MORAL FUNCTIONALITY:
THE EFFECT OF RECALLED (IM)MORAL BEHAVIOR ON FUTURE
MORAL INTENTIONS
Master thesis, MSc Human Resource Management University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
November 16, 2010 MARLIES PRINS Studentnumber: 1552538 Abel Tasmanplein 66 9726 EP GRONINGEN Telephone number: + 31 643 562 523 e-mail: M.M.Prins.2@student.rug.nl Word count: 8,480 Supervisor / university: Dr. J. Jordan University of Groningen Second assessor: Mr. R.B.L. Sijbom University of Groningen
ABSTRACT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT……….2
TABLE OF CONTENTS……….3
INTRODUCTION.………..…5
Intentions of the study..………....6
Overview………..6 THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK………7 Consistency theory………...7 Moral compensation……….8 Moral cleansing………...8 Moral credentials……….9 Order effects………..10 Primacy effect………....10 Recency effect……….………11
Order effects in the moral domain……….12
RESULTS………..19
Moral credentials hypothesis……….…20
Primacy and recency effect ypotheses……….………..…21
Negativity bias hypothesis……….…23
INTRODUCTION
Being moral is perceived as a valued quality to possess, both in one’s personal, as well as in one’s professional life. Employers desire a workforce consisting of employees who know how to behave ethically towards coworkers and the company. But what factors motivate people to behave morally? How to predict individuals’ moral behavior has been the subject of discussion for several decades. Roughly, two contradicting theories exist concerning the topic: the consistency theory (e.g., Heider, 1958; Erikson, 1964) and the moral compensation theory (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001; Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Sachdeva, Illev, & Medin, 2009).
Consistency theory states that people tend to be consistent in their actions and thoughts. According to Erikson (1964) this desire for consistency is because identity is the core of being and the best identity choices are the ones consistent with the person’s intrinsic nature. People also expect constancy in person perception, in terms of personality traits or characteristics of others. This effect is referred to as the ‘constancy phenomena’ (Heider, 1958). It says that people are interested in the invariances of the environment so that they can establish themselves in a stable world in which the future can be anticipated and controlled. In sum, this theory states that moral behavior will lead to more moral behavior and immoral behavior will lead to more immoral behavior.
Intentions of the Study
In this research I will build on previous research conducted on moral compensation. Specifically, I will take an in-depth exploration of how recall of past moral and immoral behavior affects future moral intentions. I will first attempt to replicate the simple moral compensation effects that have been previously demonstrated. I accomplish this task by making individuals’ moral or immoral (or both their moral and immoral) past behavior salient and then measuring what the consequences of this recall are for future moral intentions.
But what happens when a person is asked to recall both immoral and moral past behavior? I will then propose three competing hypotheses about how the order of moral or immoral recall and the paired recalled of both moral and immoral behavior in a single session affect subsequent moral intentions. Does the order in which the questions are asked affect intended moral behavior? And when using equal amounts of positive and negative moral questions, does one of these recollections dominate in predicting individuals’ intentions to behave ethically? These are the questions I attempt to answer in this study.
Overview
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this section I elaborate on the existing research mentioned in the introduction. Based on this research, I have developed four hypotheses (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b, 3, and 4), which I discuss next.
Consistency Theory
According to consistency theory, moral behavior will lead to more moral behavior and immoral behavior will lead to more immoral behavior. A reason for this, according to Heider (1958), is that people expect constancy in a perceived object in terms of its shape, size, color, and other attributes. Heider refers to this effect as the ‘constancy phenomena’, and states that it is also applicable in social perception. This can be applied in person perception in terms of personality traits or character; for example, most people are not very likely to change their (first) impressions of another person, despite the effects of changing conditions. An explanation for this intransigence is that people are interested in the invariances of the environment and of other persons so that they can establish themselves in a stable world in which the future can be anticipated and controlled.
Another advocate for the consistency theory is Erikson (1964). He claims that someone’s identity is the core of being and best identity choices are ones that are consistent with the person’s intrinsic nature. People with a strong moral identity should strive to maintain consistency between conceptions of their moral self and their actions in the world (Erikson, 1964). According to Erikson, a person’s identity is deeply linked to his self-conception, and therefore it is relatively stable over time.
However, empirical research demonstrated that when it comes to their moral actions, people are not consistent. Instead, people tend to compensate their own moral or immoral behavior by showing opposing intentions or actions (e.g., Jordan, Mullen, & Murninghan, 2010; Monin & Miller, 2001; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). For instance, Sachdeva et al. (2009) asked participants to write a story containing either positive or negative traits about themselves. In opposition to consistency theory’s predictions, those who used positive traits to write about themselves were less likely to donate money to a charity organization and were less environmental-friendly in decision-making than were those who wrote negatively about themselves. Affirmation of their moral identity led them to feel licensed to act immorally (Sachdeva et al., 2009) and threats to their moral identity led them to seek moral cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). I discuss the theory of moral compensation in more detail below.
