When moral rebels are resented: Can
imperfection increase their likeability?
Hanna Rietz
II
When moral rebels are resented: Can
imperfection increase their likeability?
Hanna Rietz
Master Thesis
Completion date:
January 15, 2018
Author:
First Supervisor:
Second Supervisor:
Hanna Rietz (S3202968)
Dr. J.W. Bolderdijk
Dr. M.C. Leliveld
h.rietz@student.rug.nl
+4915128720596
j.w.bolderdijk@rug.nl
m.c.leliveld@rug.nl
Herrenstraße 28a
Nettelbosje 2
Nettelbosje 2
79232, March
9747 AE, Groningen
9747 AE, Groningen
Germany
The Netherlands
The Netherlands
University of Groningen Faculty of Business and Economics
III
Preface
IV
Abstract
As climate change and resource depletion accelerate, it is crucial that consumers adopt more sustainable consumption habits. A challenge for this development is that consumers who deviate from the norm out of moral principles are ridiculed and mocked in certain situations. This is due to the moral threat that is posed by a rebel to the self-concept of observers. This threat is mainly triggered by the assumption of observers that moral rebels judge others who do not behave as moral as they do. This study suggests that negative reactions to moral rebels may not occur when moral rebels admit that they are not perfect themselves. By doing so it is proposed that the moral rebel is implicitly denying judgment of others. A between-subjects design is used to test this assumption by confronting participants with a moral rebel who admits that she is not perfect herself. The results show that anticipated moral reproach cannot be corrected by implicitly denying judgement. However, imperfection did lead to a slight increase in the liking of the imperfect moral rebel. This, process is however not mediated by imagined judgement but by another, yet unknown, factor.
V
Table of Contents
1 Introduction ... 1 2 Theoretical Framework ... 2 2.1 Literature Review ... 22.1.1 Social Risks of Sustainable Consumption ... 2
2.1.2 Anticipated Moral Reproach as Cause of Resentment... 3
2.1.3 The Role of Imperfection in Removing Anticipated Moral Reproach ... 3
2.2 Hypotheses and Conceptual Model ... 5
2.2.1 Reaction to Moral Rebels vs. Self-Interested Rebels ... 5
2.2.2 The Mediating Effect of Anticipated Moral Reproach ... 5
2.2.3 The Effect of Imperfection... 5
2.2.4 Conceptual Model ... 6
3 Methodology ... 6
3.1 Study Procedure and Context ... 7
3.2 Manipulation of the Independent Variables ... 7
3.3 Measurement of the Dependent Variables ... 9
3.4 Attention and Manipulation Check ... 9
3.5 Participants ... 10
4 Results ... 10
4.1 Anticipated Moral Reproach ... 11
4.2 Do-Gooder Derogation ... 12
4.3 Mediation Analysis ... 13
5 Discussion ... 14
5.1 Findings ... 14
5.2 Limitations ... 16
5.3 Future Research Ideas ... 17
5.4 Implications ... 18
APPENDIX A ... 22
VI
Table of Figures
Figure 1 Conceptual Model ... 6
Figure 2 Condition 1: Self-interested justification x imperfection absent ... 8
Figure 3 Condition 2: Moral justification x imperfection absent ... 8
Figure 4 Condition 3: Moral justification x imperfection present ... 9
Figure 5 Means and 95% confidence intervals of anticipated moral reproach. ... 11
1
1 Introduction
As climate accelerates, the planet will face a dark future if no dramatic changes are undertaken. In order to secure resources for future generations, it is crucial to adopt more sustainable consumption habits. A big issue within sustainability is meat consumption which is one of the major drivers of climate change (Hedenus, Wirsenius & Johansson, 2014) and heavily depletes the scarce resources of our planet. Unsustainable consumption will strain the environment even more in the future as the world’s population is continuing to grow rapidly. Consumers who adopt a more sustainable lifestyle before the majority does, so-called rebels, could play an important role in spreading more sustainable consumption habits. Rebels are among the first people who deviate from the societal norm and can thereby set an example for others. Furthermore, rebels expose others to sustainable innovations and consumption alternatives. With increased exposure it is also more likely that peers adopt the same sustainable consumption behavior (Bollinger & Gillingham, 2012). Moreover, moral rebels can inspire others to follow their behavior by making ethical consumption a widely accepted norm in society (Starr, 2009).
