BE MORAL LATER, PROFIT NOW
Effects of expectations on future moral behavior on current moral actions and intentions
Master thesis, MscHRM
University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
August 18, 2010
OSKAR PAUL ROEMELING Studentnumber: 1503243 Semarangstraat 37a 9715 JT Groningen tel.: +31 (0)6 4498 8018 e-mail: o.roemeling@student.rug.nl WORDS: 5992 Supervisor University dr. J. Jordan
“What is morality?” she [Dagny] asked. “Judgment to distinguish right and wrong, vision to see the truth, courage to act upon it, dedication to that which is good, integrity to stand by the good at any price. But where does one find it?” The young boy made a sound that was half-chuckle, half-sneer: “Who is John Galt?”
BE MORAL LATER, PROFIT NOW
ABSTRACT
This research contributes to the field of moral behavior by studying the effect of expectations of future moral behavior on individuals’ current moral actions and intentions. In a lab experiment, participants were randomly assigned to three conditions: unpleasurable and moral, unpleasurable and non-moral, and pleasurable and non-moral. Conditions varied in their hedonic value and in created expectations of future moral behavior. Participants played an economics game to investigate current moral behavior and answered several questions about their intended moral and immoral actions in the upcoming thirty days. Results showed that expectations on future moral behavior did not influence current moral behavior or current moral actions. However, expectations on future moral behavior did have a marginal effect on an individuals’ current immoral behavioral intentions. These results demonstrate that making people expect to show moral behavior in the future leads them to have slightly less immoral intentions at the current time.
TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page 1. INTRODUCTION 5 1.1 Background 5 1.2 Theory 6 1.3 Hypotheses 8 2. METHODS 10 2.1 Participants 10 2.2 Design 10 2.3 Measures 12 2.4 Procedure 14 3. RESULTS 16 3.1 Manipulation check 16
3.2 Moral behavior and intentions 16
4. DISCUSSION 19
4.1 Reflection of results 19
4.2 Limitations 20
4.3 Future research 21
4.4 Conclusion and implications 22
1. INTRODUCTION
“Credit crisis worst crisis since 1929.” Deputy Prime Minister W. Bos (Elsevier, 2008)
1.1 Background
The global economy is in a very precarious position. A lot of today's problems started with high risk taking in the banking industry (e.g. sub-prime mortgages). Due to high risk, and some would say, irresponsible investment, paired with the financial problems in the global markets, multi-national banks, including the Dutch banks ABN-AMRO and ING, had to be saved with taxpayers’ money. News of high bonuses and unscrupulous investments also reached the general public who, with great indignation, took notice. Bankers and upper-echelon managers, who seemed to have been acting for their own benefit instead of their clients by taking high bonuses and engaging in irresponsible risk, were considered immoral.
1.2 Theory
Before giving a brief history of morality related research, I will first explain the construct of moral (or immoral) behavior. Morality is defined by Reber (1989: 348) as “referring to the perceptions as to what is good and bad behavior and standards.” For the current research this means that moral behavior refers to behaviors that are normatively considered good and immoral behavior refers to behaviors that are normatively considered bad.
combined with the action of taking unearned rewards. Using moral credentials to explain these findings, the misrepresentation could be considered a (moral) justification by the participants to excuse themselves for taking the unearned monetary reward. Other research showed that when people failed to act in line with their self-interest, people sometimes justified this behavior by feeling more moral about their actions (Jordan & Monin, 2008). In this study, when confronted with a confederate who quit a dull task before it was completed, participants elevated their own morality after completing the task. In this study, the virtuous completion of a (dull) task when another gave-up might function as a moral credential to judge one’s own behavior as morally superior. As the existing research indicates, there seems to be an artificial balance where people try to compensate moral behavior with immoral behavior and vice versa. Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin (2009) show that persons who write a story about themselves using words from a set of traits (e.g. caring, generous ) donate less money to charity in comparison to people writing either stories containing neutral words (e.g., book, house) or negative traits (e.g. disloyal, greedy). Former moral actions excuse peoples’ later moral actions (or choices). These findings contribute evidence for the existence and usage of moral credentials. Lastly, in a study on past moral actions and their influence on future moral behavior Jordan, Mullen and Murnighan (2010) find that recollections of one’s own moral behavior led to more cheating on a math task than recollections of immoral behavior. According to Jordan et. al., these findings indicate that moral actions might work along a “moral equilibrium”.
