Austerity, terrorism and failed states
The influence of the Euro crisis on the European Common Security and
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Table of Contents
Introduction 3
Part I: Constructing a theoretical framework for the role of the military
in combating terrorism and failed states 6
Chapter 1: Triangular relationship: the EU, failed states and terrorism 7
Chapter 2: Failed states 11
Chapter 3: Terrorism 19
Chapter 4: Terrorism and failed states: a single framework
for military action 30
Part II: CSDP Missions and the military framework 39
Chapter 5: The CSDP: development, institutions and problems 39
Chapter 6: The CSDP vs. the military framework 43
Part III: Future warfare, defence cuts, and the CSDP 62
Chapter 7: Future warfare 62
Chapter 8: Defence cuts and the CSDP 71
Conclusion 94
Bibliography 97
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Introduction
The competition for resources such as oil and water, a changing climate, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are problems for the international security.1 Examples are the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, piracy, and the Iranian threat to block the Strait of Hormuz in reaction to a proposed oil embargo by the European Union (EU) on the country.2 From a European perspective it is important to adequately react to these, and similar future events. Many of these problems can be solved by diplomacy, but what if diplomacy fails? In that case, military action is the last resort.
Within the EU, the security issues mentioned above are part of the European security strategy. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is established to achieve these goals. The following threats are mentioned as a security risk for the EU: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, failed states, and organised crime.3 Therefore, to maintain European security, the EU emphasizes three strategic goals:4 addressing the threats, building security in the neighbourhood, and development of an international order based on effective multilateralism.
To sustain a military force which can counter the risks mentioned above, financial capabilities are a necessity. However, momentarily Europe finds itself in a financial debt crisis, and governments are cutting their expenses to force back their national debt. As a result, many member countries increase the budget cuts on their defence in order to do so. However, this leads to a paradox. On the one hand, member states express their will to protect Europe’s safety and European interests outside the Union. On the other hand, the same states are cutting the budgets of the necessary means. It is this paradox which lays the foundation for this thesis.
Therefore, the main question of this thesis is: To what extent is the Common Security
and Defence policy influenced by the Euro crisis? An answer to this question will be provided
by examining the influence of the defence cuts on the military capabilities of Europe’s largest
1 Dannreuther, R., International security: the contemporary agenda. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. / Brown, M.E., Grave new world: security challenges in the 21st century. 1st edition. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2003.
2 “Iran: langeafstandsraketten Hormuz succesvol afgevuurd”. NRC Handelsblad. Jan 2, 2012.
<http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2012/01/02/iran-vandaag-uitgestelde-proef-met-lange-afstandsraketten-hormuz/>. 3 A secure Europe in a better World: European security strategy. European Union, Dec 2003.
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>. 4
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member states: England, France, Germany and Italy. The main question will be divided into the following three sub-questions:
1. In theory, which roles apply for the CSDP regarding terrorism and failed states? This question aims to construct a theoretical framework. This framework can be used to compare the CDSP’s policy to a theoretical standard. The framework will determine which role the military can play with respect to terrorism and failed states.
2. To what extent does the European approach concerning terrorism and failed states match the theory? This chapter will handle the policy of the CSDP. Furthermore, the military missions of the EU will be analysed, and compared to the theoretical framework to see to what extent the European approach matches the theory.
3. In which areas of defence spending are the biggest member states cutting their budgets? This part of the thesis will discuss the influence of cuts in military spending on future CSDP operations under the terms of the theoretical framework with regard to the role of the military in combating failed states and terrorism.
A theoretical framework and a definition of the problem area are crucial to find solid answer to the main question. Therefore, this study will focus on two of the five threats to the EU: failed states and terrorism. In doing so, the focus will be on the military contribution to the policy regarding terrorism and failed states. To test the European security policy a theoretical framework will be constructed by means of a literature research. This framework will test the European policy regarding failed states by using the four roles Paul Collier identified for a military approach to failed states; and the roles of the military with regard to counter terrorism policy as provided by the literature. Collier mentions the following roles: expelling an aggressor, restoration of order, maintaining post-conflict peace, and preventing coups.5 In addition the framework will do the same for the terrorist threat. These are: confronting terrorists and their infrastructure and defend against terrorist attacks6
More specific, this thesis will focus on the role the CSDP plays, and could play in the future, regarding failed states and terrorism. There is an obvious link between failed states and political violence, as will be explained in the first part of this thesis. With regard to failed states, within this thesis it is about the role of the CSDP in combating political violence such as rebellion which plays an important role in state failure. Regarding to combating terrorism, this thesis focuses on the terrorist threat, and counterterrorist policies abroad. Not on these
5 Collier, P. The bottom billion: why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. 1st edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 124.
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policies and causes within the Union. This is the case because the objective of this thesis is to determine the effects of the Euro crisis on European defence policy, and counterterrorism within the Union in primarily a task for the police and Interpol.7
This thesis may provide several answers. Stress on the national defence budgets in the Union might have a spillover effect on the military cooperation. However, there is still the possibility that the goals mentioned above may not be within reach. The smaller the number of naval vessels, helicopters or tanks possessed by the member states, the smaller the European strike power and the capability to execute long or large-scale missions is. However, it is clear that the outcome and length of the financial crisis will have a considerable influence on the future of the CSDP.
The content of this thesis will be based on a literature research. Important works for constructing the theoretical framework are the theories of Paul Collier as laid out in The
bottom billion (2008) and Wars guns and votes (2010). Other important works for the
framework are the three volumes of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st
Century: International Perspectives (2007) by James Forest, and The utility of force: the art of war in the modern world (2005) by Rupert Smith. Important sources for the second part are
EU accounts of CSDP missions, as well as books such as European Security and Defence
Policy: the first 10 years (1999-2009) (2009) published by the European Union Institute for
security studies (EUISS). The substance for the third part will be gathered through media reports and The military balance 2012, published by the EUISS.
7 Norell, M. “Intelligence coordination and counterterrorism: a European perspective.” In Forest, J.F.
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Part I
Constructing a theoretical framework for the role of the military
in combating terrorism and failed states
Without a theoretical framework it is impossible to give an answer to the main question of this thesis. However, in the literature there is no theory which provides an explicit framework for a military role in combating terrorism violence such as rebellions and terrorism. On the contrary, there is an abundance of theory on the roots of terrorism, and the reasons why states fail. In addition there is also theory which provides a role for the military in combating terrorism, and reconstructing failed states through interventions.
