Understanding the Permanent Candidate: Analysis of Taught and Imposed Turkish Identity in Comparison to the Official Values of the European Union

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Master of Arts Thesis

Euroculture

University of Göttingen, Germany (Home)

University of Groningen, The Netherlands (Host)

April 2011

Understanding the Permanent Candidate:

Analysis of

Taught and Imposed Turkish Identity in Comparison to

the Official Values of the European Union

Submitted by: Teoman Karamanoglu Eston Camlievler sts. Kızılçam apt. D:79 34752 İçerenköy Istanbul - Turkey Supervised by: Prof. Dr. Jens Peter Laut

Dr. Peter Groenewold

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MA Programme Euroculture Declaration

I, Teoman Karamanoglu, hereby declare that this thesis, entitled “Understanding the Permanent Candidate: Analysis of Taught and Imposed Turkish Identity in Comparison to the Official Values of the European Union”, submitted as partial requirement for the MA Programme Euroculture, is my own original work and expressed in my own words. Any use made within it of works of other authors in any form (e.g. ideas, figures, texts, tables, etc.) are properly acknowledged in the text as well as in the List of References.

I hereby also acknowledge that I was informed about the regulations pertaining to the assessment of the MA thesis Euroculture and about the general completion rules for the Master of Arts Programme Euroculture.

Signed ………...

Teoman Karamanoglu

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Abstract

This paper examines how concepts like Europe, Europeanness, the EU and values of the EU are represented in the Turkish shapers of public opinion. For this purpose, it includes two studies focusing on two mediums: school textbooks and newspapers. For the textbook analysis, the content of five textbooks, printed after 2000, and encompassing various courses, has been studied focusing on the usage of language, common textual patterns and photographs. For the newspaper analysis, four important dates of Turkey’s accession process to the European Union have been picked, of which, the Hürriyet newspapers’ articles and news reports concerning relevant (EU related) topics have been studied.

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Preface

I was born in Germany to a Turkish father and German mother, lived there until the age of 6, and then moved with my dad to Istanbul, Turkey, where I learned Turkish and have received my education starting from primary school up until receiving my Bachelor degree.

My double-status as a Turkish and German citizen has given me the chance to learn what identity means at a considerably early age. One time at the age of 12, when I was in Germany visiting my grandparents, I remember how one of my aunts had introduced me to her friends (with a degree of sarcasm I assume only now) as “ein echter Türke” or “a real Turk”. I remember how this was by her friends perceived as something to have a laugh about; and me not understanding why they laughed, felt anger, because I thought “they – the Germans” had looked down on “myself”.

This actually is the first out of many incidents where I remember to have felt a strong sense of belonging and realized with time how my Turkish identity in a short period of time had almost erased everything related to the German part of me. I really with time had become what my aunt had joked about: “a real Turk” and was indeed proud of being so; the same way I was of everything Turkish. For example, I was even proud of the word “yoghurt” because it has its roots in Turkish language.

It was only on the 3rd year of my Political Science studies at the Marmara University in Istanbul when I found at myself the intellectual courage I needed to critically reflect on my school time memories. I looked back and noticed the dosage of ideological legacy the Turkish education system had left on me; I had developed a strong perception of Turkish identity, and was similarly convinced about a number of dogmas which I even later was able to identify.

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3 The only two answers I could come up with were the effects of the media, especially the newspapers I used to read every day, and the school education I had received.

As a result I decided to focus my study on these two shapers of public opinion, namely the newspapers and school textbooks.1

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Introduction

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of the modern Turkish republic often explicitly stated that the aim of the country is to “reach the level achieved by civilized nations” with reference to the West. But if we look at the contemporary picture we see that, today, Turks are usually seen as non-European. Major European leaders like Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy agree that Turkey does not belong to Europe. According to opinion polls to which will be referred at later stages of this paper, Turkey‟s entrance to the EU is not wanted by a majority of the Union‟s citizens. Their main argument is that “cultural differences” is what hinders Turkey from joining. Likewise, many European scholars also agree that Turkey is non-European and not fitting to basic ground rules the European Union was built upon, for example “the community of values”. Acknowledging a certain degree of truth in these views, the aim of this paper is to test the chosen sample of school textbooks and newspaper articles in search of factors which might have supported the establishment of such impressions and views.

How are concepts like Europe, Europeanness, the EU, values of the EU represented in Turkish shapers of public opinion?

This is the main question this paper will be focusing upon. The aim is to spot possible divergences in these mediums, and to analyse how these might affect the (by Europe perceived) cultural and ideological differences of Turkey and Turkish people. This study aims to give an understanding to European readers, of how the secular and

contemporary Turkish world view, be it cultural or ideological, is shaped.2

I would like to examine what today, in such a globalized and interconnected world, has prevented or prevents Turkey from becoming ideologically “European”. While doing this my aim is to underline that certain elements of Turkish official state ideology have changed or have been reinvented in the course of years, due to for example, the effects of the 1980 coup. The position this paper holds is that the

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5 revolutionary-romantic tradition of Kemalism and its rather patriotic war-time nationalism has been transformed to a partly chauvinist and anti-western dogma following the three year rule of the Turkish National Security Council. Consequently, the aim is to see how this post-1980 state ideology might have influenced the country‟s Europeanization process, through shapers of public opinion. I will be arguing that Kemalism, as argued by Aslan was not designated by Atatürk as an ideology that was supposed to become a dogmatic set of rules, but has been frequently underlined by himself to be a dynamic and self-restoring set of ideas which were supposed to always be in line with contemporary science and logic.3

Since, both, school textbooks and newspapers are also generally accepted as important shapers of public opinion, in this paper, I will try to give a picture of how these in Turkey relate to Europe and the European value system as such. Firstly, I will focus on the Turkish education system, and thus will present a study of Turkish school textbooks.

