Master Thesis
MSc Human Resource Management
June, 2012
Supervisor dr. L.B. Mulder
Jurrit Jan de Jong s1486578
Comply or Explain:
ABSTRACT
Unethical behaviour of employees can lead to severe costs for organisations. The conducted behaviour may depend on the self-interest that an employee has in acting unethically. To improve decisions in organisations, accountability is a common used method. However, it is not yet clear whether accountability works for ethical decisions as well. This study hypothesises that accountability may lead to more motivated reasoning, and less ethical behaviour. This may be moderated by self-interest. In the current study, accountability and self-interest were manipulated in three scenario sketches. Results showed that accountability did not have an influence on motivated reasoning or the ethicality of a decision. Self-interest did not moderate those relationships; it only had a slight direct influence on the ethicality of decisions. The research confirmed, however, that motivated reasoning decreases the ethicality of decisions.
Keywords: accountability, chance of being caught, ethical behaviour, ethical decision making, ethicality of decisions, justification, motivated reasoning, rationalisation, self-interest.
INTRODUCTION
branches, blacklists exist of employees who committed fraud and were fired for that reason (http://www.cbpweb.nl/Pages/inf_va_zwarte_lijsten.aspx). Examples of unethical
behaviour within organisations are numerous
(http://www.mkb.nl/download.php?itemID=442709): employees are reprimanded for asking for more compensation than they actually spend; Employees might also tamper with the hours they have worked. Either way, unethical decisions of employees might lead to high costs for employers. Hence, organisations could benefit heavily if their employees make ethical decisions. The crux is, however: how can people be persuaded to act ethically?
In an attempt to improve the ethicality of decision making, organisations may increase the degree to which employees are held accountable for their conduct (Beu & Buckley, 2004). In the Dutch banking sector, for instance, the banks themselves introduced a banking code in order to stimulate the self-regulation of their sector (http://www.nvb.nl). Dutch bank management has to sign a moral-ethical statement in which they declare that they will act ethically in their job. In scientific research, a substantial number of articles on accountability have been published recently. Recent literature research (Schillemans, 2010) has shown that during the last ten years about 114 articles were published which featured “accountability” in the title or as key concept. The concept of accountability has its origin by the government, to insure that public servants would keep acting ethically, and therefore make ethical decisions (Dubnick, 2003).
To unfold how accountability affects the ethicality of decisions, the following main research question will be used in this thesis:
In the next chapter, existing theory about ethical decision making and accountability will be depicted more meticulously.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND Ethical decision making
Ethical decision making has gained a wide scientific interest in the past decades (Elm & Radin, 2012). It is a multi-disciplinary concept, which has been elaborated on in sociology, business ethics, psychology, and philosophy. However, this multi-disciplinary elaboration of ethical decision making has not produced one consistent view about how people make ethical decisions, because the used models are somewhat limited and concepts have been operationalised differently (Elm & Radin, 2012). In past research, several variables have been examined to test whether they might have an influence on ethical decision making. Variables that might affect a person’s ethical behaviour are, for instance: gender, religion, stage of moral development, egoism, national culture, and power distance (Beu & Buckley, 2004; Casali, 2011; Curtis et al., 2012; Woiceshyn, 2011). Next to individuals, organisations can conduct ethical behaviour as well: they have a so-called ethical climate (Cullen et al., 1989). Codes of ethics, magnitude of consequences (rewards and punishments), ethical culture and social consensus are variables that might have an influence on the degree in which the organisation’s decisions are ethically justifiable. Concluding, ethical decision making is a multi-dimensional process, comprising the individual’s behaviour, the organisation context and ethical issues (Beu & Buckley, 2004).
