Leiden University
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs CSM 2017/18
Dr. Lydie D. Cabane
Europeanisation of Consular Crisis Management
Word count: 21230 Submitted on
9 June 2019
By
Franziska Maria Feinig 2101254
Salus populi suprema lex esto
Table of contents LIST OF TABLES ... 4 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ... 5 INTRODUCTION ... 7 RESEARCH QUESTION ... 8 SOCIETAL RELEVANCE ... 9 SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE ... 10 THESIS OUTLINE ... 10
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 12
1.1EUROPEANISATION OF CONSULAR PROTECTION ... 12
1.1.1 Consular Protection on a national level ... 13
1.1.2 Consular protection on EU level ... 14
1.1.3 Forms of cooperation ... 16
1.2 BUILDING EUROPEAN UNION CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPACITY ... 18
1.3 A NEW FOREIGN POLICY SETTING –THE EEAS AS AN ‘ORGANIZATIONAL MESS’? ... 22
1.4 TOWARDS DEEPER EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? ... 25
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY ... 29
2.1 OBSERVANT PARTICIPATION ... 30
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN ... 30
2.3 METHODS ... 31
CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS ... 33
3.1THE STATUS OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS IN EUFOREIGN MINISTRIES ... 33
3.1.1 The ‘unglamourous’ part of diplomacy? ... 33
3.1.2 Synergy as a blessing or a curse? ... 34
3.2THE DIRECTIVE ON CONSULAR PROTECTION OF EU CITIZENS AS A DRIVER FOR INTEGRATION? ... 35
3.2.1 Member states’ positions ... 35
3.2.2 What is new? ... 36
3.2.3 Driver for more integration? ... 38
3.3THE CURRENT SYSTEM AS AN ‘ORGANISATIONAL MESS’? ... 38
3.3.1 Setting the ‘COCON’ stage ... 39
3.3.2 Too many cooks spoil the broth? ... 40
3.3.3 Distribution of roles ... 41
3.4DYNAMICS OF EUCONSULAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT ... 43
3.4.1 Group building: Member States preferred method in consular crises ... 43
3.4.2 Fragmentation or solidarity in consular crises abroad? ... 45
3.4. 3 Joint EU Crisis Preparedness Frameworks ... 46
3.4.4 The role of the EEAS ... 51
3.4.5 The ‘dying’ concept of Lead States ... 54
3.5BATTLE GROUND CONSULAR AFFAIRS? ... 56
3.5.1 The EEAS digging for turf ... 56
3.5.2 The Commission’s power play ... 58
3.6SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ... 60
CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION ... 62
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 64
List of Tables
List of Abbreviations
BSE Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
CAD Consular Affairs Division
CC Consular Correspondent
CCI Consular Cooperation Initiative
DG ECHO Directorate-General European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
Operations
DG JUST Directorate-General Justice and Consumers
COCON Council of the EU Working Party for Consular Affairs
CoOL Consular-Online Webplatform
CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMPD Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPCC Civilian Planning an Conduct Capability
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
EDA European Defence Agency
EC European Commission
EEAS European External Action Service
EFSA European Food Safety Authority
EP European Parliament
ETD EU Emergency Travel Document
EU European Union
EU DEL EU Delegation
EUMC EU Military Committee
JFW Joint EU Crisis Preparedness Frameworks
LCC Local Consular Cooperation
MS Member State
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PSC Political and Security Committee
TEU Treaty on the European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK United Kingdom
INTRODUCTION
Diplomacy in a traditional sense is usually associated with the prestigious work of an ambassador: representing their national interests and policies by negotiating treaties, attending state dinners, and establishing relations with other diplomats. The provision of consular service is the less obvious, and perhaps even less attractive, task of foreign ministries.
When citizens get involved in a crisis outside their home country and their well-being is at risk, the relevance of consular affairs is being visualised. Natural or man-made disasters abroad prompt foreign ministries to prepare for and undertake evacuations of their citizens, respond to numerous and simultaneous requests for consular assistance from their nationals, and process inquiries from friends and family concerned.
Protection of citizens abroad can be seen as an external dimension of the states’ role as the guardian of its people. However, states are often not capable of dealing with affected nationals abroad on their own and depend on the support of other actors. Therefore, within the European Union, member states are increasingly working together in the field of consular affairs. An accelerator for this process was the establishment of European Union citizenship, which transferred some of this Leviathan’s responsibility to the EU. However, the integration of such a traditional ‘core state power’ to EU level against the background of creating synergies raises questions of state sovereignty.
Within the framework of an integrated Europe, serious institutional changes in the past have addressed European Unions’ external relations. The restructuring of European Union Foreign Policy with the Treaty of Lisbon 2009 has led for example to the creation of the European External Action Service – the European Union’s quasi diplomatic service. This significant conferral of competences regarding European Foreign and Security Policy also shapes how crisis management in the EU is organized at present. The Europeanisation of former exclusive member state competences is also illustrated with regards to consular crisis management: The EEAS has newly established a consular affairs department.
However, due to the recency of these changes, it is not clear yet, how they have changed the provision of the European Union’s consular crisis management. Moreover, issues regarding questions of citizenship and the limits of government responsibility for citizens outside their state territory do not facilitate consular affairs for member states’ foreign ministries. In particular with regard to the ‘dual’ national and EU citizenship enshrined by the Treaty of Maastricht 1992, the question of jurisdiction makes the situation highly complex.
If a Spanish citizen finds herself* in a crisis situation, does the primary responsibility of her rescue lie within Spain’s jurisdiction? Or is she primarily a EU citizen and therefore the EEAS or all member states can be held equally accountable for her rescue?
Within this context, EU consular affairs policies have recently sought for innovative approaches to solve some of these issues. Council directive 2015/637 regulates the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries.
Nevertheless, it is neither proven if these policies have resulted in more integration, nor if they actually prove to enhance consular protection for EU citizens.
Research question
The purpose of this study is to mainly look at the restructured consular crisis management system of the EU and the 2016 established ‘Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks’ of the EEAS. Since EU consular crisis management has only been introduced in recent years, a proper policy evaluation ex post is not yet feasible. Therefore, this thesis will aim to depict the current consular crisis management system and its organizational implications regarding European integration.
