Securing the Space Domain: A New Military Challenge
Tjeerdjan Nieuwenhuis Deliplein 67
9715 DB Groningen Student number: 1358936
Master thesis: Modern History and International Relations April 2011
Supervisor: Dr. C.M. Megens University of Groningen
Contents
Introduction 2
The Space Age 7
Space Threat 30
Securing the Space Domain 62
Conclusion 102
Introduction
When science fiction entered popular culture one of the central themes in the genre were political relations among societies, including war, in the outer-space domain. In general, most authors depicted a future in which space was occupied by vast galactic empires encompassing several groups of star systems, that waged war with one another on a regular basis. Within the genre it became quite common to envision these interplanetary or intergalactic wars as conflicts in which highly developed human and alien civilizations fought battles with immense fleets of spaceships all armed with futuristic weaponry, such as lasers or ray guns. The depiction of these epic space battles commonly resembled 18th and 19th century naval warfare but with the simple addition of a third dimension. As science fiction moved into the new media of film and television it became possible to project these space battles on the big screen. The advance of special effects helped to produce complex long action space sequences. In particular, George Lucas’ Star Wars saga broke new grounds by showing large fleets of Imperial Star Destroyers and Mon Calamari Star Cruisers maneuvering according to Nelsonian battle tactics and surrounded by swarms of X-wings and Tie-fighters chasing each other in complex maneuvers modeled after World War Two-era dogfights. Soon more science fiction films and television series appeared that used similar effects to depict violent conflicts in outer space, such as Star Trek and Battlestar Galactica.
Hollywood’s depiction of space battles may be thrilling, sweeping and visually stunning, it is still science fiction. Of course, there is a hug gap between reality and fiction as there are no X-wings, Tie-fighter or Death Stars to wage war with. Also, Earth is not part of a vast galactic empire that rivals with other civilizations in space. Space warfare, nevertheless, has become a real possibility in the early twenty-first century, as near-Earth space is occupied by satellites that are being used by humans for all kinds of purposes and could become targets for destruction during earthly hostilities.
information between commanders and units deployed overboard. Furthermore, space proved to be useful for many other activities such as weather forecasting, mapping, navigation, and missile early warning. In essence, space turned out to be the ultimate high ground which gave the superpower tremendous advantages in maintaining strategic nuclear stability. However, the significance of space systems was not to be limited to the pre-conflict aspect of nuclear deterrence.
During the 1991 Gulf War satellites greatly enhanced the effectiveness of military operations on the operational and tactical level. Throughout the conflict the United States and its allies used space assets for a myriad of functions which significantly helped them to achieve military victory over Iraqi armed forces. Since then, the space contribution to ongoing military operations has continued to grow, especially for United States military. In the wars against Serbia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and again against Iraq in 2003 space assets were essential for rapid exchange of information to and from units and battlefield commanders, for bomb damage assessments, to locate targets, and to guide all kind of ordnances with pin-point precision. Today, the United States may be the most extensive user of space for military and security purposes. Other countries, such as Russia, the main inheritor of the Soviet space infrastructure, and many European countries pursue military space capabilities in accordance to the American example. In addition, upcoming countries such as China are also interested in the development of military satellites.
Near Earth space is not only used for military purposes. From the late twentieth century onward satellites have become more and more significant for all kind of civil and commercial purposes. Currently, in the Untied States and in many other countries, space-based technology is used for application related to transportation, healthcare, the environment, telecommunications, education, commerce, agriculture, meteorology, navigation, and energy. Space has become part of everyday life for many people. The exploitation of space is irreversible and probably continues to set through making the United States and other countries even more dependent on space-based assets in the near future. Space, as such, has become a significant dimension for national power.
space infrastructure is largely unprotected. It can be anticipated that in the foreseeable future space-faring states would be willing to deny each other the use of space. Military history has proven repeatedly that assets that have great strategic value for a belligerent are worth to be attacked by others. Therefore, satellites as the metaphorical eyes and ears of a state, could be conceived by belligerents as lucrative targets to degrade the ability of the opponent to conduct military operations, and/or to hurt its economy and society. In line with this reasoning much has been speculated within the American defense community about the danger of a so-called ‘space Pearl Harbor’.1 Obviously, Pearl Harbor refers to the surprise attack by Japan in 1941 on Hawaii, the space equivalent of such an attack would probably have to be seen as a metaphor for being caught unaware by attacks against space systems. To meet this requirement something has to be done to reduce the vulnerability and enhance the security of United States space system. Just as navies have ensured that pirates did not harass commercial maritime activities, armies have defended borders against hostile invasions, and air forces have secured the airspace from hostile aerial threats, militaries, in particular that of the United States, now faces the challenge to do the same for space infrastructures.
The best way to provide this protection is less clear and hotly debated within the United States. Different visions and ideas have been postulated with different solutions to tackle the security problem of space assets. For example, since the beginning of the space age it has been quite fashionable to propagate the desire to maintain space as a war-free sanctuary. This sanctuary perspective has also been proposed as a policy or strategy in order to prevent hostilities in space from breaking out or taking place.2 For this school of thought it is imperative that the United States honors present international law on the free use of space and actively seeks mutual agreements with other countries on remaining
1
The term ‘space Pearl Harbor’ was first used in a governmental report headed by Donald Rumsfeld. The report is titled the following: Report of the Commission to assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization (Washington, DC., 2001). Available at:
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/commission/report.htm (June 2010).
2
See for example: H.Caldicott and C. Eisendrath, War in Heaven: the arms race in outer space (New York 2007); M. Moore, ‘A New Cold War?’, SAIS Review 26, 1 (2006) 175-188; B.M. Deblois, ‘The Advent of Space Weapons’, Astropolitics 1, 1 (2003) 29-53; Idem, ‘Space Sanctuary’, Airpower Journal 12, 4 (1998) 41-58; A. Weston, ‘Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks, and US Policy Implications’, Air & Space Power Journal 23, 1 (2009) 73-82; and D.W. Zeigler, ‘Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space
space as a natural preserve of all mankind. Other proposals, made by different authors, suggest the requirement of a space strategy that would give the United States a preponderance of space power.3 Space, according to these so-called space hegemonists, is the ‘ultimate high ground’ which, in their view, means that seizing control of space is likened to the imperative of seizing control of a strategically important hilltop in an ordinary ground war. Their logic tells that whenever the United States has the capability to effectively deny others from using space and is capable to project force from space down to Earth, it could win any war, and, thereby, to be in a position to determine international politics. Of course, this strategy goes way beyond the sole mission of satellite protection but, if possible, it would promise to be a potent force to secure space systems.
