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THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE

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THE ROLE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN MULTILEVEL GOVER NANCE

Patricia Popelier Armen Mazmanyan Werner Vandenbruwaene

(eds.)

Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland

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Th e Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance

Patricia Popelier, Armen Mazmanyan and Werner Vandenbruwaene (eds.)

© 2013 Intersentia

Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland

www.intersentia.com | www.intersentia.co.uk

Cover image: Blütenzauber, Klee Paul (1879-1940) © Musée national d’Art moderne – Centre Georges Pompidou, MNAM-CCI, Dist. RMN-Grand Palais/

Jean-Claude Planchet

ISBN 978-1-78068-106-1 D/2013/7849/3

NUR 828

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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Intersentia v

CONTENTS

Chapter 1.

Constitutional Courts and Multilevel Governance in Europe.

Editors’ Introduction

Armen Mazmanyan, Patricia Popelier and Werner 

Vandenbruwaene . . . 1 1. Institutional transformation and the expansion of constitutional review. . 1 2. Th e expansion of the scope and functions of constitutional review . . . 6 2.1. Constitutional courts as guardians of fundamental rights . . . 6 2.2. Constitutional courts as watchdogs over the institutional balance . . 8 2.3. Constitutional courts as forums for deliberation . . . 11 2.4. Constitutional courts as regulatory watchdogs . . . 13 3. Navigating the meanders of multi-level governance . . . 15 PART I.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS GUARDIANS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Chapter 2.

Constitutional Courts as Guardians of Fundamental Rights.

Th e constitutionalisation of the Convention through domestic constitutional adjudication

Catherine Van de Heyning . . . 21 1. Introduction . . . 21 2. Th e role of constitutional courts in the embedding of the Strasbourg

jurisprudence . . . 25 2.1. Interpretation in the light of the Convention . . . 28 2.2. A Convention infringement as a constitutional violation . . . 30 2.3. Convention harmonious interpretation as a constitutional

obligation . . . 32 3. Incentives and hindrances to the domestic embedding of the

Strasbourg jurisprudence . . . 33 3.1. Strasbourg jurisprudence as binding or inspirational? . . . 33 3.2. Hindrances to the embedding of Strasbourg jurisprudence . . . 36

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4. Th e European Court of Human Rights as a constitutional court . . . 39

4.1. A constitutional role for the European Court of Human Rights . . . 39

4.2. A fundamental dichotomy . . . 43

5. Conclusion . . . 48

Chapter 3. Th e Challenges for Constitutional Courts as Guardians of Fundamental Rights in the European Union Aida Torres Pérez . . . 49

1. Introduction . . . 49

2. A disturbing scenario for constitutional courts . . . 51

2.1. Decentralising the judicial review of legislation . . . 51

2.2. Reviewing domestic legislation in light of EU fundamental rights . . . 53

3. Rethinking the role of constitutional courts . . . 61

4. Case study: constitutional confl icts on the European Arrest Warrant . . . 66

5. Concluding remarks . . . 75

PART II. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS WATCHDOGS OVER THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE Chapter 4. Th e Role of National Constitutional Courts in the European Legal Space Monica Claes and Bruno De Witte . . . 79

1. Introduction . . . 79

2. Th e legal routes for entering the European legal space . . . 83

2.1. European Convention law . . . 83

2.2. EU law . . . 87

3. Facilitating European legal integration . . . 92

3.1. Facilitating the general development of EU law and its reception in the national legal order . . . 92

4. Constitutional courts and the development of a common constitutional heritage . . . 94

5. Constitutional courts up in arms . . . 101

6. Final remarks . . . 104

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Contents

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Chapter 5.

Regions and Constitutional Courts in a Multilayered Europe

Anna Gamper . . . 105

1. Th e new role of constitutional courts in multilevel governance . . . 105

2. Th e regions of Europe: a classifi cation . . . 107

3. Premises for the judicial protection of regions . . . 109

4. Constitutional avenues to the protection of regional interests by national constitutional courts . . . 110

4.1. Organisational approach . . . 110

4.2. Functional approach . . . 111

5. Regions and the CJEU de lege lata . . . 117

6. Stakeholders as an alternative model? . . . 121

7. Regional access to subsidiarity actions: national arrangements . . . 123

8. Regions and the CJEU de lege ferenda . . . 126

9. Conclusion . . . 129

Chapter 6. Th e Judicial Enforcement of Subsidiarity. Th e comparative quest for an appropriate standard Werner Vandenbruwaene . . . 131

1. Introduction . . . 131

2. Subsidiarity: a multilevel concept . . . 133

2.1. Multilevel governance . . . 133

2.2. Th e principle of subsidiarity . . . 134

3. Th e judicial enforcement of subsidiarity . . . 137

4. Subsidiarity as a non-justiciable political question: three questions . . . . 139

4.1. Question 1 – Is there an explicit textual commitment to political resolution of subsidiarity? . . . 140

4.1.1. Concerning constitutional subsidiarity . . . 140

4.1.2. Concerning legislative subsidiarity . . . 140

4.1.2.1. Th e Bundesverfassungsgericht on Article 72 II GG . . . 140

4.1.2.2. Th e CJEU on Article 5(3) TEU . . . 141

4.1.2.3. Th e Belgian Constitutional Court on local autonomy . . . 142

4.2. Question 2 – Are there prudential reasons for judicial self-restraint? . . . 142

4.2.1. Concerning constitutional subsidiarity . . . 142

4.2.2. Concerning legislative subsidiarity . . . 144

4.2.2.1. Th e Bundesverfassungsgericht on Article 72 II GG . . . 144

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4.2.2.2. Th e CJEU on Article 5(3) TEU . . . 144