Whether consular crisis management within the EU, or rather among the EU member states and the EEAS is currently organized efficiently in this compound institutional network will probably not be solved here. Nevertheless, by taking into account the implications of the Treaty of Lisbon on consular affairs and the current system of collaboration and procedures between EU member states and the EEAS, the aim of this thesis is to shed light into the complex field of consular crisis management within the European Union.
*In order to improve readability, only the female form is used in the text, nevertheless all data apply to members of both gender.
One of the main consular affairs’ policy on European Union level of the last years is the Directive 2015/637, which introduced in particular the establishment of consular crisis preparedness plans, so-called ‘Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks’. There have already been crisis events in third countries (countries outside the EU) within the last years, during which these plans were executed. One example were the earthquakes in Indonesia in 2018 or the terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka 2019. Bearing the introductory reflections in mind, the aim of this research is to answer the following central question:
How does the European Union Council Directive 2015/637 regarding the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries affect the Europeanisation of consular crisis management?
Societal relevance
In today’s globalised world, millions of EU citizens travel or live outside the EU and they do not cease being citizens when they leave the borders of their state. While nationals abroad become subjects of consular assistance, the relevance of the state in relation to the well-being of its citizens is being visualised. They could find themselves in the middle of a crisis, such as a natural disaster or political unrest, which might require immediate support, and prompt foreign ministries to assist their nationals.
However, consular officials are obliged to respect and work within the laws of the state they are operating in, but this can impede with their objective of locating and evacuating citizens. Cooperation with other states with regards to information sharing, media communication, and institutional (local) out-reach is therefore essential. Large-scale disasters such as the tsunami in South-East Asia in 2004 and the Lebanon crisis in 2006 have highlighted the weakness of the European consular crisis management system. Especially the tsunami in South-East Asia 2004, which left almost 2000 dead EU citizens can be seen as a ‘wake-up call’ for member states. In the aftermath of the catastrophe, they were overwhelmed by relatives searching for their families, transporting corpses back to their home countries and providing medical help to survivors or organising repatriation measures. This event revealed the lack of an unanimous EU approach, which would have been highly beneficial at
the time. One step towards a more unanimous approach was the reinforcement of the
conception of EU citizenship by the Treaty of Lisbon. There, EU citizens was granted the right to seek for consular protection in a country abroad if their home country is not
represented. However, whether these new measures actually strengthened European integration and consular cooperation after all lacks evidentiary knowledge. Therefore, this thesis attempts to contribute to the academic scrutiny that is currently required to depict issues regarding consular assistance abroad.
Scientific relevance
Much has been written and many case studies have been conducted about the European integration (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2016). However, even though significant institutional changes were made regarding the European Union Foreign Policy including the field of consular affairs in recent years, the Europeanization of consular crisis management has received little attention.
It seems quite obvious that consular crisis management of one single member state can never be as efficient as joint EU member states and European External Action Service action. Yet, consular protection and crisis management is first of all an exclusive member state competence and therefore raises issues of responsibility. Further, this research aims at giving an insight into consulate’s role in crisis management.
This research therefore seeks to contribute to the discussion by looking at how the latest institutional developments - such as the creation of the European External Action Service and its crisis management division - have constituted current consular crisis management within the EU.
Thesis outline
This thesis is divided in four main chapters, the first one being the theoretical framework, which will provide the reader with an overview of the main European integration theories used in this thesis. A special focus will be put on the development of European Union crisis management capacities within the last years, the establishment of the EEAS as an ‘institutional hybrid’ and the Europeanisation of consular protection. In chapter two, the methodological approach of this thesis will be explained, taking into account potential scientific limitations of this research.
The third chapter contains the analysis of this work, structured according to the main themes that emerged during the conducted expert interviews. Chapter 3.1 will present an indication of the appreciation of consular affairs of several EU member states’ foreign
ministries. In chapter 3.2 Directive 2015/637 and some member states’ positions will be discussed. In chapter 3.3 there will be given an overview of the current system of consular protection within the EU. EU consular crisis management will be addressed in chapter3.4, touching upon topics, such as the way in which member states cooperate in times of consular crises, ‘Joint EU Crisis Preparedness Frameworks’, the role of the EEAS in consular protection, as well as the concept of ‘Lead States’. Finally, chapter 3.5 will focus on the question whether there are institutional battles over the policy area consular affairs.
CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Therefore, the first part of the theoretical framework will explain consular affairs on a national level and will then present how it is currently being subject of Europeanisation. The second part will then draw upon the question on how the European Union has become a crisis management actor, briefly outlining current crisis management instruments and potential institutional challenges. The third chapter will entail an outline on the evolution of the main crisis management agency of the European Union - the European External Action Service - highlighting its institutional hybrid character. By embedding the agency’s creation with the Treaty of Lisbon in a broader historical perspective, this thesis will also address the question whether EU crisis management decision-taking can currently be defined as more intergovernmental or more supranational.
Finally, a brief overview on different theories on European integration will be presented, providing the essential background for contextualising current developments of Europeanisation of consular affairs eventually.
1.1 Europeanisation of Consular Protection
Generally speaking, the concept of consular affairs is twofold: First, the provision of consular services to foreigners, such as issuing travel visas and residence permits. Second, the provision of consular protection for nationals abroad. The latter entails individual assistance to nationals in distress (e.g. when they lost their passport or have a medical emergency) as well as consular crisis management in times of (large-scale) crises (for instance if a natural disaster takes place in a tourist location) (Okano-Heijmans, 2011). For the purpose of this thesis, this differentiation of consular affairs in issuing visas to foreigners and supporting nationals in distress is important. By ‘consular protection’ the provision of support and assistance to (EU) citizens abroad is meant.
Consular protection of EU nationals outside the European Union could be seen as a symbol for the external dimension of the European Union citizenship. It was established by the Treaty of Maastricht, Article 9, declaring every national of a member state a citizen of the European Union. Bearing in mind that the introduction of a common approach towards consular protection for citizens of the Union in third countries would also strengthen the idea of European solidarity as perceived by the citizens, Council Directive 95/553/EC was the first legal act arranging regulations for the provision of mutual consular protection.