To produce a single theoretical framework which combines the roles the military can play with regard to terrorism and state failure, it is important to address the overlap and common causes. By combining the two a framework can be provided which provides an end, ways, and means for military action against these threats. This framework can then be used to assess the current functioning of the CSDP concerning the European approach towards terrorism and failed states. Moreover, when combined with the role of the military in future conflicts, the framework can also be used to assess the future functioning and needs for the CSDP combating terrorism and failed states.
Why one framework for two separate problems? First, as this chapter will demonstrate, there is a strong link between failed states and terrorism. Second, a single framework will provide a well-organized arrangement of the thesis, and a clear tool for assessing the EU’s capabilities and functioning regarding terrorism and failed states. Of course, using a single framework brings the danger of oversimplifying solutions concerning the problems. It is therefore important that the reader keeps in mind that this framework is constructed as a tool for this thesis. Not as a practical policy-framework. The problems and solutions which will be discussed in this thesis are in reality far too complex to be addressed by a single framework.
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theoretical framework will be constructed. This framework will address the similarities in causes and solutions to provide a theoretical framework for military action.
Chapter 1
A triangular relationship: the EU, failed states and terrorism
European security strategy
Before failed states and terrorism can be linked, it is important to define the European security interest with regard to failed states and terrorism. On December 12, 2003 the EU produced a European security strategy: a secure Europe in a better world. As a Union with 27 member states and over 500 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP).8 Therefore, Europe should share in the effort for global security, as stated in the European security strategy.
According to the security strategy, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. This study will focus on two of these threats: failed states, and terrorism. The security strategy defines the terrorist threat as follows:
Terrorism seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of the European societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well resourced, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties. Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been
attacked. 9
Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. A recent example of such a threat was the shooting in Toulouse by a French terrorist who was trained by Al Qaeda.10 Benjamin Barber underpins that the current context for the struggle against terror is interdependence, as there can be neither liberty for justice nor
8 A secure Europe in a better world, 1. 9 Ibid, 3-5.
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security in one country alone.11 Nations simply cannot defeat global enemies by themselves.12 Logically, in this line of reasoning a common European approach is a necessity.
The security strategy argues that failed states are a problem because the collapse of a state can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. For the EU, state failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.13 Furthermore, failed states lead to organized crime, illegal immigration, and piracy.14 The European concerns are underpinned in the literature. Matthew Wahlert argues that globalization has changed the distant relationship between states. A nonstate actor may take refuge in a failed state and direct attacks from that state against his former home state.
Linking failed states and terrorism
What makes failed states so interesting for terrorists? Or, the other way around: why do failed states produce terrorists? A number of links are provided in the literature on terrorism and failed states. First of all, poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.15 Therefore, state failure directly affects a broad range of European interests: human rights, good governance, rule of law, investments, and so on.
Theoretically there seems to be an obvious link between terrorism and failed states. Peter Tikuisis strengthened this relation with statistical research on the relationship between weak states and terrorism in 2006 and 2007. To do this he used the Fund for Peace Failed State Index (FSI). An annual ranking of 177 nations based on their levels of stability and capacity, based on twelve social, economic and political/military indicators.16 The FSI will be used in this study to indicate the level of state failure, because of its diverse evenly weighted array of indicators.
Tikuisis’ research produced the following interesting results. First, the attacks with the highest number of casualties occurred in states that were most failed according to the FSI.
11
Barber, B. “Terrorism, interdependence, and democracy.” In Forest J.F. The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training, and root causes. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, 208.
12 Ibid.
13 A secure Europe in a better world, 4.
14 Report on the implementation of the European security strategy - providing security in a changing world, 1. 15
Chenoweth, E. “Instability an opportunity: the origins of terrorism in weak and failed states.” In Forest J.F. The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training, and root causes. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, 17.
16
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Second, a significant relationship between weak states and terrorism was demonstrated with an analysis that focused on the occurrence and non-occurrence of terrorism.17 Although the occurrence of domestic fatal terrorist incidents, which accounted for over 94 per cent of all fatalities, was just under 50 per cent among weak states, the chance of their occurrence was at least three times higher than in all other states.18 Therefore, it can be said that there is a strong relationship between weak states and terrorism. Additional analysis by Tikuisis of terrorist incidents between democracies and non-democracies demonstrated a significantly higher occurrence of terrorism in the latter states.19 The data also indicated a significantly higher incidence of fatal terrorist attacks in states which were in the top twenty of the FSI.
The high occurrence of terrorism in weak democratic states is explained by Erica Chenoweth. She argues that the political stability of the existing regime is the most significant factor affecting the origins of terrorism.20 As shown by Tikuisis, the level of democracy does not necessarily reduce the probability of terrorist development. Chenoweth reasons that it are the permissive conditions of politically unstable regimes that inhibit domestic institutional mechanisms that could potentially prevent terrorist organizations from taking root in particular countries. So, the inability of a government to demonstrate clear control over its people is a prominent factor in terrorist development. Terrorist groups will gravitate toward or originate within political vacuums, a government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent this provides opportunities for terrorist organizations to take root.21Examples of terrorist organizations who profited from such opportunities in failing states are provided by al Qaeda. The organization profited from these opportunities in Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Yemen.
Obviously Terrorist organizations profit from failed states. Moreover, most of the people who support terrorists’ life in failed states. It is these ‘tacit terrorists’ that create safe zones for the active killers.22 Former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) Rupert Smith underpins their importance. In conducting operations the insurgent, terrorist, guerrilla, etc. always follows a pattern, always adapting for the particular circumstances that face him.23 He needs a sanctuary, a preparation area, and an operational
17 Tikuisis, P. “On the relationship between weak states and terrorism.” Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Agression, 1.1 2009, 75.
18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20
Chenoweth, E. “Instability an opportunity: the origins of terrorism in weak and failed states.” 17. 21 Ibid, 20.
22 Barber, B. “Terrorism, interdependence, and democracy.” In Forest J.F. The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training, and root causes. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, 212.