1.3 Hypothesis
As described above, a growing amount of recent research indicates that moral behavior may be unstable (albeit predictable) depending on the moral credentials that individuals have ascertained. These studies show that people use earlier choices or actions to ‘excuse’ current self-centred behavior or statements. Or, put differently, moral behavior seems to seek an equilibrium which can be attained by the mechanism of moral credentials. Figure 1 gives a graphical view of this mechanism working over time. Notice, however, that existing findings only explain current moral (or immoral) behavior based on past moral actions (or justifications) performed by the individual.
FIGURE 1
Thus as former research indicates, reminding people of their earlier moral feelings or actions seem to influence their subsequent moral behavior. So how do expectations of future moral behavior influence people’s current actions (or intended actions at the present moment)? To answer this question, I tested the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: People who intend to show moral behavior in the future will behave less morally at the present time.
Hypothesis 2: People who intend to show moral behavior in the future will intend to behave less morally at the present time.
2. METHODS
2.1 Participants
In exchange for a monetary reward of 6 Euros, 76 students of the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen participated in this study. I told them that the study was about expectations and decision making. All participants were in either the bachelor phase of their studies or enrolled in a pre-master program. Of these students 49 were female (64%) and the mean age was 21 years old (SD = 3.2).
2.2 Design
TABLE 2.1 Condition overview
Condition Task Moral valence Hedonic Value
Pleasurable, non-moral (sports)
Mandatory sports Neutral High
Unpleasurable, non-moral (study)
Mandatory study Neutral Low
Unpleasurable, moral (social work)
Mandatory social work
2.3 Measures
Immoral Behavior
I measured participants’ engagement in immoral behavior using an economics game (adapted from Gneezy, 2005). Specifically, I used it to measure immoral behavior by measuring people's willingness to lie to another person (and in doing so, increase their own profit). The original game used a two player structure, Player 1 and Player 2. I changed this structure to include a third player; the Intermediary. The Intermediary role was added to give participants the idea that a non-biased party was involved.
During the economics game participants believe they are a randomly-assigned player in a 3-player game, in reality, however, participants always play against the computer. As soon as the game starts, participants receive notice that there are actually only 2 players and he or she is acting as both Player 1 and the Intermediary. Participants believe that Player 2 continues to believe that there are three people involved. This adaptation from Gneezy’s (2005) original design was done so that participants would not attempt to use “reverse psychology” by behaving counter to ways that they believed Player 2 would expect them to behave, thereby tricking Player 2. The unbiased Intermediary was added in order to influence participants to play a more straightforward game.
The economics game is structured around two choices that the Intermediary (the participant) sends to the other player through the computer terminal. The first choice gives participants the option to either lie or tell the truth. During the first choice participants hold valuable information about two pay-out options: Option A and Option B. Option A meaning a high profit for Player 1 (the participant) and Option B meaning a high profit for Player 2 (the ostensible other participant). Participants have the choice to either be truthful or lie about which pay-out would benefit Player 2 most.
The second choice gives participants the option to emphasize their earlier choice by adding 'this is the truth' to the message they will send to Player 2. When participants have decided on sending their message, the information is relayed to Player 2 to make his or her choice. In the economics game, the computer (Player 2) always chooses Option B meaning a high pay-out for Player 2 and a low pay-out for Player 1 (the participant). (Note that neither during nor after the game, participants receive feedback on the final choice made by Player 2. They only discover this information when the study is complete.)
participants are recoded into a 3-point lying scale (see Table 2.2), with higher numbers indicating more dishonesty.
TABLE 2.2 3-point lying scale Choice 1
Lie or tell the truth
Choice 2 Add “this is the truth”
Scale score
Truth Add 1
Truth Do not add 1
Lie Do not add 2
Lie Add 3
Moral Intentions
2.4 Procedure
Participants believed that they were participating in two separate studies on expectations and decision making. The study consisted of three different conditions. In each condition I first asked participants to read about an upcoming change in their university’s curriculum. This change was, in fact, fictitious. I led participants to believe that the university would implement a mandatory program consisting of either 3 hours of sports (pleasurable, non-moral), study time (unpleasurable, non-moral), or social work (non-pleasurable, moral) per week in order to graduate from the University. After reviewing the information on the upcoming program participants wrote a persuasive message about the program. I told participants that this persuasive message could be used in future communications about the program with their fellow students. Making participants write a persuasive message was done to make the upcoming change more salient in participants’ minds. After finishing this assignment, participants had to get the experimenter, who started them on the second task.
The second part of “Study 1” started with a manipulation check: participants first answered four questions on their feelings towards the upcoming program: (1) Would they enjoy
the program?, (2) Would they feel good about themselves when doing the program?, (3) Did they
think the program was a good initiative?, and (4) Do they look forward to participating in the
program? I averaged these items to form a manipulation check for my initial manipulation of their behavioral expectations (∝ = 0.89). Participants used a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = not at all; 7 = a lot) to answer the questions.