In March 2011, the Commission issued a Communication to the European Parliament on the state of play and way forward regarding consular protection of EU nationals abroad. The same year in December, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Directive, which clarified the requirements for an ‘unrepresented’ EU citizen in a third country even further. Additionally, it formalized the procedures for reimbursement of financial advances and turned the Lead State concept into legally binding Union law. Moreover, it is worth mentioning, that although Decision 95/553/EC already entailed some of specifications for consular protection, the crisis management component was only introduced in this proposal.
Finally, Council Directive (EU) 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and repealing Decision 95/553/EC was entering into force on May 1, 2018. It aims at further facilitating cooperation and coordination between consular authorities and to strengthen EU citizens' right to consular protection.
1.1.1 Consular Protection on a national level
The protection of citizens can be seen as the main task of a nation. If a state is not providing for sufficient protection, its legitimacy could be questioned. Since consular protection externalises this principle to outside the territory of the state, this policy field could be described as extremely interesting in terms of sovereignty.
Since globalization has encouraged more people to travel and live abroad, foreign ministries have become increasingly confronted by the challenging task to provide for efficient consular assistance in a crisis. However, (European) states do have different approaches to providing such assistance. Whereas consular assistance in some states may be a legal right and free of cost, others cannot be held accountable for the rescue of their citizens in a third country. Hence, countries seek for innovative instruments such as registration systems for nationals living and travelling abroad, travel warning systems, engaging honorary consuls in crisis management tasks, and involving national (private) companies in potential evacuation scenarios. For these cases, foreign ministries have established consular crisis management departments to which the respective embassy is reporting to in a crisis abroad.
1.1.2 Consular protection on EU level
Article 5 of the Vienna Convention of 1963 affirms that consular affairs of states are the sole national responsibility, one fundamental element being the assistance of nationals of the sending state during their stay in the territory of the receiving state in cases of distress (Fernandez, 2008). Large-scale (consular) crises such as the tsunami in South-East Asia in 2004, the Lebanon crisis in 2006, or the outbreak of the civil war in the Middle East in 2011 are confirmation that consular cooperation is essential given the fact that even the most resourceful national consular services could not cope on their own (Porzio, 2008).
In this context, Lindström (2009) argues that these crises have triggered EU member states to continue intensifying their capacity and consular cooperation. Furthermore, the author acknowledged that different institutional frameworks regarding the provision of consular service between member states makes cooperation extremely difficult. For some, the right to consular assistance is a national law, whereas for others, it is a government policy. Additionally, the states have differing criteria for who is eligible for consular assistance and different policies on charging citizens for services such as an evacuation (Lindström, 2009). The process of transforming the Commissions Representations abroad into European Union Delegations and taking over coordination functions of national embassies post-Lisbon should have provided the possibility to solve some of these issues (Balfour, 2015).
Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, negotiations addressed the extension of the EEAS and its legitimate practices, but did not resolve the question whether the EU should play a role in consular affairs. Some member states, for instance the UK, have shown little interest in transferring consular affairs competence to the EU delegations. As an example, the head of EU delegation received firm resistance from a member state ambassador for trying to coordinate consular meetings during the Lebanon crisis 2011 (Lequesne, 2015), saying that consular affairs is not EU responsibility. All of these meetings therefore remained under the chairmanship of the Rotating Presidency. Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers agreed in 2013 to further explore ‘possibilities for developing [...] the role of EU delegations facilitating and supporting coordination among member states in their role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union’.
In light of the European Union citizenship and since by far not every member state is represented in every third country, it could indeed be argued that the tendency is currently heading towards a Europeanization of consular affairs. The Article 23 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) can be seen as the baseline for marking this trend, foreseeing that
[...] every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall adopt the necessary provisions and start the international negotiations required to secure this protection. In accordance with this Article, the Council Directive 2015/637 was developed in 2015, providing guidance for crisis preparedness and cooperation (Art.13) in order to ensure that unrepresented citizens are taken into account in contingency planning and can be provided with the necessary assistance in the event of a consular crisis. The European Commission press release regarding the implementation of the Directive cites Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the EEAS and Vice President of the European Commission as follows:
‘This Directive represents an important step in consular cooperation within the European Union. Following the Lisbon Treaty, it aims notably at ensuring the right of EU citizens to consular and diplomatic protection in a third country, in which the Member State of which they are a national is not represented. The EEAS and the EU Delegations will actively cooperate with Member States' embassies and consulates in contributing to these efforts.’
After three years of negotiations, the agreement by the Council explicitly clarifies when and how EU citizens in distress in a country outside the EU have the right to receive assistance from other EU countries' embassies or consulates. Further, it mentions the coordination of crisis contingency plans among member states and the Union delegation to ensure that unrepresented citizens are fully assisted in the event of a crisis. Having said that, it also highlights the role of the EU home country of the citizen in distress. According to them, the respective EU home country will always be consulted by the country from whom the citizen is seeking help from and can decide to take care of its own citizens at any time. Another essential aspect of the Directive concerns the involvement of the EU delegation: citizens will also be able to turn to the EU delegation in order to get general information about consular arrangements or about the assistance they could be entitled to. Considering that only few years ago some member states strongly opposed the idea of the EEAS getting involved into consular affairs according to Lequesne (2015), this Directive seems to mark a milestone for Europeanization of consular protection. Due to austerity measures in Europe in the aftermath of the financial crisis, states were forced to decrease their representation network and are thus increasingly pressured to form synergies with other actors. This could hold as an explanation why the directive was finally being adopted.
At this point, it must be mentioned that Article 23 of the TFEU and Article 13 of the Directive 2015/637 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries comprise the former exclusive member state competence of providing consular assistance and in a wider sense protecting its citizens. However, although the European Commission initially even proposed the establishment of ‘Euroconsulates’, usual (non-crisis-related) consular work is still a sole member state matter (Fernandez, 2008).
1.1.3 Forms of cooperation
1.1.3.1 Preparedness
The role of headquarters of foreign ministries in the respective capitals and their embassies in crisis management can be summarized by the following major tasks:
- Conduction of consular crisis preparedness drills
In order to prepare for a (large-scale) consular crisis event, the headquarters foreign ministries frequently conduct consular crisis exercises, which mainly focus on informing the cabinet and the domestic press, but also receiving calls from affected citizens abroad and their families back home.