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area. Failed states provide excellent circumstances for all three. Training camps can be a result from the freedom of action that terrorist organizations enjoy in failed states. Moreover, as a result form poverty and inequality, failed states offer a large number of young men and women with few good opportunities who are a potential working force for terrorist organizations. Therefore, failed states grow to be both reservoirs as well as exporters of terror. Criminal organisations profit for the same reasons of the opportunities in failed states as terrorists. Even more dangerous is the possibility of professional criminal networks who link up with terrorist and form a deadly cocktail. Colin Gray acknowledges this, he states that the activities of terrorist and criminals can be identical; what distinguishes the two is the dominant motive.24 Both can take the opportunities offered by a failed state to create a safe zone, to recruit new “personnel”, or to obtain resources to support or finance operations. James Forest ads that terrorist groups can transform into a hybrid criminal/terror entity and partner with criminal syndicates to provide resources for their activities.25 Practical examples are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Taliban elements, both profit from drug trade. A relative new element, and a good example of terrorism meets crime is piracy, as explained in appendix 1.
Besides all reasons above, failed states can play another role with regard to terrorism. The preceding paragraphs suggest that terrorism flourishes in failed states resulting from a lack of control over its territory and people from the latter. However, it can be the other way around. That is, failed states can support. James Forest describes six areas for support from states: training and operations; money, arms and logistics; diplomatic backing; organizational assistance; ideological directions; and, most important, sanctuary. 26 Obviously, Forest focuses in this case on the root facilitators of terrorism, instead of the root causes. He argues that the primary cause of terrorism is a human decision whether or not to commit a terrorist act. A variety of factors influences that decision and facilitates the terrorist act, from ideology to weapons proliferations and criminal networks.27 Logically, terrorist organizations with state support are far more difficult to counter than those which do not.
To answer the first sub-question of this part: there are a number of links between failed states and terrorism. This makes it necessary for policy makers to counter both in a comprehensive approach. The above proves that there is not only a theoretical, but also a
24 Gray, C.S. Another bloody century: future warfare, 30. 25
Forest, James. “Combating the sources and facilitators of terrorism: an introduction.” In Countering terrorism and insurgency in the 21st century: international perspectives, edited by James J.F. Forest, 1-22. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007 , 8.
26
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statistical link between failed states and terrorism. The permissive conditions of unstable regimes allow terrorism to prosper as it offers a number of opportunities. More dangerously, it are these same opportunities that enhance and accelerate the cooperation between terrorism and crime. The results are a number of threats to strong states or groups of states such as the EU. Therefore, it is important to act against these threats, as they are self-reinforcing.
Chapter 2
Failed states
In short, the failed state argument maintains that the inability of a state to control its own territory creates a vacuum of power from which the nonstate actor can usurp state power and enjoy a freedom of action within the state.28 Why does a state fail, to what extent, and what can Europe’s armed forces do about it? The following paragraphs will provide an anwer to these questions.
Matthew Wahlert is to the point regarding this problem: ,,The point is, however, that the obvious examples of a failed state are somewhat easy to point out. At some level, moreover, the action becomes somewhat subjective and open to a great deal of discussion.”29 Obvious examples are Chad, Somalia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, some portions of Afghanistan are under control of the Taliban and warlords, as in Colombia the same can be said about the FARC. The Baluchistan region of Pakistan certainly lacks a government monopoly of power; other countries where the government lacks power are Iraq, Nigeria, Liberia and more recently Syria, Libya, and Mali.
The question remains how to define a failed state. According to Chenoweth the general consensus is that states can fall into four different categories: strong, weak, failed and collapsed.30 These categories can be combined with the FSI which provides four risk-levels: alert, warning, moderate and sustainable. At the top of this list are Somalia, Chad and Sudan; the list ends with Sweden, Norway and Finland.31 The complete list can be found in appendix two. Therefore, this thesis will combine both categorizations, meaning that a collapsed state is
28
Wahlert, M. “The failed state.” In Forest J.F. Countering terrorism and insurgency in the 21st century: international perspectives. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007, 93.
29 Wahlert, 96. 30
Chenoweth, 18.
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in the top of the “alert” category of the FSI, and a failed state at the top of the warning category, and so on.
Robert Rotberg provides additional valuable criteria by which a state’s strength can be evaluated. As one will see later in this chapter, these criteria can be perfectly combined with the theory of Paul Collier. Rotberg claims that states exist to provide mechanisms by which to deliver public goods to people living within as certain territory.32 A state assembles and channels crucial interests among its citizens to provide for the common welfare and defence. While most states fail and success to varying degrees across these dimensions, “it is according to their performance–according to the levels of their effective delivery of the most crucial public goods–that strong states may be distinguished from weak ones, and weak states from failed or collapsed states.”33
Logically, states can move back and forth among the differing categories of the continuum.
Public goods are intangible and difficult to quantify, however, according to Rotberg these goods exist in a hierarchy, and the most vital good is the supply of human security. Other goods may include health care, educational systems, infrastructure, a money and banking system and the promotion of civil society.34 Chenoweth summarizes Rotberg’s view as follows. Strong states perform well across each of these categories and tend to provide many of the goods in the hierarchy. They demonstrate clear control over their territories and deliver a wide range of public goods to their citizens. Weak sates contain a mixed profile, satisfying expectations in some areas while performing poorly in others.35 Weak states are typically characterized by unresolved ethnic or religious tensions, high urban crime rates, and diminished ability to deliver other public goods. Failed states are “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions.”36
Failed states are unable to control their borders, and state regimes may prey on their own constituents.37 A collapsed state is an extreme type of failed state, one in which there is a literal authority vacuum and public goods are obtained through private or ad hoc means.38
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Causes of state failure
Now that is clear how to categorize failed states it is time to turn to the next pressing question. Why do states fail? This is a vital question which needs to be answered to see to what extent the causes of failing states and terrorism overlap. As made clear in the above by Robert Rotberg, the provision of public goods is vital with regard to state failure. Therefore the following will focus on the causes of state failure which deny the development of public goods. Paul Collier has written extensively on this subject, and on possible solutions. His line of arguing follows an economic line of view with a clear role for the provision of public goods and the military. This makes his theory very suitable for this thesis. Therefore the following paragraphs will follow his theory as set forth in his books The bottom billion: why
the poorest states are failing and what can be done about it (2008) and Wars, guns, votes: democracy in dangerous places (2009).