Moral Compensation
According to this theory, moral or immoral behavior results from an internal balancing of moral self-image and the cost inherent in moral behavior. Moral behavior is dynamic over time and is used to regulate one’s moral self-worth (Sachdeva et al., 2009). People want do to good, but do not want to pay the costs associated with prosocial behavior, such as money, time, or other valued resources (Eisenberg & Shell, 1986). In contrast, when one’s moral self-image is threatened, moral behavior can be an instrument to regain the lost self-worth. The labels that are applied to these two phenomena are moral credentialing (Monin & Miller, 2001) and moral cleansing (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), respectively. I describe each of the phenomena in detail below.
Moral credentialing. Moral credentials are ‘payments’ that people award to themselves
act immorally in the future (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006; Sachdeva et al., 2009). Monin and Miller (2001) demonstrated that when people got the opportunity to disagree with sexist or racist statements (i.e., establishing credentials as non-prejudiced persons), they revealed a greater willingness to express a politically incorrect opinion; disagreement earned them moral credentials, leading them to feel more licensed to act on illicit motives.
Furthermore, the study of Khan & Dahr (2006) demonstrated that individuals who imagined they were donating money of their tax rebate to a charity organization, were more likely to use the remainder of the amount to hedonic (such as a designer jeans) rather than utilitarian products (such as a vacuum cleaner). The study demonstrated that the prior expression of an intent that helps establish an altruistic (moral) self-image is subsequently more likely to liberate the person to make self-indulgent (less moral) choices.
Moral cleansing. Moral cleansing refers to actions people engage in when their moral
self-worth has been threatened (e.g., Sachdeva et al., 2009; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). As mentioned in the introduction, people can cleanse their tarnished moral self-image through literal (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006) and figurative (Tetlock et al., 2000) compensatory behavior.
were more willing to donate blood, donate money or volunteer, as opposed to participants who were asked to describe a situation when they helped other people (moral). Figurative cleansing was also demonstrated by Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, and Lerner (2000). Individuals were more likely to express a willingness to donate organs or volunteer their time after considering situations that threatened their sacred, protected values, such as love, honor or justice.
In an attempt to replicate these previous findings, I make the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Those whose positive moral behavior is salient to them will be less likely to have moral intentions for future behavior relative to a control condition.
Hypothesis 1b: Those whose immoral behavior is salient to them will be more likely to have moral intentions for future behavior relative to a control condition.
The above hypotheses state a desire to merely replicate previous evidence of moral compensation; however, in the current investigation, I go beyond these simple hypotheses to engage in a more fine-grained exploration of how an individual recalls his own moral and/or immoral behaviors affects future moral intentions. I state these hypotheses in detail below.
Order effects
Primacy effect. The ‘primacy -‘ or ‘prior entry’ effect occurs when people, encountering
two opposing messages, are influenced more by the first message (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994) than by the second. When someone is confronted with the first item of a pair, a broad, uncrystallized impression is born based on this item. Nothing is competing with it in his working memory. The next item comes not as a separate item, but in relation to the direction established by the first recalled item. The items are perceived in relation to each other, and the view that is formed by this person acquires a certain stability, so that the later items are fitted, if conditions permit, to the given prior direction (Asch, 1946). For example, when forming impressions of others, the more primary ones are most decisive for the overall impression of a person (Asch, 1946).
Hypothesis 2a: The valence of the behavior (i.e., moral or immoral) that is recalled first will have greater effects than will the valence of subsequently-recalled behavior on individuals’ moral intentions. And these effects will occur in a compensatory fashion.
Recency effect. The recency effect can be defined as the principle that when people
encounter two opposing messages, they will form judgments more consistent with the second message (Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994). This effect results from the statement that end-of-the-list memory traces possess more identifying features than pre-recency traces, allowing for better item selection at the time of recall (Nairne, 1988). That people tend to recall items that are at the end of a list rather than items that are in the middle or at the beginning of a list can be demonstrated by the following example; a driver sees an equal total number of red cars as blue cars during a drive, but there happens to be a flow of blue cars at the end of the journey. Then, it is likely that he concludes that there were more blue cars than red cars throughout the drive.
to remember. The momentary advantage of the very recent behavior will most likely disappear rapidly, because by next month, a person is unlikely to remember what she had for breakfast one month ago. The strength is minimal when the recollections are contiguous and the measurement of what is remembered does not happen immediately after the recollection (Miller & Campbell, 1959). This effect is shown in the negatively accelerated forgetting curve of Ebbinghaus (1885) in FIGURE 1.
