Normative power Europe and EU relations with Israel : contradiction in terms?

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University Of Amsterdam Amsterdam, The Netherlands Faculty of Political Science

M.S.C., Political Science, European Politics and External Relations

Normative Power Europe and EU Relations with Israel: A

Contradiction in Terms?

Thesis Supervisor: Dr Dimitris Bouris Second Reader: Dr Mehdi Parvizi Amineh Author: Tristan Tonks

Student Number: 18142 Word Count: 20583

Date of Submission: 23/06/2017 Academic Year: 2016-2017

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Acknowledgements

I wish to extend my gratitude and thanks to my family for their constant support, without which I would never have been able to complete this Masters. I also thank my classmates for their reassuring comradery throughout the process of writing our theses, and also thanking my friends for ensuring that my much needed time off from work was as enjoyable as possible. And finally, I wish to thank Dr Dimitris Bouris for his constructive recommendations and advice which has made completing the thesis an actuality.

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Abbreviations

AA: Association Agreement

ACAA: Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of industrial products CPE: Civilian Power Europe

EEC: European Economic Community EC: European Community

EMIAA: Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

EMP: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership EP: European Parliament

EU: European Union

FP7: Seventh EU Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development MEP: Member of the European Parliament

MS: European Union Member States NPE: Normative Power Europe PA: Palestinian Authority

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation TA: Technical Arrangement

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1. Introduction

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the consequent demise of Soviet communism, there has been an active and lively debate on what role the EU should play in this brave new world. Though there were initial debates that the EU should expand military capabilities to ensure a form of regional hegemony (Bull, 1983) (Hill, 1993, 312-315), the debate on EU external actions has been heavily influenced in recent years by a unique concept, Normative Power Europe (NPE) (Manners, 2002). Though this concept will be discussed in greater detail, Manners suggests that the EU is a normative actor intent on setting values on the international community. Unlike other theories such as Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, which seems to justify aggressive military action in the name of state security (Mearsheimer, 2001), NPE strips away certain assumptions of the anarchic nature of state relations and indebts the EU to act in a morally righteous, external way (Manners, 2002, 252). Thus, the EU’s external actions are assessed on its ability to spread norms and values beyond its borders under the assumption that these norms are superior to all others.

This narrative that the EU is a form of normative power is challenged, however, when considering the EU’s relations with its neighbouring countries. It has been claimed that the EU has often valued partnerships with stable authoritarian regimes over dealings with fickle democracies (Borzel, 2011, 409) (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, 899) (Pace et al., 2009, 8), prompting considerations of whether the EU can pertain a normative agenda with any credible validity. These questions are amplified further when observing the EU’s relations with the state of Israel. Indeed, can the normative power narrative remain valid while the EU simultaneously continues a strong partnership with a state berated by the international community for its treatment of the Palestinian people and its ongoing illegal occupation of certain territories?

Therefore, the intent of this thesis is to critically analyse relations between Israel and the EU and conclude whether this validates or rather hinders and discredits the legitimacy of the normative EU narrative. Such a question is of great significance, as an examination into this conundrum offers the ability to analyse both the EU’s most discussed foreign affairs concept and its relations to its strongest partner in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), encompassing EU external relation interpretations and actual practice. If successful, this thesis can help contribute to a greater understanding of a substantial challenge of EU foreign policy; this being conceptualising what the EU ‘is’ in world affairs. Thus, this thesis will explore the

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validity of NPE within the framework of Israeli relations. I also intend for this to contribute to my own interpretation of the NPE concept. This being that NPE can be better understood when compared to American exceptionalism, as it is not an accurate depiction of the EU’s foreign affairs but rather an idealised attempt at forming a unified European identity.

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2. Methodology

As previously stated, the intent of this thesis is to analyse EU external relations within the framework of the NPE concept to assess the validity of the conceptualisation. Therefore, my research question is as follows:‘To what extent is the EU a normative power?’ In order to ensure that such a question is answered, I will deploy EU relations with Israel as my case study to evaluate the NPE concept. This prompts further questions of how the EU can pertain to normative values while upholding the status quo in Israel, whether the relations are an example of an ambiguity of convenience, and what this says for the European exceptionalist argument. Thus, it is an attempt to deploy the empirical to either prove or disprove the conceptual. This is not a simple task, as made evident by Diez and Pace, who state that normative power is hard to quantify as it is not an objective fact but rather a discursive discussion (Diez & Pace, 2011, 2). There have even been suggestions that NPE acts as a simple Eurocentric narrative to provide consistency in the sporadic foreign policy of a 28 member-state bloc (Cebeci, 2012). NPE clearly has amassed a great wealth of criticisms and interpretations and thus the literature review of this thesis will provide a robust overview of the academic conceptualisation of EU foreign policy, focusing on the development of the NPE debate while also providing my own perception of the concept.

There are clear challenges that lie ahead when trying to examine NPE’s legitimacy. However, one will try to traverse such hurdles through the examination of trade deals and agreements between the EU and Israel, as trade is the most tangible demonstration of the strong relationship between the two parties (European External Action Service, 2016). Nevertheless, this is not simply an examination of trade; it will be an assessment of whether the intricacies and consequences of the trade agreements in question help elevate the assertions that the EU fails to pertain to its normative principles in its external relations. There is a vast scope of trade negotiations and deals between the two parties in question, therefore, for the sake of a realistic scope of research, I will primarily start with the Association Agreement of 1995. Following this will be an examination into the Technical Arrangement of 2005 which indebted the Israeli state to label which products were coming from the controversial Occupied Territories (OTs). I will study these key documents as they are vital to EU/Israeli trade relations, doing so by analysing the language and intricacies of the documents in question to see if they pertain to normative values while detailing the consequences they bring.

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Following this, a key policy to be examined is the Horizon 2020 case and the politics that surrounded its eventual conclusion. Horizon 2020 being an ambitious research and innovation programme established by the EU, in which €80 Billion will be invested over a period of 6 years (European Commission, 2014). This is not limited to EU member states (MS), other nations have been included in the programme, such as Israel. Therefore, Israeli universities and institutions were applicable to EU grants for research and development (European Commission, 2014). However, this sparked outrage in the EP as this initially meant OT institutions were applicable, resulting in MEP pressure which removed such institutions from the initiative (Gordon & Pedro, 2015, 423). This case is entitled to further scrutiny as it has been claimed that the EP rebellion was an example of normative power in action (Gordon & Pardo, 2015) (Pardo, 2015).

