TOWARDS A MORE SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: CAN THE
EXPERIENCE OF AWE MAKE US MORE ACCEPTING OF
MORAL PIONEERS?
By Macy Iwema
2 TOWARDS A MORE SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: CAN THE EXPERIENCE OF AWE MAKE
US MORE ACCEPTING OF MORAL PIONEERS?
Master Thesis, MSc Marketing
University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business January 2018 Macy Iwema S2374978 K. de vriezestraat 8 9741AE, Groningen Macyiwema@hotmail.com +31620051893
First supervisor: Second supervisor:
Dr. J.W. Bolderdijk Dr. M. Keizer
3 Table of Contents
Abstract ...4
Introduction ...5
Theoretical Framework ...8
Do-gooder derogation due to threat of self-concept ...8
The effect of awe ...9
Current research ...10
Future consumption patterns ...11
4 Towards a more sustainable future: Can the experience of awe make us more accepting of moral
pioneers?
ABSTRACT
Moral pioneers may play an important role in changing current behavior patterns towards a more sustainable future. Previous research shows that moral pioneers can lead to more inspiration for others compared to pioneers using selfish justifications. However, pioneers using moral justifications do not only potentially lead to more inspiration, but may also elicit higher feelings of irritation and derogation among observers. The present paper investigates whether feelings of awe diminishes the threat moral pioneers elicit in others, thereby avoiding or reducing the negative responses towards the pioneers and their behavior. An experiment was conducted to find out whether awe can indeed solve the moral pioneer conundrum. The present research found no significant main nor interaction effects of awe and justification type for threat to self-concept and do-gooder derogation. However, results did show that participants who feel threatened are more likely to derogate the pioneer. Furthermore, as expected, higher usage of do-gooder derogations leads to lower likelihood of showing future sustainable consumption behavior in the same domain. Explanations for the present paper’s findings are discussed together with the limitations and recommendations for future research.
5
INTRODUCTION
Present day consumption patterns of developed countries are for a large share responsible for the strain put on earth's resources (Witt, 2011). Society currently makes more use of earth’s resources than the earth can actually handle. Considering that human population is even predicted to grow towards 9.3 billion people in the next 30 years, it is of high importance to start consuming in a more sustainable manner in order to preserve the earth (Assadourian, 2010; Prothero et al., 2011).
Pioneers may serve as a solution towards a more sustainable future (Assadourian, 2010). Another word for these pioneers is moral rebels who Monin, Sawyer and Marquez (2008) describe as “individuals who take a principled stand against the status quo, who refuse to comply, stay silent, or simply go along when this would require that they compromise their values”. Indeed, one line of research supports the notion that witnessing moral pioneers’ selfless behavior leads to admiration, elevation and inspiration for others (Assadourian, 2010; Hardy, & van Vught, 2006; Griskevicius, Tybur, & van den Bergh, 2010). Results of a second line of research however, shows that moral pioneers’ behavior is not always applauded and may elicit do-gooder derogation. For example, previous research has shown that confrontation with a moral pioneers’ behavior can lead to negative evaluations of the pioneer (Minson, & Monin, 2012) and even to showing opposing behavior (Zane, Irwin, & Walker Reczek, 2016; Monin, et al., 2008).
Whether observers respond with elevation or resentment towards a moral pioneer partly depends on the level of the observers’ involvement (Monin et al., 2008). More specifically, involved observers may feel threatened by the moral pioneer as they experience that they themselves failed to do something about the current state of affairs. On the contrary, uninvolved observers do not perceive such threat as they were not in the position to make the decision themselves. As a consequence, only uninvolved observers feel enlightened and inspired by the actions of the moral pioneer doing an ethically or morally correct deed.
6 which conditions do-gooder derogation occurs, especially for involved observers. The present paper aims to build upon this knowledge by investigating what circumstances may lead involved observers to show do-gooder derogation and subsequently how to reduce this derogative behavior. Not only are involved observers more inclined to show such derogatory behavior, involved observers are also key towards a more sustainable future. Involved observers, contrary to uninvolved observers, actually engage in the behavior that needs to be improved or altered. Therefore it would be insufficient to target uninvolved observers who are not engaged in the relevant behavior.