Accountability
code. Accountability is a broad term with many definitions. In this study, accountability is defined as an “obligation to justify one’s conduct” (Schillemans, 2010: 304). This does not embrace the monitoring of employees (e.g. with surveillance camera’s or GPS systems) but employees should be able to explain their decisions. The definition of Schillemans implies that employees or organisations have to comply with existing standards and otherwise simply have to explain why they have made a different decision; this is called “comply or explain” (Fasterling, 2012). Beu & Buckley (2004) – mentioned above – are one of the few scholars who have linked accountability to ethical behaviour before.
For the current study, at least two relevant typologies of accountability emerge from the literature. The first typology is outcome accountability, where people have to justify the outcome of the decision making process, versus process accountability, where people have to justify the decision steps they took, regardless of the outcome (De Langhe et al., 2011; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Simonson & Staw, 1992). Outcome accountability can be seen as past compliance, while process accountability can also be seen as on-going compliance as its equivalent (Fasterling, 2012). Research has shown that process accountability is more useful when simple elemental tasks have to be accomplished (De Langhe et al., 2011). When, in contrast, relative complex decisions have to be made, process accountability is no longer superior to outcome accountability. The present study is interested in whether the outcome of decisions is ethical or not and will therefore focus on outcome accountability.
employees or even entire firms have to justify their decisions to others than their hierarchical superior, i.e. a colleague or other firms in the same branch (e.g. the banking code mentioned in the introduction). This modern horizontal accountability is mainly used in this study.
In general, accountability may come in certain degrees: some companies might demand thorough reports in which the decision has to be elaborated meticulously, while other companies only ask for short reports or reports on the basis of random samples. It is suggested by multiple authors that the degree of accountability influences the outcome of the decision (Beu & Buckley, 2004; Schillemans, 2010).
Accountability can lead to “better” judgments and decisions in so-called objective decision making, i.e. the objective correctness of the process or the outcome (De Langhe et al., 2011; Simonson & Staw, 1992). It is being considered as an effective mechanism to unveil unwanted behaviour (Schillemans, 2010) and to ensure that employee’s actions are in line with long-term corporate goals, rather than striving solely for short-term profits (Beu & Buckley, 2004). Accountability may also lead to significant higher contributions among those who are held accountable for their behaviour, due to the pressure to conform to the situational norms that prescribe what one ought to do (De Cremer et al., 2001). Another finding is that accountability causes decision makers to adjust their decisions to the view of the person or agency to whom they are supposed to justify that decision (Buchman et al., 1996). In that respect, predecisional accountability – i.e. knowing that one will be held accountable before the decision has been made – to an audience with unknown views is considered as the ultimate form of accountability (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).
making. They imply that accountability will lead to more ethical behaviour, i.e. people are expected to act more ethically when they know that their decisions will be reviewed vertically by their managers and horizontally by their colleagues. However, we will now see that this suggestion might not be as obvious as it looks.
Two scholars who claim that accountability – or compliance disclosure – is not always the solution for making better decisions are Lerner and Tetlock (1999). They state that only in particular circumstances, highly specific forms of accountability may lead to better decisions, i.e. predecisional accountability to an audience with unknown views. Other research supports these results, stating that unilateral compliance disclosure, when mandatory, may lead to no or even counterproductive outcomes; it only serves as a starting point to initiate the bilateral discussion about the disclosed items (Fasterling, 2012). This discussion can, in contrast with unilateral disclosure, improve the ethicality of decisions. Accordingly, accountability can be a fruitful mechanism in objective decision making, but its role in ethical decision making is as of yet unclear.
There is reason to assume that accountability may indeed have other effects in ethical contexts than in objective ones. When objective decisions are made, individuals or organisations are not interfered by personal motives to prefer a decision that will gain personal advantage. Ethical decisions of individuals or organisations, on the other hand, are decisions that affect the interests, welfare, or expectations of others (Rest, 1986). Therefore people may act differently if they know they might affect, for example, their colleagues, their customers or their organisation.
accidently drops one euro than in a situation where the customer drops fifty euros: the employee might return the one euro, but (s)he might not return the fifty euros due to the high self-interest (s)he can gain in the latter situation.