According to Collier most states fail because they are incapable of supplying public goods and continuously revert into conflict. The reason is that most failed states are postconflict states, and postconflict states are fragile; in the past around 40 per cent of the post-conflict countries reverted to violence within a decade. 39 The most important causes of internal conflict are low income, slow growth, and dependence upon primary commodity exports.40 According to Collier this is the case, because low income means poverty and low growth means hopelessness. Young men, who are the recruits for rebel armies, come pretty cheap in an environment of hopeless poverty, simply because joining a rebel movement gives these young men a small chance of riches.41 On top of that, if the economy is weak, the state is also likely to be weak, and so rebellion is not difficult. In addition, primary commodities (natural resources such as oil, minerals, timber, and so on) help to finance conflict and sometimes even help to motivate it.42 For example, the latter is the case with the conflict over control of the mineral-rich areas of the DRC.
So, failed states keep failing because they regularly revert into conflict, and conflict blockades, and undoes, development. It results in lower income and prevents investments, resulting in a negative spiral. In addition during a war, a large number of deaths result from disease. Both economic losses and disease are highly persistent: they don’t stop once the fighting stops.43 If a state is caught up in this spiral it becomes increasingly difficult to stop
39
Collier, Wars, guns, and votes, 75. 40 Collier, Bottom Billion, 19-26. 41 Ibid, 20.
42
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failing. The opposite of the above is true as well. Growth directly helps to reduce risk; cumulatively it raises the level of income, which also reduces risk, and that in turn helps to diversify the country’s exports away from primary commodities.44
Collier argues that states fail because of four traps: the conflict trap, the resource trap, being landlocked with bad neighbours, and bad governance. War undoes the economic growth achieved during peace and increases the risk of conflict renewal. The economic growth can be further undermined by the dominance of primary commodity exports over potentially better possibilities for the long term. In addition bad neighbours can cripple a country’s excess to markets and diminish its options for growth. Bad governance can destroy an economy completely, while good governance alone cannot fix it the short term, because, there is an upper limit to recovery. Excellent governance and economic policies can help the growth process, but there is a ceiling to this growth rates at around 10 per cent: economies cannot grow much faster than this no matter what government do.45 So good governance alone cannot help failing states. On the other hand, bad governance and policies can destroy an economy with alarming speed.46 President Mugabe demonstrated this by culminating the Zimbabwean economy since 1998 with an inflation of over 1000 per cent a year.47
However, state failure can be measured by the supply of public goods. So, how do the traps lead to a problem in the supply of public goods? To answer this question one needs to understand that a country’s supply for public goods is dependent on the size of the country’s economy. Since the typical failed state is too small (economically) to provide the necessary supply of public goods, these goods cannot be delivered.48 Logically, economic development should increase the capability to provide these goods. Yet, the four traps obstruct this development. In addition, societies in failed states are usually too fragmented to achieve the necessary collective action.49 It is important for a failed state to escape from the traps. Therefore, the next paragraph will focus on possible solutions.
Solutions
As this thesis is about the role of the military, it will focus on solutions in which the military can play a role. Other solutions will therefore not be addressed. For a failed state to stop failing, it needs a successful turnaround. Research by Collier came up with three
44 Collier, Bottom billion, 32. 45
Ibid, 64. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48
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characteristics that were reliably significant in determining whether a turnaround could occur. Starting from being a failing state, a country was more likely to achieve a sustained turnaround the larger its population, the greater the proportion of its population that had secondary education, and if it had recently emerged from civil war.50 The first two elements point to the same thing: countries need a critical mass of educated people in order to work out and implement a reform strategy.51 The third, however, seems a bit odd. Nevertheless, Collier argues it is not: post-conflict countries start off with dreadful governance and policies, but the first decade sees substantial improvement. The politics are unusually fluid because the old interests have been shaken up, so it is relatively easy to get change.52 The bad news is that the probability of a sustained turnaround is 1.6 per cent, and the average time it takes to get out of being a failing state is fifty-nine years.53
With such small change for a turnaround, aid is necessary to improve the odds of recovery. The best time for aid is in a post-conflict situation.54 Some important uses of aid for post-conflict are obvious: it pays for the reconstruction of infrastructure. But, there is a much less obvious use: countering inflation.55 Collier explains that during a conflict normal tax revenues decline as the economy contracts in the face of violence. These declining revenues collide with exploding expenditures as the military demands a larger budget. So, governments are likely to resort to the printing press. The result is high inflation. The legacy of high inflation is that people expect inflation to continue and learn to economize on holding cash.56 Therefore, if the government of a failed state wants to get back to low inflation and confidence in the currency, it will need a long period of fiscal restraint. However, after a conflict there are huge demands for government spending: rebuilding infrastructure, alleviating crises of collapsed social provision, and creating jobs for unemployed youth. Collier argues that a benefit of post-conflict aid is that it helps to square the circle. The government no longer needs to use the inflation option so aggressively, and this enables confidence in the currency to return.57
50 Collier, Bottom Billion, 70-71. 51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. 53
Ibid.
54 Collier, Wars, guns, and votes, 89. 55 Ibid, 90.
56
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A role for the military
The root causes for state failure are low income, slow economic growth, and dependence on primary commodity exports. These three elements play a crucial role with regard to conflict, conflict reversion, and economic development. Economic recovery can in time support the necessary public goods needed for progress. Aid can be effective as it can square the circle of inflation, capital flight and investment. Thereby it enhances the chance of economic growth, which in turn decreases the chance of conflict. However, during the first decade after a conflict, a country has the largest chance of reverting back into conflict, but the chance for a turnaround is at its highest. This is where the military comes in. Simply put, by using the military, the international community can supply the most important public good in a post-conflict situation: security. Eventually, when the post-conflict traps are sprung, and the failed states economy is strong enough, domestic supply of security can take over.