Previous research shows that involved observers are more likely to show defensive responses towards pioneers when their behavior is challenging the observers’ morality. This is especially the case when pioneers use moral rather than selfish justifications for their exemplary behavior (Cramwinckel, van Dijk, & Scheepers, 2013; Bolderdijk, Brouwer, & Cornelissen, 2017). When selfish reasons are the cause of sustainable behavior, the morality of the involved observer is not challenged and is therefore also not threatening for the self-concept. When sustainable behavior is due to moral reasons, it implicitly challenges the morality of the involved observer. Subsequently this increases the need for defense mechanisms, such as do-gooder derogation, in order to restore the self-concept.
Although often threatening to the self-concept, moral justifications can also be very useful for galvanizing change. When there is no immediate threat to one’s self concept, pioneers using moral justifications may actually lead to more inspiration and imitation of the pioneers’ behavior compared to pioneers using selfish justifications (Bolderdijk et al., 2017). This means that pioneer’s using moral justifications potentially may have a larger social impact on observers. However, it is also precisely these moral justifications that can backfire on the pioneer’s behavior by eliciting feelings of threat to the self-concept of involved observers. The present paper aims to find a solution to this conundrum pertaining to moral pioneers: how can moral pioneers become more “digestible” to involved observers?
7 present paper proposes that experiencing awe makes it possible for involved observers to see the bigger picture, enabling them to view the moral pioneers as no threat to their self-concept. Therefore, the present paper proposes that experiencing awe might overcome the perceived threat to the self-concept elicited by the confrontation with the moral pioneer.
The present paper contributes to existing research in the fields of psychology and marketing in several ways. Firstly, as do-gooder derogation research has only just recently received more attention, there is still much that needs understanding regarding this topic. The current research provides new knowledge concerning the antecedents of do-gooder derogation. By examining the roles of moral pioneers’ justification and perceptions of awe, the present paper contributes to a better understanding of what drives humans to show do-gooder derogation
Secondly, compared with other emotions, research on awe is rather limited. One explanation for this lack of research is that for a long time psychologists disagreed about their definition of awe (Keltner, & Haidt, 2003). Therefore, the present paper contributes to existing awe research by investigating what effect awe potentially has on consumer behavior. More specifically, building on previous research that advocated associations between awe and prosocial behavior, the present paper investigates whether awe can promote sustainable consumption as well. Up to this date, to my best knowledge, awe has not yet been studied in the field of sustainable consumption; hence this may lead to important new knowledge.
The current research also has important practical contributions. When the reasons for showing do-gooder derogation are known, retailers and other organizations and institutions that are related to sustainable consumption can finally try to prevent this derogative behavior. Consequently, marketers can adjust their strategy in order to increase the diffusion speed of sustainable products which are really needed in order to sustain the earth and its resources. Specifically, the present paper expects that accompanying sustainable products with selfish motives or even more effectively: inducing experiences of awe when using moral motives, might serve as a solution.
8
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Do-Gooder Derogation due to Threat of Self-Concept
According to Social Comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), humans want correct evaluations of their own abilities and opinions. In order to find out whether our self-evaluations are correct we tend to compare our own behavior and opinions with the behavior and opinions of others. Comparing ourselves to others that behave in a superior way is called upward social comparison and this can be threatening to the self (Collins, 1996).
Upward social comparison is especially hurtful when it concerns morality. In general, humans have a desire to be moral and morality is often central to one’s self-concept (Aquino, & Reed, 2002). But in spite of that, we do not always behave in accordance with these beliefs (Carrigan, & Attalla, 2001). However, we do want to maintain a positive view of ourselves. Furthermore, being a moral person is often important and confrontation with this “failure” in our behavior therefore hurts. Such is the case when involved observers are confronted with moral pioneers. Confrontation with a moral pioneer makes humans contemplate their own behavior, starting an internal process that recalls their own moral shortcomings. As a consequence, the involved observers’ self-concept, which is “the individual's belief about himself, including the person's attributes and who and what the self is” (Baumeister, 1999: p. 456), is threatened (Cramwinckel et al., 2013). One explanation for these feelings of threat to the self-concept is anticipated judgment. Humans do not only compare themselves with others to evaluate themselves, but are also sensitive to the (imagined) negative opinions of others.