- Pre-emptive information gathering - situation analysis and risk assessment
In order to most efficiently deploy resources in a crisis event, it is important to own information about how many nationals could be affected and where to locate them. Many foreign ministries therefore have developed registration systems. Additionally, embassies or consulates represented must outline an overview to the local area of the country they are operating in, specifying characteristics regarding demography, economy, physical environment and most importantly, outline specific hazards.
- Monitoring the situation
Continuous monitoring of situations in third countries can perhaps be seen as the most important task of foreign ministries’ headquarters. They constantly reach out to their network of missions and consulates abroad in order to get crucial information about an evolving situation. Furthermore, they are responsible for not only validating the obtained information with other member states’ foreign ministries, but also for evaluating the
seriousness of the situation and determine together with the cabinet whether physical intervention by means of sending staff from headquarters is required.
- Develop and update crisis plans for third countries
Crisis plans for third countries encompass elements such as a thorough risk assessment regarding natural hazards, civil unrest or epidemics, a contact list of responsible local crisis authorities, an outline of division of tasks for the embassy staff and a reaction guideline describing, for instance, how to reach out to nationals or prepare evacuation measures. Headquarters in the capitals are responsible for regularly assessing these plans and reviewing their updated procedure.
- Organisation of internal information flow and communication
In the occurrence of a crisis, uncertainty is a crucial issue. Therefore, member states have to provide data such as number and geographical allocation of (EU) citizens, location of assembly points in case of evacuation and location of honorary consuls and whether they are capable to support citizens in distress. This flow of information has to be organized in advance, in order to prevent a sudden chaotic and redundant communication during a crisis. Additionally, communication between consular officers and the headquarters in the capitals during a crisis have to be guaranteed at all times. Hence, consular staff have to provide for the necessary technical equipment (for instance Satellite Phones), an efficient way to communicate (e.g. a consular crisis ‘Whatsapp’ - group), and a hierarchical chart presenting communication lines (a so-called ‘phone tree’).
- Organization of external communication and outreach to public media
If all 28 member states simultaneously inquire local authorities about the current ‘status-quo’ during a crisis and if respective nationals are involved, they might easily become overwhelmed by requests. Therefore, it is advisable for consular staff to know in advance which other member states’ colleague is going to reach out to local agencies and from whom they will get the information. Another essential point is the outreach to nationals and the media and what information is going to be communicated. Taking into account external communication with the public or media, it is advisable to agree on a common language among member states.
- Proactive allocation of capacities
For some third countries, the so called ‘Lead State’ (usually one of the larger member states or a state with a strong historical bond to a specific third country) is leading the EU consular crisis response; for countries where the ‘Lead State’ model does not apply, the EU Presidency at the time is primarily responsible. Member states’ foreign ministries and their embassies have to identify useful synergies well in advance of a crisis in order to know what their specific role in a crisis will be. If a crisis happens, for instance in a third country where one member state has strong economic or historical bond to, this particular member state then might know best about locating free capacities of hospitals or reaching out to unrepresented citizens.
1.1.3.2 Crisis response action
In the occurrence of a crisis, the consular crisis department of the foreign ministry is being informed by the embassy that holds the territorial jurisdiction over the state where the crisis is happening. The most important task initially is to find out whether nationals are involved. The first addressees of the department would most probably be expats or family members of travellers to receive a clearer picture of the number of nationals affected in the crisis location. If many citizens are involved, the consular crisis department together with the cabinet decides whether embassy staff or even staff from headquarters is being deployed to the crisis location. In most cases, a situation room would be activated where calls of affected nationals or their concerned family members are being received. The main task of the embassy on-site is contacting local authorities to receive an update on the status-quo of the situation, reaching out to national citizens (if possible), and to send reports to and obtain instructions from headquarters in the capital.
1.2 Building European Union crisis management capacity
Parallel to European integration debates, there has been an examination about the desirability of EU crisis management. Questions such as ‘What threats should the Union address?’ ‘What should the EU do and what should be left to member state responsibility?’ ‘What would an integrated Europe look like in an era of internal and transboundary crisis, security, and defence?’ and ‘Do the newfound crisis management capacities impinge on national sovereignty?’ reflect the transformation of EU crisis management.
A crisis can be described as an out-of-the ordinary situation which requires urgent remedial action under conditions of deep uncertainty (Rosenthal, Charles, & Hart, 1989). According to Boin, Kuipers, and Overdijk (2013), crisis management can be defined as the sum of activities aimed at minimizing the impact of a crisis whereby impact is measured in terms of damage to people, critical infrastructure, and public institutions. Thus, crises pose a particular challenge for public and private organizations as they are obliged to provide for efficient and adequate response (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010).
Even though one could easily argue that the European Union was not designed to play a role as a crisis manager (Pavlov, 2015), one must acknowledge the fact that it has always been about protection (Boin, Ekengren, Rhinard, 2013) - the very purpose of its creation being the prevention of waging wars against each other. In this regard, the EU has incorporated many crisis management functions nowadays. However, several large-scale crises in the past decades have demanded the adaption of European crisis management capacities. The Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986, the BSE crisis 1996, terror attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), the cyber-attacks in Estonia 2007, the Iceland ash cloud 2010, the Euro crisis 2012, and the Schengen crisis 2015 forced the European Union to establish a set of crisis management capacities. In this context, one has to mention one crisis of particular interest regarding consular crisis management: The 2004 South-East Asian tsunami has caused the death of almost 2000 EU citizens. The sudden need for urgent consular crisis management highlighted shortcomings of sole national crisis response. Hence, when Member States now want to work together to deal with a crisis home or abroad, they can use a range of EU instruments and mechanisms to facilitate joint response.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that crisis management has traditionally been perceived as a core function of the state and is closely linked to national sovereignty (Pavlov, 2015). In times of crisis, people expect their leaders to protect them and minimise the consequences. Therefore, governments may remain hesitant to delegating crisis management capacities to EU level. In light of national sovereignty this reluctance is understandable although one must mention that integration in the area of crisis management has accelerated within the last years.