Motivated reasoning
Because self-interest plays a more important role in ethical decision making than it does in objective decision making, it is expected that in ethical situations self-interest drives people to act unethically. Research has revealed that this phenomenon may influence the reasoning process of people (Elm & Radin, 2012; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Simonson & Staw, 1992; Sonenshein, 2007). This type of reasoning process is called motivated reasoning, also named moral disengagement, justification, rationalisation or similar terms. It refers to “the cognitive process of determining how a person reasons about ethical situations” (Elm & Radin, 2012: 315), e.g. considering excuses or explanations that clarify why the decision they prefer – ethical or not – can be seen as appropriate (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Sonenshein, 2007).
In organisations with high accountability, people are expected to apply motivated reasoning especially when the self-interest one can gain from a decision is high. In that case, people are expected to make unethical decisions. However, when self-interest is low, people only feel they have to explain their decisions and accountability will consequently lead to ethical decisions.
Motivated reasoning is not only applicable to future decisions, but also to decisions that have been made in the past, irrespective of the question whether the decision makers were held accountable during the past decision making process. When, in hindsight, a particular decision turns out to be poorly made, people still favour to depict that decision as sensible and justifiable, rather than to come up with an objective, optimal solution (Buchman et al., 1996; Simonson & Staw, 1992).
Hypotheses
Accordingly, in the current study it is proposed that when employees are held accountable, they either make more ethical decisions, or they tend to justify or rationalise their decision, which subsequently leads to less ethical decisions. If employees have self-interest in the decision they have to make, the effect of accountability on motivated reasoning and the ethicality of the decision will even be stronger. Such a relationship is depicted in the conceptual model below, which is a graphical depiction of the hypotheses of this thesis:
Hypothesis 1. Self-interest moderates the relation between accountability and motivated reasoning in such a way that accountability leads to more motivated reasoning among people with high self-interest, but to less motivated reasoning among people with low self-interest (depicted in grey in figure 1).
among people with high self-interest, but to more ethical decisions among people with low self-interest (depicted in black in figure 1).
Hypothesis 3. Motivated reasoning influences the ethicality of decisions in such a way that high motivated reasoning leads to less ethical decisions, but when motivated reasoning is low it leads to more ethical decisions (depicted in dotted grey in figure 1).
--- Insert Figure 1 about here ---
METHOD Participants and design
The participants of this study were 187 people (111 male, 76 female, Mage = 36.7,
SDage = 14.2) who were part of the Dutch working population (required age 16-67). 54.0%
went to college or university, 23.5% went to lower and middle vocational education and 22.5% went to middle or high school. The participants were sent an e-mail in which they were asked to voluntarily fill out the online questionnaire. The e-mail was send to friends, family, and colleagues of the author. The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of this 2 (accountability: high vs. low) x 2 (self-interest: high vs. low) between-subjects design experiment. Time pressure was manipulated as well, but this falls outside the boundaries of this study. This variable will be controlled for in the analyses.
Procedure
Manipulations
Accountability
Accountability was manipulated when the ethical company code was explained, before the ethical dilemmas were presented. The accountability manipulation is outlined in appendix B. In the high accountability condition, participants were told that they had to explain all decisions they made during the test in view of the company code, especially when the decision was contradictory to that company code. Participants were warned that they had to explain all their decisions after the test was completed. In the low accountability condition, nothing was said about explaining a decision. Accountability was coded as 1 (low accountability condition) and 2 (high accountability condition).
Self-interest
Dependent measures
Ethicality of decisions
Participants were asked to judge each scenario by replying what they would do in that particular situation. The questions for all three scenarios were, respectively: what will you do, will you have the costs for the dinner/lunch with your friendly business partner reimbursed by your company? What will you do, will you accept the concert tickets / bottle of wine? What will you do, will you approve the construction licence without passing it through to a colleague? For all three items, the ethicality of the decision was measured on a six-point answering scale (1 = certainly not, 6 = certainly so) where the lowest value represented the most ethical answer. The Cronbach’s Alpha of these three items was low (0.14). Therefore, the decision was made to test the scenarios separately.