By acting in a morally superior way, moral pioneers signal that behaving in a different manner is inappropriate. In other words, the behavior of the moral pioneer is implicitly questioning the morality of the observer and their behavior (Monin, 2007). Consequently, being confronted with a moral pioneer might lead to the involved observer feeling morally inadequate for not behaving in a moral manner while being in the position to do so.
9 (Monin, 2007). Previous research shows that moral pioneers indeed are derogated in order to restore the self-concept. Minson and Monin (2012) showed that merely imagining how a moral pioneer would evaluate yourself consequently leads to more negative evaluations of the moral pioneer. Furthermore, Zane and colleagues (2016) found that judgment of moral pioneers was significantly more negative when actors did not act upon ethical information themselves. This is in line with the present papers proposition that involved observers show do-gooder derogation as a consequence of a threatened self-concept.
The effect of Awe
Awe consists of two important elements - vastness and accommodation (Keltner, & Haidt, 2003). Vastness entails being in the presence of something much larger than yourself, something powerful or outside our regular frame of reference, and leads to feelings of submission. Accommodation involves feelings of amazement and surprise and that our mental structures need to be adjusted in order to be able to understand a certain experience. In other words, awe is “an emotional response to perceptually vast stimuli that overwhelm current mental structures, yet facilitate attempts at accommodation” (Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). Awe can be elicited by multiple experiences such as religion, power and art. In western societies however, people generally tend to experience awe as a reaction to grand nature, such as storms, mountains, earthquakes and oceans (Keltner, & Haidt, 2003).
10 When individuals view the world with an “I” perspective where individuals identify themselves as “one of a kind “, they are thinking in terms of a zero-sum game. When thinking in terms of a zero-sum game, the standard tendency of humans is to perceive the moral pioneer’s behavior as a threat to themselves. An explanation for this tendency is that under a zero-sum perspective, the sustainable behavior of the moral pioneer is considered to be the only right behavior; it automatically implies that the involved observer’s own behavior must be wrong.
When individuals however view the world from a more observing perspective where they see themselves as part of a larger group, they would have a lower tendency to see the behavior of others as a potential threat specifically directed at their own behavior. Because experiencing awe facilitates a more distant perspective (Grossman, Brienza, & Bobocel, 2017; Shiota et al., 2007), there would be less defensive responses by the involved observer under conditions of awe.
Due to this lower need for defensive responses, awe is specifically interesting when it concerns do-gooder derogation, as involved observers show do-gooder derogation as a defensive response towards the threat to self-concept induced by the moral pioneers’ behavior. When an involved observer is struck with awe, the involved observer is able to see the greater meaning and purpose behind the moral pioneer’s behavior (i.e. observer perspective). In other words, the involved observer will be able to understand that the sustainable consumption decision is made to serve the greater good and not to judge the involved observer. As a consequence, the involved observer would no longer feel threatened by the moral pioneer. Thus, specifically concerning moral do-gooder derogation, awe can change the perspective of the involved observer, thereby avoiding defensive responses. So when awe is elicited, the involved observer might be more willing to behave in a better way next time, recognizing the situation as an opportunity to adjust their behavior (Grossman, et al., 2017).
Current Research
11 question your morality as the moral pioneer is not morally superior anymore. As a consequence of threat to the self-concept, involved observers will respond more negatively towards moral rebels using moral rather than selfish justifications (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, the present paper proposes that under the experience of awe, humans will respond less negatively towards pioneers using moral justifications compared to selfish justifications (i.e. a reversed effect). The explanation for this proposition is that experiencing awe removes the threat induced by the moral pioneer due to a changed perspective. As a consequence, the manner in which involved observers perceive moral pioneers and their behavior is therefore no longer derived from the perceived threat to self-concept but due to the used justifications (i.e. selfish or moral). Following this reasoning, a moral pioneer making a sustainable decision would be liked more when the decision was due to selfless reasons in order to benefit the greater good rather than selfish reasons. Therefore the hypotheses of the present paper are as follows:
Involved observers normally feel more threatened by moral pioneers instead of self-interested pioneers (Hypothesis 1), and therefore react more negatively to moral instead of self-interested pioneers (Hypothesis 2).