To aid my research into the aforementioned case studies, my primary resources will be EU documents and agreements detailing the facets of trade and cooperation between Israel and the EU, while also considering citing official statements from the Commission and dialogues with the European Parliament (EP) to represent multiple institutions within the EU. Through the examination of various books, journals and articles detailing EU/Israeli relations by way of a normative framework, I will also engage with other interpretations of the topic in question. The research presented in this thesis will not only be an assessment of trade between the EU and Israel, as this is insufficient data to evaluate the possible norms present throughout these interactions. Indeed, to evaluate trade comes with certain biases and interpretations, and runs the risk of creating a limited research. Therefore, a consideration into the political institutions of the EU will also be present. This consideration will be played out in the form of interviews between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and members of the Commission. The conclusion of such interviews is intended to uncover how they interpret and even justify the contradictory nature of the relationship with Israel through discussions of the trade policies mentioned prior. The interviews will also consider how norms and values may influence their decision making in influencing EU external relations and how EU political actors interpret the union’s foreign policy. Doing this will run in conjunction with Manners claims that NPE should also be tested on the grounds that EU political actors adhere to it (Manners, 2008), consciously or not.

The manner in which these interviews were conducted bears great importance. Indeed, there is an intricate balancing act present in attempting to gain fruitful information on the topic in question while also attempting to traverse an issue which has the potential for great

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controversy. The challenge was to ask pressing questions that EU actors are willing to answer while not forcing their silence on the subject of Israel. To alleviate this concern, I adopted a semi-structured interview process. Thus, the interviews in question were not recorded and the possibility of preserving the anonymity of those interviewed was made available. The concealment of the interviewee’s identities contributed to more rewarding and valuable research as political actors are traditionally tempted with greater honesty in answering potentially controversial questions in this format (Seilbergh, 2001, 142).

It should be noted that the validity of semi-structured interviews and the research potential they provide has often been challenged. Indeed, there are some that question whether such methods provide substantial data as interviewee’s biases can potentially misdirect the conversation (Diefenbach, 2009, 891). There is also the looming concern that such an informal method of interview encourages the possibility of becoming a case of journalistic, rather than academic, inquiry (Leech, 2002, 665). However, due to the subject in question, I believe a semi-structured format provided the most fruitful research. It is apparent that Israeli relations with the EU promotes controversy, most predominately due to the lingering question of the Palestinian conflict and the two-state solution. It is due to such controversy that negating to record the interviews and providing anonymity most likely encouraged the EU actors to speak with greater openness without fear of various political consequences and ramifications. In matching my own research of trade between the EU and Israel with interviews of vital political actors, I hope to expand my research to provide a greater insight into the controversial relationship between the EU and Israel and consequently what this means for NPE’s validity.

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3. Literature Review

The conceptualisation of how the EU acts within the international community is a fervently contested topic. It is understandable that a bloc as unique as the EU is would be a hard phenomenon to quantify within international relations, as it is an interdependent set of states with a heavily integrated shared economy though possessing no unified military body. Indeed, its unique domestic facet prompts questions of whether such distinctiveness is seen in its external dealings. It is apparent that the EU’s positioning in world affairs struggles to be adequately assessed in a realist paradigm. For such a theory to rely so heavily on notions of military strength as the primary assessment of state power and traditional assumptions on sovereignty, the EU stands out due to the aforementioned void of military presence and its formulation being predicated on a form of pooled sovereignty.

3.1 Civilian Power Europe and Its Critics

Accepting that the EU poses certain challenges of conceptualisation because of its distinct and non-traditional facets, the question remains as to what sort of power it is in world affairs. Indeed, its distinctive nature is a predominant cause for the civilian power Europe (CPE) narrative. The CPE narrative, first pontificated by Duchêne in the 1970s, has heavily inspired this debate on the conceptualisation of the EU’s world positioning. Indeed, as will be discussed Manners drew heavily from this concept (Manners, 2002, 237). The concept itself states, in its simplest terms, that the EU prioritises: “Low politics, non-state actors, ideational influences, international interdependence etc.” (Orbie, 2006, 124). Though draws criticism for its ambiguous nature (Orbie, 2006, 123). Indeed, Orbie cites how it is not really clear what Duchêne was intending when drawing out the CPE narrative, and most future references to his work has been inferred from others (Orbie, 2006, 124). However, when stating that Duchêne was moving away from realist assumptions of international relations theory (Orbie, 2006, 124), a clearer picture is presented. CPE is an admission of the aforementioned dilemma of how to define such a distinct phenomenon that is the EU. A consequence of the EU’s uniqueness is the inability to categorise it within a traditional international relations framework. Therefore, CPE represents such vagueness. Despite its apparent ambiguity, the legacy of CPE can be seen as prompting interesting questions of what sort of role the EU plays/should play in the world (Orbie, 2006, 126), while also establishing the unique facet to the EU.

In the decades proceeding Duchêne’s attempts of articulating what an integrated Europe truly was, a seismic event would prompt more conceptualisation attempts of the ‘civilian’ power. As

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the Berlin Wall crumbled and the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a general narrative that a new world order was emerging with the US situated as the unchallenged hegemon. As the Cold War was drawing to a close, there were also questions being asked over what role the EU could play in the post-Cold War world. Two key texts that highlight such questions can be found within the works of Bull and Hill. In their seminal papers both ponder the possibilities that the EU could pursue. With Bull primarily discussing the feasibility of a European civilian power (Bull, 1982) and Hill questioning the capabilities that the EU possessed after being unshackled with geographical concerns about an expansionist Russia (Hill, 1993, 306).

Both Bull and Hill are calling into question the academic narrative present throughout the 1970s, pioneered by Duchêne. Indeed, traditional realist assumptions of a state’s military strength being the sole source of international influence were becoming less palpable in international relations discourse (Bull, 1982, 149). If this development in international relations discourse bore validity, it would be understandable that the EU could be categorised as a successful ‘civilian’ power, with its lack of a unified military body while still possessing considerable economic strengths. Both Bull and Hill consider the civilian power narrative (Bull, 1982, 149) (Hill, 1993, 305); however, draw from it a more cynical conclusion. They both assert that the the lack of an EU military is a direct disadvantage for the future of EU international relations. For Bull, civilian power Europe can be accepted but can only become truly apparent if the definition is expanded to accompany military capabilities (Bull, 1982, 155). For Hill, a lack of military and defence reforms will leave the EU incapable of achieving its early post-Cold War ambitions (Hill, 1993, 318). Despite such cynicism clearly present in both texts, they both share the general understanding that the EU is unique in its positioning in world affairs. Hill admits that we must move away from realist assumptions of international relations when considering the EU’s role in the world (Hill, 1993, 308), which suggests a break away from categorising the EU in a traditional realist paradigm. For Bull, despite his pressing for a military facet of the EU, still accepts that the civilian power mantle is achievable following his recommendations (Bull, 1982, 151). Thus, even critics of the rampant idealism during the closing stages of the Cold War consider the peculiarities of the EU’s international positioning. The EU’s hesitant nature of pursuing realist hegemonic goals through military means suggests a departure from traditional assumptions of great power politics, a position that Manners would carry emphatically in his Normative Power Europe concept.

