1
Life Within Securitized Societies: The Perception of Dutch Muslim
Communities
Crisis and Security Management (MSc) Thesis Liselotte Welten (s2126842)
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. T. Abbas 2nd Reader: Prof. Dr. M. Popovic Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
Word count: 23478 (incl. in text references) English (US)
2 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1: Introduction ... 5
1.1: Securitization of Islam ... 5
1.2: Jihadi Salafism ... 6
1.3: The Voice of the ‘Other’ ... 7
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework ... 8
2.1: The Rise of Salafism in The Netherlands ... 8
2.2: Securitization of Islam ... 10
2.3: The Voice of the ‘Other’ ... 12
Chapter 3: Methodology ... 16
3.1: Research Approach ... 16
3.2: Data Collection ... 17
3.3: Work field Operationalization ... 19
Interviews ... 19 Surveys ... 22 3.4: Data Analysis ... 23 Interviews ... 23 Surveys ... 23 3.5: Limitations ... 26 ... 29
Chapter 4: SPSS Survey Results ... 30
4.1: Descriptive Statistics ... 30
Variables without t-test statistical significance ... 30
4.2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients ... 32
4.3: Multiple Linear Regression ... 32
Chapter 5: “The Dirty Game that is Politics” ... 38
5.1: The Avoidance of Political Talk... 38
5.2: The ‘Tool’ of Islamophobia ... 39
5.3: Feeling Misunderstood ... 42
3
6.1: Negative Labelling ... 46
6.2: Instilling the Fear of Islam ... 49
6.3: Distrust and Disproportionate Coverage Within The Media ... 51
Chapter 7: Pre-Emptive Policies: “Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire!” ... 55
7.1: Façade Policies ... 55
7.2: Disrupting Policies ... 58
7.3: The Burqa Ban ... 64
7.4: The Double Edged Sword of Government Communication ... 68
7.5: Non Effective Pre-Emptive Policies ... 72
7.6: The Lack Of Belief In Security Services ... 78
Chapter 8: “How Many Times Should We Respond?” ... 84
8.1: Community Involvement ... 84
8.2: Radicalization – Community Resilience ... 86
Chapter 9: Conclusion ... 91 References... 93 Appendix 1 ... 102 Codebook ... 102 Appendix 2 ... 108 Code sheet ... 108 Appendix 3 ... 114 Toestemmingsformulier ... 114 ... 115
Informed Consent Form ... 115
Appendix 4 ... 116 Interview 1 ... 116 Interview 2 ... 137 Interview 3 ... 150 Interview 4 ... 166 Interview 5 ... 175 Interview 6 ... 188
4 Interview 7 ... 204 Interview 8 ... 218 Interview 9 ... 226 Interview 10 ... 235 Interview 11 ... 252 Interview 12 ... 264 Interview 13 ... 286 Interview 14 ... 293 Interview 15 ... 312 Appendix 5 ... 326 Interview Vragen ... 326 Interview Questions ... 328 Appendix 6 ... 330 Vragenlijst... 330 Survey ... 333 Appendix 7 ... 336 Verzoek E-mail ... 336 Request E-mail ... 338
5 Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1: Securitization of Islam
Conflating “Islam with the risk of terrorism” has been a concurrent phenomenon within security realms, leading Muslim communities to be under constant vigilance (Bull & Rane, 2018, p.274). Therefore, this study will explore whether or not Muslim communities in The Hague perceived to be viewed as hostile due to focused pre-emptive measures towards radicalization. According to the Dutch Ministry of Safety and Justice, pre-emptive security measures concerning radicalization include factors such as cooperation with Muslim community leaders, close communication with education systems, police surveillance, and community centers for Muslim youths (Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2014). While the concept of pre-emptive measures has become a popularized method of crime prevention within national security, Zedner (2007) explored the shift from post-crime to pre-crime criminalization and noted that “the post-crime orientation of criminal justice is increasingly overshadowed by the pre-crime logic of security” (as cited in McCulloch & Pickering, 2009, p.628). The rationality of security has shifted into one of anticipation, where classification implicates communities to be perceived as the ‘dangerous other’ (Bull & Rane, 2018, p.275). The criminalization process of pre-crime activities includes “allocating groups […] the statistical likelihood of committing certain types of acts” (Fitzgibbon, 2007, p.128).
The implications of such pre-emptive measures to be implemented across a society has been partially considered as “deleterious” (Bull & Rane, 2018, p.413), especially where Muslim communities may perceive themselves to be labeled as ‘alien’ amongst mainstream society. While there has been an increase in criminalization of right-winged groups since the attack by Anders Behring-Breivik, Islamic terrorism still takes “precedence” for national security concerns in countries such as in the UK (Mythen, 2012, p.411).
6 1.2: Jihadi Salafism
When one thinks of extremism or Jihadism within the Netherlands, the concept of Salafism has risen to the ‘top of the list’ in terms of driving mechanisms behind radicalization (Vellenga & De Groot, 2019). Salafism is known to be defined as a branch of Islam, where the interpretation of the Quran remains ‘true’. True, in the sense that the followers believe Muslims should follow the Quran literally and live their lives as the first three generations did of the religion (de Koning, 2013). Salafism in itself has been seen by many as an extremely sober and fundamental form of Islam. The history of Salafism within the Netherlands is not one which is abundant, however its’ impacts have been of paramount concern to the Dutch security services. The assassination in 2004 of prominent Dutch film Director known as Theo Van Gogh, caused radical Salafism to become a realistic threat to Dutch national security (de Graaf, 2010). The suspect, a young Dutch Moroccan Muslim, cited various passages “[…] from the medieval Salafist cleric […]” during the act (p.17). This rise in Salafist influences prompted the government to set up the NCTV (National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism and Security), where a clear “turning point in the international political arena” occurred against radical Islam (de Graaf, 2010; General Intelligence And Security Service- AIVD, 2005, p.5).
With the establishment of the NCTV, several pre-emptive policies were being implemented, including protocols for local authorities to surveille any individuals following Salafism within the Netherlands (Vellenga & De Groot, 2019). This increased surveillance led many Salafist organizations to be placed under a constant spotlight, hampering their ability to effectively disseminate their ideology. Through such constant vigilance, the NCTV stated in 2007 that the “Dutch society that felt more at ease […]” since Salafi-Jihadism was no longer a concurrent threat to national security (de Graaf, 2010, p.21). Conversely, the pre-emptive measures implemented instigated in parallel a surge of foreign influence to follow. This peace of mind did not linger for long within the security realms. Saudi Arabia was able to create an
7 entire Salafist infrastructure with the Netherlands, by bringing in a large influx of financial support (de Graaf, 2010). Saudi Arabia too, follows the more extreme form of Salafism and made it possible to establish three large Salafist institutions within the main metropoles of the Netherlands. Following the murder of Theo Van Gogh, the discovery the “Hofstad” terrorist group emerged. This particular group gained notoriety within the Netherlands due to its expansive network connections, as well as polarizing members who were “suspected of planning attacks against politicians and the AIVD” (Vidino, 2007, p. 584). In a 2009 report by the Ministry of Internal Affairs it had been noted that that “[…] every Salafist organization [is] suspicious by definition” (p.227).