This effect is reversed when involved observers experience awe. (Hypothesis 3)
Future consumption patterns
12 awe and subsequently higher amounts of future sustainable consumption behavior compared to no awe induced conditions. The proposed relationships between the variables are represented in the conceptual model (Figure 1) below.
FIGURE 1 Conceptual model
13
METHOD SECTION
The present study used a 2 (moral pioneer’s justification: moral vs. selfish) x 2 (awe: induced vs. not induced) between subjects study design. Participants’ perceived threat to self-concept, level of do-gooder derogation (likeability of the pioneer) and future consumption patterns were measured. The study was held in the University of Groningen’s Virtual Reality lab between November 27th and 12th December 2017. In order to be able to attract a sufficient number of participants, data gathering was combined with the studies of three other master students. The full survey that was used during the study can be found in Appendix A. In total, 315 participants participated in the study, either voluntary or for a compensation of 8 Euros or course credits. All participants were randomly assigned to a condition.
Procedure
First, participants were welcomed to the Virtual Reality lab and asked to take a seat in front of a large cinema screen. On their seat, participants found a sample of pork rind and the survey. Participants were asked to sample the pork rind and fill in the first two sections of the survey. The first two sections contained questions about their food preferences. The aim of these sections was to find out whether any participants were vegetarian. The decision to use vegetarianism (i.e. meat consumption) as the research topic is that previous research shows that vegetarians are likely subjects of do-gooder derogation (Minson, & Monin, 2012). Furthermore, all consumers are involved with this topic (it was relevant to them personally) because we are all confronted with the decision to eat meat in our diets. The purpose behind the sampling of the pork rind was to stress the fact that the participants eat meat, contrary to the moral pioneer introduced later into the study.
14
FIGURE 2 FIGURE 3
Screenshot control condition Screenshot awe condition
Subsequently, participants were asked to complete the remainder of the survey where participants were immediately confronted with the moral pioneer, a supposed fellow participant named Mary. In both conditions Mary refused to sample the chips the participants tasted at the start of the study. She either refused to taste the chips because she “cares about behaving in a moral way as a consumer” (i.e. moral justification) or because she “does not like the taste and structure of meat” (i.e. selfish justification). The selfish justification was added as a condition because a non-moral benchmark was necessary. Adding this benchmark made it possible to test the present papers reasoning that experiences of awe make moral pioneers more digestible to involved observers due to a changed perspective. As explained previously, when this reasoning is correct, involved observers would be less tolerant towards moral pioneers using selfish justifications under the effect of awe.
15
FIGURE 4
Moral justification condition
FIGURE 5
Selfish justification condition
Measurements
Threat to self-concept
16 disappointed with themselves (reverse-coded), annoyed with themselves (reverse-coded), disgusted with themselves (reverse-coded), angry with themselves (reverse-coded), dissatisfied with themselves (reverse-coded), self-critical (reverse-coded), and guilty (reverse-coded). The items provided sufficient internal consistency to be combined into one scale (α = .88, M = 2.43, SD = .71).
Level of do-gooder derogation/likeability moral pioneer
How participants evaluated the moral pioneer Mary was assessed with fourteen items using a 7 point bipolar scale. Participants had to declare whether they thought Mary was: dishonest–honest, unfair–fair, unpleasant–pleasant, dependent–independent, stingy–generous, immature–mature, low self-esteem–high self-esteem, stupid-intelligent, weak-strong, insecure-confident, passive-active, cruel-kind, awful-nice, and cold-warm. The items provided sufficient internal consistency to be combined into one scale (α = .88, M = 3.10, SD = .81).
Future sustainable consumption
Future sustainable consumption decisions were assessed by asking participants whether they would sign a petition to ban meat from the university’s canteen. Participants had to indicate the likelihood that they would sign the petition on a scale from 1 (extremely unlikely) - 7 (extremely likely).
