Brussels or Jerusalem?

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Brussels or Jerusalem?

Political Cleavages and the Democratic Consolidation

Process in Serbia, 2000-2007

Master Thesis

Pieter-Jan Baas

S1475584

Dr. A. Van den Assem

Faculty of Arts

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List of abbreviations

BIA Security-Information Agency (successor to the DB)

CoE Council of Europe

DB State Security

DOS Democratic Opposition of Serbia

DS Democratic Party

DSS Democratic Party of Serbia

EC European Commission

EU European Union

FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ICG International Crisis Group

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia JSO Unit for Special Operations (Red Berets)

JUL Yugoslav United Left

KOS Counterintelligence Service (army) LDP Liberal Democratic Party

MOD Ministry of Defense MUP Ministry of the Interior

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ND New Democracy

NS New Serbia

PfP Partnership for Peace (Cooperation program of NATO) SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement

SCG Serbia and Montenegro (State Union)

SCP Serbian Chetnik Movement

SKS League of Communists

SNP Socialist People’s Party (Montenegro)

SPO Serbian Renewal Movement

SPS Socialist Party of Serbia

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UCK Kosovo Liberation Army

UN United Nations

US United States

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Introduction

“We are the Serbs, destined to be the “Serbia is completely polarized. East in the West and the West in the East, If you are pro EU, you are against and to recognize above us nothing Kosovo, and vice versa.”1

on the earth, but the Heavenly Jerusalem.”2 - Hedvig Morvai-Horvat, 2008 - Saint Sava, 1221

It will remain a question whether Saint Sava, founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, realized that the words he wrote back in the year 1221 would influence Serbian society today. By stating that Serbia neither belonged to the East or the West and was not accountable to anyone on earth, Sava was one the pioneers of today’s Serbian

nationalism. Morvai-Horvat’s might well owe his lament to the consequence of Sava’s statements 800 years ago. The polarization that Morvai-Horvat means can well be described with the help of what he observes as the incompatibility between the EU and Kosovo. The EU stands for the ideas of integration with the West, modernization,

democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Kosovo stands for the greatness of the Serb nation, defiance towards foreign powers, and neutrality –perhaps better labeled as

isolation.

Serbia is a country whose political culture is deeply divided by the literal and metaphorical choice between the EU and Kosovo. Filip Ejdus has been one of the few scholars discussing the subject. He labels the divide as a civic-democratic versus a national-liberational political culture and describes them as a“ cultural rift between globalists and nationalists, modernity and tradition, East and West, individualism and collectivism, and other dyadic pairs.” Ejdus even goes as far as stating that there are “two Serbias.” 3 Chapter two will deal more extensively with this division but the main idea

1

Hedvig Morvai-Horvat, ‘Serbia, the Last Car on Balkan Express’, International Issues & Slovak Foreign

Policy Affairs, 17 (2008) 11.

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When Serbia in October 2000 ousted Slobodan Milosevic, it was the first in a new miniature wave of democratization, now better known as the Coloured Revolutions. After Milosevic’s departure, it was widely expected that Serbia would soon join the democratic and liberal Europe.4 In the years following, however, the democratization process in Serbia seemed to stall. For outsiders it was hard to overlook the fact that Serbia’s neighboring countries in the Balkans, Croatia and Macedonia, had completed their Stabilization and Association (SAA) talks with the EU in 2004, and were on the verge of opening negotiations on membership. Serbia had not even started SAA talks at the time, let alone applying for membership.5

In Serbia there was awareness of the difficult democratic development. A 2003 television documentary under the meaningful name “Ako Srbija Stane” (If Serbia Stops) showed a number of speeches given by the previously before assassinated prime minister, Zoran Djindjic. In his speeches Djindjic issued a black warning that the democratization process in Serbia was in danger of coming to a standstill. 6 Five years later, in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of May 2008, Serbian president Boris Tadic asked the question: “Why does every election round after 2000 in Serbia bear a historical

importance? Because we cannot allow a return to the nineties and we must finally make this political path an irreversible one to the future, not back to the difficult past.”7

Tadic’s lament showed that eight years after the revolution Serbia had not taken the definite path towards a full-fledged democracy and was still in danger of falling back.

The difficult democratization process and the presence of deep and polarizing divisions in Serbia urge the question what the exact relationship between these two phenomena is. In order to analyze this, two concepts are crucial: democratic consolidation and political cleavages.

According to Timothy Edmunds: “in Serbia since 2000, electoral politics has

4

Vicken Cheterian, ‘From Reform and Transition to Coloured Revolutions’, Journal of Communist Studies

and Transition Politics, 25 (2009) 143.

5_{Stefan Lehne, ‘Has the Hour of Europe come at last? The EU’s strategy for the Balkans’ in: Judy Batt ed.,}

The Western Balkans: Moving on, Institute for Security Studies (October 2004) 118-119.

6_{The documentary “Ako Srbija Stane” is available at:}_{http://www.srbijauevropi.org/}_and

www.youtube.com (only in Serbian).

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become solidly established. Liberalism has not.”8 Edmunds here not only puts into words the main problem that in this thesis will be analyzed, he also touches upon the core idea of democratic consolidation studies which focuses on a country’s movements between the electoral and liberal type of democracy. The electoral variant is a minimal type of

democracy, meaning a country where except for free and fair elections, democracy has not yet been developed.9 Fareed Zakaria has provided the most authoritative definition for the liberal type of democracy. Zakaria argues that democracy is not only defined by free and fair elections but also by the presence of “liberal constitutionalism,” meaning, the rule of law, a clear separation of powers, human rights, political and civil liberties, etc.10 For properly defining the most important divides in Serbia and analyze its

relationship with democratic consolidation the concept of political cleavages will be used. The debate on political cleavages has since the end of the Cold War shifted from

identifying cleavages for the advanced industrial societies to identifying cleavages for new democracies as Serbia. The debate focuses mostly on new cleavages based on questions of authoritarianism and nationalism. The expectation is that it can give a number of important leads for making the case of Serbia operational.11

Having explained the most basic theoretical components, concepts and definitions, a well demarcated research question can now be defined:

To what extent has the representation of cleavages by political parties determined the course of the development of liberal constitutionalism in Serbia, in the period between 2000 and 2007?

To answer this research question a number of sub questions will be discussed: 1. What is understood with the study on democratic consolidation and political

8_{Timoty Edmunds, ‘Illiberal Resilience in Serbia’, Journal of Democracy, 20 (2009) 139.} 9_{Andreas Schedler, ‘What is Democratic Consolidation?’, Journal of Democracy, 9 (1998) 92-93.} 10_{Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York 2003)} 19-20.

