Master of Arts Thesis
Euroculture
University of Groningen (Home)
Georg-August Universität Göttingen (Host)
August 2015
Between Confrontation and Cooperation:
Discourse, EU Foreign Policy, and the 2008
Russian-Georgian War
Submitted by: Anne Bakker 1875388 (Groningen) 11042843 (Göttingen) a.b.h.bakker@student.rug.nl Supervised by:dr. Senka Neuman-Stanivukovic (Groningen) Prof. h.c. dr. rer. pol. Peter Schulze (Göttingen)
Leiden, August 2 2015
1
MA Programme Euroculture Declaration
I, Anne Bakker hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Between Confrontation and Cooperation: Discourse, EU Foreign Policy, and the 2008 Russian-Georgian War”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within this text of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the bibliography.
I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
Signed ………...
2 Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations ... 4
Preface ... 5
Introduction ... 6
Literature Review and Research Design ... 11
Literature on the Russian-Georgian War ... 11
Identity and Foreign Policy ... 12
Foreign Policy and the Other ... 14
Russia as Europe‟s Other ... 15
Discourse and Foreign Policy ... 16
Discourse Analysis ... 18
Discursive Struggles ... 20
Basic Discourses ... 21
Reading the Texts ... 22
Spatial, Temporal, and Ethical Identity Construction ... 24
EU involvement in Georgia before 2008 ... 25
The European Security Strategy ... 26
Rising tensions ... 27
EU involvement in the Russian-Georgian War ... 30
French Mediation ... 31
Russian Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia ... 34
EUMM ... 35
Confrontation ... 36
The Confrontational Approach ... 37
The First Basic discourse: Revisionist, Imperialist, Aggressive Russia ... 39
Temporal Identity Construction ... 40
Ethical identity construction ... 44
Spatial identity construction ... 46
Conclusion ... 48
Cooperation ... 50
Cooperation and Partnership with Russia ... 51
The Second Basic Discourse: Russia as a Partner ... 54
3
Ethical Identity Construction ... 56
Spatial Identity Construction ... 60
Change after Russian Recognition South Ossetia Abkhazia ... 61
Conclusion ... 62
Conclusions ... 64
Bibliography ... 68
4 List of Abbreviations
CSP Country Strategy Paper
EaP Eastern Partnership
ECHO European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (later the European Commission‟s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department)
EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission
ENP European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI European Neighborhood Policy Instrument
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy (later CSDP)
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
EUJUST THEMIS European Union Rule of Law Mission to Georgia EUSR European Union Special Representative
EUSR BST European Union Special Representative Border Support Team
MAP Membership Action Plan
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIF Neighborhood Investment Facility
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
UN United Nations
5 Preface
It has been almost one year since I decided to write my thesis on the construction of Russia in EU foreign policy. The summer of 2014 saw the deterioration of the relationship between the European Union and Russia as a consequence of the Russian annexation of Crimea earlier that year and the secessionist conflicts that subsequently broke out in eastern Ukraine. In debates within the European Union, Russia was constructed as an aggressive Other. These constructions inspired me to research the construction of Russia in that other war between modern Russia and a former Soviet republic, the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. Writing this thesis has been a challenge. It was difficult at times, but mostly I have really enjoyed the thought and writing process. I could not have finished this thesis without the valuable help of others. Therefore, I would like to thank my thesis supervisors for their valuable comments on previous versions of this thesis. Furthermore, I would like to thank my friends and fellow students for reviewing my thesis on several times during the writing process.
6 Introduction
The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 was small in duration, but large in impact. The melting of the frozen conflicts in Georgia sparked a heated debate within the European Union on the future of the relationship between the EU and Russia. Iver B. Neumann has argued that the relationship between Europe and Russia is a relationship between Self and Other, and that Russia had been Europe‟s Other for more than 500 years.1 In this thesis, I will analyze how the understanding of Russia as European Other has been expressed by the member states of the European Union in response to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. I have therefore analyzed the discursive construction of Russia in the EU foreign policy debate on the war.
The Russian-Georgian war was of great significance for the EU‟s relationship with its Eastern neighbors. However, in the summer of 2008 the attention of the Council – which was then presided by France – was not directed towards the EU‟s Eastern neighborhood, but rather to its Mediterranean neighbors in the South. After president Nicolas Sarkozy‟s proposed Mediterranean Union had failed to materialize, he was now determined to make the alternative „Union pour la Méditerranée‟ into a success.
As a consequence, Georgia had been low on the priority list of the French presidency. As a French foreign ministry official stated:
Georgia is not, has never been, and never will be a French national priority. But it is our goal to make sure that Georgia does not become a source of conflict within the Union. Our priority will therefore be to find the middle ground between the positions of those who want to do more to help Georgia and those who do not.2
1 Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1999), 207.
7 The outbreak of war in Georgia in early August 2008, however, forced the French to turn their attention eastwards. The remainder of the French presidency of the Council revolved around mediation in the conflict and the coordination of the EU response to the war.
The outbreak of the war took the European Union by surprise. Not only were the European leaders distracted by the opening ceremony of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, the eruption of one of the frozen conflicts in the shared Russian-European neighborhood was something that most European leaders had not accounted for. In the European Security Strategy [ESS] of 2003, the member states of the European Union had jointly expressed their belief that war on the European continent was something of the past:
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history.3
However, the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war five years later brought an abrupt ending to this period of peace and stability. On the night of August 7, the Georgian army moved its troops into South-Ossetia, a secessionist province in the north of Georgia.4 Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, who aimed to reintegrate South Ossetia and Georgia‟s other secessionist province Abkhazia into Georgia, ordered his troops to regain control over South Ossetia. In the months before, fighting had intensified within the breakaway republic, reaching a climax in early August. A day after Georgia‟s move, Russia – which had supported Georgia‟s separatist provinces since the early 1990s5
– got involved in the conflict. Russia sent its army into South Ossetia and Abkhazia, taking control over important military and transport centers like the port of Poti, and blocking the major East-West road in Georgia. Russian forces also moved beyond South-Ossetia and Abkhazia in the direction of the Georgian capital Tbilisi. On August 12, both Georgia and Russia agreed to a ceasefire by signing a six-point peace plan. The fighting had lasted only five days. The short war nonetheless presented a major challenge to the European Union and its
3
Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, (Brussels, 2003), 1.