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3.2 Manners and Normative Power Europe

The narrative of a tradition breaking EU is carried by Manners, whose seminal paper in 2002 established the notion of NPE. Manners is also attempting to define what sort of phenomenon the EU is in global politics, distinct from other, more traditional roles of realist hegemons as its power lies in its norm defining capabilities (Manners, 2002, 236) (Manners, 2006, 170). Despite sharing Bull and Hill’s depictions of the EU’s unique mantle (he is writing in direct response to Bull’s paper), he does not see the EU’s lack of traditional state power capabilities as a direct weakness (Manners, 2002, 237). Certainly, he wishes to abandon the debate on the EU’s civilian or military potentials and substitutes such narratives with his own interpretation of EU foreign affairs, Normative Power Europe (Manners, 2002, 238). In its simplest terms, NPE is the concept that states that the EU is an actor that helps to establish norms on the international community (Manners, 2002, 239) (Kavalski, 2013, 251) (Diez, 2013, 194-195). Thus, its power is exercised through the establishing of what is normal in the international community, not through military influence or exertion. However, Manners does not see this as a simple form of soft power. Indeed, he claims that such an ability to define international normality is in fact ‘the greatest power of all’ (Manners, 2002, 253). Thus, unlike the warnings of Bull and Hill, the EU’s position in world affairs is in actuality a great strength according to Manners.

Another vital aspect to Manners’ claims to consider is his own endorsement and pontification of a normative EU. Indeed, Manners is not simply detailing what the EU does, but what it should be doing on the global stage (Manners, 2002, 252-253) (Manners, 2006, 168). This positivist interpretation of the EU’s normative actions can be highlighted when comparing the NPE narrative to other efforts in conceptualising what the EU is. Indeed, compare NPE to Market Power Europe or Europe as Empire arguments and Manners positivism is highlighted further. Damro, when discussing Market Power Europe, describes how as the EU is void of military strength it exerts influence internationally through “economic coercion” (Damro, 2012, 683). The use of the word ‘coercion’ is intentional as it implies forceful persuasion from a hierarchal position. Zielonka endorses such an interpretation to a hyper critical degree, arguing that the EU “imposes…economic and political domination” on weaker countries (Zielonka, 2008, 471). In contrast to these critical evaluations of EU external action, Manners disregards notions of coercion or dominance for the more positive vision of ‘influence’ and ‘norm shaping’ by the EU (Manners, 2002, 249). Manners’ inclusion of the EU’s role in abolishing the death penalty in many countries (Manners, 2002, 251) adds a moral dimension

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to the EU’s actions. It promotes human rights on the grounds that human rights should be respected internationally, not because they elevate EU self-interests. It is evident that Manners, unlike Bull, Hill, Damro or Zielonka, does not wish to critically question the EU’s external dealings; instead, he champions them.

Such a firm endorsement of the EU’s normative actions consequently adds a moral facet to the union’s external dealings. It suggests that the EU should be pursuing a normative agenda on the grounds that it is the morally courageous thing to do. Manners emphasises this through his use of case study to cement his argument for a normative driven EU. He points to the EU’s efforts to have countries follow suit on their abolishment of the death penalty (Manners, 2002, 248). Though this decision was rooted in a growing acceptance of human rights narratives that the death penalty was an unjust measure of punishment (Manners, 2002, 247), it truly becomes a morally charged policy of international abolishment based on Manners’ claim that most EU citizens are unaware of the EU’s attempts at the death penalties abolition (Manners, 2002, 251). If such a statement is to be believed, then a moral paradigm to the EU’s actions can be accepted. If citizens are unaware of such actions, then critical claims that the abolition of the death penalty was part of a strategy for greater political success become invalid. It suggests the EU pushed an agenda that could damage its outer relations on the basis that it was the morally righteous path to follow.

3.3 Critiques of the NPE Concept

The normative power narrative has sparked intense academic discussion on the rationalising of EU external actions, though through his assertions Manners has garnered a wealth of criticism for his idealised conceptualisation of EU foreign policy. Indeed, those still indebted to the classical theories of international relations, most notably realism, have challenged the concept as overtly idealistic and too uncritical (Sjursen, 2006, 173). For Hyde-Price, an open neorealist, he argues that the concept stumbles as it fails to address the anarchistic structure of international affairs and its disregard for hard power (Hyde-Price, 2006, 218). Following this, he also notes NPE’s rose-tinted perception of EU history, arguing that the EU was only able to pursue norms due to its strong alliance with the hegemonic, militarily dominant US (Hyde-Price, 2006, 218). Thus, a key criticism of such a concept is that the EU still has to operate within a realist world that does not share in its optimism. There may be some credence to such claims, one could argue that Manners’ own case study of the death penalty does not remove the realist challenge. True, the EU may have encouraged some countries to abandon capital punishment; though considering how militaristically superior countries such as the US and China are still wedded

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to the process, it suggests only hierarchical positions can encourage an EU adoption. If neorealist factors still drives global politics, this is likely to empower the neo-European empire concept (Zielonka, 2008, 471) over NPE.

However, perhaps the most damning criticism for the NPE concept comes with the issues of self-interest. The EU may wish to remain pertinacious over its normative agenda, though it has been consistently met with accusations that such values are second-tier in its foreign policy objectives (Hyde-Price, 2006, 223) (Pace, 2009, 49) (Pace, 2007, 1048). Indeed, the notion of self-interest in EU external politics does not fit within the NPE paradigm, because as previously stated by Manners, political gain is not the cause of normative expansion (Manners, 2002, 251). The notion that it may be self-interest that truly drives the EU’s international dealings also challenges the moral facet to the concept in question. Indeed, the narrative that the “EU is ‘doing good’ in the international system” (Sjursen, 2006, 171) become less convincing if other, self-prioritising goals are the root cause of action. The suggestion that a state may pertain some core values though are willing to abandon them when convenient or promote them to masquerade other strategic aims have been claimed within realist perspectives of IR (Mearsheimer, 2001, 46–7). Such claims further bolster Hyde-Price’s critique that the EU still has to operate within an anarchic, realist ordering of the international system.

