Master of Arts Thesis
Euroculture
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Université de Strasbourg August, 2017
Franco-‐China Relations In Nuclear Energy Cooperation
–
Aftermath of Fukushima Accident
1. Introduction
4
1-1. Reactions to Fukushima Accident and Later Nuclear Energy Use
4
1-2. Global Debate on Sustainability of Nuclear Energy
7
2. Literature Reviews & Methodology
12
2-1. Nuclear Energy Economy and its Risks
12
2-2. Shaping Strategies on Nuclear Energy
14
2-3. Structural Realist Approach & Methodology
17
3. Domestic Policies in France and China
24
3-1. The Institutional Structure on Nuclear Energy Issues
24
China
24
France
27
3-2. Nuclear Energy Policies and the forming Domestic Factors
28
China
28
Historical Developments
28
Socioeconomic Factors
29
Public Opinion and the aftermath of Fukushima accident
31
France
34
Historical Developments
34
Socioeconomic Factors
35
Public Opinion and the aftermath of Fukushima accident
37
4. Franco-Chinese Relation in Nuclear Energy
40
4-1. Franco-China Bilateral Relation
40
Historical Developments
40
Trade & Economic Relations
43
Bilateral Relations at different levels
46
5. Conclusion
50
Bibliography
52
1. Introduction
Sustainable development is an everlasting issue in modern world, especially after the spotlights of Paris Agreement. In order to contribute to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs) and solutions of the climate change, many governments have implemented the regulations into their own legal and civic systems, meanwhile many states have cooperated for decades in environmental protection and sustainable developments to improve the situation. Particularly in the field of energy cooperation, though nuclear energy only occupies 10.2% of the whole energy production in 2012, the issues of whether nuclear energy is renewable and sustainable remained sensitive and controversial due to security reasons1.
1-1. Reactions to Fukushima Accident and Later Nuclear Energy Use
The level of the controversy of whether to preserve nuclear energy has been increased after the tragedy in Fukushima in Japan. On March 11th 2011, under the great level of earthquake and a following tsunami which also brought about a large degree of loss of life, Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant complex operated by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPC) was severely damaged with incredible explosions and considerable radioactive contaminations. A large scale of 150,000 people had to evacuate the neighbouring area, and many of them had to be monitored for further investigations to see if they had been contaminated by the radiations2. According to an official report by the Japanese Health and Labour Ministry, the radiation exposure contaminated nearly 100 workers at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the level of which was exceeding the legal limits3. There are many immediate challenges that Japan
had to face after the accident, for instance, how to handle and control the radioactive cooling water and prevent the expansion of contaminations; how to ensure the local communications and deliver emergency aids; how to deal with radioactive contaminated food such as milk, crops, fish and vegetables; how to minimize the damages in public health, economics and public concerns, ex cetera4. Afterwards since May 2011, the Japanese government has reviewed its operations of nuclear plants and there was a decline in it to zero at some point.
1 “Nuclear Power in the World Today”, Official Website of World Nuclear Association, modified January 2017, accessed 30 March 2017, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/nuclear-power-in-the-world-today.aspx.
2 David Elliott, “Fukushima: The Immediate Impacts” in Fukushima: Impacts and Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 8.
Nevertheless, inevitably and obviously, this accident had raised public concerns not only domestically, but regionally, and even internationally. Except for the direct worries right after the accident on people’s health, food security, environmental pollutions in both Japan and other Pacific coastal countries, have been also raised connected with the nuclear security concern. To find out the real reason why the radioactive exposure happened had become the most urgent priority, for nearly 76 nuclear plants5 in the world have been investigated to be located at coastal area and 17 of them are especially at risk of facing tsunami damage6. In addition to this, about 90 nuclear plants have been estimated to be located in seismically active area and 34 of them7 are in the extremely active area. Besides, the system utilised in Daiichi nuclear complex was boiling water reactors (BWRs) which were used in other countries like US and Spain8. In January 2012, based on an official report submitted by TEPC, the reason of the exposure turned out to be the tsunami, while there were doubts against the official review9. Some regards this as a regional problem or concern, since a potential tsunami damage to nuclear plants are not likely to happen in other corners of the world. Whereas, as what Elliott quoted, it is a human failure caused by the policy makers, operators as well as the nuclear industry, claimed by the Greenpeace10.
Many countries in the world have reacted to this, and abandoned the utilization of nuclear energy completely, whereas some are hesitating and some insist in the possession and further development of nuclear energy. As a neighbouring country of Japan, China holds a large capacity in operating nuclear energy reactors11. After the accident, China reacted immediately
to establish its reactor safety reviews and other manners concerning the safety of utilization. New nuclear plants’ plans and approvals had been suspended until the publication of new policy reviews on nuclear safety, though others already in construction continued. By 2013, 3% of electricity in China is generated from nuclear power, and the government aims to generate 4% of the electricity from nuclear reactors by 2020. In contrast, China also has an
5 These nuclear plants are mostly in Japan, Taiwan, China, South Korea, India, Pakistan and the US.
6 David Elliott, “Fukushima: The Immediate Impacts” in Fukushima: Impacts and Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 10.
7 Among them, 30 nuclear plants are located in Japan and Taiwan.
8 David Elliott, “Fukushima: The Immediate Impacts” in Fukushima: Impacts and Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 7 & 14.
9 Ibid, 10. 10 Ibid, 15.
ambitious renewable programme which will use low carbon sources as 15% of its primary energy generation by 2020. Besides, China has doubled its use in solar energy, enhanced its utilization in wind power, and aimed at enhance wind power capacity to 250 GW by 2020. Meanwhile, nonetheless, the official view towards nuclear energy is still positive – many new nuclear reactors are still in construction and waiting to be used while China still has problems to ensure its nuclear safety12.