4 See Appendix 1 for a map of Georgia, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
5 For a historical overview of the separatist conflicts in Georgia, see Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia‟s
Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for
8 relationship with its Eastern neighbors. In this thesis, I will analyze how the member states of the EU tried to shape the EU response to the war.
The European Union played a unique role in the Russian-Georgian war by becoming the primary mediator in the conflict. Under the leadership of France, which held the presidency of the Council at the time, the EU brokered a six-point peace plan between Russia and Georgia. Furthermore, the EU deployed a monitoring mission to Georgia, appointed an EU Special Representative [EUSR] for the crisis and initiated and chaired the Geneva peace talks. The European Union was able to play an independent role in its neighborhood because of the unwillingness of the US to get involved, the presidency of a strong EU member state like France, and the image of impartiality that the EU held in the eyes of Russia and Georgia. Therefore, the EU did not have to rely on the support of the United States or the international community. The Russian-Georgian war thus allowed the European Union to become an independent security player in its Eastern neighborhood. It is therefore important to analyze the response of the European Union to the Russian-Georgian war separately from the international or Western response to the war.
The war inspired a mosaic of European reactions, ranging from strong condemnations of Russia, to carefully balanced positions, to outright support for Russia‟s position. To analyze the response of the EU to the war, it is therefore important to focus on the debate between these diverging positions and on the way in which they tried to influence EU decision making.
9 How has the understanding of Russia as Europe‟s Other been expressed in
the EU foreign policy responses of the member states of the EU to the 2008 Russian-Georgian war?
To answer this question, I will do a discursive analysis on the debate within the EU on the war.
This thesis will start with a discussion of the literature on which I have built my thesis and the methodological framework that I have used to analyze the EU debate on the Russian-Georgian war. In this chapter, I will explain the methodological choices that I have made and the framework that I have used to do a discursive analysis.
The second chapter will provide a historical background to the involvement of the EU in Georgia before the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war. Understanding this historical background is important to understand what the EU involvement in Georgia looked like when the war broke out in August 2008. This chapter therefore provides a description of the policies of the EU in Georgia since the first EU involvement in Georgia in 1992.
In the next chapter I have analyzed the steps that were taken by the EU in response to the Russian-Georgian war. This chapter provides an overview of the EU‟s involvement in the crisis from the early mediation by France to the appointment of an EUSR to the crisis. This chapter describes the background against which the debate between the member states of the EU took place.
11 Literature Review and Research Design
In this thesis I build on the work of other scholars who have researched the relationship between discourse and foreign policy, the EU‟s relationship with its Eastern neighbors and the Russian-Georgian war before me. This chapter provides a review of what has already been written on the subject of my thesis and how my research project aims to build on these works. Subsequently, this chapter provides a description of the methodological framework that I have used for my analysis.
Literature on the Russian-Georgian War
The short war of August 2008 made a large impact in Europe and beyond. This also becomes clear from the large amount of scholarly attention that the war has received. The majority of the scholarly analyses of the war have focused on the causes and trajectory of the war,6 its impact on regional security,7 or its potential solution.8 Much attention has also been devoted to researching the policies of the EU and its member states in response to the war. The focus in these works is on the EU as a conflict manager in its Eastern neighborhood and EU policy making in crisis situations.9
6 See for example: Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World; Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, eds.,
The Guns of August 2008: Russia‟s War in Georgia (New York: Routledge, 2014); Emmanuel Karagiannis,
“The 2008 Russian-Georgian War via the Lens of Offensive Realism”, European Security 22, no. 1 (2013): 74-93; Vicken Cheterian, “The origins and Trajectory of the Caucasian Conflicts”, Europe-Asia Studies 64, no. 9 (2012): 1625-1649.
7
See for example: Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova, “The Impact of the Caucasus Crisis on Regional and European Security”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 9, no. 3 (2009): 287-300; Sergei Markedonov, “The „Five-Day War‟”, Russian Politics and Law 47, no. 3 (2009): 71-91.
8 Amanda Akçakoka and others, “After Georgia: Conflict Resolution in the EU‟s Eastern Neighbourhood”,
European Policy Centre Issue Paper 57 (2009); Mykola Kapitonenko, “Resolving Post-Soviet „Frozen
Conflicts‟: Is Regional Integration Helpful?”, Caucasian Review of International Affairs 3, no. 1 (2009): 36-44; Licínia Simão, “Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus: Regional Conflicts and Transformation”,
Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 7 (2013): 1485-1486.
9
12 Little attention has been paid to the policy debate that shaped the response of the European Union to the Russian-Georgian war. A few scholars have analyzed the American,10 or the Western policy debate on the war.11 The unique role that was played by the EU in response to the war, however, justifies that separate attention is paid to the European policy debate. Important work on this policy debate has already been done through regional analyses of European responses. These analyses focus on the responses of the Baltic countries and Poland,12 the Visegrad countries,13 and the most powerful member states within the European Union.14 These analyses have greatly contributed to the understanding of the EU policy debate on the war. However, the analyses of these regional debates have thus far not been connected in a broader analysis of the overall debate. This thesis aims to contribute to filling that research gap by analyzing the policy debate on the Russian-Georgian war within the European Union. I will specifically research the construction of Russia as European Other within this debate.
Identity and Foreign Policy
By studying the construction of Russia as European Other, this study researches the relationship between foreign policy and identity. Foreign policy and identity are mutually constitutive. On the one hand, it is through foreign policy that identity is constructed.15 At the same time, however, foreign policy needs to build on already existing constructions of reality. As Lene Hansen argues,
10 See for example: Stephen Blank, “America and the Russo-Georgian War”, Small Wars and Insurgencies
20, no. 2 (2009): 425-451; Oksan Bayulgen and Ekim Arbatli, “Cold War Redux in US-Russia Relations? The Effects of US Media Framing and Public Opinion of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War”, Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 46 (2013): 513-527.
