Master of Arts Thesis
Euroculture University of Groningen
University of Strasbourg
July 2017
Assessing the role of the EU as a normative power through an examination of the EU – China Comprehensive Investment Agreement negotiations
Submitted by: Nikolaj Lund Hansen S3069478 21516808 nikolajlh@gmail.com
Supervised by: J. Van der Harst – University of Groningen Bianca Polo Del Vecchio – University of Strasbourg
MA Programme Euroculture
Declaration
I, Nikolaj Lund Hansen hereby declare that this thesis, “Assessing the role of the EU as a normative power through an examination of the EU – China Comprehensive Investment Agreement negotiations” submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the Bibliography. I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.
Table of contents
Introduction 5
1.1 Power and international agreements – what role does it play? 5
1.2 Focusing the thesis 7
1.3 Problematizing the EU’s international relations with China 8
1.4 Contextualisation 10
1.5 Methodology 12
1.6 Research ethics 14
Chapter One: Understanding the EU as an international actor 16
1.7 Introduction 16
1.8 The EU as an international actor 17
1.8.1 The realist approach to analysing the EU as an international actor 17
1.8.2 The EU as a civilian power 19
1.8.3 Normative power theory 21
1.8.4 Other perspectives on the NPE theory 27
1.8.5 Criticism of the NPE theory 30
1.9 Case studies of NPE 32
1.9.1 EU – India FTA 32
1.9.2 EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean 34
1.10 Conclusion 36
Chapter Two: Explaining EU foreign policy formation 37
1.11 Introduction 37
1.12 The role of the different EU institutions in forming EU foreign policy 37
1.12.1 The European Council 37
1.12.2 The European Commission 38
1.12.3 The European Parliament 39
1.12.4 The Council of the EU 40
1.12.5 The national parliaments, regions, and governments of EU member states 41
1.12.6 The European External Actions Service 42
1.13 Values and principles in EU foreign policy formation 43
1.14 Tools and instruments of EU foreign policy 46
Chapter Three: Analysis using tripartite model 48
1.16 Introduction 48
1.17 The structure of EU – China relations 48
1.17.1 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the EU and China 48
1.17.2 EU – China Strategic Partnership 49
1.17.3 EU – China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation 50
1.18 Tripartite analysis 50
1.18.1 Principles 50
1.18.2 Actions 54
1.18.3 Impact 56
1.19 Comparison with other case studies 57
1.20 Conclusions 60
Introduction
1.1 Power and international agreements – what role does it play?
What is power? The concept has been discussed extensively for hundreds of years and described in countless different ways. American philosopher Alvin I. Goldman defined power as “the ability to get what one wants, or the ability to realize one’s will”1. An elaboration upon this definition was provided by Robert Dahl who in 1975 wrote, “my intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”2. Robert Dahl’s words extends the definition provided by Alvin. Goldman by incorporating a second actor upon which the first actor attempts to achieve his will or wish. In other words, if the second actor does something that he would not have done otherwise, the first actor has power over the second actor. This idea of the concept of power is related to power as a measure of influence and/or control over an actor and if we relate it to the field of international relations where the actor is traditionally a state, it defines the ability of a state to exercise influence or control over other states within the international system. Such influence can be of coercive, attractive, cooperative or competitive nature and mechanisms of influence include the threat or use of force, economic interaction or pressure, diplomacy, and cultural exchange amongst others.
Technological advances in transportation and telecommunications in the 20th and beginning of the 21st century have had a major influence on the facilitation of interactions between states in the world and resulted in the generation of further interdependence of economic and cultural exchanges3. As a result, states have concluded bilateral and multilateral agreements in areas of cross-border exchanges of goods, services and investment and, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) estimates that international trade has increasing by 7 per cent per year on average in the last 30 years peaking at US$ 18
1 Alvin I. Goldman, “On the Measurement of Power,” The Journal of Philosophy 71, no. 8 (May
1974): 231–52.
2 Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law 6 (1975): 279–95.
3 Martin Wolf, “Shaping Globalization” (International Monetary Fund, 2014),
trillion in 20134. However, given that states in the world are made up of different political, economic, and cultural systems, there is inevitably also large differences in legislation, policy, and regulation between states.
Even in the first era of globalization in the 19th century however, when states began trading with each other, bilateral trade agreements contained more than a mere elimination of tariff barriers between states. The Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between France and Britain, besides reducing tariff barriers between the two states, also contained an unconditional most-favoured-nation clause aimed at guaranteeing equal and non-discriminatory access if France or Britain lowered tariffs with other third countries5. A more recent example of an agreement which contained additional clauses is the Cottoned Agreement concluded between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). Signed in 2000 in Cottoned, Benin6. Articles 8 and 9 in the agreement specifically recognise respect for human rights and fundamental rights and democracy as essential elements constituting the relations between the contracting parties7. Even though the Cotonou agreement is not the first of its kind to combine economic and political topics, it is a prime example of how politics are taking precedence over economic trade. Its blending of aid policy and enforcement of democratisation is an example of this. The agreement has since led to developments in the conclusion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the ACP countries and the EU8. However, the interesting point remains that the ACP countries were obliged to subscribe to political ideologies before trade agreements in the form of EPAs could enter negotiation.
One can thus argue that the EU exhibited a kind of power in its relations with the ACP countries in the sense that succeeded in making the ACP countries do something they might not otherwise have done. I am, however, not arguing that the ACP countries would never embrace and have never embraced ideas about human rights and fundamental rights or democracy, but rather that these are rather European constructs
4 World Trade Organisation, “World Trade Report 2013: Factors Shaping the Future of World
Trade” (World Trade Organisation, 2013),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report13_e.pdf.
5 Ibid.
6 “Partnership Agreement between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of
States of the One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part, Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000” (European Union, 2000), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:22000A1215(01).
7 Ibid.
8 “Overview of Economic Partnership Agreements” (European Commission, 2017),
which have been diffused, although with debatable impact, in the relations between the EU and the ACP countries. The role of power to influence an actor in the international system thus holds a large importance as the interaction between states has the potential to make considerable impact whether it be political, economic or cultural as the briefly above-mentioned is an example of how trade can often be found to be interrelated with political aims.
