The Responsibility to Protect

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MA Thesis

The

Responsibility to

Protect

Marriage of Morality and Law

J.F. van Leeuwen (1723553)

Research Master Modern History & International Relations

Supervisor: dr. ir. M.R. Kamminga

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1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Preamble

One of the most salient issues in International Relations is the legitimate use of military force. Public, political, and academic debates have covered this issue for centuries, but recently a novel concept has entered the stage: the Responsibility to Protect. This principle came into being in response to grave human rights atrocities and the inaction of the international community in the twentieth century. The 1990s have often been characterized as the heyday of humanitarian intervention. The Cold War paralysis of the Security Council had passed and the protection of human rights, regardless of state borders, seemed to conquer a stronger position in the international order. The use of military force “in the name of humanity” at the expense of bedrock IR-principles such as state sovereignty and non-intervention, has remained subject to critical debates. The attempt to marry morality with law – or the translation of human values into international human rights law – resulted for instance in the construction and evolution of the Responsibility to Protect norm.

After the explicit question of former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan concerning the appropriate rules for when and how the international community should assume the responsibility to use force in defense of human rights, the ad-hoc International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was convened to formulate an answer based on consultations with worldwide governmental and non-governmental actors. The results were reported one year later and introduced the term “Responsibility to Protect” (RtP).1 In both academic and political settings, this principle was often characterized as the keystone of the altering balance between state rights and individual rights. The 1990s in particular are considered to be the stage of discursive transformation from discussing state security to human security.2 As a result, the ICISS proposed the existence of an obligation to act when serious harm is done to populations within state boundaries, instead of former rules about permissive conditions for using military force to protect human rights in the face of gross violations. The precise

1_{International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:}

International Development Research Centre, 2001).

2_{Melanne Civic, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All,’ Review of}

Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, by Gareth Evans, PRISM 1, no. 2 (2010):

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4 interpretation of the stated guidelines when and how this assumed obligation to act should be put into practice, has remained a contentious issue ever since.3

The construction and subsequent evolution of the RtP norm in the international political discourse will be the central point of focus in this research. Through the theoretical lens of international norm construction, circulation, evolution and survival, the analysis will bring forward how various intertwining mechanisms have been at work and to what extent RtP has become an established norm in the international community’s normative institution. Accompanying questions about the historical and contemporary perceptions of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention will also be touched upon in order to assess the current or potential significance of RtP.

1.2 Research question

In order to assess the status of the Responsibility to Protect and the possible changes it has brought to previous perceptions of appropriate state behavior, the main research question reads as follows: to what extent has the principle of Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, 2001) altered the political perceptions of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention? This question can be justified dually. First, there is an evident academic relevance for inquiring RtP. Despite its twelfth anniversary and large number of references in numerous debates, the status of RtP remains uncertain. The legitimate use of military force has been theorized for centuries, resulting in the expansive tradition of Just War theories, encompassing conditions about a just cause, right intention, last resort, proportionality, right authority, and successful prospects. Considering this long history of Just War principles, the question arises to what extent RtP provides an alternative framework for humanitarian intervention in the twenty-first century, or that it is merely old wine in new wineskins. A quick glance at Just War premises shows that jus ad bellum (the right to war) and jus in bello (the right conduct of war) might be insufficient in providing directions for the required jus ad interventionem or jus in interventione since the latter are both types of military force in times of peace instead of war. It is clearly not the intention of the intervening party to engage in acts of war, on the contrary: the action is executed to bring peace in a state

3_{Jennifer Welsh, Carolin Thielking and S. Neil MacFarlane, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Assessing the Report of}

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5 where it does not exist. Arguably, one might question the applicability of conventional Just War theories since they seem inadequate in the context of humanitarian operations, wherein military force should equal domestic police forces instead of an adverse army. The extent to which RtP is able to fill this vacuum depends largely upon how the norm is being proposed, framed, modified, adopted, and implemented. In that context, this thesis will present a critical analysis of political discourse about RtP, reflecting existing and, possibly, new perceptions of state sovereignty and intervention.

Secondly, the academic justification is reinforced by a number of societal reasons for investigating the Responsibility to Protect in the context of humanitarian intervention. The remaining occurrence of atrocities and human rights violations across the world and the inconsistent response by the international community provides an imperative for continuous analysis of the balance between state sovereignty and human rights. In addition, the question of when and how the use of military force may be legitimized is gaining increasing importance considering the technological developments of weapons, and the growing number of intrastate conflicts.4 Whereas wars between states have virtually become extinct, there are still many violent conflicts within state borders.5 The human suffering and economic costs that are the detrimental effects of continuous conflicts increase the importance of bringing an end to intrastate conflicts. However, another trend that can be discerned is the declining popular support for sending national troops to foreign dangers. Combined with the technological advancements of modern weaponry, this creates a paradoxical situation wherein the risks of military intervention for humanitarian purposes are mostly exported to the non-combatant population that should be protected, while the intervening state(s) seems to be more concerned with upholding its own morale and minimizing the risks at all costs.

As the research question implies, this analysis will focus on the existence of the norm itself, hence leaving aside its effectiveness or successfulness in executing interventions or establishing international peace. This choice is grounded in the very essence of norms in general: they delineate appropriate from inappropriate behavior. The line may be vague or blurred, it can change over time, but the line’s existence and importance do not necessarily depend upon

4

Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946-2009,’ Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4 (2010): 501-509.

5_{Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 3}rd_{ed. (Cambridge:}

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6 behavior that complies with either side of it. To render a norm altogether irrelevant because state behavior does or does not adhere to it, is to ignore the importance of its very existence. Put differently, to examine the genesis, significance, validity, and legitimacy of the Responsibility to Protect merely on the basis of its current merits or benefits would be inaccurate because “there is no perfect positive correlation between political effectiveness and normative validity. The legitimacy of structures, processes, and substantive efficiency do not necessarily coincide.”6 In fact, one might also consider the examination of a norm’s influence on state behavior – with one of the normative requirements being apparent state compliance – tautological reasoning. In this vein, scholars have distinguished between institutional rules and behavioral realizations. The present research about the norm construction process of RtP is primarily located in the first category.