11 Mike Bowker, “The War in Georgia and the Western Response”, Central Asian Survey 30, no. 2 (2011):
197-211.
12 Ainius Lašas, “When History Matters: Baltic and Polish Reactions to the Russo-Georgian War”,
Europe-Asia Studies 64, no. 6 (2012): 1061-1075.
13 David Cadier, “CFSP and Central European Strategic Cultures: the Visegrad Countries and the Georgian
Crisis”, EU Consent (2008).
14 Florent Parmentier, “Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia: Lessons from the Russian-Georgian
War”, European Political Economy Review 9 (2009) 49-61; Henrik B.L. Larsen, “The Russo-Georgian War and Beyond: Towards a European Great Power Concert”, DIIS Working Paper 32 (2009).
15
13 foreign policies rely upon representations of identity, but it is also through
the formulation of foreign policy that identities are produced and reproduced.16
To give meaning to their policies, politicians need to build on already existing constructions of the issue that the policy seeks to address. Foreign policy only becomes meaningful if it constructs the situation that it is addressing. Policies therefore have to construct the threat, country, crisis, or security problem that the policy seeks to address.17 Politicians – and other actors that seek to influence policymaking – need to establish a logical connection between identity and policy. The proposed policy needs to appear both legitimate (the situation requires a policy response) and right (this policy response provides the solution).18 Identity thereby serves as a justification for the policy that is being proposed, while simultaneously identity is (re)produced through these articulations. In doing so, the response draws from already existing constructions of the situation. Simultaneously, by building on these constructions, the policy (re)produces identity. Identity and foreign policy are thus ontologically interlinked.19
Because identity and foreign policy are ontologically interlinked, it is impossible to study foreign policy without studying identity, and vice versa. It is equally impossible to study both concepts in a causal relationship. To study how, for example, identity constructs foreign policy, would require the separation of the two processes of identity construction and the construction of foreign policy. However, it is impossible to study solely how identity constructs foreign policy, because foreign policy constructs identity simultaneously. Separating the process of identity construction from the process of foreign policy making to research a causal relationship between the two is therefore impossible. This study therefore does not aim to research how constructions of Russia as European Other have influenced foreign policy or how foreign policy has resulted in particular constructions of Russia. Rather, I will research how constructions of identity and foreign
16 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London/New York:
Routledge, 2006): 1.
17 Hansen, Security as Practice, 5. 18
Ibid., 25.
14 policy are ontologically interlinked in EU foreign policy responses to the Russian-Georgian war.
Foreign Policy and the Other
In this thesis I have used a relational understanding of identity. Identity is constructed in relation to other identities. As Saussure has argued, this is a relationship of difference.20 Identity is constructed in relation to something which it is not. Meaning is not inherent, but is only produced through difference. To give an example, „dark‟ only becomes meaningful in opposition to „light‟, just as „rich‟ only means something in relation to „poor‟. The concept of difference holds particular relevance in relation to identity and foreign policy. For foreign policy to become meaningful it needs to establish difference between the foreign and the domestic.21 Foreign policy only acquires meaning in relation to domestic policy, in other words in relation to what it is not.
Foreign policy can be understood as expressing an understanding of the Self (the domestic) and the Other (the foreign). The relationship between Self and Other has a long history in the study of identity information. The Self/Other-nexus was first introduced by Hegel, who described it as a relationship of difference:
Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself; and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.22
To be constituted as Self, the Self needs to establish difference between the Self and the Other. This difference is established by giving or withholding recognition of the Other. The Self only acquires meaning in relation to what it is not, namely the Other.
James Der Derian was the first to introduce the study of Self and Other to the discipline of international relations.23 After Der Derian, other IR scholars like Michael Shapiro also
20 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (Peru, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1986). 21 R. B. J. Walker, Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge/New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
22
Hegel, qtd. in Neumann, Uses of the Other, 3.
15 studied international relations as Self-Other relations.24 However, the study of Self and Other in IR theory remained marginal.25 It was not until the publication of Alexander Wendt‟s 1992 article “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics” that identity, and thereby the relationship between Self and Other, became a mainstream object of study in the discipline of international relations.26 During the linguistic turn in International Relations that followed, IR scholars have increasingly studied foreign policy as an expression of the understanding of Self and Other. David Campbell has argued, for example, that foreign policy is justified through the construction of the Other as a threat to the Self.27 The construction of the foreign as a threat justifies foreign policy. Addressing EU foreign policy, Ole Waever has argued that foreign policy is not constructed in opposition to foreign actors, but rather in opposition to constructions of the history of the Self. Weaver argues that EU foreign policy is justified through the construction of Europe‟s violent past as a temporal Other.28
In foreign policy, a construction is thus made of what is Other and foreign, but also of what is not foreign and thus part of the Self.29 As Diez has argued, “the individual act of foreign policy [thereby] becomes an instance of the articulation of the identities of self and other”.30
In this thesis, I will therefore study EU foreign policy as a construction of the identity of Self and Other. The debate within the EU on the Russian-Georgian war focused on the relationship between the European Union and Russia. Therefore, my analysis will focus on the understanding of Russia as European Other in EU foreign policy responses.
Russia as Europe‟s Other
An important contribution to the study of Russia as European Other has been made by Iver B. Neumann. In his 1996 book Uses of the Other: “the East” in European Identity
24
Michael J. Shapiro, The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and
Policy Analysis (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).
25 Neumann, Uses of the Other, 21. 26 Ibid., 31.
27
Campbell, Writing Security.
28 Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in On Security (New York: Columbia University Press
1996), 122.
29 Thomas Diez, “Setting the Limits: Discourse and EU Foreign Policy”, Cooperation and Conflict 49, no. 3
(2014): 325.
