Local terrorist threat perceptions: A case study of Amsterdam

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LOCAL

TERRORIST

THREAT

PERCEPTIONS

A case study of Amsterdam

Anne Koreman S2020696

Crisis and Security Management Master thesis

Supervisor: Bart Schuurman Reader: Tahir Abbas

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Since the September 2001 attacks1, a preponderance of terrorist activity in Europe, North America, and Australia, has involved radicalized2 Westerners inspired by al Qaeda, described as ‘homegrown terrorism’ (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010).3_{The size, unpredictability and}

international character of the attacks not only harmed the US, but impacted the West and exposed “the threat posed by domestic Jihadists” (Schuurman & Horgan, 2016, p.55). 4_These

“homegrown terrorists” have been citizens and residents born, raised and educated within the countries they attack (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010, p.34). Moreover, the possible conflict

between Islam and the West has dominated public and political debates about Islam ever since (Rytter & Pedersen, 2014).5_{Western militant jihadism is not limited to one country or region}

and a widening political and geographical area is threatened by homegrown terrorism (Nesser, 2008; Thachuk, Bowman & Richardson, 2008).6

In Europe, homegrown terrorists have committed terrorist attacks multiple times during the last two decades. “Homegrown terrorists operating in the West are either born in the West, like Zacharias Moussaoui, a Frenchman, who was convicted for participation in the 9/11 attacks; or have come at a young age, like Kamel Daoudi, who lost his French citizenship

1_{During the attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon, committed by members of Al-Qaeda,}

almost three thousand people died and many others got injured (National Commission on Terrorist attacks, 2004).

2_{This thesis defines radicalisation as both the pathway as the outcome of terrorism, acknowledging that}

radicalisation does equate with terrorism per se (Schmid, 2013). ]Extremism is one step in this radicalisation process, defined by the use of (physical or verbal) violence (Bailey & Edwards, 2017).

3_{Homegrown terrorists, who are radicalized in the West instead of the Middle East, form “a scattered global}

network, a leaderless Jihad” (Sageman, 20011, p.vii).

4 _{Salafism can be understood as “collective term for a spectrum of fundamentalist currents within Sunni Islam”,}

in which three movements can be discerned (NCTV, 2018). As Shahin (2009) explains, “the Salaf are the virtuous forefathers, and a Salafi is one who draws on the Quran and the sunnah as the only sources for religious rulings” (p. 29). The biggest group consists of quietists, they stay away from political activism. The second group, political Salafists, do engage in activities such as founding parties and demonstrations. The third group are Salafi-Jihadis (NCTV, 2018). The last group endorses violence and denunciates dissidents.

5_{In this thesis, the terms Muslims and Islam are used interchangeably.}

6 _{This thesis refers to the lesser Jihad, “an extreme political ideology marked by the desire to fulfil a divinely}

ordained duty to spread Islam around the world which is achieved through holy war against all infidels” (NCTV, 2019).

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when convicted in 2005 for his involvement in a plot against the US Embassy in Paris; or came as a student, like Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the 9/11 attacks” (Roy, 2016, p33). Some attackers had never been to a conflict, some were prevented from travelling and some were returned (Europol, 2016, p.22). Moreover, the modus operandi varies, some of the terrorist attacks were employed directly and in a coordinated manner, like the Paris attacks of November 13, 2015, but others were committed by lone actors, “individuals who are

indirectly related with a terrorist group and not organized by it” (Tziarras, 2017, p.107). Besides, the attacks in Paris represented a clear shift in the intent and capability of jihadist terrorists to inflict mass casualties on urban populations (Europol, 2016, p.6).

The threat emanating from Islamist terrorism inside the EU is linked to the

developments in conflict zones and politically unstable countries, such as North Africa, the Sahel region, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (Europol, 2009, p.7). The domestic terrorist threat has further increased due to the civil war in Syria starting in 2011, which has led to a large influx of refugees in Europe (de Bont, Weggemans, Peters & Bakker, 2017, p.17).7_{This has led to a refugee crisis that started in 2015. The refugee crisis}

can be associated with different kinds of asymmetrical threats, namely foreign fighters, and social fears and polarization in recipient countries (Tziarras, 2017, p.107). Due to this, European societies became increasingly “immiskeptical” (Bartoszewicz, 2016, p.13). The migration phenomenon affecting the European continent and the perceived threat from

Islamisation remain key topics on the counter-radicalisation agenda and have been used by the right-wing scene to induce public opinion to adopt its Islamophobic position (Europol, 2017, p.46).

The so-called Islamic State (henceforth, ISIS) has been the most recent geopolitical terrorist threat. Since the summer of 2014, ISIS has advanced rapidly in Iraq and Syria. Due to military intervention, ISIS has lost territory in the Middle East and therefore it is expected that many Europeans who travelled to the caliphate will consider returning home (de Bont,

Weggemans, Peters, & Bakker, 2017, p.17), known as returnees. Regardless of its losing ground, ISIS is developing further as a terrorist organization (NCTV, 2018a).8 The main

7_{Estimations of the number of individuals who have travelled from the European Union to the conflicts in Syria}

and Iraq up to 2016 ranged from 3922 to more than 4294 (van Ginkel & Entennmann 2016, p.4).

8_{Al Qaeda is trying to take advantage of the decline of ISIS and to reposition its own organization as the leader}

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concern reported by EU Member States continues to be jihadist terrorism and the closely related phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, travelling to and from conflict zones (Europol, 2018).

Radicalisation has become a signifier in fighting homegrown Jihadism (Schmid, 2013). Whereas criminal law intervenes when there is evidence that the criminal act was committed, the counter-radicalisation policies intervene before an actual attack. In the 21st Century the term radical is overly associated with ‘radical Islamism’ (Bailey & Edwards, 2017). This is due to the greater current threat in the West of Islamist terrorism than nationalists, the far-right, the far-left, anarchist or other forms of terrorism (Bailey, Edwards, 2017, p.262). However, even though the political character of Jihadism is linked to Islam (Tibi, 2007), “in most cases religion is not the primary source of extremists’ behaviour” (Esposito, 2015, p.1077).9_{Based on the radicalisation theory that connects radicalisation to Islam, Muslims}

become a targeted group, which makes them vulnerable to ethnic profiling (European network against racism, 2009).

