Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, 18 december 1996 " Aksoy tegen Turkije
met noot van R.A. Lawson
Het Hof hecht geloofaan het relaas van Aksoy dat hij gedurende ondervragingen door de politie is mishandeld. De mishandeling is dermale ernstig dat het Hof voor het eerst in de geschiedenis -"foltering" in de zin van artikel 3 EVRM constateert. De duur van de detentie van Aksoy levert strijd op met artikel 5 lid 3 EVRM; het beroep van Turkije op de noodtoestand (artikel 15 EVRM) wordt niet gehonoreerd. Artikel 13 EVRM houdt een onderzoeksplicht in: Indien de nationale autoriteiten worden geconfronteerd met een plausibele aanwijzingen dat foltering heeft plaatsgevonden, dienen zij een grondig en effectief onderzoek in te stellen. Nu daarvan geen sprake is geweest, is ook deze bepaling geschonden. Gezien de omstandigheden van de klager kan hem niet worden tegengeworpen dat hij de nationale rechtsmiddelen niet heeft uitgeput. Over het bestaan van een 'administrative practice' kan het Hof geen uüspraak doen bij gebrek aan bewijs.
FEITEN
In Zuid-Oost Turkije wordt op 10 december 1992 de 19-jarige Zeki Aksoy vrijgelaten door
de politie. Hij was eerder, op 24 of 26 november, opgepakt op verdenking van betrokkenheid
bij de Koerdische afscheidingsbeweging PKK.
Aksoy beweert tijdens de ondervragingen ernstig te zijn mishandeld. Zijn armen zouden
achter zijn rüg zijn vastgebonden waarna hij, naakt en geblinddoekt, aan zijn polsen zou
zijn opgehangen (de zgn. Palestinian hanging). Terwijl hij zo hing, zouden zijn ondervragers
electroden aan zijn geslachtsdelen hebben vastgemaakt; terwijl water over hem heen werd
gegooid zouden hem gedurende ruim een half uur stroomstoten zijn toegediend. In de
daaropvolgende dagen zou hij met körte tussenpozen zijn geslagen. Na vier dagen hielden
de mishandelingen op. Aksoy was niet in Staat zijn armen en handen te bewegen. Hij werd
op 8 december onderzocht door een arts in dienst van de overheid. Diens medisch rapport
vermeldde in een enkele zin dat Aksoy geen Sporen van geweld vertoonde. De dokter zou
aan een politieman hebben gevraagd hoe het kwam dat Aksoy zijn armen niet kon bewegen,
waarop de agent vertelde dat hij een ongeluk had gehad. De dokter zou daarop spottend
hebben gezegd dat iedereen die hij onderzocht wel een ongeluk leek te hebben gehad.
Kort voor zijn vrijlating wordt Aksoy voorgeleid aan een officier van Justitie. Deze legt
hem een verklaring voor ter ondertekening, waarin Aksoy iedere betrokkenheid bij de PKK
ontkent. Aksoy meent dat de verklaring onjuistheden bevat; hij kan bovendien de verklaring
eenvoudig niet ondertekenen omdat hij zijn handen nog steeds niet kan bewegen.
De Turkse regering bestrijdt bovenstaande lezing van de feiten ten enenmale. Zij wijst er onder andere op dat Aksoy tegen de officier van Justitie niets heeft gezegd over foltering. Enkele dagen na zijn vrijlating vervoegt Aksoy zieh bij een ziekenhuis. Hij wordt opgeno-men met verlammingsverschijnselen in beide aropgeno-men als gevolg van een zenuwbeschadiging
(bilateral radial paralysis). Hij verblijft ruim twee weken in het ziekenhuis. Intussen besluit
de officier van Justitie af te zien van verdere vervolging.
Op 20 mei 1993 dient Aksoy een klacht in bij de Europese Commissie voor de Rechten van de Mens. Hij heeft drie Wachten: hij zou zijn gefolterd in strijd met artikel 3 EVRM; tijdens zijn arrest is hij niet onverwijld voorgeleid aan een rechter (artikel 5 lid 3); het is onmogelijk om een procedure aanhangig te maken tegen degenen die verantwoordelijk waren voor zijn mishandeling (artikel 6 lid l en artikel 13). Bovendien zou het hier niet gaan om een inciden-tele situatie: wat Aksoy was overkomen zou deel uitmaken van een systematisch patroon. Nog voor de Commissie zieh over de ontvankelijkheid van de klacht heeft kunnen uit-spreken, vindt Aksoy de dood. Op 16 april 1994 overlijdt hij aan schotwonden. Zijn familie-leden stellen dat Zeki Aksoy meermalen is bedreigd nadat hij zijn zaak in Straatsburg aanhangig heeft gemaakt; zij houden de autoriteiten verantwoordelijk voor zijn dood en claimen een schending van het individueel klachtrecht (artikel 25 EVRM). De Turkse regering, daarentegen, meent dat Aksoy is gedood door een lid van een rivaliserende PKK-factie.
Met betrekking tot Aksoy's klacht in Straatsburg voert Turkije allereerst een preliminair verweer: Aksoy heeft de nationale rechtsmiddelen niet uitgeput en daarmee niet voldaan aan het vereiste van artikel 26 EVRM. De klacht onder artikel 3 EVRM zou daarom primair niet-ontvankelijk, en subsidair feitelijk ongegrond zijn. En wat de klacht onder artikel 5 EVRM betreft: in 1990 is onder artikel 15 EVRM de noodtoestand uitgeroepen in delen van Zuid-Oost Turkije, waarbij Turkije zijn verplichtingen onder artikel 5 ten dele heeft opgeschort.
Deze verweren kunnen de Europese Commissie niet overtuigen. Na een hoorzitting in Straatsburg op 18 Oktober 1994 verklaart de Commissie de zaak ontvankelijk. Vervolgens brengt een delegatie van de Commissie tweemaal een bezoek aan Turkije. Uiteindelijk komt zij tot de volgende vaststelling van de feiten (zoals weergegeven in § 23 van 's Hofs arrest):
'(a) It was not possible to make a definite finding äs to the date on which Mr Aksoy was arrcsted, although this clcarly took place no later than 26 November 1992. He was released on 10 December 1992, therefore he was detained for at least fourteen days.
(b) On 15 December 1992 he was admitted to Hospital and was diagnosed with bilateral radial paralysis. He left hospital on 31 December 1992 on his own initiative, without having been properly discharged.
(c) There was no evidence that he had suffered any disability prior to his arrest, nor any evidence of any untoward incident during the five days between his release from police custody and his admission to hospital.
(d) The Cornmission noted that the medical evidence indicated that the applicant's injuries could have had various causes, but one of these could have been the trauma suffered by a person who had been strung up by his arms. Moreover, radial paralysis affecting both arms was apparently not a common condition, although it was consistent with the form of ill-treatment known äs "Palestinian hanging".
smce it gave the Impression that the two pubhc officers were not prepared even to consider the possibihty of ill-treatment occurrmg at the hands of the pohce
(f) The Government offered no alternative explanation for Mr Aksoy's mjunes
(g) There was msufftaent evidence to enable any conclusions to be drawn with regard to the apph-cant's other allegations of ill-treatment by electnc shocks and beatmgs However, it did seem clear that he had been detamed in a small cell with two other people, all of whom had had to share a single bed and blanket, and that he had been kept blmdfolded durmg mterrogation'
In haar rapport van 23 Oktober 1995 (Appl. No 21987/93) oordeelt de Commissie, met 15
stemmen tegen l, dat zieh schendmgen hebben voorgedaan van de artikelen 3 en 5 lid 3.