1.3: The Voice of the ‘Other’
Research concerning the perception of Muslim communities towards pre-emptive security policies is of current relevance. Spalek and Lambert (2008) noted a gap within research in which the “consideration of voices” not only of individuals, but of communities as a whole and their experiences among “counter-terror measures” was lacking (p.260). This specific aspect was researched by Rane and Bull (2018) within Australia and the United Kingdom. However, research concerning the experience of Muslim communities regarding criminalization of radicalization has not yet been conducted within the Netherlands. With the gained insight of whether or not Muslim communities perceived to be viewed as hostile due to focused pre-emptive measures, governments can improve upon social cohesion as well as policy reforms. Thus, the question for this particular research asks: To what extent do Muslim communities
perceive to be adversely labeled through the presence of pre-emptive security measures towards radicalization within the Netherlands?
8 Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework
2.1: The Rise of Salafism in The Netherlands
The branch of Salafism is not one which is entirely based on extremism and violence (Pall & de Koning, 2017). Within Salafism there are three groups: “Selefies” who are apolitical and non-violent, “Political Salafists” who remain non-violent yet partake within local politics, and lastly the “Jihadi Salafists” whom not only participate within politics but also have been deemed as the most extreme and violent branch of Salafism (de Graaf, 2010, p.18). The latter branch of Salafism has brought about increased levels of anxiety among the Dutch society (Buijs, 2009). After the assassination of Theo Van Gogh in 2004, the well-known Salafist “Hofstad group” started planning and executing a series of terrorist attacks, mostly involving arson acts within the Netherlands (Buijs, 2009).
The influx of the Salafist ideology within the Netherlands was not surprising, due to the major migration of Moroccan, Turkish and Surinamese labor forces during the 1960s (Buijs, 2009). An article by Buijs (2009) noted that after the entry of labor immigrants during 1960s, the Dutch government adopted policies in which Islamic religious practices and rituals were supported and legally recognized. As years passed on, an increasing awareness arose of a clear disadvantage among Muslim communities. For example, the unemployment rates for the Dutch Muslim youths was at least four times higher than of non-Muslim citizens. The lacking equality within the Muslim communities, allowed for Salafism to act “…as an instrument of security and protection in an insecure and changing […] minority situation” (Olsson, 2014, p.173-174). The Dutch Muslim youths were very familiar with the sentiment of dissatisfaction, and stated that the mentality of Dutch politics was one of fear where “[Dutch politicians] are trying to crush this [Islam] from above” (Buijs, 2009, p. 429). Once it was noticed by the Dutch government that the policies from 1980s were not effective, it caused them to intensify their security measures. It was established that the integration process towards
9 a multicultural society had failed (de Koning, Ragazzi & Fadil, 2019). The number of assaults towards Muslim individuals were higher after the Theo Van Gogh murder than after the 9/11 attack within the Netherlands (Buijs, 2009). After the Van Gogh murder, harsh security measures targeted specifically at Muslim communities was commended by 90% of the Dutch population (Buijs, 2009, p.434). These numbers indicated a Dutch society in turmoil and fear. Although following Salafism within the Netherlands was not thought of as an illegal act, the mere intent to support Jihadi Salafists was established as punishable in 2004 with the introduction of the “Crimes of Terrorism Acts” legislation and the creation of the NCTV (Vellenga & De Groot, 2019; Buijs, 2009).
Concerning today’s society, the worries of Salafism eroding Dutch norms and values has yet again become a topic of frequent discussion. An investigation from a well-known newspaper, NRC Handelsblad, and a media outlet, Nieuwsuur, discovered that in over 50 mosque locations within the Netherlands extreme Jihadi Salafist ideologies were being taught to young students (Kouwenhoven & Holdert, 2019). The teachings highlighted the need to reject everything within Dutch society and are required to take multiple choice tests where the options for punishment of ‘non-believers’ exist of: “(a) lashes (b) stoning or (c) death by sword”, in which option (c) is taught to be the correct answer (Kouwenhoven & Holdert, 2019). The children are trained to believe that non-Muslims and even Muslims who do not follow the Jihadi Salafist ideology should be seen as non-human and are designated as “witches” who deserve nothing expect the death punishment. Critiques from the Muslim communities have said that “Through such a generalized message, it is as if every mosque is suddenly deemed as dangerous” (Reub, 2019). Reactions such as from Said Bouharrou, a member of the Moroccan mosque foundation denounced such teachings as “horrendous” as well as detrimental to the Muslim communities and their image (Kouwenhoven & Holdert, 2019). As a result of this report, the Dutch government has sprung into action, with immediately investigating the 50
10 mentioned mosques and tightening education inspection regulations. Additionally, the House of Representatives (“Tweede Kamer”) of the Dutch Government had issued a formal request to increase transparency concerning foreign investments for mosques and religious institutions (Kouwenhoven & Holdert, 2019; 2018). Through the rise of Salafism within the Netherlands, a chain reaction of pre-emptive security measures has developed, engulfing national security and the concerns of Dutch citizens.
2.2: Securitization of Islam
The concept of pre-emptive measures towards radicalization was deemed as a ‘symptom’ of national security, where its implementation showed increased awareness of possible threats (Mythen, 2012). By securitizing individuals who followed a certain religion, the restrictions of employing extreme security measures was quickly lifted. This leeway had caused the security presence to become part of everyday life, where constant policing had become the new normal (de Koning, Ragazzi & Fidal, 2019). De Graaf (2019) pointed out that a transformation occurred during securitization. This transformation changed counter-terrorism into “risk management”, where expectations of possible danger within Muslim communities became a triggering factor for security services to take action (de Graaf, 2019, p.97).
Consequently, a report from the NCTV (2017) named the ‘National Counterterrorism
Strategy 2016-2020’ emphasized the importance of flexibility within such actions. The aspect
of cooperation between organizations as well as information sharing were considered to be highly essential in the employment within and around communities. In a letter from the NCTV to the House of Representatives, five main pre-emptive intervention goals were highlighted: (1) gaining insight on possible attacks through surveillance, (2) the prevention and disturbance of extremist individuals, (3) Protecting individuals and property from radicalized individuals, (4) Optimal preparedness in case of an attack, and lastly (5) Preserving democracy and legally
11 pursuing radicalized individuals (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV), 2016). These five emptive goals demonstrate the multifaceted process of pre-emptive measures and their intended results. The strategic framework of the counterterrorism approach indicated that for these results to be a reality, a multifaceted approach was necessary. This entailed the cooperation between many organizational bodies such as “intelligence services, local governments, security services, police, companies, social services, mental health care, education, and welfare organizations” (Ministerie can Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017, p.9). For these measures to be effective, the House of Representatives had given the NCTV 13 million euros in addition to the standard budget (Ministerie can Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017). The expansion in the budget shows that currently, the pre-crime rationale among the Dutch government has taken priority over post-crime actions (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV, 2016).