On the European Continent, many countries are originally opposed nuclear use such as Denmark. After the Fukushima accident, Germany did many efforts on its nuclear exit. Reacting to the Fukushima incident, France also reviewed the security of its nuclear reactors and a long-term reassessment in its future energy policies. Public opinion was positive about nuclear power use in 2002 by an Ipsos opinion poll, and after the Fukushima accident in June 2011, in a Reuters opinion poll, though oppositions suddenly increase to 70% of interviewees who are not in favour of any kind of nuclear expansion programmes, 22% of them still backed up the nuclear expansion13. However, France is a special case in continental Europe. Among all kinds of energies being used in France, renewable energies provided almost 13% of French primary sources in 201014, and it seems uneasy for France to abandon its nuclear use in a short period of time. According to Nuclear Energy Institute, among the countries who relied on nuclear energy generations for electricity, in 2015, France ranked top and 76.3% of its electricity generated from nuclear power15. By the data Elliott provided, though there were some exports in electricity, at the time of his writing (in 2012), 65% of electricity from nuclear energy generations is for domestic use16. Similar to those constructed in Taishan in China,
France also faces problem in nuclear safety concerning the European Pressurised Water Reactor (ERP) system in Flamanville17. In addition to this, expanding lifespan of nuclear plants which are constructed since 1970s and 1980s, upgrading their systems, and thinking about
12 David Elliott, “Reactions in Japan and across Asia” in Fukushima: Impacts and Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 26-30.
13 David Elliott, “Reactions in Continental Europe” in Fukushima: Impacts and Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 38.
14 David Elliott, “Reactions in Continental Europe” in Fukushima: Impacts and Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 41.
15 “Nuclear Energy Around the World”, Nuclear Statistics, Official Website of Nuclear Energy Institute, accessed 30 March 2017, https://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/World-Statistics.
16 David Elliott, “Reactions in Continental Europe” in Fukushima: Impacts and Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 38; written in 2012.
abandonment of ERP system to minimize the economic risks for major vendors like Areva and Électricité de France (EDF) are of particular importance to the French government18.
Apparently, both France and China have reviewed their policies on the safety in nuclear utilization right after Fukushima accident. Under the pressure of critics in nuclear energy preservations, however, France and China recently have decided to step up their cooperation in the field, and on February 21st 2017, they have also signed an agreement to cooperate in the entire industrial chain of nuclear energy19. As both countries insist in further developing their nuclear energy, such an agreement to enhance their bilateral cooperation in nuclear energy may change their bilateral relations and the world’s nuclear power use scheme in a larger context.
1-2. Global Debate on Sustainability of Nuclear Energy
Before going through the details of specific research on Franco-China nuclear energy cooperation, some backgrounds on the global debate of nuclear energy and its sustainability seem to be essential. However, either the debate or the sustainability of nuclear energy could also be much more complex than expected. In general, some strongly condemn and doubt about the green credentials of nuclear energy20, yet to answer the question to the central debate, it is better to identify some key characters of nuclear energy and the alternatives to nuclear energy, in other words, renewable energies.
The core of the debate is whether nuclear energy could be regarded as a “sustainable” energy. To define the term of “sustainable energy”, as renewable energy specialist Scurlock summarised, “is one that is not substantially depleted by continued use, does not entail significant pollution or other environmental problems, and does not bring about health hazards or social injustices.”21 Based on this definition, Scurlock believes that it is not sufficient to only assess the whole life cycle on carbon dioxide emissions, and compare the data between different energy technologies. There are other aspects which are also important – whether the
18 David Elliott, “Reactions in Continental Europe” in Fukushima: Impacts and Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 38-40.
19 “China, France sign deals on nuclear energy, science”, Official Website of the State Council of People’s Republic of China, modified 22 February, 2017, accessed 30 March 2017, http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2017/02/22/content_281475574810818.htm.
20 Jonathan Scurlock, “Can nuclear power ever be green?” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a
Place in a Sustainable Energy Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 209-220;
21 Jonathan Scurlock, “Can nuclear power ever be green?” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a Place
resources are sustained, or could be used continuously; whether the resources are evenly distributed, or could contribute to social justice.
Like many environmentalists, Scurlock suggests that nuclear energy is not “sustainable” enough according to this definition22. There are several reasons for this. Given the fact that uranium is the most commonly used resource for generating nuclear energy, this kind of resource is more likely to be a one-time source which is not “sustainable” or renewable enough. Uranium derived from high-grade ores which is expensive and would be used up in 75 to 100 years according to the current capacity on the planet and the present technologies; the one derived from lower-grade ores which is relatively less expensive would probably increase the possibilities of carbon dioxide emission in the fuel cycle. In case of prospective improved technology with more fabrications under the same demand of current electricity use, Scurlock assumes that the future emissions from lower-grade ores to generate nuclear energy would be more problematic than the present generation from gas firing.
Some counter arguments suggest that when the fast breeder reactors are being used in a nuclear plant, deriving resources from extremely lower-grade sources like sea water, then continuous utilization of the resources could be achieved – as the fast breeder reactors are fast and efficient, and the energy could be used for millions or billions of years23. However, Scurlock denounced, such system has already certified to be more complicated and costly, with no guarantee of no proliferation in the fuel cycle, and in a worse case, the pollutions in the sea could become more problematic than ever. Hence, instead of nuclear energy, for many advocates of renewable energy like Scurlock, it is the “natural” energies that would fulfil the future requirements of the world, though they also admit that there are some limits of renewable energy.
Concerning the use of nuclear energy, some environmentalists support the concept of a total abandonment of nuclear energy, while some keep silence about the current use of nuclear energy if the governments could make promise to promote and develop renewable energies rapidly until they could replace nuclear energy. Therefore, slightly off the core to debate the sustainability of nuclear energy, sometime the debate is more likely to be which one of energy technologies (the representative renewable energies, or the nuclear energy) should we keep in
22 Jonathan Scurlock, “Can nuclear power ever be green?” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a Place
in a Sustainable Energy Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 213.
23 Jonathan Scurlock, “Can nuclear power ever be green?” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a
this world. Pragmatically, the reason why many environmentalists regard nuclear energy as a threat is not merely on account of its ideological “sustainability”, but because of the undermining risks (economically and politically) that nuclear energy could bring to its “green” and “natural” renewable alternatives, as what Mitchell and Woodman suggested24.
Before analysing the competitiveness between nuclear energy and renewable energy from a pragmatic point of view, people may need to compare the energies in general. While advocates like Scurlock would strongly stand for a future replacement of nuclear energy by its renewable alternatives, some others like Elliott suggests that, it is more about which set of combination of both energies should be used in this modernised world25. For Elliott, what matters most is how to manage and balance the supply-demand relationship and the climate change. This rather neutral position has made his descriptions on both nuclear energy and renewable energy relatively objective. Inevitably, both of them have its advantages and disadvantages.