Met 13 stemmen tegen 3 vindt zij dat artikel 6 lid l eveneens is geschonden. Zij neemt geen
standpunt in ten aanzien van de klachten onder artikelen 13 en 25,
UITSPRAAK
'AS TO THE LAW
I The Court's assessment of thefacts
38 The Court recalls its constant case-law that under the Convention System the establishment and venfication of the facts is pnmanly a matter for the Commission (Articles 28 § l and 31) While the Court is not bound by the Commission's fmdmgs of fact and remams free to make its own appreciation m the hght of all the matenal before it, it is only m exceptional circumstances that it will exercise its powers in this area (see the Akdwar and Otters v Türkei/ )udgment of 16 September 1996, Reports ofjudgments and Oeasions - 1996, p 19, § 78)
39 In the mstant case, it must be recalled that the Commission reached its fmdmgs of fact after a Delegation had heard evidence m Turkey on two separate occasions, m addition to heanngs m Strasbourg (see paragraph 23 above) In these circumstances, the Court considers that it should accept the facts äs estabhshed by the Commission (see, mutahs mutandis, the above-mentioned Akdwar
and Others judgment, p 20, § 81)
40 It is thus agamst the background of the facts äs found by the Commission (see paragraph 23 above) that the Court must cxamme the Government's prelimmary objection and the apphcant's complamts under the Convention
JI Tlie Government's prelimmary objection
A The arguments of those appeanng before the Court
41 The Government asked the Court to reject the apphcant's complamt under Article 3 of the Convention on the ground that, contrary to Article 26 of the Convention, he had failed to exhaust the domeshc remedies available to him. Article 26 provides· "The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and withm a penod of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken "
The apphcant (see paragraph 3 above), with whom the Commission agreed, argued that he had done all that could be expected of him to exhaust domestic remedies
42. The Government contended that the rule relating to the exhaustion of domestic remedies was clearly established in international law and in the case-law of the Convention organs, and required the applicant to avail himself of all national remedies unless these clearly offered him no chance of success. In fact, Mr Aksoy could have had recourse to three different types of domestic remedy: a criminal prosecution, a civil action and/or administrative proceedings (see paragraphs 24-28 above). 43. With regard to the first of these options, they submitted that he could have complained about the alleged ill-treatment to the Public Prosecutor who saw him on 10 December 1992 (see paragraph 18 above). However, according to the Government, Mr Aksoy gave no indication on that occasion or at any time subsequently that he had been ül-treated during his time in police custody. Articles 243 and 245 of the Criminal Code, which were in force throughout Turkey, penalised the use of torture and ill-treatment for the extraclion of confessions (see paragraph 24 above). Legislative Decree 285 on the state of emergency region transferred the power to carry out investigations mto criminal acts allegedly committed by civil servants from the public prosecutors to the administrative couricils (see paragraph 26 above). However, decisions by the administrative councils not to prosecute were always reviewed by the Supreme Administrative Court. In this connection, the Government submitted a number of judgments reversing Orders made by administrative councils in the state of emergency region and ordermg criminal proceedings to be brought against members of the gendarmerie and security police in respect of allegations of ill-treatment of detainees, and other rulings on sentencing for similar forms of misconduct.
44. Nonetheless, the Government reasoned that criminal proceedings were perhaps not the most appropnate remedy in this type of case, because of the emphasis placed on the rights of the accused äs opposed to those of the complainant. They therefore drew the Court's attention to the existence of an administrative remedy under Article 125 of the Turkish Constitution (see paragraph 27 above). In order to receive compensation under this provision, an individual needed only to show that there was a causal link between the acts committed by the administration and the wrong suffered; thcre was no requirement to prove serious misconduct on the part of a government agent. In this connec-tion, the Government submitted examples of administrative decisions in which compensation had been awarded in respect of death caused by torture in police custody.
45. In addition, the Government argued that Mr Aksoy could have brought a civil action for damages. Again, they referred to a number of decisions of the domestic courts, including a judgment of the Court of Cassation in a case concerning a claim for damages for torture, wherc it was held that offences committed by law enforcement officers were governed by the Code of Obligations and that, under Article 53 of that Code, an acquittal for lack of evidence in criminal proceedings was not binding on the civil courts.
46. Whde the applicant did not deny that the remedies identified by the Government were formally part of the Turkish legal System, he claimed that, in the region under emergency rule, they were illusory, inadäquate and ineffective because both torture and the denial of effective remedies were carried out äs a matter of administrative practice.
medical Service had been reorgamsed and doctors who issued such reports were either threatened or moved to a different area Prosecutors m the state of emergency region routmely failed to open mveshgations mto alleged abuses of human nghts and frequently refused even to acknowledge complamts Such mvestigations äs were carried out were biased and inadequate Furthermore, lawyers and others who acted for the victims of human nghts violahons were subjected to threats, mhmidation and abusive prosecutions and mdividuals were afraid to pursue domestic remedies because repnsals agamst complamants were so common
In these circumstances, the applicant claimed that he should not be required to pursue domestic remedies before makmg a complamt to Strasbourg
48 In any case, he maintamed that he had mformed the Public Prosecutor on 10 December 1992 that he had been tortured (see paragraph 18 above), and asserted that, even if he had not, the Pros-ecutor could plamly have observed that he did not have the proper use of his hands
The failure of the Prosecutor to Start a cnmmal mvestigation made it extremely difficult for the applicant to avail himself of any domestic remedy It was not possible for him to take Steps to ensure that a cnmmal prosecution was brought, for example by challengmg a decision not to bring a prosecution m the administrative courts (see paragraph 26 above), because the lack of mvestigation meant that no formal decision not to prosecute was ever made In addttion, this failure prcjudiced his chances of victory m civil or administrative proceedmgs, because m order to succeed with either type of claim it would have been necessary to prove that he had suffered torture, and in practice a ruhng to that effect by a judge in cnmmal proceedmgs would have been required
49 Finally, he remmded the Court that no remedy was available even m theory m relation to his complamt regardmg the length of time he was detamed without judicial control, smce this was perfectly lawful under the domestic legislation (see paragraph 29 above)
50 The Commission was of the opiraon that the applicant had been injured durmg his time m police custody (see paragraph 23 above) It followed that, although it was not possible to estabhsh exactly what happened durmg his meetmg with the Public Prosecutor on 10 December 1992, there must undoubtedly have been elements which should have prompted the latter to open an mvestig-ation or, at the very least, try to obtain further Informmvestig-ation about the applicant's state of health and the treatment to which he had been subjected The applicant had done all that could be expected of him m the circumstances, particularly m view of the facts that he must have feit vulnerable äs a result of his detention and ill-treatment and that he suffered health problems requmng hospitalisati on followmg his release The threats which he claimed to have received after makmg his application to the Commission and his death in circumstances which had not been fully clanfied, were further elements which supported the view that the pursuance of remedies might have been attended by nsks
In view of its fmdmg that the applicant had done all that could be required of him to exhaust domestic remedies, the Commission decided that it was not necessary to determme whether there was an administrative practice on the part ot the Turkish authonties of toleratmg human nghts abuses
B The Court s assessment
whether or not the provisions of the Convention are incorporated in national law. In this way, it is an important aspect of the principle that the machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national Systems safeguarding human rights (see the Akdivar and Others judgment cited in § 38 above, p. 15, § 65).
