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The handle https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3176462 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.
Author: Abubakar, A.
Title: Bureaucratic politics in neopatrimonial settings: types of appointment and their implications in Ghana
iv | P a g e SUMMARY
A compelling number of consequential dynamics within the civil service are perceived to fundamentally underpin the attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats, and this remains vital within the arena of bureaucratic politics, the concern of this study. Most extant bureaucratic studies or literature usually addresses subjects related to the incidence of patronage, the merit- principle, complementarity and bureaucratic reform or efficiency, etc. While there exist abundant scholarly discussions usually focused on these subjects, there remain some critical gaps. One of such gaps is related to a comprehensive inquiry into the consequences of types of bureaucrats’ appointments. To close this gap, this study sought to ascertain the implications of types of bureaucrats’ appointments on the attitude and behaviour of civil servants. Precisely, this study’s omnibus hypothesis stipulates that the type of bureaucrats’ appointment in the civil service shapes attitudes and behaviour.
To empirically test this argument, the study methodologically adopts a mixed-method approach and combines data from a survey of bureaucrats (N=274) with qualitative in-depth interviews with bureaucrats, principals, development practitioners and experts within and without the bureaucracy. This was aimed at establishing the extent to which bureaucrats’ type of appointment influences their attitude and behaviour. Specifically, the study sought to determine whether bureaucrats appointed through merit demonstrate more autonomous attitudes in the bureaucracy; patronage-based appointees exhibit more loyalty to their patrons and hybrid appointed bureaucrats, more responsiveness? Answers to these questions were aimed at appreciating the influence of the type of bureaucrats’ appointment on their attitudes and behaviour within the bureaucracy.
The results of the analyses conducted in this study showed a positive association between merit-based appointees and bureaucratic autonomy, thus supporting our initial hypothesis. The findings, however, seem to impugn mainstream discourses regarding the
v | P a g e underlying impact of the merit processes on bureaucrats’ autonomy. In general, there has been
a tendency of both academics and policy-makers to assume that merit-based appointments considerably guarantee autonomous attitudes and behaviour. However, the findings of this study show that regardless of how meritoriously a bureaucrat is appointed, his/her autonomy is limited due to a myriad of conflating factors espoused in this thesis.
Secondly, the study found that patronage-based appointments were positively associated with a bureaucrats’ sense of loyalty whilst hybrid appointments were found to be positively associated with responsiveness. Indeed, whilst the general theoretical predictions are that patronage considerations considerably impact loyalty and responsiveness, the findings of this research suggest that such loyalties or political responsiveness are not absolute, due to other regulatory mechanisms such as legal, constitutional, administrative fiats and competing interests. Furthermore, these findings support the class of scholars who call into question the orthodox view in bureaucratic politics that patronage is automatically negative because this study finds otherwise. The study’s findings consequently add to discussions on the need to consider not only the extent to which patronage is dispensed but where, how, why and under what circumstances it is deployed. In doing so, the study moves beyond the monistic conception of patronage as being negative to encompass its beneficial outcomes as argued by Grindle (2012), McDonnell (2017) and Toral (2019).
On the extent to which demographical variables such as gender, age, type of institution and level of appointment impact autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness, the various hierarchical linear regressions conducted reveal that only level of appointment and type of bureaucratic institution were found to be significantly impactful to autonomy and loyalty respectively. Besides, the key interviews conducted among purposively selected stakeholders such as politicians, experts, academics and bureaucrats complemented the findings from the quantitative analysis, especially regarding the extent of bureaucrats’ autonomy, loyalty and responsiveness. Regarding the role of networks (social, political and economic) in impacting
vi | P a g e bureaucrats’ attitudes and behaviour, the study found that the networks that bureaucrats belong
to have appreciable levels of influence over their attitudes and behaviour. These findings have wider ramifications for the country since all government development agenda are contingent on the attitudes and behaviour of bureaucrats who are tasked with their efficient and responsive implementation.
The autonomy of bureaucrats may insulate the civil service from parochial or political interests whilst bureaucratic loyalty when harnessed appropriately, may also lead to the effective implementation of the principal’s agenda even in the face of impediments. As cited in this thesis, Rasul & Rogger (2013) and Rasul, Rogger & Williams (2017) found that allowing greater bureaucratic autonomy positively impacts bureaucrats’ attitudes and efficiency than strict monitoring and provision of incentives. Similarly, high levels of bureaucrats’ responsiveness enhance efficiency. In contrast, a completely subjugated bureaucrat, through patronage – loyalty arrangements, may exacerbate bureaucratic deficiencies and corruption which would have negative implications for service delivery and development programmes.
In the end, by way of reform, the study proposes the need to consider legal- constitutional and policy measures or amendments that would formally accommodate appointment practices that go beyond the merit-principle or regime to include patronage or hybrid considerations. This study supports Grindle (2012), McDonnell (2017) and Toral’s (2019) argument that when harnessed appropriately, patronage can be beneficial to enhancing bureaucratic efficiency. Given the current political and bureaucratic dynamics and reconciling it with the findings of this study, it is concluded that if the Ghanaian bureaucratic system continues to insist on pure merit-based appointments devoid of patronage considerations, such a regime will remain utopian and less expedient. Therefore, political principals and policy-makers may have to exercise caution by re-examining the repercussions of stipulating only a merit appointment regime at the theoretical level whilst at the practical level, patronage factors pervasively play key roles through subtle and overt backdoor schemes.