According to Elliott, there are some basic characters of nuclear energy which may strengthen or weaken the its status during the debate on the sustainability of nuclear energy26. As
mentioned above, uranium is used for generating nuclear energy which is most commonly regarded as a fast and efficient way for energy generation. In most cases, it does not have carbon dioxide emissions, and could contribute to the world’s sustainability under the climate change environment. Nevertheless, it could produce long-last and dangerous nuclear wastes. When the nuclear plants are over their lifespans, they ought to be decommissioned which is even more expensive than the built-ups, and which could cause more wastes. Comparing to other energy sources, only electricity could be generated from nuclear energy, and this electricity generation could only fulfil 30% of the total demand of energies for human beings27. Besides, due to security reasons, nuclear plants are easy to become targets of terrorists. In contrast, many renewable energies do not require any fuels, and they do not produce wastes. Additionally, their factories are not attractive to terrorists, and they do not only produce electricity, but generate heat and transport fuels as well. Yet it is not a trustworthy source for
24 Catherine Mitchell and Bridget Woodman, “Risk, Economics and Nuclear Power” in Nuclear or Not? Does
Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Energy Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007), 161-162.
25 David Elliott, “Introduction” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Energy
Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1-6.
26 David Elliott, “Introduction” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Energy
Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1-6.
electricity generation due to its intermittency. And this intermittency may decrease the people’s confidence in the credibility and the capability of some renewable resources.
Conversely, Scurlock remains positive on such issue, given the example of wind power which currently holds one-quarter of nuclear energy’s capacity, and which is producing one-eighth of the global electricity. Wind energy, he suggests, would take over nuclear energy’s capacity and leading role in electricity generation by around 202028. From another perspective, both nuclear energy and renewable energies share many things in common, at least when compared with the classic energy generated from fossil fuels, both of them have relatively lower carbon emissions29. For initial developments, they are both financially expensive, and relatively cost less at the operational stage, while to Elliott’s understanding, both of their expenses could be lessened. Hence, after comparing some general characters of nuclear energy and renewable energy, he reached a conclusion that how to handle the technological, pragmatic feasibilities of how many percent we should rely on nuclear energy and renewable energy seems to be essential.
On the basis of pros and cons that nuclear energy has, some environmental lobbyists would be strongly supportive of a “replacement” idea, since it is a fact that nuclear energy would contribute to a low-carbon world while generating radioactive wastes at the same time. A sustainable world would not be built on solving one problem by raising another problem. To a certain extent, this argument holds water. In addition to this, it cannot be denied that some scholars, like Mitchell and Woodman, concerned about the existing utilization of nuclear energy would hinder the future development of renewable energy as the total amount of governmental resource has its limits. In another word, this is because of the uncertainties in nuclear energy economics during the process of delivering sufficient budgets, technological support, as well as logistical advancements in different institutions and interest parties30. Taken these uncertainties into consideration, it is therefore of particular interest and importance to do a research on Franco-China relations in nuclear energy cooperation in the aftermath of Fukushima accident. Thus, this thesis endeavours to answer a main research question of – in spite of the potential environmental risks, why France and China would insist to preserve,
28 Jonathan Scurlock, “Can nuclear power ever be green?” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a Place
in a Sustainable Energy Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 215-216.
29 David Elliott, “Introduction” in Nuclear or Not? Does Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Energy
Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1-6.
expand the use of nuclear energy, and enhance their cooperation in the aftermath of Fukushima accident? To further explore this main question, it might be also helpful to research on a couple of sub-questions to reach a final answer to the main question: 1) What are the driving forces (Push factor & Pull factor) that shape Franco-China Cooperation in Nuclear Energy? 2) How and to what extent do environmental concerns, and Franco-China International Relations shape their cooperation in Nuclear Energy?
2. Literature Reviews & Methodology
Before doing research on domestic policies and Franco-Chinese relations, it is necessary to explore the challenges that the nuclear energy economy is facing, and to analyse the key factors that would shape strategies on nuclear energy. By utilizing structural realism as the theoretical framework, this chapter tries to prove that the material forces of a state (as the Pull factor) and the structure of international system (as the Push factor) would be helpful to understand French and Chinese policies in nuclear energy, as well as their bilateral relations in such field. Finally, this chapter will mention the methodology used for later research in chapter 3 and chapter 4.
2-1. Nuclear Energy Economy and its Risks
As already indicated in chapter 1, there are a variety of uncertainties that shape the competitiveness between nuclear energy and renewable energies, at economic, political, institutional, technological, and logistical level. Based on Mitchell and Woodman suggestions, for a new nuclear power plant, many other kind of risks (for instance – investment risks, market risks, government risks, ex cetera) could exist for both the government and private enterprises, despite the undermining risks nuclear energy could bring about for renewable energies31. Their analysis, from a variety of perspectives, would not merely have some implications for later classifications of factors that may effect on nuclear energy market, but would also provide some possible challenges that France and China may face in their bilateral nuclear cooperation. According to Malcolm Wicks, previous Energy Minister in the United Kingdom (UK), to further develop nuclear energy, it is essential to ensure that the government subsidies (both direct and indirect) were not going to become a burden32. From an investing perspective, it is important for the investors to be confident that there would be a financial reward regardless of potential changes in politics or policies. Hence the government need to prioritize their assignments if it supports a new nuclear power plant. As the tasks to reduce the investment risks could be more complicated than imagined, and they are always inter-linked with other
31 Catherine Mitchell and Bridget Woodman, “Risk, Economics and Nuclear Power” in Nuclear or Not? Does
Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Energy Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007), 149-167.
32 Catherine Mitchell and Bridget Woodman, “Risk, Economics and Nuclear Power” in Nuclear or Not? Does
Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Energy Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
support, Mitchell and Woodman suggest that the more endeavours the government did, the more expensive they will be33. This is especially the case in a liberalised market where a new
construction of nuclear plant would cost much time and budget, and where a large degree of uncertainty is predictable for the expends in waste management and decommissioning. During the process of generating electricity, nuclear energy also has some inflexibilities in providing the right amount of electricity based on the variable demand, and thus it need to be operated at a constant level. The investors, in such scenarios, may lose their interests in investing a new nuclear power plant, as they could not find their investments to be spend at the most effective level throughout the whole procedure in construction, generation or operation, and the decommissioning. In contrast to a new nuclear power plant, purely from the economic perspective, investors are more likely to be in favour of a natural gas power plant, as it is most cost-effective (flexible in size, relatively cheaper and has more flexible generators depending on market demand, and can be constructed within a limited time).