Based on this reasoning, vegetarians could act as catalysts of change and inspire other people to adopt a more sustainable diet. However, moral rebels are under certain circumstances put down for their deviant behavior. Vegetarians, for example, are often an object of ridicule for not eating meat. At first sight, it might appear contradictory that rebels do not evoke admiration for sustainable consumption. In general, people would agree that sustainable behavior should be pursued, which is why one would enthusiastically share positive behavior in public. However, it has been observed that consuming in a way that is above the societal norm evokes defensive behavior. The latter phenomenon, called do-gooder derogation, occurs when one feels threatened by individuals that appear to be morally superior (Cramwinckel, van den Bos & van Dijk, 2015). Observers imagine that the rebel would judge them which threatens their self-concept (O’Connor & Monin, 2016). Consequently, observers denigrate the rebel to restore their threatened self-concept. Ironically, it has been found that vegetarians consider meat eaters to be less immoral than the latter think (Monin, 2007). Since anticipated moral reproach is the main trigger of do-gooder derogation it is important to signal to observers that their fear is based on distorted assumptions.
2 rebels is more positive when they use self-interested instead of moral argumentation. However, this is not a viable solution for rebels who do not want to be derogated but who also do not want conceal their true motives. Therefore, this study proposes a new approach that can potentially also make rebels who are arguing on moral grounds more likeable.
This research is of significant relevance for theory related to do-gooder derogation since it adds how to prevent do-gooder derogation. It must be investigated how moral rebels can be agents of societal change. The findings provide important knowledge on how to promote more sustainable diets by using moral rebels as catalysts of change. Moreover, practical implications from this research can identify how negative reactions to rebels in social encounters could be prevented. Consequently, rebels could help in shifting society towards a more sustainable future.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Literature Review
2.1.1 Social Risks of Sustainable Consumption
Generally, societies around the world agree that its members should act morally. The group of people who acts according to societal norms is referred to as ‘observers’ in this study. The minority whose behavior is above social norms is referred to as ‘rebels’. While moral rebels can evoke inspiration and admiration, also negative responses can be observed as some moral rebels are mocked and put down for their behavior. This phenomenon of putting down moral rebels is called do-gooder derogation. Monin (2007) defined do-gooder derogation as the action of denying the capability of the rebel in domains other than morality. Rebels are put down by observers for example for being unrealistic, lacking common sense or for deceiving themselves. This phenomenon has also been observed in the domain of vegetarianism. In a study by Minson and Monin (2012) meat eaters considered vegetarians to be more moral while at the same time associating vegetarians with negative traits such as weak or stupid.
3 participants to confederates that refused to eat meat (Cramwinckel, van Dijk, Scheepers & van den Bos, 2013). The refusal was either due to moral (“I don’t eat meat because I think it is immoral.”) or self-interested reasons (“I don’t eat meat because I don’t like the taste of it.”). Subsequently, participants expressed higher disliking when the refusal was due to moral reasons. Thus, observers respond more negatively to moral rebels than to rebels acting on self-interested grounds (Cramwinckel et al., 2013).
Another factor influencing the extent of do-gooder derogation is the degree of involvement of the observer (Monin, Sawyer & Marquez, 2008). People reject moral rebels when they are involved in the same moral decision as the rebel. The rebel acts more moral than the observer, who had the same choice, which indirectly makes observers imply that they are morally inferior. Therefore, the confrontation with vegetarians is particularly stinging as on has every day the possibility of reducing their own meat consumption.
2.1.2 Anticipated Moral Reproach as Cause of Resentment
The assumption that moral behavior is universal implies judgement, that everybody who does not behave as the rebel does, acts somewhat unmoral. Thus, knowing about the mere existence of a rebel already makes observers imply that their own behavior is considered unmoral since they do not comply with rebel’s standards (Cramwinckel et al., 2013). The main trigger of the threat to the self-concept is therefore the expectation of the observer to be judged by the rebel, which is also called anticipated moral reproach. This is confirmed by O’Connor and Monin (2016) who found that derogation is caused by the imagined reproach by the rebel even when observers do not meet the rebel in person. Minson and Monin (2012) found that only imagining what vegetarians would think of them is already sufficient to make meat eaters evaluate vegetarians more negatively. Thus, the statement of not eating meat due to animal welfare implies unintentionally that vegetarians think that meat eaters do not care about the rights of animals. The threat to the self-concept is thus triggered by the imagination of the vegetarian’s judgement about meat eaters (Monin, 2007). It can therefore be said, that the focus during this mental process is on the moral rebel and not one’s own morality. To find a strategy that can prevent do-gooder derogation it is therefore crucial to find out how to neutralize the fear of being judged.
2.1.3 The Role of Imperfection in Removing Anticipated Moral Reproach
4 and Horton (2013) argue that negative evaluation is caused by the fear of being negatively assessed for being mediocre by the extraordinary person. Moreover, people fear to be judged by the superior person for not having the same capabilities resulting in the fear of not being accepted. An imperfection, such as “an occasional blunder” can influence inter-personal evaluation and increase the likeability of highly intelligent and competent persons by making them appear less distant (Aronson, Willerman & Floyd, 1966 and Helmreich, Aronson & LeFan, 1970). Aronson and colleagues (1966) examined whether participants would evaluate other people more positively when they accidentally spill a cup of coffee. This blunder should signal the participants that their counterpart is not perfect. As a result, participants evaluated the person with superior capabilities more positively. It is suggested the extraordinary person seems less distant to the observer (Aronson et al., 1966). Montoya and Horton (2013) explain the difference in evaluation with a change in the observer’s expected evaluation by the highly intelligent person. It is proposed that observers expect to be more positively evaluated when the superior person shows that he or she is not perfect. Since observers do not feel like they are being judged for being less intelligence, they can also express higher liking regarding the extraordinary person. In sum, the imperfection brings the observer and the outstanding person back on a similar level, which is why the observer does not feel judged for being less intelligent.