However, a research established by Tufail and Poynting (2013) noted that the pre-emptive security rationale triggered adverse reactions from the UK Muslim communities. Reactions such as isolation and increasing vulnerabilities towards radical ideologies started to manifest. Within the UK and Australia, Muslim communities have been “subject of heightened popular and state Islamophobia” (Tufail & Poynting, 2013, p.44). The society became exclusionary through the mechanisms of radicalization prevention policies. Within the field of crisis and security management, the necessity for the awareness of perceptions is of paramount importance in order to create effective policies. The impact of securitizing Islam demonstrated that each respondent felt as though the mentality among police and government was misconstrued. This was experienced to the point where “innocent until proven Muslim” was common principal (Tufail & Poynting, 2013, p.48). A British lawyer, with Yemeni heritage had observed that the mere appearance of a hijab had been connected with the concept of militancy. Through the criminalization of Islam, UK Muslims regarded the pre-emptive
12 measures to be “[…] draconian anti-terrorism powers […]”, which they perceived to be adversely manipulated towards their own communities (Tufail & Poynting, 2013, p.51).
2.3: The Voice of the ‘Other’
The notion that Muslim communities have become isolated through securitization, is not a new concept (Abbas, 2007). The constant discrimination through security policies has forced Muslim communities to change their outlook towards the rest of society. The perception of being the ‘other’ engrained in the Muslim social identity has not only propelled isolation but has said to be a “catalyst for springing religious terrorists into action” (Abbas, 2007; Jackson, 2007, p.406). The pre-emptive security measures have been seen as a materialization of the fear of the unknown. The UK Foreign Policy Center had previously stated that jihadists would be found within most Muslim communities (Jackson, 2007, p.405). With such proclamations, it is not difficult to understand that Muslim communities have been handed a disadvantaged position. Furthermore, the rationale behind Muslim communities being a threat has become a layman’s concept. Abbas (2007) pointed out that the Minister in charge of counter terrorism in the UK during 2005 said that “…Muslims will have to accept their ‘reality’…” in terms of being subject to frequent police surveillance (p.294).
Moreover, the double edged sword of implementing pre-emptive security measures has been that the “push” factors have become extremely highlighted (Mirahmadi, 2016). A study mentioned by Mirahmadi (2016) conducted by the University of Maryland, not only discovered that such measures lead to heightened levels of perceived discrimination among Muslims, but also increased the likelihood of larger support for radical groups. The securitization of Muslim communities can be considered as the perfect brewing ground for the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality. A clash between the thought of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and the need to become more cooperative and open towards society had emerged among Muslim community leaders. The
13 duality that is present within the communities is one in which they must cooperate with government to fight radicalization, yet at the same time they must moderate their own behaviors as to not trigger security suspicion (Roex & Vermeulen, 2019). The binary distinction has caused for many governments to see such communities “…as Muslims first and citizens second” (Edmunds, 2011, p.73-74).
Therefore, the aspect of exclusion has created Muslim communities to perceive such measures as hostile, where scrutiny under such policies was generally felt. A research by Tufail and Poynting (2013), interviewed British Muslims individuals within the UK to ascertain their view on assimilation and ‘belonginess’. One such interview revealed that the constant surveillance within their community has left families being “scared”, thus creating a communal notion of “a common ‘outlawness’” shared (p.49). An additional interview of a 31 year old female lawyer from Yemen, voiced her experience of an arrest of a young male friend in which the police officers’ justification was “… powers in the terrorism legislation are quite broad and we can arrest you for anything” (p. 51). The interviewee noted that the Manchester police officers only targeted individuals with a Muslim background, stating that racial slangs were commonly used. Tufail and Poynting (2013) additionally noted that most of the interviewed individuals perceived the pre-emptive policies to “…target for unwanted and unwarranted attention” (p.48). It is this ‘attention’ that culminated in adverse perceptions of law enforcement.
One might suggest that it is the societal perception that shapes policy formation and decision-making. It was noted by Mythen (2012) that “…counterterrorism policies have been instrumental in concretizing the idea that Islam is a problematic faith” (p.410). The perception from the British population has been explored, where 58% of the British population linked Islam with extremism. Yet, the perspective of Muslim communities has been lacking, especially within the Netherlands. An evaluation report from the Dutch Ministry of Security
14 and Justice on the ‘Netherlands Comprehensive Action Program to Combat Jihadism 2017’, showed that most of the pre-emptive measures concerning cooperation with Muslims communities had not been evaluated for efficiency or effectiveness (Inspectoraat van de Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017). Moreover, levels of perceived safety and quality of life within the political capital, The Hague had not even been reported. Online reports from the municipality have shown that surveys within highly populated Muslim neighborhoods had not been conducted, leaving a gap of data concerning their observations (“Den Haag in Cijfers, 2019). The concern for municipalities is not only to cooperate with organizations such as the NCTV and the AIVD, but also to cooperate with the communities (Ministerie can Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017). As mentioned in various reports from the Ministry of Justice and Security, the necessity to understand and cooperate with Muslim communities is a key proponent against the fight of radicalization and effective policy results (Ministerie can Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017; Inspectoraat van de Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017; Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (NCTV), 2016). Yet, when taking a closer look into the consequences of such pre-emptive measures, such as in the UK, it seems as though these policies have been counter effective (Tufail & Poynting, 2013). Thus, the perception of Dutch Muslim communities should be a crucial factor in the establishment of future pre-emptive radicalization policies within the Netherlands.
The need to understand the position from the scrutinized point of view, could inform the security realm as to how the policies affect communities, in light of a outwardly accepting society. The “generically labeled Muslims”, have deemed such policies a major factor that attributed to their ‘hostile’ marque (Mythen, 2012, p. 414). Therefore, with this logic placed within the Netherlands, the formulated hypothesis for the research reads as follows:
H1: The Muslim communities perceive themselves to be negatively labeled due to the presence of pre-emptive security measures towards radicalization within the Netherlands.
15 And the null hypothesis states the following:
H0: The Muslim communities do not perceive themselves as negatively labeled due to the presence of pre-emptive security measures towards radicalization within the Netherlands.
16 Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1: Research Approach
For this research, the use of a positive empirical study is analyzed to discover the explanatory factor of the research question through a deductive hypothesis-testing approach (Walliman, 2005). This research assumes that Dutch Muslim communities may perceive themselves to be labeled negatively due to the implementation of pre-emptive radicalization measures. This assumption has been confirmed and based upon academic literature that had been researched in the UK and Australia (Tufail & Poynting, 2013). Therefore, the logical choice behind theory-testing was used in order to have a confirmative result of the H1 hypothesis, built on deductive theories that had already been researched. The approach is nomothetic, in the sense that the assumption was based on the universal applicability of this hypothesis (Möller & Nyman, 2005). Moreover, this research will attempt to highlight consistencies across Dutch Muslim communities and their behavior, concerning their perception on policies implemented by the Dutch Ministry.