In this part of the study I will argue that the Turkish education system might be playing a role in building on the differences in value perceptions in addition to certain ideological dissimilarities between Turks and Europeans. But since there is no way to directly test this theory, and it is also nearly impossible to determine the long term effects of school education on ones value perception or identity4, I likewise Çıkar, subscribe to the quote: “Schoolbooks offer an excellent starting point for studying the functions of stereotypes and prejudices within the difficult field of how people delineate themselves from others.”5

Also according to Georg Eckert, schoolbooks which are used at a certain age of human development, play a controversial role in the individuals‟ historical imagery as well as their value system, and thus can influence them their entire

3_{Asım Aslan, Sömürülen Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük, (Istanbul: Teknografik Yayıncılık, 1985), 200-205.} 4_{Mustafa Çıkar, Von Der Osmanischen Dynastie Zur Türkischen Nation: Politische Gemeinschaften in}

Osmanisch-Türkischen Schulbüchern Der Jahre 1876-1938 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche

Buchgesellschaft, 1998),11. 5

Volker Rolf Berghahn and Hanna Schissler, Perceptions of History : International Textbook Research

on Britain, Germany, and the United States (Oxford ; New York: Berg : Distributed exclusively in the

US and Canada by St. Martin's Press, 1987), 181., quoted in Çıkar, Von Der Osmanischen Dynastie Zur

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6 life. That is why he argues, there is no point to wonder why these are constantly used as instruments of propaganda.6

After this I will present my study about Turkish newspapers. Newspapers have often been highlighted amongst the premium mediums of creating a national identity, and reproduction of nationhood as such.7 In this study I will be using the “Hürriyet” newspaper which since its foundation in 1948 has been often referred to as the biggest daily, having received the highest average number of sales, advertising revenues and still has an average of about 500.000 readers per day.8 9 The newspaper is generally regarded as a pro-state ideology newspaper which also adds to the factors that made this newspaper more attractive for the purpose of this paper.10 “Hürriyet” is being often referred to as the most influential newspaper in Turkey,11 12 thus I have decided to utilize specifically this paper in my sample.

This study does not aim to create prejudices, but aims to contribute to the creation of a certain mutual understanding, a common “third space” as has been articulated by Bhabha,13 in which in my understanding Europeans and Turks will be able to benefit more from their relations. Moreover, this study at no point provides, or aims to provide proof of certain ideologies, conspiracies or theories on which generalisations can be constructed upon; but rather wants to portray, from an objective view, how the limited selection of mediums (newspapers and school textbooks) might be shaping Turkish public opinion, ideas, world views and culture. Accordingly, the

6_{Henri Moniot, Enseigner l'Histoire (Berne: P. Lang, 1984), 303., quoted in Étienne Copeaux, Tarih Ders}

Kitaplarında(1931-1993): Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-Islâm Sentezine [De l'Adriatique à la Mer de

Chine, les représentations turques du monde turc à travers les manuels scolaires d'histoire, 1931-1933], trans. Ali Berktay (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 2.

7_{Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991).}

8_{Hürriyet in number of sells has only been passed by the “Zaman” newspaper recently. “Zaman”, today,} has one of the largest subscriber bases amongst national newspapers in Europe. In spite of this, this newspaper was not chosen in this study for a number of reasons. Most importantly; it is allegedly distributed through free subscriptions, has connections to the radical Islamist Fethullah Gulen

movement and has obtained the number of sales it has today, only after the AKP government came into power in 2002. For this reasons it was not considered to be as suitable as the “Hürriyet” newspaper, to be analysed as “a shaper of public opinion”. [R. Sharon-Krespin, Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition.

Middle East Quarterly, 16(1), 55-66.]

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Dilara Sezgin and Melissa A. Wall, “Constructing the Kurds in the Turkish press: a case study of Hürriyet newspaper” Media, Culture & Society Vol. 27(5), (New Delhi-London: Sage Publications, 2005), 789.

10_{Together with the arrival of the AKP regime in Turkey, since 2002 Hürriyet has an openly} anti-government perspective, since it is known to follow the rules and ideas of “Kemalism”. 11

Hıfzı Topuz, 100 Soruda Başlangıçtan Bugüne Türk Basın Tarihi, (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1996), 171.

12_{Orhan Koloğlu, Türk Basını Kuvayı Milliye'den Günümüze, (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları,} 1993), 117.

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7 study only aims to provide the reader with a small glimpse in the Turkish mindset intending to provide grounds for intercultural understanding and even empathy.

After this introduction first of all a theoretical and informational background to the topic will be given. A brief history of Kemalist thought will be delivered; its origins will be contrasted and explained, considering how it became to be perceived after the 1980 coup. Following this section will be the study itself. This will consist of two sections; first will come the school textbook analysis followed by the newspaper analysis. In the study it is aspired to give the readers the opportunity to form a picture from the content for also themselves, while information and analysis of the content will be provided, too. Each section will contain a short introduction in which more information about, content, methodology and the selection of the samples will be provided. For both analyses, individual results will be provided as part of the sections, since the analyses are separate cases.

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8 The early years of the Turkish Republic

Turkey in form of the Ottoman Empire has physically existed in Europe as a dominant power for five centuries and has contributed to the formation of contemporary Western culture and identity simply by being a threat, and simultaneously by performing the function of a geographical, cultural and political bridge between the East and West by means of its unique strategic position.

By being a threat it has for centuries created a common “other image” for Europe, and thus performed a significant function helping to create a common European history and even identity,14 while her bridging role between the Orient and the Occident can be argued as beingstill existent today. After the end of World War I upon the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic of today was founded in 1923. On the contrary to the fallen down theocratic monarchy, the newly founded Turkish state was established as a secular republic led by the principles laid out by its founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Atatürk defined the path of the young republic as “to reach the stage achieved by the civilized nations” clearly referring to the “West”. Wherever he toured he emphasized the idea “The war is over with ourselves victorious, but our struggle for independence is to begin only now – this is the struggle to achieve Western civilization”.15

Even after the foundation of the republic, the historical legacy of the “other” image concerning the Ottoman Empire was still part of common memories in Europe, ironically just like in modern Turkey where the same “other” image was created against the Ottoman Empire.16 According to the study of Soysal and Antoniou, in Turkish history textbooks covering modern Turkey‟s history, the Ottoman also becomes the Turkish national “other” as “the Turkish Republic‟s own history can only be written as a clean break with the Ottoman Empire and what it represents”. They explain that after

14_{Hüsamettin İnaç, "Identity Problems of Turkey during the European Union Integration Process" (Ph. D.} Thesis, Marmara University), 1.

15_{Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (London: Hurst, 1998), 463,464.} 16

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9 the end of World War I the defeated Ottoman leaders in addition to most values the Ottoman Empire was representing became “the enemy” to fight against.17

The othering of representations connected to the Ottoman identity and values had made it possible for the newly established state to begin the process of nation-building, a process which was inspired mostly by post World War I European ideologies.

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10 Kemalism - the Official State Ideology and the image of the West

This paper‟s main focus is obviously not on Kemalism as such, thus, instead of going into a lot of details on Kemalism, at this part of the paper the aim will be to give an idea on how Kemalism, the official state ideology of the Republic of Turkey, has been transformed during the course of years to become more and more anti-Western and as a result also anti-European. In order to understand the Turkish state ideology of today, alongside the identity, mentality and world view it has mediated to the people, it is important to firstly understand the mentality behind Kemalism.