52. Under Article 26, normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness.
However, there is no Obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective. In addition, according to the "generally recognised rules of international law" to which Article 26 makes reference, there may be special circumstances which absolve the applicant from the Obligation to exhaust the domestic remedies at his disposal. The rule is also inapplicable where an adminis-trative practice consisting of a repetition of acts incompatible with the Convention and official tolerance by the State authorities has been shown to exist, and is of such a nature äs to make pro-ceedings futile or ineffective (see the above-mentioned Akdivar and Others judgment, p. 16, §§ 66 and 67).
53. The Court emphasises that its approach to the application of the rule must make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of machinery for the protection of human rights that the Contracting Parties have agreed to set up. Accordingly, it has recognised that Article 26 must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism. It has further recognised that the rule of exhaustion is neither absolute nor capable of being applied automatically; in reviewing whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the particular circum-stances of each individual case. This means amongst other things that it must take realistic account not only of the existence of formal remedies in the legal System of the Contracting Party concerned but also of the general legal and political context in which they operate, äs well äs the personal circumstances of the applicant (see the above-mentioned Akdivar and Others judgment, p. 17, § 69). 54. The Court notes the provision under Turkish law of criminal, civil and administrative remedies against the ill-treatment of detainees by the agents of the State and it has studied with interest the summaries of judgments dealing with similar matters provided by the Government (see paragraphs 43-45 above). However, äs previously mentioned (paragraph 53), it is not here solely concerned with the question whether the domestic remedies were in general effective or adequate; it must also examine whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the applicant did everything that could reasonably be expected of him to exhaust the national channels of redress.
55. For the purposes of this examination, the Court reiterates that it has decided to accept the Commission's findings of fact in the present case (see paragraphs 39-40 above). The Commission, äs has been seen (in paragraph 50 above), was of the view that the applicant was suffering from bilateral radial paralysis at the time of his interview with the Public Prosecutor.
56. The Court considers that, even if it were accepted that the applicant made no complaint to the Public Prosecutor of ill-treatment in police custody, the injuries he had sustained must have been clearly visible during their meeting. However, the Prosecutor chose to make no enquiry äs to the nature, extent and cause of these injuries, despite the fact that in Turkish law he was under a duty to investigate (see paragraph 26 above).
57 The Court therefore concludes that there existed special circumstances which absolved the apphcant from his Obligation to exhaust domeshc remedies Havmg reached this conclusion it doos not consider it necessary to examme the apphcant's claim that there exists an administrative practice of withholdmg remedies m breach of the Convention
III The rnents
A Alleged vwlation of Article 3 of the Convention
58 The apphcant alleged that he was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which states "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degradmg treatment or pumshment"
The Government considered the allegations of ill-treatment to be unfounded The Commission, however, found that the apphcant had been tortured
59 The Government raised vanous objections to the way m which the Commission had evaluated the evidence They pomted to a number of factors which, m their view, should have given nse to senous doubt äs to whether Mr Aksoy had been ill-treated äs he claimed
For example, they questioned why the apphcant had made no complamt to the Public Prosecutor about havmg been tortured (see paragraph 18 above) and found it difficult to understand why, if he had mdeed been subjected to torture, he had not made any mculpatory confession They also found it suspicious that he had waited for five days between bemg released from pohce custody and contacting the hospital (see paragraph 19 above) and observed that it could not be assumed that nothing untoward had occurred m the meantime Fmally, they raised a number of pomts relahng to the medical evidence, including the facts that the apphcant took his medical records with him when he left hospital and that there was no medical evidence of burns or other marks left by the apphcation of electric shocks
60 The apphcant complamed of havmg been ill-treated in different ways He claimed to have been kept bhndfolded dunng intcrrogation, which caused disonentation, to have been suspended from his arms, which were tied together behind his back ("Palcstiman hanging"), to have been given electric shocks, which were exacerbated by throwing watcr over him, and to have been subjected to beatings, slappmg and verbal abuse He referred to medical evidence from Diele Umversity Medical Faculty which showed that he was suffenng from a bilateral brachial plexus mjury at the time of his admission to hospital (see paragraph 19 above) This injury was consistent with Pales-timan hanging
He submitted that the treatment complamed of was sufficiently severe äs to amount to torture, it was inflicted with the purpose of inducmg him to admit that he knew the man who had identified him
In addition, he contended that the conditions in which he was detamed (see paragraph 13 above) and the constant fear of torture which he suffered while m custody amountcd to inhuman treatment 61 The Court, havmg decided to accept the Commission's findmgs of fact (see paragraphs 39-40 above), considers that where an individual is taken into pohce custody m good health but is found to be mjured at the time of release, it is mcumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation äs to the causmg of the mjury, failmg which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see the Tomasi v Fiance judgment of 27 August 1992, Senes A no 241-A, pp 40-41, §§ 108-111 and the Ribitsch v Austritt judgment of 4 Dccember 1995, Reports ofjudgrnents and Deasions - 1996 [read A-336, RL], p 26, § 34)
treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the Substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. l and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see the Inland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, § 163, the Soering v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, p. 34, § 88 and the Chahal v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 November 1996, Reports ofjudgments and Decisions - 1996, pp. 22-23, §79).
63. In order to determine whcther any particular form of ill-treatment should be qualified äs torrure, the Court must have regard to the distinction drawn in Article 3 between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As it has remarked before, this distinction would appear to have been embodied in the Convention to allow the special Stigma of "torrure" to attach only to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (see the Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 66, § 167).
64. The Court recalls that the Commission found inter alia that the applicant was subjected to "Palestinian hanging", in other words, that he was stripped naked, with his arms tied together behind his back, and suspended by his arms (see paragraph 23 above).
In the view of the Court this treatment could only have been deliberately inflicted; indeed, a certain amount of preparation and exertion would have been required to carry it out. It would appear to have been administered with the aim of obtaining admissions or Information from the applicant. In addition to the severe pain which it must have caused at the time, the medical evidence shows that it led to a paralysis of both arms which lasted for some time (see paragraph 23 above). The Court considers that this treatment was of such a serious and cruel nature that it can only be described äs torture.
In view of the gravity of this conclusion, it is not necessary for the Court to examine the applicant's complaints of other forms of ill-treatment.
In conclusion, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. B. Aüeged violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention
65. The applicant, with whom the Commission agreed, claimed that his detention violated Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. The relevant parts of Article 5 state:
"(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ... (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence ...; ...
(3) Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph l (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial powcr 66. The Court recalls its decision in the case of Brogan and Others v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 29 November 1988, Series A. no. 145-B, p. 33, § 62), that a period of detention without judicial control of four days and six hours feil outside the strict constraints äs to time permitted by Article 5 § 3. It clearly follows that the period of fourteen or more days during which Mr Aksoy was detained without being brought before a judge or other judicial officer did not satisfy the requiremcnt of "promptness".