11_{See for the debate on cleavages in new democracies int.al.: Alejandro Moreno, Political Cleavages:}

Issues, Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy (Boulder 1999); Kevin Deegan Krause, ’New

Dimensions of Political Cleavage ‘ in R. Dalton and H.D. Klingemann, Oxford Handbook of Political

Science (Oxford ); Dusan Pavlovic, ‘Symbolic and Distributional Cleavages in Serbia after 2000’ in:

Wolfgang Petritsch, Goran Svilanovic, Christophe Solioz eds., Serbia Matters: Domestic Reforms and

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cleavages? How are these two concepts related to each other? 2. What cleavages can be distinguished in Serbia?

3. To what extent have political parties through the representation of cleavages

determined the development of liberal constitutionalism between 3) 2001-2004, and 4) 2004-2007?

The research period is split up in two parts which run parallel to the two parliamentary periods: 2001-2004 and 2004-2007. Both periods are on their turn divided into three subthemes which together contain the most important elements of constitutional liberalism: democracy and the rule of law, human rights and minority protection, and international obligations and integration.12 At the end of this introduction a short overview will be given of Serbian party politics between 1990 and 2000. This not only serves as an introduction to the most dominant issues in Serbian politics but also provides the opportunity of getting acquainted with Serbian political parties.

The period of research is 2000-2007. Although the first democratic government took office in January 2001, some important events occurred in the period between the October Revolution of 2000 and January 2001 which cannot be ignored. The choice for the first two parliamentary periods is based on the differing political balance of power regarding the role of cleavages. In other words, the period between 2001-2004 saw a slight domination of liberal and reformist forces, where the period between 2004-2007 saw the comeback of nationalist and conservative forces. By comparing the two periods, more can be said of the influence of political cleavages.

The relevance of this thesis lies mostly in the field of the study on the relation between political cleavages and the consolidation of democracy. It is a relevant test to see whether the cleavages as identified in the scholarly debate on new democracies also apply to Serbia and whether these cleavages have been decisive in Serbia’s process of

democratic consolidation.

12_{The division into the three subthemes is partially based on the structure of the annual Progress Report of} the European Commission (EC). Under the header of ‘democracy and the rule of law’ a number of issues can be expected as the judiciary and the separation of powers, civil control over the military, the role of organized crime etc. For an example of the EU Progress Report see: Commission of the European Communities, Serbia and Montenegro, 2005 Progress Report (Brussels 2005) Available at:

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Party politics in Serbia, 1990-2000

Like in the rest of Eastern Europe, communist rule in Serbia came to an end in late 1989. A historic revolution as in Poland and the Czech Republic did, however, not occur. In December 1989 Serbia changed overnight from a one-party state into a multi-party ‘democracy.’ In the 1990’s this resulted in a number of elections which were never completely free and fair but represented the overall Serb’s public opinion. With the first parliamentary elections of December 1990 in sight, Milosevic quickly transformed his League of Communists (SKS) into the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Because of the approaching secession of Slovenia and Croatia, the 1990 elections were dominated by nationalist themes. The SPS used the old power structures of the SKS to consolidate its position and easily won the elections, getting 194 out of 250 seats. The strongest opposition party was the nationalist Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) of writer Vuk Draskovic with 19 seats. The Democratic Party (DS), obtaining 7 seats, was more liberal-democratic and less nationalist.13

In 1992 the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) entered the political scene. It was made up of confirmed nationalist and traditionalist but was democratically oriented. Its leader, Vojislav Kostunica, split from the DS in 1991. One year later the federal and Serbian parliamentary elections were dominated by the Yugoslav wars and the resulting international isolation. The democratic opposition parties (the DS excluded) united themselves under the name DEPOS. The most important rift during the campaign was decided by the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. The SPS and the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), a split-off from the SPO led by Vojislav Seselj, advocated full support for the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, taking the ensuing international isolation for granted. On the other side DEPOS and DS preferred to give in to the international pressure and start democratic and economic reforms. The SPO had shaken off much of its “romantic nationalism” and became a strong opponent of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The SPS and SRS portrayed DEPOS and the DS as traitors who

13_{Bojan Todosijevic, ‘Serbia’, in Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman eds., The Handbook of Political Change in}

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would bring Serbia down with their internationally and reform oriented program.14 With 44 per cent, the SPS in Serbia got less than half of the seats. The SRS won over 28 per cent where DEPOS managed to obtain 20 per cent. The Serbian

parliamentary elections of the same year showed similar results. Since the SPS did not achieve a majority, it had to form a ‘red-black’ coalition with the SRS which, in different forms, would last throughout the decade. In late 1993 new national elections were needed after the SPS and SRS could not agree on how to deal with the situation of the Bosnian Serbs. The SPS came just three seats short of an absolute majority but managed to form a coalition with the small New Democracy (ND) party. De democratic parties got twice as many seats as the Radicals but due to the SRS joining its ranks, antipathy within the opposition increased, which further weakened its already vulnerable position.15

Between 1995 and 1997, national and federal elections were increasingly dominated by economic instead of nationalist issues. After the Dayton agreement of 1995, that ended the war in Bosnia, Milosevic’s goal of bringing all Serbs together within a single state had clearly failed. It weakened his position as the ultimate defender of the Serb national interest. Only the SRS persisted in its aggressive nationalist rhetoric. The opposition parties had, meanwhile, formed a new coalition under the name Zajedno (together). At the federal elections of 1996 it received 22 per cent of the votes against 43 per cent for the regime parties (SPS, ND, and the Yugoslav United Left (JUL), led by Milosevic’s wife). It won in several major cities at the same year’s local elections, including Belgrade. Milosevic, first unwillingly to acknowledge the results finally gave in, suffering his first serious defeat.16 DS leader Zoran Djindjic and SPO leader

Draskovic meanwhile clashed over the opposition’s leadership question. Djindjic saw Draskovic increasingly as a marionette of Milosevic. The DS and DSS as a result boycotted the 1997 Serbian parliamentary elections but Draskovic’s SPO participated, winning 20 per cent of the votes. The regime parties lost their majority while Seselj’s radicals benefited from the Djindjic-Draskovic clash, winning almost 30 per cent.17

The escalating conflict in Kosovo, where the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria

14_{Todosijevic, ‘Serbia’, 497-499.}

15_{Stefan K. Pavlowitch, Serbia, the History of an Idea (New York 2002) 214.; Robert Thomas, The Politics}

of Serbia in the 1990’s (New York 1999) 163.