These two schools of thought are quite extreme in content and can be perceived as the two polar extremes within the so-called space weaponization debate.4 However, not all positions in the debate on the weaponization of space are hawkish or dovish nor should this debate be seen as centered around the question of whether space should be weaponized or not. Instead, the debate encompasses issues much more diverse than weapons alone, in essence it is about the question on how to pursue a secured use of space. As such, there are more nuanced opinions that do not embrace all-or-nothing positions. For example, some authors are convinced that a vast space weapons program is too costly and that a deterrence strategy, based on the Cold War deterrence logic of the persuasiveness of threats of punishments, could guarantee that opponents would not attack United States’ space-based assets. Others see more practicability in arms control measurement that would halt the incentives for states to build space weaponry with which satellites could be threatened. Furthermore, they see utility in measurements that seek to deny adversaries benefits of attack by improving on-board satellite protection and
3
See for example: E.C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (London 2002); G. Friedman and M. Friedman, The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century (New York 1996); B. Smith, ‘The Challenge of Space Power’, Airpower Journal, 13, 1 (1999) 32-39; and M.R. Mantz, The New Sword: a theory of space combat power (Maxwell AFB, Alabama 1995).
4
mission-effective satellite alternatives. The topic on space weaponization, as such, is much more diverse.
Space and its utilization by Man
Space is a unique environment that is boundless, vast, and home to millions of stars, planets, moons, asteroids, comets, meteoroids, and, since a few decades, also to man-made objects (i.e. military, civil, and commercial satellites). This chapter will provide a brief primer on space exploitation by man. It includes a short description of the beginning of the space age and its use for military, civil and commercial purposes. Furthermore, this chapter will explain some of the basic geometry and physics of space, satellites, and man-made limitation on the exploitation of space. It will note that with existing trends there is a tendency for growing space exploitation. As space is becoming more and more part of human existence on Earth there is great potential for space of becoming a battlefield during earthly hostilities.
The Space Age
With the launch of the Sputnik on 4 October 1957, as the first artificial satellite orbiting Earth, the space age dawned. It marked a culminating point in the development of several space related technologies and theories that began at the outset of the 20th century. In 1903, the year the airplane made its debut, the Russian self-made scientist Konstantin Tsiolkovsky (1857-1935) published the article ‘Exploration of the Universe with Reaction Machines’ in which he meticulously described how a rocket with the speed of 28500 kilometer per hour could escape Earth’s gravity. Also, in the same document, he laid bare the fundamental mathematical principles needed to master orbital physics.5 Independently of Tsiolkovsky, the American Robert Goddard (1882-1945) worked on similar theories and designed, built, and launched the first high-altitude rockets. In 1919 he published his test findings in A Method of Reaching Extreme Altitudes. This work not only contained the blueprint of a reusable two-stage solid-propellant rocket that could reach the near limits of the atmosphere, it also elaborated on the feasibility of hitting the moon with a rocket. On the latter Goddard was ridiculed in the American press because of the popular notion, derived from Newton’s third law of motion, that rockets could not
5
travel through space because there was no ‘air’ to push against. Therefore, and despite Goddard response that the rocket was a self-contained unit capable of producing a reaction within its own body to cause movement, his vision of going to the moon was simply not believed.6 While ridiculed in the press getting funds for further research was quite difficult for him.
On the European continent, on the other hand, getting funds was less of a problem. In particular, it was in Germany and the Soviet Union that the visionary ideas of rockets reaching outer space received wide governmental support. In 1924, the Central Committee for the study of Rocket Propulsion was formed, thereby, the Soviet Union became the first nation to endorse the goal of space travel. But it was in Germany where the first major scientific breakthroughs occurred. There it was that the visionary path of space travel was laid out by Hermann Oberth (1894-1989) with his famous work Die Rakete zu den Planetenräumen.7 His ideas managed to capture the imagination of a broad public, including the German military. For high-ranking artillery officers the potential military significance of rocketry was not kept unnoticed which greatly inspired them to learn about rocket technology. Prohibited by the Versailles treaty of 1919, the German army was not allowed to have heavy artillery but the restrictions were silent about the development of rockets. At that time rockets were not perceived as weapons and omitted from the military restrictions laid out in the treaty. The German artillery officers wanted to exploit this loophole by turning rockets into super-long-range bombs and provide the army with a novel source of military power without violating the Versailles treaty. The potential military significance of rocketry was also picked up by the Nazi-regime which heavily invested in the technology throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. Headed by the notorious Wernher von Braun the German rocket team designed, built, and tested all kind of prototypes of which the A-4, better known as the V-2, was the most successful one. It was this weapon that in the latter part of the Second World War struck London, Antwerp, and other West European cities.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the significant potential of the military use of rocketry. Driven by the political rivalry of the Cold War and helped
6
Burrows, This New Ocean, 44-48.
7
by captured German scientists and knowledge, they developed their own versions of the V-2. Furthermore, the fierce political competition propelled East and West for the development of more advanced and more powerful rockets capable of hurling (nuclear) warheads from the center of one superpower to the heart of another in about half an hour. These military rockets, or missiles, utilized space as a transit domain before hitting their target. The use of outer space in this particular mode was quite limited but this was set to change with the development of satellite technology. Although the first satellites were only launched in the second half of the 1950s, already in 1946 the potential significance of man-made satellites was reviewed by the RAND Corporation.8 The report, titled Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship, discussed all facets of satellites including the possible military uses, among them were reconnaissance, weather observation, communications, missile guidance, and bomb damage assessment capabilities. From the 1950s and 1960s onward these functions were realized by the numerous satellites that were launched. The use of space for these purposes are generally known as space force enhancement.
Space Force Enhancement
The term space force enhancement is commonly used to indicate the significance of the use of Earth orbiting systems for enhancing the abilities of military units, terrestrial platforms, and munitions.9 It simply refers to the capabilities that generate or facilitate a more effective and efficient application of military force or operations in times of peace and war. In providing this support, space activities generally serve as force multipliers. One of the first applications of space systems to enhance military capabilities was the employment of communications satellites. During the early 1960s the United States launched its first communications satellites making it possible to transmit radio messages across the oceans. With these systems they overcame the limitations of ground-based,
8
The RAND Corporation was and is a nonprofit policy think tank founded in 1946. The institute offers research and analysis to United States armed forces on a wide range of topics, including space power issues. For the 1946 report on the military use of artificial satellites see: F.H. Clauser ed., Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship (Santa Monica, RAND 1946). Available at:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/special_memoranda/2006/SM11827part1.pdf (July 11, 2010).
9
tower-to-tower radio signaling systems making it less difficult for command centers to communicate directly with the armed forces on the battlefield. Furthermore, communications satellites where valuable substitutes for submarine communications cables which until the age of satellites were primarily used for transcontinental exchange of information.