Unfortunately, after Iraq and more recently Afghanistan, it is difficult to create support for military intervention. Nevertheless, external military intervention has an important role in helping failed states to create, or guard, a turnaround. Paul Collier argues in The bottom
billion that there are four important roles for external military intervention: expelling an
aggressor, restoration of order, maintaining postconflict peace, and protection against coups.58
Expelling an aggressor
The 1990s began well for military intervention. The expulsion of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was an obvious example of expelling an aggressor. Another success was the British military intervention in Sierra Leone. Operation Palliser imposed security and maintained it after the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was disposed of.59
Restoration of order
Another clear-cut case for military intervention is the restoration of order in a collapsed state.60 Total collapses are rare, but happen. An example is Somalia. Military action is necessary, because it is bad for European interests to leave a huge territory near an important sea trade route with no functioning government. Military intervention comes with a high risk of casualties, but that is what modern armies are for: to supply the global public good of peace
58 Collier, Bottom Billion, 124-134. 59
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in territories that otherwise have the potential for nightmare.61 Armies cannot function productively at zero risk, but it is important that they are employed. In the end, the consequences of civil war spill over to the rest of the world in the form of terrorism, drugs, epidemics, and refugees. The bottom-line is that in the end people in Europe will die as a result of chaos in failed states. Collier puts as follows: the choice is whether these deaths will be among civilians as victims of the spillovers or among soldiers who have volunteered to put things right.
Maintaining postconflict peace
After Rwanda and Somalia, military intervention was back in business in the form of postconflict peacekeeping. However, as Collier explains, it was pretty hit-and-miss: some places got lots of troops, others not many. The highest ratio of peacekeepers to population was in East Timor. After local research Collier found out that this was the case because it was safe there. This sums up the problem of foreign military intervention. Even if troops are sent to dangerous places, they often play it safe. Examples are Srebrenica in 1995 and the UN mission to Sierra Leone in 2000. In the latter case the RUF rebels took five hundred of these soldiers hostage and stripped them of their military equipment. However, once a few hundred British troops arrived (Operation Palliser) a few months later, willing to take casualties, the whole rebel army rapidly collapsed.62 Collier explains that the UN troops were an easy target because the RUF understood that they would not resist. Operation Palliser was a huge success and can serve as a model for military intervention in failed states: cheap, confident, and sustained.63
Beside the “boots on the ground” peacekeeping missions, Collier argues there is a role for another form of peacekeeping: over-the-horizon-guaranties (OTHG). This is what the British have been doing in a ten year period after Operation Palliser. After successfully expelling the RUF, only eighty British troops stationed in the Sierra Leone.64 However, the government was given a ten-year undertaking that if there was trouble, the troops will be flown in overnight.65 Sierra Leone, in terms of reversion to violence, is a major success.66 The French did the same up to 1994 (Rwanda) in Francophone Africa, and they backed their promises by a series of French military bases across Francophone West Africa. This French
61 Collier, Bottom Billion, 125. 62
Ibid, 127. 63 Ibid.
64 Collier, Wars, guns, and votes, 85. 65
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informal security guarantee was highly effective. Collier found out that statistically, the OTHG significantly and substantially reduced the risk of conflict by nearly three-quarters.67 This is a significant result, apart from the fact whether the intervening troops hold a neutral position, or not.
Protection against coups
Since independence, successful African coups have been running at a rate of around two a year.68 Democracies and dictatorships are both threatened by coups, and resulting civil wars are immensely costly, in terms of forgone income and in deeper terms of mortality and the breakdown of social cohesion.69 Furthermore, coups reduce income, and are a form of instability, which is bad for the economy. In addition, in countries with a high risk of coups, investors may keep away. Therefore, failed states should be protected against coups as they increase the already existing problems. However, in some cases a coup may be necessary to topple a regime. In that case, coups should be harnessed to enforce regime chance. A recent example of this is the NATO backed coup in Libya against the Khadafy regime.
Most of the costs of state failure accrue to bad neighbours, that's why state failure is a regional public problem. So it is in the regions’ interests to do something about it. However, in underdeveloped regions, such as Africa, no country has the resources to impose order on failing neighbours.70 The EU has the forces and the aspirations as lined out in the Security Strategy, while affected regions have the interest and can confer legitimacy. This situation has the potential for a marriage: the African Union could provide the political authority for military intervention, and European troops could be the backbone of whatever force was used to intervene.71
Critique with regard to the causes of state failure
The causes, solutions and roles for the military are to a large extend derived from the ideas of Paul Collier. These ideas are a product of an economic approach based on statistical research. The result is a theory which explains state failure and rebellion based on greed rather than grievance. When published Colliers findings in the article were a welcome addition to conflict theories. However, over the past few years, prominent large-N studies of civil war, such as
67
Collier, Wars, guns, and votes, 86-87. 68 Ibid, 142.
69 Ibid. 70
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done by Collier, seem to have resulted in the idea that grievances do not significantly increase the risk of civil war.72
Besides the standard critique about missing control variables, poor data and statistical shortcomings, there are more fundamental forms of critique. Gudrun Østby summarizes this critique. First of all, the greed versus grievance debate deserves further examination. This should not be framed in „either-or‟ terms, as the key seems to be to understand the interaction between grievances and opportunity structures.73 Second, all the economic centred studies take an individualistic approach to inequality, concentrating exclusively on inequality among individuals, even though what they are trying to explain is group conflict.74 Third, the framework’s focus on blaming rebels for civil wars ignores government oppression and responsibility for provoking conflict.75
Chapter 3
Terrorism
Within the scope of this thesis it is impossible to write a comprehensive part on terrorism. Therefore, the following will discuss some of the most important theories and root causes regarding terrorism. The idea is to sketch an overview of a part of the mainstream thoughts on the origins and solutions regarding terrorism. The subject is too complicated to be put in a nutshell, as this is what would happen if one tries to sum up all possible element regarding causes of terrorism. Hence, the following part is not an all-embracing, but a short overview of the theory regarding the causes and solutions on terrorism.