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Clirimtare e Kosovës, UCK) had started a guerilla war against the Serbian authorities, caused an important change in Serbian politics. After negotiations for a government with the SPS-JUL and the SPO had failed, SPS-JUL and SRS quickly managed to form the new government, with Seselj as deputy prime-minister. Both parties supported a violent response to the Kosovo-Albanian insurgents knowing it would cause strong international condemnation. The entry of the SRS in the government showed that any moderation on Kosovo was not to be expected.18 Where Serbia between 1990 and 1998 had fulfilled to some minimal standards of (electoral) democracy, the formation of the SPS-SRS

government signaled a strong authoritarian setback. The new government adopted a number of undemocratic laws on e.g. public information and local self-government, and increasingly hindered opposition activities. The attempts made by the international community to settle the conflict in a peaceful way, and stop the continuing violence used by the Serbian authorities against the Kosovo Albanians, proved to be unsuccessful. In March 1999 NATO finally forced Serbia’s withdrawal from the province through a 78-day bombing campaign. Kosovo was placed under UN-protectorate, depriving Serbia of exercising any authority in the province.19

The loss of Kosovo caused the support for the Milosevic regime to plummet. Milosevic, fearing the growing dissent from the democratic opposition and civil society, increased the level of political repression which proved to be counter-productive. Meanwhile an alliance of eighteen opposition parties had gathered in the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) captained by Djindjic’s DS. In an attempt to win a new term as Yugoslav president Milosevic called for new elections on 24 September 2000. Since Djindjic was far too controversial and pro-Western to be eligible as president, the DOS listed Vojislav Kostunica as its candidate, knowing Milosevic would find it impossible to accuse the convinced nationalist Kostunica of being a marionette of the West.20

When after the first round it appeared Kostunica had won a majority of almost 55 percent of the votes, Milosevic desperately tried to manipulate the election results and called for a second round. Kostunica’s and Djindjic’s rejection of Milosevic’s claims

18_{Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990’s, 413-418.} 19_{Todosijevic, ‘Serbia’, 502.}

20_{Vjeran Pavlakovic, ‘Serbia Transformed?’ in: Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic eds., Serbia}

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were followed by massive demonstrations throughout the country. The demonstrations were the result of a well-organized campaign against the authoritarian regime initiated by the democratic opposition parties and several NGO’s, most notably the student movement Otpor (resistance). Crucial to the success of the demonstrations was the silent approval of the army, secret service and police who had come to realize that Milosevic was losing a lot of public support. On 5 October 2000 demonstrators stormed the Parliament building and the headquarters of Radio-Television Serbia, marking the definitive end of the Milosevic regime. One day later Milosevic publicly admitted his loss. Kostunica soon

called for the first free parliamentary elections in Serbia on 23 December 2000.21

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Chapter 1. Democratic Consolidation and Political Cleavages

This chapter is divided in two parts. In the first part the study on democratic

consolidation will be discussed. The emphasis will be on the work of Andreas Schedler. and the significance of the electoral and liberal types of democracies. Furthermore, attention will be given to the concept of liberal constitutionalism as expounded by Fareed Zakaria. The concept of democratic consolidation serves in this thesis only as a virtual point of reference. The second part is devoted to the concept of political cleavages, more specifically cleavages in new democracies. The discussion will serve as an aid for the second chapter where the most important cleavages in Serbia have to be defined. The

chapter ends with the question how cleavages are related to democratic consolidation.

1.1 Democratic consolidation

Democratization is a long-term process which can be divided in two different stages, the transition towards democracy and the consolidation of democracy. The changeover from an authoritarian regime into a democratic regime is the first phase, the consolidation and deepening of democracy constitutes the second phase.22 The democratic revolution itself is here not the object of research but the starting point. The study of democratic

consolidation originally focused on preventing regressions towards authoritarianism and how infant democracies could survive. There are two phrases that form the basic and most widespread definition of democratic consolidation studies. First, a democracy is consolidated when it is, in the words of Guillermo O’Donnell, “likely to endure” and when we can expect it “to last well into the future”. Second and related to the first is the idea that democracy should be seen as the “only game in town.” All relevant political and societal actors should see democracy as having no alternative, i.e. democracy is the only way of attaining power.23

Admittedly, this is a very minimal definition of democratic consolidation and far

22_{Renske Doorenspleet, The Fourth Wave of Democratization, Identification and Explanation (Leiden} 2001) 11.

23_{Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘Illusions About Democratic Consolidation’, Journal of Democracy, 7 (1996) 37.;} Andreas Schedler, ‘Measuring Democratic Consolidation’, Studies in Comparative International

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from sufficient. Andreas Schedler has created a workable starting point for studying democratic consolidation with his fourfold classification of regime types.24 According to Schedler, one can distinguish between four different regime types: authoritarian, electoral democracy, liberal democracy, and an advanced democracy. Schedler places these four regime types on a horizontal line with authoritarianism forming the “outer negative horizon” where an advanced democracy forms the “outer positive horizon.” The electoral democracy is situated between the authoritarian regime and the liberal democracy which on its turn finds itself between the electoral and advanced democracy 25

Working with this model cannot go without defining the regime types, in

particular the differences between the electoral and liberal subtypes. Many scholars have noticed that a considerable number of, especially new, democratic regimes have

transformed into some kind of “borderline cases.” These regimes cannot be labeled authoritarian, but do also not fulfill to the features of a liberal democracy. ‘Minimal’, ‘formal,’ illiberal’ and ‘electoral’ are some of the names that have been given when referring to these semi-democratic regimes. It is the latter which is used by Schedler and is also adopted throughout this thesis. The most important feature of an electoral

democracy is that it is capable of holding free and fair elections but fails in promoting and protecting (some of) the essential political and civil freedoms. Schedler simplifies the use of the concept of democracy by stating that he uses the term electoral democracy for “any kind of diminished subtype of democracy.”26

The third regime type, liberal democracy, does not let itself summarize that easily. Schedler gives no lengthy definition of liberal democracy but states that an electoral democracy is “a regime that holds more or less inclusive, clean, and competitive elections but fails to uphold the political and civil freedoms essential for liberal democracy.”27 Fareed Zakaria provides a much more comprehensive notion of liberal democracy. Zakaria judges there is an important difference between democracy and liberal

democracy, a viewpoint where Zakaria’s ‘democracy’ strongly correlates with Schedler’s

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David Collier and Steven Levitsky have made a similar classification but labeled them differently. When trying to bring order in the overwhelming number of different types of democracy, Collier and Levitsky discovered there were well over 550 or more variants. This shows the necessity of a drastic reduction in the number of sorts of democracy as has been done by Schedler.

