A comparative study into the representation of national collective memory within German memorial museums

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MA Thesis in European Studies Track: Identity & Integration Graduate School for Humanities

Universiteit van Amsterdam

A comparative study into the representation of national collective

memory within German memorial museums

Author: Christina Powis Student number: 11315083

July 2017

Main Supervisor: Dr. Krisztina Lajosi-Moore Second Supervisor: Prof. Joep Leerssen

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Abstract

This thesis will examine the evolution of post-reunification German collective memory from the late 1990s to the present day. The focus of the thesis will be two case studies - the Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941−1944 exhibition and the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr in Dresden. These two case studies can be considered ‘memorial museums’ – an idea which will be explored throughout the thesis. Both the Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941−1944 exhibition and the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr focus on the German army and consider the implications of the individual responsibility of soldiers. Furthermore, both case studies challenge established German narratives of the Second World War. This paper found that exhibitions which challenge these established memory narratives often draw criticism from right-wing commentators, politicians and press. This highlights the politicised nature of the memory of the Second World War in contemporary Germany. Both the Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941−1944 exhibition and the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr play a role in the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, but this process is likely to remain an integral part of German collective memory for the foreseeable future.

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Introduction

According to the historian Michael Stürmer, “in Germany, for a long time, the purpose of history was to ensure it could never happen again” (MacGregor, 2014: xxxix). Monuments, memorials and exhibitions have been a method by which this history has been transmitted. In his book, Germany, Memories of a Nation (which accompanied the British Museum exhibition of the same name), Neil MacGregor, the former director of the British Museum claimed that there is “no other country in the world that at the heart of its national capital erects monuments to its own shame” (MacGregor 2014: xxxix). This has long been the prevailing narrative in unified German collective memory yet there are recent indications of a change in attitudes. At a speech in Dresden in January 2017, Björn Höcke, the leader of Alternative für Deutschland in the eastern state of Thuringia claimed that “Wir Deutschen, also unser Volk, sind das einzige Volk der Welt, das sich ein Denkmal der Schande in das Herz seiner Hauptstadt gepflanzt hat" (“Die Höcke-Rede von Dresden in Wortlaut-Auszügen” 2017). This statement is almost a direct translation of the aforementioned quote from MacGregor, yet Höcke’s motivation is somewhat different. During the speech he called for a new “Erinnerungskultur, die uns vor allen Dingen und zuallererst mit den großartigen Leistungen der Altvorderen in Berührung bringt" (“Die Höcke-Rede von Dresden in Wortlaut-Auszügen,” 2017) and advocated a more celebratory attitude towards Germany’s history. Höcke’s views were met with anger, even among some fellow Alternative für Deutschland members, yet his remarks suggest that there may be many who believe Germany needs to re-evaluate its attitude to Second World War commemoration.

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Indeed, the designer of the Berlin Holocaust memorial - the memorial at which the comments were aimed - Peter Eisenman, claimed in an interview with Die Zeit in November 2016 that, despite its success, his Berlin memorial would not have been built in the current political landscape. He stated that "das gesellschaftliche Klima hat sich gewandelt, vieles, was bislang als akzeptabel galt, wird nun infrage gestellt.” (Rauterberg, 2016). In the interview, focused on the (then recent) election of President Trump, Eisenman seems to link an increase in the influence of populism, both in the USA and in Europe, to a new ambivalence to Holocaust memorial. Eisenman’s comments appear consistent with Höcke’s speech – which he delivered barely two months later.

This example demonstrates that although Holocaust memorial in Germany has long been “a tortured, self-reflective, even paralyzing preoccupation” (Young, 1993: 20), it is perhaps now reaching a crossroads. In 1993, the prominent memory scholar James E Young predicted that “without the wall as a punitive reminder, Germany will become a little more like other nations: its national institutions will recall primarily its own martyrs and triumphs” (Young, 1993: 26). Two decades later, this prediction could be beginning to ring true. With the increasing voice of parties such as Alternative für Deutschland and federal elections in the September of this year, Höcke’s attitude towards Holocaust memorial could become the prevailing one.

These recent developments, discussion and accompanying controversy in the field of German memory studies will form the basis of my research. Within this background I will consider two post-reunification case studies. I chose to use case studies as, according to Katie Digan, they “provide concrete information, empirical data and a solid foundation to study the development of a piece of memorial culture” (Digan, 2015: 5).

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Firstly I will discuss the ‘Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944 exhibition’ (popularly known as the Wehrmachtsausstellung), curated by the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung. This exhibition, which was shown in 33 German and Austrian cities between 1994 and 1999, “showed for the first time the systematic involvement of army units in the atrocities in the East and the Balkans” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 308). In these four years it generated much controversy – including accusations of false or misrepresented information. However, it also provoked serious debates about how newly re-unified Germany should consider its collective memory. I will assess to what extent these debates have had a lasting impact.

Secondly, I will examine the example of the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr in Dresden. This museum, reopened in 2011 after closure at re-unification, is Germany’s official museum of military history. Therefore it is somewhat of a contrast to my first case study. However the Militärhistorisches Museum is not a typical example of a national military history museum and it aims to encourage the visitor to critically consider Germany’s varied military history.

Although the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr reopened fifteen years after the opening of the Wehrmachtsausstellung, I believe that the two projects have similar aims. The most important and most obvious similarity between the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr and the Wehrmachtsausstellung is their subject matter. Both focus on the role of the German army and consider the implications of the individual responsibility of soldiers. This, in both cases, has proven to be controversial and responses have been mixed. I will contrast these responses and assess the changes that occurred in the fifteen years between the two case studies.

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Furthermore, both the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr and the Wehrmachtsausstellung aim to provoke the visitor rather than offer established historical narratives. Furthermore, to varying degrees, these two case studies both exist in the cross-section between museum and memorial, within the emerging genre of the ‘memorial museum’. That is to say that they are a “museum dedicated to a historic event commemorating mass suffering of any kind” (Williams, 2007: 8). This is an increasingly popular genre of museum that will be discussed in detail throughout this essay.

According to Ben Gook, almost three decades after re-unification, “a mutual distrust lingers, and national history remains contentious” (Gook, 2015: 2). I have deliberately chosen case studies from both former East and West Germany and I will examine the challenges of reconciling two often conflicting memory narratives after reunification. Furthermore, both case studies, to different extents, seek to challenge traditional German national memory narratives. I will analyse the effectivity of these attempts and discuss the often politicised responses to each case study. The goal of my research is therefore to examine the evolution of the representation of German collective memory in memorial museums from unification to the present day.

To contextualise my research, I will first give an overview of existing research in the literature review. Within this literature I will introduce key theories, books and experts in the field of memory studies. In chapter two I will present the case of the Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941−1944 exhibition, explaining the background, the exhibition itself and the reactions and criticisms it received. In chapter three I will then explore the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr in Dresden. In chapter four I will compare and

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contrast the two case studies with reference to my literature review, before ending with a conclusion.