After completing the manipulation check for “Study 1,” participants started the “economics game.” I told participants that Study 2 was about dividing money, when, in fact, this task measured people's willingness to lie to another person. The economics game was structured around two central choices; choice 1: whether to be honest about two available payout options and choice 2: whether to strengthen their former statement by adding (or not adding) 'this is the truth'. The scoring for this measure is described above, see Table 2.2.
As soon as the economics game was finished, participants started of with a list of questions asking about their intent to engage in moral and immoral behaviors. Participants were asked how likely they were to engage in a variety of behaviors in the upcoming 30 days.
of what kinds of work they might do in their described program. This step was taken to ensure that participants understood what their proposed program would entail and to make sure that they were not confused as to its purpose (e.g., saying that in the study condition, she would be taking tennis lessons). All participants correctly recounted their upcoming activities.
Participants were lastly instructed to approach the researcher as soon as they completed the final manipulation check. The experimenter then probed them for suspicion, noting those participants who did not believe the cover story or those who guessed the goal of the research. Seven participants expressed suspicion (i.e., they doubted whether there was an actual second person involved during the economics game); however, their weak suspicions did not justify excluding them from the analysis. After thanking participants for their time and debriefing them on the actual purpose of the study, they received 4 Euros as compensation, plus the 2 Euros of payout from the economics game in “Study 2”.
3. RESULTS
3.1 Manipulation check
The experimental conditions had effects on participants’ feelings toward the upcoming programs. Results of a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition on the participants’ feelings about the various programs, F(2, 73) = 4.92, p = 0.01. Means and standard deviations for the three conditions are shown in Table 3.1. However, contrary to my expectations that mandatory social work would receive the lowest ratings of participants’ favourable expectations for future participation, results showed that participants reported that they would enjoy the social work (i.e., they gave it a mean score of 5.29 on a 7-point scale). Mandatory study received the lowest ratings of anticipation. These results and their implications for my findings are discussed further in the Discussion section.
TABLE 3.1
Condition means and standard deviations
Condition Mean (SD) pleasurable, non-moral (sports) 5.49 (1.07) unpleasurable, non-moral (study) 4.40 (1.50) unpleasurable, moral (social work) 5.29 (1.34)
3.2 Moral Behavior and Intentions
Moral behavior. The first dependent variable is participants’ choices in the economics
TABLE 3.2 Moral behavior Condition Mean (SD) pleasurable, non-moral (sports) 1.81 (0.75) unpleasurable, non-moral (study) 1.68 (0.75) unpleasurable, moral (social work) 1.76 (0.78)
Moral intentions. In contrast to Hypothesis 2, a one-way ANOVA of my manipulation on
Immoral intentions. A one-way ANOVA, using a composite scale for the immoral
intentions, showed a marginally-significant effect, F(2, 73) = 2.49, p = 0.09. However, the direction of the means for the three conditions was not what I hypothesized. In fact, individuals who expected to behave morally in the future were less likely than those who expected to engage in non-moral behaviors in the future to express immoral behavioral intentions. I used a post hoc follow-up test to examine how the experimental conditions differed from one another. For the first contrast, I compared the unpleasurable, moral and the unpleasurable, non-moral condition. This contrast was non-significant, t(73) = 0.17, p = 0.87. I also examined the statistical difference between the unpleasurable, moral and both the pleasurable and unpleasurable, non-moral conditions. This difference was also non-significant, t(73) = -1.25, p = 0.22. Table 3.4 shows the mean scores per condition for the immoral intentions.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1 Reflection of results
In this study, the main hypothesis was if people who believe they will be showing moral behavior in the future will choose to behave in a less moral way now (i.e., by either acting less morally or acting more immorally). The current findings did not fully support this hypothesis. Expectations on future moral behavior did not influence the choices people made when they divided money and had the opportunity to lie about it to increase their own profits. I found the same for people’s moral intentions. People who expected that they would be doing mandatory social work were not more (or less) likely to donate to charity or do volunteer work. I, however, did find that individuals’ expectations for future moral behavior did affect their intentions to download music illegally or use illegal software.