1.2 Focusing the thesis
The Cotonou agreement between the EU and the ACP countries however does not constitute the focus of this thesis. This agreement has already drawn discussions and publications from several scholars analysing the partnership with a focus on the EU’s role as a normative power in the promotion of an EU identity through self-portraying as a force of good9. Other scholars have scrutinized the partnership from a moral economic perspective10 and analysed the quantum-like superposition of value diffusion and a hidden economic agenda11. Instead, the previous paragraphs have been dedicated to a display of how power can work in international agreements and how states and organisations influence and are influenced by each other.
Rather, the thesis that lie before you has been dedicated to an analysis of the relations between the EU and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), henceforth referred to as China in this thesis, and a re-evaluation of the EU as a normative power in international relations.
China has effectively transformed itself from a crouching tiger, hidden dragon-like state of retaining an isolationist rural economy and protecting its borders to becoming an almost fully-fledged international superpower12. Since 1978 China has been averaging a 10 per cent annual economic growth13 and has become the world’s second largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) according to data obtained from the
9 Sibylle Scheipers and Daniela Sicurelli, “Empowering Africa: Normative Power in EU–Africa
Relations,” Journal of European Public Policy 15, no. 4 (2008): 607–23.
10 Mark Langan, “Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa–EU Ties: A
Conceptual Reorientation of ‘Normative Power,’” New Political Economy 17, no. 3 (2012): 243–70.
11 Christoph Vogel, “The Africa Policy of ’Normative’ Power EU Considering Cotonou
Agreement and Promotion of EPAs” (Universität zu Köln, 2008), http://www.uni-koeln.de/phil-fak/afrikanistik/kant/data/Vogel-KANT2.pdf.
12 Alan De Brauw et al., “The Evolution of China’s Rural Labor Markets during the Reforms,”
Journal of Comparative Economics 30, no. 2 (2002): 329–53.
13 Prableen Bajpai, “The World’s Top 10 Economies” (Investopedia, 2017),
World Bank14. Furthermore, the European Commission assumes that China will potentially become the world’s single largest economy within the next 10 years15.
The rise of China as an economic giant has taken the country on a path to becoming a serious international actor as it has effectively stepped up its efforts in international trade and investment leading it to being the second largest overall trading partner of the EU – only bested by the United States16. However, if one examines only the amount of imports from China to the EU, China emerges as the largest trading partner of the EU constituting 20.2 per cent of all EU imports17. Furthermore, the lack of EU export to China has created a large gap between the two figures and has left the EU with a trade deficit of -174,506 million euros according to numbers from 201518. The same trend of deficit can be found in foreign direct investment (FDI) between the EU and China. A report by research firm Rhodium Group and Berlin-based think tank the Mercator Institute for China Studies projects an estimation of Chinese investment in the EU (inward investment) to have reached 35.1 billion euros in 2016 whereas investments from the EU in China (outward investment) has fallen to 7.7 billion in euros in 2016 thus creating a significant investment deficit in this area as well19.
1.3 Problematizing the EU’s international relations with China
Such large flows of capital between the EU and China and the subsequent investment deficit following China’s entry into the world economy have not gone unnoticed in the EU either, and was highlighted by former EU Trade Spokesman for then-EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, John Clancy in 2014 when he gave the following statement:
The current level of bilateral investment between the EU and China is way below what could be expected from two of the most important economic blocks on the
14 “Gross Domestic Product 2015” (World Bank, 2015),
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.
15 “Facts and Figures on EU-China Trade” (European Commission, 2014),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144591.pdf.
16 Ibid.
17 European Commission, “European Union, Trade in Goods with China,” n.d.,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf.
18 Ibid.
19 Thilo Hanemann and Mikko Huotari, “A New Record Year for Chinese Outbound Investment
planet. Whereas goods and services trade between the EU and China are worth well over €1 billion every day, just 2.1% of overall EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is in China. The main purpose for these negotiations is the progressive abolition of restrictions on trade and foreign direct investment and to improve access to the Chinese market for EU investors20.
John Clancy’s statement was given in the context of the then-upcoming first round of negotiations between the EU and China regarding a comprehensive – meaning applying for all EU states – EU-China investment agreement. The EU – China bilateral investment agreement project was launched on 21 November 2013 at the 16th EU – China Summit during which the two parties made significant progress in their cooperation and mutual interest by jointly adopting the EU – China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation21. The strategic agenda listed the negotiation and conclusion of such an investment agreement as one of its key and most important initiatives. John Clancy’s words echoes a speech given by then-EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht to Members of the European Parliament (MEP) in plenary in Strasbourg on 8 October 2013 in which the commissioner shared some of the EU’s concerns regarding the investment deficit with China. He specifically listed market access and investment protection as the main objectives of the negotiations as well as emphasised the EU’s aim of using the negotiations to promote general external action principles22. The general external action principles to which Karel De Gucht referred are guided and informed by Treaty of Lisbon which, in article 21, states that:
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.23
The words found in article 21 thus effectively mean that whenever and if ever the EU engages itself on the international scene and conducts foreign policy, it must always
20 “EU and China Begin Investment Talks” (European Commission, January 20, 2014),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-33_en.htm.
21 “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” (European Union External Action Service,
2013), http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/china/documents/news/20131123.pdf.
22 Karel De Gucht, “On the EU-China Investment Agreement” (European Commission, 2013),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/tradoc_151819.pdf.
23 “Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
take into consideration, promote, and protect the principles, or norms, which are the foundations of its own existence. Failure to do so would thus undermine the EU’s legitimacy in conducting foreign policy and signing international agreements. This also constitutes the theoretical turn in academia and foreign policy analysis of categorising the EU as a normative power in the field of international relations and European studies because in order for the EU to be defined as a normative power international affairs, it is required to perform a certain degree of norm diffusion i.e. transmit EU constitutive values to third countries, international fora, or at the very least succeed in create an impact on the perception of what can be considered discursively normal in international relations24. The theoretical foundations for describing the EU’s role in international relations as a normative power and a discussion and literature review thereof will be revisited later in this thesis during the theoretical chapter.