Since the research aims to discover “human observations and responses”, the observational research approach was applied (Walliman, 2005, p.3). The complexity of human behavior and perception is not reducible to entirely binary distinctions. Therefore, the need to take an additional observational approach was essential to allow for the flexibility that is innate to human behavior (Walliman, 2005). This application was used for the first method of data collection.
As for case selection, a single case study was applied. The case study was the Dutch political capital, The Hague. The Hague was chosen, not only for reasons of feasibility but also due to an absence in research concerning the issue of the Muslim perception of Dutch policies and radicalization. The motive of picking the single case study of The Hague is to develop a streamlined focus which could “reveal the conditions in which policies are enacted to argue
17 more strongly for policy development” (Simons, 2015, p.174). The necessity to highlight the place of the Muslim community’s context in The Hague, is of paramount concern. One will be able to draw parallels on a European level, with other major European cities, as well as on a more local level, restricted to the Netherlands. The emphasis on cultural contexts is what might shape perceptions and play a major role within the research, concerning the effect of pre-emptive measures towards radicalization (Simons, 2015). The Dutch Muslim communities base their perception which is “infused with different norms and assumptions” (p.176). Thus, the choice of a single case study was justified and easily applicable.
3.2: Data Collection
Through the research question, and independent and dependent variable was established. The latter variable is defined as the perception of the Dutch Muslim communities. This variable is difficult to measure because it entails the emotional component of humans and is not quantifiable in a dichotomous fashion (McLeod & Thomson, 2009). Thus, the motive to measure this variable through an observational approach was necessary. The independent variable is defined as the pre-emptive security measures towards radicalization. This variable is expected to affect and interact with the independent variable of adverse perceptions of labelling. The variable was operationalized through the presence of actions established within policies as prescribed in the Overview of Actions and Measures against Jihadism by the Ministry of Justice and Safety (2014).
A qualitive as well as a quantitative methodology had been chosen to collect data in the form of face-to-face interviews and drop-and-collect surveys (Appendix 4 & 6). The benefit of conducting interviews is that it “is used in understanding interpretations, experiences and spatialities of social life” (Dowling, Lloyd & Suchet-Pearson, 2016, p.680). This aspect is extremely necessary since the independent variable, is based upon the interpretation of Dutch Muslim communities. The aspect of face-to-face interviews was semi-structured, as to allow
18 for flexibility. This flexibility is a cornerstone process of data collection since the concept of perception may be different to each individual (Dowling, Lloyd & Suchet-Pearson, 2016). Consequently, during an interview, open questions can change direction and probe deeper into specific subjects that pertain to the research more specifically (Appendix 5). Moreover, the interviews were recorded in order to “maintain the level of accuracy and richness of data” which took up to an hour and a half in duration (Meyer, 2001, p.339).
Drop-and-collect surveys has been chosen as a second method. This was method was selected in order to gain supporting primary data to build up a sufficient respondents base for “…rich and analytical meaningful imagery…” to be discovered among specific communities (Brückner, 2011, p.667). The survey statements that were given out has been based upon the literature review above. Forty-five statements such as “Dutch citizens assume Muslims are
‘dangerous’” and “I am aware of the security measures against radicalization” could be
marked, based on an even-Likert scale from ‘Strongly Disagree=1’ to ‘Strongly Agree=6’. An even Likert scale has been chosen due to its advantage of avoiding respondents to answer neutrally or with an ‘I don’t know’ (Brill, 2011). This advantage allows for the attitude of the respondents to be established towards each statement, thus giving a deeper understanding of the perceptions (Maitland, 2011). Furthermore, the survey was no longer than an A4-double sided paper. This was to maintain the respondents attention whilst avoiding the loss of interest in answering truly, rather than answering as fast as possible (Herzog & Bachman, 1981).
The sample for the interviews included ‘elite’ members from established Muslim foundations and Mosques based in The Hague. It was noted by data from the Central Bureau of Statistics, that The Hague was one of the cities within the Netherlands that had the highest percentage of individuals following Islam, thus the sample is justified (“Het aantal Moslims stijgt, maar met hoeveel?”, 2017). Furthermore, the sample size was based around accessibility of participants willing to be interviewed. However, a sample size larger than 7 was collected
19 for the interviews to ensure credibility of the data, in addition to the respondents from the drop-and-collect survey. For the survey, the sample contained not only ‘elite’ members, but also members who visit the foundation and/or the associated Mosque. Muslim individuals whom are part of a foundation have commonalities based upon religious affiliation, which allows the targeted characteristic to be accurately analyzed within surveys (Brückner, 2011, p.667). Each interviewee and survey respondent had received an Informed Consent form (Appendix 3), in which the aim and purpose of the research was stated. Additionally, the form included assurance that their personal information and identity will remain confidential to all, except to my thesis supervisor and myself. Anonymity within the thesis itself was also assured, as well as allowing the interviewee to withdraw from the interview at any time. These measures were taken to allow the interviewee and survey respondents to be able to speak freely, and divulge opinions that may ordinarily not be given under their known identity (Lancaster, 2016).
3.3: Work field Operationalization
Interviews
The process of finding respondents for interviews was initially problematic. On a primary level, scouting various websites of all the Mosques in The Hague was conducted in order to acquire contact information and potential respondents. The response rate to e-mails (Appendix 7) was very low due to indirect communication. Over 25 e-mails were sent, with only one concrete rejection reply, others simply did not write back. Phoning the Mosques served as the primary method of communication. During September through to November over 280 phone calls were made. Initially, most responses were an immediate rejection to participate in the research. Through persistent phone calls, it became evident that conversing in a more colloquial language and less official terms helped foster a connection and a will to participate in the interviews. This was also advised by a particular respondent who took me 'under his wings' and divulged
20 as many possible potential contacts as he could find. The method advised allowed the interviewees to engage in casual conversation which led to the establishment of a warm relationship. As a result, they helped me by providing potential contacts with their recommendation. This snowballed into a long list of potential contacts whom I could interview on a more trusting foundation. The creation of this dependable network was pivotal for this research. The nature of the subject matter was one in which a colleague-like relation was necessary for the respondents to share true experiences. Through this method of networking, I was able to conduct a final of fifteen interviews ranging from Mosque board members to various Imams.
Consequently, each interview location was conducted at the choice of the respondent. Such locations entailed train stations, a doctor's office, Mosques, a personal home, offices, and Turkish cafes. Most interviews would take place on weekends or a Friday right after the Jummah prayers and would last an average of one hour and fifteen minutes. Nonetheless, some interviews would take place late in the evenings due to the busy work schedule of the respondents. After each interview, a small box of chocolates was given as a sign of gratitude for the respondents' time. The commute to each interview averaged around an hour with public transport.