The pathway from radicalisation to terrorism remains a controversial topic. “Though it is extremely doubtful that its religious tenets condone the sort of violence being committed in its name, adherents of militant jihadism nonetheless self-identify as true Muslims” (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010, p.40). Most definitions of radicalisation recognize that radicalisation is an individualized and mostly unpredictable process (Abbas, 2017; Schmid, 2013). Moreover, even though “adherence to radical beliefs is not irrelevant to countering terrorism or advancing global security interests” (Borum, 2011, p.2), it is not a proxy or necessary

precursor of terrorism (Abbas, 2017; Borum, 2011). Still, the Western contemporary narrative of radicalisation is skewed towards the spectrum of radical Islamism, and the role of ideology and religion (Kundnani, 2014). Schmid (2013) even claims that the term radicalisation is “used in the political game of labelling and blame attribution” (Schmid, 2013, p.17). Therefore, several scholars argue that following 9/11, Islam has increasingly been framed as a security issue in the West through the public and political discourses about Islam (Cesari, 2009; Edmunds, 2012; Fox & Akbaba, 2015). This process is referred to as the securitization of Islam, in which discourses are constructed around a (perceived) existential

9_{“While radicals might be violent or not, might be democrats or not, extremists are never democrats. Their state}

of mind tolerates no diversity. They are also positively in favour of the use of force to obtain and maintain political power” (Schmid, 2013, p.10)

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threat from Islam and followed by the promotion of actions outside the normal political procedures (Cesari, 2009; Edmunds, 2012; Rytter & Pedersen, 2015; Fox & Akbaba,

2015).10 Given the scope of the threat posed by jihadist terrorism, countries may have reason to securitize Jihadism (IEP, 2017). Besides, it seems legitimate that the role of religion cannot be ignored (Esposito, 2015). However, by aiming at the early detection of radicalisation, the counter-radicalisation policies make Muslims vulnerable to ethic profiling (European network against racism, 2009; Amnesty International, 2013). The UK government’s strategy to prevent and counter-extremism, for example, had an over-emphasis upon Muslim issues, which cast them as suspect communities (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009).

The securitization of Islam through public and political discourses, and the counter-radicalisation policies that aim at an early intervention negatively affect Muslims (Cesari, 2009; Edmunds, 2012; Fox & Akbaba, 2015). Meeteren and Oostendorp (2018), for example, claim that the Muslim community is considered as a suspect if they do not openly adhere to Western values and voice their disapproval of violence through which they distance

themselves from Jihad. It is not because they regard every Muslim as a terrorist, but they arguably assume that the group is susceptible to radicalisation (Es, 2018). A focus group study by Cesari (2009) found that among Muslims, “the measures that are implemented to prevent radicalisation enhance discontent and prompt a transformation of religious

conservatism to fundamentalism, a militant movement” (p.1). Additionally, the discourse that constructs Islam as a threat, which fuels feelings of alienation, in turn enhancing the chance that the individual Muslims may develop a more positive attitude towards violence based on their ideology (Borum, 2007; Feddes, Mann & Doosje, 2012). Recruiting strategies of Jihadist groups make use of these sentiments (IEP, 2017). The securitization of Islam also increases the chance of religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2015). Besides, on a societal level, the process also contributes to polarization (Tiziarras, 2017). These “discriminatory practices can be avoided if counter-radicalisation policies use approaches that can demonstrate the

effectiveness and meet non-discrimination standards” (Eijkman & Schuurman, 2011, p.4). At the same time, right-wing extremists and groups will likely reinforce their efforts to portray the asylum policy in a polarising manner and exploit the debate for its purposes (Europol, 2016, p.7). The violent right-wing extremist spectrum is expanding, partly fuelled by fears of a perceived Islamisation of society and anxiety over migration (Europol, 2018,

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p.7). Nowadays, the far-right11 increasingly bases its message on an anti-Islamic outlook (Abbas, 2017). A growing number of violent incidents and acts of vandalism around the construction of Muslim places of worship have been reported in different countries (Cesari, 2009). The terrorist attacks by Anders Breivik, the series of attacks by the National Socialist Underground and the murder of Jo Cox exemplify such acts (NCTV, 2018b).

Strikingly, in several countries, the established political actors have even “adopted some of the elements of the far-right in response to the growing organizational strength of the movement” (Melzer, Serafin, 2013, p.30). Research by Meeteren and Oostendorp (2018), for example, showed that the political discourse in the Netherlands shares the suspicious tone towards Muslim communities (p.3). Moreover, during elections, topics such as immigration policy, integration and perceived Islamisation are more often addressed than economic topics (Sterkenburg, Gssime, Meines, 2019). The same phenomenon can be observed in the

European media discourse. Fekete (2010) showed that the media often reports cases of far-right extremism as single events linked to psychological illness, whereas acts of Islamist extremism are quickly linked to terrorism. This theory has never been empirically tested. Besides, one can argue that it is not a construction of Islam as a threat. Islam might also be regarded as a consequence of the threat posed by Jihadism. Nevertheless, if Islam is regarded as a threat, this risks religious discrimination. The aim of this thesis is not to seek

confirmation of this discussion, but rather to be able to challenge the risk assessments that are made in counter-radicalisation policies.

Nowadays, terrorism has morphed into something that questions national, social, legal, and cultural policies (Thachuk, Bowman & Richardson, 2008, p.37). This means that

terrorism is not only discussed in light of security policies, but social legal and cultural policies are affected by the threat as well. The legal system in the Netherlands, for example, regards acts of terrorism as more severe than other criminal offenses. The social and cultural also aim at fighting the breeding ground for terrorism. They do so by promoting inclusion for example. The terrorism threat perception therefore matters.

“The global character of terrorism has pushed multilateral agreements, which are often too broad to be of use for the variety and scope of terrorist activities” (Thachuk, Bowman &

11_{Far-right extremists “often advocate border change based on ethnicity and animosity of other ethnic groups,}

but these racial distinctions might also be based on sexual minorities or liberalism for example” (Kelly, 2019, p.3).

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Richardson, 2008, p.37). However, it is not only the national government, but also the local governments that exerts power on the public, political and media radicalisation discourse (Sterkenburg, Gssime & Meines, 2019). In many Western states the defence of the city is central to wider national security strategies (Coaffee, O’Hare & Hawkesworth, 2009, p.6). Since September 11, many cities have undergone significant changes in both morphology and management as a result of the greater perceived risk of terrorist attack (Coaffee, Rogers, 2007). Such changes have often sought to territorialise the city through the redesign of space and the modernisation of management systems (Coaffee, Rogers, 2007). Still, most research on counter-terrorism measures has focused on the national (i.e. Buijs, 2009; Crime Terror Nexus, 2018) and international levels (i.e. Knott, Lee & Copeland, 2018; Ravndal, 2018). To help address this gap this thesis studies the terrorism threat perception, on a local level, because “an urban focus is an essential approach for social science research on terrorism” (Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010, p.495). 12

1.1: Relevance

“All terrorism is local, and cities especially are at risk” (Chenoweth, Clarke, 2010, p.495). Consequently, “the greater the national security threats, the greater the local role in

responding to those threats” (Chenoweth, Clarke, 2010, p.496). Increasing attention is now being paid to the complex and localized impact of defensive strategies upon social, political and economic life (Coaffee, O’Hare & Hawkesworth, 2009, p.5), which has been studied by several researchers. This thesis adds to this knowledge by addressing the terrorist threat perception of the local government as this outlook affects the counter-terrorism policy outcomes (Bailey & Edwards, 2017). The terrorist threat perception influences what is regarded as the early signals of radicalisation. If far right-extremism is regarded as a threat, the early indication is different than when Islamic extremism is regarded as a threat. When a whole group is regarded as a threat, this risks discrimination, which is not desirable (Cesari, 2009). Moreover, a differential threat perception might enhance perceived injustices which can be a driving factor in radicalisation” (Bailey, Edwards, 2017, p.274).13

12_{As radicalisation is regarded as the pathway to terrorism, this thesis refers to the ‘terrorist threat perception’ in}

describing the threat posed by both terrorism and violent extremism.