FIGURE 6
17 Manipulation checks
As a manipulation check of awe, two scales were adopted from Joye and Bolderdijk (2014). Participants were asked how much they experienced feelings of smallness, humility and respect while watching the video and whether participants felt awed, fearful, spiritual, caring, and connected to others while watching the video. Both scales were measured on a 1 (not at all) - 7 (very much) scale.
A second manipulation check was included to assess whether participants read the information about Mary, the moral pioneer, attentively. Participants were asked if they could remember why Mary refused to taste the chips. The options were: “she doesn’t eat meat because it’s immoral”, “she doesn’t eat meat because she does not like the taste of meat” and “I forgot why Mary refused to taste the chips”.
18
RESULTS
In total, 315 participants took part in the experiment. 137 participants were excluded from the analyses: 4 participants failed the manipulation check, 1 participant forgot to answer several questions, 14 participants were vegan or vegetarian and 1 participant read the information about Mary before watching the movie. As previously mentioned, data gathering was done in collaboration with three other master students. These students used different manipulations which were not applicable to the present research. Therefore, 118 participants were excluded from the analyses because they participated in a different condition. For these reasons, 177 participants were still included in the analyses. The age of these participants ranged from 17-30 with an average age of 21.54 years old and 52% of the participants were male.
Before analyzing, data was checked for the required assumptions. The data contained a few outliers, therefore analyses were run both with and without outliers and there appeared no major differences in the results. Results reported still contained the outliers. Furthermore, data of threat to self-concept, likeability of pioneer and future sustainable consumption patterns were not normally distributed. However, data for threat to self-concept and likeability of pioneer appears approximately normally distributed. Previous research suggests that ANOVA analyses are not vastly sensitive to moderate deviations of normality (Glass, Peckham, & Sanders, 1972; Lix, Keselman, & Keselman 1996). Therefore, data analyses were continued using the ANOVA procedure.
Preliminary analysis
19 = -.12, p = .10). Similarly, the awe conditions also did not correlate with either threat to self-concept (R = .06, p =.42) or do-gooder derogation (R = -.06, p = .45).Because gender correlated with do-gooder derogation (R = .16, p = .04), gender was taken into account as a control variable in further analyses. Furthermore, age showed a positive correlation with future sustainable consumption behavior (R = .16, p = .04), implying that older participants reported higher inclinations to show future sustainable behavior. Therefore, age was taken into account in analyses concerning future sustainable consumption behavior.
TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1. Justification Type .49 .50 - 2. Awe condition .48 .50 -.02 - 3. Threat to self-concept 2.43 .71 -.02 .06 - 4. Do-gooder derogation 3.10 .81 -.12 -.06 .16* - 5. Future sustainable behavior 2.36 1.60 -.17* .04 .01 -.19* - 6. Experience awe 3.41 1.16 .01 .60** .13 -.13 .14 - 7. Age 21.54 2.43 -.04 -.06 .03 -.03 .16* -.04 - 8. Gender .52 .50 -.05 .02 .00 .16* -.10 -.05 .13 -
20 Manipulation checks
The present research used two manipulation checks. First, a manipulation check was in place to verify whether participants experienced higher feelings of awe in the awe condition compared to the control condition. As intended, participants in the awe condition noted higher feelings of awe (M = 4.13, SD = 2.59) than participants in the control condition (M = 2.73, SD = 2.50).
Second, a manipulation check was in place to monitor whether participants paid careful attention to the survey questions. Participants were asked whether they remembered why Mary refused to taste the chips. Out of 177 participants, only four people failed to answer the manipulation check correctly and those participants were excluded from the analyses.