Furthermore, another variable factor that investors normally bear in mind when they make decisions is political or policies’ changes, as already mentioned above34. For the investors, they
need to analyse the current and historical energy policies to further re-confirm if they could get returns from their investments even under the political changes or when new policy reviews have been published. For the government, it is more expensive (both economically and executively) to be supportive of nuclear plants, than some renewable alternatives (for instance, wind energy and biomass energy are cheaper and could be relatively easy to handle by different smaller projects) or demand reduction. In addition to this, the government also faces difficulties in evaluation of the new nuclear power plants as it is time-consuming. At a more practical and executive level, a new nuclear plant could cost more institutional resources such as planning applications, regulation or technical implementations, while the government also may face the risks of its weaknesses to coherent and coordinate among departments to ensure the service delivery of such nuclear plant. Besides, positive public opinion remains a variable in the whole process even if the government could cope with other risks mentioned above.
33 Catherine Mitchell and Bridget Woodman, “Risk, Economics and Nuclear Power” in Nuclear or Not? Does
Nuclear Power Have a Place in a Sustainable Energy Future? ed. David Elliott, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007), 153-156.
34 Catherine Mitchell and Bridget Woodman, “Risk, Economics and Nuclear Power” in Nuclear or Not? Does
Under this condition, as mentioned in chapter 1, it is apparent that the environmentalists’ concern about the mirror effect is reasonable – given that institutional resources, political resources, as well as financial resources at both policy makers’ level and private investors’ level are limited. The more the government has done to manage risks and boost investors’ confidence for nuclear energy, the larger possibilities that renewable energy could be undermined. Consequently, although the global debate mentioned in chapter 1 should be focused on whether nuclear energy’s contribution to sustainability could outweigh its potential risks from a pragmatic point of view, considering the complexity of the whole issue, many people would elaborate the topic into pure support or opposition to nuclear energy use especially after the Fukushima Accident.
2-2. Shaping Strategies on Nuclear Energy
Concerning the public opinions, whether people are supportive of nuclear energy use or not, many research institutions established their databases to formulate a final result by the format of an opinion poll. Despite the differences in the credibility or reliability, it should be noticed that how the research institutions phrase and build their questions, and the timing when they provide the questions to people could have a huge influence on the final data. In the case of nuclear energy in the aftermath of Fukushima accident, distinguishing the concept between attitude (either support or oppose) on general use of nuclear energy and particular reaction to Fukushima accident is essential when analysing data from different databases in different countries (this is especially the case in China, see chapter 3). In some cases, the public opinion would have a high degree of impact in domestic policies, such as Japan in nuclear energy issues. Nevertheless, except for the public opinion, there are also many other factors that may influence the political strategies of whether support or oppose nuclear energy, or to what extent does a state support nuclear energy. As what Elliott proposes and suggests, for example, technology choices, geographical locations, political orientations, economic issues, and other complex factors would take a part in states’ policies or strategies towards nuclear energy35.
35 David Elliott, “Analysis: Political, Economic and Technological Issues” in Fukushima: Impacts and
Energy and technological issues, first of all, would be an important factor that form strategies of a state, as Elliott argued, and it is sometimes connected to geographical locations36. What
seems appealing to many people and their governments is the concept of “high-technology”. To Elliott, it is hence not convincing why many countries in the world would like to preserve and develop their nuclear energy use while they have a great level of capacities in other renewable energy sources. For instance, in previous Soviet bloc countries in the Near East, especially Kazakhstan, it has very large potentials in wind power and hydro sources, though the country is nearly only developing its nuclear energy. This may on account of its abundant resources in uranium, but Elliott believes that it may have to start to develop natural resources as uranium cannot be used forever. In the Middle East where many oil fields are located, many countries like Dubai, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates started to develop their renewable energies, for example, solar power. Within this sensitive and fragile region, the development of nuclear energy could always be regarded as a military symbolic action since sometimes it is inter-linked with technological development and it is not easy to find out the real focus of a state. Similarly, Elliott also found many developing countries, especially the Asian ones, should take more efforts in renewable energies because of their locations. For him, China is still far from a low-carbon society, and it would also need to develop its renewable sources due to its large potential in wind, solar and hydro power.
National politics, to a certain degree, would also have an impact on a state’s position in nuclear energy issue37. The change of power in political parties, and political differences in various countries may sometimes alter political directions, though it is not sorely dependent on party swifts in nuclear energy issues. For example, the Netherlands was supportive of both renewable and nuclear energies whereas after a new centre-right power came on stage, the government wanted to cut down renewable subsidies to support a new nuclear plant. In contrast, regardless of left or right, Denmark was able to further develop its renewable energies and continued to oppose nuclear energy use.
Dependent on Mitchell and Woodman’s theory on the risks that a new nuclear plant could bring about, it is apparent that economic issues in nuclear energy is complicated regarding the costs of nuclear power plants. Elliott agrees that economic issues would of particular importance in
36 David Elliott, “Analysis: Political, Economic and Technological Issues” in Fukushima: Impacts and
Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 65-67.
37 David Elliott, “Analysis: Political, Economic and Technological Issues” in Fukushima: Impacts and
nuclear energy, whereas except for those already mentioned above, he proposed that insurance and damage costs would also play a role in the aftermath of Fukushima accident38. Since the
cost of a new nuclear plant is very high, it is difficult to insure the generation and operation. Vendors of nuclear power plants may have to cover some part of the insurance, but governments will also have to get involved for most parts of the potential damages. As an example, in France, government insurance on a nuclear plant is equivalent to €228 million in maximum, whereas the required amount for operators is merely €91 million39. Similar to Mitchell and Woodman’s arguments, Elliott also believes that renewable energies could become more economic than nuclear energy, in both cost reduction and investment. Additionally, he argues that renewable energies would create fast with less uncertainties in investment. The economic issues are sometimes intertwined with political orientations, he confirmed, since many variables in interest rates, technologies, and the government subsidies would be shaped by the views of policy makers.