13_{At first sight, far-right and Islamist extremists seem to be two completely different and opposing groups.}

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Moreover, most research on counter-terrorism measures has focused on the

(international)national levels (i.e. Buijs, 2009; Knott, Lee & Copeland, 2018; Ravndal, 2018). Research on the role of the local government in countering-terrorism is not extensive

(Chenoweth, Clarke, 2010), even though they have become increasingly important players in the security sphere (Prins, 2014). Several scholars have written about local security networks (Dupont, 2004) and urban security against terrorism (Chenoweth, Clarke, 2010). Besides, de Graaf and Weggemans (2018) even employed a quick scan of the counter-terrorism policies of Amsterdam. Nevertheless, an in-depth study that addresses the terrorist threat perceptions of the local government has not been employed yet. Amsterdam is an interesting case to study, as it is the capital of the Netherlands and the development of its policies between 2004 and 2008 inspired other cities in Europe and even served as an example in the fight against radicalisation and homegrown jihadism worldwide (de Graaf & Weggemans, 2018). More about this is explained in the case selection section of this thesis in chapter three.

The association of Islam with terrorism has been discussed by several scholars (Cesari, 2009; Croft, 2012; Mavelli, 2013). Not all of the previous research could be analysed.

However, this thesis found that within the studied timeframe of 2007 to 2019, critical approaches studied several cases of the securitization of Islam in Europe. The first group of academics, like Croft (2012) and Mavelli (2013), focused on the theoretical implications of securitization of Islam. Another group of scholars studied the governance of Muslims and the subsequent securitization of the group, with a focus on discrimination (Cesari, 2009;

Edmunds, 2012; Fox & Akbaba, 2015). Additionally, scholars analysed the media portrayal of Muslims, because the media play an important role in conveying information (Gündüz, 2007, p.4). Furthermore, the political discourses that construct Islam as a threat were found in various political debates (Meeteren & Oostendorp, 2016). However, a critical discourse analysis that examines all the discourses represented in counter-radicalisation policies on a local level over time has not been employed yet (Cesari, 2009; Edmunds, 2012; van Es, 2018). Therefore, the added value of this thesis is that it employs a critical discourse analysis that not only focuses on the securitization of Islam but also studies the other discourses that can be discerned from the counter-radicalisation policies.

(2017; Bouhana, Corner, Gill & Schuurman, 2018). It even seems that they share the same local driving forces (Abbas, 2017)

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Studying the counter-terrorism policies of local governments is of societal relevance as well, because their terrorism threat perception not only legitimizes their policy choices (Prins, 2014), it also influences the public, political and media radicalisation discourse (Fekete 2010; Sterkenburg, Gssime, Meines, 2019). Consequently, their threat perception may have societal consequences, such as (re)producing hostility, driving radicalisation (Bailey & Edwards, 2017), and enhancing polarization within society (Tziarras, 2017). A focus group study by Cesari (2009) found that among Muslims, “the measures that are implemented to prevent radicalisation enhance discontent and prompt a transformation of religious conservatism to fundamentalism, a militant movement” (p.1). Moreover, recruiting strategies of Jihadist groups make use of those sentiments (IEP, 2017). Last, the securitization of Islam increases religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2015). Besides, on a societal level, the process also contributes to polarization (Tiziarras, 2017). For those reasons, the outcomes of this study can be used by policy-makers in further developing the counter-terrorism policies.

By examining all threat constructions, this thesis indicates whether the focus on Muslims is indeed too one-sided and discerns other discourses that may counterbalance the security discourse, which may support the avoidance of discriminatory practices against Muslims (IEP, 2017). Avoiding discriminatory practices also helps in limiting polarization within society (Tziarras, 2017). This is of importance, as polarization may cause unrest and conflict within societies (Tziarras, 2017). For those reasons, the outcomes of this study can be used by policy-makers to further develop the policies.

1.2: Research question

To assess the terrorist threat perception by local governments, this thesis will focus on an in-depth case study of the terrorism threat assessment by one municipality, namely the

municipality of Amsterdam. This is an illustrative case study for studying the local terrorist threat perception, hence the choice for a single case study. The case of Amsterdam is chosen because the mayors of this city have gained more responsibilities in governing specific security issues14 (Prins, 2014), which makes it a suitable case study. The inaugural speech by mayor Femke Halsema in 2018, confirms the important role of the mayor in the

counter-14_{The local council (representative), the board of the mayor and aldermen (executive) and the mayor together}

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terrorism policies, as she stated that: “the coalition agreement is short about public order and security. This gives me the chance to formulate an opinion about serious crime, radicalisation and such issues, to clarify the policy direction” (Parool, 2018). Moreover, research identified the securitization of Islam and its subsequent consequences in the Netherlands, which shares many similarities to the securitization of Islam in the West (Buijs, 2009; Cesari, 2009; van Es, 2018; Fox & Akbaba, 2015; Meeteren & Oostendorp, 2016). Since 2007, municipalities in the Netherlands are responsible for their counter-radicalisation policies, hence the focus on Amsterdam (Buijs, 2009).

To the knowledge of this thesis, the municipal level is sometimes mentioned in studies that analyse the terrorist threat perceptions on a national and international level (Buijs, 2009; Fox & Akbaba, 105; Meeteren & Oostendorp, 2016), but a study that solely focuses on the counter-radicalisation policies’ threat perception has not been conducted so far. Considering the shared features of the counter-radicalisation policies of the city with other Dutch cities (de Graaf & Weggemans, 2018), this case study helps in understanding the terrorism threat

perception in other cities as well. Moreover, the development of its policies between 2004 and 2008 inspired other policies internationally (de Graaf & Weggemans, 2018). This makes the case study relevant on an international level. Moreover, the focus on a single case makes this research feasible as not much is yet known about the local terrorist threat perception and the study is limited in time. The choice for this case was based on the fact that the necessary sources to study the case are available. Counter-terrorism policy documents and letters are published by this municipality.

The municipality of Amsterdam does not publish terrorism trend reports, but the terrorism threat perception can be discerned from the city’s counter-terrorism policy. Like the national policies, these counter-terrorism policies are focused on the early detection of the radicalisation processes of individuals. As radicalisation is regarded as the pathway to

terrorism, this thesis refers to the ‘terrorist threat perception’ in describing the threat posed by both terrorism and violent extremism. Therefore, this thesis asks: “to what extent has the terrorist threat perception by the municipality of Amsterdam adapted to the terrorist threat as it has developed in the Netherlands between 2007 and 2019?” This timeframe is chosen because 2007 was the year in which the municipality introduced its first counter-terrorism

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policy and the current radicalisation policy was presented in January 2019.15 Moreover, this question enables this thesis to assess the terrorist threat assessment over time.16 The

comparative analysis was chosen to enable this thesis to identify differential threat assessments as was mentioned earlier.