Imperfection could also help in the moral domain in increasing an outstanding person’s (i.e. the moral rebel’s) likeability. If consistent with the research conducted in the domain of intelligence, observers would react more positively to a moral rebel who is showing an imperfection. To eliminate or at least minimize do-gooder derogation, anticipated moral reproach has to be removed. Observers should thus not feel like they are being judged by the rebel. Imperfection could be an implicit way of denying judgement. Instead of directly telling observers that they are not being judged, which might put them off even more, imperfection is a more subtle and implicit way of denying judgement. By admitting not to be perfect, the moral rebel puts him or herself on a similar level as the observer. As the perceived moral gap between the rebel and the observer becomes smaller, the latter has less reason to feel judged by the rebel for being morally imperfect. Like in the domain of intelligence the moral rebel becomes subsequently more approachable to observers. Putting it simple, this is thus a subtle way of saying to observers “I am not perfect myself. So I also have no reason to judge others for not being perfect”.
5 feel a threat to their self-concept which is why they have no need to derogate the moral rebel. As a result, the likeability of the imperfect moral rebel increases.
2.2 Hypotheses and Conceptual Model
2.2.1 Reaction to Moral Rebels vs. Self-Interested Rebels
The motives that rebels employ in their reasoning are an important determinant of the extent of do-gooder derogation. The threat to one’s moral self-concept is triggered more by moral rebels than by self-interested rebels (Cramwinckel et al., 2013). This is due to the desire of humans to appear moral, which is threatened by individuals that appear to be morally superior (Cramwinckel, et al., 2015). Thus, especially the comparison in the moral domain threatens the self-concept. However, there is no direct comparison to be drawn to the observer’s morality when a rebel acts out of self-interested reasons. Therefore, it is expected that participants will feel greater anticipated reproach when being confronted with a moral rebel. As a result, the moral vegetarian is also more likely to be derogated.
H1: Anticipated moral reproach and derogation is higher when being exposed to a moral rather than a self-interested rebel.
2.2.2 The Mediating Effect of Anticipated Moral Reproach
Monin (2007) found that the threat to the self-concept is caused by the anticipation of the moral rebel’s judgment. When being exposed to a rebel, who seems to do better in the moral domain, observers imagine what the rebel would think about them and their behavior. Observers expect the moral rebel to condemn them if he or she knew how they behaved. To restore the threatened self-concept, the observer derogates the rebel. It is therefore predicted that anticipated moral reproach mediates the effect of the type of rebel on the extent of do-gooder derogation.
H2: Anticipated moral reproach mediates the effect of the type of rebel on do-gooder derogation.
2.2.3 The Effect of Imperfection
6 moral reproach is neutralized, the observer does not feel threatened when imperfection is present leading to a positive evaluation of the moral rebel. However, when imperfection is absent the perceiver is expected to feel threatened since their morality is implicitly questioned. Thus, anticipated moral reproach is high unless when moral rebels implicitly signal that they do not judge others. This results in the following hypothesis:
H3: Imperfection decreases observer’s anticipated moral reproach by the moral rebel and consequently decreases do-gooder derogation.
2.2.4 Conceptual Model
In sum, imperfections could be used as a way to decrease the threat of anticipated moral reproach and could thereby eliminate moral do-gooder derogation. Since moral rebels present a higher threat to the self-concept compared to self-interested rebels, it is expected that imperfections are useful in decreasing imagined judgment in the moral domain and consequently eliminate do-gooder derogation. Figure 1 depicts this relationship between the rebel’s justification, imperfection, anticipated moral reproach, and do-gooder derogation.
Figure 1 Conceptual Model
3 Methodology
7 (Cramwinckel et al., 2013). Throughout the experiment, participant’s anticipated moral reproach and their extent of do-gooder derogation were measured.
The study was conducted between November 27th and December 12th 2017 in the university’s
virtual reality lab that can seat a maximum of 19 people. The data were collected together with three other master thesis students to recruit a sufficient number of participants. Participants were recruited through the university’s research lab and the researchers’ personal network. The questionnaire that was administered during the study can be found in appendix A.