67. However, the Government submitted that, despite these considerations, there had been no violation of Article 5 § 3, in view of Turkey's derogation under Article 15 of the Convention, which states:
required by the exigencies of the Situation, provided that such measures are not mconsistent with its other obligahons under international law
2 No derogahon under Article 2, except m respect of deaths resultmg from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision
3 Any High Contractmg Party avaihng itself of this right of derogation shall keep the Secretary General of the Councü of Europe fully mformed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons thercfor It shall also mform the Secretary General of the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions of the Convention are agam being fully executed " The Government remmded the Court that Turkey had derogated from its obhgations under Article 5 of the Convention on 5 May 1992 (see paragraph 33 above)
1 The Court s approach
68 The Court recalls that it falls to each Contractmg State, with its responsibihty for "the life of [its] nation", to determme whether that life is threatened by a "public emergency" and, if so, how far it is necessary to go m attemptmg to overcome the emergency By reason of their direct and contmuous contact with the pressmg needs of the moment, the national authonties are in prmciple better placed than the international judge to decide both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of the derogations necessary to avert it Accordmgly, in this matter a wide margin of appreciaüon should be left to the national authonties
Nonetheless, Contractmg Parties do not enjoy an unhmited discretion It is for the Court to rule whether, mter atia, the States have gone beyond the "extent stnctly required by the exigencies" of the cnsis The domestic margin of appreciaüon is thus accompamed by a European supervision In exercismg this supervision, the Court must give appropnate weight to such relevant factors äs the nature of the nghts affected by the derogation and the circumstances leadmg to, and the duration of, the emergency Situation (see the Branmgan and McBnde v the United Kwgdom judgment of 26 May 1993, Senes A no 258-B, pp 49-50, § 43)
2 Existence of a pubhc emergency threatemng the life of the nation
69 The Government, with whom the Commission agreed on this point, mamtamed that there was a public emergency "threatemng the life of the nation" in South East Turkey The apphcant did not contest the issue, although he submitted that, essentially, it was a matter for the Convention organs to decide
70 The Court considers, in the light of all the matcnal before it, that the particular extent and impact of PKK tcrronst activity m South East Turkey has undoubtedly created, in the region concerned, a "public emergency threatemng the life of the nation" (see, mutatis mutandis, the LawkbS v Ireland judgment of l July 1961, Senes A no 3, p 56, § 28, the above mentioned Ireland v the United Kingdom judgment, p 78, § 205 and the above-mentioned Bianmgan and MiBnde judgment, p 50, § 47)
3 Wliether the measures were stnctly required by the exigencies of the Situation a The length of the unsupervised detention
connection with a collective offence to be held for up to thirty days in the state of emergency region (see paragraph 29 above).
72. They explained that the place in which the applicant was arrested and detained feil within the area covered by the Turkish derogation (see paragraphs 31-33 above). This derogation was necessary and justified, in view of the extent and gravity of PKK terrorism in Turkey, particularly in the South Hast. The investigation of terronst offences presented the authorities with special problems, äs the Court had recognised in the past, because tho members of terrorist organisations were expert in withstandmg interrogation, had secret support networks and access to substantial resources. A great deal of time and effort was required to secure and verify evidence in a large region confronted with a terrorist Organisation that had Strategie and technical support from neighbouring countries. These difficulties meant that it was impossible to provide judicial supervision during a suspect's detention in police custody.
73. The applicant submitted that he was detained on 24 November 1992 and releascd on 10 December 1992. He alleged that the post-dating of arrests was a common practice in the state of emergency region.
74. While he did not present detailed arguments against the validity of the Turkish derogation äs a whole, he questioned whether the Situation in South Hast Turkey necessitated the holding of suspects for fourteen days or more without judicial supervision. He submitted that judges in South East Turkey would not be put at risk if they were permitted and required to review the legality of detention at shorter intervals.
75. The Commission could not establish with any certainty whether the applicant was first detained on 24 November 1992, äs he claimed, or on 26 November 1992, äs alleged by the Government, and it therefore proceeded on the basis that he was held for at least fourteen days without being brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial powcr.
76. The Court would stress the importance of Article 5 in the Convention System: it enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. Judicial control of interferences by the executive with the individual's right to liberty is an essential feature of the guarantee embodied in Article 5 § 3, which is intendcd to minimise the risk of arbitrarmess and to ensurc the rule of law (see the above-mentioned Brogan and Others judgment, p. 32, § 58). Furthermore, prompt judicial Intervention may lead to the detection and prevention of serious ill-treatment, which, äs stated above (paragraph 62), is prohibited by the Convention in absolute and non-derogable terms.
77. In the Branmgan and McBnde judgment (cited in paragraph 68 above), the Court held that the United Kingdom Government had not exceeded their margin of appreciation by derogating from their obligations under Article 5 of the Convention to the extent that individuals suspected of terrorist offences were allowed to be held for up to seven days without judicial control.
In the instant case, the applicant was detained for at least fourteen days without being brought before a judge or other officer. The Government have sought to justify this measure by reference to the particular demands of police investigations in a geographically vast area faced with a terrorist Organisation receiving outside support (see paragraph 72 above).
b Safeguards
79 The Government emphasised that both the derogation and the national legal System provided sufficient safeguards to protect human rights Thus, the derogation itself was hmited to the stnct minimum required for the fight agamst terronsm, the permissible Icngth of detention was prescnbed by law and the consent of a Public Prosecutor was necessary if the pohce wished to remand a suspect m custody beyond these penods Torture was prohibited by Article 243 of the Crimmal Code (see paragraph 24 above) and Article 135 (a) stipulated that any Statement made m consequence of the admimstration of torture or any other form of ill-treatment would have no evidential weight 80 The apphcant pointed out that long penods of unsupervised detention, together with the lack of safeguards provided for the protection of pnsoners, facilitated the practice of torture Thus, he was tortured with particular intensity on his third and fourth days in detention, and was held thereafter to allow his injunes to heal, throughout this hme he was demed access to either a lawyer or a doctor Moreover, he was kept blmdfolded durmg mterrogation, which meant that he could not identify those who mistreated him The reports of Amnesty International ( Turkey a Pohcy of Demal", February 1995), the European Committee for the Prevenhon of Torture and the United Nations Committee agamst Torture (cited in paragraph 46 above) showed that the safeguards contamed m the Turkish Cnmmal Code, which were m any case inadequate, were routmely ignored m the state of emergency region
81 The Commission considered that the Turkish System offered msufficient safeguards to detamees, for example there appeared to be no speedy remedy of habeas corpus and no legally enforceable rights of access to a lawyer, doctor, fnend or relative In these circumstances, despite the senous terronst threat m South Hast Turkey, the measure which allowed the apphcant to be detamed for at least fourteen days without bemg brought before a judge or other officer exercismg judicial functions exceeded the Governmenfs margin of appreciation and could not be said to be stnctly required by the exigencies of the Situation
82 In its above-mentioned Bi anmgan and McBnde judgment (cited in paragraph 68), the Court was sahsfied that there were effective safeguards m Operation m Northern Ireland which provided an important measure of protection agamst arbitrary behaviour and mcomrnunicado detention For example, the remedy of habeas corpus was available to test the lawfulness of the original arrest and detention, there was an absolute and legally enforceable nght to consult a sohcitor forty-eight hours after the time of arrest and detamees were entitled to mform a relative or fnend about their detention and to have access to a doctor (op cit, pp 55-56, §§ 62-63)
83 In contrast, however, the Court considers that in this case msufficient safeguards were available to the apphcant, who was detamed over a long penod of time In particular, the denial of access to a lawyer, doctor, relative or fnend and the absence of any realistic possibility of bemg brought before a court to test the legahty of the detention meant that he was left completely at the mercy of those holding him
84 The Court has taken account of the unquestionably senous problem of terronsm in South East Turkey and the difficulhes faced by the State m takmg effective measures agamst it However, it is not persuaded that the exigencies of the Situation necessitated the holding of the apphcant on suspicion of mvolvement m terronst offences for fourteen days or more in mcommumcado detention without access to a judge or other judicial officer
4 Whether the Turkish derogation met the formal recjuirements of Artide 15 § 3
85 None of those appearmg .before the Court contested that the Turkish Repubhc's notice of derogation (see paragraph 33 above) complied with the formal requirements of Arttcle 15 § 3, namely
to keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which were taken in derogation from the Convention and the reasons therefor.