Furthermore, due to my outward Western appearance, I was very aware of the clothing I wore. A headscarf and long-sleeved shirts were worn to each interview. Once the respondent said it was not necessary, I would remove my headscarf. This show of respect was said to be deeply appreciated and many respondents would laugh, allowing the ice to break and ensured for a more relaxed atmosphere during the interview. Throughout the first three interviews, the respondents held back slightly. I believe that this was due to the initial interviewing method. The fear of all questions not being answered restricted me from further elaborating on important comments made by the respondents due to the time restraint. However, as the
21 interviews progressed the extra insights made were essential to probing emotional questions which allowed for the respondent to speak more freely. At times some interviews were very casual. A particular interview had taken place at a respondent own home, where their cats would jump on the table during the interview. Other times, an entire family would be having dinner behind a curtain in the same room as the interview. This was not a hindrance, but in fact, it was an advantage for the research as it prompted invitations for dinner or coffees. Hence fostering signs of openness. This created a higher level of confidence and kinship that helped the other respondents to reply with honesty and a sense of trust.
Nonetheless, this type of environment was not present during all interviews. After interviewing and leaving a Mosque, I was followed by an older gentleman. He confronted me and asked me several personal questions, including a proposition to marry. Once I made clear that I was not willing to engage with the man, he became irritated. As I continued my commute, the man grabbed my arm and tried to pull me in his direction. At this point, some bystanders interfered. I called the representative of the board at the particular Mosque and explained what had happened. It appeared this situation had occurred before and I was reassured that the man meant no harm. The representative noted that this man had just migrated from Somalia and was not yet accustomed to the norms and practices of The Netherlands.
Another striking interview experience was one in which I was asked to sit on the floor whilst the Imam sat on a raised chair. It was slightly puzzling since there were other chairs available, yet for the interview, it was highly insightful. . It may also have been due to cultural or religious aspects since the Imam is of a higher status. Thus, sitting at a higher level may be a custom at the Mosque. Non-verbal communication was also essential to grasp the emotion of the answers behind the questions asked. Accordingly, the interview itself combined with the Imam's answers, shed light upon a dissatisfied and slightly angry opinion towards the Dutch society which the Imam may have associated with my Western appearance before the interview
22 took place, the Imam made it clear to me that my ankles were exposed, thus I had to cover my feet during the interview. Furthermore, I sensed at times that I was not welcome. This would manifest in glares from the Mosque followers, or unwillingness to have conversations with me whilst I would be waiting for the respondent to arrive. Undergoing fieldwork does expose one to several situations that may not be expected. Yet, such experiences during the data collection phase were very enriching for the research. I became engulfed with the cultural aspects of the Muslim community allowing me to gain deeper insights into their specific points of view.
Surveys
Contrary to the interviews, the process of obtaining survey respondents proved to be immensely challenging. Since the surveys were a drop-and-collect type survey, the responsibility of having the surveys filled was left with the members at the Mosques. After each interview, a proposition to leave surveys behind for the followers of the Mosque to fill in was met with unwillingness and defensiveness. In two cases I had printed 100 surveys and given it to the interviewees. Once I would call back to discuss the surveys, they never replied or answered any of my e-mails. Over 400 surveys were printed out in total. All except two interviewees allowed for me to leave surveys behind, with the condition of no more than ten or fifteen surveys. The reasoning behind the refusal to share the surveys around in the Mosque was always answered with two reasons. Firstly being that most of the members at the mosque do not understand Dutch or English very well and thus would not be able to reply. Secondly, the interviewees did not want to expose their members to a survey containing a highly sensitive and controversial topic.
Consequently, I had decided to walk around certain neighborhoods and ask individuals if they would want to fill in the surveys. Each request was denied. After noticing this method was not fruitful, certain businesses were approached. Yet, similarly, no one was willing to subject their clients to such a sensitive and provoking subject. Lastly, several Islamic schools
23 were called as well as e-mailed, however none of the schools replied back, nor picked up any of my returning calls. Later in the thesis writing process, I decided to call an interviewee who worked at an Islamic Foundation. He was very supportive and willing to spread out the surveys among Muslim communities he was familiar with. After a month of calling back and forth with the interviewee to discuss its progress, a total of 86 interviews was collected from him. In the end 127 surveys were filled out.
3.4: Data Analysis
Interviews
The analysis of the qualitative data was done through thematic analysis coding. The fifteen interviews were all transcribed (Appendix 3) to allow for easier identification of themes and referencing. Each interview was conducted in Dutch, therefore also transcribed in Dutch. For the use of this research, quotes were translated into English. The useful aspect of thematic analysis was that it was used for various data sources. The triangulation aspect of the data collection can also be analyzed alongside the interviews (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 2010). Fieldwork observations such as notes and observation written during the interviews were analyzed parallel to the text. This type of analysis was helpful in the management of “large volumes of data without losing the context [whilst] focusing on the interpretation” (p.2). A total of 10 categories were identified, containing 112 indicators (Appendix 1). The coding revealed several indicators that were mostly mentioned in each interview and which interviews were highly negative in terms of perceptions towards pre-emptive policies towards radicalization (Appendix 2).
24 102 surveys were used for analysis due to the exclusion of respondents who did not live in The Hague. With the sample of N=102, frequency analysis and descriptive analysis was run in SPSS (Table 1 &3 ).
The survey included a total of 43 questions, which needed to be reduced into fewer number of composite variables for the purpose of feasibility in the SPSS analysis. Since there has not be a survey conducted before on this particular topic, no validity measures were previously established through this survey. Therefore new variables and measures had to be discovered via analyze and dimension reduction in SPSS. Thus, the approach of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was chosen. The EFA allowed for the variables to be tested upon their relation to each other, therefore grouping certain variables together that measure components
25 in commonality (Hayashi & Yuan, 2010). From the EFA, a total of 7 composite variables, after a series of EFA’s with Oblimin-Kaiser rotations (Table 2). This was done until the questions in their meaning did not show a cross loading value higher than .03 or higher. Secondly, questions would be excluded if their meaning did not fit into the composite variable. The EFA was repeated 17 times in total. The exclusion criteria of the cross loading values higher than .03 was chosen due to the fact that the survey was conducted as exploratory, thus the limit of exclusion was reduced in order to gain composite variables that are conceptually similar. From the EFA a total of 26 questions remained in 7 composite variables for further analysis (Table 2). An additional 5 variables, which were not found to be conceptually similarly to the other composite variables in the EFA were chosen from the survey due to their importance towards to the research. These 5 variables were treated as singular components in the analysis alongside the 7 from the EFA. The 5 variables were as followed: Islam Perception 4 (I am aware of the negative perceptions of Islam), Islam Perception 6 (People judge me negatively for practicing Islam), Radicalization 25 (I perceive to be negatively labeled by society because of radicalized individuals), Radicalization 26 (I perceive to be negatively labeled by security forces because of radicalized individuals), and Pre-Emptive Measure 27 (I am aware of the security measures against radicalization). Once construct validity of the variables was established through EFA, the 7 component variables were tested for reliability. This was done via Cronbach ‘s Alpha (Table 2). Each of the 7 composite variables had a score of a= .774 or higher, meaning the necessary criterion value of a >.70 was reached for reliability to be established for further SPSS analysis.