1.3 Methodology

The research methods by which the significance and meaning of RtP will be analyzed are based upon social constructivist discourse analysis. This type of research in particular holds certain ontological and epistemological assumptions about social sciences and methodological tools which are of specific relevance to understanding the construction of RtP. At the outset, it is important to underline that norms should be distinguished from regulatory law or agreements. Although norms are correctly understood as “social rules,” they bear an important additional feature: they have a more ideational than written character. In other words, norms are more related to inner convictions than to externally enforceable rules. This does not signify that legal rules or agreements necessarily lack this component, but they are less dependent upon it since they can rely on established enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms in case of non-compliance. Norms on the contrary, are more or less prone to continuous contestation and changing interpretations. In general, they can be defined as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.”7 Norms can also be translated into judicial guidelines with accompanying accountability, enforcement and

6_{James G. March and Johan. P. Olsen, ‘Elaborating the “New Institutionalism,”’ in Oxford Handbook of Political}

Institutions, ed. Sarah A. Binder, R.A.W. Rhodes, and Bert A. Rockman, Oxford Handbooks Online, 2009,

http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548460-e-1 (accessed September 24, 2013).

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7 sanctioning mechanisms, but the belief in the legitimacy of a norm is in principle an independent matter. Norms are followed because they create expectations which influence actors’ perceptions of legitimate behavior, and not so much because they could be enforced.8 Therefore, the forthcoming analysis will concentrate on the discourse in a number of foundational texts and statements addressing RtP since they are considered to be the utmost reflections of continuities and discontinuities in the political perceptions of appropriate and inappropriate behavior.

In the name of “discourse analysis” numerous divergent researches with distinct research methods have been carried out, so there is no single unambiguous definition of what exactly constitutes a discourse analysis. One of the basic assumptions of all constructivist ideas about discourse is that language (textual or oral) is considered to be an essential constitutive element of social life. Hence, discourse does not merely reflect the outside world as it is independently, but it is actually an integral and crucial factor in creating and changing that world. Put differently, “with language, we create representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality.”9 Thus, discourse or language does not only describe or explain action, but it is action. Likewise, changing discourse patterns are important not because they are associated with change in practice, but because it is a change in – discursive – practice.

To reconstruct the process of RtP emergence and evolution, it is imperative to analyze closely the key documents and statements which reflect the actors’ perception of state sovereignty, humanitarian intervention and RtP. In essence one could say that enquiring the perception of a concept like RtP is in fact an attempt to trace the major changes in thinking about appropriate behavior in international relations with regard to the use of force. However, assessing and valuing what organizations, states, or individuals are really thinking is virtually impossible. As a consequence, it is necessary to search for the most accurate reflections of convictions. Public statements and official releases can be considered as such, since they reflect how organizations or states think about how one ought to behave. Definitions of norms in social sciences are various, but they at least all include an element of “oughtness:” the generally

8_{Ann Florini, ‘The Evolution of International Norms,’ International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 3 (1996): 365.} 9_{Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Philips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage Publications,}

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8 accepted perception of appropriate behavior.10 Therefore, the construction and perception of international norms can be analyzed via official and public sources.

Besides social constructionism and the study of discourse and language in general, discourse analysis within the field of International Relations requires some special attention. As outlined by Jennifer Milliken, discourse analysis in IR wishes to challenge the “scientism” of mainstream IR, encompassing positivist and rationalist attitudes. She distinguishes three theoretical commitments that can be found in general in IR discourse studies: 1) discourses as signifying systems which give meaning to reality, often in terms of relationships between subjects and binary oppositions; 2) discourse productivity which (re)creates subjects, authority, audiences, common sense, and policy practices; and 3) discourse as a play of practice which refers to legitimizing and shaping the implementation of practices which are historically contingent.11 These three commitments are in essence the more specified manifestations of the ontological and epistemological premises of social constructivist discourse analysis in general, as outlined above. It would take us beyond the scope of this research to elaborate upon all ontological and epistemological features of discourse analysis by IR scholars, but a number of its methodological tools need to be clarified since they will be used in this specific study of RtP.

Each of the three theoretical commitments of IR related discourse analyses holds distinct methodological strategies. Since the present research is concerned with the process of norm construction and the assessment of RtP’s significance for the past, present and future international normative framework, it is important to spend a few explanatory words on some particular strategies within the first two categories only. In the context of discourse as signifying systems, the analysis focuses on illuminating the background capacity for people to differentiate, identify, give meaning to, and relate things. The accompanying methods include predicate analysis and metaphorical analysis. Predicate analysis (or: linguistic analysis) is occupied with investigating language practices of predication in texts, such as treaties, diplomatic documents, public statements and press releases.12 Put differently, the analyst zooms in on the modifying linguistic aspects of texts (verbs, adverbs, adjectives), which attach certain features,

10_{Jack P. Gibbs, ‘Norms: The Problem of Definition and Classification,’ American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 5}

(1965): 586-594.

11

Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods,’

European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2 (1999): 229-230.

12_{Norman Fairclough, ‘Discourse and Text: Linguistic and Intertextual Analysis within Discourse Analysis,’}

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9 characteristics and capacities to subjects. Metaphorical analysis draws attention to recurring patterns of metaphorical language practices in a society to make sense of the world. Choices of metaphors in policy discourse structure the debate and create certain worldviews.13

The second category of discourse analysis within IR – discourse productivity – underlines the importance of uncovering how discourses constitute and changes relationships, authorities, policies, and practices. The accompanying strategy is directly concerned with understanding how a particular discourse put forward by elites produces policy practices. As said, this research will initially focus mostly on the formulation of the RtP, although matters of implementation will be touched upon when necessary. The third category of IR discourse analysis holds yet another set of distinctive methods (such as deconstruction, juxtaposition, subjugated knowledge, and the genealogical method),14 but considering the narrow focus on the construction process itself, they would not genuinely contribute to achieving the present research objective. Put differently, since the central research question focuses on the norm construction dynamics, and not so much on the norm implementation practices, the methodological starting point of inquiry will consist of identifying signification systems and norm productivity in the political discourse concerning RtP. Ultimately, these methodological strategies will provide the means to attain the prime research objective: to enhance the understanding of RtP’s norm construction process, and its significance for the political understanding of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. The interpretation of the analysis results will be organized according to a composite theoretical framework, to be addressed in the following paragraph. To be clear at the outset, it must be noted that the analysis in the following chapters will not function as a theory- or hypothesis testing research. Instead, the theory serves as the main supplier of the organizational framework for the interpretation and representation of the observation results after analyzing relevant discourses. As such, it occupies a crucial position in the analysis, although in varying degrees of explicitness.