Main analyses
Threat to self-concept
In order to test the first and third hypotheses whether involved observers feel more threatened by moral pioneers instead of self-interested pioneers and if this effect is reversed under the experience of awe, a two-way ANOVA was performed. Analyses were first run with gender as a control variable. Gender did not have a significant effect on threat to self-concept, F(1,171) = .00, p = .97. Consequently, it appears that the level of threat to self-concept is not dependent on the involved observer’s gender. Therefore, the reported results are from analyses without gender as a control variable. Results showed no main effect of justification type on the threat to self-concept F(1, 171) = .06, p = .81. Participants in the selfish justification condition (M = 2.44, SD = .08) reported slightly higher feelings of threat to the self-concept compared with participants in the moral justification condition (M = 2.41, SD = .08, Mdifference = +.03). Moreover, results showed no main effect of awe on threat to self-concept F(1, 171) = .64, p = .43. However not significant, participants in the awe conditions (M = 2.47, SD = .08) indicated higher feelings of threat compared to participants in the control condition (M = 2.38, SD = .08, Mdifference = +.11).
21 .11) rather than selfish justifications (M = 2.39, SD = .11, Mdifference = -.01). Therefore results show no support for the first hypothesis that in the control condition, involved observers feel more threatened by moral pioneers rather than self-interested pioneers.
A similar pattern was found in the awe condition. Mary elicited lower feelings of threat when using moral justifications (M = 2.45, SD = .11) compared to selfish justifications (M = 2.5, SD = .11, Mdifference = -.05). However not significant, these results are in alignment with hypothesis 3, that moral pioneers are less threatening compared to self-interested pioneers under the experience of awe.
FIGURE 7
Scores of feelings of threat to self-concept
Note: Higher scores represent higher feelings of threat, error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Likeability of pioneer
22 was performed. Gender was added as a control variable and showed a significant effect, F(1, 171) = 3.91, p = .05. Females (M = 3.00, SD = .84) showed lower levels of derogation towards Mary compared with males (M = 3.22, SD = .78). Results showed no main effect for justification type on likeability of the moral pioneer, F(1, 171) = 2.33, p = .13. Participants in the selfish justification condition (M = 3.19, SD = .09) were more derogative towards Mary compared with participants in the moral justification condition (M = 3.01, SD = .09, Mdifference = +.18). Furthermore, no main effect was found for awe on likeability of the moral pioneer, F(1, 171) = .70, p = .41. However not significant, participant reported higher feelings of derogation towards Mary in the control condition (M = 3.15, SD = .08) compared to the awe condition (M = 3.05, SD = .09, Mdifference = + .1).
23
FIGURE 8
Evaluation scores of Mary
Note: Higher scores mean higher degree of derogation, error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Results were controlled for gender.
Mediation analyses
24 .05). However, results showed a significant positive effect of threat to self-concept for do-gooder derogation (B = .18, p = .03). This means that when participants experienced higher feelings of threat, they indicated higher levels of derogation.
FIGURE 9
Moderated mediation analysis
Note: * = p < .05. Results were controlled for gender.
Future sustainable consumption patterns
25
DISCUSSION
Findings
The goal of the present paper was to investigate whether feelings of awe influences how people respond to moral pioneers. More specifically, the present paper proposed that when awe is elicited, humans will respond less negatively towards pioneers using moral justifications compared to selfish justifications. The explanation provided by the present paper for this proposition is that under conditions of awe, humans would no longer feel threatened by the moral pioneer due to a changed perspective. However, contrary to the expectations, no support was found for the hypotheses. Results showed neither main effects nor interaction effect of awe and justification type on threat to self-concept and do-gooder derogation.
Although not significant, involved observers reported higher feelings of liking towards Mary when she used moral justifications compared to selfish justifications in both control and awe condition. Furthermore, when under the influence of awe, involved observers liked Mary more when she used either moral or selfish justifications for her behavior compared to the control condition. These findings suggest that experiencing awe potentially might not only affect evaluations of moral pioneers using moral justifications in a positive way, but also pioneers using selfish justifications. Therefore, inducing awe might have more potential than the present paper anticipated. It appears that experiencing awe does not only lead to more open mindedness and feelings of being connected with morally motivated others, but towards others in general. However, differences across conditions were small and not significant and therefore have to be approached with caution.
26 perceived Mary as more threatening compared to the control condition. One explanation for this occurrence is that objects and phenomena inducing awe have also been related to feelings of fear. As a consequence, awe appears to be a double edged sword as well, not only increasing feelings of open mindedness and helpfulness towards others, but also increasing feelings of threat. In other words awe seems to have both positive and negative consequences for do-gooder derogation and subsequently future sustainable behavior.