In direct contrast to my hypothesis that expectations on future moral behavior would increase peoples’ current immoral intentions, results suggest that these expectations actually result in slightly less immoral intentions. People expecting to show moral behavior in the future seem less likely to download illegal music or use illegal software. Although post hoc contrasts showed that theses individuals were not significantly more likely than those in the mandatory study or sports programs, means trended in unexpected directions. This finding is contrary to the most recent findings on moral credentialing (e.g., Monin & Miller., 2001). A possible explanation could be that, in accordance with consistency theory (viz. Festinger, 1964; Garret & Wallce, 1976); when people project the future self they plan to be, they intend to behave consistently with this future self. Thus peoples’ view of a future moral self inhibits current immoral intentions because of the desire to be consistent. This finding, however, is in direct conflict with actual behaviors that have been found when looking at the relationship between current and past moral behavior and its influence on current moral actions (e.g., Khan & Dhar, 2006; Monin & Miller, 2001).
One possible reason that results did not support my hypothesis is that my experimental manipulations did not have the intended effects on people’s attitudes. Contrary to expectations, individuals reported high expectations for enjoyment in participating in social work, indicating that they may have seen this as a pleasurable activity, rather than one that had a moral, dutiful component.
moral ways when expecting to engage in future moral behavior. Thus, merely believing you will be performing moral behavior at some time in the future does not appear to influence current moral behaviors or intentions. This finding might also be extended to indicate that expectations of future moral behavior do not provide individuals with moral credentials.
4.2 Limitations
As with all research, this study has its limitations. First, this study was done in the laboratory. Translating laboratory results to the real world is always difficult. Effects (not) found in controlled situations might not always hold-up in real world settings. That said, based on comments during my suspicion probe, participants truly believed that they would be participating in these programs at their university. Thus, I have reason to believe that participants took the manipulation seriously and expected to engage in either moral or non-moral behaviors in the near future.
Another concern for this study is that it was the first study running in English at my university’s lab. This meant that most participants read the instructions and responded in their non-native language. Although participants did not report any difficulty with the language and knew that the study would be done in English prior to participation, it is not unlikely that a study done in a person’s first language could make for a better understanding.
Furthermore, many of the participants were either Native Dutch or international students. It is possible that the moral credentials effect is culturally-specific to the U.S. context and does not extend to other cultures. All prior research showing moral credentialing effects was done in the U.S.. The U.S. has a strong religious movement (Uhlmann, Poelmann, & Bargh, 2009) that might influence the attention people have for moral issues and what they define as moral versus non-moral. For example, non-American participants might not see performing social work as a moral activity or may not consider downloading music illegally as immoral. Unfortunately, I did not have any manipulation checks to follow up on these possibilities. Thus, there is no data to confirm whether or not participants did or did not see their behavior as morally-valenced.
4.3 Future research
This is the first study examining the effects of expectations of future moral behavior on current moral actions. Future research could use different ways to manipulate expectations on future moral behavior, for example, by looking at people already pledged to volunteer in a future project. In the current study people are ‘forced’ to undertake a moral deed (social work). The mandatory aspect could be removed if research would focus on people who are already planning on undertaking a moral action (e.g. social or community work). When people commit themselves there is no doubt about actually doing the work which might enhance the obtained moral credentials. Early research has already shown that individuals’ volitional choices (or commitment) can influence their attitudes (e.g., Linder, Cooper & Jones, 1967).
The unexpected results found in this study relating to the influence of future moral behavior on current immoral intentions warrants further examination. Future research could focus on this possible relationship and try to ascertain its actual existence. Special attention should be devoted to the way expectations of future moral behavior influence immoral intentions. For example, do people compensate, or as suggested by the current research, act consistently? And if they act consistently, what are the mechanisms of this relationship?
In this study I focused on the effect of future moral behavior on current actions and intentions. This focus means that at this point there is no way of telling if expectations of future immoral behavior could have effects for current actions or intentions. Future research could look at the expectations people have on their future immoral behaviors and their consequences for today’s actions. Possibly, by having people believe they will be acting immoral in the future, individuals will feel the need to engage in moral cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) – acting more morally in the present. Or, consistent with the current findings, individuals who expect to behavior immorally in the future will act in consistent ways in the present time.
relatively easy to purchase in special stores. Currently, the usage of cannabis in the U.S. is a crime. But also, the passage of time influences on what is considered to be moral or immoral behavior. For example, during the early 17th century it was acceptable, and even considered a moral mandate, to burn women accused of being witches at the stake (Middleton, Gilbert & Jolly, 2010). Views on these actions have changed since. But it is not impossible that we hold certain ideas about morality today that might change in upcoming years or decennia.