1.4 Contextualisation
The move of the EU to engage itself in the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral investment and trade agreements with third countries also finds its origins in the Treaty of Lisbon. The treaty transferred the competence of international trade relations and FDI negotiations from being a member state competence to being an EU competence by broadening the existing Common Commercial Policy (CCP). Article 206 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that:
By establishing a customs union in accordance with Articles 28 to 32, the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers25.
A regulation of the European Parliament (EP) and of the Council of the European Union, henceforth referred to as the Council, in 2014, provided for an establishment of transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between member states and third countries so as facilitate the transferral of competence and provide more specific
24 Ian Manners, Kenneth Lynggaard, and Karl Löfgren, eds., Research Methods in European
Union Studies, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
25 “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union” (European
Union, 2008),
details on the negotiation of BITs both on behalf of member states and the EU26. The regulation provides for a continuation of a BIT between a member state and a third country until such time that the EU has concluded such an agreement with the same third country and that agreement has entered in to force and also allows for the negotiation of BITs between member states and third countries provided the member state obtains approval from the European Commission (the Commission)27. The 1219/2012 regulation also provides for a roadmap for future investment relations between the EU, member states and third countries by foreseeing a gradual and progressive replacement of member state BITs for EU wide BITs.
In the interest of Union investors and their investments in third countries, and of Member States hosting foreign investors and investments, bilateral investment agreements that specify and guarantee the conditions of investment should be maintained in force and progressively replaced by investment agreements of the Union, providing for high standards of investment protection28.
It is therefore not simply a one-off case in which the EU is opening negotiations with China but part of a larger trend within the EU to standardise and unify BITs between member states and third countries. And since the entry into force of the TFEU and the transferral of competence in negotiation BITs, the EU has vamped up its efforts to conclude such agreements. So far, investment negotiations have been concluded with Canada, Singapore and Vietnam while negotiations are still ongoing with many more countries such as Australia, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the Mercosur sub-regional bloc29.
The EU – China investment agreement negotiations should therefore be perceived as a continuation of this process of replacing member state BITs with EU-wide encompassing BITs which apply the same rules and regulations for all EU member states. The aim of this thesis is therefore to contemplate the theory of the EU as a normative power in international politics and test the hypothesis in the case of the EU – China Comprehensive Investment Agreement negotiations to obtain confirmation or rejection
26 “Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December
2012 Establishing Transitional Arrangements for Bilateral Investment Agreements between Member States and Third Countries” (European Union, 2012), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R1219&from=EN.
27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
29 “Overview of FTA and Other Trade Negotiations” (European Commission, 2017),
of the hypothesis and theory. The broad and overarching research question will therefore be the following:
To what extent does the EU act as a normative power in the EU – China Comprehensive Investment Agreement negotiations?
The first chapter consists of an introduction to foreign policy analysis with an extensive discussion and overview of the literature on the theory of normative power, tracing the steps from its inception to current contributions to the theory in combination with conducted case studies of its applicability and criticism of the theory. The second chapter consists of explanation of how EU foreign policy is made, how the decision-making process works in theory by considering the role of the Lisbon Treaty, and the different EU institutions, the tools which the EU has at its disposal in foreign policy. The third and final chapter consists of an analysis of primary and secondary data to conduct an examination of the EU’s role as a normative power in negotiations in and around the EU – China investment agreement.
1.4.1 Methodology
The research conducted in the writing of this thesis thus take on a rather deductive quality. Deductive research aims at examining theories proposed by other scholars and test their applicability and validity. As such a deductive research project typically starts by contemplating a theory and then proceeds to collect data for analysis that is fitting for the theory. On the other hand, if one starts by looking at collected data and then proceeds to construct a theory, it is likely that one is more engaged with what is called inductive research. While both approaches serve a valid and specific purpose, I found myself very intrigued by normative power theory in the context of European foreign policy analysis and therefore decided to dedicate my thesis to the testing of the theory in a chosen case. See below figure for process of deductive research.
methodologies deriving methods and strategies from other academic disciplines30. The idea has started to gain ground and some scholars are starting to embrace a cross-disciplinary approach by combining normative power theory and role theory, for example31.
The dichotomy between inductive and deductive research further echoes the methodological worldview divide that existed in European studies in the 1990s between the theoretically driven rationalist and the empirically driven constructivist32. The analytical inductive researcher is sometimes argued to be of a higher quality than the hypothetical deductive researcher due to their commitment to devising testable hypotheses and theoretical causal claims – a ‘rivalry’ which does not benefit the advancement of academic knowledge when it can be argued that academia gains more from moving back and forth between the two approaches33. In the context of this thesis, this would mean that an optimal result of my research would not consist of only a rigid examination of the data according the theoretical assumptions but also incorporate alternative hypotheses and interpretations of the data.
Since the research conducted for the purpose of this thesis is grounded in the application and testability of normative power in the context of European foreign policy, certain fundamental methodological choices have to be made. Even though Ian Manners, the scholar behind the application of normative power theory to describe the role of the EU in global politics has recently argued for using the method of longitudinal interpretation to tackle the analytical constraints to normative power research, taking into account norm changes occurring over large periods of time, such an approach is often – and also in this thesis – impossible to undertake due to time constraints34. As such, this thesis focuses only on one aspect of EU foreign policy: trade and investment policy. Furthermore, due to lack of time and space, the research laid out in this thesis also only account for a time frame from 2013 when the EU – China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation was adopted and the official steps towards negotiating a comprehensive
30 Manners, Lynggaard, and Karl Löfgren, Research Methods in European Union Studies. 31 Vogel, “The Africa Policy of ’Normative ’ Power EU Considering Cotonou Agreement and
Promotion of EPAs.”