Another space force enhancement capability that was developed was the ability to spot the launch of a ballistic missile and immediately relay that information to the ground. These spacecrafts were known as early warning satellites. In the 1950s, radars were used to detect incoming hostile missiles, but because of the curvature of the earth the range of radars was limited and provided only about 15 minutes during which a government could work out a response. The use of satellites capable of detecting the enemy’s missiles as soon as they are launched extended this warning time to some 30 minutes.10 Clearly the vantage point that space offered was comparable to none other on Earth. This was also true for the field of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. To get insight on the development of each others strategic forces both superpowers built spy satellites. With these systems it became possible to view routinely denied areas in order to find ballistic missile sites, bomber fields, and other military installations. The information provided by these satellites enhanced the knowledge of intelligence agencies on the military capabilities of the opponent and helped dispelling myths about so-called 'missile gaps' or other misperceived threats.
Satellites were also significant for enhancing navigation capabilities. Early navigation techniques, although reliable, were often troublesome because bad weather could spoil positioning calculations. Navigation satellites solved this problem. By signaling from space these systems help to determine one’s location and bearing at any point on earth. Moreover, they provide consistent and reliable information which could be transmitted through fog and clouds. The first truly global navigation system was the NAVSTAR GPS system. Launched in 1978 by the US Air Force it provided precise information regarding latitude, longitude, altitude, travel velocity and direction, and time
10
to all kinds of military platforms, including long range strategic weapons.11 The Soviet Union developed and launched a similar constellation of navigation satellites, called GLONASS. However, this system was less advanced and rapidly fell into disrepair with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Note, that the military space activities of both Superpowers during the Cold War were primarily driven by nuclear-strategic and intelligence functions. Above all, these functions were directed at the same target, either the Soviet Union or the United States in a pre-conflict fashion. During the Cold War this changed gradually, especially for United States military. Although the military role of space assets did not alter significantly, in essence, that role was still that of support, meaning the enhancement of military operations within the atmosphere. But the emphasis of space support became more focused on the real-time enhancement of ongoing, non-nuclear military operations. In contrast to the early days of the Cold War, the value of near-earth space for military purposes came to rest no longer solely on its supportive role in nuclear deterrence strategy, instead the new main function of space systems was to provide information services to improve the operational and tactical capabilities of air, sea, and land forces.
The First Gulf War can be seen as a clear example of this changed, operational and tactical role of space-based assets. During this conflict the United States and its allies used satellites for a myriad of functions. For example, sixteen military and five commercial communications satellites were utilized for long-haul communications, to optimize command and control functions, and to pass information in and out of the Gulf theater.12 Imagery satellites were employed to create detailed and updated maps for order-of-battle and target intelligence. The Cold War-era early-warning satellites alerted coalition forces of attacks by Iraqi modified-Scud ballistic missiles and provided information on launch location. Another novel and important use of space assets was the navigational help that was provided by the GPS satellite system to coalition forces. GPS allowed Allied tank forces to find their way through the featureless Iraqi deserts. Furthermore, the opening air campaign was made possible by GPS-equipped special purpose helicopters that functioned as pathfinders for AH-64 Apache attack helicopters,
11
S. Lambakis, On the Edge of Earth: The future of American Space Power (Lexington 2001) 18-19.
12
which did not possess GPS at that time, to attack Iraqi radar sites with the purpose to provide opening passages through Iraqi airspace for coalition fighter-bombers.13
Let it be clear that space systems increasingly enhanced the performance of the United States military and its allies in their effort against the military forces of Saddam Hussein. The vantage point of space proofed to be the best location for the collection and rapid distribution of information. It helped to provide a lopsided advantage for coalition forces on the where about of enemy forces, while the Iraqi commanders could only guess where the American-led coalition would attack. The systematic use of space systems certainly had a great share in the spectacular military victory of the coalition over the Iraqi armed forces, whereas the American and Allied forces suffered less than 300 combat-related deaths and the Iraqi’s more than 30000. Due to the extensive use of satellites during this conflict, the 1991 Gulf War is often presented as the ‘first space war’, because many within the military establishment for the first time became aware of how important the investments in space systems actually were to the overall military power of the United States.14
Since 1991 the space contribution to the United States military has continued to grow. During the 1990s a major breakthrough was achieved in the development of precision guided ordnances. Already during the Vietnam War experiments where conducted with laser guided precision bombs. These weapons were used during the Gulf War with great success. Nevertheless, laser beams can be deflected by clouds or dust storms which greatly affect the accuracy of these weapons. In 1995 development began on a cheap tail kit that could turn an iron ‘dumb’ bomb into a smart weapon. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), as these systems are official called, use GPS signals to steer itself towards a particular target. Currently GPS is used as a guidance system in various bomb and missile types. There are even special artillery rounds fitted with GPS.15 With every succeeding war, the use of GPS aided munitions by the United States has grown extensively. For instance, during the 1999 Kosovo War 29 percent of the ordnances used
13
M. Boot, War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the course of history, 1500 to today (New York 2006) 318-319.
14
P. Anson Bt and D. Cunnings, ‘The First Space War: The contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War’, The RUSI Journal, 136, 4 (1991) 45-53.
15
were precision guided, in 2001 in the war over Afghanistan this figure had risen to 60 percent, and in 2003 during the invasion of Iraq 68 percent of the bombs thrown were ‘smart’.16
The navigational information provided by GPS has not only allowed for an explosive growth in the number of precision guided munitions, it also fixed certain flight problems with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Instead of some complex and expensive inertial navigation system, a low-cost GPS receiver simply tells the UAV where it is in time and place.17 With such data and piloted through communication satellites from military bases in the United States UAVs can perform various missions, while flying over an area on the other side of the globe.
Space has become a significant and essential player in the planning for, and conduct of, military operations. In liaison with the revolution in information technology, the military use of space has steadily become ubiquitous, providing the capacity to form networks that link all armed services of the United States. Space systems make it possible to realize the vision of net-centric warfare, laid down by the United States Department of Defense during the 1990s, to lift the boundaries of the separate armed services and to network as many elements of the armed forces together. This network allows all kind of military units not only to communicate with one another, but also to engage targets only seen by other units. Net-centric warfare, flattens hierarchy, reduces operational pause, enhances precision, and increases the speed of command.18 Space systems provide information support to military units, increasing effectiveness not through increased firepower but by providing the capacity to share and use information rapidly and effectively. The extensive military use of space has multiplied the effectiveness of combat forces through providing them with far greater intelligence information about enemy force disposition and even allowing them real-time imagery of movement of hostile forces.
Probably, the heavy and growing dependence on space is an irreversible trend. Substitutes for space assets exist but only the vantage point of space can provide the
16
Boot, War Made New, 361, 382, 396.
17
Wong and Fergusson, Military Space Power, 57.
18
required infrastructure and information services for a truly networked armed force. Therefore, it can be predicted, that the military exploitation of near-earth space is here to stay. Above all, space systems have become key for effective performances of joint military operations. It is unlikely that the United States will retreat from space. Also, sound logic suggest that other major powers will seek to replicate the United States military by adopting and incorporating space-enabled information-age techniques into their own armed forces, to enable the same effectiveness on the battlefield.