With the foundation of the Turkish Republic, founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk initiated a series of reforms which were aiming to westernize or modernize the new-born nation-state. Atatürk aimed to make the Turkish Republic a highly independent country taking part in the Western system as an equal actor. For Atatürk, Westernization meant modernization and the same was correct the other way around.18 Besides Westernization the other guiding concept of Kemalism was independence. Independence was understood by Atatürk as independence from the West, from Western imperialism and economic dependency. Thus in this regard Kemalism had an interesting twofold characteristic which we could call, “Westernizing while getting rid of the West”. 19

Steinbach defines the Kemalist reforms that took place in the 1920s and 1930s in Turkey with the words “The reforms he introduced ... as well as his economic and foreign policies, derived less from any complex thought about the politics, social fabric, economy or traditions of Turkey than a simple determination to pursue the path of Westernization, which he recognized to be the only viable course.”20

Kemalism was born in an era where the national identity in Turkey was very weak; the only common and real representation of identity during that period amongst most of the population was Islam, which basically was a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Atatürk‟s aim never was to use religion as a tool of nation building but he had aimed to build the foundations of the Republic on the principle of secularism. Thus, as a tool of nation building or a glue to stick the people together, he preferred to use nationalism, an

18_{Baskın Oran, Atatürk Milliyetçiliği, (Ankara: Bilgi, 1997), 280-282.} 19_Ibid.

20_{Udo Steinbach, “The impact of Atatürk on Turkey‟s Political Culture since World War II” in Atatürk}

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11 ideology very popular during that time. Although he has used nationalism as a tool, it is arguable that he never really believed in ethnic nationalism as few of his European counterparts did during those years, but aimed to create a more open and embracing identity. Atatürk did not define Turkishness as a race but; he said: “The people of

Turkey who have founded the Republic of Turkey are the Turkish nation”21 22, what is to take into consideration here is that he did not say “the Turkish people” but used the expression “the people of Turkey”. His most famous saying in Turkey which can be found on almost any suitable location, classrooms, streets, monuments, state institutions etc., reads “How happy is he/she who calls himself/herself a Turk!”2324 Here, instead of ending the sentence with a phrase like, “who is a Turk” he preferred to leave room for preference; in order to create an identity based on more accepting and civic ground stones.25

Kemalism has been historically defined in terms of its six principles, also called “the six arrows” which are also depicted on the logo of the Republican People‟s Party (RPP) which was founded by Atatürk himself. These principles are

 republicanism,  populism,  secularism,  reformism,  nationalism and  statism.

These principles have been firstly formulated at the party program of the RPP and were designated to restore and save a war-torn country, which has just gained its independence.

21_{Emphasis added.} 22

Translation of: “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‟ni kuran Türkiye halkına Türk ulusu denir.” 23_{Emphasis added.}

24_{Translation of: “Ne mutlu Türk‟üm diyene!”}

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12 These have laid and introduced the main mentality behind Atatürk‟s plans for Turkey, shaping to a high extent the ideology we know today as Kemalism. Aslan, in his analysis of Kemalism adds to these three more, these being

 pragmatism,

 rationalism and

 modernism.26

For Atatürk, civilization meant the West and thus he tried to implement Western institutions and habits to Turkey. Indeed, to make progress in science, technology, arts, rational thinking, human rights and free democracy was what Ataturk had always envisioned for Turkey, therefore all throughout his life he tried to initiate a society which would resemble the Western as much as possible. He considered the Western civilization to be the common heritage of mankind therefore it can be argued that he used to have more of a universalist perspective on this issue.27

Atatürk, in light of his modernization – Westernization efforts, first of all, singled out Ottoman and Islamic institutions as "backward," and abolished the sultanate and caliphate in favour of a republic led by the RPP. He also, according to many in a forceful way, imposed Europeanization upon the masses by numerous measures, e.g.:

 banning the fez in favour of a European-style brimmed hat;

 adopting a Latin alphabet, thereby cutting off Turks from much of their recorded history;

 replacing the Sharia with European legal codes;

 closing religious institutions and orders; and

 expanding public education and women's rights.28

Europe was clearly the model, and bilateral links to Europe, not Turkey's Islamic neighbours, were given top priority. Atatürk declared, "The Ottoman Empire began to decline on the day when, proud of her successes against the West, she cut the ties that

26_{Aslan, Sömürülen Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük, 205.} 27_{Ibid, 201.}

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13 bound her to the European nations."' The new republic would not make the same mistake.29

The most urgent of the necessary change in Turkey has been the secularization of the regime since Atatürk had strongly believed that state and religion should always remain separated. Thus, in contrast to the fallen theocratic monarchy, the newly founded Turkish state was established as a secular republic led by the principles as laid out by its founding father, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Amongst these reforms, aiming primarily at modernizing the country, also, a reform concerning the dress code existed. Atatürk himself disliked the fez and any type of clothing which had roots in the Ottoman past and believed that: “Turks must dress in the ordinary clothes in use amongst the civilized peoples of the world.”30

In one instance where he was asked about why he abolished the fez and implemented the so called “hat revolution” in November 1925, he responded:

Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on the heads of our nation as an emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism, and hatred of progress and civilization, to accept in its place the hat, the headgear used by the whole civilized world, and in this way to demonstrate that the Turkish nation, in its mentality as in other respects, in no way diverges from civilized life.31

As we can see in this example, too, Atatürk‟s primary aim was to Europeanize the country, as he saw Europe as the only civilization that Turkey should take as an example.

The reforms in general helped to cut symbolic ties with the Ottoman past and were aimed to establish the principle of “laiklik”, often translated as laicité or secularism, which refers to the separation of state matters from religion. Thus in Turkey secularism was not the separation of church and state but the subordination of the

29_Ibid. 30

Andrew Davison, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeunetic Reconsideration, ed. Joel Weinsheimer (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998), 149.

31_{Emelie A. Olson, "Muslim Identity and Secularism in Contemporary Turkey: "the Headscarf Dispute","}

Anthropological Quarterly, 58, no. 4 (10.1985, 1985), 164, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3318146

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14 church to the state.32 Davison, too, makes this point saying that the institutions in Turkey were designed in order to “control from above” all aspects of religious life, pointing out to the fact that even Imams are state employees,33 the secularist principle of the state was in this way being secured against possible threats forming in mosques. Religious schools came under the control of the government and religious expression was curtailed through the regulation of dress and speech.34 This portrays how Atatürk‟s justifiable phobia (due to almost six centuries of Islamic rule) of religious institutions gaining power, became visible in modern Turkey.