13_{Greg Marston, ‘Metaphor, Morality and Myth: a Critical Discourse Analysis of Public Housing Policy in}

Queensland,’ Critical Social Policy 20, no. 3 (2000): 349-373.

14_{Linda A. Wood and Rolf O. Kroger, Doing Discourse Analysis: Methods for Studying Action in Talk and Text}

(Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2000), 92;

Lilie Chouliaraki, ‘Discourse Analysis,’ in The SAGE handbook of cultural analysis, ed. T. Bennet and J. Frow (London: Sage Publications, 2008), 689;

Jacques Derrida, Positions (London: Athlone, 1981), 41; and

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1.4 Theoretical background to norm construction

Besides the methodological toolkit, it is necessary to address concisely the theoretical background to the process of international norm construction in order to understand and assess the development and significance of the Responsibility to Protect. Whereas the methodology provides the research instruments, it is the theory that functions as the lens of interpretation by attributing meaning to conceptual findings. The raison d’être and construction of international norms have been theorized extensively in previous studies. This section will focus upon the social constructivist approach since it addresses exactly those aspects of international norms which are presently subject to analysis: the genesis, evolution and survival of RtP as an international norm.

The interest in the significance, meaning and influence of norms in national and international societies originally springs from sociology. In this field of research norms play a vital role in understanding and explaining causal relations and decision-making processes.15 More specifically, Sociological Institutionalism covers a wide range of theoretical contributions concerning the social structure of international society. Martha Finnemore, for instance, has pointed towards the beneficial potential of these sociological approaches for political science by underlining the central argument put forward by institutionalists, which says that globalization and the increasing dominance of Western culture brings important consequences for the structure of international relations: the rational purposive approach to governing; the organization of politics in Western-style bureaucratic states; and a strong inclination towards individualism and human rights.16 Building upon the work of Sociological Institutionalism, Finnemore herself developed a theory of international norm construction. The rationale for doing so lies primarily in the observation that conventional rationalist approaches to international politics cannot provide reasonable explanations for state behavior with regard to humanitarian intervention. The social constructivist alternative focuses on the (dynamic) normative context in which state practices occur because they shape and influence interests and decision-making processes.17

15

Jack P. Gibbs, ‘Norms: The Problem of Definition and Classification,’ American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 5 (1965): 586-594.

16_{Martha Finnemore, ‘Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,’}

International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996): 325-347.

17_{Martha Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention,’ in The Culture of National Security:}

Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996),

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11 Norm construction at the international level proceeds in various phases wherein the norm subsequently emerges, cascades, and internalizes. Together, they constitute a norm’s “lifecycle.” The first phase is often characterized as the stage of norm emergence. In this phase, the efforts of norm entrepreneurs are essential: they advocate the norm’s dispersion by persuading decision-makers to follow a specific principle. Entrepreneurs can act on individual basis, but they often rely upon their advocacy networks to function as organizational platforms for norm dispersion. The deliberative attempts of entrepreneurs to get a specific issue on the agenda often involve framing: “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”18 In short: the (re)interpretation and dramatization to change the way of talking about and understanding issues.

However, norms do not enter a normative vacuum: they face opposition by, and competition with firmly established norms which have created other understandings of appropriateness and interests. The collective modalities that tie together social objectives with accompanying permissions, prohibitions, and obligations are called normative institutions.19 The more the established norms are constitutive elements of the normative system or organizational culture, the harder it will be for a new norm to gain access to the stage and succeed in transforming the general understanding of appropriateness. Resistance may be expressed by the norm’s redefinition into a less pervasive and less powerful verbalization in official negotiations, or by defusing actions in the follow-up negotiations (compliance bargaining) and implementation phase.20 The normative context of the Responsibility to Protect consists for the largest part of the state sovereignty and non-intervention principles. These two are important features of the international system which direct the debates about the (im)possibilities of humanitarian intervention. Consequentially, the RtP needs to “battle” against or together with elements of the existing normative institution in order to survive.

18

Robert M. Entman, ‘Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,’ Journal of Communication 43, no. 4 (1993): 52.

19_{Sindhu Joseph, Carles Sierra, and Marco Schorlemmer, ‘A Coherence Based Framework for Institutional Agents,’}

in Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems III, ed. Jaime Simao Sichman and others (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 2008), 287-300.

20_{Ole Elgstrøm, ‘Norm Negotiations: the Construction of New Norms Regarding Gender and Development in EU}

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12 Once the norm acceptance has reached a certain threshold the norm enters a new dynamic. One way of defining what constitutes a threshold or tipping point is proposed by Ole Elgstrøm: “Once a norm has established a bureaucratic presence, further spread is facilitated.”21

This transition marks the beginning of the second phase: norm cascades. The extent of bureaucratic presence can be assessed via examining the number of new institutions or positions within existing organizations that concern the implementation of the norm, professional training of bureaucrats and the norm’s presence on the decision agenda. Hence, the accompanying question would be to what extent RtP is in- or decreasingly discernible in existing or new bureaucracies, institutions, and agendas? Whereas the former phase was characterized by (domestic or international) pressure or persuasion, in this phase states begin to adopt the new norm easier and more rapidly due to international socialization processes whereby norm breakers are induced to become norm followers. The reference to “socialization” invites an expansive amount of literature into this theoretical section, but it suffices to note here that socialization can be defined as the enduring internalization and domestic implementation of international norms through instrumental adaptation, strategic bargaining, consciousness-raising, argumentation, dialogue, persuasion, institutionalization, and habitualization.22 Other mechanisms at work which result in the change of social purposes are professional training, legalization, social movements, affective mechanisms such as “liking” and empathy, coercion, and face-to-face diplomacy.23

The analysis of RtP related discourse will demonstrate which and to what extent these norm cascade mechanisms are at work.