3.1 Study Procedure and Context
To begin with, the participants were asked to taste a snack which contains pork. Furthermore, they were explicitly told that they do not have to taste the snack, giving them the opportunity to refuse to taste the pork. The context of vegetarianism was chosen as the choice of meat consumption creates a high degree of involvement among participants. People are more likely to reject moral rebels when they are involved in the same moral decision as the rebel (Monin et al., 2008). Since participants are given the same choice as the moral rebel, this context should present a sufficient level of threat to participants when being confronted later on in the study with the refusal of the rebel.
Subsequently, a movie was shown as part of the study of another master student who investigates the effect of awe on do-gooder derogation.1 After having watched the movie, the
participants were confronted with a fictitious vegetarian, called Mary, who refused to eat the snack that the participant had tasted before. Depending on the condition that participants were randomly allocated to, they read one out of three statements given by Mary. After the confrontation participants stated to which extent they anticipate to be judged by Mary. Moreover, participants evaluated her character on several dimensions.
3.2 Manipulation of the Independent Variables
The type of justification that Mary uses to explain why she refused to taste the snack and imperfection was manipulated by a statement that the participants were asked to read carefully. In the first condition, participants read a statement Mary in which she justifies the refusal with a self-interested reason. This reason not to eat meat is unrelated to the moral domain and merely based on her personal preference. Imperfection was absent in this condition which is why Mary merely states her justification for the refusal. Figure 2 shows the statement that participants read in the first condition.
1 Awe is not controlled for in the subsequent analysis since it is not a significant covariate regarding anticipated
8 Figure 2 Condition 1: Self-interested justification x imperfection absent
In the second condition, participants were confronted with moral Mary (moral x imperfection absent) who explains that she refuses to eat meat due to moral reasons. The imperfection statement was left out in this condition. The text and picture that participants saw can be found in figure 3.
Figure 3 Condition 2: Moral justification x imperfection absent
9 Figure 4 Condition 3: Moral justification x imperfection present
3.3 Measurement of the Dependent Variables
To measure participant’s anticipated moral reproach, participants had to complete the following sentences: “If Mary saw what I normally eat, she would think I am…”, “Most vegetarians think that most non-vegetarians are…” (on a 7-point scale ranging from extremely immoral to extremely moral) (Minson & Monin, 2012). The two items that measure anticipated moral reproach were averaged to form one scale in the subsequent analysis (α = .64, M = 3.08, SD = 1.14). While this is a rather low Cronbach’s α, it was considered as indicating sufficient reliability to work with a combined scale of anticipated moral reproach in the subsequent analysis. Other reputable papers (Minson & Monin, 2012 and Cramwinckel et al., 2013) have been working with similar α levels.
Monin and colleagues (2008) measure the degree of derogation of vegetarians by observing how meat eaters evaluate vegetarians on several traits. Based on that, the participants in the present study rated Mary using a ten 7-point scale on the following traits: stupid – intelligent, weak – strong, insecure – confident, passive – active, cruel – kind, awful – nice, cold – warm, dishonest – honest, unfair – fair, unpleasant – pleasant, dependent – independent, stingy – generous, immature – mature, and low self-esteem – high self-esteem. Moreover, participants indicated whether they would like the Mary as a friend, colleague, and whether they respect her (Bolderdijk, Brouwer & Cornelissen, 2017). These items are combined and averaged into a reliable scale in the subsequent analysis (α = .86, M = 4.97, SD = .68).
3.4 Attention and Manipulation Check
10 correct answer was either the moral, self-interested, or moral justification combined with the imperfection statement.
3.5 Participants
In total, 256 persons participated in the relevant conditions for the present study of which 199 were included in the analysis. 20 participants were excluded because they stated that they are vegetarians and four people skipped an entire page of the survey. In addition to the vegetarians, 21 participants refused to eat the snack for other reasons such as religion or illness. These participants were excluded from the analysis since they were less threatened by Mary as anticipated moral reproach and derogation was lower compared to participants who did taste the snack. Moreover, seven participants were excluded who failed the manipulation check and five were excluded since they were outliers.
Of the 199 participants that were included in the analysis, 81 were in the condition ‘selfish x imperfection absent’, 73 in ‘moral x imperfection absent’, and 45 in ‘moral x imperfection present’. This unequal sample size is due to the master thesis student who was investigating the effect of awe for which the participants in the two ‘imperfection absent’ conditions needed to be spread additionally across an ‘awe present’ and ‘awe absent’ condition. The variance of the means in the different conditions is similar which is why the unequal sample size should not present issues in the subsequent analysis.
The participants that were included in the analysis are aged between 17 and 30, and 44.7% of them are female. 52.8% of the participants are Dutch, 7% German, 6% Indonesian, 4.5% Romanian, 4% Chinese, and the rest is from other nationalities.