FIGURE 1 Negatively accelerated forgetting curve of Ebbinghaus (1885) (Adapted from Miller & Camplbell, 1959, page 2)
This curve implies that a pattern exists where the primacy effect does not occur instead of a recency effect, but in addition to a recency effect. The place in time after the recollection decides whether the recency or the primacy effect occurs, and is dependant of the time interval between the last message and the measurement (Miller & Campbell, 1959). In this study, as well as in most en vivo recalls of moral and immoral behavior, there is no delay between the recollection of the past behavior and measurement of the future intentions, and therefore the recency effect is most likely to occur.
Hypothesis 2b: The valence of the behavior (i.e., moral or immoral) that is recalled last has greater effects than does the valence of previously-recalled behavior on individuals’ moral intentions. And these effects occur in a compensatory fashion.
Negativity bias
Considering the order-related hypotheses above, it is also important to acknowledge that what is recalled may be more important to subsequent behavior than the order in which it is recalled. Acknowledging this possibility, my last hypothesis has to do with the strength and salience of the valence of the recalled information. According to several studies (e.g., Fiske, 1980; Pratto & John, 1991; Taylor, 1991), people selectively apply more weight to negative attributes when perceiving another person. They also assign relatively more value, weight, and importance to events that have negative, rather than positive influence on them (Pratto & John, 1991).
FIGURE 2 The mobilization-minimization hypothesis of Taylor (Reprinted from Taylor, 1991, page 76)
Being moral is important to people. Moral identity can be a foundation that people use to construct their self-definitions. Furthermore, a person’s moral identity may be associated with certain beliefs attitudes and behavior, particularly when that identity is highly important for him. Therefore, negative information about a person’s moral self might be more salient to him (Aquino & Reed, 2002), and thus more influential on subsequent behavior – specifically, immediate subsequent behavior, than will positive information about the moral self (Taylor, 1991). Based on this research, I propose a third hypothesis that competes with Hypotheses 2a and 2b:
Hypothesis 3: Recalling immoral behavior (negative), regardless of the order that it is recalled relative to moral behavior, affects future moral intentions more than does recalling moral behavior (positive).
Self-image
People typically have very strong beliefs about their own morality, and want to maintain this aspect of their self-concept (Groffin & Ross, 1991; Mazar et al., 2008). Mazar and colleagues (2008) demonstrate that aside from financial considerations, whether a person decides to be honest or dishonest is also based on internal rewards. The study describes how compliance with the internal value system provides positive rewards, whereas noncompliance leads to negative rewards. If someone fails to comply with his internal standards for honesty, he will have to negatively update his self-image, which is an aversive activity. For instance, Mazar et al. showed that as opposed to a control group, participants who were given a moral reminder (i.e., asked to recall the Ten Commandments) were less likely to cheat in the successive part of the experiment. This example demonstrates that reminding participants of standards of morality will decrease the level of cheating.
In their study on the ‘licensing effect’, Khan and Dhar (2006) examined the influence of the prior expression of an altruistic intent (e.g., volunteering) on the choice of a consumer between a relatively luxury (e.g., designer jeans) and an utilitarian product (e.g., vacuum cleaner). The study demonstrated that the prior expression of an intent that helps establish an altruistic (moral) self-image is subsequently more likely to liberate the person to make self-indulgent (less moral) choices. Khan and Dhar showed that the virtuous intent boosted the self-image, which mediated the preference for a luxury option. In addition, according to Jordan and Monin (2008), people use moralizing of their behavior as a reduction mechanism for self-threat. For instance, when someone completes a favor a superior asked him to do and sees that a colleague who is asked for the same favor refuses without negative consequence, it is likely that he evaluates his own behavior as morally superior (as a ‘saint’) as opposed to his colleague, which he views as a ‘sinner’ (i.e., the sucker-to-saint effect, Jordan and Monin, 2008). This moralization of oneself is done to maintain one’s positive self-image.
Based on these arguments, I propose that people’s moral self-image mediates the relationship between the recall of prior moral/immoral behaviors and participants’ intentions to act morally:
METHOD
I measured moral intentions by examining how likely people are to intend to behave prosocially, that is to intend to donate money, donate blood, and volunteer their time, as well as the interest they take to donate actual money to charity. I manipulated people’s recall of past moral behavior by asking them to recall either moral, immoral, or both immoral and moral (in both order) actions that they have taken. I also included a control condition in which I asked participants to recall morally-neutral actions. I examined how these recalls affected individuals’ moral self-image and moral intentions.
Design
This study has one independent variable (moral recollections) with five conditions, recalling either exclusively moral, exclusively immoral, first moral and then immoral, first immoral and then moral, or morally-neutral actions.