Next to socialization, the social constructivist literature on international norm development also refers to “peer pressure” to describe the process of norm diffusion across borders. Peer pressure occurs mainly in regionally integrated areas where countries “might tend to imitate one another […] this effect will be more important over time with an increase in the density of countries that have enacted legislation.”24 The motivations for states to give in to peer

21_{Elgstrøm, ‘Norm Negotiations,’ 460.}

22_{Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic}

Practices: Introduction’ in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 5.

23_{Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force (Ithaca: Cornell}

University Press, 2003), 142-161.

24_{Fransisco O. Ramirez, Yasemin Soysal and Suzanne Shanahan, ‘The Changing Logic of Political Citizenship:}

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13 pressure can vary, but in general they can be grouped together in three categories: legitimization, conformity and esteem. The need for legitimization holds both domestic as well as international aspects. Internationally, states care about their reputation, trust, and credibility because they can influence the effects of interstate interaction. Domestic legitimacy is obviously important since it contributes to compliance with national rules and laws. Conformity and esteem are concerned with the state’s relationship with its peer countries: states wish to conform to their social environments to proof that they belong to international society, and they follow certain norms because they wish to gain one’s pride or esteem. 25

In the light of RtP, peer pressure is especially interesting because humanitarian intervention is considered to be altruistic, charitable, or benevolent. Gains in terms of conventional Realpolitik profits or benefits are not primarily at stake when discussing humanitarian intervention. Instead, the prospect of gaining esteem, pride or admiration by peers will likely play a major role in RtP-discourse, although possibly – or likely – complemented by other geo-strategic considerations.

Finally, if the norm acquires a kind of taken-for-granted quality, one can speak of the final phase of norm construction: internalization. The question of compliance is no longer an issue, and the norm is frequently referred to and utilized in bureaucratic discourse and practice. Norm entrepreneurs – and others – can now condemn state behavior that conflicts with the norm on the basis of official agreements and policies. Put differently, the norm has reached “prescriptive status.”26

In the case of RtP, this would mean that every instance wherein states ask themselves or others how to (re)act to human rights atrocities within or outside their borders, the first way out would be the principle of the Responsibility to Protect. If RtP has become an internalized feature of international politics, it would perhaps not even be referred to literally that much, but it has then become a natural element of state conduct.

An important footnote to this theoretical understanding of international norm construction processes should be added in order to do justice to its complexity. So far, the lifecycle of international norms seems quite clear-cut in the sense that “good” transnational norms alter or displace “backward” local norms and practices. However, in reality new norms are rarely endorsed wholesale but modified and localized to better fit the existing beliefs and practices.

25

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’ International

Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 903.

26_{Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and Comparative}

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14 This norm circulation perspective deepens and enriches the norm life cycle theory because it allows for multiple sources, actors, issues, and contexts. For instance, global norms can have regional origins, while the feedback mechanism uses resistance by norm takers to redefine, modify, and qualify the initial norm.27 Such circulation can improve the prospects for global acceptance and increasing compliance by norm takers (primarily states). Hence, it is imperative to analyze not only the discourse in advance and during the construction of RtP, but it is of equal importance to analyze the discourse after the initial norm emergence has occurred in order to see to what extent and how RtP has been subject to contestation, localization and modification. Having considered the ideal-type life cycle of norms, one important question remains: why do some norms survive and others not? Why would the Responsibility to Protect sustain in political quarrels in competition with other norms about state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention? The norm evolution theory by Ann Florini provides an interesting three-tier analogy between genes and norms: first, genes and norms both work as instructional units guiding the organism’s behavior; secondly, genes and norms are both transmitted from one to another through inheritance or reproduction; and thirdly, norms and genes are both in competition with others that are somehow incompatible.28 This competition can end up in the absolute prevalence of the one and disappearance of the other, or the norms/genes can coexist for longer periods. The reproductive success (or: the norm’s survival) is dependent upon three variables: its prominence amidst competing norms, its interaction and coherence with existing norms, and beneficial or adverse environmental conditions.29 These influencing variables are likely to be more important during the early stages of the norm’s lifecycle but they continue to play a role in the follow-up negotiations and implementation as well. As noted before, the RtP is a relative young concept and therefore the norm survival variables will play an important role in the analysis.

Norm prominence focuses on the extent to which a norm is likely to gain foothold on the ground in the critical first phase of inception. Norm prominence is enhanced usually via the efforts of a norm entrepreneur. Some entrepreneurs may be better equipped, or have a broader audience which enhances the prominence or visibility, and thus the chance of success, for a

27

Amitav Acharya, ‘The R2P and Norm Diffusion: Towards A Framework of Norm Circulation,’ Global

Responsibility to Protect 5 (2013): 466-479.

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15 specific norm. Prominence is by nature a relative concept and therefore hard to “measure.” Existing norms – which are challenged by the new norm – are likely to be less explicitly present in written or oral language because they have become internalized, taken for granted, and therefore hard to discern. Easier to demonstrate however is a norm’s prominence over time: a norm may become more or less prominent in sequential international discourses. The prominence of RtP will therefore be established on the basis of its in- or decreasing prominence, instead of its relative prominence at a given time.

Norm survival is also dependent upon its coherence which refers to its internal quality and to the interaction with established norms. Norms do not exist on their own, but on a continuum of inter-subjectively shared understandings about appropriate behavior. New norms must therefore match with other existing rules in order to be perceived as legitimate. Whenever an incoherence or deviation from the existing normative institution is detected, agents “often need to choose between norm violation or belief revision.”30 The legitimacy of a new norm depends not only on coherence with other norms, but also on its internal quality. Similar to prominence, it is hard to assess the quality of a norm, but in general one could say that it depends upon the norm’s formulation (to what extent is the norm determinate and specific enough?) and its content (to what extent is the norm indeed congruent with the social purpose it attempts to advance?).