Despite that awe and justification type had no significant effect on threat to self-concept, results showed a significant positive relationship between threat to self-concept and do-gooder derogation. Specifically this means that when people felt less threatened, they showed less do-gooder derogation. Although the present research did not find an explanation for feelings of threat to the self-concept, the findings are in alignment with the proposition that removing feelings of threat to the self-concept reduces and potentially might eliminate do-gooder derogation. These findings confirm the results of the research by Bolderdijk and colleagues (2017) that being confronted with a moral pioneer elicits an internal process where involved observers feel threatened about their concept which subsequently leads to the usage of self-defense mechanisms such as do-gooder derogation. However, as previously mentioned, the results of the present paper were not in alignment with previous research (Bolderdijk et al., 2017) concerning the source of the threat to self-concept. This discrepancy implies that there are more factors in play, calling for future research that investigates the causes of these feelings of threat more closely.
27
Limitations
An experimental design provides more control of the variables to be measured. However, the present paper’s design also faced some limitations. Firstly, participants were only confronted with one moral pioneer, Mary. Results demonstrated that males have higher inclinations to derogate Mary compared with females, implying that involved observers might respond differently towards different types of pioneers. On the picture, Mary comes across as a nice, young female and potentially not as threatening. In retrospective, it might have been wise to confront the involved observers with moral pioneers varying in gender, age and ethnicity providing more realistic results.
Another limitation of the present research entails the used sample; all participants were students from the business faculty of the University of Groningen. Although student samples are not uncommon for behavioral research (Peterson and Merunka, 2014), opinions about the appropriateness of using college student samples differs. The present paper’s opinion is that this sample might lead to reproducibility issues, questioning whether the results would be the same with a different, more generalizable sample. The sample consists of young and highly educated college students while extant research shows that highly educated and younger people show higher concerns about the environment and increased motivation to show environmentally responsible behavior (Straughan and Roberts, 1999; Carrete, Castaño, Felix, Centeno, González, 2012). As a result, the possibility exists that the current sample was more open minded towards moral pioneers, affecting the results of the study. More research should be done in order to find out whether results would be different with a more general, representative sample.
28
Implications
Despite that the present paper did not find support for the main proposition that experiencing awe is able to eliminate feelings of threat to the self-concept and thereby reducing do-gooder derogation, there are some important implications that can be drawn from the present research. Firstly, as mentioned before, research on awe is still fairly limited and requires more time and exploration in order to understand its effects thoroughly. That awe is a rather complex emotion is supported by the results of the present paper. Not only does experiencing awe have the potential to make humans more accepting of others, it also increases feelings of threat. More research is needed in order to understand this emotion more clearly.
Secondly, as the significant positive relationship between threat to self-concept and do-gooder derogation points out, it is of high importance to reduce feelings of threat. However, it remains unclear what the exact source of these feelings of threat is. Therefore, marketers, retailers and sustainability advocates should be careful with positioning their sustainable products in either a moral or selfish manner as there is no clarity yet about its effects on feelings of threat. For now, the safest way would probably be to advertise about sustainable alternatives online or in other private situations. In those situations, decisions by moral pioneers will not be able to have a negative effect on others sustainable behavior. However, the downside is that in these situations, moral pioneers will not be able to lead to inspiration as well. As a consequence, moral rebels will probably remain the minority group, while the current environmental situation urgently asks for a change in the majority’s behavior.
Future research
29 thereby overcoming the femininity that is associated with the behavior. Therefore, it would be interesting for future research to investigate what effect characteristics of the moral pioneer might have on the degree of do-gooder derogation, not only for gender but also other characteristics such as age and ethnicity.
Another facet that would be interesting for future research to investigate is the role of culture for do-gooder derogation. The present paper did not find an explanation for the threat to self-concept that people experience after confrontation with a moral pioneer. One conceivable explanation might be that the concept is more complicated than the present paper anticipated and that culture plays a certain role as well.