About 10 years after Atatürk‟s death in 1938, starting from 1946 the multi-party system was beginning to be implemented in the light of Atatürk‟s will. Thus the political opposition to modernization had the chance to accumulate its power through political parties, which became challenges to secularism and Atatürk‟s revolutions. As a result, the military bureaucracy which was the only institution having the power to keep Atatürk‟s ideals alive felt the duty to intercept in political processes which were threatening the regime and democracy; thus beginning from 1960 military coups began to regularly dominate the Turkish political sphere.

32_{Ruth Mandel, "Turkish Headscarves and the "Foreigner Problem": Constructing Difference through} Emblems of Identity," New German Critique, no. 46 (Winter, 1989), 32,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/488313 (accessed 10.04.2010).

33_{Davison, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeunetic Reconsideration, 139.}

34_{Rachel Rebouché, "The Substance of Substantive Equality: Gender Equality and Turkey‟s Headscarf} Debate," American University International Law Review 4, no. 24 (2008), 714,

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15 The 1980 coup and its effects on Kemalism

Amongst these the 1980 coup was the one which created the most drastic of changes for the future of Turkey and Kemalism, as indeed it was aiming against the anarchic circumstances created by the relatively-free 1960 constitution.35 This coup created the so-called Turkish-Islamic synthesis which is argued to still dominate the official identity of Turkey.36 In 1980 the military-controlled National Security Council (NSC) introduced a new constitution and seized control of the legislative process. Although at the same time the constitution supported by the NSC, established in 1982, prohibited any constitutional amendment or law that would contradict the principle of secularism;37 the NSC implemented legislative measures that recognized or protected religious practices and expression.38

As expected, the generals who felt a responsibility towards Kemalism, believed that it should once again provide a framework for Turkey‟s political and socio-political development. By doing this they hoped to bring more stability and continuity to the country and its political system than it had suffered in the “troubles” that were brought by the 1960 constitution.39 Though the way the generals have used and treated Kemalist thought, has resulted in it losing all its progress oriented character, which as formulated by Atatürk would only exist through constant adaptation to the standards and needs of the current era. Steinbach, too, agrees to this approach saying that “the fundamental elements of Kemalism have lost their formative and creative function”.40

Cornell and Karaveli also speak of the 1980 coup and its aftermath as the “defining point of recent Turkish history”.41

35_{The coup of 1960 was aimed against authoritarianism and thus resulted in the most democratic and free} constitution of Turkish history. This freedom that arguably was too large for the Turkish population to handle, has caused the anarchic environment of the 1960s and 1970s in Turkey which then again was aimed to be prevented by the 1980 coup.

36

Emre Kongar, "Türban: Bir Çözümleme Ve Çözüm Önerisi," Prof. Dr. Emre Kongar, http://www.kongar.org/aydinlanma/2005/474_Turban.php (accessed 24.05, 2010). 37_Ibid.

38_{Rebouché, The Substance of Substantive Equality: Gender Equality and Turkey’s Headscarf Debate,} 715.

39

Udo Steinbach, “The impact of Atatürk on Turkey‟s Political Culture since World War II”, 77. 40_Ibid.

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16 First of all, the most important of the Kemalist elements, which until then had been known to form Kemalism have been started to be challenged. Amongst them of utmost importance can be seen three factors. First of all the principal of secularism; second, the “democratic left” which was in fact supposed to play a key developing and improving function in the system, in a way updating Kemalism to the needs and standards of the day; third the liberalization of the economy which paved the way for the creation of a new bourgeoisie based in Anatolia, which can be described as predominantly conservative.42

These institutionalized developments have created a more conservative, less democratic, more Islamic-oriented, less Western and more Eastern inclined Turkey.43 In addition these forces arguably because of their militarist, rule-oriented worldview have changed and dogmatized the Kemalist ideology, taking away its probably most important characteristic: to adapt and adjust to the needs of contemporary civilization.

This political structure formed by the coup resulted in the Islamic views gaining power. An Islamist oriented political party, called the “Welfare Party”, for the first time in Turkish history won an election and Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist movement “Milli Görü ” (National Vision), became Prime minister. The Welfare Party, in 1997 was forced out of the 1 year old coalition government, and 1 year later had been banned by court decision for anti-secular activity. Leading figures of the currently ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party), like Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Gül, were also members of the Welfare Party, thus having share in this anti-secular reputation. Erdoğan was even jailed for a poem he read in 1998 saying: “The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers ..." 44; he stayed in prison for four months and was banned from politics. After AKP won the elections in 2002, a fast change in law granted him the right to become active in politics again.

Although as portrayed above, opposition to the European oriented approach of Kemalist thought is an old phenomenon, from time to time getting stronger and weaker; it has through the effects of the 1980 coup, gained a significant boost. The political

42 Ibid.

43_{Tanıl Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket,(Istanbul:} İleti im, 2007), 161.

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17 ideology of the country has first of all reduced Kemalism from its original dynamic attributes to a mere set of rules and dogma, and is confronting this dogma with a moderate – Islamic / democratic rhetoric.

Although these developments have effected and perhaps led Turkey to keep its current distance from Europe, a distance not intended by founding father Atatürk, and have resulted in Turkey being often classified as non – European, (which will be further analysed in the next section); throughout the 88 years passed since the foundation of the Republic the indoctrinated aim of Europeanization can also be argued to never have totally come to a stop, and continues to even further materialize in form of the longer than half a century old bid of Turkey to become a member of the European Union.45

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18 The Community of Values and Turkey

Support for Turkish membership to the European Union is low in the EU member states. Influential leaders like German Chancellor Angela Merkel or French President Nicolas Sarkozy are both strictly against Turkish membership. Public opinion does not speak against them: Eurobarometer 66 report of 2006 shows that 59% of EU citizens are against Turkey joining the EU, while only about 28% are in favour. According to the same report 61% of the EU population believes that the cultural

differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow it to

join the EU.46 König and Sicking argue that the reason of the previously unmatched complexity of debates going around Turkey‟s European Union membership is that Turkey is considered to be much more “foreign” than any other previous candidate. The reasons of this foreignness, they argue, are to a high degree related to Turkish religion and culture, likewise its history and geographical position.47 Wehler in addition to these when listing why Turkey shall not become an EU member mentions his argument that Turkey is not suitable to the “community of values” concept,48

also an official self-definition of the EU. The European Commission official website, too, declares that they reject the approach that the community is built on religion but emphasize that the EU is founded on common European values.49

Often, public actors simply refer to this community of values without further specifying what it consists of. In many other instances, however, public actors refer to either Enlightenment or Christian values. During the Convention debates, for instance, Christian Democrats and leading Church representatives backed the inclusion of a reference to Christian values in the Constitution‟s preamble, by stressing with Pope John Paul II that „Christendom‟s decisive contribution to the history and culture of the different countries is part of a common treasure and it would thus make sense to inscribe this in the constitutional project‟ (Le Monde, November 8, 2002). Meanwhile, other political actors emphasized shared human rights,

46

Eurobarometer 66: Public Opinion in the European Union. European Commission, [2007], http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_en.pdf (accessed 15.04.2010).