4 Results
11
4.1 Anticipated Moral Reproach
The fact that the stimulus person Mary was female may lead to confounds regarding anticipated moral reproach of men compared to women. Indeed, anticipated moral reproach was higher among males (N = 110, M = 2.95, SD = 1.17) than females (N = 89, M = 3.25, SD = 1.09). A one-way ANCOVA was conducted to determine the difference between the experimental groups on derogation controlling for gender. The results showed that there is a significant effect of the manipulation of Mary on the extent of anticipated moral reproach experienced by the participants when controlling for gender (F(3,195) = 5.85, p = .001). The means are all below the middle of the 7-point Likert scale which indicates that participants in all conditions expect to be evaluated as immoral rather than moral by vegetarians including Mary. The following figure 5 depicts the means across the three conditions regarding anticipated moral reproach.
Figure 5 Means and 95% confidence intervals of anticipated moral reproach.
Lower scores indicate greater anticipated moral reproach.
Participants expected to be judged the most by Mary in both moral conditions whether imperfection is present (N = 45, M = 2.79, SD = 1.12) or absent (N = 73, M = 2.88, SD = 1.10). The difference between these two conditions is not significant (t(116) = -.45, p = .653). Participants expected Mary to be the least judgmental when she refused to eat the pork snack out of self-interested reasons (N = 81, M = 3.43, SD = 1.12). Thus, participants expected self-interested Mary to judge them less than moral Mary whether imperfection was absent (Mdifference = -.55, t(152) = 3.03, p = .003, Cohen’s
d = .50) or present (Mdifference = -.64, t(124) = 3.06, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .57).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12 As predicted in Hypothesis 1, anticipated moral reproach is higher when being exposed to a rebel who is reasoning on moral grounds. However, opposite to the prediction in Hypothesis 3, imperfection cannot neutralize anticipated moral reproach regarding moral rebels. Thus, the imperfection statement did not implicitly signal Mary’s denial of judgement to observers as intended.
4.2 Do-Gooder Derogation
The analysis was repeated with do-gooder derogation as dependent variable. The fact that the stimulus person Mary was female may invite confounds regarding her evaluation by males compared to females. Indeed, female (N = 89, M = 5.09, SD = .70) participants evaluated Mary slightly more positive in all conditions compared to males (N = 110, M = 4.87, SD = .65). A one-way ANCOVA was conducted to determine the difference between the experimental groups in terms of derogation of Mary when controlling for gender. The results showed that there is a significant effect of the manipulationon the extent of do-gooder derogation when controlling for gender (F(3,195) = 5.41, p = .001). In all three conditions the evaluation of Mary was rather positive as the scores are on the side of the bipolar scale with the positive attributes. It is therefore questionable whether participants felt threatened by Mary since they did not derogate her. The means of do-gooder derogation across the different groups are depicted in figure 6.
Figure 6 Means and 95% confidence intervals of do-gooder derogation
Lower scores indicate greater do-gooder derogation.
Opposite to Hypothesis 1, Mary was not liked more when she employed self-interested reasoning instead of moral reasoning. In fact, participants liked Mary the least when she refused out
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13 of self-interested reasons (N = 81, M = 4.82, SD = .70) and out of moral reasons when imperfection was absent (N = 73, M = 4.98, SD = .67). However, the difference between these two conditions was not significant (t(152) = 1.50, p = .135). As predicted, Mary was the most liked in the condition ‘moral x imperfection present’ (N= 45, M = 5.22, SD = .58). Imperfect Mary was almost significantly more liked than moral Mary (t(116) = 1.973, p = .051) and she was significantly more liked than self-interested Mary (Mdifference = .40, t(124) = 3.3, p = .001, Cohen’s d = -0.61).
In sum, it can be concluded that Mary was rather liked than derogated in all three conditions. Opposite to the prediction in Hypothesis 1, there was no significant difference in liking between moral and self-interested Mary. As proposed in Hypothesis 3, derogation of Mary was decreased by the imperfection.
4.3 Mediation Analysis
The mediation analysis was conducted with the purpose to examine whether anticipated moral reproach is a mechanism that is driving do-gooder derogation as predicted in Hypothesis 2. Due to the fractional factorial design of the present study, moderated mediation cannot be tested. Therefore, only mediation was tested by using model 4 (bias-corrected, 1000 bootstrap samples) of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013; see appendix B). The three different conditions were combined into one variable called ‘manipulation of Mary’. This multicategorical variable was coded by using the indicator method with ‘moral x imperfection present’ serving as the reference group with the code 0 on D1 and D2. The
condition ‘self-interested x imperfection absent’ was coded with the code 1 on D1 and ‘moral x
imperfection absent’ with 1 on D2. Since the response of males and females differed regarding
anticipated moral reproach and do-gooder derogation, gender was being controlled for in the mediation analyis.
14 the relationship between the moral rebel’s justification and derogation which is why Hypothesis 2 is rejected.