As already addressed in the previous chapter, there is a significant discrepancy about the nature of EU sovereignty, which could undermine its legitimacy and efficiency in the field of crisis management (Pavlov, 2015). Further, one could argue that crisis management ‘is not merely an operational concept, but a public law phenomenon which can have great impact on the transformation of national sovereignty within the EU and on the nature of the emerging
EU sovereignty’(Pavlov, 2015). The steady rise of the EU as a crisis management actor poses an intriguing question: How did the EU manage to expand in an area that normally falls within the sovereignty of the nation state?
In their book The European Union as a Crisis Management Actor (2013), Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard describe a driving argument that pushed the European Union in the crisis management realm: A (transboundary) crisis creates a ‘systematic shock’ which requires the ‘protection of EU citizens’. In such a crisis, member states are confronted with their shortcomings and the EU is quick to suggest a role for herself and introduce new policy initiatives. Subsequently, it became difficult for member states to constrain institutional innovations that for ‘practical’ purposes were required for success, not least the ones that were implemented to minimise the loss of lives. As an example, they refer to the mad cow disease in the 1980’s where member states agreed to new health security measures offered by the Commission who then built an institution that is now known as the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA).In the case of consular protection, arguments of creating synergies due to national budget cuts and finding more practical solutions have entered the door for transferring the topic to EU level.
According to the authors, the ‘infusion’ with value of organisational and policy tools reflects a classic pattern of institutionalisation. This is particularly visible in the Council Conclusions on the Renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy 2015-2020 which is built on an all-encompassing notion of ‘protecting European citizens’. In this regard, one has to also mention the increasing Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) capacities as well as the external use of the civil protection in light of EU citizenship introduced 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht. The treaty established an EU citizenship as ‘complementary’ to national citizenship, thus creating protection responsibilities for the EU. The Lisbon Treaty even expanded the conception of EU citizenship by granting EU nationals the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State if their home country is not represented.
Another element introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon plays a significant role of how EU crisis management is being shaped: Article 222., usually known as the ‘Solidarity Clause’ requests Member States to assist one another in case of a natural or man-made disaster. The treaty seems to offer a clear application of solidarity, yet it is not self-evident how solidarity should be interpreted (Boin et al., 2013). Are member states obliged to help each other in a crisis and if yes to what extent? Whether ‘solidarity’ can be constitutionalised and how it should be performed in practice has also implications on civil protection. The concept of
‘solidarity’ is a symbolically powerful element in the narrative of European integration and has also been used to drive forward institutionalisation in the area of crisis management and civil protection.
The institutionalisation of EU crisis management capacities is strongly linked to the question of what drives institutionalisation in the EU in general. As already mentioned, neo-functionalists see the starting process of institutionalisation with vaguely articulated political ambitions to solve a problem. If this problem is an urgent one (such as a crisis or a disaster) it will quickly become the centre of attention (Boin et al., 2013). However, institutionalisation highly depends on the efforts to generate legitimacy for the capacity under construction. A new type of activity or policy will require the support by member states and therefore needs to be ‘sold’ to them (Boin et al., 2013). According to the authors, High Representative at the time Javier Solana played an important role as institutional architect for CSDP. He convinced member states that a delegation of tasks to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy would not jeopardize their interests, but only bring efficiency in the implementation of state interests. Hence, if one thinks about the EU twenty years ago, the Union had no crisis management capacities besides the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), whereas now there is a growing number of organisations displaying the intensifying relations between them and bringing together previously disconnected task areas (Boin et al. 2013).
One example of an institutionalised crisis management tool is the European Union Civil Protection Mechanism which was established after the 9/11 attacks in 2001 serving as an instrument to coordinate rapid resource sharing in times of need. Another key organ dealing with crisis management is the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the Council of the European Union which together with the High Representative may exercise political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations. This Committee is supported by two advisory bodies: the EU Military Committee (EUMC) for military operations and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) for civilian operations. There is a wide range of other tools dealing with crisis management in one way or another, such as the Civilian Planning an Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), as well as the European Defence Agency (EDA). This brief list does not come even close to naming all EU crisis management instruments. It does, however, demonstrate a dense institutional framework comprising civilian and military crisis management bodies that appear to create an ‘institutional conundrum’.
If one considers here the idea of Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2016) that the integration of ‘core state powers’ has left the European Union as fragmented as ever before, it could indeed be argued that the integration of crisis management capacities to EU level has
established an intricate web of organs. Also Pavlov (2015) sees EU crisis management
instruments scattered among EU bodies, constituting a complex set of intra-EU institutional relations whose dynamics determine EU activities as a crisis manager. Further, he sees a ‘negative coordination’ among different EU actors and contradicting political views of Member States hindering efficient EU crisis management. According to him, this results in a fragmentation of authority in EU crisis management, opening up an ‘authority vacuum’.
Since it is often not clear, who ‘owns’ the crisis and who must deal with it, tensions between member states, institutions, local authorities, international organisations, private companies are likely to arise (Boin et al., 2013). However, according to Blockmans and Wessel (2009), effective crisis management calls for effective decision-making. They further state that EU’s effectiveness will be tested upon the level of cohesion among Member States. A Union that is divided will achieve little, but derision, both in Europe and in third countries. Additionally, Boin et al. (2013) see the main task for the European Union as a crisis management actor in the alignment of national interests of its member states and in the facilitation of a coordinated well-resourced response.
One of the main crisis management institutions within the EU whose main task is the coordination and facilitation of member states’ foreign and security policies is the European External Action Service (EEAS). Even though in theory EU agencies remain tightly controlled by member states, in practice they enjoy a great deal of autonomy which allows them to develop a distinctive take on the formal aims of the agency. As the next chapter will demonstrate, these agencies have become quite important in shaping crisis management policies.
1.3 A new Foreign Policy setting – The EEAS as an ‘organizational mess’?
Having outlined how the European Union has gained crisis management capacities over the past decades, it is also necessary to look at the main organ for Foreign and Security Policy and crisis response: The EEAS. The agency has not only become the quasi European Union diplomatic corps and main actor for reconciling a common European approach to Foreign and Security Policy, but has also gained a role in matters of consular affairs. Therefore, the following part will briefly describe the transformation of diplomacy in general, the
motivational drivers for the creation of the EEAS, and what its institutional constitution might mean in terms of organisational efficiency.