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notion of ‘electoral democracy.’ Because since World War II (WWII) western

governments have been both democratic and liberal, it has become increasingly difficult to keep the two phenomena separate. Zakaria emphasizes that most people in the West understand democracy to be “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections” but also by what he defines as “constitutional liberalism”: “the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.” There are many regimes which are democratic but lack the essential features of constitutional liberalism. It are these regimes that Zakaria calls “illiberal democracies,” a group which on its turn can be divided in multiple different types, ranging from “modest offenders” to “near-tyrannical” regimes.28

According to Zakaria democracy and liberal constitutionalism are not

automatically related. They are even mutually hostile since “constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, and democracy about its accumulation and use.”29 Where democracy is about selecting the ones to govern, constitutional liberalism is about the way a country is governed. The government is meant to protect its citizens against “coercion,” whether by the state, church, or society. In order to guarantee the rights and freedoms of the individual, a democracy needs to control its government, and there should be “equality under the law, impartial courts, and the separation of church and state.”30 Zakaria thus completely detaches the concept of democracy from its liberal content, making it easier to discern whether a democracy is electoral or liberal.

The fourth and last regime type is the advanced democracy which is a deepened version of liberal democracy, i.e. an expansion of inclusiveness, competition and civil liberties. In an advanced democracy not only politics but the whole society is functioning in a democratic way. Economic and social affairs are evenly arranged in a democratic way as are political ones. It is a society where all citizens are to a high level engaged with, and dedicated to, the governing of their country. In fact, it are the citizens who rule themselves, a “government not just for but by and of the people.” The role of the state is reduced to preventing and fighting the negative consequences of socioeconomic

28_{Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, 17-18.}

29_{Paul D’Anieri, Understanding Ukrainian Politics, 26-27.; Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal} Democracies’, Foreign Affairs, 76 (1997) 30.

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inequality. An advanced democracy, however, is seen more as an ideal type than a reality.31 It is the open end of Schedler’s scale, an image liberal democracies work towards but are never are really able to reach.32

Where developments between authoritarianism and electoral democracy are a part of democratic transition studies and the concept of an advanced democracy serves as an ideal type, the interplay between the electoral and liberal democracy types constitutes the core of democratic consolidation studies. Electoral and liberal democracies represent each other’s “normative horizons.” An electoral democracy forms the liberal democracy’s negative horizon where liberal democracy is the positive horizon of the electoral

democracy.33 When a country moves from the stage of electoral democracy towards a liberal democracy one can speak of democratic completion. When it moves in the opposite direction it is called democratic erosion.

Democratic erosion can be a process of largely hidden events. Focusing on, for example, military coups, then is the wrong method. Instead, Schedler emphasizes that “many new democracies have to contend with the danger of decay, of less spectacular, more incremental, and less transparent forms of regression.”34 Schedler also refers to Guillermo O’Donnell and Samuel Huntington who both warn for silent regressions from democracy to semi-democratic rule. O ‘Donnell talks about a “progressive diminution of existing spaces for the exercise of civilian power and the effectiveness of the classic guarantees of liberal constitutionalism” where Huntington mentions “the intermittent or gradual weakening of democracy by those elected to lead it”35

1.2 Cleavages and Political Parties

1.2.1 The relevance of political parties

Democratic consolidation is an elusive concept and scholars have used many different

31_{Doorenspleet, The Fourth Wave, 12-13.} 32

Schedler, What is Democratic Consolidation?, 105, fn 5. 33_{Idem, 92-94}

34_{Idem, 94-97.}

35_{Scott Mainwaring; Guillermo O’Donnell; and J. Samuel Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic}

Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective (Notre Dame 1995)

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variables for measuring it. Schedler sees this plurality of different meanings as confusing and argues it will lead to different conclusions, hampering a well structured study on democratic consolidation. Schedler complains that consolidology has evolved into an “obese concept,” encompassing all different kinds of indicators like the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of anti-system actors, the routinization of politics, party building, and the decentralization of state power, to name just a few.36

The choice of taking party politics as the independent variable may, considering the aforementioned, seem arbitrary and adding up to the indistinctness of the study on democratic consolidation. There are two reasons, however, why the choice for party politics has been made. First, political parties are without a doubt the most important actors in democracy. Admittedly, there is increasing debate on the erosion of the political party’s position in democracy but this will be discussed later. Secondly, it is exactly the lack of clarity on the interpretation of democratic consolidation, that forces to choose an own approach. Considering that an all-embracing variable, explaining every detail of democratic consolidation, is impossible to find, and keeping in mind the central role of the political party in democracy, makes the choice for political parties justifiable at the very least.

There is a large number of enumerations of the functions a political party needs to perform, all more or less containing the same elements. Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair have argued that all of these elements can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, there are the representative functions like the articulation and aggregation of demands. These can be traced back to the original role of political parties representing cleavages. On the other hand, there are the procedural functions including elite recruitment and the formation of parliament and government.37 The relevance of political parties in

democracy, however, has come increasingly under pressure. Many claim that political parties, especially in Western Europe, are losing their importance and are no longer able of performing all of the to them ascribed functions. Advocates of the idea of ‘party decline’ have pointed to the fact that political parties have lost their main function of interest aggregation and now see other actors taking over many of their original tasks.

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Single-issue groups, mass media, social movements, and other organizations have gained themselves a position at the expense of the political party.38

There is, however, enough reason to justify the choice for party politics as the independent variable. Except for the fact that it is not the aim of this thesis to analyze whether the contemporary political party is losing ground, there is an increasing belief that party decline is not as grave as many expected. Parties have proven to be adaptive and able of coexisting with other forms of interest representation. “Scholarly consensus is emerging that the literature on party decline and disappearance was alarmist and

inaccurate,” and that “parties continue to be central representative actors, and will remain so.” Besides, since much of the literature on political parties is directed at Western Europe and the United States (US), it would not be fair to ask whether in new

democracies like Serbia we can talk of party decline, considering that these countries have experienced their democratic transitions only recently.39

1.2.2 Cleavages

According to Knutsen and Scarbrough, a cleavage consists of three components. First it is “rooted in a (..) social division.” Secondly, it “engages some set of values common to the members of the group” and, thirdly, it “is institutionalized in some form of organization – most commonly a political party.”40 It is, however, possible that in a certain case not all three elements of a cleavage are present, making it “something less” than a cleavage. Kevin Deegan-Krause provides a conceptual model for these cases. He defines those cases which have only one cleavage element as a “difference”, a case with two elements as a “divide”, and a case consisting of all three elements as a “full cleavage.”41 Alejandro Moreno seems to be more flexible on the use of the term cleavage by stating that “purely social or value divisions can be considered political cleavages when they are tied to partisan preferences.” He defines values that are connected to party preference as “value

38_{Peter M. Siavelis, ‘Parties and Social Structure’, in: Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty ed., Handbook}

of Party Politics (London 2006) 10.