Subsequently, analytical SPSS tests were run such as: the Independent t-tests, Pearson Correlation Coefficients, and Multiple Linear Regression tests.
26 3.5: Limitations
Unavoidably there were limitations to this research method. This research being a masters research firstly, needed to be feasible from the stand point of the researcher. Consequently, the sample size of the interview (N=15) was not extremely large, which caused internal reliability to be lower than with a higher sample size. Furthermore, the basis of the research being placed upon Dutch Muslim communities brought about cultural barriers that the researcher was not fully subjected to. Thus, the translation process may have been slightly affected, not in the sense of the language itself but in the meaning behind the language that is specific to the Islam culture and its norms (Mills, Durepos & Wiebe, 2012). Additionally, the researcher being present during the data collection, could have “affected the subjects' responses” to the extent that it may have reduced reliability of the data and increased observer’s bias (Anderson, 2010, p.3). Notably, the choice of a single case study does indeed lower external validity, yet provides a more in depth data collection process that is necessary for a study based on observing perceptions (Meyer, 2001).
Furthermore, another limitation that was highly plausible to occur, is that of subjectivity within the survey. One may not interpret the same statement in the same way, thus changing the meaning of the answer (Brückner, 2016). There is no clear way to circumvent this limitation, besides choosing a sample population that all share common characteristics which influence their understanding of a statement, which has been done. By doing so, the hope is to reduce reliability concerns to a realistic minimum. With this research being done for the first time in the Netherlands, no type of measurement scale was existent for the survey. Therefore, via the use of Exploratory Factor Analysis, new composite variables were constructed. However, due to the exploratory facet of the survey, the p-value was raised. Rather than having the limit of exclusion as p=.05, the limit was chosen to be p=.10. This does change the confidence interval from 95% to 90% of the data results. However, the loss of the 5%
27 confidence interval is needed to expand statistically significant insights of the survey data (Thiese, Ronna & Ott, 2016).
Lastly, when looking at the gender of the respondents, males are seen to be of highest frequency for the survey (65.7%) and all interviewee respondents were also males (N=15). This does pose an issue when uncovering a perspective of a Muslim community as a whole. As Figure 1 shows, within Muslim communities the gender ratio is mostly 1:1. This means that the female respondent rate was not due to lack of female population, but perhaps due to cultural limitations. Such limitations may be due to the fact that the surveys were given to the male Board Members and Imams of Mosques, who may have not handed it out to the females in their prayer rooms. Consequently, it may have given the research a more male-based perspective.
30 Chapter 4: SPSS Survey Results
All significant statistic results from the SPSS output will be mentioned further along the research alongside the relevant chapters. Below, statistics which showed either no significance or have not been mentioned in other chapters will be mentioned below.
4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables without t-test statistical significance
The composite variable of Prejudice Towards Muslim Communities (N=102), contained statements such as “Dutch security services target Muslim communities more than other communities” or “Dutch Politics label Muslims as ‘dangerous’” etc. (Table 2). The respondents mean score (M=4.16, SD=1.03) revealed a “Somewhat Agree” answer in the Likert Scale of the Survey. Furthermore, the Awareness of Pre-emptive Measures composite variable (N=102) containing statements such as “I am aware of the cooperation with Muslim representative and the police” and “I am aware of the cooperation with Muslim representative and the municipality” with the results (M=3.86, SD=1.02) showed that they were not aware of pre-emptive measures being put in place by the government, with a “Somewhat Disagree” score on the Likert Scale. The variable Islamperc 4 (N=100, M=4.42, SD=1.04) “I am aware of negative perceptions towards Islam” has respondents score a “Somewhat Agree” on average on the Likert scale. Yet, the variable Islamperc 6 (N=102, M=3.06, SD=1.38) “I am judged negatively due to me practicing Islam” thus shows that respondents on average “Somewhat disagree” which is not in accordance with the composite variable Islam perception where the (M=4.16, SD=1.03) was much higher. Lastly, the variable Pre-emp 27 (N=102, M=3.84,
SD=1.23) “I am aware of the pre-emptive measure against radicalization”, resulted in a
32 4.2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
As Table 4 below shows, there are many variables that show significant correlations between each other. The strongest positive correlation that is found is between the variables Radical 25 and Radical 26, r(99)=.741, p<.001. When respondents would perceive to be strongly labelled by society, then they would accordingly respond to perceive to be strongly labelled by the security services. Thus, the higher the score for Radical 25, the higher the score for Radical 26 as well. Moreover, the variable Religious Discrimination was also found to be positively correlated with Prejudice Towards Muslim Communities, r(100)=.666, p<.001 This indicates that higher the score on perceived religious discrimination, the score on the statements within the composite variable such as “Dutch politics label Muslims as ‘dangerous’”, “Dutch security services target Muslim communities more than other communities”, etc. would also be higher. Experiencing religious discrimination causes the perception of prejudice towards the respondents own Muslim Community to be present as well.
4.3: Multiple Linear Regression
Once the 7 composite variables were confirmed to be reliable and valid, the sub-variables under each composite variables were transformed and given new labels. This can be seen in Table 2. A total of six independent variables (Age, Gender, Cultural Background, Awareness of Pre-emptive Measures, Effectiveness of Pre-Pre-emptive Measures, and Pre-Pre-emptive Measure 27) were established. Furthermore, a total 9 dependent variables (Religious Discrimination, Negative Labelling Through Radical Individuals, Prejudice Towards Muslim Communities, Islam Perception, Perception of Security Services, Islam Perception 4, Radicalization 26, Radicalization 25, and, Pre-Emptive Measure 27) were established.
34
Prejudice Towards Muslim Communities
The aspect of Prejudice Towards Muslim Communities uncovered only one significant predictor. The regression equation of (F(6,94)=1.35, p=.241) with "# of .080, is found not to
be significant due to the p-value being higher than .10. However, within Table 5 it is shown that the variable Effectiveness of Pre-Emptive Measures does show to be a significant (p=.039) predictor. Prejudice Towards Muslims Communities would decrease by .265 on the Likert Scale when respondents answered a value for the Effectiveness of the Pre-Emptive Measures. The R squared value describes that 8% of the variance by Prejudice Towards Muslim Communities is explained by the six independent variables.
Radical26 & Islamperc6
Likewise, Radical 26 (Perceive to be negatively labelled by security services due to radicalized individuals) does not show a statistically significant regression equation, (F(6,94)=1.70, p=.128). The R squared value, depicts that for the case of Radical 26 a mere 9.8% of variance would be explained by the independent variables. Moreover, the dependent variable Islamperc6 (Judged negatively due to me practicing Islam), showed no significant regression equation (F(6,94)=.844, p=.539, "#=.051). Nor did any of the independent variables
have statistically significant predictor interactions with this variable (see Table 5).