5 Discussion
The aim of this study was to investigate whether signaling imperfection affects anticipated moral reproach and consequently influences do-gooder derogation. It was proposed that if a moral rebel claims not to be perfect, observers expect less judgement. As anticipated moral reproach would thereby be neutralized, it was suggested that observers would not need to restore their threatened self-concept by derogating the moral rebel. Opposite to the expectations, anticipated moral reproach could not be neutralized by imperfection and did also not predict do-gooder derogation. Despite imperfection not being able to decrease anticipated moral reproach, it did lead to an increase in the liking of the rebel. In the following the findings from the present study are discussed more into detail.
5.1 Findings
15 they do not derogate her but evaluate her positively in all three conditions. Another possible reason for Mary’s positive evaluation might be however that participants did not feel threatened to begin with which is why there was no need for them to derogate Mary. The following paragraph discusses this issue more into detail.
The second research question investigated whether anticipated moral reproach mediates the effect of the manipulation of Mary on do-gooder derogation. The results revealed that anticipated moral reproach does not necessarily lead to do-gooder derogation. This is in opposition to previous findings that suggest that anticipated moral reproach is the main trigger of the threat to the self-concept which in turn leads to do-gooder derogation (O’Connor & Monin, 2016). Even though participants expected to be judged by Mary and vegetarians in general this did not translate into do-gooder derogation in this study. A possible explanation for this discrepancy might be that imagined judgement by itself is not sufficient to pose a threat to the self-concept. Thus, another trigger to threaten the self-concept must have been absent in this study. Despite imagined judgment being present in this study, this might not have been enough to make participants feel bad when encountering the moral rebel.
Most importantly, the present paper addressed the question whether imperfection could neutralize anticipated moral reproach. Hypothesis 3 argued that imperfection can decrease observers’ anticipated moral reproach when being confronted with a rebel who is arguing on moral grounds. The proposed reason was that this might be an implicit way of signaling to observers that the rebel is not being judgmental since the rebel claims not to be morally perfect. The results showed that even when Mary mentions that she is not perfect participants expect to be judged more by her than when she argues based on self-interest. In the present study imperfection could thus not serve as a way of neutralizing anticipated moral reproach. Possibly, implicitly denying judgement is not strong enough to signal to observers that they are not being judged. The goal of the imperfection statement was to signal to observers that the moral rebel is not perfect herself which is why she also does not judge non-rebels. However, observers did not make this link which is why they perceive imperfect Mary equally judgemental as moral Mary. The manipulation might have been too weak or observers simply do not perceive a person who is admitting an imperfection as less judgmental in the moral domain. More elaborate research is thus needed, to investigate how to make moral rebels come across as less judgemental.
16 Moreover, there was a difference in liking between the condition “moral x imperfection absent” and “moral x imperfection present” at a 5.1% confidence level. Perhaps a stronger manipulation of imperfection could yield stronger results in this respect. The positive evaluation of imperfect Mary is in line with previous research which suggests that outstanding persons become more likeable when they do not appear to be perfect, like super humans to observers. The fact that Mary positions herself as not being perfect might have made her, like the highly intelligent person in the pratfall study (Aronson et al., 1966), more approachable to observers resulting in higher liking. Thus, the ‘flawed’ rebel appears more similar compared to observers instead of as being superior. Perhaps, observers expect to get along better with an imperfect person that is more similar to them which is why the liking increases.
In sum it can be said, that imperfection can slightly increase the liking of a rebel. However, opposite to the prediction of the present paper, this effect is not due to a change in expected judgment by the rebel. Thus, imperfection seems to directly affect do-gooder derogation without having to eliminate anticipated moral reproach first. While the results of this paper give an indication on the effect of imperfection on the liking of moral rebels, the results should be taken with caution as the differences between the experimental groups were only marginal.
5.2 Limitations
Next to the fact that only students participated in the experiment there are also other issues of generalizability. Since the study was conducted in a lab environment, issues arise regarding the external validity. The situation of a vegetarian refusing to eat meat could also take place in real life. However, the rebel, Mary, remained the same throughout the experiment. No conclusions can be drawn from the present research to which extent other characteristics of a rebel such as age, race or the appearance influence his or her evaluation by peers. In the present study it was the case that females evaluated Mary more positively than males. Thus, caution should be exercised in extrapolating these findings to rebels with other characteristics than Mary. Moreover, the reaction of observers might also depend on their own demographics. It might be the case that an observer evaluates a rebel differently depending on the similarity or dissimilarity between them.
17 consumption. Therefore, the results could differ significantly when conducting the experiment with a more diverse sample. Mary’s positive evaluation and the lack of derogation could be also attributable to the rather public setting of the study. Even though participants were told to only look at their own questionnaire, the fact that participants were sitting next to each other might have influenced their responses. The public setting might have prevented them from derogating the rebel. Thus, the results could change significantly if the study is conducted in a more private setting.