39_{Siavelis, ‘Parties and Social Structure,’ 10. See also: Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards}

Consolidation (Baltimore 1999)

40_{Moreno, Political Cleavages, 16.}

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cleavages” and voting based on social divisions as “structural cleavages.”42 Translating societal cleavages into party politics is a complicated and distinct process. Some cleavages are taken up by parties where others are not, seemingly without any objective reason. Giovanni Sartori has made an interesting observation with respect to this ambiguity. According to Sartori, societal cleavages are not automatically translated by political parties. Sartori argues that political parties intervene to politicize social differences instead of social differences causing the formation of political parties. In the words of Sartori “it is not the objective class that creates the party, but the party that creates the subjective class.” Social divisions in politics, therefore, say more about the political parties exploiting these divisions then about the divisions themselves.43

The discussion on the politicization of societal cleavages started with the work of Seymour Martin Lipset. In 1960 Lipset concluded that political parties represent societal divisions on the basis of class differences. Political parties were in his view, therefore, most of all “translators of class struggle.” The most classic and widespread acknowledged analysis of the relation between social cleavages and political parties came with the later work of Lipset and Stein Rokkan. Based on a research on Western European

democracies, they claimed that the national and industrial revolutions created the most important social cleavages which became established and politicized in the democratic regimes through the formation of political parties. Lipset and Rokkan spoke of four different cleavages, knowing: center-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and worker-owner.44

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent rise of new, post-communist, democracies in Eastern Europe, urged scholars to review their idea of political cleavages. Cleavages as described by Lipset and Rokkan originated from the sixties and were based on the observation of western developed countries. In new and established democracies cleavages evolved that were not necessarily based on income distribution. Alejandro Moreno argues that political cleavages are not only centered around issues of income distribution, the classic left-right dimension, but that different types of cleavages shape

43_{Peter Mair, ‘Cleavages’, in: Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty ed., Handbook of Party Politics} (London 2006) 1.

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party competition. His starting point is that “generally, the most salient issues in society determine the dimensions of political competition. These dimensions, in turn, shape the relevant political cleavages.”45

Moreno divides the issue dimensions into a group that is representative for advanced industrial societies and a group that characterizes party competition in new democracies. Since Serbia can be considered a new democracy, only the latter group will be discussed here. Central to Moreno’s argument is the existence of a strong democratic-authoritarian cleavage in new democracies. This cleavage is based on the contrast between a group that favors a more open democratic government versus a group that prefers an authoritarian government. Moreno finds that attitudes towards societal change can be an important indicator in identifying a democratic-authoritarian cleavage. He distinguishes between a group which favors rapid reform through the use of revolutionary and radical means, a group that prefers gradual reforms through moderate means, and a group that advocates the preservation of the status quo. It is the last group that Moreno sees as representing authoritarian values since it wants to maintain the old regime.46

According to Moreno, the scholarly debate on political cleavages has made the mistake by taking a “democratic context for granted” while this is not necessarily the case in new democracies.47 “The most salient issue in new democracies is not redistribution of wealth but redistribution of power.” In a new democracy polarization occurs between the people that support the new regime and those who prefer a return of the non-democratic regime. Moreno adds, however, that since a democratic transition and the subsequent consolidation process are temporary, the democratic-authoritarian divide can be expected to have a temporary character as well.48 Moreno states that “If the left-right axis of political competition reflects the main issue or issues in a given society, then it should reflect the conflict between democratic and authoritarian positions in new democracies. In fact, pro-democratic views are associated with the left, where authoritarian views are associated with the right.”49

Except for the democratic-authoritarian issue dimension, Moreno also

45_{Moreno, Political Cleavages, 1.} 46_{Idem, 81}

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distinguishes a liberal-fundamentalist and a pro-reform-antireform issue dimension in new democracies. With the pro-reform-antireform dimension Moreno attempts to identify an all-embracing cleavage that includes attitudes towards economic, political and cultural reforms. According to Moreno “the poles in this dimension are defined by liberal,

democratic, and pro-market preferences, on the one hand, and conservative, authoritarian, and statist preferences on the other hand.“ The reform dimension implies that in new democracies a line can be drawn between attitudes based on contrasts encompassing all issue dimensions but Moreno acknowledges that in many countries only two out of three elements have constituted the actual cleavage.50

The liberal-fundamentalist dimension forms basically the contrast between liberal and conservative forces in society when it comes to cultural issues. Moreno describes this dimension as opposing attitudes toward religion, nationalism and abortion. The liberal-fundamentalist dimension combines “a liberal-fundamentalist world view with a more secular and tolerant world view.” Moreno does not use the classic liberal-conservative contrast since he finds the term too contaminated through its frequent use on many political, economic and cultural divisions.51

By including nationalism to this dimension Moreno touches on the importance of an issue dimension that plays a central role in many new democracies: a cleavage that concerns nationalist questions and is expressed through debates on minority rights, national sovereignty and the “magnitude of threats to national security.” According to Deegan-Krause the most interesting fact about the nationalist cleavage is that conflicts over questions concerning minority rights “occur within as well as across ethnic lines.”52 Dusan Pavlovic clarifies this. He states that nationalism usually causes rifts between in- and out-groups, but can also exist within the in-group. Pavlovic names this as the division between ‘patriots’ and ‘traitors.’53 The former group represents the (extreme) nationalists who stand negatively towards ethnic minorities and external influences in general, and the latter group that is constituted of the more moderate and tolerant forces in society.

It is important to emphasize that in the second chapter Moreno’s work – and that

50_{Idem, 76-79.} 51_{Idem, 78-79.}

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of others – will serve as an aid, and not as a mould, for properly defining cleavages in Serbia. That Moreno’s identification of cleavages needs the own input of the user is made clear by Steven Taylor. In a book review on Moreno he argues that “the precise

differences and cross-comparative relevance of all the dimensions is somewhat difficult to nail down.”54 The cleavages as described by Moreno do indeed overlap, something to which Moreno acknowledges.55 Taylor asks whether this “indicates a weakness in the definition of the dimensions itself” or “that separate dimensions should be defined for differing cases?” Taylor adds that “while the fundamental concept of different cleavages being created in different societies by different issues is sound, further refinement of the categories used to classify these dimensions is warranted.”56

1.3 Cleavages and democratic consolidation

How do political cleavages influence the democratic consolidation process? Kevin Deegan-Krause points at the fact that cleavages and divides “have a decisive impact on outcomes.” Cleavages have sides and the side that wins can determine a country’s course. Deegan-Krause argues that in new democracies oscillation between opposing views tends to be greater than in established democracies. If debate is only based on, for example, socioeconomic subjects, this wider oscillation can be of hardly any threat to democratic consolidation. The problem with new democracies, however, is that debate many times “occurs along more dangerous lines.” If political competition is based on questions of nationalism and authoritarianism, the position of democracy is far more unstable than when solely socioeconomic issues are at stake. Deegan-Krause in a catching way phrases

this idea by stating that “the questions that divide a country thus shape its destiny.”57 Moreno and Dusan Pavlovic deal more specifically with the relation between

democratic consolidation and cleavages based on authoritarian and nationalist questions. Moreno argues that the more a democratic-authoritarian cleavage is present in a new democracy, the less it is consolidated, and vice versa. According to Moreno, the

54_{Steven Taylor, ‘Review: Political Cleavages, Issues, Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy by} Alejandro Moreno’, Latin American Politics and Society 43 (2001) 170.