47_{Helmut König and Manfred Sicking, "Statt Einer Einleitung: Gehört Die Türkei Zu Europa? - Konturen} Einer Diskussion," in Gehört Die Türkei Zu Europa? : Wegweisungen Für Ein Europa Am

Scheideweg, eds. Helmut König and Manfred Sicking (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2005), 11.

48

Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Die Türkische Frage. Europas Bürger Müssen Entscheiden," in Die Türkei Und

Europa: Die Positionen, ed. Claus Leggewie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004), 66-67.

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19 democratic and tolerance values, and attached priority to the inclusion of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in a future EU Constitution (for example, Walter Schwimmer in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 25, 2000; Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues in Le Temps, February 12, 2000).50

In this context the Eurobarometer report 66 shows us that EU nationals believe that after common universal values like peace, respect for human life and human rights, the most important values for them are democracy and individual freedom.51 While the same group believes that the value best representing the European Union is

democracy,52 the Charter of Fundamental Rights refers to the importance of

individualism as a value in the EU in its preamble: “It [The EU] places the individual at

the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.” Therefore the meaning of these two values for the EU and its citizens is unquestionable.

The Turkish Values Survey from 2007 gives us some interesting information concerning values and levels of trust in Turkey. For example, in a ten years‟ time span trust in the military is stable around 90%, while in comparison trust to political parties is fluctuating between 15% and 35%. 83% regard themselves as religious and 73% of the questioned group said they wouldn‟t trust a person from another country. Only 27% believe that Turkey would be accepted into the European Union in case it meets all conditions required to become a member.

According to a news report from the “Radikal” newspaper the survey coordinator Prof. Dr. Yılmaz Esmer commented on the results saying:

It‟s true that Atatürk said, “Turk, be proud, work, trust!” but in truth Turkey has a society with a low level of trust. The most important reasons that differentiate us from Western Europe are these: for us religion is very important; the way we look at gender relations, to the role of women in society, and our [lacking-inferior] approach to active politics, freedoms, democratic values and tolerance.53

50_{Juan Diez Medrano, "The Public Sphere and the European Union‟s Political Identity," in European}

Identity, eds. Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2009), 95. 51

Eurobarometer 66: Public Opinion in the European Union, 30. 52_{Ibid, 32.}

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21

Taught Turkish Identity vs. EU values

Introduction

Textbooks form the cultural identity of individuals; they seek to anchor the political and social norms which the society (or the state) expects from an individual. They do this by reflecting the traditions society has formed over decades or centuries, aiming in a way to set the borderlines of each individual within the society.54

The Turkish education system is known for having an overtly nationalist tone and being full of these propagandist elements, which have become evident especially after the military coup of 1980 and have steadily increased during the following decade, over shadowing non-national elements.55 Also Copeaux mentions this exact period when according to him a “new national culture” based on a synthesis of Islamic and Turkish identity was officially implemented into schoolbooks; also referring to the nature of this synthesis saying that it is partly anti-European.56

In this part of the paper, my aim is to firstly look if (then how) Europeanness is

observable in the ideological context of Turkish school textbooks. Secondly, I will

focus on how their content is in accordance with some European values, precisely:

democracy and individualism.

Coming from the aforementioned educational background, argued to be ideologically value-laden and propagandist, I aim to go back over the same grounds - the times of my school education, examining these books from which parts of content I even do remember having studied. I have picked five books from classes which tend to include social and cultural knowledge; all are relatively contemporary - printed after the

54_{Falk Pingel, UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision, 2nd ed.}

(Paris/Braunschweig: UNESCO and Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research, 2010), 7.

55_{Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal and Vasilia Lilian Antoniou, "Nation and the Other in Greek and Turkish} History Textbooks," in The Nation, Europe and the World, eds. Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal and Hanna Schissler (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), 105.

56

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22 year 2000, are published under the control of the Ministry of National Education, and are for elementary school ranging between 4th and 8th grade.57

I have looked at different readings regarding methods of textbook analysis,5859 and also examples of textbook analysis regarding my topic,606162 in none of which I was able to spot a specific methodology which would provide me with sufficient answers to my research questions specified in the paragraph above. Thus I chose to come up with my own methodology, which in a way is a fusion of different methodologies. I will ask the questions mentioned in the paragraph above to my sample of textbooks using qualitative discourse analysis, attempting to find out what the authors (or in this case the

national education system) regards as important. I will be focusing on parts of each

book which are in a way related to my research questions, using elements of hermeneutic, linguistic and semiotic analysis. I will not compare the content of the books but will analyse these as a single sample. Referred to in the study will be patterns and examples to these patterns, which often appear in the selected sample.

57

The books are as follows:

 The Reformation History of the Turkish Republic and Kemalism – 8th Grade (2005)  Turkish – 5th Grade (2000)

 Religious Culture and Ethical Knowledge – 4th Grade (2003)  Social Knowledge – 6th Grade (2002)

 Citizenship and Human Rights Education – 8th Grade (2007) 58_{Pingel, UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision}

59_{Jason Nicholls, "Methods in School Textbook Research," International Journal of Historical Learning,}

Teaching and Research 3, no. 2 (July 2003, 2003), 11-27.

60_{Copeaux, Tarih Ders Kitaplarında(1931-1993): Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-Islâm Sentezine} 61_{Çıkar, Von Der Osmanischen Dynastie Zur Türkischen Nation: Politische Gemeinschaften in}

Osmanisch-Türkischen Schulbüchern Der Jahre 1876-1938

62

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23 How is Europeanness observable in the textbooks?

Europeanness is a broad and ambiguous concept which often is used in different contexts. In this paper Europeanness is referring to anything related to a European identity or self-definition relating to the continent of Europe and/or its peoples. Since Turkey, as explained in the previous section, has close historical ties to the continent and the structure of Modern Turkey has unquestionably borrowed a lot from the continent, the schoolbooks have been tested for references to Europeanness.