Globalization and Space
Soviet strategic thinkers were among the first to recognize the significance of the use of space systems on operational and tactical levels of warfare, but due to the collapse of the Soviet Union their version of space force enhancement was never realized.19 However, Russia as the main inheritor of the Soviet military infrastructure still operates the second largest fleet of military satellites in the world and possesses an important space industry.20 Its current use of military space assets is focused primarily on providing strategic rather than tactical support, nevertheless this is set to be changed when the GLOSNASS navigation system becomes fully operational. As mentioned above, GLOSNASS was developed by the Soviet Union and fell into disrepair in the 1990s, however, beginning in 2001, the Russian government said to be committed to restore the system. It is expected that in 2011 GLONASS will achieve global coverage, and thereby be capable of providing the same services as the GPS counterpart system. Russia defense industry already has developed an array of weaponry that requires modern targeting capabilities. Deployment of these systems will likely be part of the State Armament Program 2020, announced by the Kremlin in 2010, which aims at an extensive re-armament of the Russian military.21
19
Lambakis, On the Edge of the Earth, 196-197.
20
Space Security 2010 (Waterloo 2010), 119. Available at:
http://www.spacesecurity.org/space.security.2010.reduced.pdf (September 20, 2010).
21
D. Gorenburg, ‘Russia’s State Armament Program 2020: Is the third time the charm for military modernization’, October 12, 2010. Available at:
The Chinese government also understands the importance of space for its national security interests. Already in 1975 China launched its first satellite, since then its space program has made tremendous progress. By 2003 it even became the third country in the world after the United States and Russia, to be capable of sending humans into Earth orbit independently. Originally, China’s space program was firmly focused on military space applications, which it still is today. Experts believe that the Chinese army strives for similar space capabilities as the United States.22 For this purpose China has launched a range of communication, weather, remote sensing, navigation, and other satellites which should enable Chinese military commanders to communicate and share data with forces under joint command. Of most interest is China’s ambition to develop an independent global satellite navigation system, similar to the Russian and American counterparts. China already operates the Beidou navigation systems but this constellation provides only regional coverage and limited accuracy. The newly to be built system, named Compass, will be similar in principle to GPS and GLONASS, and can provide accurate guidance information to a range of weapons systems, such as ballistic missiles, ‘smart’ bombs, and cruise missiles.
The military exploitation of space is, however, not an exclusive domain of these three countries. Other states utilize military satellites for communication, reconnaissance, surveillance, imagery, damage assessment, and navigation purposes as well. Most prominently are the major European countries, who also in cooperation with the EU develop and build the Galileo satellite navigation systems which will be operational in 2013. Although Galileo is initially designed for commercial use it is also applicable for national security purposes by EU member states. Outside Europe, countries like India, Israel, Iran, Japan, Australia, Brasilia, South Korea, own and operate military and/or commercial satellites for a range of space-enabled information services. Note that not all of these states have independent launch capabilities. Currently only nine states have the capacity to launch satellites, these are, the United States, Russia, France, Japan, China, United Kingdom, India, Israel, and Iran. Many other states have suborbital capabilities,
22
which means that they have the capability to enter space with rockets but cannot yet achieve orbits around Earth. These states are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Italy, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and Syria.23 It can be expected that due to globalization access to space technology will grow which will cause these states to further develop their space capabilities and possible, in the near future, to be capable of launching and operating their own space systems. As this trend continues it will ultimately make an end to the absolute pre-eminence of the United States, and other major powers, in space.24
Thus far the description above on the utilization of near-Earth space focused mainly on the military use of satellites. In the post-Cold War era an important transition has taken place towards the exploitation of space for civil and commercial purposes, especially in the Western world. Initially, GPS may have begun as a military project, but the application has diversified in recent decades to the point that in 2001 the military use of GPS accounted for only two percent of its total use.25 The immense scale of non-military applications of GPS indicates that the system has become a global utility, which is being applied for all kind of purposes. Most modern cars are equipped with GPS receivers for precise location and navigation. Also, modern businesses use space navigation to track and trace their trucks that transport spare parts or products from factories and warehouses to customers. Maritime industries use GPS to allow cargo vessels to safely enter and dock in harbors. Commercial air transportation industry relies on GPS to allow safe airplane landings. In addition, telecommunication, remote sensing, weather and other satellites are also used for commercial and civil purposes. Today millions of individuals rely on space systems on a daily basis, as phones, televisions, radios, and all kind of personal data devices in one way or another rely on satellites for the transmission of information that flows to and from them. Modern information societies have become widely dependent on space systems as it enables a wide public to share, utilize, distribute, and create information.
23
Space Security 2010, 84.
24
B. de Montluc, ‘The new international political and strategic context for space policies’, Space Policy 25, 1 (2009) 20-28, 21; and A. Burzykowska, ‘Smaller states and the new balance of power in space’, Space Policy 25, 3 (2009) 187-192, 188-189.
25
Quite likely the dependency of modern societies on space systems for economic, civil, and national security purposes is set to grow. Expecting this trend to continue it can be anticipated that states will develop strategies and weaponry to defend their space assets against possible hostile attacks or to be able to deny the use of space to others. To paraphrase the British strategist Colin Gray: ‘It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others.’26 With great probability, warfare in space will be a certainty in the future especially when the United States, or any other space-faring power, whishes to retain its national space assets and degrade or destroy that of others during armed struggle. Necessarily, to protect national interests in space states would have to develop strategies, doctrines, and capabilities to do so.
The Geometry and Physics of Space
Before elaborating further on space warfare it is essential to provide some information on the space environment. This is necessary because the physical properties of space defines just what is possible and what is not possible in space, what can and cannot be done. Although technology can change that story, the unique geographical realities of space cannot be altered and will, with absolute certainty, due to its permanency, continue to impose distinctive constraints on future space activities.
To begin with the demarcation of outer space. Where does space begin? It is problematic to give a clear boundary line of where the Earth’s atmosphere ends and space begins. Natural scientists often find it useful to divide the atmosphere in different layers stretching from the troposphere to the exosphere. But because the upper limit of the exosphere extend to an altitude of 10000 kilometers, which is significantly higher than the minimum altitude for earth orbit, this demarcation is not useful. A more common demarcation is the Kármán line. Theordore von Kármán (1881-1963) calculated that at around 100 kilometers above Earth, a vehicle would have to fly faster than orbital velocity in order to derive sufficient aerodynamic lift from the atmosphere to support
26
itself. In other words, at that altitude a vehicle can achieve Earth orbit. Nonetheless, the minimum orbital altitude of 100 kilometers in practice is unstable, a vehicle at that altitude would require active propulsion to maintain sufficient speed to stay in orbit because there remains enough atmospheric drag for rapid decay to Earth.27 However, for our purpose outer space begins at 100 kilometers, as it is a commonly used boundary demarcation. Note that in practice the lowest of stable orbits can only be found at an approximate altitude of 150 kilometers. Airplanes, on the other hand, cannot fly higher than 20 kilometers because at that altitude their engines refuse to function and the atmosphere is too thin to generate aerodynamic lift.28 As a result, there is a huge region surrounding Earth that is relatively unexploited before one can find operationally useful orbits.