Finally, it must be noted at this point that – just as was the case with individual norms, entering a complex normative institution – normative frameworks must be understood in a wider context of competing arguments and motivations. The construction of norms and consequent state behavior is time and place contingent. A wide variety of environmental conditions constrains or promotes the norm development during all three stages of its lifecycle. These include for example structural conditions such as power distribution, levels of technology, and available resources. This third requirement of norm survival demonstrates that social constructivist thinking about international norms does not disregard realist assumptions about international order; they are indeed important constraints to political behavior and decision-making. However, they are insufficiently capable to explain the development of social rules about appropriate behavior, such as humanitarian intervention in this case because states are only rational actors up to a certain point. Florini – and others – also speak of “bounded rationality:”

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16 estimates about the results of different policy options or state behavior in a complex and ill-understood situations will be imperfect.31 Due to incomplete information and insufficient knowledge about certain causal relationships in reality, states tend to emulate other states instead of embarking upon cognitively difficult processes. These two processes are positively correlated: the higher the uncertainty, complexity, interdependence, and number of participants, the higher the likelihood that states pursue strategies of emulation rather than rational decisions.

1.5 Research blueprint

The questions that come to the fore after combining all these theoretical and methodological approaches to norm construction in IR research are concerned with clarifying the identities of the major norm entrepreneurs of RtP and norm leaders, RtP’s relationship with earlier established norms concerning appropriate state behavior; favorable or hostile environmental conditions; competing norms which possibly constrain the further development of RtP; and the extent of emulation incentives for state behavior with regard to RtP. In order to evaluate the emergence, current status and potential impact of RtP on perceptions of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention, these questions need to be addressed in a chronological manner. Put differently, since the constructivist approach to international norms focuses on the social power of the RtP discourse, this demands a linear research strategy. The sub-questions that logically follow from this can be formulated as follows:

1) What were the historical perceptions of state sovereignty and non-intervention within the existing normative institution prior to the Responsibility to Protect (2001)?

2) Why and how did the Responsibility to Protect principle emerge in international politics and what implications did it have for the existing normative institution?

3) To what extent did the Responsibility to Protect cascade and internalize in international political discourse after 2001?

As the critical reader might notice, this categorization indicates that the emergence phase of the norm lifecycle is being addressed separately in the second sub-question, whereas the cascading and internalization processes are merged together in the third sub-question. The rationale behind

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17 this choice is based on two considerations. First, the emergence process and accompanying mechanisms are reducible to a clear point in history, namely the publication of the ICISS report in 2001. With this publication and the subsequent inclusion of RtP in mainstream debates about state sovereignty and human security, the emergence process can be defined as more or less completed. In contrast, the cascading and internalization processes of the second and third stages are more diffuse, mingled and open-ended. In terms of the norm circulation and evolution theories, the post-2001 discourse analysis will have to demonstrate to what extent and how the norm developed after its emergence (i.e., to what extent it indeed cascaded and internalized or not). Hence, being a chronologically ordered analysis, it is intuitive logic to adopt a before-during-after organization of the research, which results in the three sub-questions as formulated above. The second consideration is somewhat more circumstantial and concerns the relative young age of RtP. Although the norm did not follow from thin air, its ultimate emergence in 2001 is only thirteen years before the current time of writing. Hypothetically, this reduces the likelihood of full-fledged cascading and internalization significantly. Therefore, the post-2001 discourse analysis will be focusing on still ongoing, or possibly by now completed, processes of norm circulation and evolution, whether they contribute to the norm cascading or internalization process.

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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL CONCEPTIONS OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The capital concerns about the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in current international politics deal are related to possible infringements of state sovereignty and non-intervention. The internal and external sovereignty of states (i.e., jurisdictional discretionary powers, and international equality of states and non-interference in domestic affairs) are continuously under pressure by a manifold of factors. These range from economic globalization and privatization, to technological advancements, ecological challenges, and new social movements.32 The Responsibility to Protect also bears a number of possible implications for the altering balance between state rights and human rights and can be placed in the broader field of the contemporary security dilemma. Before addressing the exact content of RtP and its consequences for the norms of state sovereignty and non-intervention, it is necessary to analyze past interpretations first. The sub-question for this chapter reads as follows: What were the historical perceptions of state sovereignty and non-intervention within the existing normative institution prior to the Responsibility to Protect (2001)?

The difficulty of determining customary law is the question of when and how a certain state practice acquires the required extent and frequency of occurrence before being considered an accepted international norm. Moreover, state practices are not the only source of customary law principles according to the International Court of Justice Statute: “The Court, whose function it is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it shall apply: […] judicial decisions and the teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law [emphasis added].”33 It follows from this statutory article that the most influential interpretations and explanations of scholars concerning state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention are essential determinants of customary law, next to the observance of state practice. As a result, the texts under scrutiny here

32_{Martha Finnemore and Judith L. Goldstein (editors), Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (New}

York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

33_{International Court of Justice, Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 38, paragraph 1(d), San}

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20 are a selection of the most authoritative and influential texts which reflect the historical perceptions of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. The selection is based on the most frequent references within the existing literature in the fields of International Law and International Relations. Since the concept of humanitarian intervention in essence comes down to the defense of humanity only in case of state “exploitation” of sovereignty at the expense of human rights, the analysis will first focus on the origins and developments of sovereignty, and thereafter on humanitarian intervention.