First of all it is to say that in none of the books any direct reference to Europeanness is found. Europe as a whole is portrayed as “the other”, a neighbouring civilization that is, so to say, a competitor. There is no visible reference to any cultural or identity based commonality. However, it is underlined that the Turkish culture in its “thousands of years of existence” has influenced the world civilization to a high degree, leaving footprints all over the world amongst them also the European civilization.63 In addition the geographic position of Turkey is defined as “a bridge between the European civilization and the Middle East”, thus differentiating itself from both.6465

In general good qualities are associated with Turkishness. Some of these are being creative and constructive,66 being friendly to neighbours,67 helping people in need,68 respecting the beliefs of others,69 appreciating fine arts70, even having exemplary sportsmen representing the Turkish nation in the best way possible.71

Dominating the texts is the idea that Turkey is a unique and strong country which has its own values, culture and identity. Although certain qualities of the European civilization are recognized and pictured as good and righteously adopted, they

63

Güler Şenünver and others, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Inkılap Tarihi Ve Atatürkçülük 8, Vol. 1 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Basımevi, 2005),138.

64_{Ahmet Kapulu, Seyfinaz Kapulu and Ay e Tekin, Ilköğretim Vatandaşlık Ve Insan Hakları Eğitimi 8} (Ankara: Koza Yayıncılık, 2007), 110.

65_{Güler Şenünver and others, Ilköğretim Okulu Sosyal Bilgiler 6, Vol. 5 (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi,} 2002),46.

66_{Şenünver and others, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Inkılap Tarihi Ve Atatürkçülük 8, 167.} 67_{Hüseyin Hüsnü Tekı ık, Ilköğretim Türkçe 5 (Ankara: Tekı ık Yayıncılık, 2000), 90.} 68

Ibid, 22.

69_{Ersin Mara lıoğlu, Hasan Uslu and Betül Yetkin, Ilköğretim Din Kültürü Ve Ahlak Bilgisi 4, Vol. 2} (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Basımevi, 2003), 18.

70_{Şenünver and others, Ilköğretim Okulu Sosyal Bilgiler 6, 142.} 71

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24 are not given credit as particularly European but rather as good qualities which were anyhow suitable and fitting to Turkish culture.

Nevertheless there are indicators showing that acknowledgement from Europeans is to provide certain self-esteem. For example the reactions of European leaders upon Atatürk‟s death are thoroughly covered, in a way justifying the argument that he was the greatest leader of the 20th century.72

In the history book which covers the years 1881-1945 European powers are unexceptionally portrayed as invading, profit seeking, exploiting and unreliable outsiders with which interaction is only to be performed in an interest-based platform.73 Also in other books European powers are often mentioned as cunning, hostile oppressors with reference to historical conflicts.7475

When talking about the reasons of terrorism there is an arguable implication considering Europe and the USA saying that “some industrialized countries” support terrorism to weaken and exploit countries like Turkey,76 while underlining the fact that these foreign countries aim to “divide, shatter and destroy the regime”77

of Turkey in order to reach their economic and political goals.78

The weak Ottoman Dynasty seeking to cooperate with Europe after World War I is also “othered” and described as traitors to the cause of Turkish independence.79

The aforementioned goal set for the modern Turkish nation by Atatürk, where he actually was referring to Europe saying “to reach the level of civilized nations” is rather neutralized from Europeanness, strongly rejecting the idea of “imitating Europe”. Europe is accepted as “civilized” and thus aspects of this civilization which are seen as “suitable” to the Turkish context are portrayed as there to adopt.80

72

Şenünver and others, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Inkılap Tarihi Ve Atatürkçülük 8, 189-192. 73_{Ibid, 13-112.}

74_{Şenünver and others, Ilköğretim Okulu Sosyal Bilgiler 6, 69.} 75_{Tekı ık, Ilköğretim Türkçe 5, 152, 153.}

76_{Translation of: “Bazı devletler, ekonomik ve siyasal amaçlarına ula abilmek için ülkemizi bölmek,} parçalamak ve rejimimizi yıkmak istemektedirler.”

77_{Kapulu, Kapulu and Tekin, Ilköğretim Vatandaşlık Ve Insan Hakları Eğitimi 8, 95.} 78_{Ibid, 109.}

79_{Şenünver and others, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Inkılap Tarihi Ve Atatürkçülük 8, 13-112.} 80

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25 As an example the reason for the implementation of the Swiss civil code in 1926 is explained by referring to it as the “newest and most suitable of all”,81

just like the adaptation of “European-like” modern institutions of education is neutralized from Europeanness quoting Atatürk: “The Turkish nation could not leave the education of its children to two different institutions namely, the modern school and medrese” arguing that two different types of schools would create two different communities, underlining the importance of the nationalized uniformity of education.82 The new European-like dress code imposed on the population living in modern Turkey is also explained in the same context, pointing out to the differences in the population‟s way of dressing, the reform is explained in terms of preventing differentiations of class and also affiliations with the out-of-favourOttoman cultural legacy.83

81_{Ibid, 128.} 82_{Ibid, 132.} 83

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26 How is the content of the textbooks in accordance with EU values?

a) Democracy

Turkey, since the foundation of the republic, based on the principles of Atatürk is designated as a democratic and secular republic. Nevertheless to achieve the level of European democracy is not an easy task for a state and nation which has lived under 600 years of theocratic monarchy. There are and have been many obstacles in front of the republic‟s aim to achieve a well-functioning participatory and social democracy, such as the strong bureaucratic and military tradition of the country, or the Islamic legacy the country has inherited from the Ottoman Empire.

One other factor is that democracy has not been established in the country naturally, like in Europe, through an industrial revolution and years of bloody class struggle with other words a bottom-up process, but as the result of a War of Independence which ended with a military bureaucracy imposing it in a top-down process.84

Thus the textbooks have been tested for their accordance with the principles of democracy. Democracy, its principles and their importance is thoroughly covered in the textbooks. It is even in a way mystified and glorified comparable to the degree Turkishness is.

The first paragraph of the first chapter of the Social Sciences book titled “Democratic life” reads: “Democracy is a regime that suits well to societies in which people live who are good, mature, respectful, and have a heart full of love.”8586 Democracy is generally portrayed as a vital element of the Turkish republic, and Atatürk‟s intention to implement a multi-party regime as early as 1924 is spoken of with high regards.87

84_{Emre Kongar, "Türkiye'nin Kültürel Öz-Anlayı ı: Avrupa Için Bir Zenginlik" (Ankara, METU,} 10.05.2001, 2001), http://www.kongar.org/makaleler/Turkiye_nin_Kulturule_Oz-Anlayisi.php (accessed 01.05.2010).