Besides, under particular social or political context, things could be even more complicated40. Taken the instance of Lithuania, social movements emerged to against nuclear power since the Ignalina nuclear plant was under Russian possession. Due to security reasons, the movements was only about oppositions to nuclear energy though the practical aim was to against the Soviet rules. Afterwards in 1990, when Lithuania actually gained its independence, and under a new national governmental controls, voices of oppositions to nuclear energy was barely heard, and instead, the Ignalina nuclear plant is promoted as a national agency.
From all above, most of these factors could be perceived as real reasons or propaganda, since political decisions and public opinions are subtly interacted to each other. Public opinion or social movements in some cases may play a role in political strategies, whereas in many other cases public opinion maybe shaped by governmental strategies. As will be noticed in the theoretical framework and further research on domestic policies afterwards, the interaction between public opinion and government could be regarded as one major factor in the formation of nuclear energy policies (this is particularly in the case of France, see chapter 3) – since structural realists believe that material forces of a state could be regarded as an important pull
38 David Elliott, “Analysis: Political, Economic and Technological Issues” in Fukushima: Impacts and
Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 71-76.
39 David Elliott, “Analysis: Political, Economic and Technological Issues” in Fukushima: Impacts and
Implications, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan: 2013), 72.
40 David Elliott, “Analysis: Political, Economic and Technological Issues” in Fukushima: Impacts and
factor shaping international relations. In such case, technological and economic arguments could be often used in both France and China.
2-3. Structural Realist Approach & Methodology
A structural realist approach will be introduced in this research as a theoretical framework to grasp more detailed puzzles in Franco-Chinese relations in nuclear energy cooperation41. As the realist theory developed, the idea of structural realism has been proposed and/or developed by many scholars who emphasizes that it is the structure in the theory that should be paid more attention in international relations42.They assume that structure is at the core of analysis in
social sciences, people could identify the structure of concepts without knowledge in contents, thus the issue of changes over time could be excluded in understanding the structure43.
Some scholars believe that the concept of “balance of power” is at the fundamentals of structural realism to describe international relations as well as states behaviour, and in this sense states are “constrained” in the shifting of power balance under the international order44 and “think strategically about how to survive in the international system”45. Krasner perceives that many elements could shape policies, such as political systems, values or interests of some political bureaucracies and potential influences by particular leaders46, though Sørensen doubts about the applicability of Krasner and Waltz’s theory in specific policy choices47. Nevertheless, structural realism still provides a strong theoretical framework in understanding domestic and international political orders, which could be utilized in this particular research.
41 Structural realism is sometimes called as neorealism, but in this thesis paper, the theory is more focused on the influence that a structure could bring about towards a behaviour. Hence, to be consistent for more clarification, this paper will use the term “structural realism” no matter which term has been used in the referencing literatures. 42 John Worrall, “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?”, Dialectica (1989), Volume 43, Issue 1-2, 99– 124; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Political Structures” in Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 79-101.
43 Harold Kincaid, “Structural Realism and the Social Sciences”, Philosophy of Science (2008), Volume 75, Issue 5, 720–721.
44 Georg Sørensen, “‘Big and Important Things’ in IR: Structural Realism and the Neglect of Changes in Statehood”, International Relations (2009), Volume 23, Issue 2, 223-226.
45 John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, in The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary
Realism and International Security, ed. Brown, Michael E; Lynn-Jones, Sean M; and Miller, Steven E.,
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), 332-376.
46 Stephen D. Krasner, “Realism, Imperialism, and Democracy: A Response to Gilbert”, Political Theory (1992), Volume 20, Issue 1, 38-52.
According to Waltz, the main components of a system are the structure and the interacting parts in the structure. In a state, a political system is not a total sum of agencies, but rather a setting of how things work, thus differences in governmental behaviours among states generated from orders of polities. His classical structural realist theory introduced that there are two main factors could be considered as the driving forces in international relations of a state – survival motivation (in other words, domestic material forces, as the Pull factor), and the structure of the international community (as the Push factor) 48. Later on he also implemented that his theory of structural realism aims to illustrate how the structure and the following pressures within the international system would have an impact on the behaviours of a state49. Unlike Sørensen, Thies followed Waltz’s theory of structure and further implemented and strengthened the relation between the structure and states’ behaviours50, which could also be interpreted or utilised as a good model to understand both of domestic policies and foreign policies. “Structure does not directly produce effects in the system”, Thies claimed, but it would affect the behaviours of a state by means of competition and socialisation51, like what Waltz already noticed in his previous writings52. Thies reinforces the role of socialisation in his theory to further develop the structural realist theory where Waltz did not provide detailed illustrations and elaborations. In addition to this, consistent with Waltz, he argues that material capabilities and its distributions would constrain states’ behaviours and differentiate the structure of the international community53.
Synthesizing most of the scholar’s opinions mentioned above, the theory of Structural Realism can be outlined, illustrated and summarised into two following figures.
48 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Political Structures” in Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 79-88.
49 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘International Politics Is Not Foreign Policy’, Security Studies (1996), Volume 6, Issue 1, 57.
50 Cameron G. Thies, “State Socialization and Structural Realism”, Security Studies (2010), Volume 19, Issue 4, 689-717.
51 Cameron G. Thies, “State Socialization and Structural Realism”, Security Studies (2010), Volume 19, Issue 4, 691.
52 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power” in Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 127-128.
Figure 1
As Figure 1 illustrates, based on Waltz fundamental theory, there are three main components which are necessary to constitute a system – structure, the interacting parts in the system, and a setting of how things work54. To make a metaphor, suppose a system is a human being, biologically, the structure will be the skeleton; the interacting parts in the system of a human body are going to be the flesh and blood; and the setting of how things work inside a human body will be relying on blood circulation and food digestion. Applying this framework into the International (Political) System, it is apparent that its skeleton will be the structure of the international community; its flesh and blood will be the national roles of different states in the international system; and finally the blood circulation and food digestion will be the interstate interactions, in other words, state behaviours.