1.3: Methodology

This thesis is based on qualitative research that employs a literature study of the terrorism threat development in Amsterdam and the Netherlands over time, and a document analysis of counter-terrorism policies and letters of the municipality of Amsterdam between 2007 and 2019. The literature study is aimed at gaining insights into the changing terrorist threat over time. Besides, it studies the development of the counter-radicalisation policies of both the Netherlands and that of Amsterdam in specific. Academic papers are used as sources. Moreover, the literature study utilizes primary sources, such as the policy documents on the Dutch counter-terrorism policies, intelligence services policy and position papers on

countering-terrorism published by the NCTV and AIVD, terrorism trend analysis of the EU (Europol TE-SAT reports)17 published by Europol, Crime Terror Nexus18 reports, the terrorist threat assessment of the Netherlands (DTN) reports, and regional safety plans that discuss the terrorist threat in the region.

The document analysis is based on an analysis of counter-radicalisation policies of Amsterdam and policy letters by mayors between 2007 and 2019. This analysis will be supported by statements of mayors that were found in interviews about radicalisation.

Acknowledging the subjective nature of the threat assessment of counter-terrorism policies, in which threats are constructed within a specific regime of truth (Salter, 2008), the document analysis of the counter-terrorism policies borrows elements of the critical discourse analysis.

15_{According to the ‘national action plan polarisation and radicalisation of 2007 to 2011’ municipalities are}

responsible for their counter -radicalisation policies, which has been the case ever since.

16_{Job Cohen (2001-2010), Eberhard van der Laan (2010-2017) and Femke Halsema (2018-now) are the mayors’}

in the time period that is analyzed in the case study of this thesis.

17_{Europol’s TE-SAT reports are based on qualitative and quantitative data provided by Eurojust and member}

states

18_{The Crime Terror Nexus is a project that systematically explores the new links between petty crime, organized}

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This kind of analysis challenges the “ways of thinking and speaking about aspects of reality” (Cheek, 2004, p.1142). This choice of methodology assumes that the politics of security are socially, politically and lexically constructed and interpreted by nation-states (Salter, 2008). Therewith, this method of analysis helps in analysing the threat assessment of the counter-terrorism policies of Amsterdam.

The discourse analysis utilizes Fairclough’s three-dimensional model, which is a well-known analytical scheme in employing a critical discourse analysis (Cheek, 2004). Fairclough proposes three levels of analysis: the first is discourse as a text, which examines the structure of the text and its linguistic features (Fairclough, 1995); the second is discourse as a

discursive practice, which studies the production, circulation, and consumption of the text; the third is discourse as social practice, which relates the discourse to the broader social context. Rather than adopting the whole scheme, this thesis will focus on discourse as a discursive practice and discourse as a social practice. The discourse as a text is only used as a coding system to identify the different discourse strands in the policies.

The discursive practice identifies which larger discourses can be distracted from the policy documents. This is based on the assumption that security can be understood as a discursive practice (Stritzel, 2007) in which every truth is constructed by multiple levels within a group (Gaston, 2017). This dimension pays attention to the security discourse and the differences within the security discourse over time (Fairclough, 1995). The analysis of the social practice puts the terrorist threat assessment by the municipality of Amsterdam in a wider context. This part of the thesis studies the compatibility of the discourses reflected in the policy documents and the audience. This seeks to explain why some discourses are more effective than others by looking at how a discourse appeals to the existing beliefs and values of the audience (Rychnovská, 2014, p.10). The methodological approach, data collection, methods of analysis and the justification of these choices will be explained in chapter three of this thesis.

1.4: Theoretical Framework

The concept of risk plays a key role in the theoretical framework of securitization. Risk suggests the probability of harm, damage, or danger (Skleparis, 2016). In other words, “securitization can be understood as a discourse that emphasizes danger to the stability and public order of the society, which leads to exceptional measures taken by the government to

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counter potential challenges to their control of the state and hegemony over the public sphere” (Ben-Porat & Ghanem, 2017, p. 861). Terrorism itself is already a high-security topic, but as a consequence of the security policies and the discourse surrounding those policies, certain groups might become securitized as well. Using the securitization theory as the theoretical framework allows this thesis to study the phenomenon of the securitization of who or what is to blame for causing the terrorist threat in the constructed discourses in the

counter-radicalisation policy documents (Rychnovská, 2014, p.14). In this process, the municipal council and the mayors in specific, can be regarded as the actors who negotiate a shared understanding of a problematic condition or situation “which they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding to who or what is to blame, articulate alternative sets of the arrangements and urge others to act to affect change” (Rychnovská, 2014). This thesis is guided by the assumption that successful securitization is a combination of socio-political and socio-linguistic factors (Stritzel, 2007).

According to Waever (1995), one of the founders of the securitization theory,

securitization is “a speech act through which an understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a (valued) referent object (the one who is threatened), and to enable the implementation of exceptional measures to deal with the threat” (p.35). However, guided by the premise that “security is conceptualized and politically practiced differently in different places and at different times” (Bubandt, 2005, p.291), this thesis builds on the second generation of the securitization theory. Those academics recognize that security is constituted by a broader range of factors and embodied in a broader set of context-specific social practices (Bigo,2008; Huysmans,1998; Williams, 2003). By studying discourse as a discursive and social practice, analysists can highlight how actors frame the threat and uncover the tensions in the ways they understand the issue and trace how the meaning of the threat is negotiated between the audience and the actor (Rychnovská, 2014). This explains how a certain issue reflects the interactions between the securitizing actor and the different voices in the audience and how it was possible to negotiate such a threat frame (Rychnovská, 2014). The securitization theory is discussed in the theoretical section of this thesis together with a literature review of the securitization of Islam in chapter two.

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1.5: Outline

The second chapter of this thesis explains the securitization theory, its origins and the

contextual interpretation of the securitization theory that will be applied in the analysis of this thesis. Moreover, this constitutes a literature review of the academic literature on the

securitization of Islam. The third chapter explains the chosen methodological approach of this thesis and justifies this choice. Chapter four of this thesis employs a literature review of the development of the terrorist threat between 2007 and 2019 in the Netherlands and explains the counter-radicalisation policies of the Netherlands and Amsterdam. This information forms a basis of understanding that serves the document analysis of the counter-terrorism policies and letters of the municipality in chapter five. The analysis focuses on the discursive practice, namely the development of the national policies and the increasing role of municipalities in this security field, as well as the terrorism threat assessment derived from the

counter-terrorism policies of the municipality over time. This is followed by a study of discourse as a social practice, which refers to the socio-political context of the terrorist threat assessment of the municipality. The discussion interprets the outcomes through the theoretical lens of the securitization theory. The last chapter concludes by addressing the research question, acknowledging its limitations and recommending future research.