16 Formation, Neumann argues that European identity has been constructed in opposition to Russia or „the East‟. He argues that for the past 500 years, Russia has been Europe‟s Other, a contrasting idea or image against which a European identity has been constructed.31 Russia has been constructed as everything that Europe is not – barbaric, authoritarian and Asiatic. According to Neumann, Russia has a:
five hundred-year history of always just having been tamed, civil, civilized; just having begun to participate in European politics; just having become part of Europe. [...] [T]he main metaphor in European discussions of Russian politics and economics has been that of transition (emphasis in original).32
Russia has thus been constructed as being perpetually in transition to Europe. In this thesis I aim to build on the work of Neumann in researching the understanding of Russia as European Other in the EU policy debate on the Russian-Georgian war.
Discourse and Foreign Policy
To analyze identity and foreign policy it is necessary to turn to language, because it is through language that policies are shaped, debates are constructed and arguments are formulated. Furthermore, it is necessary to turn to language because there is no other way of studying reality. Because meaning is always mediated through language, it is impossible to study reality without studying discourse. As Foucault has argued,
We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a legible face which we would have only to decipher; the world is not the accomplice of our knowledge; there is no prediscursive providence which disposes the world in our favor.33
Language is not a neutral medium through which reality can be accessed, but neither is it a smokescreen that prevents us from accessing reality.34 Rather, language constitutes reality. Something can only become part of reality if it can be thought about and expressed through language. It is impossible to move beyond the discursive level to study reality outside
31
Neumann, Uses of the Other, 207.
32 Ibid., 110.
33 Foucault, qtd. in Thomas Diez, “Speaking „Europe‟: The Politics of Integration Discourse”, Journal of
European Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999): 89.
34
Henrik Larsen, “Discourse Analysis in the Study of European Foreign Policy”, in Rethinking European
17 discourse. As Thomas Diez argued, it is therefore “possible to know of reality through linguistic construction only.”35
Therefore, the relationship between identity and foreign policy can only be studied through discourse. To study the understanding of Russia in EU foreign policy I will therefore perform a discursive analysis.
18 Research Design
Discourse Analysis
EU foreign policy is a contested object of study because of its fragmented nature and disputed meaning.36 It is the outcome of the interplay between national foreign policy interests, common interests, and institutional interests. The Russian-Georgian war sparked a mosaic of reactions coming from several layers of government within 27 different member states, as well as from experts, the media, civil society, and many other actors. The object of study of this thesis is thus highly fragmented. The complexity of the interplay between and the sheer number of actors involved in the EU policy debate about the Russian-Georgian war make it impossible to discuss all actors within the scope of this thesis.
I have therefore chosen to analyze the debate on the EU response to the Russian-Georgian war through the responses of the member states. The member states of the European Union are very influential when it comes to EU foreign policy. The reluctance of member states to transfer sovereignty within this domain to the European level has resulted in the fact that decision making on the EU‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy remains largely intergovernmental. In limiting the scope of my research project, I have therefore chosen to focus on the intergovernmental level by analyzing how the member states of the EU have tried to shape the EU response to the Russian-Georgian war through discourse.
Also within member states many different actors try to influence policy making at EU level. The scope of my research project, however, does not allow for the inclusion of all these actors. Therefore I have chosen to research the responses of the actors that were directly involved in shaping policy making within the EU in response to the Russian-Georgian war. When it comes to EU foreign policy, the most influential actors are the heads of state or government and the ministers of foreign affairs of the member states. They are able to influence EU policymaking through the European Council and the Council of Ministers respectively. Focusing on the discourse of this limited amount of actors might
36
Caterina Carta and Jean-Frédéric Morin, eds. EU Foreign Policy Through the Lens of Discourse Analysis:
19 seem irrelevant for studying the wider consensus. However, discourse is never the product of an individual.37 As Larsen has argued, “individual views and identities are constructed by discourses which are formed and changed in social interaction and thus are fundamentally social”.38
Politicians do not act in isolation and have to answer to their government and their constituencies. Therefore they necessarily have to reflect a broader consensus in their policies. Furthermore, in constructing their policies they have to make use of and build on existing discourses. The discourses of this limited amount of actors are thus significant because they are a reflection of larger discourses. Therefore, the discourses of individual politicians at governmental level are representative for more broadly shared discourses within the EU member states. The texts that I have selected to study the discourse of the heads of state or government and the ministers of foreign affairs are statements made by these actors in declarations, speeches or in the media.
I have studied these texts by taking a Derridarean approach to language. Derrida defines language as a system of differential signs. Within this system, meaning is established not by a pre-discursive essence – because there is no reality outside of discourse – but through “a series of juxtapositions, where one element is valued over its opposite.”39
Jacques Derrida builds on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure on difference by arguing that language is a system of differential signs whose meaning is always deferred. Meaning does not stem from the essence of things, but is established through difference. This opposition is a relation of power, in which one term is valued over its opposite. Not only does a sign mean something only in relation to something which it is not, the relationships between two differential signs is a relationship of power in which one sign is valued over its opposite. The relationship between Self and Other is thus a relationship of power. Approaching language from a Derridean perspective has helped me to analyze how the Self and Other are constructed in the EU foreign policy debate on the Russian-Georgian war, and how the relationship of power between Self and Other in these constructions has served to justify the policy options that were proposed by the EU member states.
37 Larsen, “Discourse Analysis in the study of European Foreign Policy”, 65. 38
Ibid., 65.
20 Discursive Struggles
The debate on the Russian-Georgian war involved a struggle over meaning making. Taking a Derriderean approach to discourse, this thesis will argue that meaning is constantly produced and reproduced. Meaning is not fixed, but the site of continuous struggle.40 Discursive struggles try to re-set the limits of the discourse by which they are governed.41 As a result of constant struggle, meaning can only temporarily be fixed.42
Discourse has a double function: a positive, enabling function and a negative, limiting function. Discourse enables certain policy options, while it simultaneously excludes others.43 New policies are built on existing discursive constructions. Discourse thereby provides the context in which policies can meaningfully be articulated. Secondly, discourse also limits what can meaningfully be articulated. Thereby discourse excludes certain policy options. As Diez has argued, “discourse constructs meaning through difference – and therefore through setting the limits”.44
Discourses are involved in a continuous struggle over meaning.45 Within the EU foreign policy debate on the Russian-Georgian war, discursive struggles took place about the limits of legitimate EU policy.