Figure 2 is a complex circle portrayed on the basis of different structural realists’ theories where five major elements are listed. Among them, as indicated above, the structure of the international community, national roles of a state in the international system, as well as the interstate interactions are the key components in the International System. Interstate interactions could be regarded as a kind of state behaviour which is not only affected by external factor, but internal factors as well. As Thies argues, socialisation55 and competition
54 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Political Structures” in Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 79-88.
are two major ways to influence the behaviour of a state56, while material capabilities could interact with three of them57. Hence a national system constrained by many domestic affairs
would have many manifestations to ensure the “blood circulation”, for instance, the interactions among state socialisation, its material capabilities and the state behaviour.
Figure 2
According to Mearsheimer’s arguments, under the structure of the international community, the aim of national states is to “think strategically about how to survive”58, thus the state behaviour is at the centre of this circulation in Figure 2, and there are two major routes to understand how the structure of the international system could impact on state behaviours. Externally, the structure of the international community would determine different roles of a national state in the current international system, and the particular role of a state would enact its interactions with other states in the community. In this way, the structure of the international community influences state behaviours. On the other hand, from a different direction of this circulation in Figure 2, the structure of the international community could balance the material capabilities of different states. Internally, the material capabilities could constrain state behaviours directly or indirectly through state socialisation. Hence, as what many structural
56 Cameron G. Thies, “State Socialization and Structural Realism”, Security Studies (2010), Volume 19, Issue 4, 691.
57 Cameron G. Thies, “State Socialization and Structural Realism”, Security Studies (2010), Volume 19, Issue 4, 699-703, 714-717.
58 John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, in The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary
Realism and International Security, ed. Brown, Michael E; Lynn-Jones, Sean M; and Miller, Steven E.,
realists believe, the structure of the international community could have an impact on the state behaviour.
Conversely, Figure 2 also clarifies that the state behaviour would also have an influence to react, reinforce, or alter the structure of the international community. At international level, state behaviours would cause different interstate interactions which could strengthen or weaken their national roles in the international system by means of competition or cooperation with other states. When the national roles of many states come together, they will formulate a stable or changing structure of the international community. At domestic level, the state behaviour could alter its socialisation which has many manifestations of activities, such as social influences, domestic factors, and policy making processes.
Nevertheless, sometimes the situation could be even more complicated when something unexpected happened, as state socialisation is not only constrained by material capabilities and state behaviours domestically and internationally, but could also be a reaction to external pressures or international events. As what Thies proposed as the phenomenon of “rogue” states, contemporarily like Iran and North Korea on nuclear security issues who did not accept the constrains from the structure of the international community59, this framework could also fit in when taken considerations on how state socialisation would take part in the circulation shown in Figure 2.
Figure 3
According to this framework, as is indicated in Figure 2, state behaviours or interstate interactions could have various manifestations, such as foreign policy formulations, and choice-selections of survival interests of the states. Therefore, applying this into the current research, Franco-China Nuclear Energy Cooperation is at the core of the topic which could also be interpreted as “interstate interactions (state behaviours)” in Figure 2. Another two important elements of the topic – nuclear energy policies and Franco-China bilateral relations could be regarded as factors respectively at domestic level (as the pull factor) and international level (as the push factor). As interpreted in Figure 3, it is notable that nuclear energy policies could be seen as an outcome under the interaction between state socialisation and state behaviours (in this research specifically, Franco-China nuclear energy cooperation), whereas it cannot be neglect that state socialisation (key elements of chapter 360) in the current case also responds to external events (Fukushima accident). Furthermore, on the basis of the framework, it cannot be ignored that Franco-China International Relations are not merely shaped by domestic factors, but meanwhile the structure of the international community at both regional and international level. In other words, as already mentioned above, the issue could be more sophisticated than expected and the pull factors or the push factors could be intertwined with each other.
Besides, it should be noticed that although this research would fit in the proposed theoretical framework, it does not mean the intension of this thesis research is trying to further contribute to the structural realist theory, but conversely using this framework to answer the research questions. Applying the theory in this research, key driving forces have been mapped out and an answer could be reached for the first sub-question which is reiterated as follows: “What are the driving forces (Push factor & Pull factor) that shape Franco-China Cooperation in Nuclear Energy?” On the basis of the theoretical framework, just as Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrated, the Pull factors are domestic material capabilities, state socialisation (which could also be a response to international influence). Hence in the case of Franco-China Cooperation in Nuclear Energy, the Pull factors will be the domestic material needs, socioeconomic forces in nuclear energy, as well as public opinions on nuclear energy which is probably shaped by international affairs or domestic system, and which could also form the domestic nuclear safety policies. On the other hand, the Push factors are the structure and the national roles in the international community. Thus on the topic of Franco-China Cooperation in Nuclear Energy, the Push factors will be Franco-China International Relations (both political and economic relations) at different levels.
3. Domestic Policies in France and China
Reflecting to the theoretical framework, this chapter is going to explore the basic elements that form nuclear energy policies in France and China. Before going through the details, it is necessary to firstly research on the institutional structure on nuclear energy issues in France and China, as the theoretical framework already proved the importance of a structure. As already indicated at the end of chapter 2, in the case of Franco-China Cooperation in Nuclear Energy, one of the main pull factors will be the domestic material needs and forces in nuclear energy. Thus, secondly, this thesis is going to research on the domestic elements that may have an influence on nuclear energy policies. These elements could be economic forces or industrial demand, public opinions and other social influences.
3-1. The Institutional Structure on Nuclear Energy Issues China
According to Waltz’s theory, a system is composed by the structure, the interacting parts in a system and the setting of how things work61, thus for better understanding in how China’s nuclear energy policies are shaped, it is a good starting point if one look at the governmental structure in the domains of nuclear energy. Additionally, applying Waltz’s theory into the Chinese nuclear energy industry, it would become more complicated than imagined due to the complexity of Chinese politics and political system. Unlike most western countries where a general ministry of energy is taking a leading role in the energy policy making process, China does not have a single ministry which could take such a leading role. This is also on account of the fragmented policy-making process – specifically, in the field of energy and under the supervision of the State Council (the highest executive governmental agency in China), three original agencies are involved62: the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Finance (MoF, which gets involved in particular financial rules and standards63), and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the
61 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Political Structures” in Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 79-88.
62Sang Dongli, “Nuclear Energy Development in China”, in Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: problems and prospects, ed. Xu Yi-chong, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 46.