4.2.2.3. Th e Belgian Constitutional Court on local autonomy . . . 145

4.3. Question 3 – Methodological barriers to justiciability? . . . 146

4.3.1. Concerning constitutional subsidiarity . . . 146

4.3.2. Concerning legislative subsidiarity . . . 146

4.3.2.1. Th e Bundesverfassungsgericht on Article 72 II GG . . . 146

4.3.2.2. Th e CJEU on Article 5(3) TEU . . . 147

4.3.2.3. Th e Belgian Constitutional Court on local autonomy . . . 147

5. How to remedy the methodological objections? Capita selecta . . . 147

5.1. Th e Bundesverfassungsgericht on Article 72 II GG . . . 148

5.2. Th e CJEU on Article 5(3) TEU . . . 152

5.3. Th e Belgian Constitutional Court on local autonomy . . . 159

6. General observations on methodology . . . 160

7. Conclusion . . . 164

PART III. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS FORA FOR DELIBERATION Chapter 7. Majoritarianism, Deliberation and Accountability as Institutional Instincts of Constitutional Courts Armen Mazmanyan . . . 167

1. Majoritarian countermajoritarian courts: introduction . . . 167

2. Majoritarian courts: perspectives from the theories of constitutional dialogue. . . 168

3. Majoritarian courts: evidence . . . 171

4. Expanding the case study: evidence from non-consolidated democracies . . . 173

5. Why do constitutional courts make popular decisions? . . . 176

6. Deliberative courts: implications for multilevel systems of governance . . . 179

7. Conclusions . . . 181

Chapter 8. Constitutional Courts and Deliberative Democracy Mark Van Hoecke . . . 183

1. Introduction . . . 183

2. Ideological backgrounds . . . 184

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Intersentia ix

3. Legitimation of constitutional review . . . 185

4. Legitimation through deliberative communication . . . 190

5. Th e constitutional interpretive community . . . 192

Chapter 9. Deliberative Practices of Constitutional Courts in Consolidated and Non-Consolidated Democracies Patricia Popelier and Aída Araceli Patiño Álvarez . . . 199

1. Th e role of courts in deliberative theory . . . 199

2. Brief introduction to the legal and political context . . . 203

2.1. Deliberative judicial review in consensus democracies . . . 204

2.2. Deliberative judicial review in Latin America . . . 206

3. Deliberative practices of constitutional courts in old and new democracies . . . 208

3.1. Variable 1. Access to the Court . . . 208

3.1.1. Limited access . . . 209

3.1.2. Wide access . . . 211

3.2. Variable 2. Th e set of reference norms . . . 215

3.3. Variable 3. Reasoning . . . 218

3.3.1. Transparency of the reasoning process . . . 218

3.3.2. Reasoning . . . 221

3.4. Variable 4. Sanctioning and modalities . . . 223

3.5. Variable 5. Review against procedural norms . . . 226

3.6. Variable 6. Review against deliberative requirements included in legal principles . . . 229

4. Conclusion . . . 230

PART IV. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS REGULATORY WATCHDOGS Chapter 10. Th e Good Shepherd of Karlsruhe. Th e ‘Hartz IV’ decision – A good example of regulatory review by the German Federal Constitutional Court? Klaus Meßerschmidt . . . 235

1. Introduction . . . 235

2. Th e image and role of the constitutional court as regulatory watchdog . . . 237

2.1. Judicial activism versus judicial self-restraint . . . 237

2.2. Diff erent approaches to judicial review . . . 238

3. Challenges to the procedural approach of regulatory review . . . 240

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4. Hartz IV Case . . . 243

5. Outlook . . . 247

Chapter 11. Th e Court as Regulatory Watchdog. Th e procedural approach in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights Patricia Popelier . . . 249

1. Rationality, legitimacy and the rise of regulatory reform programs . . . . 249

2. Procedural rationality as a middle way between deference and rights protection . . . 251

3. Procedural rationality versus parliamentary sovereignty . . . 254

4. Th e European Court of Human Rights as regulatory watchdog: analysis of case law . . . 257

4.1. Consultation procedures . . . 258

4.2. Evidence based law making . . . 259

4.3. Ex post evaluation . . . 263

4.4. Self-regulation and co-regulation . . . 264

5. Conclusion . . . 265

Chapter 12. Courts as Regulatory Watchdogs. Does the European Court of Justice bark or bite? David Keyaerts . . . 269

1. Introduction . . . 269

2. Better Regulation in the EU . . . 271

3. Should EU courts act as regulatory watchdogs? . . . 274

4. Impact of Better Regulation in case law of the EU courts . . . 277

4.1. Introduction: convergence between BR output standards and the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity . . . 277

4.2. Low intensity of review . . . 279

4.3. Th e recourse to procedural requirements . . . 281

4.3.1. Introduction . . . 281

4.3.2. Th e principle of proportionality and due care requirements . . . 281

4.3.3. Essential procedural requirement . . . 284

4.3.4. Self-binding eff ect of BR Programme commitments . . . 285

4.3.5. Th e principle of proportionality and IA as procedural requirement . . . 287

5. Conclusion . . . 288

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Contents

Intersentia xi

Chapter 13.

Standing Rights and Regulatory Dynamics in the European Union

Anne Meuwese . . . 291

1. Introduction . . . 291

2. Standing rights and regulation . . . 295

3. Standing rights and participation . . . 296

4. Pre-Lisbon case law: restrictive on ‘individual concern’ . . . 297

5. Craft ing the reform of Article 263 para 4 TFEU . . . 300

6. Recent case law: still restrictive? . . . 302

7. Conclusion: what change in regulatory dynamics? . . . 308

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