32 Kenneth Lynggaard, Ian Manners, and Karl Löfgren, “Crossroads in European Union Studies,”
in Research Methods in European Union Studies, ed. Kenneth Lynggaard, Ian Manners, and Karl Löfgren (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
33 Ibid.
34 Ian Manners, “The European Union in Global Politics: Normative Power and Longitudinal
investment agreement was launched. This does not, however, mean that there will not be data incorporated dating from before the year 2013 but only that the vast majority of data and attention given to the topic is focused on data from 2013 until today.
And, although this thesis is a very specific case study of the EU’s normative role in the EU – China investment negotiations, as emphasised by Ian Manners in his construction of a normative power research design, there needs to be a comparative element to the research35. This means that the results obtained from the analysis of the data needs to be compared to results from other case studies on the EU as a normative power. The underlying reason for this is clearly that in order for something to become normative in principle, it needs consistency. Otherwise it goes from normative to extraordinary. Therefore, in the theoretical chapter, an exploration of past research on the EU as a normative power has been incorporated for comparison in the analysis chapter.
Another methodological choice advocated by Ian Manners is whether to construct the research design to be causal or constitutive in nature. A causal method of analysis is concerned with how principles, actions, and impact cause a change in the principles of the other party. However, as the negotiations between the EU and China have not yet to be concluded, this thesis will employ a constitutive research design aimed at analysing how principles, actions, and impact mutually construct the EU as an actor and role in global politics36. Employing a causal method of analysis would prove much more difficult at the current state of negotiations between the EU and China as its focuses would essentially be on the result of the negotiations and how it impacts China. However, once negotiations have concluded and an investment agreement has been signed, such an approach will be much more feasible and capable of yielding interesting results.
This thesis employs discourse analysis as its mode of analysis and adopts a tripartite model of analysis as constructed by Ian Manners focusing on how principles and values inform EU foreign policy, how actions taken to promote such principles and values construct EU actorness, and what kind of impact that these actions have on China.
1.5 Research ethics
At any given time when a European researcher sets out on a quest to conduct research on a topic, they must be aware of some of the pitfalls of their own bias toward
the subject matter. As has been pointed out by scholars over the years such as Edward Saïd in his 1978 book Orientalism on the cultural (mis)representation and creation of knowledge by the West, academics must be cautious not to engage in exaggerations of difference and the presumption of Western superiority37. Of course, Edward Saïd’s book dealt mainly with the Western perception of the Middle East but nevertheless, the idea of attempting to remain neutral in intellectual enquiry remains an important point. It is therefore also paramount that this thesis also attempt to stay neutral in its analysis and avoid a worldview centered on European exceptionalism. This includes avoiding tendencies toward awarding too much focus to European achievements and accomplishments, underplaying sins and crimes committed by Europeans and giving disproportionate space to a European-centered history38.The researcher must thus avoid a Eurocentric analysis both quantitatively in terms or space and qualitatively in terms of detail and accuracy.
However, the topic of this thesis remains highly Eurocentric in its nature as it presents an analysis of EU foreign policy and its consequential effect on the actorness of the EU in international politics. Furthermore, being a EU national myself and having been engaged in the study and work of EU politics and diplomacy over the last two years, it is entirely possible that the research laid out in this thesis may display slight Eurocentric traits and qualities. It should however be noted that much effort has been dedicated to avoiding such injustices.
37 Edward Saïd, Orientalism (Pantheon Books, 1978).
38 Rajani Kannepalli Kanth, ed., The Challenge of Eurocentrism: Global Perspectives, Policy, and
Chapter One: Understanding the EU as an international actor
1.6 Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to an exploration of the most important theoretical frameworks of analysis that contain applicability in the field of international relations to studying EU foreign policy. Because this thesis is concerned with deductive testing of a theory to describing the actorness of the EU in international politics – a normative power – it is also important to consider other theoretical approaches to the topic. This will allow for a better understanding of the pros and cons of each theory and a better understanding of why the normative power theory has been chosen as the framework of analysis of EU foreign policy in the context of the EU – China investment negotiations. This chapter will also give a detailed account of the normative power theory, why it has gained importance in the academic community, how the theory is structured, how and what developments it has seen since its inception, and how it is used in practice in analysis. This chapter also provides an overview of current research conducted within the framework of normative power with a specific focus on case studies of EU foreign policy which in turn allow for a comparative aspect later in this thesis. Lastly, this chapter reviews some of the criticism of the theory that other scholars have put forth in recent years as the theory still remains a highly debated subject in the academic community.
The introduction to studying the EU as an international actor did not preoccupy the minds of scholars much until after the fall of the Berlin wall and the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)39. Before the signing of the TEU, most scholars in the field of European Studies were mostly concerned with studying and explaining the processes of European integration through the application of mainstream integration theories40. This however changed with signing of the TEU and there has been an increasing focus on analysing and understanding the role that the EU plays in world politics and what kind of political entity it represents by putting an emphasis on the values, principles, and images that inform and shape the EU as an actor41. The research
39 Richard G. Whitman, “Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and
International Relations,” in Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Richard G. Whitman (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
40 Ibid.
41 Sonia Lucarelli, “Values, Principles, Identity and European Union Foreign Policy,” in Values
thus take on answering the question of how can we understand the EU’s identity in international politics better by applying innovative theoretical and methodological frameworks42. The rise of the EU in global politics has almost aligned with the introduction of the epistemological debate concerning the way in which we can understand the underlying nature of international relations and how we can study interaction between actors in international politics43. This shift is also known as the third Great Debate – or the fourth Great Debate depending on one’s recognition of the inter-paradigm debate as constituting a Great Debate44 - which was – and to some extent still is – a debate between scholars adhering to one of the two major camps of international relations – the positivist and the post-positivist45. This thesis does not intend to poke to the fire on the debate but merely attempts to highlight two almost simultaneous events in the field of international relations – the third Great Debate and the entry of the EU on the international scene with the signing of the TEU - and how it can be perceived as a symbol of the changing nature of how to study international institutions and actors.