It is not implausible that culture affects how receptive people are towards the effects of awe. For example, inhabitants from China with a collectivist culture might be more susceptible to an experiental perspective induced by awe compared to inhabitants from America who are more individualistically oriented (Hofstede, 2001). As a consequence, inhabitants from China might feel less threatened by a moral pioneer compared to Americans under the experience of awe. Another interesting aspect is whether people from more feminine societies where caring and modesty is key respond differently to moral pioneers compared to masculine societies where being strong is an important facet. These differences in culture might ask for a different approach to reduce do-gooder derogation and are therefore an interesting facet to study more closely.
Lastly, the present paper used an experimental design in which the situation differs from our daily life decision making. Future research should consider using a field study design in order to avoid mundane realism. For example, it would be interesting to accompany certain products inside a store with a sign, providing selfish or moral justifications for purchasing the product and see how observer respond to moral pioneers in a more realistic setting.
Conclusion
31
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34
APPENDIX A: Survey
Movie and Taste Perceptions
The following survey has five sections; completing the survey takes approximately 10-15 minutes. Please read the questions carefully and answer in English!
Section 1
Did you taste the chips? o Yes
o No
If you refused to taste the chips, please indicate why and continue with Section 2:
--- In three words, please explain what the chips tasted like
--- --- --- In three words, please explain what kind of thoughts appear when eating the chips --- --- ---
Section 2
How often do you eat meat? o Every day
o A few times a week o Once a week o Once a month
o Occasionally throughout the year o Never
How often do you eat fruits and vegetables? o Every day
o A few times a week o Once a week o Once a month
35 How often do you eat chips?
o Every day
o A few times a week o Once a week o Once a month
o Occasionally throughout the year o Never
Do you have any special dietary preferences? o Lactose free o Gluten free o Vegetarian o Vegan o None o Other, namely: __________________
36
Section 3
Suppose another fellow participant in this study named Mary (see picture left) refused to eat the chips you tasted at the start of the study. She explained her reasoning with the following comment:
"I did not eat the chips, because they contain meat. I generally do not like the taste and structure of meat. For this reason, I do not eat meat at all and did not want to try the chips.”
Mary
How would you describe Mary?
Stupid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong Insecure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Confident Passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Active Cruel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kind Awful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nice Cold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Warm Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pleasant Dependent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Independent Stingy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Generous Immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mature Low self esteem
37 "I did not eat the chips, because they contain meat. I generally do not like the taste and structure of meat. For this reason, I do not eat meat at all and did not want to try the chips.”
If Mary saw what I normally eat, she would think I am: Extremely
immoral
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
moral
Please indicate the likelihood that you, like Mary, would become a vegetarian: Extremely
unlikely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
likely Most vegetarians think that most non-vegetarians are:
Extremely immoral
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
moral
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:
Strongly disagree
Strongly agree
I would like Mary as a friend 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I would like to have Mary as a colleague
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I respect Mary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mary would like me as a colleague
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mary would like me as a friend 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:
Totally not applicable
Totally applicable
I feel happy with
myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel satisfied with myself
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel dissatisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel self-critical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel determined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel angry with myself
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel disgusted with myself
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel annoyed with myself
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel disappointed with myself
39 Please remember watching the movie and imagine yourself as strongly as possible to being back in the theatre, seeing the movie for the first time.
While watching the movie, to what extent did you experience feelings of…
Not at all Very much Smallness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Humility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Respect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
While watching the movie, to what extent did you feel…
40 Not at all Very much I admire people who own expensive homes, cars and clothes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I like a lot of luxury in my life 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I’d be happier if I’d be able to afford more things
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ______________________________________________________________________________ Delicious taste is an important consideration for me when purchasing food 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Can you remember why Mary refused to taste the chips?
Please do NOT look at the previous pages to look for the answer. It’s ok if you forgot. It’s important that you answer honestly.
o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral.
o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral. However, she initially struggled with not eating meat.
o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral. However, she does not like to talk about it.
41
Section 4
Please indicate the likelihood that you would sign the petition shown above Extremely
unlikely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely
likely
Section 5
How old are you? --- What is your gender?
o Male o Female o Other