The definition of terrorism
Crucial to this part of the thesis is a definition of terrorism. However, the fact that the United Nations (UN) has, despite numerous conventions, not yet been able to agree on a formal definition of illustrates how politically loaded definitions are. Contrasts can be found in the fact that Western definitions generally encompass elements which define terrorism as politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets to influence a
72 Ostby, G. “Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict.” Journal of Peace Research 45.2 (2008), 143.
73 Ostby, 143. 74 Ibid, 145. 75
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government. Islamic and Arab countries distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate struggle of nations against foreign occupation.76
Most important however are the key elements of a definition of terrorism. The definition should at least hold key elements in order to be of use for this thesis. As the focus of this thesis is military action, the definition should offer elements which can be handled by Europe’s armed forces. It should therefore at least tell who the perpetrators are, what their goals and targets are, who they address, and what their motivations are. Therefore the following definition by Fathali Moghadam will be used, as his definition is clear in these aspects:
,,Terrorism is politically motivated violence that is perpetrated by individuals,
groups, or state-sponsored agents and intended to bring about feelings of terror and helplessness in a population in order to influence decision making and to change behaviour.’’77
This definition excludes the idea of state terrorism. However, this should be no problem, as this form of use of force by states is already thoroughly regulated under international law.78
A typology of terrorism
Now that it is clear which definition of terrorism will be used it is time to turn to the different types of terrorism. The most general distinction can is can be made through the goal of terrorism. As such, terrorism can be identified as tactical terrorism or strategic terrorism.79 Tactical terrorism is where the acts of terror are part of a broader strategy. Here the acts of terror are not expected to change the behaviour of the target state by themselves, but to contribute to a desired outcome within the context of a broader politico-military campaign.80 Hence, it is often difficult to draw the line between guerrilla action and terrorism. There is no such difficulty with strategic terrorism, because the expectation in these cases is that the acts of terror will themselves be sufficient to achieve the desired political ends.81
76 Ramsbotham, O., Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall Contemporary conflict resolution, 69.
77 Marsella, A. J., & Moghaddam, F. M.. “The origins and nature of terrorism: Foundations and issues.”Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment and Trauma, (2004) 9, 19-31, 23.
78 United Nations General Assembly, Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Chapter 3 (2005) para. 91.
79 Dannreuther, R., International security: the contemporary agenda. 2nd edition. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008, 168.
21
Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall distinguish the following four types of terrorism in relation to armed conflict in Contemporary conflict resolution: terrorism that is an unavoidable aspect of most armed conflicts; terrorism as a supplementary measure in asymmetric conflicts; the type of terrorism where it is more important to some groups than other forms of more traditional armed action; radical islamist terrorism, such as undertaken by al Qaeda, that operates internationally and has multiple international purposes.82
Another way to categorize terrorist organisations is by their source of motivation. Although subject to over-generalisation, the following types can be distinguished: left-wing terrorists, right-wing terrorists, ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorists, and religious fundamentalist terrorists.83 Left-wing terrorist organisations tend to prefer revolutionary, antiauthoritarian, anti-materialistic agendas.84 Right-wing terrorist tend to be less cohesive and more impetuous in their violence.85 Examples are neo-Nazi and racist groups. Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorists usually have a clear political or territorial aim that is rational and negotiable, if not always justifiable in any given case.86
Audrey Kurth Cronin explains why religious terrorism is especially dangerous. They consider themselves to be engaged in a struggle between good and evil, implying an open-ended set of targets. They are not just trying to correct the system, but are trying to replace it completely, this makes them uniquely dangerous.87 In the process of trying to weed out the relatively few people providing support from these groups, there is the real risk of igniting the very holy war that the terrorists may be seeking in the first place.88
Causes of terrorism
To provida a theoretical framework the overlap between the causes of terrorism and state failure need to be established. Terrorism is not caused by a single factor, and there is no fixed group of factors or catalysts that can be universally applied to explain its cause. This is not a surprise if one takes into account the variety of terrorist groups, their goals, and their origins. However, there are a number of elements which shine some light on the current landscape of terrorism. Furthermore, the literature provides a number of theories regarding the causes of terrorism, as well as some root causes and root facilitators. Hence, due to the scale of this
82 Ramsbotham, Woodshouse and Miall, 68.
83 Kurth Cronin, A. “Transnational terrorism and security.” In Brown, M.E. Grave new world: security challenges in the 21st century. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003, 285.
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thesis it is impossible to provide all the relevant elements. Therefore, the following will discuss a number of so called root causes and theories which will provide a brief overview of the field.
Root causes
What are these so called root causes? Edward Newman describes the root causes as follows:
“the basic concept of the root causes of terrorism is that certain conditions provide a social environment and widespread grievances that, when combined with certain precipitant factors, result in the emergence of terrorist organisations and terrorist acts. These conditions can be either permissive or direct.”89
Andrej Zwitter provides a broader definition in Human security, law and the prevention of
terrorism. Instead of terrorism, Zwitter speaks of political violence and argues root causes
underlie more than just terrorism.
“root causes are critical pervasive threats to the vital core of human lives, which
are underlying causes for political violence in any kind: civil wars, terrorism, rebellions, turmoil, guerrilla wars, etc.”90
The literature provides numerous root causes. Some overlap, others do not. The following table will provide a short overview of root causes provided by Andrej Zwitter, Paul Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, and Edward Newman.
Table 1: Zwitter, Ehrlich & Liu and Newman
Zwitter91 Ehrlich & Liu92 Newman93
Economic insecurity Population growth Urbanization
Food insecurity Age structure Demography
Health insecurity Geopolitical factor Poverty
89 Newman, E. “Exploring the “root causes” of terrorism.” Studies in conflict & terrorism 29 (2006): 750. 90
Zwitter, A. Human security, law and the prevention of terrorism. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, 49. 91 Ibid, 47.