1.7 The EU as an international actor
1.7.1 The realist approach to analysing the EU as an international actor
The thesis that lies before you finds its existence in the examination of the validity of viewing the EU as a normative power in international relations. As such, by its very nature, this thesis also contends that adopting a classical approach to describing the role of the EU in international relations is therefore insufficient. The EU represents an evolution in the characteristics that define and embody an international actor and thus we need to engage in a re-examination and discussion about how we as an academic community – professors, researchers and students alike – perceive and define the very nature of international politics. This should not only apply to studies of the EU as actor in international relations but also to other multilateral and regional organisational systems
42 Ibid.
43 Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” International Studies
Quarterly 32, no. 4 (1988): 381–86.
44 Ole Wæver, “The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate, International Theory: Positivism
and beyond,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
45 Yosef Lapid, “The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist
in the world that transcends single nations states such as the study of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) amongst many others. Patterns of development in the post-World War II era necessitates a re-evalutation in the scholarship of international relations. The same holds true for the study of the EU in international relations46. As Ginsberg argued in 1999, there is a need for developing new explanatory concepts and analytical models to conceptualising the EU’s external identity and remains valid to this date47.
A realist analysis of the EU’s actorness in international politics will argue that the EU cannot become a traditional international actor as long as it does not dispose of any coercive (i.e. military) power or a centralised and efficient decision-making instrument to use it48. Realists perceive the international system as an anarchic system in which nation states are the primary actors who are rational and whose final goal is always survival49. Realist theory thus remains a very state-centric analysis of international relations which does not account for collective will and a group of actors doing what is best for the group as a collective as opposed to what is best for the individual actor50. Instead, it takes a much more pessimistic stance on international organisations by viewing them more as instruments of influence of national governments who uses them to in the effort of maximising their own interest51.
The other core tenet of a realist analysis of the EU’s actorness is that it is undermined by a ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’. The arguments put forth are that despite the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar of the EU with the entry in to force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) there exists(ed) a significant gap between what the then-European Communities (EC) argued that it would be able to do and what it was then able to deliver on52. This inherent inability to achieve concrete results in foreign policy can be perceived as a consequence of the level of current
46 Ian Manners, “Towards Identifying the International Identity of the European Union: A
Framework for Analysis of the Eu’s Network of Relationships,” Journal of European Integration 21, no. 3 (1998): 231–49.
47 Roy H. Ginsberg, “Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing
the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap,” Journal of Common Market Studies 37, no. 3 (1999): 429– 54.
48 Nick Wright, “The European Union: What Kind of International Actor,” Political Perspectives
5, no. 2 (2011): 8–32.
49 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Knopf, 1978). 50 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Mass McGraw-Hill, 1979).
51 Kenneth Neal Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security 25, no. 1
(2000): 5–41.
52 Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International
integration which imposes the European Council and the Council to act unanimously in CFSP matters53. The ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ has since been developed further in light of developments in EU decision-making by reconceptualising it as rather a ‘Consensus-Expectations Gap’. The argument is that, while the EU now disposes of the necessary capabilities and institutions, it still remains incapable of delivering the necessary foreign policy results due to decision-making procedures and the inability to overcome dissent and find common consensus54. An example of such is how the EU failed in intervening in the Sudanese province of Darfur55. This lack of common consensus-making has thus resulted in a scenario in which, the EU has a tendency of cherry-picking the issues in which consensus can be reached56.
If one takes the stance of a realist in international relations, the EU will thus appear a weak and insignificant actor – if an actor at all – on the world scene. And that is precisely why there is a need for a better theoretical model of analysis of the EU as an international actor because the realist model of analysis cannot be used to explain the influence of the EU without the use of coercive force. The realist approach could however be used as a guide on how the EU could gain more influence and establish itself as a more powerful actor in the world but it does not offer the student of international relations enough tools and a proper framework to analyse and understand EU foreign policy and the role of the EU in international politics.
1.7.2 The EU as a civilian power
Another approach to defining the role of the EU in international politics takes the point of view that the EU is better described as a civilian power. This approach was initially advanced by François Duchêne in 1973 who claimed that traditional military means of influence in the world had become overshadowed by more civilian means of influence including economic, diplomatic, and cultural policy instruments and that describing the EU as a civilian power was more accurate as it commanded considerable
53 Wright, “The European Union: What Kind of International Actor.”
54 Asle Toje, “The Consensus-Expectations Gap: Explaining Europe’s Ineffective Foreign Policy,”
Security Dialogue 39, no. 1 (2008): 121–41.
55 Ibid.
economic power but very little military power57. This theory however, like the realist approach to international relations, also remain state-centric in its nature while at the same time emphasising the same need for an effective decision-making process as a fundamental aspect to asserting influence58. Development to this approach was later added by Hanns Maull who stressed:
1. the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives;
2. the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interaction; and
3. a willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international management59.
Ambiguity however remains about where to draw the line between civilian and military means of influence. Often, peace-keeping missions are referred to as a civilian foreign policy instrument but as the soldiers sent on peace-keeping missions may or may not be armed they are still soldiers and as such have received training in the act of killing60. As such, defining the EU’s role as that of a civilian power necessitates the non-use of any military personnel. It has even been argued that EU’s lack of developing a proper defence policy and military identity has more to do with the protection of the continuation of NATO than it has to do with the EU attempting to remain a civilian power and therefore the EU became a civilian power by default61. Scholars debating the validity of the civilian power theory therefore perceive the role of the EU as a civilian power more as a temporal status-quo which can possible change under the right circumstances, dictated by other factors in the world rather than a specific position consciously taken by the EU62.
57 François Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence,” in A
Nation Writ Large? Foreign-Policy Problems before the European Community, ed. Max Kohnstamm and
Wolfgang Hager (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1973).
58 Wright, “The European Union: What Kind of International Actor.”
59 Maull Hanns, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,” Foreign Affairs 69 (1990): 92–
93.