56_{Taylor, ‘Review: Political Cleavages’, 171.}

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democratic-authoritarian cleavage “may be a catalyst for the advancement or reversal” of the process of democratic consolidation.58 Pavlovic makes the more general remark that the stronger symbolic cleavages59 are, the weaker is the consolidation of democratic institutions. That logic also applies for the opposite: the weaker symbolic cleavages, the smaller the chances democratic institutions will collapse.

Concerning cleavages based on nationalist questions Pavlovic argues that when the major divide in society is that between patriots and traitors, democratic development is under pressure. Because “the room for negotiation and bargaining is narrowed and limited,” and “since democracy is about bargaining and negotiating, democratic processes and democratic institution-building have limited success in societies in which such a conflict dominates.” Pavlovic continues that actors in such situations are tempted to act outside of the democratic framework. Actors will try to achieve their nationalist goals by appealing to “sacred reasons and higher interests”, often breaching democratic principles and damaging democratic institutions.60

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has laid the theoretical basis for analyzing the relationship between the political representation of cleavages and the development of liberal constitutionalism. The concept of democratic consolidation starts with Schedler’s fourfold classification of regime types which provides for the visualization of a country’s position in the

democratic process but also makes a convenient distinction between different forms of democracy. Central to the study of democratic consolidation is the difference between the two middle subtypes, electoral and liberal democracy, and the way and direction a

country moves between these two types. An electoral democracy is defined as the most minimal form of democracy. Its regime is too liberal to be called authoritarian but too authoritarian to be called liberal. Most importantly, an electoral democracy experiences free and fair elections but lacks the promotion and protection of political and civil

58_{Moreno, Political Cleavages, 24-26.}

59_{Pavlovic distinguishes between symbolic and distributional cleavages. Where distributional cleavages are} about the distribution of wealth, symbolic cleavages encompass the polarization on issues of identity like ethnicity, linguistics and religiosity.

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The definition of the subtype of liberal democracy is based on Fareed Zakaria’s concept of liberal constitutionalism. Zakaria detaches democracy from its liberal content showing why it is crucial to look beyond a country’s ability of holding free and fair elections. According to Zakaria a democracy can only be labeled liberal if it fulfills to a large number of qualities which he defines as liberal constitutionalism, including: the rule of law, human rights, a clear separation of powers, the protection of civil and political liberties, equality under the law, and the separation of church and state.

To relate the existence of societal and political divisions in Serbia to the process of democratic consolidation, the concept of political cleavages is used. The concept has changed dramatically since its identification by Lipset and Rokkan. Especially in new democracies completely new cleavages have evolved. Alejandro Moreno has made an important contribution to the study on political cleavages in new democracies by identifying the democratic-authoritarian, liberal-fundamentalist, and

pro-reform-antireform cleavages. Moreno’s work is an important starting point for analyzing which cleavages can be distinguished in Serbia. The definitions Moreno uses are, however, too vague and have too much overlap to put them in practice straight away. Therefore, in the following chapter, Moreno’s concepts will have to be polished and refined in order to make them operational for Serbia.

Except for the democratic-authoritarian dimension, nationalist-related questions also underlie cleavages in many new democracies. Nationalism here refers to the rivalry within a group constituted of people sharing the same identity but looking differently at questions concerning minority rights and national identity. This cleavage exists of two opposing groups. On one side the nationalist patriots opposed to minority rights, and on the other side, the more tolerant and open-minded forces of society, labeled by the opposing side as traitors.

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dangerous questions of nationalism and the desirability of a democratic regime. Pavlovic argues that if the nationalist-related cleavage (patriots versus traitors) is dominant, room for negotiation and bargaining is small, which has a negative effect on democratization. In general, democratic consolidation seems to be dependent on the prominence of political cleavages. The stronger cleavages are, the weaker is democratic consolidation, and vice versa.

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Chapter 2. Cleavages in Serbia

In this chapter attention will move from the theoretical to the material content. An account will be given of the most important divisions that shape Serbian society. The central question is: which issues dominate public debate in Serbia? To determine whether we can speak of cleavages or rather divides we have to look what value orientations are present in Serbia, whether they are represented by political parties and if they coincide with certain social divisions. In the conclusion, with the help of the discussion on cleavages in new democracies by Moreno, Deegan-Krause and Pavlovic, a cleavage model will be developed for Serbia. Furthermore, a hypothesis will be given that visualizes the dominant divisions in Serbia and will be operated throughout the case-study.

2.1 Value orientations

2.1.1 Nationalists versus cosmopolitans

There is widespread consensus about what constitutes the most important division in Serbian society but agreement on how to exactly define this division is lacking.61 Elizabeth Pond speaks of “two souls that lodge in Serbia’s breast” and which still are recognizable within the political elite. On the one hand there is the “mythic macho” soul which emphasizes Serbia’s violent fight for independence throughout the centuries, especially the fight for liberation against the Ottoman Empire which is seen as the Serb defense of the Christian Europe against the Islamic world. This soul is “anti-Western in the Byzantine and Serbian Orthodox tradition of exclusivity and suspicion of the Latin West.” It is characterized by a defiant attitude towards the outside world. The other soul, according to Pond, is “the cosmopolitan, skeptical, and ultimately Western one.” Human rights and civil society activists belong to this group and are seen as being responsible for Milosevic’s overthrow in 2000.62

According to Filip Ejdus, Serbian political scientist Milan Matić is the most

61_{Ejdus, Security, ‘Culture and Identity’, 45.}

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authoritative when it comes to the analysis of Serbian political culture. Matic argues that political divisions in the 1990’s reflected deep cultural roots and that the influence of these divisions on contemporary Serbian politics should not be underestimated. Matić distinguishes two main groups of thought in Serbian culture, similar to the two souls identified by Pond. The qualifications he ascribes to these groups provide an overall picture of the most important differences. The first group, Matic awards with qualifications as national-libertarian, mythic-libertarian, radical popular and ethno-nationalist, where the second group is civilizing-social, democratic, liberal, progressive, modernizing, and civilizational-participatory. Other authors have defined the contrast as: nationalism versus globalism, traditionalism versus modernism, East versus West, and collectivism versus individualism. 63 For the purpose of this thesis, this division will be labeled as nationalists versus cosmopolitans.