86. The Court is competent to examine this issue of its own motion (see the above-mentioned Lawless judgment, p. 55, § 22 and the above-mentioned Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment, p. 84, § 223), and in particular whether the Turkish notice of derogation contained sufficient information about the measure in question, which allowed the applicant to be detained for at least fourteen days without judicial control, to satisfy the requirements of Article 15 § 3. However, in view of its finding that the impugned measure was not strictly required by the exigencies of the Situation (see paragraph 84 above), the Court finds it unnecessary to rule on this matter.
5. Conclusion
87. In conclusion, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. C. Alleged lack of remedy
88. The applicant complained that he was denied access to a court, in violation of Article 6 § l of the Convention, which provides, so far äs is relevant: "In the determination of his civil rights ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
In addition, he claimed that there was no effective domestic remedy available to him, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, which states: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms äs set forth in this Convention arc violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstan-ding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
89. The Government contended that, since the applicant had never even attempted to bring proceedings, it was not open to him to complain that he had been denied access to a court They further argued, äs they had in connection with their preliminary objection (see paragraphs 41-45 above) that there were a number of effective remedies available.
90. For the applicant, the Prosecutor's decision not to open an investigation had effectively rendered it impossible for him to enforce his civil right to compensation (see paragraph 48 above). He submitted that, under Turkish law, civil proceedings could not be contemplated until the facts con-cerning the events had been established and the perpetrators identified by a criminal prosecution. Without this, civil proceedings had no prospect of success. In addition, he stated that the ability to seek compensation for torture would represent only one part of the measures necessary to provide redress; it would be unacceptable for a State to claim that it fulfilled its Obligation simply by providing compensation, since this would in effect be to allow States to pay for the right to torture He claimed that the remedies necessary to meet his Convention Claims either did not exist, even in theory, or did not operate effectively in practice (see paragraphs 46-47 above).
91. The Commission found a violation of Article 6 § l, for the same reasons that it found in the applicant's favour under Article 26 of the Convention (see paragraph 50 above). In view of this finding, it did not consider it necessary to examine the complaint under Article 13
1. Article 6 § Ί of the Convention
respect of ill-treatment allegedly committed by agents of the State (see, for example, the Tomasi judgment cited m paragraph 61 above, p 43, §§ 121-122)
93 The Court noles that it was not disputed by the apphcant that he could m theory have brought civil proceedmgs for damages m respect of his ill-treatment He did claim that the failure of the prosecutor to mount a cnmmal mvestigation m practice meant that he would have had no chance of success m civil proceedmgs (see paragraph 90 above) The Court recalls, however, that because of the special circumstances which existed m his case (see paragraph 57 above), Mr Aksoy did not even attempt to make an apphcahon before the civil couits Given these facts, it is not possible for the Court to determme whether or not the Turkish civtl courts would have been able to dcal with Mr Aksoy's claim, had he brought it before them
In any event, the Court observes that the crux of the apphcant's complarnt concerned the Prosecutor's failure to mount a cnmmal mvestigation (see paragraph 90 above) It further notes the apphcant's argument that the possibihty of seekmg compensation for torture would represent only one part of the measures necessary to provide redress (also m paragraph 90 above)
94 In the Court's view, agamst this background, it is more appropnate to consider this complamt m relation to the more general Obligation on States under Article 13 to provide an effective remedy m respect of violations of the Convention
2 Article 13 of the Convention
95 The Court observes that Article 13 guarantees the availabihty at national level of a remedy to enforce the substancc of the Convention nghts and freedoms m whatever form they might happen to be secured m the domestic legal order The effect of this Article is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authonty both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complamt and to grant appropnate rehef, although Contractmg States are afforded some discretion äs to the manner m which they conform to their obhgations under this provision (see the Cfmhal judgment cited m paragraph 62 above, p 38, § 145) The scope of the Obligation under Article 13 vanes dependmg on the nature of the apphcant's complamt under the Convention (see the above-mentioned Chahal judgment, p 39, §§ 150-151) Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be "effective" m practice äs well äs m law, m parhcular in the sense that its excrcise must not be unjustifiably hmdered by the acts or omissions of the auth-ontics of the respondent State
96 The Couit would first makc it clcar that its fmdmg (in paragraph 57 above) that there existed special circumstances which absolved the apphcant from his Obligation to exhaust domestic remedies should not be taken äs meanmg that remedies are meffective in South Hast Turkey (see mutatts rnutandi'i the Akdivar and Others judgment cited m paragraph 38 above, p 19, § 77)
97 Sccondly, the Court, hke the Commission, would take judicial notice of the fact that allegations of torture m police custody are extremely difficult for the victim to substantiate if he has been isolated from the outside world, without access to doctors, lawyers, family or fnends who could provide support and assemble the necessary evidence Furthermore, having been ill-treated m this way, an individual will often have had his capacity or will to pursue a complamt impaired 98 The nature of the nght safeguarded under Article 3 of the Convenhon has imphcahons for Article 13 Given the fundamental importance of the prohibition of torture (see paragraph 62 above) and the especially vulnerable position of torture victims, Article 13 imposes, without prejudice to any othcr remedy availablc under the domestic System, an Obligation on States to carry out a thorough and effective mvestigation of incidents of torture
leadmg to the Identification and punishment of those responsible and mcluding effecbve access for the complamant to the investigatory procedure It is true that no express provision exists in the Convention such äs can be found m Artide 12 of the 1984 United Nations Convention agamst Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degradmg Treatment or Punishment, which imposes a duty to proceed to a "prompt and impartial" investigation whenever there is a reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed However, in the Court's view, such a requirement is implicit in the notion of an "effective remedy" under Article 13 (see mutatis mutandis the Soenng judgment ctted m paragraph 62 above, pp 34-35, § 88)
99 Indeed, under Turkish law the Prosecutor was under a duty to carry out an investigation However, and whether or not Mr Aksoy madc an explicit complamt to him, he ignored the visible evidence before him that the latter had been tortured (see paragraph 56 above) and no investigation took place No evidence has been adduced before the Court to show that any other action was taken, despite the Prosecutor's awareness of the apphcant's injunes
Moreover, m the Court's view, in the circumstances of Mr Aksoy's case, such an attitude from a State official under a duty to mvestigate cnmmal offences was tantamount to undermmmg the effectiveness of any other remedies that may have existed
100 Accordmgly, m view m particular of the lack of any investigation, the Court fmds that the apphcant was denied an effective remedy in respcct of his allegation of torture