State Council (SASAC, which is in charge of managements of state-owned enterprises64). After a failed attempt of the former National Energy Leading Group and many later replacements, integrations or establishments65, currently there are five governmental agencies who are
supposed to share the authorisation in charge of energy policy making and supervising functions, as illustrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4
Resources: IAEA & Gov.cn & other government websites
NDRC is in charge of the general planning of national economic and social development, hence it is also responsible for energy development66. The National Energy Administration (NEA) could be regarded as the major policy maker as it is taking charge of general management, strategies and planning of national energies, foreign energy investments and negotiations67. Notably, it is a vice-ministerial governmental body which is under the supervision of NDRC, with unclarified accountabilities of direct report to the State Council68. The National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) is an independent agency who is responsible for supervision
64 “Institutional Profile”, Official Website of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, Accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/index.html. (Resources in Chinese)
65 Ibid., 46-51.
66 “Main Functions of the NDRC”, Official Website of National Development and Reform Commission, Accessed 31 July 2017, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/mfndrc/. (Resources in Chinese)
67 “Introduction of NEA”, Official Website of National Energy Administration, Accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.nea.gov.cn/gjnyj/index.htm?override=1. (Resources in Chinese)
68 Sang Dongli, “Nuclear Energy Development in China”, in Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: problems and
and management of nuclear safety and radiation safety69. It is also under the umbrella of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) which has to take care of the environmental aspects of nuclear energy issues70. While NNSA is the technical and safety license provider
and approver, it is required for the enterprises to obtain another license from MEP to pass the environmental assessments, before they could begin any nuclear energy related projects71. Concerning activities relevant to international cooperation, according to Sang, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (FMPRC) are sharing the responsibilities respectively in regards to nuclear material and export controls, as well as exchange and cooperation with foreign states72. Besides, National Health and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) takes actions in emergencies when nuclear accidents happened, which is also in charge of disease preventions and rescues73. Interestingly, the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA, under Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, MIIT), the agency who is supposed to share all the accountabilities indicated above74 remained merely a representative at International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at practical level – if Sang’s analysis is reliable75.
Except for the central government, the state-owned enterprises (reiterated, under supervision of SASAC) is another major player in Chinese nuclear energy industry. As Figure 4 clarified, the two major operators are China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), China General Nuclear Power (CGN); China Nuclear Engineering Group Corporation (CNEC) is taking charge of constructions and installations; and State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) is only responsible for technology related issues76. According to the Medium- and
Long- Term Development Plan of Nuclear Power (2005–2020) published by NDRC, the
69 “Institutional Responsibilities of NNSA”, Official Website of National Nuclear Safety Administration, Accessed 31 July 2017, http://nnsa.mep.gov.cn/zjjg/jgzn/. (Resources in Chinese)
70 “Responsibilities of MEP”, Official Website of Ministry of Environmental Protection, Accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.mep.gov.cn/zjhb/zyzz/. (Resources in Chinese)
71 Sang Dongli, “Nuclear Energy Development in China”, in Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: problems and prospects, ed. Xu Yi-chong, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 50.
72 Ibid., 49.
73 “Main Responsibilities of NHFPC”, Official Website of the National Health and Family Planning Commission, accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.nhfpc.gov.cn/zhuz/jgzn/lmtt.shtml. (Resources in Chinese)
74 “Introduction of Mission”, Official Website of China Atomic Energy Agency, Modified 30 April 2013, Accessed 31 July 2017, http://www.caea.gov.cn/2017en/n6759357/n6759358/c6792759/content.html.
75 Sang Dongli, “Nuclear Energy Development in China”, in Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: problems and prospects, ed. Xu Yi-chong, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 48-49.
government aimed at enterprises to be self-financed for capital funds77. As mentioned in
chapter 2, from the viewpoint of the investors, it is important to value the potential returns. Taken that most of the funding would be from the major banks which are also state-owned, it is not clear enough how much the government got involved in the whole process as all major enterprises in the supply chain are state-owned.
France
In contrast to the Chinese case, the government authorities getting involved in the nuclear energy industry are much fewer. In the Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy78, the General Directorate for Energy and Climate (DGEC79) is responsible for nuclear energy policy, and general energy supply, energy efficiency drafts and implementations80. However, in the French case, there are several public institutions dealing with nuclear safety issues which are independent from the central government. The Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorité de sûreté nucléaire, ASN) was created in 2006 by French law, which is designated to be responsible for regulations on nuclear safety and to guarantee nuclear transparency to the public81. These accountabilities are done on behalf of the state, yet not the central government, hence it has full independence and it does not receive instructions from the government82. The
Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire, IRSN), similarly, is also created by French laws which was aimed to be “an independent public industrial and commercial establishment” with main objectives of providing research and technical support to governmental ministries and ASN83. The Commissariat à l’énergie atomique (CEA) plays a major role in research technological
77 National Development and Reform Commission, Medium- and Long- Term Development Plan of Nuclear
Power (2005–2020), Published October 2007,
http://www.snptc.com.cn/sylj/zcfg/gnflfg/201705/P020170520355788429493.pdf. (Resources in Chinese) 78 Ministre de la Transition Écologique et Solidaire, the new name in French since 17 May, 2017.
79 Direction générale de l’énergie et du climat in French.
80 “Direction générale de l’énergie et du climat”, in Mission et organisation, Official Website of Ministre de la Transition Écologique et Solidaire, Modified 27 December, 2016, Accessed 2 August 2017, https://www.ecologique-solidaire.gouv.fr/direction-generale-lenergie-et-du-climat-dgec. (Resources in French) 81 “ASN”, Official Website of ASN, Accessed 2 August 2017, http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/ASN. 82 “The ASN Commission”, Official Website of ASN, Modified 4 May 2017, Accessed 2 August 2017, http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/ASN/About-ASN/The-ASN-commission.
development, concerning not merely nuclear and renewable energies, but other fields as well84. In addition to this, the National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs, ANDRA), as its name indicates, is in charge of nuclear waste managements and national policies in relevant field85.
Besides, in the industry of nuclear energy, there are two major companies – Electricité de France (EDF) and Areva which are the major operator and constructor in France. Particularly, both of them are largely state-owned. According to International Energy Agency (IEA), Areva is the “only vertically integrated company that covers all aspects of the fuel cycle,”86 which is worth of attentions, as it also enables France to be one of the few countries in the world who is capable of recycle the used nuclear fuels87.