What is an orbit? An orbit is the path of a spacecraft or satellite caught in the grip of gravity.29 Basically, satellites achieve Earth orbit by being propelled beyond the atmosphere with the speed of 28500 kilometer per hour (at relatively low altitudes). This particular velocity counteracts the force of gravity. Furthermore, at that speed when moving sideways, the earth recedes from the satellite at the same speed that the earth's gravity pulls the satellite toward it. Put differently, the orbiting vehicle is constantly falling towards the center of the Earth, but never hits the surface.30
The properties of orbits are described in terms of altitude, eccentricity, orbital period, and inclination. As said, the minimum altitude for earth orbit can be set at approximately 150 kilometers, lower orbital altitudes are instable due to great atmospheric drag. Therefore, as a rule of thumb, the higher the altitude, the more stable the orbit. For example, satellites at 300 kilometers have to burn their engines now and them, otherwise drag will cause the spacecraft to gradually lose altitude until it re-enters the atmosphere and burns up. Atmospheric drag ceases to interfere at approximately 2000 kilometers above Earth, this is where the hard vacuum of Earth begins. At that altitude all
27
Wong and Fergusson, Military Space Power, 16-17.
28
J.J. Sellers et al., Understanding Space: an introduction to Astronautics (New York 2005) 73-74.
29
E.C. Dolman, ‘Geostrategy in the Space Age: an Astropolicial Analysis’ in: C.S. Gray and G. Sloan ed., Geoplitics: geography and strategy (London 1999) 83-106, 84.
30
objects will stay in orbit permanently. However, already at 600 kilometers the atmosphere is so thin that the effect of drag is almost insignificant.31
The eccentricity of an orbit describes the variations in altitude of an orbiting mass. Because it is almost impossible to create perfect circular orbits, most orbits are elliptical and have differing altitudes, relative to Earth. The apogee is called the highest point in orbit and the perigee the lowest. An orbital period is the time it takes for a satellite to circumnavigate the body it is orbiting, in this case the Earth. Generally, the higher the average altitude the slower the satellite appears to travel relative to the body it orbits.32 Satellites at low altitude, for example, can have orbital periods of 90 minutes, at higher altitudes it takes hours or even days to circle the Earth.
Additional useful details can be given by determining the satellite’s inclination. Once launched into space, the shape of the satellite’s orbit will form a flat plane that bisects the Earth. Measuring the inclination can be done in terms of the degrees above or below the equator.33 The degree of inclination determines which area of the Earth the satellite can view. A satellite with a 90 degree orbit, for example, overflies the North and the South Poles every time it circumnavigate the Earth and effectively can pass over every point on Earth. Satellites with an inclination of 45 degrees will only be able to overfly the territories ranging from 45 degrees north to 45 degrees south of the equator.34 If the satellite’s inclination is 0 degree, and its altitude is constant at 36000 kilometers, the satellite will appear to stand still above the same equatorial point. This is called a geostationary orbit.35
Note that orbits are highly inflexible. The movement of a spacecraft is determined by the effects of gravity which rigidly inhibit freedom of movement. Whereas airplanes can fly in any directions, satellites cannot. For this reason, orbits can be described mathematically, which means that a satellite’s position above the earth can be calculated from a few variables. From a strategic point of view it means that a political actor can calculate with great precision which satellite it can use at which moment in time. It also means that a political entity can estimate the orbits of adversary’s space systems at any
31
Sellers, Understanding Space, 81-82.
32
Dolman, Astropolitik, 63.
33
Idem, 63.
34
Lambakis, On the Edge of the Earth, 298.
35
moment in time. In relation to the predictability of orbits it is noteworthy to state that simple hobbyists can figure out the math behind satellite orbits with the information collected from backyard telescopes. Some of these amateurs even maintain websites on which they post orbital information of practically any satellite, both commercial as well as military.36 Getting orbital information is thus not very hard.
Satellites can maneuver but in order to do so much energy is required.37 Because satellites can only carry limited supplies of fuel with them into space their ability to change orbits is severely restricted. Moreover, for the most part this supply is consumed to counteract orbital perturbations, which are forces that gradually move a satellite from its useful planned orbit. Sources that cause orbital perturbations are: atmospheric drag, solar winds, difference in gravity due to the earth not being the perfect sphere from which basic orbits are calculated, third-party gravitational influences, and collisions. Thus, satellite orbits are highly inflexible due to the effects of gravity and thereby predictable, movement of a spacecraft is possible but dependent on finite fuel supplies which are mostly spent to counteract natural forces that cause an orbiting body to depart from its pre-calculated orbit. The life of a spacecraft is, for the most, a function of its fuel capacity and orbital stability.38
There are several recognizable categories for terrestrial orbits, which are based on altitude and mission utility. The first category is Low Earth Orbits (LEO), these lie between 150 to 2000 kilometers above the surface of the Earth. These altitudes are particularly useful for remote-sensing, reconnaissance, surveillance, and meteorological missions. LEO allow for 14 to 16 complete orbits per. Furthermore, LEO has the advantage that satellites can be placed into them with cheaper and less sophisticated two-stage rockets. Orbits above 2000 kilometers require at least a third two-stage boost to achieve final orbit.39
The second category is Medium Earth Orbit (MEO). These orbits have altitudes ranging from the upper limits of LEO (2000 kilometers) to 35000 kilometers in altitude and allow for 2 to 14 orbits per day. These are generally circular or low eccentricity
36
Lambakis, On the Edge of the Earth, 119. See http://www.heavens-above.com (August 2, 2010) for information on practically any satellite.
37
On the complex characteristics of maneuvering in space see: Sellers, Understanding Space, 191-219.
38
Dolman, Astropolitik, 64-65.
39
orbits that are practical for supporting linked satellite networks. Note that the delimitation between LEO and MEO is quite notional and arbitrary. For instance, some authors choose to put the upper limits of LEO at 800 or at 300 kilometers. What is of importance to know is that generally lower orbital altitudes are used for missions such as reconnaissance and surveillance, because these need closer views of earth. Higher orbital altitudes, on the other hand, are more practical for missions that need relatively more stable orbits, such as navigation. Therefore, navigation satellites such as those of the GPS and GLOSNASS systems can be found at an approximate altitude of 20000 kilometers, and in the near-future, also those of the to be built Galileo and COMPASS satellite navigation systems.