23 Personal insecurity Individual
Political insecurity Political Dispossession, human rights abuse, alienation, humiliation
Community insecurity Exclusion and social inequality
Environmental insecurity Religious/cultural factor Clash of values, especially ideological or religious
Thomas Homer-Dixon explains how and why the root causes come together. He argues that in some areas root causes include a demographic explosion that has produced a huge bulge of urbanized, unemployed young men.94 They also include environmental accents – especially shortages of cropland and fresh water – that have crippled farming in the countryside and forced immense numbers of people into squalid urban slums, where they are vulnerable to fanatics.95 The impact of these factors is intensified by chronic conflict that have shattered economies and created vast refugee camps; by the region’s corrupt, incompetent governments; and by an international political and economic system that’s more concerned about Realpolitik, oil supply, and the interest of global finance that about the well-being of the region’s human beings.96
Root causes suggest that there is some form of causal relationship between underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions and terrorism. To find out whether there is a significant correlation Edward Newman used statistic research to clarify the relationship between the underlying social conditions and terrorism. His research shows some correlation between root causes and terrorism. By applying several methodological approaches Newman found out that root causes tend to be most relevant in helping to understand terrorism associated with ideological, ethno-nationalist, and Islamist groups in developing countries.97 Root causes are of limited value in explaining nationalist groups in developed societies; and least relevant with regard to ideological and nihilist groups in developed countries.98 Newmans lists the root causes that correlate strongest for the three types. Important for this thesis is the following:
Ethno-nationalist and Islamist groups in developing countries: marginalization,
humiliation, denied opportunities, and suffering from a lack of education
94 Homer-Dixon, T. “Why root causes are important.” Toronto Globe and Mail, Sept. 23, 2001. April 22, 2012. < http://www.pugwash.org/september11/letter-homerdixon.htm>.
95 Homer-Dixon. “Why root causes are important.” 96 Ibid.
97
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opportunities. They also reflect the root cause demographic profile: young males in urban concentrations.
As one remembers with regard to most issues in failed states, Newman’s conclusions underpin the presence of a relation between failed states and terrorism.
Several theories offer an explanation how permissive root causes translate into terrorism. Zwitter names three prominent theories: first he relates root causes to Johan Galtung’s triangle of violence. He argues that the nature of root causes is that they constitute crucial factors which give rise to structural and cultural violence and in consequence could lead to direct violence.99 The second theory is Ted Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation. Zwitter explains that Gurr points out that the emphasis must be on the actors’ perception of deprivation, because this, and not an objective judgement of a root cause, causes violent behaviour among the people affected. Thus, the perception is the cause. Third, there is Frances Stewart’s theory of horizontal inequalities. Horizontal inequalities are inequalities between cultural defined groups, such as ethnic or religious groups.100 If root causes are shared by one or several defined groups, and the perception of relative deprivation is added together with accelerating and decelerating factors for violence, this can lead to group violence.101
Critique on the root causes approach
To start with: the root causes approach seems to offer only a valuably explanation for the arise of certain terrorist groups in certain regions. Furthermore, root causes cannot explain terrorism by itself, but need a catalyst. Second, root causes do not imply a direct cause and effect. Phenomena such as poverty, social inequality, dispossession, denial of human rights, of self-determination do not necessarily result in terrorism.102 Third, the vast majority of the people who are subject to the named root causes do not give rise to terrorism. Finally, evidence points to the fact that a large number of terrorist leaders, like Mohammed Atta, are highly educated. This suggests that he links between terrorism and social conditions is complex. Terrorist organizations require management and technological skills found in the upper and middle classes.103
99 Zwitter, 46.
100
Stewart, Frances. Horizontal inequalities and conflict: understanding group violence in multiethnic societies, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 10.
101 Zwitter, 43. 102
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Another important element of the critique is the definition of terrorism. Because the use of a single term for such a wide array of phenomena is problematic. The definition used in this essay covers a range of factors differing from broad elements as violence, political motivations and non-combatant targets. This makes almost impossible to come up with a coherent set of causes. Furthermore, Andrej Zwitter quotes Marc Sageman who is critical about the relevance of relative deprivation: ,,Sageman argues that judging from their background not all members of the global jihad suffer from long-term relative deprivation’’.104 The same critique can be used regarding the theory of Stewart and Galtung.
Other critique comes from Paul Collier who argues that theories which try to explain conflict trough grievances neglect the opportunity side of the story. Grievances explain terrorism through motive, not through atypical circumstances that generate profitable opportunities such as low costs, a military advantage, or financial gain.105 Furthermore, terrorist organizations are not famous for their transparency in their motives, methods, and negotiations: their communication goes only one way. Therefore, it is important that one keeps in mind the problem regarding the objectivity of root causes as an explaining factor, because Western scholars came up with the idea. It is always dangerous to draw firm conclusions from sources which represent only a single side of a conflict. Nevertheless, the following causes lay the groundwork for terrorism in failed states, as made clear by Newman’s research: denied opportunities, lack of education, young men & urbanization, and humiliation.
Solutions
As the critique on the above has shown it the origins of terrorism are highly debateable. The following Solutions are too. Therefore the following will focus solely on the type of terrorism which correlates with root causes: ethno-nationalist, and Islamist groups in developing countries. The focus of this thesis is to find out to what extent the euro crisis has an influence on the EU’s CSDP with regard to failed states and terrorism which originates in, and operates from failed states. In line with the wide array of possible causes, the number of possible solutions is wide too. Hence the following will not discuss all possible solutions. Only those solutions in with the military element can play a role, and those solutions which address the root causes which correlate with terrorism which originates from failed states: humiliation, denied opportunities, a lack of education and the demographic element.
104 Sageman, M., Understanding Terror networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, 97. In Zwitter, A. Human security, law and the prevention of terrorism. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011, 37.
26
In short, an effective suppression of terrorism requires a combination of short-term measures, including military force tailored for special missions, and long-term steps, mostly political, economic, and legal in nature. 106 One can understand that terrorist groups become stronger over the long-term unless we make it harder for them to recruit new members and sustain their activities.107 In addition, their leaders must be captured or killed, and their training facilities must be destroyed. Logically, outside EU boarders this is a task for the military as law enforcement does not have the might the military has to undertake the necessary operations, or can protect themselves in a hostile environment. Therefore, the military can play a direct role in combating terrorism.
However, as Andrej Zwitter points out with a metaphor about disease, treating the symptoms is not enough:
,,To treat the symptoms would not only fail to cure the patient from the disease. Sometimes it would make the disease even worst by creating new grievances, as when a counter-insurgency mission is conducted in a way that creates a high amount of collateral damage.’’108
Therefore a broader approach is needed to ensure success, as terrorism is symptom resulting from underlying factors. Effective prevention needs structural global changes. Investing in sustainable development, poverty reduction, progressive education, improved governance, strengthening the rule of law, etcetera.109 To do this the relevant governments need to provide public goods as lined out by Paul Collier. Another important aspect of a broad approach is that it focuses on ‘tacit terrorists’ as well. Tacit terrorists support, and provide safe zones, for the active terrorists and should therefore be addressed as well.110
To combat terrorism effectively one needs to treat the symptoms as well as the underlying problems. A comprehensive approach would combine both a short term and a long term solution. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall expound this in a four step policy framework. A simplified, but telling version of this framework can be found in table 2.