2.1 State sovereignty

The notion of sovereignty is regarded as one of the sacred concepts of the modern international order since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and it has acquired such a taken-for-granted status that the question of how, when and why this norm came about is not frequently posed. However, sovereignty is not a static fact, but a changing expression of how political power is or should be exercised.34 The term sovereignty has a long and troubled history and a wide variety of meanings and interpretations.35 Sovereignty is in essence a matter of legitimization of authority: to what extent is the governance of a certain territory and the provision of public goods executed by a legitimate ruler? One of the earliest publications that addressed sovereignty is Aristotle’s Politics in which he argues that there must be a supreme power existing in the state to maintain order (leaving aside how this power is assigned and to whom). In etymological terms this is confirmed by the fact that sovereignty stems from the Latin word “supra,” meaning “superior” or “above.” In ancient Rome, this understanding of state sovereignty was clearly expressed by the belief that “the will of the Prince has the force of law, since the people have transferred to him all their right and power.”36

How absolutist this may sound, a strong doctrine on sovereignty’s nature was constrained by two important factors: first, the belief in the superiority of divine or natural law over positive law; and secondly, the mixed form of state authority due to Church-State conflicts and the feudal system. In medieval times all people (whether governors or governed) were “subject to a universal legal order which reflected and derived its authority from the law of

34_{Joseph A. Camilleri, ‘Rethinking Sovereignty in a Shrinking, Fragmenting World,’ in Contending Sovereignties:}

Redefining Political Community, ed. R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz (Boulder: Lynne Riener Publishers,

1990), 13.

35_{James Crawford, The Creation of States on International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 26.} 36_{Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague:}

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21 God.”37

Also non-Western sources of political philosophy addressed the nature of state sovereignty, by underlining the both the rights and obligations of sovereign rulers. Turkish historian Tursun Bey for example, published in the early sixteenth century that sovereigns were required to be righteous, tolerant, moderate and wise. Only in return for those qualities, a sovereign ruler had the right to be obeyed by his subjects.38

Historians disagree about the exact time when sovereignty became solidified in political reality, but a few trends signal its increasing acceptance. The rationalization and secularization after the Renaissance movement (beginning in the 16th century), coupled with scientific discoveries, brought into motion a decline of both constraining factors. Moreover, secular authorities benefited considerably from the wish to bring all religious wars to an end – as officially determined in the peace treaties of Westphalia. Related to that is another, possibly even more critical element in the construction of the modern state system: the Reformation (1517). Internal developments in the Catholic Church contributed to the breakdown of Papal authority and the Church’s claim to universality. As a consequence, “the Reformation [..] helped to prepare the ground for secular absolutism.”39 In fact, the Reformation is by some believed to have been an indispensable contributing factor: “had the Reformation not occurred, a system of sovereign states would not have developed, at least not in the same form or in the same era as it did.”40

Although this claim is fairly counterfactual, the influence of religion on the formation of secular states can hardly be overestimated. The argument roughly comes down to identifying a strong correlation between the polities that experienced the Reformation (the Protestants) and the ones that had an interest in Westphalia. Next to this causal relationship, also the intrinsic character of Protestantism – including the challenge of central (Papal) authority – provided an essential impetus for the genesis of the Westphalian international order. This religious variable was probably not the sole, but at least a central cause.

37_{Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World}

(Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1992), 12.

38

Bernard Lewis, Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 54.

39_{Camilleri and Falk, The End of Sovereignty?, 14.}

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22 2.1.1 Prior to Westphalia: Jean Bodin

Although it is common practice to start analyses of state sovereignty with the Westphalian peace treaties of 1648, it is incorrect to assume that the theory and practice of sovereignty indeed started here. On the contrary, there are quite a number of treatises that addressed the nature of state sovereignty long before 1648. Also in practice one could perceive that the international system was already familiar with relations between states, although the nature and identity of political systems varied considerably. Monarchical interests, dynasticism, overlapping authorities, marital links, diffusion of personal and national interests, and multiple sovereignties are all accurate terms to describe the scene wherein the principle of state sovereignty gained an increasing strong foothold in the international domain.

One of the first explicit and expansive treatises addressing state sovereignty was published by French philosopher Jean Bodin. He is regularly considered the “father” of sovereignty as he provided the first systematic discussion of its nature.41 Against the background of a civil war, he argued that the only means to achieve order and circumvent anarchy was to grant unlimited power to a central authority. With unlimited power he meant absolute and perpetual legislative power, or “supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by law.”42 This may sound very absolute, and in a way it is indeed quite radical. However, there are two important constraints to this absolute power of the sovereign power: natural law (or: divine law) always overrides any other positive law, and the obligation to keep his “covenants” (agreements between the ruler and the ruled) with his subjects.43 With respect to the former, Bodin believed that all sovereigns were subject to “the laws of God, and of nature, and to many human laws common to all peoples.”44

The practical consequences of these limitations remain unclear, however.

Bodin mainly focuses upon the domestic aspects of state sovereignty and in this context frequently incurs the metaphor of a family. The father of a household symbolizes the sovereign authority of a state: “Thus the well-ordered family is a true image of the commonwealth, and domestic comparable with sovereign authority […] And just as the whole body enjoys health

41_{C.E. Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau (New York: Columbia University Press,}

1900), 13.

42

Jean Bodin, quoted in: Merriam, History of Sovereignty since Rousseau, 18.

43_{Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), 22.}

44_{Jean Bodin, quoted in: Donat Pharand, ‘Perspectives on Sovereignty in the Current Context: A Canadian}

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23 when every particular member performs its proper function, so all will be well with the commonwealth when families are properly regulated.”45 He then explains that fathers have absolute power over their wives, children and servants, and that these subjects have the obligation to obey. After repeatedly incurring this relationship between a father and his subjects, he adds an important note: “The affection of parents for their children is so strong, that the law has always rightly presumed that they will only do those things which are of benefit and honour to their children.”46 This latter conviction is important to understand how Bodin attaches virtues such as prudence and altruism to sovereign rulers.