The third category can be found at the altitude of 36000 kilometers, this is the province of Geosynchronous Earth Orbits (GEO). The orbital period of spacecrafts at this altitude is identical to one rotation of Earth. Furthermore, as long as the satellite is orbiting in the same direction as the Earth's rotation, the satellite will constantly cover the same spot of the Earth’s surface.40 A geosynchronous orbit with an inclination of 0 degree will appear fixed above the equator, this is called a geostationary orbit. The orbital altitude of GEO is commonly occupied by communication and early-warning satellites. Access to these satellites can be realized with non-manoeuvrable antennae. This feature is useful for applications designed for a broad public, such as direct television distribution.
The fourth category is High Earth Orbit (HEO). These are orbits beyond the 36000 kilometers of GEO. However, this orbital area contains no satellites of great strategic importance. Of more strategic significance are the last two categories, namely Polar Orbit and Molniya Orbit. Both are eccentric orbits. Spacecrafts with a polar orbit will pass over the North and South pole each complete orbit, and thus have an inclination of 90 degrees. A unique feature of polar orbit is that a satellite will eventually pass over all points on Earth. These orbits are often used for Earth-mapping, Earth observation, and weather satellites. The Iridium communication satellite constellation, used by the United States military, also uses a polar orbit to provide its services. Polar orbiting spacecrafts can commonly be found in MEO, but lower or higher altitudes are also possible for polar orbit. Molniya Orbit is an orbit that can be described as highly eccentric with a perigee as
40
low as 250 kilometers and an apogee of up to 700000 kilometers.41 Satellites placed in Molniya orbit have high inclinations and make use of the so-called apogee dwell, which means that these spacecrafts appear to move slowly at apogee relative to the surface of the Earth and fast at perigee.42 This particular orbital characteristic makes these orbits very useful for communication satellites servicing the arctic regions, as geostationary satellites have difficulties with covering these areas. Russia has made the greatest use of highly elliptical orbits, as most of the Russian heartland lies near or in the northern arctic.
Most, if not all, satellites that are currently in use by governments, militaries, and businesses can be found in either LEO, MEO or GEO. This means that the space beyond geosynchronous orbits is of less strategic relevance. Some authors are well intrigued by the potential strategic significance of exploiting the resources of the Moon or the occupation and exploitation of the so-called Lagrange Liberation Points.43 The latter refers to five points in space where objects can be stationary relative to the Earth and the Moon, due to the balancing of the gravitational forces and orbital motion of these bodies at these five locations. This means that an object positioned at one of those points would not require fuel to remain stable permanently. The Lagrange Liberation Points are perceived as perfect locations for a space base or space colony. However, and besides the political will, the costs involved in exploiting the Moon and occupying one of the Lagrange Liberation Points are immense and currently unaffordable for any space-faring state. Space is not an environment that is easily occupied and exploited by mankind. In contrast to flying or sailing, spaceflights are highly expeditionary that need complex and costly technologies, most notably, to overcome the effects of gravity and the hazards of space.
Getting satellites in orbit, already, is a very challenging enterprise which requires expensive rockets capable of overcoming Earth’s gravitational pull that cannot be reused. Furthermore, it differs if a rocket has to put a satellite into LEO or GEO. An ordinary three-stage rocket, for example, could normally carry a payload of fifteen tons into LEO, but only three tons into GEO. Consequently, putting satellites into LEO typically implies
41
Dolman, Astropolitik, 89.
42
Wong and Fergusson, Military Space Power, 23.
43
launch costs ranging in the tens of millions of dollars and for GEO hundreds of millions of dollars.44 Expenses will become higher if one adds the design and manufacturing costs of satellites which are significant due to the need of protection against the hazardous environment of space.
In general, things are more easily destroyed than protected, in space this is an absolute truth. Equipment in space is exposed to intense heating by the sun and extreme cold when in the shadow. Very often satellites are exposed to two extreme temperatures simultaneously as one side of the spacecraft is turned to the sun and the other side is not. Generally, this causes great stress to equipment. Aside from temperature, spacecrafts are exposed to certain forms of radiation, such as from the sun and other sources. Most notably is the radiation from the two Van Allen belts. These belts are formed by Earth’s magnetic field and are shaped as two donuts that encircle the globe.45 The Van Allen Belts comprises highly charged particles that can be extremely destructive to the equipment found onboard of satellites. Thus, to launch and operate satellites it is of utmost importance that one is able to produce technology that can function under such demanding and harsh conditions.
However, nothing can be more demanding than protection against space debris. Since the beginning of the space age all kind of objects have been left in space, out of human control. For the most part, these are remains of satellites that have failed, spent launch vehicles stages, and other launch debris of various sizes. Currently, the United States is able to track 21000 objects with a diameter of 10 centimeter or larger. NASA on the other hand has estimated that there are over 300000 objects with a diameter larger than one centimeter, and millions smaller objects orbiting in near-earth space.46 The speeds involved with orbiting means that even the smallest piece of debris can cause great damage when it collides with a spacecraft. Furthermore, when collision happens there is great chance that additional debris is created. In recent decades this has happened a number of times unintentionally. Although the current hazards to space activities from debris is quite low, this can change when war is conducted in space, especially when
44
O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space (Washington 2004) 33-34.
45
Sellers, Understanding Space, 86-87.
46
fought with such destructive means as kinetic kill vehicles.47 When a satellite is hit by a kinetic kill-vehicle it will break up in untold numbers of fragments with the result that a vast cloud of debris is produced. This debris subsequently can hinder other orbiting satellites and possible destroy them. To get an impression on how severe the problem of space debris is and can become, it is noteworthy to mention the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite test. In this particular test a guided ballistic missile was used to slam in on an aging Chinese weather satellite deployed at an approximate altitude of 860 kilometers. The result was a head on collision at extremely high velocity producing 2317 objects of at least 10 centimeters in diameter and 35000 smaller shards.48 It is not hard to imagine that the more kinetic kill-vehicles are used to destroy satellites the more debris is produced. The ultimate fear is a chain reaction where debris generated by collisions rapidly leads to more collisions, producing more debris, which in turn continues to chain. This scenario is also known as the Kessler syndrome, named after the NASA scientist who first mentioned it.49
Weapons for Space Warfare
Given the vulnerability of satellites for kinetic impacts intentional destruction by means of mass-to-target weapons is one of the main instruments to conduct warfare in space. Both Cold War superpowers have researched and developed a number of these types of anti-satellite weapons. For example, the Soviet Union conducted some tests with a 30 mm cannon, which was installed in a Salyut spacecraft, and a co-orbital anti-satellite weapon which used explosives to destroy satellites.50 The United States began an anti-satellite weapons program in 1959, however, test results were not encouraging and the project was stopped in 1963. The program was revived in the 1980s with the
47
A kinetic kill vehicle is a projectile that does not contain an explosive charge but uses kinetic energy, speed and mass, to penetrate or destroy a target.
48
‘Chinese ASAT test’, Center for Space Standards & Innovation (CSSI). Available at:
http://www.centerforspace.com/asat/ (October 15, 2010).