According to Diez, discursive struggles operate on three levels: on the level of individual discourse participants, discursive positions, and overall discourse.46 On the first level, individual discourse participants are engaged in a struggle with the discursive contexts by which they are constrained. The participants are negotiating competing discourses to provide themselves with meanings. On the second level, collective actors articulate their views from discursive positions. These actors are engaged in a struggle with other discursive positions. The third level focuses on overall discourse. At this level, discursive struggle takes place between collective actors, while their discursive positions simultaneously shape their identity. Discursive struggles try to reset the limits of discourse,
40 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). 41 Diez, “Setting the Limits”.
42
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic
Politics, (London /New York: Verso, 2001 (1985)).
43 Larsen, “Discourse Analysis in the study of European Foreign Policy”, 69. 44 Diez, “Setting the Limits”, 321.
45
Ibid.
21 but are simultaneously constrained by it. Through struggles the limits of what is an acceptable policy and what is not can be reset, but these struggles are themselves limited by what can legitimately be said about policies.
In my analysis of the debate on the Russian-Georgian war, I will focus on the second level of discursive struggle. I will analyze discursive struggles between the member states of the EU that seek to shape the identity of the EU. In the policy debate on the Russian-Georgian war, discursive struggles took place between EU member states and between these member states and the EU institutions. I will focus on the discursive struggles between EU member states. To structure my analysis of discursive struggles, I have made use of Hansen‟s concept of „basic discourses‟. Basic discourses are similar to Diez‟s discursive positions.
Basic Discourses
Policy discourses both construct the problems, objects and subjects of the situation at hand and provide policies to address them.47 Although it can be argued that every text constitutes its own discourse, my analysis will focus on „groups‟ of discourses around which the debate is centered. These are what Lene Hansen has referred to as basic discourses:
Basic discourses point to the main points of contestation within a debate and facilitate a structured account of the relationship between discourses, their points of convergence and confrontations; how discourses develop over time in response to events, facts and criticism; and how discursive variations evolve. [They] identify the main convectors of discussion by asking how competing discourses articulate the relationship between Self and Other through the deployment of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities and how they couple identity and policy.48
By analyzing the foreign policy debate within the EU on the Russian-Georgian war, I have identified two basic discourses. I have identified these discourses by reading policy discourses and looking for recurring discursive constructions within these discourses. In the first basic discourse that I have identified Russia is constructed as a revisionist, imperialist aggressor, which justifies a confrontational approach to Russia. The second basic discourse
47
Shapiro, The Politics of Representation.
22 that I have identified constructs Russia as a partner, which serves as justification of an approach based on cooperation with Russia. By choosing to analyze the basic discourses within the debate, not all member states of the EU are discussed in my thesis. However, it does allow for an analysis of the main positions that were taken within this debate.
Reading the Texts
In my analysis of the discursive constructions within the EU debate on the Russian-Georgian war, I have focused in specific on the position design of these constructions. When policymakers defend their preferred policy options, they want to convince their audience of their position. Policymakers therefore try to influence their behavior and thinking. This is what James Paul Gee has referred to as position design, through which “the speaker/writer seeks to invite or hail the listener/reader to assume a particular identity, to be a particular type of recipient that the speaker/writer wants”.49 In defending their policies, politicians try to position their audience to sympathize with and support the policies proposed. Politicians try to make their audience assume a particular identity. I have analyzed how EU politicians have tried to shape the EU‟s response to the Russian-Georgian war through position design, by looking at how they have used discursive constructions to try to make their audience support the policies that they proposed.
To analyze position design in discourse, it is necessary to turn to the „building blocks‟ that constitute discourse. Discourses are constructed through these blocks. James Paul Gee has identified seven building blocks, or what he calls “the seven building tasks of language”.50
These building tasks are significance, practices, identities, relationships, politics, connections and sign systems and knowledge.51 To research the construction of Russia as European other in EU foreign policy discourse, four building tasks are especially relevant: identities, relationships, politics and connections. Below I will explain the significance of these four building blocks and how I have used them to analyze the policy debate on the Russian-Georgian war.
49 James Paul Gee, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method (Milton Park, Abingdon:
Routledge, 2011), 21.
50
Gee, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis, 32.
23 Identities
To study the relationship between identity and foreign policy, it is essential to look at how identities have been constructed in the texts. I have analyzed the construction of the identity of Self and Other by looking at how the domestic and the foreign have been constructed. I have analyzed the understanding of Russia as European Other, and how this understanding has contributed to the construction of the Self.
Relationships
Through discourse relationships are enacted. In the foreign policy debate on the Russian-Georgian war the member states of the EU were trying to shape the relationship between the EU and Russia. In analyzing the texts I have therefore looked at which relationships were pursued by the EU member states in relation to Russia.
Politics (the distribution of social goods)
By analyzing politics (the distribution of social goods) within discourse, it becomes possible to analyze how difference is established between Self and Other. As James Paul Gee has argued, “we use language to convey a perspective on the nature of the distribution of social goods”.52
In analyzing the texts I have looked at the distribution of goods between Self and Other to analyze how this distribution serves to establish difference.
Connections
Through discourse connections are made between different discursive constructions. These connections do not stem from the essence of these discourses, but from social construction. In analyzing the texts I have looked at how certain phenomena are made relevant to other phenomena and how this connection supports the policy proposed.
24 Using these building blocks has helped me to analyze the understanding of Russia as
European Other in EU foreign policy and the different aspects on which this understanding of Self and Other is built.
Spatial, Temporal, and Ethical Identity Construction
The building blocks out of which discourse is built together constitute different types of identities. In this thesis, I will look at three forms of identity construction: spatial, temporal, and ethical identity construction.53 Spatial identities establish a link between identity and a defined space (for example European or Russian identity). Temporal identities focus on temporal constructions of identity through for example continuity, change or development. Ethical identity construction involves the construction of responsibility (for example by constructing the responsibility for the EU to provide a solution for a certain problem). Analyzing the construction of spatial, temporal, and ethical identities, allows me to see how different constructions of identity have shaped the understanding of Russia as European Other in the responses of the member states of the EU to the Russian-Georgian war.