Motivated reasoning
Chance of being caught
In this study there was no interest in the influence of the chance of being caught. Therefore this variable was controlled for in the results. The degree to which a participant thought (s)he would have been caught in case (s)he acted unethically, was measured by three items on a five-point answering scale (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree). The items were, respectively: the chance that someone finds out is large; my executive will not ask questions about it (reversed); nobody will find out (reversed). Cronbach’s Alpha of the chance of being caught items was high for the dinner scenario (0.73), but low for the business gift scenario (0.55) and the construction licence scenario (0.56). Hence, only the items of the dinner scenario could be merged into one construct. Therefore, one of the three items is used to represent the construct chance of being caught in all three scenarios, namely: the chance that someone finds out is large. This item is considered to describe the construct chance of being caught most closely.
Manipulation checks
As a manipulation check of self-interest, participants were asked to indicate after each scenario to which degree they would gain an advantage by that particular scenario. For the dinner scenario, the two items were: having the costs of the lunch or dinner reimbursed would be very beneficial for me; I would gain major advantage by the previous decision. For the other scenarios, similar questions were asked, only with the focus on that particular scenario. For each scenario, these two items were measured on a five-point answering scale (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree). Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.88 in the dinner scenario, 0.92 in the business gift scenario, and 0.89 in the construction licence scenario; hence they were merged into a single construct for each scenario.
decisions; I had the feeling that I had to explain my actions; I had the feeling that I had to justify my decisions. Participants could indicate on a five-point answering scale (1 = completely disagree, 5 = completely agree) whether they had the feeling that they would be held accountable for their decisions. Cronbach’s Alpha was 0.88; hence the items were combined into one construct.
RESULTS Manipulation checks
An independent T-test was conducted to investigate the effect of high or low accountability condition on the accountability check. The accountability condition did have an effect on the accountability check, t(178) = -3.05, P < 0.005. In the high accountability condition participants indicated to a greater extent that they were held accountable for the decisions they made (M = 4.07, SD = 0.79) than participants in the low accountability condition (M = 3.69, SD = 0.89). Accordingly, this test confirmed that the manipulation of accountability was successful.
related to the perceived self-interest as well, t(185) = -3.71, P < 0.0005. Participants in the high self-interest condition have indicated that their interest in approving the construction licence was greater (M = 3.28, SD = 1.39) than participants in the low self-interest condition (M = 2.56, SD = 1.27). Consequently, these tests confirmed that the manipulation check of self-interest was successful in all scenarios.
--- Insert Table 1 about here ---
Correlations between all relevant variables and covariates are depicted in table 1. This study hypothesised that motivated reasoning influences the ethicality of decisions in such a way that high motivated reasoning leads to less ethical decisions, but when motivated reasoning is low it leads to more ethical decisions. The depicted significant correlations in table 1 confirmed that more motivated reasoning relates to less ethical decisions.
Some other noteworthy correlations of table 1 are that accountability has no significant direct effect on ethical decisions or motivated reasoning. Age does have a significant effect on both ethical decisions and motivated reasoning in two of three scenarios: when people become older, they are more inclined to make an ethical decision and they are less inclined to apply motivated reasoning.
Ethicality of decisions
scenarios. The covariates that were taken into account were age, gender, time pressure, motivated reasoning, and chance of being caught.
In the dinner scenario, no interaction effect of self-interest and accountability was found, F (1,177) = 1.90, p = 0.17, η2
= 0.01. However, there was a significant main effect of self-interest, F(1,177) = 7.4, p < 0.01, η2
= 0.04. When the reimbursement of expenses is higher, participants were more inclined to have those expenses reimbursed (M = 3.11, SD = 1.63) than when the reimbursement of expenses is lower (M = 2.48, SD = 1.49). The results showed no main effect of accountability in the dinner scenario, F (1,177) = 0.04, p = 0.84, η2
= 0.00.