49
Wong and Fergusson, Military Space Power, 25, 69.
50
J.E. Oberg, Space Power Theory (Washington, D.C., 1999) 53. Available at:
development of the so-called Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle. This vehicle was intended to be launched at high altitude from a F-15 fighter aircraft in a steep climb to help it reach its target in orbit and destroy a satellite by high-speed collision.51 Strictly speaking, the first effort to develop anti-satellite weapons did not lead to the permanent deployment of such systems on a large-scale. However, mass-to-target weapons do not require highly sophisticated materials or technology. Every state possessing long-range ballistic missile technology, spacecrafts, and air or missile defenses has the potential ability to develop and produce kinetic-energy weapons.52 For example, the Chinese anti-satellite missile was an adapted intermediate-range ballistic missile. The United States, as it demonstrated in 2008, can utilize the Standard Missile 3, designed to be used against ballistic missiles, in a dual-use role as a kinetic anti-satellite weapon. Also, (micro)satellite technology offers the opportunity for a broad range of countries to enter space with relatively inexpensive satellites that can be used in a offensive mode against other objects in space.53 Theoretically, any object in space that can be maneuvered in a position in which it will ram another satellite is a potential anti-satellite weapon.
Nuclear weapons are also very effective against satellites. Carried on top of a ballistic missile and programmed to detonate at a particular point in space it can physical destroy nearby satellites due to the blast and damage satellites thousands of kilometers away. Also, nuclear blasts in space can ‘pump’ the Van Allen radiation belts striking all satellites which repeatedly enter these belts in the ensuing days and months. This phenomenon already occurred in 1962. During the so-called Project Starfish Prime a 1.4 megaton thermonuclear warhead was detonated over Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean at an altitude of 400 kilometer which generated radiation belts which over time disabled weather and observation satellites. The artificially generated radiation can last for several months or even years. Besides radiation, the nuclear blast also generated an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) which burned out street lights in Hawaii 1500 kilometer away.54 Due to the indiscriminate destructive nature of nuclear blasts, nuclear weapons
51
D. Webb, 'Space Weapons: dream, nightmare or reality?' in: N. Bormann and M. Sheehan ed., Securing Outerspace (Londen 2009) 24-41, 28.
52
D. Preston, et al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars (Santa Monica, RAND 2002) 37.
53
AU-18 Space Primer (Maxwell AFB, Alabama 2009) 277.
54
are crude instruments to conduct space warfare. However, every state possessing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles might be able to generate this type of threat.
Other means to destroy or damage spacecrafts are directed-energy weapons (laser, radio frequency, and particle-beam weapons). These weapons can either be ground-, air-, or space-based and are technologically highly sophisticated, due to that, unavailable for most states. Laser systems have been studies throughout the Cold War especially during the 1980s in an effort to built a based strategic missile shield. However, space-based laser weapons have never been deployed. This technology still has to mature. Ground-based laser systems, on the other hand, do exist. China is suspected of having ground-based lasers with which they can 'blind' spy satellites. Russia and the United States are believed of having laser technology as well. Radio frequency weapons are conceptual, they include ground- and space-based radio frequency emitters that fire intense burst of radio energy at a satellite, disabling electronic components.55 Particle-beam weapons are space-based systems that fire an intense Particle-beam of elementary particles at a satellite, disabling electronic components. These types of weapons have been researched by the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, and other states but as a weapon these are thus far non-existing.
It is important to take in consideration that attacks on a nation's space infrastructure does not necessarily have to be conducted against objects in space. Attacks can be focused on any one of the three segments that make up space capabilities. These segments comprises: (1) the satellite in orbit; (2) the ground station from where the behavior of the satellite is controlled, the received information is distributed to the users, and the space operations are conducted (launch sites); (3) and the communication link to and from the satellite, the ground station, and additional users.56
The ground segment of a particular space infrastructure can be attacked or sabotaged by direct attacks. Since satellites are brought into space from well-established launch sites, attacks on these locations are particular useful to effectively deny a particular state the capacity to launch spacecrafts. This also counts for research and test
55
AU-18 Space Primer, 278.
56
facilities. These facilities can be directly attacked in order to sabotage or disrupt space programs. Satellite tracking and controlling stations are vulnerable to similar threats.
The communication segment of a space infrastructure can be attacked through multiple types of electronic attack, in particular up- and downlink jamming and spoofing. Uplink jamming is an electronic attack which uses a radio frequency signal to frustrate a particular satellite from broadcasting its signals to ground users. This type of attack is temporarily and useful against geostationary communication satellites. Also the effect of such attack is significant, since the satellite or space system could be made unusable for all users.57
Downlink jamming is a type of electronic attack which aims to disrupt the satellite’s transmission from being received by select ground, sea or airborne users. This type of attack is particular useful to disrupt GPS signals. A simple handheld jammer is enough to jam the GPS signal which effects are local from tens to hundreds of kilometers, depending on the power of the jammer. These devices are easily manufactured. There are reports that countries like Russia, China, North Korea and other states already export these devices to other states. During the Iraq War of 2003 the Iraqi’s have used GPS jammers in a fruitless attempt to frustrate United States’ precise bombing sorties.58
A spoofing attack involves the attempt to take-over the space system through computer hacking by an unauthorized subject appearing to be an authorized user for the satellite controlling station.59 This type of attack can be useful to give the spacecraft commands that can cause it to malfunction or fail its mission. This type of attack is very discreet and depends on the ability to successfully hack into secured networks, by that it can also be considered a ground station attack.
There are thus multiple means through which an actor could attack the space capabilities of a space-faring entity. However, attacks against the space segment requires sophisticated technology which limits the potential adversaries capable of generating this kind of threat to a few political actors. Ground and communication segment attacks, on the other hand, can be conducted by potentially more adversaries. The means required for these attacks can be quite simple and do not demand complex technology.
57
AU-18 Space Primer, 275.
58
C.K.S. Chun, Defending Space: US Anti-Satellite Warfare and Space Weaponry (New York 2006) 54.
59
International Space Regime
Before this brief primer on the use of space, its unique geographical characteristics, and the possible threats to space infrastructures can be concluded, it is imperative to give some information about man-made restriction on the use of space for national security purposes that are made in the form of international law. The Outer Space Treaty is the cornerstone of space law which is formed in 1967 and sets out the main guiding principles for exploitation by man. The first and second article of this treaty taken together are the most important and establish the idea of space (including the Moon and other celestial bodies) as a res communis. This means that space is a property that is owned communally, everyone is equally free to use this geography for ‘the benefit of and in the interests of all countries.’60
The Outer Space Treaty was established during the Cold War and resembles those days interests of both superpowers. As said, the main function of satellites in the early years of the space age were mainly focused on the pre-conflict aspect of nuclear deterrence to monitor arms control compliances and to gather intelligence on each others military activities. This interest was conceived by both superpowers as more important than to deny each other access over each others territory. Therefore, both superpowers were interested in the right of overflight. This principle was formally recognized with the Outer Space Treaty and differs over existing air law, which recognizes sovereignty over a state’s territory.61
The Outer Space Treaty imposes two provisions which limits the military uses of space: (1) nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction are prohibited to be placed in orbit around the Earth, on the Moon or any other celestial body; (2) and the Moon and other celestial bodies shall only be used for peaceful purposes, meaning that it is forbidden to establish military bases, installations and fortifications, to test any type of weapons and to conduct military maneuvers on celestial
60
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (London, Moscow, and Washington 1967). See article I. Available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ost/text/space1.htm (November 30, 2010).