60 Karen E. Smith, “Still ‘Civilian Power EU’?” (Paper presented at the CIDEL Workshop, ‘From
Civilian to Military Power: The European Union at a Crossroads?, Oslo, 2007), http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/projects/cidel/old/WorkshopOsloSecurity/Smith.pdf.
61 Karen E. Smith, “The End of Civilian Power EU: A Welcome Demise or Cause for Concern?”,”
The International Spectator 35, no. 2 (2000): 11–28.
62 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. (Alfred
The two approaches to defining the EU’s role become almost paradoxical in nature. The realist will argue that the EU is and will never become a proper international actor without the capacity to use coercive military means whereas the civilian power approach necessitates the non-use of military means. The view that the EU as a civilian power cannot incorporate military means however remains a debated aspect of the theory. Some scholars believe that military capacity is a necessity in the design of a civilian power as a last resort to uphold civilian values63. The very existence of the civilian power approach has also been called into question in recent years. It has been suggested that an explanation for this can be found in the vagueness of Duchêne’s original idea which has lend itself to extensive debate on the different ways of interpreting the notion64. As has been pointed out also, is that an important aspect of the civilian power Europe theory is its normative dimension65. This idea echoes the original words of Duchêne who correctly remarked that Europe must undertake the task of diffusing civilian and democratic standards as well as promoting values that are fundamental to the existence of the Europe such as equality, justice, and tolerance66.
Due to the vagueness of Duchêne’s original idea and what the natural qualities of a civilian power constitute, the academic discussion of the validity of the theory is therefore not a closed chapter. It still holds relevance despite its ancienneté and scholars still struggle to define the theory67.
1.7.3 Normative power theory
Duchêne’s remarks on the normative aspect of civilian power Europe has led to the conceptualisation of a ‘new’ theory which takes that aspect as its main tenet by arguing that civilian power Europe’s main characteristic is essentially its emphasis on using civilian instruments68. Ian Manners instead advances the argument that the normative dimension should take centre-stage in the way that we perceive and understand
63 Stelios Stavridis, “‘Militarising’ the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited,”
International Spectator 41, no. 4 (2001): 43–50.
64 Jan Orbie, “Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates,” Cooperation
and Conflict 41, no. 1 (2008): 123–28.
65 Stavridis, “‘Militarising’ the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited.” 66 Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence.”
67 Cloë Gotterson, “Is Europe Better Described by a ‘Civilian’ or ‘Normative’ Power Model?”
(Atlantic Community), accessed October 5, 2017, http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/PowerEurope.pdf.
the role and identity of the EU in foreign policy. He further argues that the normative power theory was also conceived as an attempt to escape the post-colonial civilising element that flows through the civilian power approach69. In a now much quoted article from 2002, Manners lays out his vision of the EU as a normative power – one which rests on three legs: the EU’s normative difference, the EU’s normative basis, and the diffusion of EU norms70. What Manners argue in his inception article is that perceiving the EU as a normative power - e.g. the ability to shape discourse and/or agenda and influence other actors in a desired direction - does not reject notions of the EU’s military or civilian power but that normative power can provide an overarching development on the understanding of the role and identity of the EU in the world71. The problem with perceiving the EU as either a military or civilian power, argues Manners, is that both approaches are too state-centric in nature and are too focused on empirical analysis of institutions and policies72. Manners thus also implicitly take a worldview stance on the Great Debate between positivists and post-positivists by rejecting the notion that the world and international relations can only be studied in an objective and value-free manner with states at the heart of its interest. He argues that as opposed to previous research which has focused on what the EU says and does as a power, the most important factor in understanding the EU’s role lies in what the EU is73. The normative power approach is broadly speaking a constructivist view of foreign policy which posits that normative power is about attempts to influence conceptions of what can be considered normal in global politics and which treats an actor’s communicative discourse as being constitutive of both its interests and behaviour74.
To further differentiate his approach to that of civilian and military power, Manners provides a simply but concise table to highlight the inherent differences in how each theoretical approach characterise the traits constituting actors.
69 Ian Manners, “The European Union as a Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez,”
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2006): 167–80.
70 Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” 71 Ibid.
72 Ibid. 73 Ibid.
74 Ben Rosamond, “Three Ways of Speaking Europe to the World: Markets, Peace, Cosmopolitan
Civilian Military Normative
Carr Economic Military Opinion
Galtung Remunerative Punitive Ideological
Manners Ability to use
civilian instruments Ability to use military instruments Ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ Source: Ian Manners’ article Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? (2002)
From the table, we can draw the conclusion that for Manners, the normative power approach constitutes a new cornerstone in how we attempt to analyse the role of the EU. With this table, Manners also rejects the centrality of using instruments in foreign policy as the EU’s difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative manner. Manners does not however necessarily perceive the ability to use military instruments as undermining the notion of the EU as a normative power provided that the usage of such instruments undergo a process of critical reflection upon the nature, principles and purpose military instruments75. He argues that despite a prioritisation of military affairs in contrast to civilian affairs in the early 2000s during the war in Iraq, and various EU-coordinated efforts such as EUPM, EUPOL Proxima, EUJUST Themis, and EUPOL Kinshasa, the EU differs from other international powers using military instruments by prioritising a doctrine of preventive engagement and civil crisis management with the aim of obtaining human security and sustainable peace76. But he does recognise a potential for the undermining of the EU’s normative power as the EU gains more military capability77. Manners’ predisposition on a constructivist approach via normative power does however not mean that the theory cannot be adopted to a more rationalist approach. As Richard Youngs points out, the possibility of studying the EU as a normative power through rationalism remains a possibility by focusing on strategies, the degree of
75 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads,” Journal of
European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 182–99.
instrumentalisation, and the policy-making process78. A co-existence between a study of normative action and strategic or self-interested action79.
Manners draws on other scholars in political science to make the argument that because the EU represents such a unique and new political form, the way that we attempt to understand it also necessitates an innovate and ‘new’ framework. He argues that the constitutional norms made explicit in the Copenhagen criteria including the principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice, and respect for human rights are the constitutive building blocks of the EU’s international identity from which it also derives its legitimacy and the way that these norms inform and condition the EU’s external relations is what constitutes the EU’s normative difference80. This view of foreign policy as internally constituted necessitates an inside-out analytical strategy.