As already addressed above, the EU demanded for a stronger cooperation among member states in order to tackle future global challenges and enhance capabilities of efficient large-scale crisis response. The Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 introduced the creation of a European External Action Service (henceforth EEAS), transforming the EU’s foreign policy and crisis response system. The overarching structure of the new established agency sought to facilitate discussions between member states and with EU institutions about defining coherent long-term foreign policy and security priorities (Boin, Ekengren, Rhinard, 2014).
The establishment of the (respective) agency was, however, not without hardship. Right from the beginning, negotiations about the structure of the EEAS were highly synthesised by intergovernmental and supranational approaches. The High Representative, the European Parliament, the European Commission, as well as member states (Adler-Nissen, 2013) struggled to define a clear institutional character and transferral of competences to the new agency. According to Balfour (2015), the first years after its creation, the EEAS was confronted with shifting and blurring boundaries between member states and EU institutions that did not result in a more integrated logic of EU foreign policy cooperation. These intergovernmental disputes over structure/leadership and turf/budgets transformed the EEAS into an ‘organizational hybrid’, which makes it legally merely the recipient of delegated tasks from member states (Henökl, 2014). Here, Furness (2013) as Kelemen (2013) state, that this ‘grey area’ of mixed competence policy fields created a vacuum, opening up further possibilities for the EEAS to push for greater autonomy. Its situatedness between Commission and member states, may indeed enable the EEAS to draw different elements of EU foreign policy – supranational, intergovernmental, and national preferences, EU instruments and resources, different working methods and structures – into a coherent system which may generate innovative patterns of cooperation (Balfour, 2015).
Tercovich (2014) states that High Representative Catherine Ashton substantially promoted the EEAS institutional project after the Haiti Earthquake in 2010 when EU crisis management had been heavily criticized internationally (OECD, 2011). It can be said that the event served as a catalyst for setting up new institutional structures, emphasizing a ‘comprehensive approach’ regarding EEAS crisis response.
One of the main logics behind the creation of the agency was to narrow the gap between EU and national levels of foreign policy making (Balfour, 2015), but also functional
motivations played a role. In times of budgetary cuts, the European diplomatic field was forced to using synergies and fostering cooperation on EU level.
Regarding the European Union network of delegations, the EEAS incorporated the former external relations department of the European Commission and of the Council which is why the agency is still mainly staffed by Commission personnel. This even further impaired the already existing tension between national diplomats and EEAS staff. Here, Balfour (2015) quotes a French Ambassador who drastically depicts this tension:
‘[...]people from the Commission serving in the EU delegations...their first reflex when a country enters into a war or a deep crisis is to go back to Brussels for security reasons. We, national diplomats, our first reflex is to stay by any means, because it is during a crisis that our job reaches a maximum utility.’
The global representation network of the EEAS encompasses now missions in over 130 countries. For the ministries of foreign affairs of some of the smaller member states - for instance Estonia, Luxembourg or Malta - which have a limited network of bilateral embassies worldwide, the creation of European Union delegations posed an interesting prospect. They could co-locate or minimise their embassies and consulates and make use of the work done by the newly established EU mission. On the other hand, larger member states such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom which have a thorough network of bilateral embassies were less eager to be represented by the EU delegation abroad.
In this context, one has to take into account the conception of solidarity in times of crises outlined in the previous chapter. Against the background of solidarity, analysing the role of larger member states and EU delegations and their conduction of consular crisis management in the event of large-scale crisis abroad might be of particular interest.
Within the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, member states may have acknowledged the fact that new global challenges required for more cooperation. However, they were rather willing to transfer foreign policy competence to an institutional ‘hybrid body’ such as the EEAS than to a classical supranational institution such as the Commission. This left the EEAS a somewhat ‘organizational mess’, inducing the question whether it has actually contributed to more coherence and efficiency (Boin, Rhinard & Ekengren, 2014).
This especially affects European crisis response. As already mentioned above, numerous transboundary crises of various sectors have triggered a greater willingness among member states in the past decades to confer more crisis management competences to the EU and future large-scale crises are likely to accelerate this process.
1.4 Towards deeper European Integration?
How is the current state of art of constitutional balance with regards to consular protection? If we consider that the EU is now gaining power in the former sole member state competence of consular crisis management, should some responsibilities remain sole member state responsibility or - in light of efficiency and capacity- should more power be delegated to supranational bodies? One could also pose the question whether the EU serves more as a ‘service provider’ in the field of consular affairs or if it is becoming a protective actor of its own? And what role would European solidarity play in a large-scale consular crisis abroad? These questions all involve different facets of European integration. From environment to social policy, virtually all aspects of government policy in Europe today are shaped by the EU in some way. The concept of Europeanisation is traditionally being understood as the impact of European integration at the domestic level (Saurugger, 2014). However, Radielli (2000) allows for a broader definition, stating that Europeanisation is a process of diffusion, construction and adaption of domestic political processes, policy discourses and ways of doing things, inducing an interdependence between the European Union on a supranational, and member states on a national level.
Since this thesis attempts to contextualise the previously exclusive member state competence of consular protection within the framework of the European Union, it is essential to comprehend motivational drivers for Europeanisation in general. Therefore, the following chapter shall provide an overview of the main theoretical explanations for European integration.
The theory of neo-functionalism was developed by Ernst B. Haas in the late 1950’s and can be seen as the first grand narrative of European integration. Even though the theory was declared obsolete later on, it regained attention with the scholars Sandtholtz and Sweet (2013) through their empirical study. In principle, the theory can be explained as an expansion of transnational activity and economic interdependence leading European elites (private actors, firms and public officials) to seek for regional – rather than national – solutions. For these shared problems supranational organs can supply rules for. Furthermore, it sees the transfer of national authority to the EU as means to circumvent domestic reluctance to the loss of national sovereignty which is required to open up national markets (Börzel and Risse, 2018). This upgrade to supranational power is then accompanied by a politicisation of EU policies and institutions which causes a ‘spillover’ effect, subsequently resulting in the empowerment
of supranational bodies and broader integration (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016). This very functional perspective to European integration is partially contested by liberal intergovernmentalism, which views states and national governments as the primary actors in the integration process.