3-2. Nuclear Energy Policies and the forming Domestic Factors China
Historical Developments
Besides the structure and its interacting governmental bodies getting involved in Chinese nuclear energy industry, the historical development would provide a basic view on nuclear energy policies in China. Back in history, the start of nuclear energy development in China was relatively late comparing to some other countries like the United States (US), UK, France and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In 1970, Zhou Enlai, the previous Premier of the State Council pointed out that it is essential for China to develop its nuclear energy for civic utilisation, which represented the start the contemporary and modern development of commercialised nuclear power88. In 1991, the nuclear power plant in Qinshan
84 “The CEA: a key player in technological research”, Official Website of CEA, Modified 19 April 2017, Accessed 2 August 2017, http://www.cea.fr/english/Pages/cea/the-cea-a-key-player-in-technological-research.aspx. 85 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries France 2009, (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010), 124-125.
86 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries France 2009, (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010), 124-125.
87 Timothy F. Braun and Lisa M. Glidden, “Nuclear Power”, in Understanding Energy and Energy Policy, (London: Zed Books, 2014), 85.
88 “A Review of Historical and Current Nuclear Power Development in China, 2016”, Energy section, ASKCI,
modified 17 March 2016, accessed 29 July 2017,
put into operations by the indigenous technology which is official regarded as a landmark of development in nuclear energy industry in China89. Importing French technologies, afterwards
since 1994, the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant complex (unit 1 and 2) came into large commercial utilisations and operations90. The Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) seek for “moderately developing nuclear power”, and the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) aimed to construct 8 nuclear power plants. By 2011, China held 11 nuclear reactor units that are under commercial utilisation of which 6 were put into operation during these two Five-Years Plan91. Hence the development of China’s nuclear energy industry remained at a slow speed level before 2006 when the Eleventh Five-Years Plan proposed to optimize the energy structure and seek to decrease energy consumption by 20%, total emissions from major pollutions by 10%92, and to improve resources utilisation efficiency93. Specifically in the field of nuclear energy, as what Sang quoted Wen Jiabao’s speech in the Standing Committee of the State Council before the final publication of the Eleventh Five-Years Plan, that there is a necessity for China to shift its structure in electricity generation and to actively develop nuclear energy and other renewable energies94. This is a remarkable guiding policy since it approves that environmental
issues have been regarded as one of the governmental priorities in the future development.
Socioeconomic Factors
Reflecting back to the theoretical framework, many other elements could be marked as either material capabilities or state socialisation that forms the Nuclear Energy Policy in China. First of all, China has a large amount of uranium capacities. According to Wu, the resources that China has is sufficient for nuclear energy fuel at least for the short term and the medium term. As China is rapidly developing its nuclear energy plants, it is still uncertain whether the current
89 Although internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency believes that China just connect this nuclear power plant into the grid. Refer to: “Nuclear Power Situation”, China, Country Nuclear Power Profiles, modified in 2014, accessed 20 July 2017, https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/China/China.htm.
90 Ibid.,
91 Sang Dongli, “Nuclear Energy Development in China”, in Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: problems and
prospects, ed. Xu Yi-chong, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 44.
92 “Wen Jiabao: Economic and Social Development Guiding Principles and Main Objectives in Eleventh Five-Years Plan”, Domestic News, Sina.com, Modified 5 March 2006, Accessed 20 July 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-03-05/11018365220s.shtml. (Resources in Chinese)
93 “The 11th Five-Year Plan: targets, paths and policy orientation”, Official Website of National Development and Reform Commission, Modified 23 March 2006, Accessed 20 July 2017, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/200603/t20060323_63813.html.
94 Sang Dongli, “Nuclear Energy Development in China”, in Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: problems and
uranium storage will be enough in the long term95. In addition, China faces some challenges regarding its electricity supply chain. Since the late 1970s, China opened its market to the world and its economy is developing rapidly through industrialisation and modernisation which are dependent largely on electricity consumptions. At present, China is internationally ranking the second for its great amount of electricity consumptions as well as productions. In 1978, the electricity consumption per capita was 260 kilowatt hour (KWh), and 30 years later it increased to 2,328 KWh and brought 400 millions of population to an industrialised society96. The data for the world average consumption per capita in 2007 was 2,752 KWh97, and China still remained below the average. However, taken that China has one of the world’s largest population, the total consumption of electricity is reasonably high. Under this condition, China had to expand its electricity generation to fulfil the large amount of electricity consumption. Despite the fact that its 5 major electricity generation companies (all state-owned, under the supervision of SASAC, as Figure 4 illustrated) have taken many efforts in expanding their electricity capacities, there is still a shortage in many provinces in China. Many researchers predict that China will be in need of more electricity generation on account of its fast development of economic growth, though China already occupies 23.8% of the world’s total electricity generation in 201498. Furthermore, the imbalanced distribution of resources, especially coal fuels, has put more pressures on the demand-supply relation for electricity, and it has also made the cost of electricity higher because of the transportation fees. By 2007, transportations of coals to load-centres had occupied more than half of the total transportation capacities along the coastal areas.99 Besides, China’s heavy reliance on coal fuels for electricity generation has caused serious environmental problems, and brought a large amount of sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Chinese emissions of carbon dioxide during the past 40 years had incredibly increased. In 1973, China shared only 5.7% of the world’s total emission of carbon dioxide, whereas in 2014, China was responsible for 28.2% of carbon dioxide emission100.
95 Kang Wu, “Energy and the Economy”, in Energy Economy in China: Policy Imperative, Market Dynamics, and
Regional Developments, (USA: World Scientific, 2013), 20.
96 Sang Dongli, “Nuclear Energy Development in China”, in Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: problems and
prospects, ed. Xu Yi-chong, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 56.
97 Sang Dongli, “Nuclear Energy Development in China”, in Nuclear Energy Development in Asia: problems and
prospects, ed. Xu Yi-chong, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 56.
98 International Energy Agency, “Electricity Generation by Region”, Key World Energy Statistics 2016, Accessed 2 August 2017, https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2016.pdf. 26-27. 99 International Energy Agency, “Electricity Generation by Region”, Key World Energy Statistics 2016, Accessed 2 August 2017, https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2016.pdf. 57.
100International Energy Agency, “Co