Participants
One hundred forty bachelor students of the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen (Mage = 21.95, SD = 2.14; 35% women) participated in this study by completing an online survey. I randomly-assigned students to the moral, immoral, immoral-moral, moral-immoral, and control conditions. They participated in exchange for entry into a raffle for a €50,00 retail certificate.
I dropped 30 participants because they did not complete a significant portion of the survey or because they failed to follow the instructions. As a result, the final sample consisted of 110 participants (Mage = 22.06, SD = 2.15; 38% women). I distributed
participants over the five condition groups as follows: moral 22, immoral 21, immoral-moral 20, immoral-moral-imimmoral-moral 18, and control 28.
Measures
Self-image. In their study, Khan and Dhar measured participants’ image by the
moral self-images by asking them to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = very untrue, 7 = very
true) how much they agreed with four statements of Khan and Dahr that reflected their
moral self-image. These items (Cronbach = .74), served as potential mediators for the relationship between the past moral behavior and participants’ intentions to act morally.
Moral intentions. I measured future moral intentions by asking participants to indicate on
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely) how likely it was for them to engage in six specific actions in the next two weeks. These items were presented in a random order. Using three of these behaviors, I made a composite measure of moral intentions, indicating their likelihood of donate money to a charity organization, donating blood, and to volunteering their time to a non-profit institution (Cronbach’s = .60). I made a composite measure of non-moral leisure behaviors by combining three items, which indicating the likelihood that the individual would go on a vacation, to go to a party, and to go to the movies (Cronbach’s = .45).
As a second measure of moral intentions (called here, moral pursuit), I measured intentions to be moral by asking participants if they would like to be linked to a website where they could donate money to a charity (1 = Yes, 2 = No). The Haitian earthquake had occurred shortly before this study took place and the charity was an organization where people could donate money to the victims of this earthquake (www.giro555.nl).
Procedures
I approached participants with an e-mail containing an invitation to join the experiment and a link to a website where they could complete the survey anonymously. I did not tell them the actual purpose of the study but told them that I was asking for their help for writing my master thesis. The survey can be found in Appendix I.
preservation second. I asked the moral-immoral condition the same questions but in reverse order. Finally, in the control condition, I asked participants to name five actions that they take on a typical Tuesday and on a typical Sunday.
RESULTS
Before discussing the outcomes of my hypothesis tests, I will discuss a correlation matrix, which contains intercorrelations between all relevant study variables (TABLE 1). Unsurprisingly, there was a significant correlation between how many times participants donated money to a charity organization and how many Euros they have donated to charity. There is also a significant correlation between participants’ age and their intentions to undertake leisure activities, such that the older participants were, the less likely they were to engage in leisure activities. There was also a correlation between individuals’ moral intentions and moral self-image. I will discuss this relationship later in the chapter when I discuss the results of testing the hypothesis of moral self-image as mediator between moral recollections and moral intentions.
TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for research variables
Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Mean
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Moral intentions 3.12 (1.18) -
2. Leisure intentions 4.83 (1.30) .14 -
3. Moral Self image 5.67 (.73) .23* .20* -
4. Age 22.06 (2.15) -.06 -.33** .15 -
5. Income level 2.61 (1.66) -.10 .09 .01 .08 -
6. Past donation (Times) 22.43 (41.69) .15 .05 .16 .03 .12 - 7. Past donation (Euros) 176.92 (482.16) .15 .10 .13 .15 .14 .68**
Notes. Income level was a 6-level categorical question with 1 < €4000 a year, 2 = €
4.000 - € 5.999 a year, 3 = € 6.000 – € 7.999 a year, 4 = € 8.000 - € 9.999 a year, 5 = € 10.000 - € 12.000 a year and 6 > €12.000 a year.
N = 110
Moral Credentials Hypothesis
The first hypotheses stated that relative to a control condition, participants who recalled moral behavior would be less likely to express intentions to behave morally in the future (Hypothesis 1a) and those who recalled immoral behavior would be more likely to express intentions to behave morally in the future (Hypothesis 1b). For this analysis, I examined the moral condition group, the immoral condition group, and the control group. The mixed recollection groups are left out of this analysis, leaving an n = 63 for these analyses.
TABLE 2 contains the means and standard deviations of the moral, immoral and control condition groups. A one-way ANOVA on participants’ moral intentions revealed a marginally-significant effect of recall condition on moral intentions, F(2, 68) = 2.45, p = .09. Their effect on composite measure of leisure activities is insignificant, F(2, 68) = .03, p = .97. To see if the condition groups were significantly different in their intentions to behave morally, I ran a planned comparison, comparing the condition in which only moral behavior was recalled with the condition in which only immoral behavior was recalled. This comparison demonstrated that the moral group was marginally less likely to behave morally than the immoral group, t(105) = -1.77, p =.08. A planned comparison between the moral condition group and the control condition demonstrated an insignificant effect on moral intentions, t(68) = .37, p = .71, leading me to reject Hypothesis 1a. However, a planned comparison did demonstrate a significant effect between immoral recollections and moral intentions, t(68) = 2.128, p = .04, supporting Hypothesis 1b.