Liberal intergovernmentalism too acknowledges the delegation of political authority to the EU in order to be able to take decisions necessary to solve societal problems that are likely to be blocked or delayed by domestic opposition (Börzel and Risse, 2018). However, intergovernmentalists pointed to the continuing relevance of nation-states and view the role of supranational bodies as instruments serving their causes. Though functionalism and intergovernmentalism differed in their beliefs about causes of integration, both correspond in their assumption that integration entailed the empowerment of supranational actors leading towards overall deeper and broader integration (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016).
Some scholars also diagnose the rise of a ‘new intergovernmentalism’ which argues that integration in the post-Maastricht period has indeed been intensified, but has been pursued by avoiding transferral of more powers to traditional supranational bodies such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice (Bickerton et al. 2015). The intensification of policy coordination has thus rather taken place by delegation to ‘de novo’ bodies (newly created institutions such as the ECB or the EEAS) which often enjoy considerable autonomy and can to some extent decide over their own resources. According to them, this results in an integration paradox: Member States pursue more integration but stubbornly resist further supranationalism.
Although much of what has been delegated to those new bodies could have been on the supranational agenda of the Commission, one should not automatically assume merely a power struggle between national governments and existing supranational bodies. Given that the vast majority of de novo bodies derive their legal status from secondary law, this can only mean that the Commission has been co-responsible for their creation (Bickerton et al. 2015). Considering though, that for instance the European External Action Service was created by primary law under the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (without the involvement of the Commission) and that the agency was taking over much turf that was previously assigned to the European Commission, one could indeed identify an institutional power battle between those two organs. What the creation process and its hybrid institutional nature of the EEAS may signify for European Union consular crisis management will be discussed at a later point. Nevertheless, against the background of new intergovernmentalism, the empowerment of ‘de
novo’ bodies may have brought broader, but not deeper integration in a supranational, centralised sense.
Similarly, the findings of Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2016) support this view, stating that the increasing involvement of EU institutions in key functions of sovereign governments has not led to an ‘ever closer Union’, but leaves the EU territorially and institutionally fragmented. As ‘core state powers’, they define state competences of high symbolic power that are strongly associated with sovereignty and nationhood, as for instance external security, internal security, taxation, and the operation of a nation-wide system of public administration. This concept of ‘core state power’ is closely linked to a rather narrow definition of the state as the organisation that maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given territory. Drawing upon new intergovernmentalist’ ideas, they substantiate this argument by explaining that member states prefer vesting the integration of ‘core state powers’ into task-specific new EU-bodies rather than to supranational ones such as the Commission.
They conclude that this contributes to an interinstitutional competition and fragmentation, or in more radical terms, an ‘organizational mess’. If one considers for instance the role of the head of the EEAS, this ambiguous institutional character becomes apparent: The High Representative acts not only as leader of the agency, but also as Vice-President of the Commission and chair of the Council for Foreign Affairs. This intertwinement of three different institutional bodies depicts indeed an internal power struggle. This research will in this sense make use of the concept ‘organisational mess’ and analyse what it might stand for in terms of consular crisis management of the European Union.
Börzel and Risse (2018), as well as Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2017) argue that neither functionalism nor intergovernmentalism can sufficiently explain why most recent crises such as the financial crisis 2007 or the migration crisis 2015 resulted in very different outcomes. According to the latter ones, European Monetary Union and Schengen failed for systematic reasons: due to insufficient risk and burden-sharing highlighted by the conflict between two fairly consolidated camps. According to them, the first camp consisted of the unfortunate member states which were directly and immediately hit by the crisis. They viewed the crisis as a common problem, and crisis management as a common responsibility of all member states. The second camp included the fortunate governments, who were not immediately affected by the crisis. Each side therefore had a clear policy preference: The unfortunate member states called for European burden sharing for instance through the creation of genuinely supranational burden-sharing capacities, whereas the fortunate ones opposed joint
capacity building and burden-sharing (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2017). If one considers this lack of solidarity among member states during large-scale crises in the past years, the question arises if and how member states would assist each other in a large-scale consular crisis abroad.
Considering the above, it becomes apparent that there is no acknowledged doctrine explaining European integration and its motivational drivers as a whole. For the purpose of this thesis it is however essential to understand the basic concepts of these theories. Neo-functionalism as well as liberal intergovernmentalism both see practical reasons on a national level as drivers for integration on a supranational level. Bickerton et al.’s (2015) new intergovernmentalism as well as Genschel and Jachtenfuchs’ (2016) ideas about the integration of ‘core state powers’ both acknowledge that the empowerment of de novo bodies has led to a more fragmented European Union. Furthermore, the latter ones (2017) see the splitting into two opposing camps (one for more capacity building and integration, the other one against it) induced by lack of solidarity as the main difficulty for further European integration.
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY
Since the Directive 2015/637 was only implemented on May 1, 2018, not much academic literature exists on this topic. Hence, this thesis aims to give an insight into the broader topic of how consular crisis management is carried out within the European Union. Drawing upon the theoretical framework outlined above, this thesis will analyse the following assumptions:
A. The findings of Genschel and Jachtenfuchs (2016) conclude that states were willing to transfer ‘core state powers’ to the EU, however not to a supranational level, but only to intergovernmental or in the case of the EEAS ‘institutional hybrid” bodies which has resulted in a more than ever fragmented European Union. Considering that
consular protection and crisis management is such a ‘core state power’ and it has been transferred (to some extent) to the EEAS,
one could argue that this theory is applicable to the current EU consular crisis management system.
B. Considering that large-scale consular crises, for instance the South-East Asia tsunami 2004, the Lebanon crisis 2006, and the outbreak of civil war in the Middle-East in 2011 have triggered more willingness among member states to more closely working together and using synergies in the field of consular affairs, one could claim that these events are pushing towards greater coherence and effectiveness, if not further integration.
C. Taking into account that
Directive 2015/637 assigned the EEAS a more important role with regards to consular protection and that
the inter-institutional ambiguity, the lack of clarity about its mandate and the dependence on a highly informal procedure of policy formulation makes the EEAS a loosely institutionalized network
one could assume that the provision of consular crisis management (which inherently requires for clear structure and organization) on EU level is negatively influenced by this ‘institutional mess’.