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1. Literature review

1.1 Collective memory

I will first briefly explain the concept of collective memory, which will be an important consideration throughout my paper. According to Aleida Assmann, “institutions and larger social groups, such as nations, governments, the Church, or a firm do not ‘have’ a memory – they ‘make’ one for themselves with the aid of memorial signs such as symbols, texts, images, rites, ceremonies, places, and monuments” (Assmann, 2008: 55). This suggests that the creation of collective memory is not an organic process and memorials and museums, often state funded, can be used as a tool to support the formation of a specific national identity. James E. Young argues that “the motives of memory are never pure” (Young, 1993: 2). That is to say that memory, including collective memory, is influenced and created by a multitude of factors, potentially for a multitude of purposes. One of these influences is the contemporary discourse and memory is always shaped in the political, economic and social climate of the present. Furthermore, Ben Gook claims that it is national identity which remains the most “dominant form of the social bond” (Gook, 2015: 5) and it “has been remarkably resilient to deconstruction over the last century” (Gook, 2015: 5). Therefore national identity remains an important factor in the formation of collective memory.

1.2 Holocaust memorials

This essay will mainly consider the intersection between Second World War memorial and museum, so it is first useful to briefly consider the purpose and evolution of the Holocaust memorial.

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The American historian Harold Marcuse argues that “Holocaust memorials tended to be complex experiential spaces, usually going beyond mere documentary markers to include significant didactic accoutrements” (Marcuse, 2010: 54). The main purpose of Holocaust memorial is often seen as education – by maintaining a knowledge of the past in the present, it is hoped that it will never be forgotten and therefore never repeated. However Martin Broszat “suggested that in reference to the fascist era, monuments may not remember events so much as bury them altogether beneath layers of national myths and explanations” (Young, 1993: 5). That is to say that these monuments serve as reminders of national allegiance rather than the horrors of the Holocaust per se.

Since the ‘memory boom’ of the 1980s, countless remembrance projects have been planned and built in Germany. These include “the musealisation of Jewish heritage (today 80 museums exists), concentration camps, memorials in Berlin but also the voluminous Reichparteigelände in Nuremberg” (Aronsson & Bentz, 2010: 343). Furthermore, Holocaust memorials and museums have now spread far beyond Germany and former Nazi-occupied states. Paul Williams claims that there are as many as 250 Holocaust memorials and museums in the USA and that “while these museums are ostensibly humanistic, their emphasis on democracy and tolerance carries an American inflection” (Williams, 2007: 7). The has led to the claim that the Holocaust has, at least in some cases, been Americanised. While this may be an interesting idea to explore, it is perhaps too large and irrelevant a topic for the purposes of this essay

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1.3 Collective memory in divided Germany

The study of contemporary German collective memory is particularly complicated as the two separate pre-unification German states had contrasting attitudes to memory policy. Following the end of the Second World War and the creation of the German Democratic Republic, “the East German state made a concerted effort to populate the memory landscape with monuments, museums, and commemoration festivals that supported its vision of the past and bolstered the regime’s claim to represent the best interests of German society” (Olsen, 2015: 2). This restrictive approach to national memory presented “a history of antifascist resistance that singled out the communists and socialists as the only true defenders of the Germans against the Nazis” (Olsen, 2015: 217). Countless monuments to communist leaders and working heroes were built throughout the East German state and Holocaust memorials served not as a “commemoration of the victims, but a celebration of anti-fascist resistance and international solidarity” (Marcuse, 2010: 74). In contrast collective, state-sponsored memory in the Federal Republic “was a public and highly controversial topic in West German political culture” (Kattago, 2001: 3). Bill Niven claims that blame for National Socialism “was frequently passed over the border to the ‘other’ Germany” (Niven, 2006: 1) and “it finally became possible for Germany as a whole to own responsibility for Nazism” (Niven, 2006: 1) after 1990. However, re-unification presented the newly formed Germany with countless social, economic and logistical challenges. Decades after the fall of the wall, the former East still has “high unemployment (double that of western regions), dwindling population (around 1.8 million have left since 1989), rotting infrastructure, a lower standard of living (around one third lower than in the west)” (Gook, 2015: 73). Furthermore, “re-unification dismantled and destabilized identities built up

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during the years of division” (Gook, 2015: 3) and post-reunification Germany has had to attempt to align these destabilised identities.

GDR era monuments remain part of the urban landscape throughout former East Germany and arguably continue to shape collective memory in contemporary Germany. Today, almost three decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Mauer im Kopf remains, and some argue it is becoming even more pronounced. I will briefly consider two examples from Ben Gook to illustrate this. Gook describes the neighbouring towns of Sonneberg and Coburg, previously located on opposing sides of the East/West German border, which on 9 November 2009 organised separate Mauerfall celebrations. However a decade earlier, “the cities, whose centres lie just five kilometres apart, co-hosted a commemorative event on their connecting bridge” (Gook, 2015: 73). Gook claims this suggests “fraying commitments to re-unification in the decline of pan-German solidarity” (Gook, 2015: 73). Furthermore in 2009 conservatives argued for an end to the Solidaritätszuschlag1, which had been “an untouchable subject for years” (Gook, 2015: 73) and in 2015 the CDU and the CSU announced a plan to reduce the Solidaritätszuschlag from 2020 onwards (“Union will Solidaritätszuschlag ab 2020 senken”, 2015).

While these examples do not prove a change in attitude to East/West German relations, they do suggest that the legacy of Germany’s divided past remains important in contemporary society and politics. Furthermore, they highlight the politicised and highly personal nature of national identity in modern Germany. The past, both in terms of National Socialism and the Cold War, is constantly present within German national identity. As one of

1_The_{Solidaritätszuschlag is a tax levied by the Federal Government “since 1991 on individual and corporate}

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my case studies, Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr is located in Dresden, this will be especially important to remember.

1.4 Museums

My research considers the overlap between museum and memorial so it is therefore important to briefly discuss the role of the museum within the formation of national memory narratives and then specifically in Germany.

National museums have long played an important role in the process of nation building and have often been used to reinforce and indeed celebrate the nation. The growth in demand for national museums followed the Napoleonic wars and the “creation of national states, within which the nations justified the autonomy of the state on the basis of being distinctive and unique” (Elgenius & Aronsson, 2010: 5). Museums have often been used “as a means of representing high values and culture as well as national pride” (Elgenius & Aronsson, 2010: 5). This was particularly prevalent during the nineteenth century, a period which saw the establishment of many major national museums across western Europe. Indeed in Germany, many of the institutions at the Museumsinsel in Berlin and the Deutsches Museum in Munich were built at this time and “helped to legitimize both military national unification and imperial undertakings” (Aronsson & Bentz, 2010: 327).