To elaborate on what self-interests are at play in EU external relations policy and the challenge they pose to the NPE concept, it has often been stated that the EU is often willing to relax its views on the upholding of democracy and human rights for economic cooperation (Borzel, 2011, 409) (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2011, 899) (Pace et al., 2009, 8). Indeed, its propensity to overlook the authoritarian conditions of partner countries within the ENP have been well documented. During the Gadhafi reign in Libya, the EU had been accused of establishing a wide gap between rhetoric and practice with the continued cooperation with a human rights abusing regime (Hamood, 2008, 37) (Zafar, 2009, 135). Under Mubarak’s command in Egypt, despite several concerns raised by the European Parliament, state torture was still rampant despite its strong economic ties to the EU (Zafar, 2011, 109-110). It is possible to retort to such accusations of the EU’s morally questionable dealings with authoritarian states. One could feasibly argue that not only is this the reality of the international community, it is also naïve to assume that all the EU’s external policy actions are selfless acts, economic benefits to the Union should also be considered within such cooperation. However, this does not help to alleviate the concerns from a NPE position, as the relationship between authoritarian regimes creates elements of inconsistency within NPE. As previously mentioned,

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Manners’ NPE is not simply a description of what the EU ‘should’ do, it is also a depiction of ‘what’ it is in regards to foreign policy. Therefore, inconsistent norms and values consequently weakens the Manners’ concept.

3.4 American Exceptionalism and NPE as Idealised Self Identification

We see that the NPE concept inspires a wealth of criticism. Despite Manners pontification of the EU as an ideal norm spreading phenomenon, the criticisms of NPE’s inconsistency, thinly veiled self-interests and the realist challenges still linger. These criticisms lead me to argue that the NPE concept is best compared to notions of American exceptionalism, an inconsistent concept that rewards the US with a privileged position of superiority on the world stage. I argue that such comparisons are necessary to the debate on a normative Europe, as both NPE and American exceptionalism best serve as concepts providing a vague form of self-identification rather than an accurate depiction of the external dealings of the EU or US.

American exceptionalism is a three pronged ideology/narrative which depicts the US as superior to all other nations. Its origins are rooted in the myths and legends established during the process of the nation acquiring its independence. Indeed, as noted by Restad, this brand of American uniqueness and exceptionalist rhetoric was first established in the revolutionary wars (Restad, 2012, 57). In successfully vanquishing British rule, this helped start the narrative that there was a unique facet to the American way of governance and society; one that championed freedom, liberty, individualism and democracy. The first new nation (Lipset, 1979), a new city on the hill that was the beacon of what many Americans saw as the ideal model of society. This was carried further in the civil war, which set into the nation’s narrative by Lincoln’s Gettysburg address in which he demanded that the United States’ commitment to republicanism should never diminish (Lincoln, 2009, 75). Thus, highlighting the idea that it was America’s duty to transform the world in its image. Finally, there is the more recent development (only in the post-war period has ‘American exceptionalism’ as a term been used), which is the sense that due to its unique history, the US stands superior to other nations. This three part faceted narrative, heavily interwoven into the nation’s cultural and political shared identity, has often been a justification or at times a rationalising factor in the US’ foreign policy actions (Restad, 2012, 53-54). Indeed, various administrations during the Cold War have been accused of deploying such sentiment to justify at times unilateral action to prevent the spread of communism (Rojecki, 2008, 70). This narrative, in its simplest terms, is the belief that the US is a beacon of exceptionalism that is indebted to expanding such a model across the globe. It matters very little that these exceptional historical events have often been warped

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from their true reality (Steinmo, 1994, 107); the heavily mythicized founding fathers were predominately slave owners for example. However, the societal acceptance of brilliance and exceptionalism still stands firm.

When considering the US exceptionalist narrative/concept, and how this can be used to influence and rationalise US foreign policy decisions on such grounds, I would argue that this same sense of superiority and exceptionalism is found interwoven into the NPE concept. A form of European exceptionalism found at the EU level. Indeed, one could conclude that if the NPE concept truly believes that EU norms are to be spread across the globe, then there is the present belief that these norms and values are superior to other nations’. Though not traditionally perceived as having a ‘unique’ European history, this is rectified by the narrative that the EU is truly unique in its form of governance and this conditionality is sufficient to justify its normative agenda. Such tangible comparisons I believe bolster my claims that NPE is a European exceptionalist doctrine.

However, there are some differences in the narratives on the opposite sides of the Atlantic that need to be addressed. Indeed, American exceptionalism is often considered to be filtered throughout US society, from the public to the political actors and the institutions (Restad, 2012, 55). This bottom-up approach is not seen as apparently with NPE as Manners himself suggests by arguing that the average EU citizen is not likely to be aware of the normative agenda (Manners, 2002, 251). However, I believe the conceptual similarities are still valid, as both researchers of American exceptionalism and Manners infer that such concepts have the power to influence or rationalise the actions of political actors. For those analysing American exceptionalism, there have been claims that the neoconservatives of the Bush administration were heavily influenced by such a US exceptional concept (Drolet, 2010, 555) (Rojecki, 2008, 68) (Fukuyama, 2006, 2). Manners too believes that the NPE concept should be viewed as a catalyst for EU political actors actions, he states its plausibility as a concept should be judged on the extent to which political actors at the EU level practise it (Manners, 2008, 46). These two claims running in parallel with each other help in aiding in the validity of my claims of NPE being depicted as a European form of exceptionalism, despite the lacking bottom-up approach as seen with the US equivalent.

The comparisons hold further when considering the aforementioned criticisms of NPE. Indeed, American exceptionalism can be accused of distorting the realities of US foreign policy, projecting an idealised narrative over an accurate depiction. For example, American exceptionalism would struggle to incorporate itself into the realist actions of the US. Indeed,

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American exceptionalism pertains to morals and good governance rather than cynical aggressions in the name of state security. The morally superior notions of republicanism would also struggle to hold against the accusations of US cooperation with authoritarian states with murky human rights abuses such as Saudi Arabia. It would seem that US exceptionalist and NPE arguments can have accusations of inaccuracy laid against them in equal measure. American exceptionalism, however, has often been accused of historical inaccuracies (Steinmo, 1994) (McDougal, 2012), but this has been retorted with the claims that American exceptionalism is an attempt to depict a form of American identity rather than empirical fact (Kammen, 1993, 6). As noted by Onuf, though advocates of American exceptionalism might fall victim to fetishizing certain periods in US history while conveniently overlooking others, citing slavery as an example, predominant intention of American exceptionalism is to depict and even preserve what it means to be American (Onuf, 2012, 94-96). This notion that a conceptualisation of US foreign policy serves more accurately as an attempt of self-identification for a diverse selection of fifty federal states prompts my final comparison between American exceptionalism and NPE. Both concepts are attempts to formulate some form of identity for the US or EU respectively, thus inconsistencies are to be expected as both are examples of self-identification rather than accurate reflection of the form of power the EU or US is.