Both groups of thought have their historical origins. These historical origins are especially important to the nationalists where the cosmopolitan identity is based on more recent political developments. The historical with which the nationalists identify

themselves can be traced back to two themes: the glorification of the hey days of the Serbian state, and the belief that Serbia is in an ongoing struggle against a wide array of foreign dangers that have threatened its existence throughout the centuries. Examples of the first theme are the founding of the Serbian Orthodox Church by Saint Sava in the beginning of the 13th century and the establishment of the Serbian Empire in the second half of the 14th century under Tsar Dušan. The 1389 Battle of Kosovo, where the Serbs fought the Ottoman advance, is an important example of the latter.64

The two Serbian Uprisings at the beginning of the 19th century against the Ottoman archenemies are an important symbol of Serbia’s defying attitude. The first Uprising of 1804 under the leadership of Karadjordje Petrović and the Second Uprising (1815-1817) under Milos Obrenovic eventually forced the Ottomans to tolerate a de facto independent Serbia within its borders.65 Other historic landmarks are the First (1912-1913) and Second ((1912-1913) Balkan war, the First World War, and the resistance against Nazi-Germany in the Second World War. All these events endorsed the belief that Serbia

63_{Ejdus, ‘Security, Culture and Identity in Serbia’, 44-45.} 64_{Idem, 47.}

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was in a continuous battle, fighting against outside enemies who threatened its existence. The NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1999, as part of the Kosovo War, confirmed that belief.66 What is striking about the nationalists’ use of formative moments is the large degree of myth making that has taken place. Particularly in the case of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, myths are hard to distinguish from historical facts.67

The cosmopolitan identity, similar to Pond’s cosmopolitan soul, is based on a much shorter period in Serbian history which is mostly oriented towards Serbia’s experiences with democratic rule or events that were related to the democratic

emancipation of Serbian society. Its formative historical moments are, among others, the students protest of 1968, the anti-Milosevic demonstrations in 1990 and 1996-1997, and above all the overthrow of the Milosevic regime at October 5th 2000. A somewhat more controversial moment is the assassination of prime minister Zoran Djindjić in March 2003. Being the figurehead of the reformist forces in Serbian society, his death was an enormous blow to the reformist forces in Serbian society.68

2.1.2 Between East and West

The nationalist-cosmopolitan divide is strongly evident in a debate that goes back as far as the beginning of the 20th century, on whether Serbia should pursue westernization and modernization. The debate was between liberal (cosmopolitan) and nationalist scholars who accused each other of guiding Serbia in the wrong way. Liberal scholars argued that conservative nationalist elements in society obstructed progress and prosperity by

blocking integration with the West. Conservative nationalist scholars, however, claimed that Serbia should pursue an independent way of attaining modernity and should not follow the “uncritical Westernization.” According to Florian Bieber the debate “reflects uncertainty about how to combine national identity with Westernization and by

extension, modernization.”69

66_{Ejdus, ‘Security, Culture and Identity in Serbia’, 47.}

67_{Branimir Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia, From Myth to Genocide (London 1999).} 68_{Ejdus, ‘Security, Culture and Identity in Serbia’, 45-46.}

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In the eyes of the nationalists, the East and the West represent “two fundamentally different worlds” who are strong opposites on the spiritual and cultural level. Serbia should not pick a side but keep a neutral position between the two. It is this neutral position which was reflected in Sava’s words that Serbia should recognize above it nothing but Jerusalem. Serbia’s religious and historical origins are in the Orthodox East but geographically it belongs to the West. By asserting that western-European

civilization, its morality, and its values are reprehensible, the Church extensively

influenced Serbian sentiment towards the West which is still noticeable in Serbian society today. Where nationalists are suspicious of everything that is foreign, especially the western powers, the cosmopolitans are united by the strong belief that Serbia in essence belongs to the West, and that it should adopt European principles of democracy,

liberalism, the rule of law, and human rights.70

2.1.3 Partisans versus Chetniks

Related to the foregoing is the Second World War enmity between the Partisans of Josip Broz Tito, and the monarchist Chetniks led by Draza Mihailovic. These two resistance movements initially fought the Nazi’s together but turned against each other later on. The rightist Chetniks supported a non-federal, Serb dominated Yugoslavia and advocated the idea of a ‘Greater Serbia.’ They generally adhered to (extreme) nationalist views, and on more than one occasion collaborated with the Nazi’s. The leftist Partisans, on the other hand, were less pro-Serb and pleaded for the equality of all of Yugoslavia’s nationalities, therefore attracting greater support throughout the country. Tito was a strong proponent of a federal Yugoslavia without a role for the Karadjordje monarchy. The Partisans were supported mainly by the political left and the intelligentsia.71

Tito’s communist regime looked in a patronizing way at the traditionalist,

monarchy-adoring peasant culture which dominated Serbian inhabited lands in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. From there the Chetniks originated and derived their popular

support. Members of the communist regime not necessarily originated from the intelligentsia but the regime had entered into an unusual alliance with the urban and

70_{Ejdus, ‘Security, Culture and Identity in Serbia’, 45-51.}

71_{John K. Cox, The History of Serbia (Westport 2002) 85-91.; Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the}

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intellectual elements of society. Instead of purging the intellectual class, similar to what happened in other authoritarian regimes like the Sovjet-Union, Tito tolerated the urban intellectuals. In return, intellectuals defended and appraised the communist’s tolerant regime outside of Yugoslavia. Tito’s tolerant attitude made the intelligentsia move

towards the cities, increasing the cultural gap between the cities and the traditional village life.72

The legacy of the Chetnik-Partisan divide is still present in contemporary Serbian politics where it, according to Obrad Kesic, has been “one of the greatest obstacles to democratic reform.” Both sides are extremely intolerant towards each other, seeing power in the hands of the other as disastrous for Serbia. The Left blames the Right for its close ties with the Chetniks, the monarchy, the Orthodox Church, and Serbian folk culture, while the Right criticizes the Left for being corrupt, its desire for power, and its elitism towards the ordinary Serbs. In addition, the Left and Right blame each other for causing the Yugoslav Wars, the subsequent international isolation, and enabling Milošević’s rise to power. The rightists see the leftists as hypocrites because of promoting democratic values while at the same time having profited of the Titoist regime. The leftists disdain the rightists for their primitive nationalism and right-wing ideas.73

2.2 The political representation of values

This paragraph will look at the political representation of the above described divisions. That history plays an important role in Serbian politics is confirmed by Daniel Bochsler, he states that “contemporary political discussion in Serbia sometimes reads like a history book of Serbia in the twentieth century. Figures like Draza Mihailovic, Josip Broz Tito, Slobodan Milosevic, or Vojislav Seselj would fit in very well among the members of today’s parliament.”74

It is possible to make a division between nationalist and cosmopolitan parties.

72_{Eric D. Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia, Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives} (Pennsylvania 1999) 10.