However in the aftermath of the traumatic twentieth century, the definition of a museum as a symbol of national pride has proven to be problematic, especially in nations which were the perpetrators of the very violence now being exhibited. If the purpose of museums was once to cultivate national pride, then Germany (and indeed many other

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nations) has had to revaluate the role of the museum within national identity. Curators must increasingly “ask if museums retain the responsibility of validating and confirming tradition” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 320) or if the purpose of the museum is now something quite different.

There are, however, some important characteristics specific to museum culture in Germany. Rather predictably, prior to re-unification, the two Germanies pursued contrasting approaches to museums. The GDR focussed on “the didactic power of visual art and plastic instalments” (Aronsson & Bentz, 2010: 336) and highlighting links with the Soviets. In contrast, in West Berlin, where many of the city’s former cultural attractions were across the border in the GDR controlled section of the city, the Kulturforum was established in the 1950s and 1960s, although never fully completed. This complex, much of which remains operational today, includes music halls, a national library and an arts and craft museum. However Peter Aronsson and Emma Benz argue that the “timing for reconstructing the past on the national level was not ready and issues of guilt had to be dealt with more thoroughly” (Aronsson & Bentz, 2010: 337). That is to say that it would be decades before West Germany began to deal with its National Socialism past, and even longer before it began to musealise it.

During the process of re-unification - as with other aspects of German political, cultural and economic life - East and West German museums had to adjust to the new, reunited Germany. Some collections were merged and some former East German museums had to be brought up to the standard of their western counterparts. The Museumsinsel complex, for example, had been badly damaged during World War Two and was in urgent need of repair in the early 1990s. The area has now been listed as a UNESCO World Heritage

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site and, interestingly, "the word ‘national’ is seldom heard in discussions concerning the Museumsinsel, instead the site as a European and global museum is emphasised” (Aronsson & Bentz, 2010: 341). This perhaps highlights a lingering reluctance to celebrate German national identity. Furthermore, in contrast to most other western European states, modern German cultural politics is far less centralized and “mainly dealt with on a regional level within each Bundesland” (Aronsson & Bentz, 2010: 328). As with much of Germany’s decentralisation “this can partly be explained by the terrifying experience of centralized rule and the misuse of art and culture for political ends” under National Socialism (Aronsson & Bentz, 2010: 328). Today, debates remain surrounding how best to effectively musealise German heritage while including but not over-emphasising Nazi and GDR eras.

1.5 The memorial museum

I will now briefly discuss the concept of the ‘memorial museum’, an emerging genre of museum which has received more attention over the last decade. Both of my case studies can be described, at least to some extent, as a memorial museum.

Traditional definitions of the museum2 “refer to it not as a place of remembrance – rather as a place of scholarly study or as a repository” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 299). However this definition is becoming increasingly outdated as the distinction between museum and memorial becomes more blurred and now exhibitions “engage with many of the same questions as memorials: questions about marking the landscape, naming and honouring” (Paver, 2010: 262) . According to Chloe Paver, “memorials are becoming less

2_{“Neither the statutes of the International Council of Museums (http://icom.museum/statutes.html#3) nor}

the Latin or Greek roots of the word museum refer to it as a place of remembrance – rather as a place of scholarly study or as a repository” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 299)

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fixed in place, time, and material form, while exhibitions have begun to borrow commemorative forms from the traditional memorial” (Paver, 2010: 253). This has led to the emergence of what Paul Williams describes as ‘memorial museums’, a phrase he first used in his book Memorial museums : the global rush to commemorate atrocities, in 2007. Williams claims that memorial museum can be used to describe a “museum dedicated to a historic event commemorating mass suffering of any kind” (Williams, 2007: 8). Memory spaces of the persecution of the Jews during the Second World War are typical examples of memory museums, however the phrase can also be used within the context of countless other worldwide sites of mass suffering. There are numerous examples of prominent memorial museums, such as the United States Holocaust Museum in Washington and the Jüdisches Museum in Berlin.

Clemens Maier-Wolthausen, Berlin based historian and director of History-Memory.eu, argues that the Second World War triggered changes in the purpose of museums. He describes that memorial museums emerged first from war museums, which “had their roots in feudal armouries [then] encountered a new trend - the trend towards the combination of museum and memorial” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 299). Following this process, “The museums become memorials and the buildings became monuments” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 299) and the museum became a multi-purpose space for research, commemoration and education.

According to Aronsson and Bentz, “the scientific status of the museum as a knowledge institution is the basis for its being legitimate” (Aronsson & Bentz, 2010: 342), and this is perhaps one of the major problems of a memorial museum. Unlike traditional national museums, the memorial museum “features the coexistence of remembrance and

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critical interpretation”(Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 301). The public expects museums to provide authoritative and scientific information, yet within the context of a memorial museum, remaining impartial proves more problematic. However, Paul Williams argues that “one of the most important distinguishing features of museums is that they – unlike monuments which can communicate their own significance visually – must construct history (by means of textual strategies) as scientific rather than commemorative” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 300). Therefore, it is perhaps possible that rather than weakening the authority of the museum, the commemorative aspect of the memorial museum in fact reinforces it.

Furthermore, memorial museums can encourage the visitor to critique, question and challenge existing narratives. Paver argues that “today’s exhibition makers often seek to provoke the visitor rather than to provide a stable framework for interpretation” (Paver, 2010: 262). This, especially within the context of national memory narratives, can help provoke discussion and raise awareness. Maier-Wolthausen claims that “museums are, of course, also places of cultural communication since they are agents in the process of creating memories” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 301-302). Therefore, arguably, these modern forms of memorial museums allow the visitor to play a more active role in the memorial process than both traditional memorials and museums.

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2. Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944

2.1 Introduction

The first case study I have chosen to focus on is the exhibition ‘Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944’, known in English as ‘War of Annihilation: Crimes of the German Wehrmacht, 1941–1944’. For ease of writing, I will refer to the exhibition as the Wehrmachtsausstellung.

The Wehrmachtsausstellung, in contrast to many typical examples of memorial museums, focuses on the perpetrators rather than the victims – specifically the German Wehrmacht during the Second World War. For arguably the first time ever, “the exhibition challenged the notion that the German army was not to blame for the Nazi genocide and was only carrying out orders” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 308). In contrast to traditional master narratives, the exhibition suggested that the Wehrmacht often played a significantly more active and conscious role in Nazi atrocities. This was met with outrage across German society, with protests not just from neo-Nazi groups but also major politicians and cultural figure-heads. However, although many reactions to the exhibition were negative, it could be argued that by bringing often taboo issues to the fore of German society, it played an important role in the process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. According to the official website of the Wehrmachtsausstellung, “never before had the West German public discussed its past with such intensity and for such a long period” (Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 2004).