In conclusion, there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention D Alleged violahon of Artide 25 § Ί of the Convention
101 The apphcant alleged that there had been an mterference with his nght of individual petition, m breach of Article 25 § l of the Convention, which states " The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental Organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the nghts set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Contractmg Party agamst which the complamt has been lodged has declared that it recognises the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions Those of the High Contractmg Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not to hmder m any way the effective exercise of this nght" 102 It is to be recalled that Mr Aksoy was killed on 16 April 1994, according to his representatives, this was a direct result of his persistmg with his apphcation to the Commission It was alleged that he had been thrcatened with death m order to make him withdraw his apphcation to the Commis-sion, the last threat being made by telephone on 14 April 1994 (see paragraph 22 above) 103 The Government, however, dcmed that there had been any mterference with the nght of individual petition They submitted that Mr Aksoy had been killed m a setthng of scores between quarrelling PKK factions and told the Court that a suspect had been chargcd with his murder (see paragraph 22 above)
104 The Commission was dceply concerned by Mr Aksoy's death and the allegation that it was connected to his apphcation to Strasbourg Nonetheless, it did not have any evidence on which to form a conclusion äs to the truth of this claim or the responsibility for the killmg
105 The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective Operation of the System of individual petition mstituted by Article 25 of the Convention that applicants or potential apphcants are able to commuracate freely with the Commission without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authontics to withdraw or modify their complamts (see the Akdwar and Others judgment cited in paragraph 38 above, p 25, § 105)
responsible for any interference, m the form of threats or intimidation, with his nghts under Artacle 25 § l, and no new evidence m this connection was presented to the Court
The Court cannot therefore find that there has been a violation of Article 25 § l of the Convenhon E Alleged administrative practice ofvwlatmg the Conventton
107 The applicant additionally asked the Court to rule that Articles 3, 5 § 3, 6 § l, 13 and 25 § l were violated äs a matter of practice in South Hast Turkey, with high level official tolerance This entailcd that the Court should find aggravated violations of the Convention
108 With reference to the reports of the international bodies cited above (paragraph 46), he argued that torture at the hands of the pohce was widespread m Turkey and that this had been the case for many years The State authonties were aware of the problem but had chosen not to implement recommended safeguards
Furthermore, the victims of torture and of other human nghts abuses were rouhnely demed access to judicial remedies m breach of Articles 6 § l and 13 of the Convention and were harassed, threatened and subjected to violence if they attempted to bring their complamts before the Strasbourg organs, contrary to Article 25 § l
Fmally, smce the domestic law permitted suspects to be detamed for long penods m violation of Article 5 § 3, this was evidence of an administrative practice of breachmg that provision 109 The Court is of the view that the evidence established by the Commission is msufficient to allow it to reach a conclusion concernmg the existence of any administrative practice of the violation of the above Articles of the Convention
F Application of Article 50 of the Convention
110 Under Article 50 of the Convention, "If the Court fmds that a decision or a measure taken by a legal authonty or any other authonty of a High Contractmg Party is completely or partially m conflict with the obhgahons arismg from the Convention, and if the internal law of the said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the mjured party "
111 In his memonal the applicant claimed compensation for pecumary damage caused by his detention and torture, consishng of medical expenses of 16,635,000 Turkish hra and loss of earnings amountmg to £40 (Sterling)
In addition he sought non-pecumary damages of £25,000, which, he submitted, should be mcreased by a furthcr £25,000 m the event that the Court found an aggravated violation of the Convention on the grounds of administrative practice
He also rcquested payment of his legal fees and expenses which totalled £20,710
112 The Government offered no comment either in its memonal or dunng the heanng before the Court äs regards thcse claims
1 Damage
2 Costs and expenses
114 The Court considers that the apphcant's claim for costs and expenses is reasonable and awards it in füll less the amounts received by way of legal aid from the Councü of Europe which have not already been taken into account m the claim
3 Default mterest
115 With regard to the sum awarded m Turkish hra, default mterest is to be payable at the rate of 30% per annum, which, accordmg to the Information available to the Court, is the statutory rate of mterest applicable in Turkey at the date of adoption of the present judgment
As the award m respect of costs and expenses is to be made m Sterling, the Court considers it ap-propnate that mterest should be payable on this sum at the rate of 8% per annum, which, accordmg to the Information available to it, is the statutory rate applicable m England and Wales at the date of adoption of the present judgment
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1 Dismisses by eight votes to one the prelimmary objection concerrung the exhausbon of domestic remedies,
2 Holds by eight votes lo one that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, 3 Holds by eight votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, 4 Holds by eight votes to one that it is not necessary to consider the apphcant's complamt under
Article 6 § l of the Convention,
5 Holds by eight votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, 6 Holds unammously that no violation of Article 25 § l of the Convention has been established, 7 Holds by eight votes to one
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, witbn three months, m respect of compensa-tion for pecumary and non-pecuniary damage, 4,283,450,000 Turkish lira,
(b) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, in respect of costs and expenses, £20,710 less 12,515 French francs to be converted mto pounds Sterling at the rate applicable on the date of delivery of the present judgment,
(c) that simple mterest at the followmg annual rates shall be payable from the expiry of the above-mcntioncd three months until settlement
NOOT
Foltering
1 Het arrest Aksoy zal de geschiedenis ingaan als de eerste zaak waarin het Hof zieh
gedwongen zag de kwalificatie "foltering" in de zin van artikel 3 EVRM te gebruiken (§ 64).
In de vroege jurisprudentie constateerde de Commissie gevallen van foltering in de
statenklacht tegen Griekenland en in de zaak lerland t. Verenigd Koninkrijk.
1Maar de eerste
zaak bereikte het Hof nooit, en in de tweede zaak beperkte het Hof zieh nadrukkelijk tot
de "mildere" omschrijving van 'vernederende en onmenselijke' behandeling (A-25, § 167).
Het Hof benadrukte bij die gelegenheid dat de stigmatiserende term "foltering" gereserveerd
dient te blijven voor een opzettelijk toegebrachte onmenselijke, wrede behandeling die zeer
ernstig lijden teweegbrengt. Uit § 63 van Aksoy blijkt dat het Hof die definitie nog steeds
aanhangt.
Zodoende vormen foltering, onmenselijke behandeling en vernederende behandeling
een glijdende schaal. Toen in de zaak Tyrer werd geklaagd over de toepassing van lijfstraffen
(een 15-jarige jongen had drie stokslagen gekregen), oordeelde het Hof dat er sprake was
geweest van een 'vernederende' bestraffing (A-26, § 35). In recente zaken over fysiek geweld
tegen arrestanten paste het Hof de kwalificatie 'vernederende en onmenselijke' behandeling
toe.
22 Foltering dus. Gezien de nachtmerrie die Zeki Aksoy heeft doorstaan - en daarvan moeten
we uitgaan: het Hof heeft, in navolging van de Commissie, zijn lezing van de feiten
groten-deels aanvaard - is dat ook de enige gepaste term.