85_{Translation of: “Demokrasi; iyi, olgun, saygılı ve gönlü sevgi dolu insanların ya adığı toplumlara} yakı an bir yönetim eklidir.”

86_{Şenünver and others, Ilköğretim Okulu Sosyal Bilgiler 6, 9.} 87

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27 All elements of democracy amongst them also the importance of civil society, free media, freedom of speech and thought, active citizenship, right to protest, rights to petition are thoroughly covered and encouraged.8889 Likewise political, social and economic rights as well as human rights are widely covered especially emphasizing the rights of women and children.909192 Although Kemalist nationalism is dominating the content of the textbooks partly to a chauvinist degree, ethnic nationalism is avoided in parallel to Kemalist populism emphasizing the equality of Turkish citizens in front of law as well as in every other aspect of public life. This is underlined quoting Atatürk‟s “The people of Turkey are the Turkish nation” statement,93

aiming to prevent the exclusion of any ethnic group living in the country.

One obvious and sharp differentiation from the principles of democracy is the enormous emphasis on the military. The military is glorified in every related topic while military service is pointed out as sacred and the most important duty of every male Turkish citizen. The military is referred to as the guardian of the independence, safety, existence; with the duty of keeping the “Turkish Republic articulated in the

constitution”94 secure against internal and external threats. Amongst the listed duties of the - until shortly military official dominated - National Security Council, the following article is present: “to determine precautions necessary to upkeep the constitutional order, the national unity and solidarity; and to unify the Turkish nation around the national cause and values in the light of Kemalist thought guiding it towards national goals.”9596

Out of 373 images in the textbooks 83 are directly related either to the practice of democracy or human rights. Again, out of 373 pictures in the textbooks 88, almost one fourth, are related to the military.9798

88

Kapulu, Kapulu and Tekin, Ilköğretim Vatandaşlık Ve Insan Hakları Eğitimi 8, 12, 25-36, 52-77. 89_{Şenünver and others, Ilköğretim Okulu Sosyal Bilgiler 6, 12-18, 23.}

90_{Ibid, 9-18, 29.} 91

Kapulu, Kapulu and Tekin, Ilköğretim Vatandaşlık Ve Insan Hakları Eğitimi 8, 52-77.

92_{Şenünver and others, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Inkılap Tarihi Ve Atatürkçülük 8, 145,146, 173, 174.} 93_{Ibid, 174.}

94_{Kapulu, Kapulu and Tekin, Ilköğretim Vatandaşlık Ve Insan Hakları Eğitimi 8, 86. [italics added.]} 95_{Translation of: “Anayasal düzeni koruyucu, milli birlik ve bütünlüğü sağlayıcı, Türk milletini}

Atatürkçü dü ünce doğrultusunda ve milli ülkü ve değerler etrafında birle tirerek milli hedeflere yönlendirici tedbirleri belirlemek.”

96_{Ibid, 84.}

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28 Amongst 20 pieces of readings in the Religious Culture and Ethical Knowledge book, only one sentence is highlighted, this sentence written in bold letters reads: “The greatest soldier/military is our soldier/military!”99100

b) Individualism

In this paper individualism is referring to political individualism, or the freedom of the

individual as opposed to being victim to the imposition of obligations and/or certain

requirements coming from an institution, which in this case will be the Turkish state. Thus the textbooks are tested for their accordance to this principle.

Most obvious of all in the study were the differentiation of the textbooks from the principle of individualism. Instead of emphasizing the importance of the individual at the basis of its existence, the content focuses on a societal understanding, a societal interdependence based on cultural values and family, giving highest priority to the existence of the nation and homeland. The Turkish nation according to the books is one single entity which, as mentioned earlier, even has common characteristics and attributes which are found in every individual.101 The individual with regard to this is defined within his or her duties, or role in the community and nation. Solidarity is explained “as the legacy of the forefathers”102

, mentioning that the Turkish nation along history has given the best examples for how solidarity keeps a nation strong.103

Even basic individual behaviour like being physically clean is associated with national unity and solidarity.104 Family is given an important place in the society, its aim is articulated as “to raise useful individuals for our state and nation”.105

98

The images have been classified as “related to the practice of democracy or human rights” if they portray representations of democratic behaviour, (e.g. parliaments, usage of democratic rights, voting processes etc.) or human rights (e.g. images propagating the more widespread use of human rights, children rights, women rights, or images aiming to create an awareness on the issue like working children, labour unions etc.) In return classified as Military related, are all the images that include a military uniform, or weapons.

99_{Mara lıoğlu, Uslu and Yetkin, Ilköğretim Din Kültürü Ve Ahlak Bilgisi 4, 92. [italics added.]} 100_{Translation of: “En büyük asker, bizim asker!”}

101

Şenünver and others, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Inkılap Tarihi Ve Atatürkçülük 8, 167. 102_{Şenünver and others, Ilköğretim Okulu Sosyal Bilgiler 6, 29.}

103_{Kapulu, Kapulu and Tekin, Ilköğretim Vatandaşlık Ve Insan Hakları Eğitimi 8, 45.} 104_{Mara lıoğlu, Uslu and Yetkin, Ilköğretim Din Kültürü Ve Ahlak Bilgisi 4, 37.} 105

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29 The goal of Turkish national education is stated as “to raise citizens who know their duties and responsibilities towards the Republic of Turkey. ... As a result of a good education, if needed, the individual will be ready to completely ignore his own interests for the sake of his nations‟.”106107

Atatürk is praised because he never was proud of himself but always of his nation. He is quoted saying “No love in the world can be above the love for the nation. This love cannot be sacrificed for any other.”108 Thus Turkish soil is also depicted as sacred and worth dying for.109110111112

This, amongst many other instances, has been made obvious in the following verse: “What makes a flag, the flag, is the blood on it; soil is only homeland if there are people to die for it.”113114

Atatürk is quoted saying: “The homeland will surely find peace; the nation will surely find happiness. Because there are many who are ready to sacrifice their own happiness and being, for their nation‟s happiness and well-being.”115116

As imaginable, military service, too, is in this context regarded as of great importance and universal conscription has been portrayed as “a part of Turkish culture”. To do military service is defined as a citizenship duty, a very respectful, proud and sacred act; underlining the culture of ceremonial welcoming and farewell celebrations organized for recruits.117

106_{Translation of:”Türk milli eğitimi, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti‟ne kar ı görev ve sorumluluklarını bilen} vatanda lar yeti tirmeyi amaçlar. İyi bir eğitimle kazanılacak bu nitelikler sayesindedir ki ki i, gerektiğinde milli menfaatler uğrunda kendi çıkarlarını hiçe sayabilir.”