3.5 Europe’s Idealised Self-Identification Continued

This depiction of the NPE concept being a method of self-identification over accurate evaluation is not unique to this thesis. Indeed, other critics of Manners’ concepts have drawn similar conclusions, as seen with Cebeci. Her critique levied at NPE, though indeed other aforementioned EU foreign policy concepts such as CPE, is that it serves as a positivist narrative rather than a legitimate and valid depiction of EU action. Cebeci therefore seeks to reduce such concepts to a simple “Ideal Power Europe” depiction (Cebeci, 2012, 563). She argues that any foreign policy research inadvertently results in some form of self-identification narrative, as it is the depiction of “us” against “others” (Cebeci, 2012, 565). This is a logical assumption, in attempting to quantify a nation’s foreign policy action, it will inevitably be compared to the differing aspects of another nations, therefore helping to establish a contrast against the ‘other’. However, if all foreign policy narratives are victim to this, it raises questions on whether NPE and CPE can specifically be faulted for such a consequence if this is the norm within this research field. Cebeci believes so, as attempts at EU external conceptualisation are founded on the claims that the EU actually has a tangible foreign policy while simultaneously

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championing it in a regressive, positivist manner (Cebeci, 2012, 566). This positivist account perpetuated in normative conceptualisations, in Cebeci’s view, also fails empirically as the ‘model’ form of EU governance has failed to resolve major conflicts throughout the world (Cebeci, 2012, 571). Thus, Cebeci attempts to reduce the NPE argument to a simple ‘meta-narrative’ that promotes the EU in an idealistic manner, it serves as a form of positivist self-identification rather than tangible concept that influences world politics (Cebeci, 2012, 582). This contradicts Manners assertions as it suggests that NPE is not a depiction of what the EU ‘is’ and ‘should’ be doing but rather an EU fantasy of idealised self-perception. Such a notion of NPE as a method of EU identity building has been shared among some of its critics, as seen with Diez and Pace who state that NPE “is a discursive construction rather than an objective fact, and that the “power of normative power Europe” rests in the identity it provides for the EU” (Diez & Pace, 2011, 210). In a similar vein to my assertions of AE, NPE does not present fact but rather a narrative that seeks to unify a trade bloc of 28 MS.

Just as American exceptionalism is best portrayed as a form of identification rather than an accurate attempt at US foreign policy conceptualisation, Cebeci and others have also carried such a narrative with their critiques of NPE. Choosing to condemn the concept to being a depiction of how the EU would like to be seen, and thus establishing a diverging doctrine of ‘us’ and ‘others’; rather than the Manners’ claims of NPE’s valid depiction of EU external action. This thesis wishes to expand on the self-identification narrative that the likes of Cebeci have argued in their works. If we are to accept that, due to the NPE’s inaccuracies and inconsistencies, it serves as an attempt to rationalise the complexities of a foreign policy shared by 28 MS, we should also expand this criticism to include a European exceptionalism facet. Indeed, the notion of spreading norms rationally comes from a European perception of superiority, as one would not willingly endorse norms knowing they were inferior. To compare American exceptionalism and NPE also helps to understand the lingering questions of inconsistency and self-interests. As US exceptionalism has a domestic dimension (this being an attempt to unify 50 federal states with a distinct ideology), this helps understand why irregularities in foreign policy are overlooked. It seems identity construction is the greater goal over consistency. As with NPE, Manners argues that the EU mode of governance is distinctly unique (Manners, 2002, 243) and therefore a facet of European identity. Indeed, NPE’s primary need to conceptualise the EU with a unifying foreign policy as a method of identity-building is likely to trump questions of consistency and thinly veiled self-interests.

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As discussed above, there have been the accusations that NPE suffers in its lack of accommodation for realist perspectives of IR. Certainly, it is arguable that NPE cannot exist within the realist doctrine as it challenges such assertions of global affairs and inter-state interaction. Harpaz and Shamis for example, have argued that NPE has to be interpreted as a European form of rationalised realism. Devoid of substantial military means, the EU uses its norm spreading capabilities as a way of pursuing self-interests and material gains (Harpaz & Shamis, 2012, 583). In doing so, they cite the seminal Kagan paper that claims that the EU adopts a process of “multilateralising” the US as a form of constraining it, with their weaknesses in military capabilities and fear of the overarching hegemon being the motive behind such action (Kagan, 2002, 8).

This realist interpretation of the externalisation of norms for material gains has been carried by the likes of Del Sarto, who argues for the notion of a Normative Empire Europe. She believes that if we choose to conceptualise the EU as a form of modern empire (in a similar vein to Zielonka) then we can bridge the gap between NPE and realism (Del Sarto, 2016, 215). The notion of a normative empire might be conceived as a difficult position to defend, though Del Sarto does this through comparisons of the EU to empires of the past. She notes how traditional empires seek to pacify their peripheries and reap economic benefits from their neighbours, even indulging in “civilising missions” due to their own perceived superiority, something she believes the EU is also guilty of (Del Sarto, 2016, 216). Thus, NPE can also be portrayed as a way of justifying the EU’s realist actions in world affairs, which also aligns the concept closer to American exceptionalism again. American exceptionalism does also act as a form of justification for the actions of the US, even if those seem to contradict its more cynical approach to foreign policy, as demonstrated with its notions of defending republicanism while supporting authoritarian regimes.

3.6 Manners’ Response to NPE Criticisms

Manners has not remained silent throughout the critiques of his concept. Indeed, he has revised his position based on criticisms and developments in EU policy. Though not directly responding to Hyde-Price, Manners does seem to somewhat tackle the realist challenge to NPE through reflections on the militarisation of the EU. Indeed, he is sceptical that a more militarised Europe, effectively symbolising a return to the a 19th century ‘great power’, challenges the legitimacy of a normative-driven Europe (Manners, 2006, 182-183). He even suggests that bolstering military capabilities would risk being a betrayal of the peace acquiring reasoning behind the formulation of an integrated Europe (Manners, 2006, 183). He notes how

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some of the recent developments within EU perceptions of human rights, such as a focus on human security assurances justifying intervention, are problematic to the NPE cause (Manners, 2006, 192). Thus, Manners is suggesting that NPE cannot run in conjunction with a realist-driven EU, with its normative agenda being challenged by a desire to become more militarily robust. This may not satisfy the claims that NPE has to operate within a realist international community as Manners is arguably agreeing with the sentiment that this is impossible. However, within his paper he does incrementally quell the aforementioned accusations that his concept is too idealistic and does not allow for necessary critical evaluation. Indeed, he claims that a greater military presence within the EU can only be justified if it is accompanied by increased scrutiny and reflection (Manners, 2006, 183). It should also be noted that the previously apparent idealism seen within his first NPE papers has diminished as he raises concerns that on its current trajectory the EU has diverged from its normative path (Manners, 2006, 194-195).