In the present research, imperfection could not signal to observers that the rebel is not being judgmental. Also the slight but significant increase in likeability due to imperfection might not be practically relevant. Possibly, the manipulation was not strong enough but even otherwise the ‘imperfection approach’ presents drawbacks. In everyday life, rebels usually do not get the opportunity to explain their motives or even to implicitly deny judgement. Often times, observers directly draw conclusions about rebels without engaging in a conversation. In this case, rebels do not have the opportunity to tell observers that they are no morally perfect themselves to signal that they do not judge others for not acting in the same moral way as they do.
5.3 Future Research Ideas
This study proposed that imperfection can increase the likeability of moral rebels by neutralizing anticipated moral reproach. Though, imperfection led to an increase in likeability this did not happen through lowering the imagined judgement of observers. Future research should investigate what the exact underlying process is of the influence of imperfection on likeability and do-gooder derogation. Moreover, the present study only investigated whether imperfections can increase the likeability of moral rebels in the context of vegetarianism. It would also be interesting to test the impact of introducing an imperfection in other domains of sustainable consumption. Moreover, future research could investigate whether a stronger manipulation of imperfection can yield stronger results. Instead of a short statement, participants could read a more elaborate statement or essay, and subsequently evaluate the moral rebel.
18
5.4 Implications
More than ever, it is important to consume more sustainably to secure resources for future generations. In order to transition towards a sustainable future, it is important to find ways to avoid or at least minimize do-gooder derogation. At the same time this strategy should not compromise the values of moral rebel’s. If rebels employ self-interested reasons in order not to be derogated, they won’t create long-term change and spillover effects to other areas of sustainability. Moreover, it should be possible for moral rebel’s to freely express their motives without being derogated by observers. Admitting one’s imperfection could be such a strategy, though more exploration is needed in this new field of research.
As proposed by this paper, imperfection can make rebels slightly more likeable. Though the increase in likeability should not be exaggerated, as it was only marginal, certain implications can be derived from these findings. First of all, moral rebels can use this knowledge and position themselves not as ‘sustainable super humans’ but also admit their imperfections from time to time. Though, this does not lead to a change in anticipated moral reproach, imperfection does seem to positively affect a rebel’s liking. Thus, moral rebels do not necessarily have to be an obstacle for social change. Moreover, marketers of sustainable brands can make use brand advocates and influencers who mirror their ethical values but at the same time do not position themselves as morally perfect. The increased likeability of the messengers could in turn also benefit the sustainable brand. In addition to that, the brand itself could make use of imperfections, for example, by being transparent about the difficulties that they encounter when producing sustainably.
Despite anticipated moral reproach being present in this study, observers’ self-concept was not threatened sufficiently for the rebel to be denigrated. Thus, there must be other important triggers of do-gooder derogation. Imagined judgement did not translate into do-gooder derogation in the present study however it could have under different circumstances as other studies have showed. As the underlying process is not revealed, marketers and brand advocated should exercise caution when promoting sustainable products as morally superior.
19
References
Aronson, E., Willerman, B., & Floyd, J. (1966). The effect of a pratfall on increasing interpersonal attractiveness. Psychonomic Science, 4(6), 227-228. DOI: 10.3758/BF03342263.
Bolderdijk, J. W., Brouwer, C., & Cornelissen, G. (2017). When do morally-motivated consumers elicit inspiration instead of irritation? Frontiers in Psychology, in press.
Bollinger,B., & Gillingham, K. (2012). Peer Effects in the diffusion of solar photovoltaic panels. Marketing Science, 31(6), 900‐912. DOI: 10.1287/mksc.1120.0727.
Cramwinckel, F. M., van Dijk, E., Scheepers, D., & van den Bos, K. (2013). The threat of moral refusers for one’s self-concept and the protective function of physical cleansing. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 49(6), 1049-1058. DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2013.07.009.
Cramwinckel, F. M., van den Bos, K., & van Dijk, E. (2015). Reactions to morally motivated deviance. Current Opinion in Psychology, 6, 150-156. DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.08.007.
Haidt, J., Rosenberg, E., & Hom, H. (2003). Differentiating diversities: Moral diversity is not like other kinds. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33(1), 1-3. DOI:
10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb02071.x.
Hayes, A. F.(2013). Introduction to Mediation, Moderation and Conditional Process Analysis – A Regression-Based Approach. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.
Hayes, A. F., & Preacher, K. J. (2014). Statistical mediation analysis with a multicategorical
independent variable. British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 67(3), 451-470. DOI: 10.1111/bmsp.12028.
Hedenus, F., Wirsenius, S., & Johansson, D. (2014). The importance of reduced meat and dairy consumption for meeting stringent climate change targets. Climatic Change, 124(1–2), 79-91. DOI: 10.1007/s10584-014-1104-5.
Helmreich, R., Aronson, E., & LeFan, J. (1970). To err is humanizing sometimes: effects of self-esteem, competence, and a pratfall on interpersonal attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16(2), 259-264. DOI: 10.1037/h0029848.