In the business gift scenario there was no interaction effect of self-interest and accountability, F (1,176) = 0.06, p = 0.80, η2
= 0.00. Also no main effect of self-interest was found, F (1,176) = 2.45, p = 0.12, η2
= 0.01, nor a main effect of accountability, F (1,176) = 0.06, p = 0.81, η2
= 0.00.
In the construction licence scenario, no interaction effect of self-interest and accountability was present, F (1,173) = 0.01, p = 0.91, η2 = 0.00. Also no main effect of
self-interest has been shown, F (1,173) = 0.60, p = 0.44, η2
= 0.00, neither was there a main effect of accountability, F (1,173) = 1.46, p = 0.23, η2
= 0.01. Means and standard deviations of all separate scenarios can be found in the first half of tables 2, 3, and 4.
--- Insert Tables 2, 3, and 4 about here ---
Motivated reasoning
self-interest is low. Three 2 (accountability) x 2 (self-self-interest) ANCOVA’s were performed on the extent to which participants were justifying and rationalising their decisions. The covariates that were taken into account were age, gender, time pressure, ethicality of decision, and chance of being caught.
In the dinner scenario there was no interaction effect of self-interest and accountability, F (1,177) = 0.53, p = 0.47, η2 = 0.00. Neither was there a main effect of
self-interest, F (1,177) = 0.18, p = 0.67, η2
= 0.00, nor a main effect of accountability, F (1,177) = 1.98, p = 0.16, η2
= 0.01.
In the business gift scenario there was no interaction effect of self-interest and accountability, F (1,176) = 1.26, p = 0.26, η2
= 0.01. There was also no main effect of self-interest, F (1,176) = 1.04, p = 0.31, η2
= 0.01, and no main effect of accountability, F (1,176) = 0.50, p = 0.48, η2
= 0.00.
In the construction licence scenario there was no interaction effect of self-interest and accountability, F (1,173) = 1.89, p = 0.17, η2
= 0.01. Neither was there a main effect of self-interest, F (1,173) = 0.13, p = 0.72, η2 = 0.00, nor a main effect of accountability, F
(1,173) = 0.32, p = 0.57, η2
= 0.00. Means and standard deviations of all separate scenarios are depicted in the second half of tables 2, 3, and 4.
DISCUSSION Accountability
decisions or if an employee has a lot to gain by a decision: employees do not motivate their decisions differently. This leads to the conclusion that the first hypothesis has to be revoked: self-interest does not moderate the relation between accountability and motivated reasoning. An explanation for the lacking influence of accountability and self-interest on motivated reasoning in particular might be that people more or less unconsciously think of excuses anyway, whether they are held accountable or not.
With regard to the second hypothesis that self-interest would moderate the relation between accountability and the ethicality of decisions, this study revealed that no such interaction was present. Self-interest only had a direct effect on the ethicality of a decision when it concerned reimbursement of expenses, i.e. an employee’s request to the organisation to reimburse the costs of a business lunch / dinner during which not a word was spoken about business issues. Employees were more tempted to have such costs reimbursed when the expenses were judged higher. When it concerned the conflict of interest – i.e. accepting a business gift and approving a construction licence – the degree of self-interest did not affect the ethicality of a decision. In all scenario’s highlighted above, accountability did not have an effect on the ethicality of a decision. Consequently, the second hypothesis also has to be discarded: self-interest does not moderate the relation between accountability and the ethicality of decisions. It only has a direct effect on the ethicality of decisions in case of the reimbursement of expenses.
significant role. This reinforces the finding that accountability does not affect ethical decision making in multiple situations.