61
bodies.62 These provisions do not prohibit ICBMs carrying nuclear warheads of traversing through space. These missiles, when they are launched, do not go into orbit, and they are not installed or stationed on a celestial body. Until 2002 the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) also limited the use of space for national security purposes. This treaty restricted the testing, development, and deployment of strategic anti-ballistic missile systems or components that were sea-based, air-based, (mobile) land-based, or space-based. Although anti-ballistic missile systems have the purpose to counter strategic ballistic missiles these systems can potentially be used in an anti-satellite mode, as both missile warheads and some satellites have roughly similar altitude and speed characteristics. However, with the unilateral retreat by the United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, the only treaty that specifically forbids weaponization in space is the Outer Space Treaty, which relates only to weapons of mass destruction.
Sub-conclusion
Since the launch of the Sputnik space has become an indissoluble part of human existence on Earth. It is a challenging environment that is not easily exploited but due to man’s ingenuity utilized today for a myriad of purposes. These functions have great economic and military value in the sense that they contribute to men’s welfare and security. Also, space is not monopolized by one actor. The United States may currently enjoy a large technological lead. Existing trends, however, show that more and more actors have access to space technology and/or are capable of launching satellites independently. With space becoming more important it is also a domain for warfare. Obviously this is dependent on the ability of belligerent to conduct military space operations but it is entirely predictable that in wartime space systems would become targets for destruction or degradation because of their strategic value. As such, the United States, as a significant space-faring state should develop plans to defend the space realm for its own use.
62
The Significance of Space
In relation to the growing dependence on space-based capabilities many authors believe that the United States could become victim of a so-called ‘space Pearl Harbor’.63 This threat warning can be understood as a metaphor for being caught unaware, like the United States was caught by surprise by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. But there is more to be said about the perceived danger of a ‘space Pearl Harbor’. When this threat warning is put forward the authors also proclaim something about the strategic utility of attacking space systems. Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, for example, states that American space-based assets are a center of gravity representing the equivalent of the World War Two Pacific Fleet, whose destruction enabled the Japanese to dominate the Pacific region for some years.64 In similar logic, he believes that the destruction or disabling of American space systems would be critical for potential adversaries to achieve future military success against United States armed forces. Anticipating on the economic significance of space capabilities United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) claimed that space, besides being a military center of gravity, is also an emerging economic center of gravity, as national commerce is inextricably linked to space-enabled information services.65 Consequently, as believed by Major Cynamon, a peer competitor could ‘cripple our [United States] economy’ through attacks on ‘commercial space systems, a decisive point’.66 Major Wagner went even further by saying that the control of space is just, and perhaps more, critical to modern national
63
See for example: Report of the Commission to Assess United States national security space management and organization (Washington 2001) 9, 22; D. Coletta, ‘Space and Deterrence’, Astropolitics 7, 3 (2009) 171-192; S. Lambakis, ‘Space Control in Desert Storm and beyond’, Orbis 39, 3 (1995) 417-434; A.W. Burke, Space Threat warning: foundation for Space superiority, avoiding a space Pearl Harbor (Maxwell AFB 2006); C.H. Cynamon, Protecting Commercial Space Systems: a critical National Security Issue (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1999) 24-25; Air force Doctrine Document 2-2.1, Counterspace Operations (Washington, D.C., August 2004) viii; and Lambeth, Mastering the ultimate High Ground, vii, 101-102.
64
A.W. Burke, Space Threat warning: foundation for Space superiority, avoiding a space Pearl Harbor (Maxwell AFB, Alabama 2006) 8.
65
United States Space Command, Long-range Plan (Peterson AFB 1998). United States Space Command (USSPACECOM), was one of the nine unified multiservice commands of the United States. It was founded in 1985 with the purpose to institutionalize the use of outer space by the United States armed forces. USSPACECOM was responsible for putting satellites in orbit, operating them, protecting them, and ensuring that the information they provided would reach the armed forces. In 2002 USSPACECOM merged with United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).
66
survival as controlling trade routes in the nineteenth century.67 In short, as stated by Lambakis: ‘Space is rapidly becoming this country’s [United States] Achilles’ heel.’68 These assertions say something about the strategic effect which attacks on space systems are perceived to have. In particular, the use of Clausewitz’s concept of center of gravity in relation to attacks on space-based assets has the tendency to assert that such hostile engagements could be independently decisive when war is waged against a belligerent who depends on satellites for a range of economic and military functions. For Clausewitz striking a perceived center of gravity, ‘the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends’, should lead to a specific effect, namely the collapse or defeat of the enemy.69 However, it is not clear how a well aimed attack at United States’ space-based capabilities could lead to such devastating consequences as crippling the economy or military defeat on the battlefield. As advised by Colin Gray, ‘the strategic thinker must ask “So What?” and ”How?”’ when vulnerabilities are identified.70
Is space an economic and military center of gravity for the United States? To answer this question it is important to have a clear understanding of Clausewitz’s center of gravity. The concept has come to occupy a common place in the vocabulary of professional soldiers and defense pundits but the more it is used in different contexts the more the concept loses its meaning. A flawed conception of center of gravity could lead to mischaracterizations regarding the significance of space-based assets, which further could affect war and defense planning quite detrimentally. The purpose of this chapter is to look closer at the vulnerability problem of today’s space infrastructure, first by examining whether space can be perceived as a military and economic center of gravity according to the Clausewitzian meaning of the concept and, secondly, what the strategic significance of the space environment is. It is important to assess properly the value of near-Earth space before one can examine strategies for securing space-based assets. The more vital secured access to space is the more prominent space security should be as a national security interest. As such, if United States' national survival is at stake in case of
67
J.W. Wagner, Spacepower Theory: Lessons from the Masters (Maxwell AFB, Alabama 2005) 33.
68
Lambakis, ‘Space Control in Desert Storm and beyond’, 417-434, 423.
69
C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. M. Howard and P. Paret (New York 1993) book VIII, chapter 4, 720; and A.J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz’s center of gravity: changing our warfighting doctrine – again! (Strategic Studies Institute, September 2002) 12. Available at:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=363 (August 26, 2010).
70