Although debate around the exhibition began over two decades ago, it continues to be a popular subject for academic publications. For examples, in 2014 Christine R Nugent

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published a paper in which she examines the comments of visitors of the exhibition through analysis of the visitors’ books. Furthermore, the chapter The Dilemma of Exhibiting Heroism by Clemens Maier-Wolthausen, from the book The Power of the Object. Museums and World War II was particularly useful when researching this chapter and I will refer to Maier-Wolthausen’s ideas frequently. I will first given an introduction to the background and content of the Wehrmachtsausstellung, before discussing the responses and criticism and then describing the consequences of the exhibition.

2.2 The Exhibition

Part of a larger exhibition project ‘In the Light of Our Century: Violence and Destructiveness in the Twentieth Century’, the Wehrmachtsausstellung was created by the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung four decades after the end of the Second World War. Opening in Hamburg, the exhibition visited 33 cities throughout Germany and Austria between 1995 and 1999. In chronological order, the Wehrmachtsausstellung visited; Hamburg, Berlin, Potsdam, Stuttgart, Vienna, Innsbruck, Freiburg, Mönchengladbach, Essen, Erfurt, Regensburg, Klagenfurt, Nuremberg, Linz, Karlsruhe, Munich, Frankfurt am Main, Bremen, Marburg, Konstanz, Graz, Dresden, Salzburg, Aachen, Kassel, Koblenz, Münster, Bonn, Hannover, Kiel, Saarbrücken, Cologne, Hamburg (for the second time) and Osnabrück. Rather than in museums or exhibition spaces, the travelling exhibition was mounted “in city halls and other venues that were politically exposed in the same way” (Nugent, 2014: 251). As a travelling exhibit, the Wehrmachtsausstellung reached a huge audience – Die Zeit estimates visitor numbers at just under one million (Erenz, 2015). However, by locating the exhibition in political spaces the content became instantly politicised and this arguably contributed to the surrounding controversy.

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According to the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, the exhibition itself dealt with three case studies: “the first months of German warfare against the partisans in Serbia; the advance of the German Sixth Army through the Ukraine towards Stalingrad; the three year occupation of Byelorussia” (Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 2004). These case studies were compiled of mostly of previously unseen photos, some text and a small selection of objects. Christina Nugent describes that many of photos were from private collections or archives in Eastern Europe, some originally found in the pockets of killed Wehrmacht soldiers and “depicted scenes of the humiliation of Jews, evictions, shootings, mass graves, public hangings of civilians, emaciated prisoners of war, together with German troops as on-lookers, some posing with corpses” (Nugent, 2014: 251). She adds that minimal text was added to these powerful images to create a dramatic and overwhelming affect (Nugent, 2014: 251).

The official Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung website states the aims of the original exhibition as follows:

“Within the context of the larger project, the aim was to consider a war that was without precedence in the modern period since the Thirty Years War. This was not a war waged against another army; rather, the state infrastructure of countries attacked by the Wehrmacht in eastern and south-eastern Europe was to be destroyed and the inhabitants enslaved or murdered. Focusing on the frontline troops as well as on what occurred in the rear areas, the exhibition demonstrated that the German army was responsible for the death of non-combatants in the context of “extermination actions” conducted independently and in cooperation with Himmler’s SS Einsatzgruppen.”

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(Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 2004)

These are particularly strong words considering that this statement is taken from a webpage last updated in 2004, years after the initial controversy surrounding the Wehrmachtsausstellung. The curators clearly remain confident in their original aims and, from the outset on, were not afraid of controversy. Indeed, it could be interpreted that they deliberately sought to provoke controversy.

By appropriating blame not just to SS Einsatzgruppen but also to ordinary German soldiers, the Wehrmachtsausstellung triggered a national debate and drew criticism from right-wing extremists and local politicians alike.

2.3 Public reactions

In the early hours of 9 March, 1999, a bomb exploded outside an adult learning centre at the Schloßplatz in the otherwise sleepy city of Saarbrücken. The target of the bomb was the Wehrmachtsausstellung – at that point housed in the adult learning centre. The perpetrators were found to be a group of right-wing extremists who, angered at the suggestions of the exhibition, had planted the bomb, which thankfully injured no-one (Sattler, 1999). The exhibition was re-opened the weekend afterwards, but ultimately closed just months later in December 1999, after making three more stops. The Saarbrücken attack followed a succession of increasingly inflamed debates, discussions and protests surrounding the Wehrmachtsausstellung. The exhibition was the target of the largest neo-Nazi march in Germany since National Socialism and, according to Nugent, it “was the first public event dealing with National Socialism that had incited right-wing extremists to the point of perpetrating a bomb attack” (Nugent, 2014: 250).

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However, anger at the content of the Wehrmachtsausstellung was not limited to marginalised groups and many political groups protested against the exhibition. In Saarland, the location of the bombing aimed at the Wehrmachtsausstellung, the regional branch of the CDU launched a political campaign against the exhibition. Using headlines such as “Unsere Väter waren keine Mörder” in their publications, the Saar-CDU campaigned for the closure of the exhibition (Sattler, 1999). Following the bomb attack, the Saarland CDU received criticism for its supposed role in creating a climate, “in dem sich rechte Gruppen bestätigt und ermuntert sehen könnten” (Sattler, 1999). In addition to Saarland, the exhibition was the subject of debates in regional parliaments in Bremen, Munich, Wiesbaden, Hanover, Kiel and Hamburg (Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 2004). Even the Bundestag held two debates focussed on the Wehrmachtsausstellung. The Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung hails these debates as a great success, claiming that politicians “from all political parties joined in a discriminating and very personal discussion that related the issues to their own family histories and actually listened to one another rather than signing documents or reading the newspapers as is all too often customary during plenary sessions.” (Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 2004).

Interestingly, the Berliner Zeitung stated that both right and left-wing groups protested against the exhibition (Sattler, 1999), however it fails to provide examples and I can find no concrete evidence of this.

However, the criticism surrounding the exhibition extended beyond anger at the exhibition suggesting “that virtually all male Germans had, in fact, probably participated in criminal acts, either as witnesses, bystanders or perpetrators” (Nugent, 2014: 250). In October 1999, researchers published a report claiming photographs used in the exhibition

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“had been incorrectly presented as depicting the bodies of Jewish pogrom victims, when in fact the victims had been murdered by the Soviet secret service” (Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges, no date). In October 2001 the founder of the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, Jan Reemtsma, announced an investigation into these allegations and the findings were as followed:

“On 15 November 2000, the committee presented the results of its work to the public; stating that the exhibition contained »1. factual mistakes, 2. inaccuracies and oversights in the use of documents, and 3. in particular due to the way in which the material was presented, statements which are too sweeping and suggestive.« However, the committee report concluded, »no forgeries with respect to the main issues and hypotheses« could be determined. The commission recommended that the Institute »continue to present the exhibition in a thoroughly revised or newly conceived form«.”

(Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges, no date)

Maier-Wolthausen claimed that the “accusations of improper and unwarranted use of primary sources proves to be mostly incorrect” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 308), however the investigating committee still found “factual mistakes, inaccuracies and oversights”. Even though most of the more serious accusations against the exhibition were disproved, the credibility and reliability of the Wehrmachtsausstellung was irrevocably damaged.

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2.4 Visitor reactions

While many of the reactions of the press and politicians were negative, Christina Nugent suggests that the exhibition, and consequently the resulting visitor books, could play an important role in “the overall process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in post-war Germany” (Nugent, 2014: 250). In 2014 Christina Nugent conducted a thorough study on entries from the visitor books of the Wehrmachtsausstellung, analysing the comments and messages. She claims that many of these messages describe the emotional impact of the exhibition. Some visitors even “used magnifying glasses, fearing that they would recognise a father, grandfather or uncle in the photos” (Nugent, 2014: 251) - which did in fact happen in one instance. Her study highlights the highly personal nature of the Wehrmachtsausstellung - perhaps an important part of why it produced such a hostile reaction in the press. Most German family histories are forever intertwined with Germany’s national socialist past and therefore investigations into the Nazi period, especially those which attempt to attribute blame, will always be personal and sensitive.

2.5 Second exhibition

In November 2000, Jan Reemtsma revealed in a press conference that the original Wehrmachtsausstellung would no longer be shown. From November 2001 until March 2004 a new version of the exhibition, entitled Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941 – 1944, was shown, which, according to the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung, was not a revised version of the original exhibition but “rather a new exhibition with a new concept that nonetheless upheld, explicated, and substantiated the central argument of the previous show” (Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des

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Vernichtungskrieges, no date). Reemtsma claimed this version of the exhibition was different, with “different kinds of crime on display, not only shooting people but systematic starvation and deportation as well as the terrible treatment of prisoners of war" (Cleaver, 2001). The new exhibition opened at the Institute for Contemporary Art, in Berlin and yet again was met with neo-Nazi protesters – this time from a six thousand strong crowd. The more recent exhibition ended in 2004 at the Deutsches Historisches Museum , Berlin, where it remains in storage.

2.6 Consequences

The Wehrmachtsausstellung, and the controversy that surrounded it, highlights the difficulties of challenging traditional national narratives – especially narratives which many relate to on such a personal level. Maier-Wolthausen claims that, in this regard, the Wehrmachtsausstellung has been successful and it can be regarded as “a model for the healthy revision of a master narrative” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 320). Clearly an enthusiastic supporter of the exhibition, he also states that until the Wehrmachtsausstellung, “no previous exhibition in the history of modern Germany had so profoundly altered the fabric of people’s memory of the last war” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 307-308). Although this comment may seem like an exaggeration, Nugent agrees and adds that no other historical exhibition had drawn so many visitors, “no previous controversy had engaged virtually all facets of society, from the Federal government down to individual families; none before had prompted accusations of forgery and treason; nor had vandalism and near-riots in the streets accompanied earlier historical controversies.” (Nugent, 2014: 250). The exhibition was ground-breaking for the sheer amount of exposure it received.

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Furthermore, it is possible to claim that in 1999, almost a decade after re-unification, a discussion was needed about what exactly constituted a united German memory narrative. The Wehrmachtsausstellung gave a platform to this discussion. Nugent claims that it was the first controversial exhibition “to expose to public view issues that involved personal and communal memory and family relationships” (Nugent, 2014: 250). These issues were now shared by all Germans, both from former East and West Germany. By openly discussing and debating their National Socialist past on a public platform, however emotional and upsetting that may be, Germany and Germans could acknowledge their shared history. In its tour of 33 German and Austrian cities, the Wehrmachtsausstellung visited five cities in former GDR territory (Berlin3, Potsdam, Erfurt, Klagenfurt and Dresden). Bill Niven claims that before re-unification “it had still been the case that the existence of two Germanies worked against, rather than in the interest of, coming to terms with National Socialism” (Niven, 2006: 1). However in re-unified Germany, the discussions surrounding the Wehrmachtsausstellung and others like it could help facilitate a united process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Therefore, regardless of the controversies which accompanied the Wehrmachtsausstellung, the acceptance of shared history and potentially also shared guilt, could have served as a uniting factor in newly re-unified Germany.

2.7 Conclusion

The Wehrmachtsausstellung was ground-breaking for several reasons. It was the first controversial exhibition to seriously implicate individual members of the Wehrmacht and possibly implicitly also their families (Nugent, 2014: 250). As already stated, it attracted almost one million visitors, travelling to all corners of Germany and much of Austria.

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Furthermore, the publicity it received ensured that it triggered a controversial debate, both on a regional and national level. This was arguably the most important effect of the Wehrmachtsausstellung- it forced Germans, politicians and everyday citizens alike, to consider multiple aspects of German identity. However “long-cherished convictions, interpretations and narratives developed after a war are always hard to change” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 307) and the discussion surrounding the exhibition suggested that Germany still faced many challenges in its process of coming to terms with National Socialism. Furthermore the Wehrmachtsausstellung also showed that challenging traditional narratives of German history often provokes reactions in right wing groups. Rather than acting as a preserver of German history narratives, the exhibition questioned these narratives. However, the question remains of whether this is indeed the role of a museum in contemporary Germany. This question will be discussed in the final chapter.

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3. Das Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr

3.1 Introduction

For my second case study I have chosen to focus on the Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr in Dresden – throughout the text I will refer to the museum as the Militärhistorisches Museum. At first, the official German museum of military history may seem far removed from the Wehrmachtsausstellung. For example, in comparison to the Wehrmachtsausstellung, the Militärhistorisches Museum holds an extensive and varied collection. In fact, at 13,000 square metres, it is the largest museum in Germany. Furthermore, it is obviously stationary and houses permanent exhibitions on eras of German military history from the late middle ages to the modern day. Finally, it has become an accepted representation of German military history narratives – so much so that German soldiers are now required to visit the Militärhistorisches Museum as a component of their basic training (Alessi, 2013). However this last point is perhaps the key link between the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Militärhistorisches Museum. Daniel Libeskind, the Polish-American architect of the daring new extension of the Militärhistorisches Museum claims that his new modernist extension “offers visitors a chance to question "why people participate in and organize violence, why they conform to totalitarian thoughts"” (Hoare & Lake: 2012). This suggests that although military history is the primary subject of the museum, it also operates on the level of a memorial museum. According to Paver, memorial museums “often seek to provoke the visitor rather than to provide a stable framework for interpretation” (Paver, 2010: 262) – both the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Militärhistorisches Museum aim to do exactly that.

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Although exhibitions handling the Second World War make up only a small fraction of the vast Militärhistorisches Museum, the memory of National Socialism seems to impact many aspects of the museum, especially its modern extension. For example, the English language tourism website for the city of Dresden claims that the museum seeks “to avoid biased presentations and challenge traditional perspectives” (The Bundeswehr Museum of Military History). This seems a remarkably similar aim to the Wehrmachtsausstellung – which opened almost two decades before the reopening of the Militärhistorisches Museum.