Despite efforts from Manners to re-evaluate the concept within a new decade of EU external relations, his relative silence on one of the most damning criticisms of his NPE narrative raises concerns. Indeed, when trying to suggest improvements to the concept in question, he endorses a closer examination at the differing institutional levels that NPE is played out, from the state to non-state actors (Manners, 2013, 321). He has also called for greater reflection on what the EU is and what it does for a more robust normative conceptualisation of the bloc (Manners, 2006, 180). However, his lack of a response to the criticism that the EU at times shelves its normative agenda when dealing with authoritarian regimes for economic benefits and cooperation is concerning. He addresses that the ENP is a contradictory policy, with imbalance between practice and principle with regards to the upholding of values such as democracy and human rights (Manners, 2010, 30). However, his response is far from satisfactory, arguing that the ENP should be best analysed through a normative lens without articulating a valid retort to how NPE matches EU dealings with autocratic regimes (Manners, 2010, 44). If NPE is a concept intent on conceptualising what the EU does in its external dealings, though does not run in conjunction with how the EU acts, it ceases to be a valid concept. There may be a retort to be found within the NPE that NPE is a method of gradual and incremental change through persuasion, seeing that Manners is rejecting the coercion of market power Europe and political domination of the Europe as an empire narrative. Indeed, to enforce EU rule of law on neighbouring countries may be effective in norm spreading though would most likely symbolise the actions of a hegemon, an idea Manners is keen to reject within his NPE argument.

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This still may fail to convince, as inconsistencies with the normative agenda has the potential to condemn the concept to simple rhetoric devoid of evidential practice. Such inconsistencies may also bolster the realist conceptions of NPE as self-interests trumping norms and values damage the NPE perceptions of the EU and suggests it operates in a manner mimicking hegemonic powers.

Despite the retorts from Manners, it is apparent that the NPE concept has a wealth of challenges to traverse to gain validity. Questions of consistency between rhetoric and practice remain which could encourage the disregarding of the concept. Following this, there are also arguments which depict NPE as an idealistic narrative that observes the EU external actions through a rose-tinted framework. It is clear, however, that norms and values are still a facet of EU governance, and so it cannot be completely thrown out as an inadequate conceptualisation of European dealings with neighbouring countries. It is therefore necessary to test this concept through an examination of the EU’s relations with Israel to further progress the debate on the validity of the NPE concept and whether it is more accurately described as an effort to build an identity I have considered a European exceptionalism.

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4. The History of EU/Israeli Relations

As this thesis progresses, it is necessary to provide insight on the history of the relations in question, detailing the often fluctuating and at times volatile EU-Israel affairs. To provide a robust overview it may be tempting to span back towards the early periods of the state’s creation with the Balfour Declaration, this being a statement by the British Prime Minister in 1917 that the Palestinian region should be gifted to the Jewish people so that they may have a homeland. However, starting from the beginnings of the Israeli state would be casting too wide a net as that this does not grant us much insight into European relations to Israel as the integrated European community would not be formed until another world war had concluded. Thus, I begin in the late 1950s, when the formation of an integrated European was starting to be established.

4.1 The Seventh Potential Member State of 1957

Although now one could argue that Israel’s strongest international ally would be that of the US as the hegemon has supplied more military aid to Israel than any other state since WW2 (Sharp, 2013, 1), their strong relations were not always so tangible. Indeed, when European integration was in its early fruition, Israel thought their destiny was to be found within the new emerging European bloc. As noted by Pardo, before the Six-Day War would unfold and with an Israeli state desperate to seek legitimacy and security from its hostile neighbours, there was a fervent desire evident from the Israeli government to join the European Economic Community (Pardo, 2015, 22). He points towards a 1957 memo that was presented to Israeli cabinet ministers which stressed the need to join the European project as no other state, including the US, sympathised with their security concerns (Pardo, 2015, 24). This is certainly significant moment in EU-Israel relations, it both details a clear desire within EU-Israel to shift towards Europe while shedding light on how far relations have regressed when considering the recent claims of Israeli minister Bennett to cut all economic ties to the EU (Lis, 2013).

4.2 The Six Day War and the Establishment of Contested Borders

The infamous conflict of 1967, in which the state of Israel declared war on its neighbouring countries of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, is a necessary consideration as the consequences of such a war ignited the controversies of Israel’s true borders and the two-state solution (Newman & Yacobi, 2014, 176). Due to heightening tensions that were never truly quelled following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel pre-emptively launched an unexpected attack against its neighbouring states. The result of such an attack concluded with Israel successfully acquiring

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the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. The political implications of this war bear great significance to this discussion. Not only did the Israeli military success grant the state with new, larger borders, it dispelled many Palestinians who fled (Cooley, 1984, 13) while also encouraging the start of the Israeli settlement process in the West Bank. Due to the Israeli governments desire to cement a cultural foothold in the newly acquired territories, they sought to establish Israeli settlements in the region to increase the population and limit the possibility of losing the territory (Hauswaldt, 2003, 602).

Such an event was also detrimental to the relationship between Israel and the EC. The perceived act of Israeli aggression led to the deterioration of the special relationship between France and Israel, encouraging the French to veto the European Commission’s attempt at formulating a new Israeli trade deal (Pardo & Peters, 2012, 72). It also exposed the lack of a unified foreign policy within the EEC as the community failed to release a joint statement on the event due to MS either condemning or supporting Israel’s actions (Pardo & Peters, 2012, 73). Over time, however, a more tangible EU position has prevailed as evidenced by the common position for the desired return to the pre-1967 borders (Green line) (European External Action Service, 2016b). Indeed, not only have EU foreign officials decried further settlement plans and reiterated calls for a return to the pre-1967 borders (Haartez, 2011), such rhetoric has also been exercised in policy with various EU trade guidelines which respect the Green line (European Commission, 2015) (European External Action Service, 2013). The significance of such a war cannot be overlooked, it is the catalyst event that cemented the contradictory position of the EU, wanting to achieve the two-state solution while also not risking the damaging of EU relations with a strong ally.

4.3 Europe’s Involvement in the Middle Eastern Peace Process and the Election of Hamas in 2006

In 1977, the London Declaration helped to solidify the EEC’s position that the Palestinian people had the right to a homeland, signifying the complex, double-faceted nature of Israeli relations. Following this, the Venice Declaration of 1980 further cemented the EEC’s commitment to the cause of an eventual sovereign Palestinian state. The declaration would state that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), would have to be associated within the negotiations for a lasting peace (European Economic Community, 1980, 7). The Venice Declaration also asserted that the EEC’s extensive ties to the region rewarded the Community with a ‘special role’ in the peace process (European Economic Community, 1980, 2), establishing a narrative that it was the EEC’s duty to bring about peace within the region.