1.6: Limitations and possible pitfalls

This thesis acknowledges its limitations and possible pitfalls. Only accessible data could be researched and sources of secretive nature are beyond the scope of this research. Moreover, most research that has been employed so far has focused on Jihadism (Knott, Lee &

Copeland, 2018; Ravndal, 2018) and less is known about far-right extremism, which has been criticized by critics of the contemporary radicalisation discourse6 (i.e. Cesari, 2009; Edwards, 2012; Kelly, 2019). This means that far-right extremism is an under-researched field when compared to Islamist extremism. Consequently, there is an unequal set of data available about the two phenomena (Kallis, Zeiger & Öztürk, 2018). The information about far-right

extremism is therefore limited. Moreover, the securitization theory limits the scope of this study to the construction of threats and emergency measures. However, part of this problem is solved by using critical discourse analysis as a method. The case study of Amsterdam limits the external validity of this thesis but does serve as an illustrative case. To a certain extent, this thesis can provide insights for other municipalities as they often base their policy on that

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of Amsterdam. More about the limitations of this thesis are explained in the methodological part of this thesis.

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Chapter 2: The securitization theory

Securitization studies focus on “how security issues emerge, spread, and dissolve” (Skleparis, 2016, p.93). In this thesis, the securitization theory, therefore, serves as a theoretical lens in understanding the terrorist threat perception by the municipality of Amsterdam between 2007 and 2019. As was explained in the introduction of this thesis, groups can be securitized when they are discussed in relation to security topics, like migrants often are in migration debates. The securitization theory is argued as a suitable theoretical framework for this thesis for multiple reasons. First of all, “the issues on the current public safety governance agenda show a trend of defining societal phenomena in terms of (threats to) public safety” (Prins, 2014, p.21). Secondly, the securitization of radicalisation in the counter-terrorism policies, in which Islam is securitized as well, has been observed by different researchers (Cesari, 2009;

Williams, 2008). This chapter will explain the securitization theory and continues with a literature study of the securitization of Islam.

2.1: The securitization theory as the theoretical lens

In the 1970s, the Copenhagen School of thought (CS) introduced the securitization theory “as a method of understanding the social construction of threats and security policies” (Charrett, 2009, p.3). In the traditional understanding of the securitization theory, security is understood as the outcome of a specific social process. According to this traditional approach, security was understood as a speech act, “an utterance which represents and recognizes phenomena as security issues, thereby giving it special status, which legitimizes extraordinary measures” (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.26). The theory aims at analysing “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results and, not least, under what conditions (what explains when securitization is successful)” (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.32). It serves as a theoretical tool that facilities actors’ analysis of what does security do? (Taureck, 2006). The most important aspects of securitization are the “referent object (depicted as being threatened), the referent subjects (depicted as the posing the threat) and the securitizing actor (those who securitize by declaring something as being existentially threatened)” (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998, p.36). Without acceptance of the audience, one cannot claim that a speech act of securitization has been successful (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998).

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The traditional Copenhagen school defined the securitization theory as “something being presented as a security issue or threat, called the securitization move, followed by the adoption of emergency measures, called security acts” (p.26). However, guided by the

premise that “security is conceptualized and politically practiced differently in different places and at different times” (Bubandt, 2005, p.291), this thesis builds on the second generation of the securitization theory. Those academics recognize that security is constituted by a broader range of factors and embodied in a broader set of context-specific social practices (Bigo, 2008; Huysmans, 1998; Williams, 2003). By using a critical procedural method that takes a critical look at who is promoting security measures of the policies, a normative element is added to the theory (Huysmans, 2001).

Therewith, this study takes the broader context and the construction of political authority, political identities and subjectivities into account (Charrett, 2009). It critically analyses if and how the securitization process takes place and in what way the used writing introduces, reproduces, or rejects acts that are considered as exclusionary or harmful acts of securitization. The importance of adding a normative element to the theory is expressed by Huysmans (2002) who argues that language is an “instrument that brings social practices into a particular communicative, institutionalized framework” (p.44). Critically reconceptualizing the meaning of security is important as it is a fluid concept, rooted in social constructivism (Charrett, 2009, p.16). It recognizes that “security is conceptualized and politically practiced differently in different places and at different times” (Bubandt, 2005, p.291) and occurs in a specific regime of truth (Salter, 2008, p.322), in which the audience can be both the object and the securitizing actor. Moreover, this thesis expands the traditional focus on emergency measures, such as far going monitoring, restrictions of civil liberties, enhanced surveillance and tight government controls (Fox & Akbaba, 2015), to the inclusion of acts that have a less obvious link to security measures, such as the restriction of religious liberties (Fox & Akbaba, 2015).

2.2: Literature review of the securitization of Islam in the West

According to different scholars, 9/11 and the terrorist attacks that followed have led to an increasing securitization of Islam in the West (Cesari, 2009; Edmunds, 2012; Fox & Akbaba, 2015), which can be understood as a process that includes discourses constructed around a perceived threat from Islam, an existential threat to European norms, and, consequently, the

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promotion of emergency actions to counter the threat (Cesari, 2009). A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the theory that the attacks mobilized the image of Islam as a

dangerous and threatening religion and therewith triggered a governance response that

classified people into groups of composing a threat or in need of protection, as the governance of people is based on risk management (Edmunds, 2012, p.68). Controversially, “research on the characteristics of violent extremists suggests that many are religious novices or converts” (Lyons-Padilla, Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq & Egmond, 2015, p.2). Besides, it has shown the importance of social factors, such as personal relationships, social networks, and a sense of community, in decisions to join extremist groups which is widely shared (Vallenga & Groot, 2019, p.7).

Some scholars argue that nowadays, securitization of Islam manifests itself in

policymaking processes which has led to the restriction of religious beliefs (Cesari, 2012; Fox & Akbaba, 2015). Hard cases of securitization, such as EU based rendition conduits and Guantanamo bay, have only affected a small number of Muslims (Edmunds, 2012). However, soft cases of securitization, such as banning Islamic clothing like the headscarf in France and the recently introduced Burka ban in the Netherlands, have led to the hyper-legalization of the perceived cultural threats (Edmunds, 2012). Controversially, academic evidence shows that at least 40% of the Dutch Jihadists had a history of violent behaviour (Crime Terror Nexus, 2018), which contradicts the assumption that extremism can be linked to religious behaviour. Van Es (2018) states that counter-terrorism policies tend to frame acts of terror

committed by Muslims as a theological problem, in that case, “the political discourse has a suspicious tone towards Muslim communities which intertwines general public’s opinion” (Meeteren & Oostendorp, 2018, p.3). The whole community is considered as a suspect if they do not openly adhere to Western values and voice their disapproval of violence through which they distance themselves from the Jihad (Meeteren & Oostendorp, 2018; van Es, 2018). It is not because they regard every Muslim as a terrorist, but they arguably assume that the group is susceptible to radicalisation (van Es, 2018). Edmunds (2012) even argues that many Westerners perceive Muslims as a threat to their livelihoods. This was confirmed by Bakker and Veldhuis (2009) who argue that “people tend to (unconsciously) establish links between Muslims and violence” (p.2). Strikingly, acts that securitize Islam can have opposite effects (Cesari, 2009), as they “encourage fear, foster anxiety, and feed off of nervousness in the population” (Ben-Porat & Ghanem, 2017, p.867).