25 EU involvement in Georgia before 2008
The European Union has been involved in Georgia since Georgia declared its independence in 1992. The EU supported the democratic transformation of the former Soviet republics by providing technical assistance. Therefore, the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States program [TACIS] program was launched. The EU was not actively involved in the territorial conflicts in, and over, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Early EU involvement in these conflicts focused on humanitarian assistance through funding by the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office [ECHO].
EU involvement in Georgia increased considerably after 1999, the year in which Georgia and the EU signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement [PCA]. The PCA was intended to facilitate a political dialogue between the EU and Georgia, and included a provision on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the provision that was included Georgia and the EU expressed the hope that the dialogue would “contribute towards the resolution of regional conflicts and tensions”.54
At the 1999 Council meeting in Cologne, this hope was expressed in even stronger words by stating that the PCA would facilitate the solution to the conflicts.55
As political cooperation with Georgia deepened, so did the EU‟s involvement in the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The EU continuously expressed its support for the territorial integrity of Georgia. In the first Country Strategy Paper [CSP] on Georgia, written by the European Commission in 2001, the EU for example expressed a willingness to contribute to conflict settlement based on “the principle of Georgian territorial integrity”.56
To facilitate conflict settlement and the broader political dialogue with Georgia, the EU appointed a special representative [EUSR] to the South Caucasus in July 2003. The appointment of the EUSR signified that the European Union started to view the South Caucasus as a separate region, rather than a part of the larger post-Soviet space.
54 Qtd. in Whitman, “The EU as Conflict Manager?”, 89. 55
Ibid.
26 The European Security Strategy
The EU‟s engagement with Georgia‟s territorial disputes increased strongly after the publication of the first European Security Strategy [ESS] in 2003. In the ESS a connection was made between the territorial conflicts in eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus – including the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia – and European security. Thereby these conflicts were constructed as legitimate objects of EU foreign policy. The Council constructed the conflicts as threats to European security by stating that “violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability.”57 As Campbell has argued, the construction of the foreign as a threat serves as a justification for foreign policy.58 In this case, the construction of the territorial conflicts in the Southern Caucasus and eastern Europe as security threats served as a justification for increased EU engagement with its Eastern neighbors. The Council proposed to “take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus”59
and aimed to establish a „ring of friends‟:
Our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations.60
This ring of friends was to be established through the European Neighborhood Policy [ENP], which was adopted in 2004. Together with Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova in Eastern Europe and Azerbaijan and Armenia in the South Caucasus, Georgia would form the Eastern dimension of the ENP (which would develop into the Eastern Partnership [EaP] after the Russian-Georgian war). EU policies towards Georgia were now guided by the ENP Action Plan and the PCA, and funded through ENP instruments (mainly the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument [ENPI] and the Neighborhood Investment Facility [NIF]).
57
Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels, 2003), 4.
58 Campbell, Writing Security.
59 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Brussels,
2003), 8.
27 After the inclusion of Georgia in the ENP, the EU launched two civilian ESDP missions in Georgia. In June 2004 the Council decided on the establishment of a rule of law mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS. The mission sought to support, mentor and advice ministers and senior officials within the Georgian government. EU JUST THEMIS was accompanied by a border support mission, EUSR BST. Nonetheless, the EU maintained a marginal civilian presence in Georgia and relied on its partners – the US, the UN, and the OSCE – to provide stability in the region.
In the first ENP Action Plan, which was adopted by the EU-Georgia Cooperation Council in November 2006, the EU reaffirmed its support for Georgian territorial integrity. In the Action Plan, Georgia and the EU committed themselves to conflict settlement in Abkhazia and Ossetia on the basis of “respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders.”61
The involvement of the EU in conflict settlement had increased over time. Whereas Heikki Talvitie, the first EUSR to the South Caucasus, was given the mandate to “assist” in the resolution of the territorial conflicts, the next EUSR, Peter Semneby, was given the mandate to “contribute” to their resolution.62
This mandate envisioned a more proactive role for the EUSR in conflict mediation. Rising tensions
In 2008 a number of events contributed to rising tensions in, and over, Georgia. In February of that year Kosovo declared its independence. The United States and the majority of EU member states recognized this independence. Russia, however, strongly opposed Kosovar independence and threatened to use it as a “precedent” for the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.63 Tensions between Russia and the West over Georgia rose even higher after the NATO Bucharest summit, which took place in April 2008. At the summit, the US, the UK and several Eastern European countries proposed to grant Georgia (and Ukraine) a Membership Action Plan (MAP), thereby facilitating their further integration into NATO. The member states of the European Union were divided on the future of Georgia within the West. France and Germany vehemently opposed MAP-status for Georgia and Ukraine. As a
61 European Commission, EU/Georgia Action Plan (Brussels, 2006), 10. 62 Whitman, “The EU as Conflict Manager?”, 91.
63
28 compromise, the NATO countries agreed to reconfirm their support for future NATO membership for both countries and to intensify political cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia in preparation for MAP-status. In the final declaration of the Bucharest summit, the NATO member states welcomed “Ukraine‟s and Georgia‟s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in (and agreed) that these countries will become members of NATO.”64 The statement that Georgia would become a member of NATO contributed to rising tensions between Russia and the West over Georgia.