4.4 Conclusion and implications
Returning to the example presented at the beginning of this paper, based on the current findings, it is unlikely that bankers’ immoral behaviors were influenced by their future expectations of engaging in moral behavior. Future moral behavior showed some suggestive influences on individuals’ current immoral intentions, but this influence was relatively weak and in a direction that was reverse from what I expected. That said, it is likely that the bankers were making immoral decisions that were of a far greater magnitude than those involved in the current study. Thus, it is also possible that their expectations of future moral behavior were also of a far greater magnitude than those involved in the current study. Without question, a greater understanding of what factors influence current moral (and immoral) behavior is needed if we hope to rein in some of these destructive behaviors.
If the objective is to enhance current moral actions or intentions, having people believe that they will be acting in a moral way in the future will not help create these actions or intentions. Based on the results of the current study, legislation or government and business programs aimed at increasing current moral behavior by affecting people’s expectations of their future moral behaviors will probably not be effective. If influencing current moral actions or intentions is the goal, organizations would be far better off focusing on past or current moral behavior, as it has been shown that past moral actions do influence current moral actions. As a practical example consider the implications for charity organizations. As a charitable institution, reminding people of their previous immoral actions and then presenting them with the option to donate to charity could enhance fund income (c.f., Sachdeva et al., 2009). People are more willing to make a contribution after the immoral reminder compared to just being asked for a donation. Raising people’s expectations on future moral (or immoral) behaviors will probably not elicit similar responses.
show moral behavior in the future seem to be more prone to have less immoral intentions now. However, these findings are entirely different than how most people actually act (i.e., establishing moral credentials). Thus, people restricting their immoral behavior today are likely to compensate for this behavior in the future. Meaning that instead of reaching their moral future, they compensate by showing more immoral behavior thus never reaching their projected future moral state they had expected to reach.
In general, when the goal is to influence people’s current moral behaviors or intentions it is not advisable to try to accomplish this goal by raising expectations on future moral actions. For as there are currently no indications that expectations on future moral behavior have a causal link with current moral behaviors and intentions. However, if reducing current immoral intentions is the goal, creating expectations on future moral behaviors might be a successful way to accomplish this goal. Returning to our bankers, these findings mean that having bankers expect to show future moral behavior could help reduce their irresponsible risk taking and help lower their acceptance of high bonuses.
LITERATURE
Davidson, A. R., & Jaccard, J.J. 1979. Variables that moderate the attitude-behavior relation: Results of a longitudinal survey. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37: 1364 – 1376.
Festinger, L. 1964. Behavioral support for opinion change. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 28: 404 – 417.
Garrett, J. B., & Wallace, B. 1976. Cognitive consistency, repression-sensitization, and level of moral judgment: Reactions of college students to the Watergate scandal. Journal of Social
Psychology, 98: 69 – 76.
Gneezy, U. 2005. Deception: The role of consequences. The American Economic Review, 95: 384-394.
Jordan, A.H., & Monin, B. 2008. From sucker to saint moralization in response to self- threat.
Association for Psychological Science, 19: 809 – 815.
Jordan, J.M., Mullen, E., & Murnighan, J.K. 2010. On the pendulum of moral action:
The effects of own and others’ past moral actions on future moral behavior. Working paper.
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. 2006. Licensing effect in consumer choice. Journal of Marketing
Research, 43: 259 – 266.
Middleton, J.F.M., Gilbert, R.A., & Jolly, K.L. 2010, August 4. Late medieval and early modern Europe. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved on August 4th, 2010 via http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/356655/magic/215623/Late-medieval-and-early-modern-Europe
Monin, B., & Miller, D.T. 2001. Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 81: 33 – 43.
Peeters, B. 2008, April 12. Bos: Kredietcrisis ergste crisis sinds 1929. Elsevier. Retrieved on August 4th, 2010 via http://www.elsevier.nl/web/Nieuws/Economie/189432/Bos-Kredietcrisis-ergste-crisis-sinds-1929.htm
Rand, A. 1957. Atlas shrugged. New York: New American Library.
Reber, A.S. 1989. Woordenboek van de psychologie. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker.
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D.L. 2009. Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The paradox of moral self-regulation. Association for Psychological Science, 20: 523 – 528.
Schweitzer, M.E., Ordonez, L., & Douma, B. 2004. Goal setting as a motivator of unethical behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 47: 422–432
Uhlmann, E.L., Poehlman, T.A., & Bargh, J.A. 2009. American moral exceptionalism. In J.T. Jost, A.C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.), Social and Psychological Bases of Ideology and
System Justification:. 27-52. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Weigel, R.H., & Newman, L.S. 1976. Increasing attitude-behavior correspondence by broadening the scope of the behavioral measure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33: 793 – 802.