In contrast to predictions, the control condition group’s moral intentions were not in the middle of the moral and immoral groups. Rather, individuals in this condition were even less likely to behave morally than were the persons recalling moral behavior. I also conducted a Chi-square analysis on the relationship between recalling (im)moral behavior and participants’ choice to explore greater donation opportunities (moral
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for the Moral Credentials Hypothesis
Content of Recalled Behavior Moral Immoral Control Intentions to Behave Morally 3.05(1.17) 3.67(1.16) 2.92 (1.30)
Notes. N = 110. The ‘moral’ group contains the results of the condition group recalling
only moral behavior. The ‘immoral’ group contains the results of the condition group recalling only immoral behavior.
Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
Primacy and recency effect hypotheses
The primacy and recency effect hypotheses both predict that the order of recalled behavior uniquely predicts subsequent moral behavior. In order to test the primacy hypothesis, I first ran an overall ANOVA comparing the conditions in which moral behavior was recalled first with the conditions in which immoral behavior was recalled first, as well as the control condition. The results are shown in TABLE 3. The overall ANOVA revealed a non-significant difference, F(2, 107) = .57, p = .57, indicating a lack of support for Hypothesis 2a. Therefore I did not conduct any follow-up comparisons. The overall ANOVA using the composite measure of leisure activities was non-significant, as well, F(2, 107) = .05, p = .96. I also conducted a Chi-square analysis on the relationship between first recalled moral behavior and moral pursuit, resulting in a non-significant relationship, χ² (2, N =108) = 1.93, p = .38.
TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics for the Primacy Hypothesis
Content of Recalled Behavior Moral first Immoral first Control Intentions to Behave Morally 3.17 (1.04) 3.21 (1.24) 2.92 (1.30)
Notes. The ‘moral first’ group contains the moral condition and the moral-immoral
condition. The ‘immoral first’ group contains the immoral condition and the immoral-moral condition. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
For the recency hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b), I combined those conditions that had
the recalled moral behavior last and those that had recalled immoral behavior last. Thus, I combined the moral recollections group with the immoral-moral group, and the immoral recollections group was combined with the moral-immoral group. I then ran an ANOVA using these conditions, which revealed a significant effect of the morality of the recollection on the intention to behave morally, F(2, 107) = 3.46, p = .03. The means and standard deviations for these conditions are contained in TABLE 4.
To see how the three groups differed in their intentions to behave morally, I ran follow-up post hoc comparisons, comparing the conditions in which moral behavior was recalled last with the conditions in which immoral behavior was recalled last. This comparison demonstrated that, the moral-last group was significantly less likely to behave morally than the immoral-last group, t(105) = -2.42, p = .02, supporting Hypothesis 2b. An additional comparison, comparing moral last with the control condition, showed no significant differences on moral intentions, t(105) = -.15, p = .88; however a similar comparison comparing those who recalled immoral last with the control condition was significant, t(105) = 2.03, p < .05. These findings demonstrate that participants who recalled immoral behavior last, were more likely to behave morally than participants recalling moral behaviors last, as well as those who recalled non-moral behaviors.
An overall ANOVA of the leisure activities was non-significant, F(2, 107) = .04, p = .96, which is why I did not conduct any follow-up comparisons. I also conducted a Chi-square analysis on the relationship between last recalled moral behavior and moral pursuit, which resulted in a non-significant relationship, χ²(2, N =108) = 1.50, p = .47.
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics for the Recency Hypothesis
Content of Recalled Behavior Moral last Immoral last Control Intentions to Behave Morally
Notes. The ‘moral last’ group contains the moral condition and the immoral-moral
condition. The ‘immoral last’ group contains the immoral condition and the moral-immoral condition. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
N = 110
Negativity bias hypothesis
According to Hypothesis 3, recalling immoral behavior leads to more future moral behavioral intentions, regardless of whether such recall was paired with recall of moral behaviors, as well as regardless of the order of recall. To test this hypothesis, I combined the immoral condition group with both the moral-immoral group and the immoral-moral group, and compared the moral intentions of this group to those of the moral condition, and the control group. I ran an overall ANOVA, which revealed that these groups did not significantly differ from each other: they showed statistically equivalent moral intentions,
F(2, 107) = .79, p = .46 – although the means were in the predicted direction, with recalls
involving immoral behavior eliciting the greatest moral intentions relative to the other two groups.1 Thus, it cannot be confirmed that recalling immoral behavior had a stronger influence on moral intentions, leading me to reject Hypothesis 3. Likewise, of the comparison of these condition did not affect individuals’ intentions to engage in leisure activities, F(2, 107) = .14, p = .87. As for moral pursuit, a Chi-square analysis showed no significant relationship between recalling immoral behavior, moral behavior, and moral pursuit, χ²(2, N =108) = 1.32, p = .52.