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Moreover, the possible conflict between Islam and the West dominates public and political debates about Islam (Rytter & Pedersen, 2014). “Whereas until 2011, terrorism was framed as a problem that originates in the society which is to be solved for society as a whole, it is currently seen as a problem that originates in Islam” (Meeteren & Oostendorp, 2018, p.1). Competition between groups leads to favouritism of the own group, the in-group, and hostility towards other groups, the outgroups” (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2009, p.6). Therefore, when the membership of a group comes with feelings of relative deprivation, this can lead to negative emotions within this group (Feddes, Mann, & Doosje, 2012). This may occur because once people have categorized themselves into a social group, issues that concern the group as a whole also concern the individual (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2009).

Consequently, people may distance themselves from society, which may enhance the chances of the individual becoming attracted to criminal behaviour or radicalisation (Doosje, Loseman & van den Bos, 2013). Research has shown that the discursive creation of a ‘suspect community’ may fuel radicalisation (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Demant & de Graaf, 2010), as the securitized group is more inclined to take measures to protect the religious practices, traditions, and beliefs (Rytter & Pedersen, 2015). Furthermore, when the public and political discourse constructs Muslims as a threat (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009), this creates a barrier to good police-community relations (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Eijkman &

Schuurman, 2011). This can be problematic as disclosure of the information is important in countering terrorism.

The media discourse also plays a role in the securitization process, as it established links between Muslims and terrorism, whereas reported violence of the extreme right is more often linked to psychological illness (Fekete, 2010; Abbas, 2017). Hysmans and Buonfino (2006) claimed that the interaction of media, national governments, and public opinion

resulted in immigration as a topic becoming ‘hegemonized’ as a discourse type in government policy (Hysmans & Buonfino, 2006, p.24). Together, this could be regarded as a form of interpellation, “the process by which ideology transforms individuals into subjects”

(Huysmans & Buonfino, 2006). This is a manifestation of securitization as it dehumanizes the group and legitimizes the focus on this group in security measures (Meeteren & Oostendorp, 2018; Es, 2018). Moreover, it turns everything related to Islam into a matter of security that requires evaluation (Es, 2018). This can be considered as a form of surveillance, in literal sense, but also in the sense that the general public continuously watches the group with a certain suspicious attitude (Es, 2018). Besides, it reflects the unequal power relations between

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the Muslim community as a whole and the individuals who form the dominant majority (Es, 2018).

Moreover, Islam is securitized through “the rise of anti-immigrant political parties and policies” (Fox & Akbaba, 2015, p.180). These policies target Muslim groups and

“demonstrate changing expectations of immigrants” (Cesari, 2009, p.3). This is motivated by “the defence of secularism that accompanies Islamophobia” (Doyle, 2013, p.265). It is argued that 9/11 and the influx of large numbers of asylum seekers have accelerated the feeling that “Muslims cannot integrate successfully in European societies” (Doyle, 2013, p.266). Besides, with regards to the refugee crisis, “Muslims are portrayed as invaders with values that are fundamentally different from those of Westerners” (Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Thomsen & Sidanius, 2018, p.570). This public sentiment was voiced by the far right, who claimed that “Muslims were undermining the traditional liberalism of Dutch culture” (Cesari, 2009, p.6). However, the process of increased suspicion and resentment among Muslims towards authorities can be used by terrorist organizations in their recruitment strategy (Pantazis & Pemberton 2009). Moreover, this form of securitization of Islam may enhance polarisation within society (Montiel & Anuar, 2002).

Besides, it is now increasingly apparent that an anti-Muslim outlook plays a role in radicalizing far-right extremists (Abbas, 2017, p.54). At first sight, far-right and Islamist extremists seem to be two completely different and opposing groups. Remarkably, researchers have shown that the two groups seem to have more in common than ever thought (Abbas, 2017; Bouhana, Corner, Gill & Schuurman, 2018). It even seems that they share the same local driving forces (Abbas, 2017), such as “the rise of new subcultures, the decline of traditional masculinity, hate or discrimination, territorial and local claims, grievances, the quest for identity and significance and anti-establishment standpoint” (Knott, Lee &

Copeland, 2018, p.5). In the age of globalization, the society has become more individualized and especially in times of insecurity, such as the economic crisis and the refugee crisis, group identity can give a sense of belonging (Huntington, 2001). The similarities do not only serve as evidence of reciprocal radicalisation but also contradict the correlation between religious behaviour and radicalisation (Bouhana, Corner, Gill & Schuurman, 2018, p.158).

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that, to a lesser extent, historical local and domestic tensions have already led to the portrayal of Islam as a threat which gave rise to emergency sentiments in the non- Muslim European population (Silvestri, 2010, p.48). Ever since the expansion of the Ottoman empire, the danger posed by Islam has been part of

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European history and identity (Rytter & Pedersen, 2014, p. 2309). Some other examples of influential events prior to 9/11 are “the Arab-Israeli war leading to the global oil crisis (1973), the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Palestinian intifada (1987–90, 2000), the Rushdie affair (1989), the headscarf affair in France (1989) and the Bosnian War (1992) (Kaya, 2012, p.401). It is a structural unease in a “risk society framed by neoliberal discourses in which freedom is always associated at its limits with danger and (in) security” (Bigo, 2002, p.65). The boundary between “them” and “us” may change, but the division between them and us is necessary for the existence of the society’s identity. In society’s perception, migrants are Muslims and their national affiliation is often of secondary importance (Bartoszewicz, 2016, p.19).

Another explanation made by Doyle (2013) is that the discourse of securitization partly stems from “the defence of secularism that accompanies Islamophobia” (p.265). The

Netherlands and Scandinavian countries, for example, are smaller countries that are committed to liberal social norms. However, these norms were threatened by “the consolidation of the EU and the growing visibility of Muslims as a result of immigration which coincided with the rising voice of Islamic fundamentalism” (Doyle, 2013, p.266). Besides, in the Netherlands, incidents involving Moroccans or Muslims are placed in the context of a diffuse terrorist threat (Demant & de Graaf, 2010; Bakker & Veldhuis, 2009). This is a rather new perception (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2009). The majority of the far-right voices an opposition towards Islam and the multicultural society (NCTV, 2018). This negative discourse has become generalized over the whole Muslim population, which facilitates radicalisation (Demant & de Graaf, 2010). With the securitization of

multiculturalism now the norm, where Muslim cultural and religious differences are seen as problematic, Muslim minorities are even more under the spotlight, receiving even greater attention from vast swathes of society that generalize Islam and Muslim (Abbas, 2017, p.59). However, even though the securitization of Islam explains religious discrimination, the theory is criticized for not being empirically tested (Fox, Finke & Eisenstein, 2019). It is questionable whether the mainstream sees Muslims as an existential threat. Nevertheless, the literature has shown that “religious minorities that are perceived as security or political threats can be targeted for discrimination” (Fox, Finke & Eisenstein, 2019, p.10). Therefore, the discourses that present Islam as a threat still risks religious discrimination, but the securitization of Islam by groups other than the far-right remains questionable.