In this chapter I will first give an overview of the background of the Militärhistorisches Museum, then I will describe the architecture of the modern extension and the current exhibitions. In the next chapter I will then compare and contrast the two case studies.

3.2 Background

The long and varied history of the building housing the Militärhistorisches Museum is important to its modern day function. Built in the late nineteenth century, the building was first used as an armoury for Kaiser Wilhelm I, before the museum was officially founded in 1897. It served as the main military museum for the Nazis and then the East Germans, before it was shut down in 1989 as the German government was “unsure how the museum would fit into a newly unified German state” (Frearson, 2011). Acting as the national military museum throughout Germany’s many epochs of the twentieth century, the building itself is symbolic of Germany’s often volatile military history.

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The Militärhistorisches Museum can also be seen as representative of the tumultuous history of its home city – Dresden. Once known for its spectacular architecture, Dresden was almost entirely destroyed in allied bombing in 1945. The city has now been largely restored but Libeskind claims that “Dresden is a city that has been fundamentally altered; the events of the past are not just a footnote; they are central to the transformation of the city today” (Frearson, 2011). Even though the museum escaped destruction – due to its location slightly outside of the city centre (Frearson, 2011) – the memory of the bombing of Dresden is still ever-present. Furthermore, it is also important to remember that for most of the second half of the twentieth century Dresden was an East German city. Modern Dresden has therefore been shaped by the memories of both National Socialism and, more recently, the German Democratic Republic. In her book After the Dresden Bombing: Pathways of Memory, 1945 to the Present, Anne Fuchs describes Dresden as "the single most prominent lieu de mémoire in the German cultural imagination" (Fuchs, 2012: 2). Dresden experienced first-hand some of the most devastating periods of twentieth century German history and has now become a symbol of the culture of post-reunification conciliation. Both Second World War and socialist memory are ever present in Dresden, and the Militärhistorisches Museum now showcases that memory.

3.3 Architecture

Although at first reluctant to reopen the museum, in 2001 the German government decided to hold a competition “for an extension that would facilitate a reconsideration of

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the way we think about war.” (Frearson, 2011). The winner of that competition was the Polish-American architect Daniel Libeskind, already famous for his work both worldwide and in Germany. Having designed the Jewish Museum in Berlin and the redevelopment of the World Trade Centre site in New York City, Libeskind was already connected to the idea of the memorial museum. While leaving the original building mostly untouched, Libeskind designed a five storey metal wedge which cuts into the middle of the main building. The wedge, constructed of concrete, steel and stone, contrasts with the classical style of the old armoury. The point of the wedge “points eastwards, to the source of firebombs dropped during the war” (Frearson, 2011), which seems to blur the lines between memorial and museum. Furthermore, the Dresden tourist website claims “the play of light and shade produced by the new wedge symbolises the eventful military history of Germany” (The Bundeswehr Museum of Military History). It is arguable whether the symbolism of the new design is realised by the average visitor to the museum, however the metal wedge is certainly unusual and creates a dramatic impression.

Libeskind is himself the child of Jewish Holocaust survivors and it is perhaps an important symbol of reconciliation that he was chosen as the architect of the Militärhistorisches Museum redesign. The architect “says the concept underpinning his design "wasn't something that I had to research in libraries"” (Hoare & Lake: 2012) but relates to his own personal experiences. For Libeskind and so many others, the history on display inside the museum relates directly to his own family history. Therefore it is unsurprising that the memory of the Second World War is so present in the symbolism of the architecture.

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After a 22 year total closure and a seven renovation costing $85 million (Hoare & Lake: 2012), the museum was reopened in 2011.

3.4 The modern-day museum

The modern museum is divided into two sections, the first in the old building and the second in the new extension, and additionally houses an auditorium for lectures and screenings (Frearson, 2011). In total, 10,000 exhibits are held in 13,000 square metres (The Bundeswehr Museum of Military History). The architecture of the two sections reflects their content, for example the older section “represents the severity of the authoritarian past while the [new section] reflects the openness of the democratic society in which it has been reimagined.” (Frearson, 2011).

The first section, housed in the original arsenal, guides the visitor chronologically through German military history in three exhibitions. The first exhibition presents 1300-1914, the second 1914-1945 and the third 1945 until the present day. This section of the museum also highlights “critical turning points in German history: the Thirty Years' War, the beginning and end of World War II, and the division and reunification of Germany (The Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr).

In contrast to the more traditional first section, the second section presents elements of Germany’s military history thematically. This is “designed to help visitors who are not familiar with the military find ways of approaching military history” (The

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Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr). Housed in Liebeskind’s extension, it contains a total of nine thematic exhibitions. The thematic exhibitions are; Krieg und Gedächtnis, Leiden am Krieg, Politik und Gewalt, Militär und Technologie, Militär und Gesellschaft, Schutz und Zerstörung, Formation der Körper, Herausforderung des 21. Jhd. and Tiere und Militär (The Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr). These are less typical of a traditional national military museum. To consider just one of these themes, Krieg und Gedächtnis offers an insight into the unconventional approach of the Militärhistorisches Museum. On their official website the description of Krieg und Gedächtnis includes the following quote:

“In jedem der Rollregale in diesem Teil des Themenparcours befinden sich 16 Vitrinen. Von diese stehen sich jeweils zwei gegenüber. Die Ausstellungsstücke beschäftigen sich mit den Fragen „An wen wird erinnert?“, „An was wird erinnert?“ und „Wie wird erinnert?“. Durch diese räumliche Gegenüberstellung können gegenläufige Sichtweisen und Perspektiven auf Ereignisse dargestellt werden. Die Besucher können dabei selbst entscheiden, welche Vitrinen gezeigt werden sollen und welche Erinnerungen sie somit offen legen möchten”

(The Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr).

This explanation is typical of the approach taken throughout the less traditional section of the museum. The curators encourage the visitor to interpret the exhibits themselves and reach their own conclusions. However, although this is the aim of the exhibition, it remains unclear whether it has been successful.

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The museum also houses special exhibitions and helps create travelling exhibitions. One such travelling exhibition featured on their website is titled “Rechtsextreme Gewalt in Deutschland 1990-2013" and consists of a series of photographs by the American photographer Sean Gallup. Gallup spent two years travelling through Germany and photographing active Neo-nazis and their victims. The Militärhistorisches Museum claims that the photos “provozieren die Fragen, warum Menschen andere hassen und was sie dazu bringt, sie schwer zu verletzen oder gar töten zu wollen” (The Militärhistorisches Museum der Bundeswehr). Again, the aim of the exhibition is to provoke questions rather than provide answers. Rather than military history, the focus of this exhibit seems to be the psychology of violence. Much in the same way as the thematic section of the museum, the exhibition “Rechtsextreme Gewalt in Deutschland 1990-2013" is a somewhat unconventional approach to exhibiting military history.