3 Wat dit aspect van Aksoy betreff lag de moeilijkheid niet zozeer in de juridische
kwalifica-tie van zijn behandeling, maar in de vaststelling van de feiten. Zaken als deze, waaraan geen
nationale rechter te pas is gekomen, vergen het uiterste van de Straatsburgse
onderzoeksvaar-digheden. Documenten moeten boven water worden gehaald en vertaald, getuigen
onder-vraagd; het kan nodig zijn detentiecentra te bezoeken. Niet zelden zullen getuigen elkaar
tegenspreken. Een politieman die in verband met de Afcsoy-zaak werd ondervraagd, deed
alle berichten over schendingen van mensenrechten in Turkije zonder meer af als een poging
om de reputatie van zijn land te beschädigen. Anderzijds merkte de Commissie in de zaak
Aydin (zie punt 15 hieronder) op dat familieleden en kennissen van de klager, die evenals
in Aksoy afkomstig waren uit het ruige berggebied van Zuid-Oost Turkije, niet altijd in Staat
bleken data van gebeurtenissen te reproduceren of de precieze toedracht van een voorval
te reconstrueren. De Commissie wordt al met al in de rol van "rechter in eerste aanleg"
gedwongen, terwijl zij in wezen over onvoldoende bevoegdheden beschikt om die rol altijd
\ Zie resp. Yearbook ICHR, vol. 12 (1969), p. 501 en B-23, p. 411.
naar behoren te kunnen uitvoeren, en zij zieh intussen ook met een immer groeiende werklast geconfronteerd ziet.
In dit geval bracht een delegatie van de Commissie onder meer twee bezoeken aan Turkije. Voor het Hof betekent dit dat het zieh behoort te verlaten op (should accept) de vaststelling van de feiten door de Commissie (§ 39). Dat is een tamelijk stellige formulering, maar het Hof lijkt zieh het recht voor te behouden ander bewijsmateriaal mee te wegen (zie ook § 106). Zie voor de bewijslastverdeling in zaken als deze § 61; de in Ribüsch ontwikkelde
presumptie behoort nu tot de vaste jurisprudentie.
Een 'administrative practice'?
4 Het" Hof gaat niet zover dat het spreekt van een 'administrative practice' (§ 109). Ook in het arrest Akdivar ging het Hof nadrukkelijk algemene conclusies uit de weg (zie § 88 van dat arrest, NJCM-Bulletin jrg 21 (1996), nr 8, p. 1105). De individuele klachtprocedure, waarbij de rechtsstrijd zieh toespitst op een concreet geval, leent zieh in beginsel ook siecht voor dergelijke algemene uitspraken.
Maar misschien had de publieke verklaring van het CPT over Turkije, die eiders in dit
Bulletin (p. 214 e.v.) is afgedrukt, het Hof in Aksoy toch tot een ander oordeel kunnen brengen.
In die verklaring spreekt het Comite van 'clear evidence of the practice of torture and other forms of severe ill-treatment by the Turkish police.' In ondubbelzinnige termen wordt daar aan toegevoegd: 'To attempt to characterise this problem äs one of isolated acts of the kind which can occur in any country - äs some are wont to do - is to fly in the face of the facts.' 5 Het Hof zal niet op de hoogte zijn geweest van de CPT-verklaring, die dateert van 6 december 1996. Weliswaar is de uitspraak in Aksoy gedaan op 18 december 1996, maar in de - hierboven niet weergegeven - inleidende overwegingen van het arrest valt te lezen dat de beraadslagingen van het Hof plaatsvonden op 27 april, 24 Oktober en 26 november 1996; op de laatste datum is de tekst van het arrest aangenomen. Kennelijk stemmen het Hof en het CPT de agenda's niet op elkaar af.
liggen een gepast gebruik te maken van uitspraken van het CPT, dat net als de Hof en de
Commissie behoort tot de Raad van Europa en althans ten dele identieke doelen nastreeft.3
6 Het belang van de vraag of sprake is van een administrative practice wordt onder meer
duidelijk onder artikel 50. De vergoeding voor immateriele schade zou, zo meent Aksoy,
moeten worden verdubbeld als het Hof een administrative practice zou constateren (§ 111).
Bij mijn weten is tot nu toe slechts tweemaal eerder in Straatsburg gevraagd om aggmvated
damages, overigens zonder resultaat.
4Het Hof zelf heeft in de zaak Cruz Varas aangegeven dat een Staat zieh inderdaad schuldig
kan maken aan een aggravated breach indien zieh een schending van het Verdrag voordoet
nadat de Staat een verzoek om interimmaatregelen heeft genegeerd.5 Die verzwaarde
staats-aansprakelijkheid zou kennelijk haar basis vinden in het gegeven dat de Staat doelbewust
het risico heeft genomen dat het Verdrag wordt geschonden. Hetzelfde zou mijns inziens
kunnen gelden voor een Staat die talmt met het aanpassen van nationale wetgeving na een
Straatsburgse veroordeling. Het lijkt me alleszins redelijk die constructie naar analogie toe
te passen wanneer een door het Hof geconstateerde inbreuk onderdeel blijkt van een
systema-tische schending van het Verdrag.
Zover kan het in Aksoy niet körnen, want het Hof heeft nu juist gesteld over onvoldoende
bewijs te beschikken om zieh te kunnen uitspreken over het bestaan van een administrative
practice (zie punt 4 hierboven). In § 113 zegt het Hof wel het "gehele" bedrag toe te kennen
aan de klager; dat suggereert dat ook de gevraagde "extra" schadevergoeding wordt
toege-kend. Door het gegoochel met alle valuta ontstaat een enigszins onoverzichtelijke situatie,
maar als ik het goed heb uitgerekend heeft het Hof de voorgestelde "boete" niet toegekend.
Duidelijk is in ieder geval wel dat het Hof het idee als zodanig niet van de hand wijst.
Artikel 5, incommunicado detentie en artikel 15
7 De tweede klacht van Aksoy had betrekking op artikel 5 lid 3. Hij is gedurende een
periode van ten minste 14 dagen van zijn vrijheid beroofd zonder te zijn voorgeleid aan een
rechter of vergelijkbare magistraat. De situatie lijkt wel wat op de zaak Brannigan & McBride:6
het is evident dat de klager niet "onverwijld" is voorgeleid aan een rechter, maar de Staat
3 Daarmce is niet gezegd dat het Hof zou zijn gebenden aan het oordeel van het CPT dat zieh ergens foltermg heeft voorgedaan zie mijn Raphaie t VK A pnsoners' düemma, m NlCM-Bulletin jrg 19 (1994), nr 2, pp 140-146
4 Allereerst EHRM, 9-6-1988, B t het VK (an 50) (A-136-D), § 7 (een uit een sene Machten over uithuisplaat-smgen van kmderen) Het Hof kende wel een bedrag toe, maar ging met nader m op het karakter daarvan Ten tweede EHRM, 27-11-1992, Olsson t Zweden (nr 2) (A-250), § 110 Het Hof ontkende dat zijn eerste O/sson-arrest met was nageleefd cn kende een geringer bedrag toe dan geclaimd. Vgl. ook de opmerking van Cie.-hd Schermers m Ribttsch, supra noot 2, § 45
5 EHRM, 20-3-1991, Cruz Vmas t Zweden (A-201), § 103, NlCM-Bulletin jrg 16 (1991), nr 4, pp 335-349, m nt H Steenbergen & T Zwart <.