TABLE 5
Descriptive Statistics for the Negativity Bias Hypothesis
Content of Recalled Behavior Only moral Containing immoral Control Likelihood to Behave Morally
3.05 (1.17) 3.24 (1.13) 2.92 (1.30)
1 The fact that the N’s in each condition are unequal is likely to reduce the level of significance of this test;
Notes. The ‘containing immoral’ group contains the immoral condition, the
moral-immoral condition, and the moral-immoral-moral condition. The ‘only moral’ condition contains the group in which only moral behavior is recalled. Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.
N = 110
Self-image hypothesis
In Hypothesis 4, I proposed that moral self-image acted as mediator in the relationship between recalled moral behavior and moral intentions (FIGURE 3). In doing so, I only tested mediation for the recency hypothesis, because it was the only one that demonstrated a relationship between moral recall and moral intentions, which is a necessary step to test mediation. In order to test this hypothesis, I conducted three regression analyses for all relationships in the model. That is, first I tested if a significant relationship existed between the morality of the last recalled item and moral intentions, which, as I showed above in my testing of Hypothesis 2b, proved to be significant, = 2.92, t(107) = 13.39, p = .04. I then ran a regression examining the relationship between the moral recollections and the individual’s moral self-image, which showed a non-significant effect, = 5.63, t(107) = 40.37, p = .85. Therefore, I did not test the last step of the mediation analysis, that is, if the relationship between recollections and intentions was rendered non-significant when moral self-image was entered into the model.
x
y z
FIGURE 3 Moral self-image as mediator
This finding led me to conclude that although moral self-image did affect moral intentions, moral self-image was not affected by individuals’ moral recollections, and therefore, did not mediate the relationship between recollections and intentions. So, people with a greater moral self-image were more likely to have moral intentions;
Moral self-image
DISCUSSION
The objective of this research was to examine the effects of the morality of recalled behavior on future moral intentions. The study demonstrated marginal support for the moral credentials hypothesis (Hypothesis 1): the moral intentions of the moral group were less moral than those of the immoral group. I also found that the order in which participants recalled moral versus immoral behavior influenced moral intentions. Specifically, I found evidence for the recency effect (Hypothesis 2b). This result implies that behavior that is recalled last is decisive for future moral intentions. The occurrence of this effect may be explained by the fact that in the current study, no delay existed between the recollection of the past behavior and measurement of the future intentions. Miller and Campbell (1959) demonstrated that the strength is of the recency effect is the strongest under these conditions.
Furthermore, based on the results, it cannot be confirmed that recalling negative behavior (i.e., immoral behavior) has a stronger influence on future moral intentions than positive behavior (i.e., moral behavior) (Hypothesis 3). The three groups that contained the recollection of immoral behavior had noticeably different results on their moral intentions (Immoral-Moral: M = 2.70, SD = 2.70, Moral-Immoral: M = 3.32, SD = .88, and Immoral: M = 3.67, SD = 1.16) and combined, they were not more moral in their intentions than was the group that only recalled moral behavior. These three conditions were distributed as the most likely to behave morally, the least likely to behave morally, and a state of intent that was in between the other two conditions, respectively.
Lastly, moral self-image did affect moral intentions, but moral self-image was not affected by individuals’ recalled moral behavior (Hypothesis 4). The lack of effects from moral recall on moral self-image suggests that moral self-image is likely not affected by the recollection of (im)moral behavior.
Implications
Theoretical implications. The findings emerging from this study add to the growing
body of empirical research on moral compensation. Especially, they contribute an understanding of how the order of recalling moral versus immoral behavior affects future moral intentions. The participants who only recalled their own immoral actions were most likely to behave morally, as predicted by the moral compensation hypothesis (Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009). But the results of the groups that recalled both immoral and moral behavior did not fall in between those of the groups recalling only moral or immoral behavior. Rather, groups that recalled immoral behavior the last were most likely to behave morally in the future. It also proved that the group with the least moral intentions was not that in which participants recalled only moral behavior, but the group recalling immoral behavior first and then moral behavior. So the recollection on one’s own immoral behavior does not always lead to moral intentions, especially, when it is combined with the recollection of moral behavior.