Negative Labelling Through Radical Individuals
Furthermore, a significant regression equation was found (F(6,94)=2.40, p=.033), with an "# of .133. Cultural Background is coded as 0=Non-Western, 1=Dutch and Gender is coded
as 0=Male and 1=Female. Thirdly, the Effectiveness of Pre-emptive Measures is coded from 1-6 (1=Strongly Disagree, 6= Strong Agree). The Negative Labelling Through Radical Individuals scored .366 lower for females than for males. The Cultural Background variable showed a score of .716, meaning that respondents with a Dutch cultural background scored .716 lower than respondents with a Non-Western Background. For the Effectiveness of
Pre-35 Emptive Measures, respondents scored .248 higher on the Likert Scale compared to the scores of the dependent variable. Thus, the Negative Labelling Through Radicalized Individuals would decrease .366 in value when female respondents would answer. Additionally, the dependent variable would decrease by .716 for respondents with a Dutch cultural background. Conversely, the score of .248 from the Effectiveness of Pre-Emptive Measures would increase on the dependent variable Likert scale. All three independent variable of Gender (p=.050), Cultural Background (p=.010) and Effectiveness of Pre-Emptive Measures (p=.018) were significant predictors of the dependent variable: Negative Labelling Through Radical Individuals, with 13.3% of the variance explained by the six independent variables.
Religious Discrimination
For this particular dependent variable, only age played a significant predictor role within the model (p=.005). The regression equation (F(6,94)=2.83, p=.014) with an "# of .153
was also found to be statistically significant. The Age variable is coded as 1= >35 and 0= <35, and has a coefficient of -.650. This means that Religious Discrimination scored .650 lower with respondents over the age of 35, compared to respondents under the age of 35. The dependent variable would decrease by .650 for each respondent above the age of 35. Finally, the Religious Discrimination’s "# value shows that 15.3% of the variance is explained by all the independent
variables.
Radical25
Lastly, a significant regression equation was found (F(6,94)=2.04, p=.068), with an "#
of .115 for the variable Radical25 (Perceive to be negatively labelled by society due to radicalized individuals). Radical25 scored .457 lower with respondents of the age higher than 35, compared to respondents under the age of 35. Comparably, Radical25 score .573 lower for females than for males. Therefore, when looking at Radical25, it would decrease in score by .457 for every respondent above the age of 35. Radical25 would also decrease by .573 when a
36 female respondent would answer. Both Age (p=.071) and Gender (p=.76) were significant predictors for the dependent variable: Radical25, with a 11.5% of the variance explained through the six independent variables.
38 Chapter 5: “The Dirty Game that is Politics”
5.1: The Avoidance of Political Talk
The aspect of the political realm "fetishizing the Muslim veil as a symbol of non-integration in the West" was a prominent theme among all interviews (Tufail & Poynting, 2013, p.46). The view that Muslim communities are being labeled as 'dangerous' or 'evil' was established within the UK by Tufail and Poynting in 2013. Respectively, each interview in this research had mentioned the negative effects of policies upon their community apart from one interview. Significantly, from this interview, a board member named Arda maintained an unusually positive outlook within the interview stating that "The municipality knows our situation well
and who we are. We communicate well with each other […] And I am on the board and never hear anything about radicalization." (Interview 13, L37-40). The conversation with Arda was
noticeably the shortest out of all conversations. The aspect of potential denial was present since not one single negative indicator was present. Arda spoke of the threats being received by an extreme right-winged group Pegida. When asked what his response was to the threat, he replied with "I just think 'guys, come here, the Mosque is always open. It's not just ours. It is for the
whole world, for the entire humanity'" (Interview 13, L22-24). Rather, Arda pushed for the
Muslim community to integrate more and to follow the rules of the government closely. Arda avoided the aspect of politics entirely and focused mostly upon religious texts and references to answer each question. His positive outlook toward policies as well as the security services was that it was "effective and scares people away" from perpetrating the wrong deeds from "individuals who obviously do not follow the Koran" (Interview 13, L79; L107-108).
What should be noted, was that almost every interview started with a positive answer. After asking the initial question of "Do you think The Netherlands is an open society in terms of religious practices?". Most interviewees would answer with a simple "Yes". Once asking the interviewees to name an example of such an experience, it proved difficult to reply. The
39 interviewees would alter their answers. The interviewees delved into personal experiences of the Dutch society being more prejudiced than accepting. Thus, most of the interviews started with a positive perception, yet quickly shifted towards negative opinions. This may have been due to the probing of the respondents to talk about every-day experiences.
5.2: The ‘Tool’ of Islamophobia
Furthermore, researchers such as Spalek and Lambert (2008) had illuminated a major policy issue when it came to engagement with the Muslim community. It was said that Muslims were considered to be "' evil' and a 'fifth column enemy within'" the political and security services realm (p.261). The negativity surrounding Islam has seeped into the Dutch political system, according to the other 14 interviews conducted. Additionally, within the survey a negative correlation was found between composite variables Religious Discrimination and Effectiveness of Pre-Emptive Measures, r(100)=-.209, p=.035 (Table 4). This particular correlation depicts that the more religious discrimination the respondents were subjected to, the less they perceived the pre-emptive measure to be of help. Therefore, scores to statements such as “If I am concerned about an individual radicalizing, I would know who to contact.” or “The Muslim community is highly aware of police suspicion, in terms of radicalization.”, etc. would have decreasing values as religious discrimination’s values would increase (Table 2). This demonstrates the notion that pre-emptive measures towards radicalization are not deemed effective by the respondents as along as religious discrimination maintains a prominent hold in the Muslim communities around The Hague.
Politicians, especially Geert Wilders was frequently blamed for the negative labelling forced upon the Muslim society. The phenomenon of abusing Islam for political gain was noticeably frequent among interviews. Interviewee Zubair noted that politicians would need a
40 fiend of society to stay relevant among voters. His thought was that politicians such as Wilders manipulate society:
"Politics must have a scapegoat […]One has to cultivate a certain fear against
another culture. Just to be able to grab votes. This is what prevails now. And that is because of politicians through demagogues, can play on people's ignorance."
(Interview 6, L177-184).
The view that Islam is used as an instrument to gain political popularity had evident negative effects upon self-perception. When Saket shared his experience of needing to respond to each negative comment made by a politician, he felt as though Geert Wilders and other politicians alike were "[…] crazy. He says things you know, that's basically insulting. You just get so
exhausted." (Interview 8, L47-49).