In the months leading up to the Russian-Georgian war, when tensions between Georgia and Russia were rising, several European leaders paid a visit to Georgia. In May 2008 the heads of state of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden and Slovenia travelled to Tbilisi to show their support for the further integration of Georgia into the West. In June 2008 EU High Representative Javier Solana travelled to Georgia to strengthen the role of the EU as a conflict mediator in the region and to promote trust building activities between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Simultaneously, the EU also sought to strengthen its relationship with Russia. In June 2008 an EU-Russia summit was held in Khanty-Mansiysk. At the summit, the EU and Russia agreed to resume talks on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia. The previous PCA had expired in 2007, and the resumption of talks had long been blocked because of tensions between Russia and several EU member states. At the summit the EU also sought to strengthen its role as mediator in Georgia‟s secessionist conflicts. However, Moscow did not accept conflict mediation by the EU, preferring bilateral talks with Georgia instead.65
The EU has thus been present in Georgia since long before the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war. Although the involvement of the EU in Georgia‟s secessionist conflicts, which was based on the principle of Georgian territorial integrity, had grown over time, the EU still relied on its partners – the US, the UN, and the OSCE – to provide stability in the
64 North Atlantic Council, Bucharest Summit Declaration, (Bucharest, 2008).
65 Vladimir Socor, “Georgia High on the EU Summit Agenda”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 30 June 2008,
30 EU involvement in the Russian-Georgian War
The European Union played an important role as mediator in the Russian-Georgian war. For the first time since its involvement in Georgia, the EU was able to act as an independent security player in the region. It was able to do because the parties that had a stake in the conflict entrusted the EU and especially France, which held the Council presidency, with mediation. The US was unable and unwilling to play a major role in the conflict. The close ties between Washington and Tbilisi prevented the US from becoming an impartial mediator. Furthermore, American politicians were preoccupied with the upcoming presidential elections.66 As French foreign minister Kouchner stated, the involvement of the US in the conflict was therefore only marginal:
The Americans were out. They were nowhere. (...) They were sending a navy ship to the Black Sea, but so what? Nothing! So we had to stop the Red Army ourselves.67
Under Sarkozy, the relationship between France and the US had greatly improved. This contributed to Washington‟s decision to support French/EU mediation in the Russian-Georgian war. The presidency of a strong EU member state like France thus allowed the EU to become a mediator in the conflict. Furthermore, EU mediation was welcomed by Russia and Georgia. The EU was viewed as a more impartial mediator than the United States – which had actively sided with Georgia before and during the war – and the OSCE and UN. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov therefore welcomed “a European solution to the problem”.68
France in particular was viewed by Russia as impartial and therefore a suitable mediator.69 The French government had for example blocked a Membership Action Plan [MAP] for Georgia at the NATO Bucharest Summit of April 2008. Although Georgia would have preferred US mediation, it still preferred the EU over the OSCE and the UN,
66
Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2.
67 Qtd. in Ibid., 203.
68 Tuomas Forsberg, “The EU as Peace-Maker in the Russo-Georgian War”, paper presented at
the Fifth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Porto, 23-26 June 2010, 7.
31 because the latter bodies were viewed as less impartial due to the membership of Russia in these organizations.70
As has been argued in the previous chapter, the EU had significantly increased its policy options and financial instruments to deal with its Eastern neighbors after the 2003 European Security Strategy and the subsequent inclusion of the Eastern neighbors in the ENP. Nonetheless, the response of the EU towards the Russian-Georgian war remained largely intergovernmental, rather than supranational. EU High Representative Solana did not play an active role in conflict settlement. EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner was even less visible. The European Union played an active role in conflict settlement mainly through the diplomatic efforts of France.
French Mediation
The French, holding the presidency of the Council, played a major role in the EU response to the war in Georgia and were the first EU representatives to arrive in Georgia. On August 9 French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner travelled to Tbilisi together with Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb, who held the chairmanship of the OSCE. Jointly, Kouchner and Stubb drafted a ceasefire proposal, which consisted of three major points: the cessation of hostilities; the recognition of Georgia‟s territorial integrity; and the reestablishment of the status quo ante.71As in previous EU declarations on the territorial conflicts in Georgia, the Kouchner-Stubb peace plan upheld the principle of Georgian territorial integrity.
The proposal was agreed upon by Georgian foreign minister Ekaterine Tkeshelashvili and President Micheil Saakashvili. After having obtained the Georgian signature, Kouchner and Stubb travelled to Moscow to persuade the Russian government to agree on the terms of the peace plan. In Moscow, however, Kouchner and Stubb were joined by French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Sarkozy wanted to be personally involved in the mediation process and therefore took over the negotiations from Kouchner and Stubb. He rejected the peace plan
70
Forsberg, “The EU as Peace-Maker in the Russo-Georgian War”, 7.
32 that had been signed in Tbilisi, because he did not want to be bound by the proposal in his negotiations with Russia.72 Therefore Sarkozy brought a new draft proposal with him to the negotiation table in Moscow.
The Six-Point Peace Plan
This new ceasefire proposal left out the reference to Georgian territorial integrity. Furthermore, two new points were added to the Kouchner-Stubb peace plan. Russia was given permission to establish „additional security measures‟ around South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Secondly, point six was added to facilitate a debate on the future status of the two breakaway republics. The six-point peace plan thus contained the following points:
the non-use of force;
the definitive cessation of hostilities; free access for humanitarian aid;
the withdrawal of the Georgian military forces to their usual bases;
the withdrawal of Russian military forces to the lines they held before hostilities broke out. While waiting for an international body, the Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures;
the opening of international discussions on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.73
The six-point peace plan incorporated Russian demands by not including a reference to Georgian territorial integrity and leaving the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia open for discussion. Furthermore, the provision on „additional security measures‟, which was intended to allow Russia to maintain its peacekeeping forces in Georgia, did not differentiate between the army and peacekeeping forces. As a consequence, the plan enabled Russia to open multiple new checkpoints in Georgia, often near important
72 Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World, 196. 73
33 economic infrastructure.74 The French felt that it was needed to give in to some Russia‟s demand. As foreign minister Kouchner stated later:
We wanted to stop the (Russian) Army. That was our purpose, our goal. And in order to stop the Army, we had to accept that they (Russia) are the winners in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.75
Russia signed the peace plan on August 12, but Georgia was vehemently opposed to point five and six of the plan. Both points could potentially undermine Georgian territorial integrity by allowing the presence of Russian troops on Georgian territory and by keeping the possibility of South Ossetian and Abkhazian secession open. After mediation by Sarkozy, Russia agreed to replace „status‟ in point six with a more general reference to „the modalities of peace and security in South Ossetia and Abkhazia‟.76 Furthermore, Sarkozy agreed to write an accompanying letter, in which point five would be explained.77 This side letter stated that:
additional security measures may only be implemented in the immediate proximity of South Ossetia to the exclusion of any other part of Georgian territory. More precisely, „these measures‟ may only be implemented inside a zone of depth of a few kilometers from the administrative line between South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia. (The measures will) take the form of patrols undertaken solely by Russian peacekeeping forces at the level authorized by existing agreements.78
Georgia agreed upon the terms of the six-point peace plan the next day.