In contrast to my predictions, the moral intentions of the control group were not in the middle of the moral and immoral groups. Rather, individuals in this group were even less likely to express moral intentions than were the persons recalling moral behavior. An explanation for this finding can be that when one is forced to think of morality, whether it is one’s own moral or immoral actions, one expresses greater intentions to behave morally than one otherwise would. But this hypothesis is beyond the scope of the current data. Therefore, I cannot make any empirically-based conclusions about the effects of the moral domain more generally. Future research might examine this outcome by comparing the moral intentions of participants who are asked to name some moral behaviors or actions, not necessarily of themselves, and compare these intentions to the ones of a control group, with no morally-related prompts.
environment. This is consistent with existing research (Jordan et al., 2010; Sachdeva et al., 2009) and has interesting implications for the vast reaches of the moral self.
The amount of empirical evidence supporting the recency effect in equivalent contexts is relatively much larger than the primacy effect (see Costabile & Klein, 2005; Crowder, 1976; Murdock, 1974). I also did find support for the recency effect as opposed for the primacy effect. Miller and Campbell (1959) showed that the recency effect is most likely to operate when there is no delay between the stimulus and the measurements based on this stimulus. The current procedures present questions about participants’ moral intentions immediately following their recalls of moral and immoral behaviors. However, in contrast to this prediction, in the mixed recall groups, I asked participants to recall the opposing behaviors subsequently, which, according to Miller and Campbell, would lead to a stronger effect of the primal recall. This prediction conflicts with the current findings. Although I do not have evidence to address why the recency (as opposed to the primacy) effect occurred, I believe that it did because the measurement of the moral intentions was done immediately after the recollection of (immoral) past behavior. It has been demonstrated that the recency effect is most likely to occur when the short term-memory is addressed, as it is in the current study.
The study of order effects in the moral domain of juror judgments of Costabile and Klein (2005) already showed that evidence that was presented late in a trial was most decisive for the ultimate verdict. The results of this study not only confirm that the recency effect is applicable in the moral domain, but also indicates that the recency effect occurs in a broader scope of the moral domain (i.e., the likelihood to donate money, blood, volunteer). These results indicate that the last message not only is decisive when judging another person (in the verdicts of jurors), but also when judging oneself.
be emotions (Hardy & Carlo, 2005) or guilt proneness (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007).
Practical implications. The current research provides several insights regarding how to
improve moral behavior in organizations. The results suggest that the best way to encourage people to behave morally is to let them recollect their own immoral actions last, either letting them recall moral behavior before that or not. For employers who want to improve the moral intentions of their employees, it implies that when discussing the performance of the employee (e.g., at an assessment interview), it would be beneficial to end the talk by discussing the employee’s moral shortcomings. The results of the current study suggest that ending with a discussion of past immoral behavior is the most likely way to encourage future moral behavior.
The matter of order effects has been subject of research in consumer choice, as well (e.g., Gorn & Goldberg, 1980; Haugtvedt & Wegener, 1994; McCullough & Ostrom, 1974). The overall goal of research in this domain is to investigate the variables that lead to the greatest amount of persuasion of consumers. The results of this study may contribute to this domain of research. For instance, when a non-profit company, like Unicef, wants to encourage people’s donation behavior through commercials, they should highlight the consumer’s immoral behavior (for instance, by reminding them of a time when they did something that harmed others) and ensure that this commercial is the last one in the show.
organizations to not have to be too negative in their advertising to take advantage of this affect. They can highlight people’s positive moral selves – just not last.
Limitations
The first limitation has to do with the nature of my dependent variable. The results obtained in this investigation rely on self-reports of intended morality, which are prone to social desirability response biases. Even though the questionnaires were anonymous, participants might have felt the urge to indicate their likelihood of behaving morally as higher than it would actually be. Inflating such projections would likely have made them feel good about themselves or present themselves as prosocial individuals to the researchers.
In addition, participants only indicated their moral intentions, which may not correspond to actual moral behavior.
In addition, when participants in this research were asked to recall past moral or immoral behavior, there was little room for elaboration. They were asked only to recall moral, immoral, a combination of both, or non-moral behaviors that they have taken in the past. It was, for instance, not possible for participants to provide an argument about why they had done certain things – that is to justify their behavior or to elaborate on it. This limitation has implications for the order effects; Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994) demonstrated that recency effects are most likely to occur when motivation and ability to elaborate the initial (prime) message are low. According to this study, when confronted with negative characteristics about themselves, people will likely be able to defend themselves from this position developed from processing the first message. So, it can be argued that when people have room to elaborate, they might find rationalization for their actions and as a consequence will not feel the need to compensate for their negative self-concept by acting morally (Mazar et al., 2008). Thus, the effects that I found in the current study may not have occurred had participants been given the opportunity to elaborate on their behavioral recalls.
demographic group that has less money to donate to charity and perhaps, more time to volunteer. Older demographic groups may have more money to donate and less time to volunteer, plausibly changing their reported moral intentions.
