed 4 October 2011).

106 European Commission, DG Enlargement, Twinning: a Tested Experience in a Broader European Context (Brussels, European Commission: 2006),

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/press_corner/publications/twinning_en.pdf (accessed 25 April 2011).

107 Ibid.

108 BBC News World Edition, “A-Z of Europe,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/europe/euro- glossary/1216329.stm (accessed 5 October 2011).

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.