3.5 Aims

In an interview in Der Spiegel, Lt. Col. Patrick Ruppert highlights the importance of the pedagogical role the museum serves in preserving the history of the Second World War for future generations. Ruppert, who works full time as a lawyer and part time as a military reserve soldier, claims that “the generation of our grandparents is now dead and there is no one who can directly report on the past" (Alessi, 2013) and so the museum is needed to help transmit that past. Members of Ruppert’s family served in the German Wehrmacht and like many other Germans, he feels the responsibility of preventing future conflicts and “passing down an accurate historical record to the current generation" (Alessi, 2013). While

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attracting a younger visitor demographic may be important for Ruppert and the museum alike, this is of course not always simple. However, in 2012 the director of the museum Mathias Rogg claimed that one year after reopening, the museum had proven popular with young people due to the amount of chewing gum found by cleaning staff (Kailitz & Schirmer, 2012). Rogg added that the museum is also popular with women, many of whom say “sie seien bislang in militärhistorischen Museen ihrem Mann gefolgt und hätten sich gelangweilt. Hier ist das anders. Wir sind anders” (Kailitz & Schirmer, 2012). While Rogg provides no concrete date on the number of young people or women visitors and it remains debatable whether chewing gum is used exclusively by young people, his aim is clear. Both Rogg and Ruppert believe the museum needs to be seem by as many visitors as possible.

Promotional material for the museum reiterates that it is not a traditional military museum, which supposedly would not interest women or young people. Rather than acting as simply a collection of weapons, the museum aims to show “violence as a historical, cultural and anthropological phenomenon” (The Bundeswehr Museum of Military History). With half a million visitors in their first year of reopening, it is undeniable that the museum is reaching a large audience (Kailitz & Schirmer, 2012).

3.6 Criticism

However, despite large visitor numbers, responses to the Militärhistorisches Museum have been somewhat mixed. As already stated, the museum aims not just to present a collection of weapons but “to navigate between the horizontal world of history and the vertical world of human aspiration and understanding." (Hoare & Lake: 2012). Some

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critics have taken issue with this less conventional approach to the musealisation of military history. In an article titled Militärgeschichte ohne Identität - das neue Militärhistorische Museum der Bundeswehr in Dresden, Felix Springer criticises the representation of German soldiers. Springer asks “wo, wenn nicht im bundeswehreigenen Museum, soll aus der deutschen Militärgeschichte Identität für den tötenden und fallenden Parlamentssoldaten der Gegenwart und Zukunft gewonnen werden?”. Springer made these comments in a blog post for Sezession, which claims to be “die bedeutendste rechtsintellektuelle Zeitschrift in Deutschland” (Springer, 2012) – therefore his comments are perhaps not particularly surprising. Other right wing visitors have also been critical of the museum. In an article for the conservative weekly newspaper Junge Freiheit, Johannes Meyer claimed that the museum showed a lack of sympathy for the German military. He asserted that the exhibitions omitted important aspects of German military history, such as “linksextremer Gewalt gegen die Bundeswehr” (Meyer, 2012) – implying a left-wing bias within the museum.

In contrast, left-wing critics have mostly praised the museum. Following a visit to the museum in 2012, the Linke politician Katja Kipping claimed on her personal website that it is not a military museum in the traditional sense of the word but “vielmehr ein Museum gegen Krieg und Gewalt” (Kipping, 2012). Dresden born Kipping recommended the museum to anyone visiting Dresden. Furthermore, the left-leaning Tageszeitung claimed the museum is not for military-fans but rather for “Antwortsuchende”- and importantly is worth the 65 million Euro cost (Bartsch, 2011).

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It is perhaps unsurprising that the Militärhistorisches Museum polarises visitors and provokes more negative reactions from right-wing visitors. Left-wing politicians, campaigners and publications have been instrumental in challenging traditional perspectives on the German military since the late 1960s. The museum could be seen to be part of this ongoing trend – a trend which many right-wing commentators are critical of.

3.7 Military museum

I will now briefly discuss the label of ‘memorial museum’ in relation to the Militärhistorisches Museum. As revealed in its name, the Militärhistorisches Museum is a national military museum, rather than a traditional memorial museum. However, I would argue that a museum can be both – especially a museum as large as the Militärhistorisches Museum. In fact, Maier-Wolthausen claims that memorial museums “had their roots in feudal armouries [then] encountered a new trend - the trend towards the combination of museum and memorial” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 299). If this is correct then the military museum is essentially the home of the memorial museum. The definition of a memorial museum, according to Paul Williams, is a “museum dedicated to a historic event commemorating mass suffering of some kind” (Williams, 2007: 8). War is surely one of the most extreme examples of mass human suffering.

It is perhaps possible to claim that some military museums glorify rather than memorialise war, however the Militärhistorisches Museum attempts to avoid this. The Spiegel argues that the Militärhistorisches Museum “is more of a history museum than a military one, wrestling with the concepts of violence, power, and the grim brutality of war

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from the middle ages through the present day” (Alessi, 2013). Therefore I would argue that the Militärhistorisches Museum can operate simultaneously as both a national military museum and a memorial museum.

3.8 Conclusion

Consolidating Germany’s varied military history into one museum is no simple task, but the Militärhistorisches Museum attempts this in a sometimes unconventional style. The memories of the twentieth century are ever present in Germany, especially in the city of Dresden, and this is reflected within the museum. Maier-Wolthausen argues that “telling “the truth”, commemorating the fallen, the comrades and preserving their stories” (Maier-Wolthausen, 2009: 300) are common features of many war museums. In contrast the Militärhistorisches Museum, and in particular the modern extension, aim to challenge traditional ideas of the role of the national military museum by inviting the visitor to actively question their preconceptions of war, violence and German history. However this modern approach was not appreciated by all visitors and some, particularly right-wing critics argued that this is not the role of a state sponsored military history museum. Despite this I would argue that the Militärhistorisches Museum operates not just as a military history museum, but also as a memorial museum.

The museum also considers the role of the Bundeswehr in contemporary Germany, within the context of Germany’s tumultuous military history. Rogg believes that more attention needs to be given to this issue within German society as a whole, but that the museum can "play a role in facilitating this conversation" (Alessi, 2013) within German.

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In the next section I will consider these conclusions in connection with the Wehrmachtsausstellung.