6 EHRM, 26-5-1993, Brannigan & McBnde t het VK (A-258-B), NiCM-Bulletm jrg 18 (1993), nr 7, pp 793-810, m nt J P Loof
betoogt dat de onrechtmatigheid hiervan wordt weggenomen door het feit dat de noodtoe-stand is ingeroepen onder artikel 15 EVRM.
8 In Aksoy aanvaardt het Hof dat zieh in Zuid-Oost Turkije inderdaad een noodtoestand voordoet, zonder daar veel woorden aan vuil te maken. Tussen neus en lippen door wordt het begrip "regionale noodtoestand" (§ 70) gerntroduceerd. Dergelijke elementen roepen enige verwondering op: waarom is de zaak niet aan een Grand Chamber van het Hof voorgelegd? In Lawless stelde het Hof immers dat de term "noodtoestand" verwijst naar een 'exceptional Situation of crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the Community of which the State is composed' (A-3, § 28). In Bmnnigan
& McBride constateerde het plenaire Hof 'terrorist violence in Northern Ireland and dsewhere in the United Kingdom' (A-258-B, § 47). In Aksoy lijkt het Hof zieh niet te hebben uitgeput
in pogihgen om het begrip "noodtoestand" nader af te bakenen. De aandacht gaat uit naar de concrete maatregelen.
9 In Brannigan & McBride aanvaardde het Hof tamelijk gemakkelijk de Britse noodmaatrege-len - volgens sommigen te gemakkelijk.7 Dat is in Aksoy anders. Het Hof kan niet aanvaarden
dat het noodzakelijk is een verdachte gedurende 14 dagen vast te houden zonder rechterlijke tussenkomst (§ 78). Maar anders dan die heldere Stelling doet vermoeden, is die situatie op zichzelf kennelijk toch niet per definitie in strijd met het Verdrag, want het Hof gaat vervol-gens na of er voldoende waarborgen waren om de rechten van de verdachte te beschermen (§§ 79-84). Uiteindelijk leidt die onnodige omweg tot dezelfde uitkomst: de duur van Aksoy's detentie kan niet worden gerechtvaardigd met een beroep op de noodtoestand onder artikel 15 EVRM. Het is moeilijk om vast te stellen of het Hof nu tot een strengere interpretatie van artikel 15 is overgegaan dan in Brannigan & McBride: de feitelijke omstandigheden in Aksoy wijken daarvoor te sterk af.
10 Kortheidshalve zal ik niet stilstaan bij het mooie obiter dictum in § 86 en vestig ik slechts kort de aandacht op het feit dat het Hof opnieuw niet zo ver gaat incommunicado detentie per definitie in strijd met het EVRM te achten. Wat dat laatste betreft: in Brannigan & McBride hadden de klagers, Amnesty International en Liberty gewezen op de gevaren die inherent zijn aan incommunicado detentie. Zij hadden aangedrongen op een uitspraak naar voorbeeld van de Algemene Vergadering van de VN en het Inter-Amerikaanse Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, dat een dergelijke volstrekte isolatie van de buitenwereld onder geen omstandig-heid is toegelaten (A-258-B, § 61). Het antwoord van het Hof was toen ontwijkend (§§ 62-64). In Aksoy laat het Hof de mogelijkheid open dat incommunicado detentie onder omstandigheden gelegitimeerd kan zijn (zie § 84). Dat daarvan in de extreme omstandigheden van Aksoy geen sprake was, is intussen duidelijk. De risico's van incommunicado detentie worden beschreven in § 83; de waarborgen die in dezelfde paragraaf genoemd zijn, worden reeds lang gepropa-geerd door het CPT.
Artikel 13: een verplichting tot onderzoek
11 In veel opzichten is Aksoy een belangrrjk arrest Niet alleen zrjn de feiten van de zaak
van een uitzonderlrjke wreedheid, het Hof betreedt ook enkele meuwe paden Zo introduceert
het bij de behandeling van de klacht onder artikel 13 een onderzoeksplicht, die intreedt zodra
de nationale autoriteiten worden geconfronteerd met plausibele aanwrjzmgen dat foltenng
heeft plaatsgevonden Het kan daarbrj uiteraard gaan om expliciete klachten, maar ook om
feitehjke omstandigheden zoals m Aksoy In een dergelrjk geval dienen de autoriteiten een
grondig en effectief onderzoek m te stellen dat kan leiden tot de identificatie en bestraffing
van de schuldigen, het slachtoffer moet m Staat zijn bi] het onderzoek betrokken te zijn en
waar gepast een schadevergoeding krrjgen (§ 98) Opmerkelrjk is dat het Hof hier raet alleen
verwijst naar artikel 12 VN-Folterverdrag, dat anders dan artikel 13 EVRM expliciet op de
onderzoeksplicht ingaat, maar ook verdergaat
8Een mooi staaltje van ideologische
interpreta-tie en een passende hennnering aan het uitgangspunt dat de juridische controle op de
naleving van het EVRM in eerste instantie een zaak van de nationale autonteiten is Naar men
mag aannemen bestaan vergekjkbare verplichtingen onder artikel 13 in leder geval ook indien
nabestaanden klagen over een schending van artikel 2 EVRM (het recht op leven)
912 De klacht over schending van artikel 25 (het individuele klachtrecht) strandt op
bewijspro-blemen (§ 106) Indien de klagers m staat waren geweest hard te maken dat de autoriteiten
achter de dood van Zeki Aksoy zaten, dan had dat ook een schending van artikel 2 EVRM
opgeleverd
13 Een laatste opmerking betreff het preliminaire bezwaar Aksoy had de nationale
rechtsrrud-delen met uitgeput, de Turkse regering had gewezen op een aantal m haar ogen geschikte
procedures Niet zonder irorue merkt het Hof op dat 'it has studied with interest the
sum-maries of judgments dealmg with similar matters' (§ 54)
Het preliminaire bezwaar kan alleen de Turkse rechter Golcuklu overtuigen Hrj zal het
dezer dagen druk hebben met het schrrjven van dissentmg opmions De meerderheid van acht
rechters volgt de redenering van het baanbrekende Afcdnw-arrest (zie §§ 65-77 van dat arrest,
NlCM-Bullehn jrg 21 (1996), nr 8, pp 1101-1104) en bouwt daarop voort Aanvaardde het Hof
in Akdivar dat het rechtsapparaat kan haperen in de turbulente omstandigheden van Zuid-Oost
Turkrje en dat potentiele klagers zieh in die omstandigheden gemtimideerd kunnen voelen,
in Aksoy ligt de nadruk sterker op een subjectief element In een mooi geformuleerde
over-wegmg geeft het Hof aan dat het, gezien de afschuwelrjke ervarmgen van Aksoy, met zou
verbazen als hrj de hoop had opgegeven om genoegdoemng te knjgen via de nationale
judiciele autoriteiten (§ 56, zie ook § 97)
8 Art 12 VN-Foltervcrdrag (1984) luidt 'ledere Staat die Partij is, draagt ervoor zorg dat zijn bevocgde autoriteiten een onverwijld cn onpartijdig onderzoek instellen, wanneer er redelijke gronden zijn om aan te nemen dat m enig gebied, onder zijn rechtsmacht foltenng heeft plaatsgehad "
9 Die suggestic kan worden gelezen m EHRM, 27-9-1995, McCcmn t het VK (A-324), §§ 161-162, N/CM Bulletin jrg 21 (1996), nr 4, pp 537 561, m nt R A Lawson