Future research
Finally, I will point out some suggestions for future research directions. The current results, combined with previous findings (e.g., Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), all suggest that restoring the moral self-image occurs through the internal process of moral compensation. It might be interesting to examine the effects of external restoration of the moral self-image by, for instance, punishment. If an individual is being punished for his immoral behavior by another person (before being able to compensate for his immoral self-image internally by acting morally), does this punishment lessen the need to behave morally in the future and actually license future immoral behavior? In such a case, I would expect that after being punished for something supposedly immoral, individuals may feel morally superior and, as a result, engage in the aforementioned suckertosaint effect (Jordan & Monin, 2008), -feeling even more licensed to act immorally in the future.
Another suggestion for future research is to allow participants to elaborate on their recalled behaviors. As mentioned above, it was not possible in the current study for participants to provide an argument about why they had done certain things and to justify certain behavior. The study of Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994) showed that recency effects are most likely to occur when motivation and ability to elaborate the initial (prime) message are low. Therefore, the results of a future study may not replicate the results of the current study if individuals are allowed to elaborate on recalled behaviors.
The last suggestion I have for future directions of this research has to do with improving its generazability. In the current study I used a quite homogeneous sample of participants (e.g. young, students). In order to make the results of this study more generalizable, I suggest using a more heterogeneous sample of participants.
Conclusions
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APPENDIX 1: Questionnaire
Instructions
Thank you for your interest in this survey. Please complete the questions below. The survey will take you approximately 10 minutes.
Upon completion, we will enter you in a raffle for a € 50,00 gift certificate for Ikea. Your email address will only be used for the purpose of this raffle. It will not be distributed to any third parties nor be attached to your responses.
This survey is for a master thesis. Participation is voluntary and is not connected with any RUG course. All personal information will be disconnected from any responses before analysis.
Recalling moral/immoral behavior* CONDITION 1 - Moral
Please name 5 actions that you take that contribute to environmental preservation. Please name 5 actions that you take on a typical Tuesday.
CONDITION 2 - Immoral
Please name 5 actions that you take that contribute to environmental destruction. Please name 5 actions that describe your typical Tuesday.
CONDITION 3 - Moral-Immoral
Please name 5 actions that you take that contribute to environmental preservation. Please name 5 actions that you take that contribute to environmental destruction. CONDITION 4 – Immoral-Moral
Please name 5 actions that you take that contribute to environmental destruction. Please name 5 actions that you take that contribute to environmental preservation. CONDITION 5 - Control
Please name 5 actions that you take on a typical Tuesday. Please name 5 actions that you take on a typical Tuesday.
* Participants were placed in one of the five conditions.
Self-image
Please describe in what extent you agree with the following statements:
Strongly Somewhat Neither agree Somewhat Stronlgy disagree Disagree disagree or disagree agree Agree agree
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
I am compassionate □ □ □ □ □ □ I am sympathetic □ □ □ □ □ □
Intended generosity
In the next two weeks, how likely are you to do the following activities**:
Very Somewhat Somewhat Very Unlikely Unlikely unlikely Undecided likely Likely likely
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
go on a vacation? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ go to the movies? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ help a fellow student understand
course material? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ go to a party? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ volunteer your time to a non-profit
institution? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ download or share music illegally? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ donate blood to a blood bank? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ take home office supplies from your
job for personal use? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ donate money to a charity organization? □ □ □ □ □ □ □ Consume a small item (e.g. a grape) from
a grocery store without paying for it? □ □ □ □ □ □ □
** These questions were randomized.
Past moral behavior
Approximately, how many times have you donated money to a charity organization in your lifetime? (please name a number)
…………..
Approximately how many euros have you donated to charity organizations in your lifetime?
……… Demographics
What is your gender? Male Female
1. 2.
□ □ What is your age? ………….
What is your income level (including student grant, allowances, etc)? 1. < €4.000,- a year
6. > € 12.000,- a year
What is the highest level of education you have attained? 1. Primary school (Basisonderwijs)
2. Lower General Secondary Education (VMBO) 3. Higher General Secondary Education (HAVO) 4. Pre-University Education (VWO)
5. Intermediate vocational education school (MBO) 6. Vocational degree (HBO)
7. Bachelor degree 8. Master degree 9. None of the above
Email address
Please enter your email address below to be entered into the raffle for a € 50,00 gift certificate for Ikea.
Your email address will only be used for the purpose of the raffle. It will not be distributed to any third parties nor be attached to your responses.
………. Goal
What do you think this study is about? ………..
Moral Pursuit
Are you interested in being directed to website where you can donate money to the victims of the earthquake in Haiti***?
Yes No 1. 2. □ □
***If answered ‘Yes’, a page with the a link to the website http://www.giro555.nl is shown. If answered ‘No’, the next page is shown immediately.
Thank you