Research shows that accountability does have positive effects on objective decision making (De Langhe et al., 2011), but the absent effect of accountability on motivated reasoning and ethicality of a decision corresponds with the mixed findings in the ethical decision making literature up until now. On the one hand, accountability can prevent people from acting unethically, so they do not need to rationalise their decision (Beu & Buckley, 2004). On the other hand, accountability can encourage the motivated reasoning process of people to rationalise an unethical decision (Simonson & Staw, 1992).
An explanation for the lacking influence of accountability on both motivated reasoning and ethicality of decisions can be that the outcomes of a person’s decisions are related to the perception of the person to whom they are accountable (Buchman et al., 1996). In the current study, participants were only held virtually accountable and all their answers were confidential, so they were not concerned with perceptions of others to whom they were accountable.
Between motivated reasoning and ethicality of decisions
cannot be deduced from the current study. Accordingly, the third hypothesis can be accepted partially. Motivated reasoning and the ethicality of decisions are negatively related to each other, but it is not clear which one variable leads to the other.
Because more motivated reasoning can lead to less ethical decisions, employers might be interested to reduce motivated reasoning. The literature provides two different solutions to do so: the first solution demands that people should be assured of confidentiality for their responses when they are held accountable (Simonson & Staw, 1992). This prevents people from continuing the unethical behaviour that they carried out in the past. The second solution, on the other hand, suggests that such responses should be made public to increase the ethicality of decisions (De Cremer et al., 2001). In that case, people tend to be more concerned of the perception of their decision by others and people are expected to display consistent (un)ethical behaviour along different situations. In the current study, outcomes of people’s actions were not made public. That might be an explanation why people did not show consistent (un)ethical behaviour along the different scenarios (Simonson & Staw, 1992).
Implications and limitations
making?” before they go into the question “How does accountability work in ethical decision making?” The present study shows furthermore that motivated reasoning has a relation with the ethicality of decisions. The as of yet unknown details of this relationship might be an interesting topic of future research.
A strong aspect of this study is that it comprises several completely different scenarios, because from this study can be derived that people do not act consistent upon different ethical scenarios. To improve this study, future research could go more into detail on the specific characteristics of a scenario. In that regard, also the accountability typologies should be taken into account: are the decisions complex or simple (De Langhe et al., 2011; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Simonson & Staw, 1992), and are people horizontally or vertically accountable (Schillemans, 2010)?
Organisations can learn from this study that accountability mechanisms in itself are not enough to prevent employees from making unethical decisions; such mechanisms might not even work at all. When an organisation is trying to improve ethical decision making, they may want to pay more attention to situations in which self-interest is high, rather than low. In some of those situations, employees are more easily tempted to act unethically. With knowledge of the factors that influence the ethicality of decisions, employers can organise the decision making process in such a way that employees will act ethically. Employees can also be trained more specifically in the ethical factors they are not yet competent in, and employers can select applicants more meticulously on their ethical values (Casali, 2011). Thereby, negative, expensive effects of unethical decisions can be prevented. To postulate it concretely: well-elaborated ethics programs can improve an organisation’s performance, due to the assumption that decisions of an organisation will then be more in line with societal ethical expectations (Beu & Buckley, 2004).
The combination of ethical decisions with accountability, self-interest, and motivated reasoning in one study has given new perspectives on how people can or cannot be persuaded to act ethically. With regard to the limitations that are provided above, further research is needed to disclose all facets of this area. The current study has proven to be a rudimentary, nonetheless fruitful step into that direction.
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APPENDIX A: SCENARIO SKETCHES
Dinner scenario (differences between manipulations are underlined)
High self-interest manipulation
For your work it is common to go out for dinner with business partners. The costs for such a dinner can be reimbursed by your organisation. On a day you have an elaborate dinner with a business partner to whom you are personally connected. That evening you hardly talk about business and it turns out to be merely a friendly dinner. The costs of this dinner are €100,-.