73_{Obrad Kesić, ‘An Airplane with Eighteen Pilots, Serbia after Milošević’ in Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran} Pavlakovic eds., Serbia since 1989, Politics and Society Under Milošević and After (Seattle 2005) 105-106. 74_{Daniel Bochsler, ‘The Party System of Serbia’ in: Vera Storajova and Peter Emerson eds., Party Politics}

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Except for the SRS and SPS, also the democratic opposition parties DSS and SPO belong to the nationalist camp. Even the DS adopted a nationalist agenda for a short while in 1994-1995 but it has been advocating a non-nationalist Serbia ever since.75 Within the nationalist camp, different forms of nationalism can be distinguished. The SRS and SPS have propagated the most extreme, expansionist and populist form of nationalism. It should be noted, however, that the nationalist rhetoric of the SPS might have served more as an instrument for holding power than really constituting a confirmed belief. The SPO was most of all anti-communist and its nationalism can be labeled romantic rather than extremist. The traditionalist and conservative DSS has somehow managed to combine a nationalist program with a clear preference for democratic rules.76

The nationalist-cosmopolitan division to a large extent is similar to a division that can be labeled as authoritarian versus democratic though there are some crucial

differences. Better said, authoritarian parties are by definition nationalist but not all nationalist parties are by definition authoritarian. Authoritarianism has a strong influence on nationalism and is positively related to nationalism, where it negatively relates to liberalism.77 Parties adhering to authoritarianism are closely related to the former socialist regime and the Milosevic government. The SRS and SPS are the main political

representatives of the authoritarian current in Serbian society. Their red-black coalition government (1998-2000) marked the most authoritarian regime of the decade. According to Vera Storajova, these voters “identify themselves much more with the nation, do not like Americans, tend towards authority, are traditional, patriarchal, passive, and anti-Western.” On the other side, the democratic opposition throughout the 1990’s, consisted mainly of the pro-European DS, DSS, SPO, and the ethnic minority parties.78

Related to the nationalist-cosmopolitan divides is the Chetnik-Partisan legacy. The SRS, SPO and DSS have been representing Chetnik ideas in Serbian politics. The anti-communist SPO was at the time of its foundation driven by the desire for the rehabilitation of the Chetniks. The before mentioned SPO’s romantic nationalism is the most important characteristic relating it to the Chetniks. The association between the

75_{Bochsler, ‘The Party System of Serbia’, 103.} 76_{Todosijevic, ‘Serbia’, 519-520.}

78_{Vera Stojarova, ‘Nationalist Parties and the Party Systems’, in: Vera Storajova and Peter Emerson eds.,}

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Chetnik movement and the SPO is also found in its strong connection with the Serb Orthodox Church. The SPO attaches great value to the Church’s opinion, and has called for the introduction of religious education.79 It has supported the establishment of a Greater Serbia but abandoned the idea in 2001, showing a more moderate and pragmatic form of nationalism. The DSS is known for supporting the idea of a Greater Serbia, opposing the Dayton agreement, and repudiating the post-war borders. Its close ties with the Serbian Orthodox Church complement its upholding of the Chetnik tradition.80

The SRS is more extreme in its reference to the Chetnik heritage. With the establishment of the SRS in 1990, Vojislav Seselj declared his party, successor to the Chetnik fighters in WWII. He found the Serbian Chetnik Movement (SCP) which fought in the Croatian and Bosnian wars. Both the SCP and Seselj are accused of having

committed severe war crimes including mass murder and torture.81 Furthermore, like the Chetniks, the SRS is a fierce proponent of a Greater Serbia, meaning that “all Serbian lands should be united in a homogenous Serbian state.”82 The SRS has been seeking for revision of the Dayton agreement and the rearrangement of Serbia’s borders. It was also the only party to vote against the withdrawal of Serbian police and armed forces from Kosovo after the NATO bombing campaign of 1999.83

The conflict that would emerge within the DOS after the revolution between Kostunica and Djindjic – which will be discussed in detail in chapter three – illustrated and intensified the decades old struggle between Partisans and Chetniks. The nationalist Kostunica and his DSS mainly were mainly supported by rightist (Chetnik) voters where the pro-reformist Djindjic and the DS appealed to the more leftist (Partisan) oriented Serbs.84

One of the core differences between the nationalists and the cosmopolitans is the attitude towards the outside world. Kosovo, EU integration, NATO membership, and cooperation with the ICTY are the most important issues when it comes to foreign policy.

79_{Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990’s, 57-58.} 80

Bochsler, ‘The Party System of Serbia’, 108-110.

81_{BBC, ‘Profile: Vojislav Seselj,’ retrieved from:}_{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2317765.stm} [28-06-2010].

82_{ICTY, ‘Case information sheet: Vojislav Seselj’, retrieved from:}

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/seselj/cis/en/cis_seselj_en.pdf [29-06-2010]. 83_{Stojarova, ‘Nationalist Parties and the Party Systems’, 47-48.}

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Except for the SRS, all parties to a larger or lesser degree talk about EU integration. Even the SPS emphasized the need for international integration after the Dayton Agreement.85 The DS, SPO, and the ethnic minority parties are the most pro-European parties and also support future NATO membership. The nationalist parties rather turn to Russia than the EU. The SRS and SPS have been the most fervent opponents of cooperation with the ICTY. They see the ICTY as an anti-Serbian institution and the Serb nation as the main victim of the Yugoslav Wars. The DSS has been slightly milder but opposed the

extradition of Slobodan Milosevic in 2001.86

2.3 Social divisions

According to Knutsen and Scarbrough a cleavage can only be called as such when it consists of a “relatively persistent social division which gives rise to objectively identifiable groups.”87 Eric Gordy seems to provide a quick answer by stating that the conflict between the regime parties and the democratic opposition in the 1990’s was a conflict of south versus north, undeveloped versus developed, province versus

metropolis, and village versus city.88 Although Gordy does touch on the major social divisions in Serbian society, it seems uncertain whether there really is a straightforward connection between social divisions and party preference in Serbia.

Bojan Todosijevic has done research on the subject. He analyzed the relationship between party preference and the variables of age, residence (urban-rural), occupation, and education. For the age variable, Todosijevic finds that Serbia is similar to other post-communist states in the sense that the elderly tend to support the former post-communist party. In Serbia, people voting for the SPS are relatively older than those supporting other parties. As the leading party of the opposition during the 1990’s, the SPO attracted most of all young voters, as did the DS. Although the DSS initially appealed mostly to young voters, its post-2000 popularity has widened its constituency to an average age category.

85_{Todosijevic, ‘Serbia’, 515.}

86_{Stojarova, ‘Nationalist Parties and the Party Systems’, 47-48.; Bochsler, ‘The Party System of Serbia’,} 103-108.

87_{Alejandro Moreno, Political cleavages, Issues Parties, and the Consolidation of Democracy (Boulder} 1999) 21.

Brussels or Jerusalem?