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4. Analysis and conclusions

4.1 Introduction

One of the largest exhibits within the Militärhistorisches Museum features the remains of a German military vehicle, heavily damaged during conflict in Afghanistan. This is strategically placed next to a display of parliamentary voting cards of the leaders who led Germany into military intervention in Afghanistan with the USA – including Angela Merkel. In an interview with the Der Spiegel, the director of the museum, Col. Matthias Rogg claims the display “made him realize that from political and military leaders down to the average voting citizen, “we are all responsible for what happens” when German soldiers go to war” (Alessi, 2013). It reminds the visitor that political decisions have an impact on war, which in turn has a (sometimes deadly) impact on individual lives.

The idea that the individual is responsible for the consequences of war is reminiscent of the aims of the Wehrmachtsausstellung, which challenged the “defence that ‘orders were orders’” (Cleaver, 2001). The earlier exhibition suggested that, in many cases, Wehrmacht soldiers should be held responsible for atrocities committed during the Second World War. This “exploded the popular myth of the ‘unblemished Wehrmacht’” (Nugent, 2014: 250) and, as discussed in chapter two, triggered a series of long, complicated and sometimes violent debates on how Germany considers its own past.

However, less than two decades later, similar sentiments have essentially become state-sponsored memory narrative, within the Militärhistorisches Museum in Dresden. Both

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projects attempted to comprehend colossal acts of violence in the country of the perpetrator and also encouraged the visitor to critically consider existing collective German memory narratives. The Militärhistorisches Museum received some criticism from the right-wing press, but this was negligible in comparison to the backlash against the Wehrmachtsausstellung. This shows that, at least in some cases, attitudes to German Second World War memory narratives have changed. In this section I will consider to what extent this is true. I will also compare and contrast the Militärhistorisches Museum and the Wehrmachtsausstellung in relation to some key themes and refer back to the theories introduced in the first chapter.

4.2 The politics of memory

Whilst studying both the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Militärhistorisches Museum, it became clear that most criticisms of both case studies were from a right-wing perspective. This suggests that memory, and especially the process of challenging traditional memory narratives, can become highly politically charged.

In the case of the Wehrmachtsausstellung, the criticism aimed at this project came from many different sources across the German right-wing, from neo-Nazis to the CDU. The bomb in Saarbrücken was the most extreme example of this. Criticism of the Militärhistorisches Museum came from conservative press outlets and right-wing pundits, who often objected to the supposed left-wing bias of the museum. Both the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Militärhistorisches Museum were criticised for misrepresenting German soldiers – or at least the memory of German soldiers. Bill Niven claims these types of criticisms can be traced back to a backlash against the liberals of the

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’68 generation. In the Spring of 1968, while student protest was erupting across Europe, students in Germany rebelled against the supposed “complicity of their parents in the crimes of the Nazis and their subsequent conspiracy of silence” (Hutchinson, 2009). This helped to establish a larger discussion about the Second World War but also politicised this discussion. According to Niven, the ’68 “generation stands accused of having institutionalised a doctrine of politically correct memory which led to the marginalisation and indeed exclusion of all memory of German suffering” (Niven, 2006: 10-11). Some right-wing critics believe there should be more focus on German victimhood and that Germans have not been allowed to sufficiently grieve.

This idea is a recurring theme within the German right-wing. In the introduction to this paper I quoted the Alternative für Deutschland politician Björn Höcke, who criticised the Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas and called for a new “Erinnerungskultur, die uns vor allen Dingen und zuallererst mit den großartigen Leistungen der Altvorderen in Berührung bringt" (“Die Höcke-Rede von Dresden in Wortlaut-Auszügen,” 2017). Höcke gave this speech in January 2017, but his words echo the criticism of the Wehrmachtsausstellung in the late 1990s and the Militärhistorisches Museum in 2011 and 2012. This suggests that right-wing politicians continue to criticise liberal ideas of German memory, however perhaps now to a lesser extent. Höcke’s speech was largely criticised, even by some members of his own party, so this suggests that his views are becoming less acceptable – even in far-right parties such as Alternative für Deutschland. Therefore, the discussion of German Second World War memory narratives continues to polarise Germans, but perhaps now to a lesser extent than at the time of the Wehrmachtsausstellung.

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4.3 Memorial museums

I will now consider the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Militärhistorisches Museum within the context of memorial museums, a concept which I explained in chapter one. I will focus particularly on Paul Williams’ definition of the memorial museum, which he explains in his book Memorial Museums: The Global Rush to Commemorate Atrocities.

I would argue that it is possible to label both of these examples memorial museums. The Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Militärhistorisches Museum are both located in the nation of the perpetrators and focus more significantly on the perpetrators than the victims. Although it is perhaps true that more memorial museums focus on the victims of atrocities or violence, there are certainly many examples of memorial museums with exhibits exploring the role of perpetrators. For example, The House of Terror in Budapest ends its exhibits on Hungary during the Second World War and under communism with a “Hall of Victimizers” – a corridor of photos of perpetrators of Nazi and communist crimes (Williams, 2007: 17). According to Paul Williams, a typical characteristic of the memorial museum is that “issues surrounding identity, culpability, and punishment of perpetrators are often contentious or unresolved” (Williams, 2007: 20). This could certainly be said to be true of both the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Militärhistorisches Museum.

Williams also claims photographs taken by the perpetrator “often form a significant section of a memorial museum’s collection” (Williams, 2007: 56), as they do in the Wehrmachtsausstellung. This, he claims, can be problematic for the memorial museum. For the victims, “the camera was itself an instrument of humiliation and psychological torture” (Williams, 2007: 57) and so by using photographs taken by the perpetrator in a museum,

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that humiliation and psychological torture is arguably perpetuated. If this is true, then the visitor becomes a voyeur, almost complicit in the original crimes. However, while this is perhaps true to an extent, I would argue that the importance of education and remembrance outweighs this. One of the most important aspects of a memorial museum is its emotional appeal – the visitor can relate to the exhibition on a personal level. Therefore photographs, even those taken by the perpetrators of genocide, are vital tools in creating this personal connection.

I will now elaborate on the emotional effect of the memorial museum, as this is an important component in all memorial museums, including the Wehrmachtsausstellung and the Militärhistorisches Museum. Williams claims that the subjects of memorial museums often “have a dramatic quality that lends itself to evocative reconstruction and storytelling for memorial museums and visitors alike” (Williams, 2007: 20). The Wehrmachtsausstellung contained a large selection of photographs, including a selection of colour photographs depicting sites of Wehrmacht atrocities as they appear today – often empty roads, fields or wastelands. Chloe Paver claims that these pictures “suggested an almost total lack of memorialization of the victims of Wehrmacht crimes” (Paver, 2010: 262). These pictures were displayed separately from the main exhibition, in their own space with little accompanying text and Paver argues that this meant visitors were able to draw their own conclusions and perhaps consider “how little trace human atrocities leave behind unless conscious efforts are made to remember” (Paver, 2010: 262). By including these modern pictures, the exhibition contextualised sights of memory and reminded the visitor of the importance of memorial. This is an important aspect of the memorial museum.

A comparative study into the representation of national collective memory within German memorial museums