2.1 Observant participation
The assumptions that preceded this research are based on my employment with the consular crisis management department of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs during the Austrian Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2018. I regularly participated in meetings of the council working party for Consular Affairs (henceforth ‘COCON’) in Brussels, which allowed me to get an insight into the complex field of consular cooperation among member states and the EEAS.
The first COCON meeting I participated took place under the Bulgarian Presidency on 21 June 2018, where the Joint EU Crisis Preparedness Frameworks for Tunisia and Peru were discussed. The logistical and content-related organization of the three working party meetings
under the Austrian Presidency (held on 28September, 30 October and 30 November 2018)
fell under my responsibility, giving me a unique opportunity to gain insight into the consular crisis management field.
During the second half of 2018, the working party for consular affairs evaluated the following Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks: Albania, Angola, Brazil, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, India, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Nepal, Northern Macedonia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, actual and potential consular crisis hotspots such as the Lombok earthquake in Indonesia, hurricane ‘Michael’ in the Caribbean, the political escalation in Venezuela, as well as the Ebola outbreak and civil unrest in the Democratic Republic of Congo were being discussed.
Therefore, relevant documents, such as consular affairs working party documents, EEAS papers regarding the ‘Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks’, as well as seminar transcripts have already been collected within this year.
2.2 Research design
Since this thesis attempts to give a contextualized insight into the under-researched field of the European Union consular crisis management, the research design will be an exploratory
one. The first part of the analysing section will therefore focus on the evaluation of process, attempting to answer how the recent institutional changes and policies such as the establishment of the European External Action Service with the Treaty of Lisbon and the Directive 2015/637 have re-organized the current framework of providing consular crisis management for EU citizens. For this, the unit of analysis will be the wider European Union consular crisis management setting. Legal documents such as the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council Directive 2015/637 and their reference to consular protection, as well as institutional rules of procedure regarding the cooperation among member states and the EEAS in a consular crisis abroad, as well as the recently established ‘Joint EU Consular Crisis Preparedness Frameworks’ for third countries will constitute the unit of observation.
In order to touch upon the question whether these recently established frameworks for consular crisis preparedness are actually effective and provide to some extent an impact evaluation of the new consular cooperation Directive, the second part of the analysing section of this thesis will examine the ‘lessons learned’ of recent consular crises such as the Hurricane ‘Irma’ in the Caribbean in 2017 and the 2018 earthquake in Indonesia. This will be undertaken by reviewing ‘Lessons Learned’- reports of the working party for Consular Affairs and interviewing consular officers of EU member states on site, EEAS policy officers of the consular crisis management division, as well as of EU member states delegates to the working party for Consular Affairs. Finally, this assessment will contribute to the broader question how the newly established institutional setting has transformed European consular crisis management.
2.3 Methods
The findings of this research is primarily based upon a qualitative content analysis of European Union legal documents referring to consular protection and papers of the working party for Consular Affairs, as well as progress reports and joint EU consular crisis preparedness plans of the EEAS. Additionally, qualitative (semi-structured) interviews will be held with delegates of the working party for Consular Affairs (Austria, Romania, Greece, Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, and the Netherlands) as well as with an official from the EEAS. The interviews were based on a question guideline developed in advance, but will also allow to explore further follow-up queries. Hence, by allowing respondents to express their views in their own words, these semi-structured interviews will provide a way to develop a better understanding of the topic.
The main limitation of this research to be considered is that interviewees are not willing to speak frankly about how they experienced the efficiency of the new structure of the EU consular crisis management or the EU crisis preparedness plans established therein. They might feel an obligation to highlight positive aspects of the plan in order not to start a ‘blame game’. Therefore, one has to take into account that results could be biased. Yet, this research not only relies on expert interviews as source of information, but will also study essential EU documents.
Additionally, although EEAS authorities gave permission to this research topic and the analysis of respective EU documents, a clause of confidentiality could prevent the use of some delicate, but scientifically valuable EU documents.
What has to be mentioned here as well is the potential national bias that could underlay this research. Even though I attempt to writing this thesis against an objective academic background, my employment with the Austrian Foreign ministry and the contacts with other member states delegates might have subconsciously led me to a certain view on the topic. Nevertheless, by keeping in mind this potential obstacle, I will be able to accurately undertake this research.
In addition, it has to be noted, that only a small amount of member states will be interviewed for this research, hence, not giving a general opinion of EU member states. All interviews will be taken with officials from small member states with rather small representation networks. Nevertheless, this glimpse could visualise a tendency, that can indeed be analysed.
CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS
The fourth part of this thesis analyses the results of eight interviews conducted with consular expert officials from various member states and the EEAS, as well as legal documents stipulating consular protection for EU citizens. It is structured according to the different topics reflected in the interviews. Under consideration of the assumptions outlined in the theoretical framework, statements of the interviewed officials will be analysed.
The first chapter will aim at giving an insight into member states foreign ministries’ perception of the importance of consular affairs. Further, this chapter will be questioning whether the rather low popularity of consular work among member states foreign ministries could be associated with delegating this task to EU level. The second chapter will explain the main parts of the Directive 2015/637 and present positions of the involved entities. The third theme will be the organisational structure of the current consular protection system within the EU. The fourth chapter will focus on different issues of EU consular crisis management, namely whether there is a tendency towards more fragmentation or more solidarity in the field of consular affairs, how member states evaluate the newly established ‘Joint EU Crisis Preparedness Frameworks’, how they view the role of the EEAS in consular work and the concept of ‘Lead States’. The final chapter will focus on the main research topic: The field of consular affairs as subject of institutional turf war.
3.1 The status of Consular Affairs in EU Foreign Ministries
In the practice of foreign policy, consular affairs has often been labelled as the unglamorous ‘diplomacy for the people’. Considering this secondary role for consular protection of nationals next to the ‘high politics’ of inter-state diplomacy, it has been underestimated from the outset. Hence, one could assume that member states are more willing to transfer competences with regard to the ‘unpopular’ field of consular protection to the EEAS.
3.1.1 The ‘unglamourous’ part of diplomacy?
Several consular experts stated, that consular affairs is not the most renowned field in their foreign ministries. However, this perspective seems to be changing in the last years. Since more people are travelling and living abroad, consular work in the receiving more attention.