The first joint reaction of the EU to the Russian-Georgian war was given after an emergency session of the EU Council on foreign relations, which was held in Brussels on August 13th. During the Council meeting, the ministers of foreign affairs of the EU discussed the six-point peace plan. In its final declaration, the Council expressed its “great concern” over the situation in Georgia and called on all parties to end hostilities.79
The
74 Qtd. in Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World, 211. 75
Ibid., 200.
76 Ibid., 207. 77 Ibid., 206.
78 Qtd. in David L. Philips, Implementation Review: Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement between Russia and
Georgia, (Washington: The National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 2011), 8.
34 Council did not blame any of the parties to the conflict for having initiated the hostilities. The Council also gave its full support for the six-point peace plan and French mediation during the conflict. Finally, the Council briefly discussed the possibility of sending a civilian monitoring mission to Georgia.
Russian Recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
On August 26, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. To formulate an EU response to this recognition, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk requested an extraordinary Council meeting. This meeting, the first extraordinary Council meeting since 2003, took place on September 1st. At the Council meeting it was decided to freeze the negotiations on the PCA with Russia, which were planned for November 2008. The Council also discussed the possibility of sending a civilian monitoring mission and requested the European Commission to conduct an in-depth examination of EU-Russia relations.
On September 8 an EU delegation headed by Nicolas Sarkozy travelled to Moscow. This time he was joined by EU Commission president José Manuel Barrosso and EU High Representative Javier Solana. At the Council meeting of September 1st, the delegation was given full authority to implement the six-point peace plan. In Moscow, the EU representatives and the Russian government signed an implementation agreement. Russia agreed to break down its checkpoints in Georgia within a week, withdraw its troops from Georgian territory around South Ossetia and Abkhazia,80 allow an EU monitoring mission on the ground and participate in the Geneva talks on the future of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were to take place within a month.81 The Geneva talks would be hosted by the EU, in coordination with the UN and the OSCE. The talks would establish an incident prevention and response mechanism, which allowed for weekly meetings between Georgia, Russia, and the mediators.
80
The rest of the withdrawal would happen under the supervision of international monitors.
35 EUMM
The mandate for an EU monitoring mission was given during a Council meeting on September 15th.82 The civilian monitoring mission to Georgia [EUMM Georgia] would replace the Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, monitor the compliance with and implementation of the six-point peace plan and to contribute to stabilization, normalization, and confidence building.83
The final measure that was taken by the EU in response to the Russian-Georgian war, was the appointment of a second EUSR to represent the European Union in implementation talks on the six-point peace plan and the Geneva talks. The European Union thus played a prominent role in the mediation of the Russian-Georgian War, mainly through the diplomatic efforts of president Nicolas Sarkozy. It was the first time that the EU was able to be an independent security actor in its neighborhood. The EU was thus able to agree on a common response to the Russian-Georgian war.
However, by focusing solely on policy outcomes, the debate within the EU that led to these outcomes is overlooked. In the next chapters I will therefore analyze the policy debate within the EU. This analysis shows that the response of the EU to the Russian-Georgian war was not so united as the policy outcomes might suggest. On the contrary, a heated debate broke out about the future of the relationship between the EU and Russia which divided the EU into two opposing camps.
82 European Council, Joint Action on the European Monitor Mission in Georgia, EUMM Georgia, Joint
Action 2008/736/CFSP.
36 Confrontation
My analysis of the EU foreign policy debate on the 2008 Russian-Georgian war focuses on the discursive struggles within this debate. I will analyze discursive struggles between EU member states on the limits of legitimate EU policy in response to the Russian-Georgian war. Two basic discourses emerged within these struggles, one advocating a confrontational approach towards Russia, and the other advocating an approach based on partnership and cooperation. In this chapter I will analyze the first basic discourse in the debate. This basic discourse supports a confrontational approach towards Russia by constructing Russia as a revisionist, imperialist aggressor. The EU member states that have used this basic discourse are Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Great Britain and Sweden.
37 The Confrontational Approach
The countries that are analyzed in this chapter all advocated a confrontational EU response to Russia. Unlike other EU member states, these countries did not hesitate to accuse Russia of having initiated the Russian-Georgian war. The most active within this group were Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In order to get maximum support for their position, these four countries acted as a group by issuing several joint statements and by paying a joint visit to Tbilisi to show their support for Georgia.
Two days after the beginning of the war, the four countries issued their first joint declaration. This declaration was an initiative of the Lithuanian president Adamkus, who was determined to call for a confrontational EU response towards Russia after the Russian bombing campaign of August 8.84 To make his appeal stronger, he contacted neighboring countries to issue a joint statement. Adamkus found the presidents of Poland, Latvia and Estonia willing to participate. The countries issued their joint declaration on Saturday August 9, and kept it open for further signatories. In the declaration, the countries condemned Russia as the principal aggressor in the conflict and called on other countries to support Georgia.85 After Russia had dismissed the ceasefire that had unilaterally been declared by Georgia and threatened to move its troops further towards Tbilisi, the four countries decided to follow up on their joint declaration with a joint visit to Georgia. On August 12, the Polish and Baltic presidents, together with Ukrainian president Yushchenko, travelled to Tbilisi to show their support for Georgia.
Furthermore, Poland and the Baltic states sought support within the EU and NATO for punitive measures against Russia.86 Estonian president Thomas Ilves advocated the suspension of talks on the extension of the EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The Lithuanian ministry of foreign affairs stated that the EU should stop supplying aid to Moscow and cancel talks on the relaxation of the visa regime.87 Poland was highly critical of the approach that was adopted by France, Germany, Italy and other
84 Lašas, “When History Matters”, 1064. 85 Ibid., 1061.
86 Ibid. 87