Low self-interest manipulation
For your work it is common to go out for lunch with business partners. The costs for such a lunch can be reimbursed by your organisation. On a day you have a lunch with a business partner to whom you are personally connected. That afternoon you hardly talk about business and it turns out to be merely a friendly lunch. The costs of this dinner are €15,-.
Business gift scenario (differences between manipulations are underlined)
High self-interest manipulation
band that has not performed in the Netherlands in years. The customer tells you he is giving you the tickets because he considers you an important business relation. The costs of both tickets are roughly €120.
Low self-interest manipulation
For your work you are trying to sell a large amount of bicycle lamps to a customer. You did not arrive at an agreement on the selling price yet and decide to continue tomorrow. The customer offers you a bottle of wine. The customer tells you that he is giving you the wine because he considers you an important business relation. The costs of the bottle of wine are roughly €10.
Construction licence scenario (differences between manipulations are underlined)
High self-interest manipulation
As a civil servant you are responsible of the assessment and approval of construction licences. Coincidentally, you have handed in an application for a construction licence yourself. This licence is extremely important to you: it gives you the opportunity to improve the value of your house tremendously, so you will not have to incur a loss when you sell your home; you might even make some profit. You are fairly sure that your application meets all requirements and you expect that a colleague will assess your application. Surprisingly, you have to assess your application yourself. You have to decide if you will approve the construction licence yourself or if you would pass it through to a colleague.
Low self-interest manipulation
your application meets all requirements and you expect that a colleague will assess your application. Surprisingly, you have to assess your application yourself. You have to decide if you will approve the construction licence yourself or if you would pass it through to a colleague.
APPENDIX B: ACCOUNTABILITY MANIPULATION
High accountability manipulation
Your organisation has a company code that contains rules and principles to which employees have to comply. These are:
§ Careful handling of company finances § Avoiding confusion of interests.
All employees have to be able to explain their decisions in view of this company code. For all behaviour that is not consistent with the code an explanation has to be provided. Thus, all decisions have to be explained. Imagine that you are actually working in the depicted scenario and that you are really committed to your decision. Afterwards, you will be asked to explain all your decisions.
Low accountability manipulation
Your organisation has a company code that contains rules and principles to which employees have to comply. These are:
§ Careful handling of company finances § Avoiding confusion of interests.
APPENDIX C: MOTIVATED REASONING ITEMS Dinner scenario:
§ The organisation has enough money to pay for such dinners; § The organisation will not go bankrupt by reimbursing the dinner; § Everyone does such things;
§ The costs of this behaviour are marginal compared to the overall organisation budget;
§ This behaviour means nothing compared to large-scale organisation fraud; § My executive would not worry about this behaviour.
Business gift scenario:
§ No confusion of interest will take place by accepting the business gift; § The organisation will not go bankrupt due to this action;
§ Everyone does such things;
§ I will certainly not offer lower prices after accepting the business gift; § This behaviour means nothing compared to large-scale organisation fraud; § My executive would not worry about this behaviour.
Construction licence scenario:
§ No confusion of interest will take place by approving the construction licence; § It will not harm the organisation;
§ Everyone does such things;
TABLE 1
Means (M), standard deviations (SD) and correlations of the variables a
TABLE 2
Means and standard deviations scenario 1
TABLE 3
Means and standard deviations scenario 2
TABLE 4
Means and standard deviations scenario 3
Low accountability High accountability Ethicality of decision Low self-interest 2.30 (1.44) 2.67 (1.52) High self-interest 3.27 (1.57) 2.93 (1.69) Motivated reasoning Low self-interest 2.74 (0.96) 2.82 (1.03) High self-interest 2.88 (0.89) 3.03 (0.82)
Low accountability High accountability Ethicality of decision Low self-interest 3.26 (1.59) 3.62 (1.35) High self-interest 3.00 (1.47) 2.86 (1.58) Motivated reasoning Low self-interest 3.36 (0.85) 3.61 (0.85) High self-interest 3.31 (0,77) 3.22 (0.61)