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2.3 Sub-conclusion

This thesis makes use of the contextualist reading of securitization, applying critical discourse analysis to the study of securitization as a discursive practice. The securitization of Islam includes discourses constructed around a perceived threat from Islam and the promotion of emergency actions to counter the threat (Cesari, 2009). This process was accelerated by 9/11, but already existed long before. Securitization measures can be hard cases that breach human rights but are more often soft cases, which are considered as a form of cultural racism

(Edmunds, 2012). Examples are the deportation of Imams or restricting religious beliefs. The public opinion is influenced by the political and media discourses and the recent policy changes made by governments. Constructed as a target community, Muslims continuously have to prove their position, understood as interpellation. They are continuously watched by society, here considered as a form of surveillance. The securitization of Islam has several consequences, it may hamper police-community relations, fuel radicalisation and intertwine with the public opinion. Lastly, the intergroup processes can result in polarization, in which there is a chance of reciprocal radicalisation (Abbas, 2017). Nevertheless, the scholars of the securitization of Islam have been criticized for not empirically testing this conjecture.

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Chapter 3: Methodology

The goal of the analysis is to identify the terrorism threat perception of local governments. This thesis does so by performing a literature study and a discourse analysis. It uses the securitization theory as a theoretical framework, because, it “pays attention to how political communities identify and respond to threats” (Cesari, 2012, p.433). As explained in the introduction, this thesis will start with a literature review of the local and national counter-terrorism policies as well as the counter-terrorism threat development during the time period of this study (2007-2019). It is the descriptive part of this thesis that forms the basis of the second part of the analysis, the discourse analysis of the policy documents of Amsterdam’s counter-terrorism policy during the time period of this study. To make the analysis structured and comprehensive, this thesis utilizes Fairclough’s three-dimensional model in conducting a critical discourse analysis. This thesis employs Norman Fairclough's dialectical model of critical discourse analysis as a method using the securitization theory as the theoretical framework. This chapter will explain the analysis, justify the choices and discuss the limitations. This part of the thesis will explain the methodology more thoroughly.

3.1: Case selection

Amsterdam serves as an illustrative case study. This case is a relevant case study as the city does face a terrorist threat. Moreover, there are several organizations that can be categorised as radical Muslim organizations that are active in the Netherlands. “The Hofstadgroup is probably the most extreme and infamous radical Muslim organisation in the Netherlands” (Bakker & Veldhuis, 2009, p.12). Additionally, several studies confirmed that the

securitization of Islam is taking place in the Netherlands (Edmunds, 2012; Fox & Akbaba, 2015). Moreover, Meesteren and Oostendorp (2018) have shown that the Dutch political discourse constructs Muslims as a suspect community since 2011. Additionally, “after the assassination of ﬁlmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, by a Muslim affiliated with the Hofstad group, a radical Muslim group, the government took measures that expanded the power of the state to fight terrorism” (Fox & Akbaba, 2015, p.180). Besides, the policies of Amsterdam inspired other policies worldwide between 2004 and 2008 (de Graaf, Weggemans, 2018). In 2007 the municipality of Amsterdam developed its first integrated radicalisation policy (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2007). Between 2002 and 2010 mayors have gained more powers regarding specific safety problems and their responsibilities in the security sphere have increased (Prins, 2014). The local approach complements the national strategy in

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countering terrorism. In many respects, the content of the counter-radicalisation policies of Amsterdam does not differ much from the municipal counter-radicalisation policies in other large Dutch cities (de Graaf & Weggemans, 2018). The approach is focused on the early signalling of radicalisation to prevent that someone who radicalized would become a terrorist. Therefore, Amsterdam serves as an illustrative case in studying the local terrorist threat perception.

3.2: Data collection

The literature study utilizes academic literature about the international, national and local terrorism threats, and government responses in countering terrorism. These are found through Google Scholar and by snowballing on the search results, as was explained in the introduction of this thesis. The literature study uses primary sources that are found through links and references in the academic literature. Some of these are terrorism trend analysis of the EU (TE-SAT reports)19published by Europol; Crime Terror Nexus reports20 about the terrorism threat in the Netherlands; national security reports that discuss the terrorist threat and counter-terrorism strategies published by the NCTV and AIVD21; the terrorist threat assessment of the Netherlands (DTN) reports; and regional safety plans that discuss the terrorism threat in the region. This information is retrieved from official websites of the AIVD, NCTV, Europol and the Crime Terror Nexus. This thesis is limited to accessible resources that are not secretive. The case study of Amsterdam is based on a document analysis of primary sources. This method is chosen, because a document analysis can be used as a systematic procedure for reviewing documents. This part will focus on the official documents of the counter-radicalisation policies of the Netherlands between 2004 and 2019, the counter-terrorism policies of Amsterdam between 2007 and 2019, interviews with the mayor’s on the local news

19_{TE-SAT reports are based on qualitative and quantitative data provided by Eurojust and member states}

20_{The Crime Terror Nexus is a project that systematically explores the new links between petty crime, organized}

crime and terrorism in Europe and can be found on: www.crimeterrornexus.com

21_{The analysis of the problems posed by radicalisation mostly rely on the information provided by the Dutch}

Intelligence Services (AIVD) and national coordination terrorism in the Netherlands (NCTV). The threat assesment is based on that of the terrorism threat assesment of the Netherlands (DTN), which is published three times a years by the NCTV.

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channel AT5. The coding of data was accomplished via highlighting the different discourse strands, which were later coded under the names of larger discourses, such as the cultural discourse and the security discourse.

3.3: Fairclough’s three dimensional model

Fairclough (1995) identifies three aspects of the constructive effects of discourse. Discourse contributes to the construction of social identities, social relationships between people and systems of knowledge and belief. The three aspects correspond to what he calls the ‘identity’, ‘relational’ and ‘ideational’ functions of language. His method is based on the three

components of description, interpretation and explanation. Fairclough proposed a three-dimensional framework that could be employed to relate micro instances of language use to wider aspects of social practice and the dimensions are explained in this section of the thesis. The first dimension serves as a coding system in analysing the policy documents. The second step is identifying the discursive practise, this part analysis all the counter-radicalization policies together to find interdiscursivity and intertextuality. The third step is to identify how the texts reproduce or challenge wider aspects of society, the social practice. This part makes use of a literature review of the terrorist threat on an international, national and local level.