Importantly, Bodin puts forward a clear delineation between two distinct objectives of the state: the preservation and perfection of a nation. It is only when a society (or a family) has secured or preserved its basic needs – such as adequate supply of water, fertile soil, strong fortification against possible attacks – that it can actively seek the society of wise and virtuous men. “When he has purged his soul of troubling passions and desires [required for self-preservation], he is free to give his attention to observing his fellows, and interests himself in the difference that age and temperament makes between them, the causes of the greatness of some and the failure of others, and the fluctuations of states.”47 Put differently, “before a man can govern others he must learn to govern himself.”48 One can observe a modest move towards external aspects of sovereignty here, but Bodin does not explicitly dwell upon this matter in more detail. Summarizing, the “word sovereignty was used by Bodin for a particular purpose, namely to place the ruler at the apex of a pyramid of authority.”49 Bodin’s contemporaries considered his views authoritative, as is shown by the fact that he was cited often and his book was used for lectures in Cambridge. By 1580, Six Livres was already well used in English political circles and it had significant impact on French and German theorists.50

45_{Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, 7.} 46

Ibid., 14.

47_{Ibid., 4.} 48_{Ibid., 9-10.} 49

Stéphane Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law: The Word Sovereignty in Bodin

and Vattel and the Myth of Westphalia (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004),122.

50_{George L. Mosse, ‘The Influence of Jean Bodin’s Republique on English Political Thought,’ Medievalia et}

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24 2.1.2 1648: The Peace of Westphalia

Bodin’s preoccupation with the exact meaning of state sovereignty paved the way for what is now often considered to be the start of the modern state system: the Peace of Westphalia. Indeed, “there may not be a greater orthodoxy than that according to which the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 […] constituted a paradigm shift in the development of the present state system. […] It is portrayed as a historical fact that Westphalia represented a new diplomatic arrangement.”51 Put in even stronger terms, “sovereignty was the crucial element in the peace treaties of Westphalia […which] enthroned and sanctified sovereigns, gave them powers domestically and independence externally.”52

The Peace of Westphalia consisted of several separate treaties, of which the following three were the most prominent: the Peace of Munster, which ended the Eighty Years War between Spain and the Dutch Republic (May 1648); the Treaty of Munster between the Holy Roman Emperor and France (October 1648); and the Treaty of Osnabruck, between the Holy Roman Emperor and Sweden (October 1648). The preceding negotiations were one of the longest and most complex in history, due to overlapping conflicts with different conceptual and chronological origins.

It would take us far beyond the scope of this research to reflect upon the precise content of the Congress of Westphalia, so it suffices to note here that the peace talks were mainly guided by conflicting geo-strategic and religious interests. As a consequence, the Peace of Westphalia is not only well-known with regard to “sovereignty” but also because 1648 is in hindsight often seen as the starting point for the separation of state and church in Europe. The religious divisions in Europe were not only caused by Catholics on the one hand versus Protestants on the other, but also within the Protestant countries, one could discern controversies between different factions. The internal divisions were probably severest in the Holy Roman Empire where religion – next to political, personal, constitutional, and economic motives – was used by numerous German princes across the Empire to enforce their authority. In order to end the devastating impact of religious disagreements within and between states, it was decided to devolve religious authority to the sub-national level. This principle had been issued before in the Treaty of Augsburg (1555) and determined that religious disputes were not to be valid reasons for waging war: “in order to bring peace to the Holy Roman Empire […] let neither his Imperial Majesty nor the Electors,

51_{Beaulac, The Power of Language in the Making of International Law, 67.}

52_{Mark W. Janis, ‘Sovereignty and International Law: Hobbes and Grotius,’ in Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya, ed.}

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25 Princes, etc., do any violence or harm to any estate of the empire on the account of the Augsburg Confession, but let them enjoy their religious belief.”53

In general, power was divided among provincial or noble assemblies, self-governing cities, and corporate bodies of all kinds.54 It was not an exception that religious concerns transcended state borders, such as the Protestant diplomatic pressure on behalf of co-believers.55 However, the signatures under the 1648 peace treaties did by no means put an end to all these practices. The multilateral Congress did indeed provide an example of how future diplomatic conferences would look like, but it would take many years before the idea of state sovereignty with national governments as the sole authoritative entities in international relations would be an internalized feature of the international system.

In the Dutch Republic for instance, the provinces were preoccupied with maintaining their share of authority, instead of centralizing all powers to the political capital.56 Furthermore, the central power of the Holy Roman Emperor was seriously constrained to the benefit of the separate constituent entities of the Empire. The maintenance of provincial sovereignty was untenable in the end, but it illustrates how national state sovereignty has not been as “natural” as it is currently perceived. Importantly, although the notion of European balance of power politics was already visible before 1648, it was after the peace treaties of Westphalia that it became an accepted core element in foreign policy strategies.

This sovereignty did not only bring a certain right to local rulers to decide upon internal matters, but the treaty also assigned an important obligation to the sovereign rulers: the responsibility to protect certain minimum safety standards for all three officially recognized sects – the Calvinist, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic Christians – and the return of all religious properties to the rightful owners.57 This illustrates that already in the treaties of Westphalia – normally conceived as the bedrock of sacrosanct sovereignty and non-intervention –

53

Religious Peace of Augsburg, 1555, ed. E. Reich, London, 1905,

http://pages.uoregon.edu/sshoemak/323/texts/augsburg.htm (accessed October 19, 2013).

54_{M.S. Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919 (New York: Longman Publishing, 1993), ix.} 55_{Jeremy Black, European International Relations 1648-1815 (New York: Palgrave , 2002), 19.}

56

Gees van der Plaat, ‘De Vrede van Munster in de historiografie,’ in 1648. De Vrede van Munster, Handelingen van het herdenkingscongres te Nijmegen en Kleef, 28-30 augustus 1996 (Hilversum: Verloren, 1997), 42; S. Groenveld, ‘Unie, religie en militie. Binnenlandse verhoudingen in de Nederlandse Republiek voor en na de Munsterse Vrede,’ in 1648. De Vrede van Munster, Handelingen van het herdenkingscongres te Nijmegen en Kleef, 28-30 augustus 1996 (Hilversum: Verloren, 1997), 67-87.