Manners then lays out his perception of what constitutes the EU’s normative basis – a basis that was further constituted with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty81 - by identifying five core norms found in EU legislation and policy which are sometimes referred to as the acquis communautaire including: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms82. In addition to these five norms, Manners furthermore identifies four minor norms which help explain and understand EU policy including: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance83. Manners includes a table to help create the link between principles, institutions, objectives, and rights.
78 Richard Youngs, “Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’s External Identity,”
Journal of Common Market Studies 42, no. 2 (2004): 415–35.
79 Tuomas Forsberg, “Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal
Type,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49, no. 6 (2011): 1183–1204.
80 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: The International Role of the EU” (The European
Union between International and World Society, Madison, Wisconsin, USA: European Community Studies Association, 2001).
81 Ian Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union,” International Affairs 84, no. 1
(2008): 45–60.
82 Ian Manners, “The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics” (Danish Institute of
International Studies, 2009),
http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/68745/B09_maj_Concept_Normative_Power_World_Politics.pdf.
Founding Principles
Tasks and Objectives
Stable Institutions Fundamental Rights
Liberty Social solidarity Guarantee of
democracy Dignity
Democracy Anti-discrimination Rule of law Freedoms Respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms
Sustainable
development Human rights Equality Solidarity
Rule of law Protection of
minorities Citizenship Justice Treaty base – set
out in art. 6 of TEU
Treaty base – set out in arts. 2 of TEC and TEU, arts. 6 and 13 of TEC
Copenhagen criteria – set out in the conclusions of the June 1993 European Council Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union Source: Ian Manners’ article Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? (2002)
The final leg comprising the stool upon which rests the Normative Power Europe (NPE) theory deals with the diffusion of norms. Manners identifies six mechanisms of diffusion through which the EU constructs its own identity as well as influences other actors:
1) Contagion – unintentional diffusion from the EU to other actors. 2) Informational diffusion – diffusion through strategic communications.
3) Procedural diffusion – achieved through an institutionalisation of a relationship between the EU and another actor.
4) Transference – diffusion through exchange of goods, trade, aid or technical assistance.
5) Over diffusion – diffusion as a result of physical presence of the EU in other states or organisations.
6) Cultural filter – diffusion through exchanges on the construction of knowledge and the creation of social and political identity by the subjects of norm diffusion.84
These three legs of the NPE stool thus constitute what has come to become known as the tripartite method of analysis in NPE theory. As discussed earlier in the methodological chapter, the tripartite method is comprised of a three-step analysis of principles, actions, and impact. The first step is to analyse how the principles laid out above inform and condition the foreign policy of the EU, how these principles construct the EU as an actor and how the promotion of these principles represents an extension of the EU polity85. In the specific context of this thesis, this means that the analysis chapter will attempt to explain how principles of the EU condition the policy approach that the EU takes towards China in relation to the investment negotiations. The second part of the tripartite method should analyse the actions that the EU take in the promotion of its principles e.g. how structural and political challenges can be met through actions while at the same time explaining how such actions construct the EU as an actor86. The third and final part of the tripartite method lies in the examination of the impact of the principally informed actions taken by the EU to address challenges e.g. a third country being part of an open-ended engagement with the EU while retaining a critical perspective on how such impact can cause a reconsideration of the principle being promoted87. The impact of actions, argues Manners, can often take the form of normative justification.
It has been argued that NPE is essentially a self-empowering exercise and that the idea of the EU as being normative and powerful at the same time is a contradiction in terms, but Manners argues that this is a miscomprehension of the idea88. He argues that the notion of the EU as a normative power is grounded in the EU promotion of generally acknowledged normative principles in the United Nations system89. NPE theory thus has on an ethical dimension to it and a normative power exercise following the tripartite method of analysis means that the way in which the EU promotes ethical principles is by the EU as living by example, its actions being reasonable, and the consequence of its impact as being the least harmful with the overall aim of creating a more just, cosmopolitan world, thus normative in the ethical sense of the word90.
85 Manners, “The European Union in Global Politics: Normative Power and Longitudinal
Interpretation.”
86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.
88 Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union.” 89 Ibid.
The theory of the EU as a normative power has since become a hot topic of discussion diffusing from academics, to policy-makers, to decision-makers, and to international journalism with terms such as power and normative being some of the most contested and debated91. In its own right, NPE has diffused itself to reaching far areas of the social world and become almost a normative discussion and approach to understanding EU foreign policy and the role of the EU92.
1.7.4 Other perspectives on the NPE theory
It is no surprise therefore that the theory has drawn several developments and different perspectives on it. The large discussion about the theory also stems from a slightly vague description of it without enough critical reflection of it in the initial article by Manners in 2002. A common perspective on NPE is that while the EU likely does base its behaviour on normative rhetoric, there needs to be a greater examination upon the practice of its external actions and the underlying strategic rationality and thus conduct an analysis that takes into account both norm-motivated and interest-motivated behaviour93. Rosamond points out the liberal-values inherent in the normative basis of the EU’s internal and external behaviour and argues that an analysis in line with NPE must therefore also incorporate certain aspects of economic liberalism. He perceives the EU as significantly constituted by economic liberalism, that its external policy is partly determined by its liberal market system, and a part of the EU’s normative influence includes the diffusion of liberal economic norms94. The nine normative principles identified by Manners are almost all liberal principles but as Rosamond argues, one is missing; economic liberalism95. He makes a case that economic liberalism should be included as one the principles in NPE as there is evidence found in the EU treaties and
acquis to suggest it as a principle and that a reflection upon this is required in NPE
analyses and that the EU has internalised and projects different modes of liberalism96. A
91 Ian Manners, “Sociology of Knowledge and Production of Normative Power in the European
Union’s External Actions,” Journal of European Integration 37, no. 2 (2015): 299–318.