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Though there are accusations that the declaration was in truth a case of EEC self-aggrandisement rather than necessary progress in the conflict (d'Alancon, 1994, 43), this was still a matter of high politics due to the subsequent diplomatic fall-out with Israel. The Israeli position following the declaration was one of fervent disdain towards the EEC’s actions, stating that not since “Mein Kampf was written have more explicit words been said…about the desire for the destruction of the Jewish state and nation” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980, 160). Though this may have had a minimal impact in the actual solving of the conflict, the memory of the Venice Declaration would contaminate relations between Israel and the EEC. Indeed, it acted as a catalyst for ever worsening tensions as Europe’s position on Palestinian self-determination grew in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the handling of the First Intifada in the 1980s. Such a position being evidenced by the European Council’s statement in which they spite the invasion of Lebanon with “vigorous condemnation” while also insisting that Palestinian self-determination were “legitimate aspirations” (European Council, 1982, 169-170).

Despite the challenging period of the 1980s, the demise of the Cold War reinvigorated hopes for a resolution to the conflict. Indeed, as the bipolar nature of the international system had drawn to a close, US hegemony in the region demonstrated by the first Gulf War encouraged the belief that cooperation with Arab states would result in the two-state solution (Müller, 2012, 40). Symbolic (though not tangible) progress had been made with the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991, however the Oslo Accords of 1993 bolstered hopes for peace further. Following secret negotiations in Oslo, diplomatic efforts resulted in the PLO recognising Israel’s right to exist, while the PLO was also granted the recognition that it was the official representatives of the Palestinian people and therefore a part of the ongoing peace process (Soetendorp, 2002, 287). This also led to the formulation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), tasked with minor governance duties of the West Bank and Gaza strip. These limited powers were intended as the initial steps towards building a Palestinian state, following the logic that if the PA could manage such Palestinian affairs then the calls for a sovereign state would be ever more valid (Bouris, 2010, 383). Though this was primarily a US-backed initiative, the EU did encourage some form of influence in the process due to its healthy financial contributions to the Palestinian cause (Soetendorp, 2002, 288). Indeed, following the signing of the Accords the EU pledged an immediate 55 million European Currency Units (the precursor to the Euro) with a pledge for a further 500 million over the next five years in aid to the OTs (d'Alancon, 1994, 41).

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As the initial optimism of Oslo quickly faded with the election of Netanyahu and his acceleration of settlement expansion, the EU’s political influence in the region grew. As noted by Müller, the EU made great progress in taking a more critical line of Israeli policy while also reigniting the stalled peace process with the EU’s special envoy in the region (Müller, 2012, 43-44). Signifying a move from the mere financial to the political influencer within Israel and Palestine. The EU would also further reiterate its position on the Palestinian’s right of self-determination following the Berlin Declaration of 1999, which stressed the importance of Palestinian sovereignty would ensure Israeli security in the region and the EU’s willingness to recognise a Palestinian state (European Parliament, 1999). The declaration in question signalled the increase in political involvement of the EU within the conflict. The EU’s political commitments would become more palpable following the Second Intifada and the EU’s formal inclusion with the diplomatic Quartet tasked with mediating the peace process (Newman & Yacobi, 2008, 183).

Following the promoted position of the EU within the conflict, violence between Israel and the Palestinians substantially intensified in September 2000. Named the Second Intifada, as it was the second attempted Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation. This was a bloody conflict that resulted in the deaths of around 3000 Palestinians and 1000 Israelis over the course of five years (BBC News, 2005). The cause of such an outbreak in violence has been debated, with the traditional wisdom being that Israeli politician Ariel Sharon provocatively entering the Holy Mount with 1000 armed escorts, sparking Palestinian outrage, was the predominate cause of violence (Pressman, 2003). However, there has been suggestions that this was also due to Palestinian dissatisfaction with the lack of action after the Oslo Agreement matched with the then PA President Arafat believing that violence would strengthen the Palestinians position (Pressman, 2003). Whatever the catalyst for the Intifada, the event further increased the EU’s involvement with the peace process. Indeed, the EU made numerous efforts to encourage an end to the violence, and subsequently hardened their rhetoric towards the 1967 borders with the Seville Declaration (Bouris, 2014, 53). Following this, the EU also constructed the ‘Roadmap towards Peace’, which was tasked with pacifying Israeli-Palestinian relations and was adopted by the Quartet (Bouris, 2014, 53). Not only did this further legitimise the EU’s role within the region, it also laid the groundwork towards Palestinian democracy in the OTs, with the Roadmap serving as the precursor to the 2006 Palestinian elections (Bouris, 2014, 54). 2006 marks another key event in the EU’s turbulent history with Israel and Palestine. Primarily due to the efforts of EU driven democratisation, elections were held for the legislature of the

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Palestinian National Authority for the first time. Though there was initial optimism that new ground had been made for the likelihood of a two-state solution, such hopes were quickly diminished following the result. The unexpected electoral victory for Hamas, an organisation deemed terroristic by both the EU and the US (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2017) (European Council, 2017), led to a crisis as Israel and its European partners did not recognise the newly formed government (Usher, 2006, 30). Though this event was a primarily Palestinian affair, it is a significant moment within the discussion of normative power in practice. Indeed, there were claims that to ignore a democratic result was within direct violation of normative values (Pace, 2007, 1044). Claims that were amplified further by the EU’s decision to freeze funding to the territories in response to Hamas’ unexpected success (Pace, 2009, 46). Such actions did little to allay the accusations that the EU in truth favoured stability over democracy despite its fervent declarations of being a democratic promoter for Palestine. Such an event is worthy of consideration as it demonstrates how the normative concept has been consistently challenged by the EU relations within the region.

Following the troubles caused by the Palestinian elections, the US was keen to reignite the peace process in 2007 with the ‘West Bank First Initiative’. The Initiative was an attempt to isolate Hamas by consolidating power with Palestinian representatives that the West deemed more acceptable (Bouris, 2015, 112). This consequently led to the separation of Gaza and the West Bank as the international community funded the Fatah-led West Bank while leaving Gaza boxed in due to Israel’s various blockades (Bouris, 2015, 113). Such a development weakened the likelihood of a two-state solution, as the different territories of Palestine became ever more divided, especially with the West Bank undergoing some form of state building from the international community while Gaza remained isolated. The situation in Gaza has become more detrimental following the three wars that have occurred since the election of Hamas in 2006. The first took place in late 2008, during which Israel responded to Hamas rocket strikes within Gaza by an intense offensive which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,400 Palestinians (Levy, 2010, 386). Israel offensives in the region would reoccur in both 2012 and 2014, the last of which also involved predominately civilian causalities (Bouris, 2015, 111). Thus, despite clear efforts from the EU to promote state building in the Palestinian territories, this has come to little avail as the situation in Gaza stifles the possibility of a united, sovereign Palestinian state.