Minson, J. A., & Monin, B. (2012). Do-gooder derogation: disparaging morally motivated minorities to defuse anticipated reproach. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(2), 200-207. DOI: 10.1177/1948550611415695.
Montoya, M. M., & Horton, R. S. (2013). A two-dimensional model for the study of interpersonal attraction. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18(1), 59-86. DOI:
0.1177/1088868313501887.
20 Monin, B., Sawyer, P. J., & Marquez, M. J. (2008). The rejection of moral rebels: resenting those who
do the right thing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95(1), 76-93. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.76.
O’Connor, K., & Monin, B. (2016). When principled deviance becomes moral threat: Testing alternative mechanisms for the rejection of moral rebels. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 19(5), 676-693. DOI: 10.1177/1368430216638538.
Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and nonexperimental studies: New procedures and recommendations. Psychological Methods, 7(4), 422-445. DOI:
10.1037%2F1082-989X.7.4.422.
Starr (2009). The social economics of ethical consumption: Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 38(6), 916‐925. DOI:
22
APPENDIX A
Movie and Taste Perceptions
The following survey has five sections; completing the survey takes approximately 10-15 minutes. Please read the questions carefully and answer in English!
Section 1
Did you taste the chips? o Yes
o No
If you refused to taste the chips, please indicate why and continue with Section 2:
--- In three words, please explain what the chips tasted like
--- --- ---
In three words, please explain what kind of thoughts appear when eating the chips --- --- ---
Section 2
How often do you eat meat? o Every day
o A few times a week o Once a week o Once a month
23 How often do you eat fruits and vegetables?
o Every day
o A few times a week o Once a week o Once a month
o Occasionally throughout the year o Never
How often do you eat chips? o Every day
o A few times a week o Once a week o Once a month
o Occasionally throughout the year o Never
Do you have any special dietary preferences? o Lactose free o Gluten free o Vegetarian o Vegan o None o Other, namely: __________________
24
Please do NOT proceed until
you receive further
25
Section 3
Suppose another fellow participant in this study named Mary (see picture left) refused to eat the chips you tasted at the start of the study. She explained her reasoning with the following comment:
"I did not eat the chips, because they contain meat. I care about behaving
in a moral way as a consumer and therefore refuse to eat any meat.
Producing meat puts a strain on the environment, and is bad for animal welfare. I don't mean to imply that I'm perfect however. I struggled a lot with not eating meat initially, and I think that I can still learn a lot." Mary
How would you describe Mary?
Stupid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent Weak 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strong Insecure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Confident Passive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Active Cruel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Kind Awful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Nice Cold 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Warm Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Fair Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Pleasant Dependent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Independent Stingy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Generous Immature 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Mature
26 "I did not eat the chips, because they contain meat. I care about behaving
in a moral way as a consumer and therefore refuse to eat any meat.
Producing meat puts a strain on the environment, and is bad for animal welfare. I don't mean to imply that I'm perfect however. I struggled a lot with not eating meat initially, and I think that I can still learn a lot."
If Mary saw what I normally eat, she would think I am:
Extremely immoral
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely moral
Please indicate the likelihood that you, like Mary, would become a vegetarian:
Extremely unlikely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely
Most vegetarians think that most non-vegetarians are:
Extremely immoral
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely moral
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:
Strongly disagree
Strongly agree
I would like Mary as a friend 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I would like to have Mary as a colleague
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I respect Mary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mary would like me as a colleague 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mary would like me as a friend 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
27
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:
Totally not applicable
Totally applicable
I feel happy with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel happy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel dissatisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel self-critical 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I feel determined 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel angry with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel disgusted with myself
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel annoyed with myself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel disappointed with myself
28 Please remember watching the movie and imagine yourself as strongly as possible to being back in the theatre, seeing the movie for the first time.
While watching the movie, to what extent did you experience feelings of…
Not at all Very much Smallness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Humility 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Respect 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
While watching the movie, to what extent did you feel…
29
Not at all
Very much I admire people who
own expensive homes, cars and clothes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I like a lot of luxury in my life
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I’d be happier if I’d be able to afford more things 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ______________________________________________________________________________ Delicious taste is an important consideration for me when purchasing food
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Can you remember why Mary refused to taste the chips?
Please do NOT look at the previous pages to look for the answer. It’s ok if you forgot. It’s important that you answer honestly.
o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral.
o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral. However, she initially struggled with not eating meat.
o She doesn’t eat meat because she believes it is immoral. However, she does not like to talk about it.
30
Section 4
Please indicate the likelihood that you would sign the petition shown above
Extremely unlikely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extremely likely
Section 5
How old are you? --- What is your gender?
o Male o Female o Other
What is your nationality? ---
What is your SONA ID? ---
31