3.3.1: Dimension one: language as a social practice

The first dimension that Fairclough’s model studies refers to language as a social practice. This dimension examines the structure of the text and its linguistic features (Fairclough, 1995). Drawing on systematic functional linguistics (Halliday, 1985), the textual dimension focuses on how discourses are established linguistically. Due to time constraints, this thesis will focus on lexicalisation, modality and patterns of transitivity as these aspects are the most likely to reflect the securitization. The three textual dimensions serve as a coding system for the analysis of the second and third dimensions. Critical discourse analyses assumes that linguistic features of the texts trigger the assumptions of the political and ideological content of the discourses.

Simply put, lexicalisation is the process of making a word to express a concept. An author can choose how to refer to the same person, social group, social relations or issues. The choice the author makes depends on the social, personal and socio-cultural context (van Dijk, 1995). Therefore, lexicalisation expresses an underlying ideology. The choice between

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“terrorist” and “foreign fighter” is an example of lexicalisation. According to Fairclough (1995), modality is anything which reflects the author’s personal view to what they say. High modality is exemplified by the modal verb “will” and low modality can is exemplified by the modal verb “may” (Mayr & Machin, 2012, p.187). These are epistemic modality, which concerns how certain the author is about an issue. A second type of modality is deontic modality, which is about influencing or persuading people. Examples are words like “must” and “should”. Additionally, verbs such as “believe”, “think” and “appear” can express a degree of certainty. Transitivity refers to how people are described as doing something (Mayr & Machin, 2012, p.104). Things to look at are participants, processes and circumstances. Three main processes of transitivity are discussed in the analysis of this thesis; material, relational and mental. In the material process there is an actor and a goal, it concerns an action. In the mental process, there is a sense and a phenomenon, it concerns sensing, someone seeing something for example. Relational processes ascribe a meaning to participants, “Peter is smart” for example. These serve as a coding system in identifying different discourse strands (minor discourses).

3.3.2. Dimension two: discursive practice

The second dimension, called ‘discursive practice’, studies the production, circulation and consumption of the text (Fairclough, 1995). This dimension pays attention to the coherence and intertextuality between the policies within the time period. In other words, it critically analyses the expression of social practice through discourse, which explains how discourse is involved in the construction of social practice such as beliefs, knowledge, religion, norms and values (Fairclough, 1995). There are three focus points.

First, it studies the role of the people who construct and consume the discourse, in this case the role of the mayor´s and that of the audience. This is of importance, as political leaders play an important role in labelling something as a security issue in order “to understand and shape the world and make this view accepted by the public” (Balzacq, Léonard & Ruzicka, 2016, p. 495). Citizens can demand and accept the municipality to pull strings (Prins, 2014). Second, it identifies whether the policies contain shared discourses that are related to common, more general, topics. Therewith, it discusses the similarities and differences between the policies, the interdiscursive relations.

The policies can influence or inspire each other, they can contrast the previous ideas, or built on the other policy. Therefore, interdiscursive relations reflect the process of social

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change and the hegemony of one group over the other, as only the dominant group can intervene and form discursive practices. In this thesis it means that this step studies whether the security discourse contains a consistent threat assessment over time. This is of importance, because the construction of reality needs the repetition of this truth over time. Moreover, research has shown that the discursive creation of a ‘suspect community’ may fuel

radicalisation (Pantazis & Pemberton, 2009; Demant & de Graaf, 2010). Third, it studies the intertextuality, which studies the references that the policies make to national and

international policies and events. Making cross-references links the policies to discourse as a social practice.

3.3.3. Dimension three: discourse as a social practice

To place the terrorist threat assessment of Amsterdam in the wider socio-political context of the city, the analysis of the discourse as a social practice utilizes: data on the geographical features of the city, published by the municipality of Amsterdam and national statistics (CBS); and data on political formations, published by the municipality and the governing political parties backed up by academic literature that discusses terrorist threat on an international, national and local level. This part of the analysis reflects on the ideological effects and hegemonic processes of the constructed discourses. Moreover, placing the discourse in a wider social context is crucial, as the discourse both shapes and is shaped by the social (Fairclough, 1995). “Social practices can be thought of as ways of controlling the selection of certain structural possibilities and the exclusion of others” (Fairclough, 2003, p.21). They can be seen as “articulations of different types of social elements which are associated with particular areas of social life” (Fairclough, 1995).

3.4 Justification of methodological choices and possible pitfalls

The method of discourse analysis is used, because it helps in understanding why and how a group is identified as an existential threat as it analyses how specific actors construct an argument, and how this argument fits into wider social practices. Besides, both securitization and critical discourse analysis are constructivist and thus make the theoretical framework and analysis fit together. Like securitization, discourse is a fluid concept. The critical discourse analysis: challenges “ways of thinking and speaking about aspects of reality” (Cheek, 2004, p.1142). The assumption of the securitization theory that something becomes a security issue

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if it is labelled as one (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998) fits the assumption of discourse analysis, which assumes that reality is socially constructed and therefore discourses determine how the society interprets reality (Fairclough, 1995). Consequently, the understanding of the reality, determines the appropriate action, with regards to the securitization theory, this would be the security act. Therewith, this method serves the aim to assess the production of

meaning, in this thesis the terrorist threat assessment by the municipality of Amsterdam. Overall, it seems that the chosen theory and method are suitable for this research. Moreover, discourse analysis is an inductive approach and therewith avoids confirmation bias.

Nevertheless, the thesis acknowledges the possible pitfalls and limitations of the study. First of all, the securitization theory limits the scope of this study to the construction of threats and emergency measures. However, the critical discourse analysis employs

Fairclough’s three-dimensional model, which challenges “ways of thinking and speaking about aspects of reality” (Cheek, 2004, p.1142). This avoids a confirmation bias of the securitization of Islam. Moreover, using this analytical model adds the normative element to the securitization theory, which resolves the theory’s lack of a basis to critically evaluate claims of threat, enmity and emergency, referred to as the normative dilemma (Williams, 2003; Charrett, 2009).

Secondly, the critical discourse analysis cannot measure the effects of the discourse it can merely indicate which limits the internal validity of this study. However, the method of discourse analysis is used, because it helps in understanding if and how a group is identified as an existential threat as it analyses how specific actors construct an argument, and how this argument fits into wider social practices. Besides, both securitization and critical discourse analysis are constructivist and thus make the theoretical framework and analysis fit. The assumption of the securitization theory that something becomes a security issue if it is labelled as one (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998) fits the assumption of discourse analysis, which assumes that reality is socially constructed and therefore discourses determine how the society interprets reality (Fairclough, 1995). Consequently, the understanding of the reality, determines the appropriate action, with regards to the securitization theory, this would be the security act. Therefore, discourse exercises power as different people and groups can

influence the discourse. Nevertheless, there may be the reason for using a certain discourse could differ from the social consequences the discourse has.

Thirdly, the external validity is low, because Amsterdam shares some unique features when compared to other counter-radicalisation policies in the Netherlands and abroad (de

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Graaf & Weggemans, 2018). Therefore, the results will add to the existing literature, but are not generalizable. Nevertheless, Amsterdam is an illustrative case. Moreover, many Dutch cities base their approaches on that of Amsterdam.