57_{Roderick M. Hills, ‘Subnational Norms in the New Constitutional Order: Federalism. Federalism as Westphalian}

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26 responsibility to protect was directly linked to sovereignty. This responsibility did not only count for the inhabitants with which the authority in question could identify (the official religion in this case), but especially for the minorities. In other words, despite the “otherness” of certain religious groups, the ruler had an undisputed task of protecting all inhabitants of the territory. The idea that Westphalian state sovereignty was basically a green card for rulers to do as they deemed right or necessary, is an oversimplified interpretation of the intentions of the Peace of Westphalia. As Stephen Krasner put it in strong terms: “There has never been some golden age of the Westphalian state. The Westphalian model has never been more than a reference point or a convention; it has never been some deeply confining structure from which actors could not escape.”58 Hence, it is open to doubt to what extent the widely established conviction that the Peace of Westphalia indeed marked a transition from the Old to the New World. The treaty texts actually contained no explicit references to state sovereignty or non-intervention. Anyone who analyses the treaties in detail comes away disappointed if one searches for a clear statement or definition of the sovereignty principle.59 Furthermore, the practice of international relations and the political power divisions on the European continent before and after 1648 are better characterized as a continuous gradual process than as a genuine break with the past. 60

Alternatively, it can be argued that there was indeed an important innovative aspect of the Congress of Westphalia, which was perhaps not so much a widespread acceptance of state sovereignty and non-intervention (as is often portrayed nowadays), but the dawning of multilateral diplomatic practices. Before Westphalia, diplomacy was primarily exercised within bilateral relationships. Although in practice the actual negotiations in Munster and Osnabruck were still bilateral, it was for the first time that all parties were at least gathered together on the same site.61 The number of nationalities present during the Congress of Westphalia and the extent to which (in)formal exchanges of thoughts were practiced, provided a cautious base for the future of European diplomacy. Moreover, despite the bilateral character of the treaties, there

58

Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia,’ International Security 20, no. 3 (1996): 115.

59_{Derek Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty,’ The International History}

Review 21, 3 (1999): 569.

60

Andreas Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,’ International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 251-287.

61_{S. Groenveld, Unie – Bestand – Vrede. Drie fundamentele wetten van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden}

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27 was a novel awareness that the accorded peace could only prosper when warring neighbors also ended their conflicts.62

All in all, the significance of the treaties of Westphalia lies primarily in the transformation from de facto into de jure multilateral recognition of state sovereignty. Discourse analysis shows that the texts proper did not genuinely propose groundbreaking ideas about state sovereignty and intervention, but they did function as important reference points in the current perception of the interstate system. At the same time, the Westphalian arrangements did not erase the struggles for authority and executive powers in sub-national regions described above. Furthermore, the agreement provided extensive fruit for thought for future debates about state sovereignty.

2.1.3 Post-Westphalian perceptions

The first notable contribution to the state sovereignty debate after the Peace of Westphalia was provided by Thomas Hobbes. Three years after the Westphalian settlements, he published The Leviathan, which has become one of the most essential must-reads within IR. He sides with Jean Bodin in his absolute understanding of state power, but he does not follow Bodin’s natural law constraints to central authorities. For Hobbes, the omnipotent sovereign is the sole credible alternative for disorder and anarchy. The only law of nature that Hobbes defines, dictates that each man should choose the most advantageous manner of self-preservation, whether peaceful or forceful.63 In order to be able to preserve themselves best, men enter into civil society and place their will at the disposal of one man or a body of men (the sovereign). In Leviathan, chapter 17, par. 112, Hobbes uses the metaphor of a father who rules his children. As was noted above, this family metaphor can also be found in Aristotle’s and Bodin’s perceptions of sovereignty. Hobbes underlines that this does not preclude the children’s (or subjects’) right to resist. It follows that the sovereign is not irresistible, but simply strong enough to convince the subjects that they would lose more than they would gain by resistance. Similar to Bodin, Hobbes argues that limited sovereignty is a contradiction in terms since any supposed sovereign cannot be limited by

62

Vrede van Munster 1648-1998. Tractaat van ‘een aengename, goede en oprechte Vrede’ (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1998), 25.

63_{Ian M. Wilson, The Influence of Hobbes and Locke in the shaping of the concept of sovereignty in eighteenth}

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28 another institution because the latter would then in fact be superior in the last resort, hence the true sovereign.

In response to Hobbes’ absolute explanation of sovereignty, John Locke proposed a reinterpretation of natural law as a claim to inalienable human rights (e.g. life, liberty and estate) which were to be protected by state and society. These rights were effectively constraining the authority of the state since the legislative and executive rights of the state were conditional on its performance – that is, the preservation of human rights.64 Locke’s interpretation of the relationship between people and governors is based upon the idea of tacit consent: the government holds its authority based on people’s trust; the people are the trustors, the government the trustees.65 Hence, Locke stipulates that the government framework shall always remain under control of the propertied in order to prevent arbitrary government.66

Also Locke’s discourse contains references to the family metaphor, but instead of confirming the similarities between patriarchal and governmental authority, he argues that parental powers are limited to the child’s welfare and education. Beyond that, a parent’s right does not extend to the child’s life and property. Therefore, Locke concludes, the family model cannot serve as a model for absolute civil authority. Thus, compared to Bodin and Hobbes’s accounts, Locke’s understanding of sovereignty was less absolute: the people’s consent by which the government rules is a genuine limitation on its legislative power, in addition to the executive limitation due to the unequal balance of power. “A government to which the people consent is truly limited by that consent and is therefore subject to the judgment of the people. The people in their turn are subject to the judgment of the government through its laws. Whether, therefore, their mutual relationship be one of trust or compact, each is judge of the other, and therefore neither is sovereign.”67

So far, the debates focused primarily on the domestic aspects of state sovereignty, but Swiss philosopher and diplomat Emer de Vattel (1714-1767) was one of the first to address the external aspects of state sovereignty explicitly. He regarded the state sovereignty from an international perspective by focusing on the consequences of state sovereignty for international

64

J. Dunne, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 87-164.

65_{John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 208}

http://site.ebrary.com/lib/ugroningen/docDetail.action?docID=10170809 (accessed November 3, 2013).

66

C.B. Macpherson, Introduction to Second Treatise of Government, by John Locke (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), xx.

67_{Ian M. Wilson, The Influence of Hobbes and Locke in the shaping of the concept of sovereignty in eighteenth}