Being labelled negatively was a frustration that was depicted by Narish. The infamous slogan "Less Moroccans! Less Moroccans!" by Geert Wilders in 2014, sent shock waves thought that such apparent verbal abuse towards the community was not only counter-productive but a "breeding ground" for young individuals who already perceive to be at a disadvantage within society due to the "continuous political discrimination" (Interview 1, L189; L182). The appearance of heightened pre-emptive policies was no surprise to him and the mosque followers. The hostile societal environment can be seen as self-inflicted by politicians who have self-centered interests for their own party's popularity. The redundancy of pre-emptive policies was noted to be present. Additionally, within the Multiple Logistic Regression analysis (Table 5) of the survey it was found within a significant regression of Islam Perception (F(6,94)= 3.66, p=.003, "#= .138), that the independent composite variable
Effectiveness of Pre-Emptive Measures scored .228 higher on the Likert scale when Islam perception was scored. This signifies that the less the survey respondents felt they were able to
41 practice Islam freely and without judgement, the less they would deem pre-emptive policies to be effective.
Pre-emptive policies not being effective in their implementation could be explained by society having a biased view that any Muslim is deemed as 'bad news' (Tufail & Poynting, 2013). Consequently, a mentality had fostered among the Muslim youths which showed itself in daily situations where young Muslim individuals would apply for work. Employers would habitually tell the Muslim youths: "Your last name doesn't seem right, just go home. No job
application for you" (Interview 1, L176-177). This was also corroborated by Latib, in which
the clear divide of 'good and bad' was equated with 'Muslim and non-Muslim'. Latib rationalized that:
"If an individual who can be linked to Islam, then Islam is put on the naughty bench.
If 'Jan' does it [terrorist attack], then Jan is responsible for his actions, but if 'Mohamed' does it, then Islam is responsible for his actions. It's just crooked."
(Interview 12, L194-197).
Zubair noted that the inverted abuse of policies for political gain was also present. The aspect that Islamophobia created popularity towards a political party, came combined with the inaction of politicians to listen to the Muslim community. This is slightly shocking seeing as one of the main policies of the Ministry of Security and Justice, in combating radicalization is clear communication and cooperation with the Muslim community (Inspectoraat van de Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017). More shockingly, the effectiveness of the implementation of this particular policy was not evaluated within their efficacy report (Inspectoraat van de Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, 2017). The necessity to converse with members of the Muslim community is seen by all interviewees as a policy that is rarely enforced yet could be extremely helpful. The need to understand the effects of the implemented
42 policies and perceived labelling among Muslim communities is clearly missing within the action program. Zubair stated that the response of the municipality is one of silence.
"But what does the municipality do to advise the community? Here in The Hague?
[…] What are they doing? I don't see D66, GroenLinks doing anything. Neither is the PvdA or SP taking any action." (Interview 6, L332-336)
This idleness is seen by Zubair as politicians inadvertently supporting policies that "everyone
[the policies] are polarizing. And when that is done, we don't have a voice" (Interview 1,
L340-341). The lack of political support towards Muslim communities has embedded a sense of immense irritation according to respondents. Zubair's opinion alongside Saket and Narish is that the pre-emptive policies have created a fissure along the borders of cohesion within society. The political strategy of certain politicians is seen as an instrument to create 'buzz', as well as importance around self-serving interests of gaining majority votes. The separation between the interests of the Muslim community and that of the politicians, showed that the respondents had a universal agreement. The understanding that the social cohesion aspect of Dutch society was quickly drifting farther apart. By the government’s inaction, the Muslim communities feels as though they are not equally valued when compared to non-Muslim communities. Perceiving such a distinction is what fosters the alienation process within society (Abbas, 2007). According to the interviewees, the aspect of being labeled negatively was no surprise and mostly present among Mosque followers.
5.3: Feeling Misunderstood
The incorrect understanding of Islam by politicians is one of the primary reasons negative labelling seems to occurs. Spalek and Lambert (2008) stated that "the perspectives of those
43 individuals whose identities lie at the margins, occupying disempowered positions" (p.263). Moreover, with the overall respondent response (N=101, M=5.15, SD=.860), the perception of being negatively labelled by radicalized individuals was “Agreed” upon by the respondents in the survey (Table 3) . Also, the variable showed to statistically vary when it came to Cultural Backgrounds. Respondents with a Dutch background (N=11, M=4.61, SD=.976), versus respondents with a non-Western background (N=90, M=5.21, SD=.828) experienced or perceived significantly less negative labelling from radicalized individuals, t(100)= -2.237, p=.027. This indicates that respondents who were not born in The Netherlands or have Dutch familial ties, but rather come from countries such as Turkey, Morocco, Suriname, Africa, Pakistan, etc., (Table 1) have a stronger impression that radicalized individuals place a negative label upon their own identity as a Muslim in The Hague. It is these disadvantaged positions that lead to a certain disdain towards politics. The speeches or statements made by Dutch politicians in The Hague were understood to be mostly misinformed and untrue by the respondents. A Dutch national named Hadad explained that statements such as:
"[…] ‘all non-believers should die’ That makes no sense! And then you get political
followers who also think that that is true. That we say that. Do we think every non-believer should die? What kind of crap is that?!" (Interview 7, L280-282).
The emotion of anger, as well as the sense of lacking trust, was coupled with the interviewees when discussing this topic. The aspect of speaking on behalf of a community, yet not knowing the religion closely was considered to be of an offensive act. Tabeeb, a board member, shared an experience in which
"A number of young individuals are starting to say "Fuck you. I'm done. Who do
they think they are?" They then go the wrong way, and we try to corral them. […] I'm worried. I have four grandchildren. I'm not worried about my position but that
44
of my grandchildren, the coming generation" (Interview 15, L252-255).
The fear that seems to be present is that the next generation may turn to radical ideas, simply because of a few prominent politicians speaking out of turn. The mixture of being Muslim and an active member in society was not a label that had been made visible by politicians enough. Rather the politicians are seen to undermine the Muslim community. The municipalities "lack
the correct information, and too few members come forward to speak out" (Interview 7,
L70-71).
Misinformation is seen by the fourteen interviews as harmful towards their self-perception. Commonly, the notion of conflicted identities arises from a lacking will of the politicians to understand their culture. When politicians made incorrect statements, Dutch society would follow suit. Thus, affecting the bias of perception. Zubair was born in the Netherlands, yet still feels a pull from both identities. Latib shares this emotional confrontation, where:
"Every time something happens that has to do with Islam, certain experts are called
in to speak. As if they represent me? They don't represent me! […] You can continue to play the victim role. And then at a certain point, you will turn against society, against the community. So you isolate." (Interview 12, L163-165; L181-182).
By isolating oneself, the youth is seen to increase their vulnerability to radicalization. The concern that the next generation may turn to radical Salafism with less hesitation has been a present thought among some respondents. The politicians are seen to push the youth unknowingly towards seclusion. Respondents from the survey depicted a statistically significant variation of Religious Discrimination (N=102, M=2.87, SD=1.14) when it came to individuals under the age of 35. Thus, The age group under 35 (N=45) experienced more