106 Kurth Cronin, A. “Transnational terrorism and security.” In Brown, M.E. Grave new world: security challenges in the 21st century. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003, 285.
107
Newman, 750. 108 Zwitter, 47. 109 Newman, 750. 110
27 Table 2: Prevention, persuasion, denial and coordination 111
1. Prevention Reduce proneness to terrorism:
address perceived inequalities, urban poverty among young men, and underlying conflicts, and lack of democracy.
Treat legitimate grievance with proper seriousness and respect.
2. Persuasion Reducing motivation and
recruitment: persuade insurgents
groups and governments to choose political accommodation over violence and repression.
Discredit terrorism/repression and alter calculations of its likely effectiveness among potential perpetrators and supporters.
3. Denial Reducing vulnerability and
defeating hardliners: limit target
vulnerability to terrorism. Cut off supply for acts of terror. Break up terrorist networks and arrest activists.
Strike correct balance between effectiveness and upholding the values being defended.
4. Coordination Maximizing international
efforts: apply principles of
contingency and
complementarity, and of
comparative advantage. Respect international law.
Ensure that this is a genuinely international enterprise.
Andrej Zwitter distinguishes a narrow and a broad approach to derivative threats from root causes. He argues that the narrow (short-term) approach does not eliminate the relevant root causes, focusing only on existing terrorist groups and the pre-emption of terrorist attacks.112 Underlying problems are not addressed, and the probability that scattered terrorist groups will reunite is high. The broad (long-term) approach prefers the use of preventive measures which address threats to human security before they exceed the threshold, and in this respect favours the reduction of root causes.113 Results of this approach are durable because the underlying problems are handled.114
111 Ramsbotham, O., Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall Contemporary conflict resolution, 257. 112 Zwitter, 49.
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A role for the military
An effective anti-terrorism strategy is a comprehensive approach containing short-term and long-term measures. The military can play an important role in both approaches. In the short term it is very important to capture and kill known terrorists. This is a role for professionals. In the long term they can deliver and support the most important public good, and the most important precondition for the durable addressing of root causes: security.115 It is most important to disrupt the recruitment cycle of terrorist groups. In the short term this can be done by denying success for terrorists and the destructing of their training facilities. Eventually this will reduce the quality and effectiveness of terrorist groups.116 By providing security in regions, where the home country cannot supply it domestically, the military can support the tackling of root causes in the long-term.
Obviously, bringing in the military has an enormous downside: collateral damage. In general, the main purpose of the military is, to put in bluntly, kill and destroy. By doing this they can control an area and deny the enemy freedom of movement. Within a larger strategy, this can be necessary in order to provide the security needed to address root causes permanently. However, as pointed out earlier, military action can create new grievances when a counter-insurgency mission results in a high amount of collateral damage. Therefore it should be clear that, despite the prominent role in this thesis, the military should always be in support. It should be part of a larger strategy to accomplish a political goal.
When it is the case, the military can play three roles with regard to combatting terrorism. They can attack terrorists and their infrastructure, defend against terrorist actions, and provide intelligence. This should all be in support of the long-term approach. By doing so, the military will not only participate in the fight against active terrorists, but indirectly against tacit terrorists as well. Securing regions which harbour terrorism and/or suffer from terrorism is the precondition for development of the region with regard to the root causes which are linked to terrorism. In the literature there is no ready-made framework available such as provided by Paul Collier with regard to failed states. However, if one goes through the literature it becomes evident that authors such as James Forest, Colin Gray, Rupert Smith and Roland Dannreuther come up with comparable roles with regard to combating terrorism by the military.
115 Rotberg, R., “Failed states in a World of terror.” Foreign Affairs 81.4,129. Collier, P. The bottom billion. 125.
29 Confront terrorists and their infrastructure
A successful anti-terrorism strategy should aim to reduce the quantity and quality of terrorist groups. An additional advantage is that by putting pressure on terrorist groups they cannot solely focus on planning operations, but have to evade capture too. To reduce quality and quantity in the short-term it is important to deprive terrorist groups from their financial support, training facilitates, and leaders. Operation Enduring Freedom was a successful in disrupting al Qaeda and its state sponsor, the Taliban regime.117 The military can be used to find and destroy training camps, capture or kill key figures such as leaders, affiliated arms or drugs dealers, and bomb makers. Examples are the liquidation of Osama Bin Laden, the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed118, and the destruction of training camps in Somalia, Yemen, and pre 9/11 Afghanistan.
Defend against terrorist actions
A second clear-cut case for the military is providing defence against terrorist actions. They can protect crucial infrastructure, such as pipelines, harbours, airports, and shipping routes. This needs to be done within their home region, or abroad if security cannot be provided by failed states themselves. A perfect example is the EU’s anti-piracy mission Atalanta. Atalanta is concerned with the protection of vessel of the World Food Programme; the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy; and the protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast.119
Another important aspect of the military is that they can undertake emergency hostage rescues at home, and abroad.120 Special Forces are trained to operate in special objects such as planes, trains, and ships. An example is the rescue of the crew from a German container ship off the coast of Somalia by Dutch marines in 2010.121 After successfully retaking the ship the marines arrested the hijackers whom where later adjudicated before a German court.122 Furthermore, the military can deploy other specialised unites such as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).
117
Forest, J., “Strategic and tactical considerations.” In In Forest J.F. The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training, and root causes. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, 6.
118 Wesley, R. “Capturing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.” In Forest J.F. Countering terrorism and insurgency in the 21st century: international perspectives. Westport: Praeger Security International, 2007, 162.
119 European Naval Force Somalia: Operation ATALANTA. April 26, 2012. <http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/>.
120 KCT callsign Nassau, 72-85.
121 Gebauer, M. “Somali pirates could face trial in Germany.” Spiegel International, April 14, 2010. April 26, 2012. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,689035,00.html>.