To exacerbate matters further, Israeli nationalist sentiment has been a growing phenomenon since the Hamas election. Indeed, Israel has been described as developing a “siege mentality”

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due to the interpretation that the international communities disdain for the occupations is a direct threat to Jewish identity (Gordon, 2012, 351). In part, this has been driven by the Israeli government’s dramatic swing to the right in recent years (Gordon, 2012, 351). This right-wing surge was further evidenced in the aftermath of the 2016 elections, as Netanyahu’s new coalition was described as the most right-wing in the country’s history following the appointment of ‘ultranationalist’ Avigdor Lieberman as defence minister (Beaumont, 2016). Thus, the possibility of the two-state solution becomes ever more distant due to issues found both domestically and internationally as the EU and others have not successfully initiated sufficient developments while the Israeli government becomes ever more nationalistic.

4.4 Israeli Trading with the EEC

When evaluating the history of relations between the state of Israel and the EU, it would be accurate to state that trade is the most palpable area of cooperation. Indeed, the EU is currently Israel’s largest trading partner (European External Action Service, 2016). Thus, it is necessary to evaluate how such commerce has transpired and evolved through the years. Israel was always eager to trade with Europe, partially driven by the Arab states boycott of Israel throughout the 1940s, leaving the country economically isolated (Langer, 1982, 64). Negotiations in the early 1960s led to the liberalisation of certain minor goods such as fruits justified on the belief that Israel was similar to a European country due to its living standards and democratic principles (Langer, 1982, 66-67). It should also be noted that due to EEC capabilities of the time, trade was the primary method of influence in the Middle-Eastern region. Indeed, due to the hegemons of the Cold War still challenging each other through realist methods of power, a limited ECC could only make its mark economically, thus trade with Israel was the predominate form of cooperation (Harpaz & Shamis, 2010, 584-585). It has been noted that trade between the EEC and Israel during the 1960s had a limited economic benefit for either partners, though it was of great political importance to Israel. Indeed, despite the minimal commerce during this period, it demonstrated closer ties to the EEC which was a primary target for the Israeli government (Schweitzer, 1964, 30).

Closer economic ties would be progressed further in 1975 when Brussels and Jerusalem would finalise the first free-trade agreement between Israel and the EEC. Such an agreement was intended to remove all trade barriers between the EEC and Israel (European Economic Community, 1975). The accord had significant implications for Israeli agriculture as it removed many of the tariffs on Israeli produced fruit and vegetables (Langer, 1982, 79). The establishment of the free-trade agreement was another tangible demonstration of further

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economic cooperation between Israel and the EEC, however, this period also saw the emergence of new political challenges. Indeed, after the agreement was signed, France and Italy began pressuring the other MS to have a unified position on the Palestinian question (Pardo & Peters, 2012, 76). Such a stance would evolve into the London Declaration of 1977, which stated that peace in the region could be met with the ‘legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for the Palestinian people.’ (European Council, 1990, 93). Such economic and political developments unfolding in conjunction highlight the complexities of the European-Israeli relationship; a drive for closer economic cooperation matched with the ever-lingering Palestinian question.

As a result of the 1975 Free-Trade Agreement, Israeli dependency on the EEC trade would gradually increase. Between 1975 and 1983, for example, around 40% of all Israeli imports originated from the EEC (Müller, 2012, 37). However, the EEC’s commitment to the Palestinian cause would stifle the possibility of significantly increased trading relations between Israel since the 1975 agreement. This was highlighted in the late 1980s when the European Parliament threatened to withhold funds granted in the 1975 accord following Israel’s decision to close Palestinian universities situated in the West Bank (Müller, 2012, 37). Demonstrating how the Palestinian question continued to run in parallel and influence EEC-Israel economic relations. However, in 1991 suggestions of a closer economic bond between the EEC and Israel was reasserted following the suggestions of Gianni De Michelis, the EC President of the Troika at the time. She stated that Israel should be considered a member of the European Economic Area to strengthen ties and to provide a greater incentive for Israel to commit wholeheartedly to the Middle Eastern Peace Process (Del Sarto & Tovias, 2001, 62). Though this was rejected by the Commission, who did not want to be portrayed as picking favourites amongst it Mediterranean allies, it did encourage the declaration that the 1975 Trade Agreement should be upgraded (Del Sarto & Tovias, 2001, 62). Thus, preparation for the EU-Israel Association Agreement, a facet of the ambitious European-Mediterranean Project was underway.

4.5 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Israeli Association Agreement of 1995 In 1995, with Spain helming the EU presidency, efforts were made in Barcelona to create a greater political and economic dialogue with countries in the Mediterranean. The project to emerge from such dialogues was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). This was an incredibly ambitious project due to the political complexities in the partnered region (Asseburg,

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2003, 174). The EMP possessed three key objectives when introduced; the first being to promote stability and peace within the traditionally turbulent region, therefore bolstering some normative ambitions. The second, the eventual establishment of a free-trade area in the Mediterranean, cited as a construction of an area of shared prosperity. And finally, focusing on the growth and development of civil society for the eventual rapprochement of peoples and cultures. Despite good intentions and clear ambitions, the EMP has often been cited as a failure in retrospect (Attinà, 2003, 182) (Asseburg, 2003) (Youngs, 2015), however, the policy was significant as it further strengthened relations between the EU and Israel. Indeed, Israel was one of the fist partner countries to sign up to the ambitious project in 1995, eventually cementing the infamous and controversial Association Agreement that would come into force in 2000.

A trade agreement vital to this debate of NPE is the Association Agreement signed between the EU and Israel that became enforced in 2000. Such a deal liberated trade between the two economic partners, predominately in the field of agriculture, while also providing the legal framework for political and economic cooperation between Israel and the EU (European Commission, 2017c). The agreement in question bears great significance as it perfectly encapsulates the tension between EU normative claims and economic wants due to the document’s glaring contradictions. It is clear that the agreement pertains to some normative value. Indeed, Article 2 of the agreement indebt the Israeli state to uphold democratic principles and human rights, considering them “essential” facets of this accord (European Communities, 2000, 4). However, a confliction emerges due to the document’s ambiguity of the borders of Israel. The agreement does not specify what the borders of Israel are (Sadeh, 2004, 35), despite the EU often calling for a reversal to the pre-1967 borders. This cemented relations with Israel into one formed between normative values and a legitimising as well as upholding of the status quo that directly contradicts the NPE concept.

4.6 EU-Israel Technical Arrangement of 2005

This development was an attempt to tackle the issue of trade coming out of the OTs. The arrangement in question states that: “Products produced in the Israeli settlements located within the territories brought under Israeli administration since June 1967 are not entitled to benefit from preferential tariff treatment under the EU-Israel Association Agreement” (European Commission, 2005, 1). In essence this commits Israel to a labelling process in which products emerging from the OTs are clearly classified to avoid tariff free-benefits. This can be seen as a normative attempt to reinstate the EU’s commitment to the pre-1967 border conditions, though