107

Şenünver and others, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Inkılap Tarihi Ve Atatürkçülük 8, 129. 108_{Ibid, 52.}

109_Ibid. 110

Tekı ık, Ilköğretim Türkçe 5, 79, 80, 131,173-174.

111_{Kapulu, Kapulu and Tekin, Ilköğretim Vatandaşlık Ve Insan Hakları Eğitimi 8, 88, 89.} 112_{Şenünver and others, Ilköğretim Okulu Sosyal Bilgiler 6, 27.}

113_{Tekı ık, Ilköğretim Türkçe 5, 126.}

114_{Translation of: “Bayrakları bayrak yapan üstündeki kandır, Toprak, uğrunda ölen varsa vatandır.”} 115

Kapulu, Kapulu and Tekin, Ilköğretim Vatandaşlık Ve Insan Hakları Eğitimi 8, 44.

116_{Tranlation of: “ Vatan mutlaka selamet bulacak, millet mutlaka mesut olacaktır. Çünkü kendi} selametini, kendi saadetini memleketin, milletin saadet ve selameti için feda edebilen vatan evlatları çoktur.”

117

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30 Results

The results of this study are only related to the selected literature of school textbooks, and thus cannot be generalized as regarding the whole system of education in Turkey. However, I believe that this study gives an idea of how the content of Turkish schoolbooks is ideologically value-laden and how these elements might influence the identity perceptions of young pupils, and as a result public opinion. In addition to this is that the language used in many instances can be interpreted as very propagandist, as commonly known elements of propaganda like glittering generalities, logical fallacies, creation of euphoria, usage of emotive language and virtue words often occur in the texts.118

Turkey as well as Turkish culture and identity are defined without any reference to Europeanness; thus Europeanness, as defined in this paper, is not present in the textbooks. On the contrary a tendency of neutralizing European-rooted characteristics of Turkey from Europeanness is discovered. These ideas are not covered in a framework acknowledging the Europeanization of modern Turkey, but are transmitted as necessary and civilizing reformations against the unwanted and backward Ottoman legacy. Distrust to European powers is visible in the texts. Alongside this distrust, in the language used implications of a certain degree of competitive rivalry, based on an implicit admiration and respect is noted.

Even though the definition and principles of democracy are covered in a comprehensive manner; democracy is seen as being glorified to an illogical degree, making it become a “virtue word” of its own. It is transmitted as a symbol which is a part of Turkish identity and is associated with everything good, thus arguably dogmatizing the concept. The role of the military and the effects of it to Turkish democracy, which is a topic of long lasting political debate in the country, make themselves also visible in the textbooks. The military has been given excessive importance, which is reflected in the huge share of written and visual elements usually dedicated to praising it. It is often implied that they are the protectors of the republic, the constitution and as a result also the democracy; which in fact deeply contradicts

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31 with the concept of democracy itself. Though it is to note that as part of the political discussions in Turkey, opinions stating that the military in a way is the protector of the country‟s democracy exist, but are out of context for this paper.

Individualism as referred to in the paper is challenged by a strong societal and national approach. The in Turkey well known, “State and nation hand in hand!”119

idea can be pointed out as dominating the content of the textbooks. The aim to create an ideologically homogeneous society with a strong sense of solidarity, belongingness and mutual dependence is clearly visible. Concepts like homeland, territory, flag and nation are pointed out as worth dying for which clearly contradicts with the idea of individualism. People as a result are motivated to cherish their nation more than anything, including themselves, and to feel proud of this choice.

To sum up, a series of disconformities regarding EU values are found in the content of the textbooks which might be playing a role in shaping basic ideological dissimilarities between Turks and Europeans. Furthermore, the lack of reference to Europeanness in the texts might also be regarded as a factor which discourages Turks from seeing themselves as Europeans, thus forming and deepening differences in identity perceptions. Finally, through the conclusions reached in this paper it has been made arguable that the content of Turkish schoolbooks might be having a negative effect on the Europeanization process of Turkey, and therefore might also be affecting the path leading towards the country‟s European Union membership.

119

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32

Imposed Turkish Identity: The image of Europe and the EU in

Turkish newspapers

Introduction

Since the scope of this study is fairly limited, it has been intended to select a sample that would provide as much information regarding the European Union as possible. Thus it has been decided to select important dates of Turkey‟s path towards European Union accession. Four amongst the most significant have been chosen and introduced below. As a result the study will consist of four dates, all one day after dates which arguably are the most important dates of Turkey‟s path towards European Union candidature in the last two decades. These are as follows:

 7th March 1995 – Day after signing the Customs Union treaty between Turkey and the European Union, which has been heralded as one of the most important steps bringing Turkey and the European Union closer. According to the treaty all custom restrictions of travelling goods between the two entities have been

lifted.120

 14th December 1997 – Day after the European Council meeting held in Luxembourg. In this meeting the European Council has decided to launch an accession process comprising the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus; Turkey was held outside these. This turned out to become a huge shock in Turkey, which had been waiting for the status of candidateship for a much longer period than other countries.121

120_{European Commission Official Website, “European Commission: Trade: Turkey (Bilateral relations)”} http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/turkey/, (Accessed: 10.2.2011)

121 _{European Council Official Website, “Official text of the 1997 Luxembourg European Council} presidency conclusions”,

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33

 11th December 1999 – Day after the European Council meeting held in Helsinki. In this meeting Turkey for the first time has been mentioned as a candidate country in an official document. The candidateship status, like other candidate countries, gave Turkey the right to benefit from the European Union pre-accession strategy, intended to support and stimulate its reforms. 122 This decision after the shock experienced in Luxembourg was received as a positive development in the membership process of the country.

 4th October 2005 – Day after the European Union General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting in Luxembourg in which the Council approved a framework for negotiations with Turkey on its accession to the EU, and thus enabled the accession negotiations to formallybegin.123

The corpus consists of all pages of the Hürriyet newspapers as of the dates specified above, which deliver an article or news report involving the signified European Union related occasion. Every article, news report and heading of the selected corpus has been analyzed in order to fulfill the aim of the analysis.124

122

European Parliament Official Website, “Official text of the 1999 Helsinki European Council presidency conclusions”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm#a, (Accessed: 10.2.2011).

123 _{European Council Official Website, “General Affairs and External Relations, General Affairs Council} Main Results”, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/86442.pdf, (Accessed: 10.2.2011).

124_{Hürriyet, 07.03.1995, pp.: 1, 6, 7, 9.}