92 Ibid.
93 Rosamond, “Three Ways of Speaking Europe to the World: Markets, Peace, Cosmopolitan Duty
and the EU’s Normative Power.”
table is provided by Rosamond to differentiate different liberal modes that inform EU foreign policy.
EU modes of liberalism
Mode Dominant idea Subjects Policy logic
1. Markets Economic
liberalism
Market actors Propagation and spread of market order
2. Peace Kantian
republicanism
States Radical diminution of the probability of war 3. Cosmopolitan duty Universal human rights
All human beings Protection of distant stranger Source: Ben Rosamond’s article Three Ways of Speaking Europe to the World: Markets,
Peace, Cosmopolitan Duty and the EU’s Normative Power (2014)
The added value of Rosamond’s contributions to the liberal and liberal economic aspects omitted in the NPE analysis of EU foreign policy is that it will allow us to classify EU foreign policy according to which liberal mode is at play. The liberal character in NPE to a certain extent demands intervention informed by and on the part of certain values and principles97. The exportation of values and principles such as human rights and democracy, especially in regards to the 2004 Eastern enlargement of the EU, has been argued forms the foundation of the EU’s essential identity98. It has even been argued that the exportation of EU norms was a fundamental necessity to the European project99.
Developing Manners’ argument that the researcher’s role is to explain the extent to which EU principles and values inform and condition EU foreign policy by communicative action, Rosamond states that a comprehensive understanding of the
97 Ibid.
98 Karen E. Smith, “The EU, Human Rights and Relations with Third Countries: Foreign Policy
with an Ethical Dimension?,” in Ethics and Foreign Policy, ed. Karen E. Smith and Margot Light (Cambridge University Press, 2001).
99 Iver B. Neumann, “European Identity, EU Expansion, and the Integration/Exclusion Nexus,” in
Constructing Europe’s Identity: The External Dimension, ed. Lars-Erik Cederman (Lynne Rienner
nature of EU foreign policy therefore necessitates a reflection on how and to what extent the EU’s liberal and regulated market is externalised in EU foreign policy100.
This idea of the EU’s liberal and regulated market as a significant factor in the construction of EU foreign policy is closely related to the conceptualisation of the EU as a market power in international relations. This notion posits that the EU is better understood as a market power Europe (MPE) which practices its power in foreign policy through an externalisation of economic and social-related policies and regulatory measures101. The EU as an MPE argues that it is capable of using both persuasive and coercive measures to influence international politics and that the exercise of such power can be either intentional or unintentional but that the externalisation of the EU’s regulated market is the dominant means of influence of the EU102. But despite the validity of this idea, as Rosamond argues, such externalisation may still be of a normative nature which is why it can be argued that liberalism and the liberal market should be included in the identification of the principles informing EU foreign policy103.
This thesis takes the same stance as Rosamond that while MPE provides a valuable contribution to understanding the EU as an actor in international politics, it may ultimately not be a comprehensive enough perspective to account for all EU foreign policy and that it may be better understood as a part of the normative basis of NPE. Furthermore, MPE as a theory is still very underdeveloped and most of its application has only been focused on certain aspects trade policy and has had trouble to completely account for the actorness of the EU104.
Another perspective on NPE is that it is a kind of self-empowering concept that closely resemble eurocentrism. Thomas Diez calls for more reflectively of the kind of identity that NPE attempts at creating of EU and how this identity construction alienates other actors and positions the EU as the central actor in international politics against ‘others’105. Essentially a poststructuralist perspective, it is not concerned with whether or not the EU is a normative power but how the EU constructs itself and others discursively
100 Rosamond, “Three Ways of Speaking Europe to the World: Markets, Peace, Cosmopolitan
Duty and the EU’s Normative Power.”
101 Chad Damro, “Market Power Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 19, no. 5 (2012):
682–99.
102 Ibid.
103 Rosamond, “Three Ways of Speaking Europe to the World: Markets, Peace, Cosmopolitan
Duty and the EU’s Normative Power.”
104 Jesper Dahl Kelstrup, “Market Power Europe - A Constructive Critique,” International Journal
of Public Administration 38, no. 12 (2015): 895–901.
105 Thomas Diez, “Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering ‘Normative Power
through a binary opposition and leading to associations of ‘othering’106. Diez’ observations on this problem and challenge of NPE is a very valid point and something which should form the part of any analysis located within the NPE framework. A perspective shared by Helene Sjursen who stated that the term ‘normative’ has strong positive connotations and as such, the application of the term towards a study of the EU reflects an amount of impartial sympathy towards it107. The dangers therefore of unconsciously employing elements of othering in a NPE analysis risk undermining the research and the researcher both as it points towards bias and eurocentrism. This thesis therefore also dedicates part of the analysis to a critical reflection on how the analysis itself constructs the EU and others.
1.7.5 Criticism of the NPE theory
Indeed, the criticism of the theory number almost the amount of articles expanding upon it and discussing it. And, especially the debate whether NPE offers something which the civilian power approach does not and to what extent Manners has simply reinvented the wheel remains much discussed. Manners argues that the difference lies in the centrality of values and princples, Westphalian concepts of statehood, and a reliance on civilian instruments108. This is however, not a point shared by everyone and therefore the similarities and differences between the two require more analysis from the academic community109.
Moreover, it has been suggested that whatever normative or transformative power that the EU has had in the world is more closely linked with the economic power of its markets and the desire for inclusion and possible future membership110. This thesis contends that this argument without doubt contain some truth as we can see from the ongoing Brexit debate – access to the single market remains one of the most debated topics and sought-after outcomes for the UK111.
106 Ibid.
107 Helene Sjursen, “What Kind of Power?,” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006):
169–81.
108 Orbie, “Civilian Power Europe: Review of the Original and Current Debates.”
109 Forsberg, “Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal Type.” 110 Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” Journal of European
Public Policy 13, no. 2 (2006): 217–34.
111 Daniel Boffey, “US Businesses Warn the UK over Loss of Access to EU Single Market” (The
