1
Leiden University
Faculty of Social and Behavioural Science
MSc in Political Science
Master Thesis
Political space for poverty reduction: a case study on Senegal
Submitted by: Federico Cavadi S2108313
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Introduction
At the national level, decentralisation policies and redistributive land reforms (Deininger, 2003; UN-DESA, 2005; Cotula, 2004, 2009) are generally evoked as a crucial element in the way to the reduction of poverty. Decentralization policies are supposed to bring central governments closer to the people, to make them more reachable and accountable, to strengthen popular control over policy-makers and decision-making process; on the other hand, land reforms redistribute and secure land access providing poor with their own livelihood. At the same time, their actual effectiveness is still debated (Crook, 2003, Herring, 2003, Vedeld, 2003). The aim of this work is to address decentralisation and land reform for the case of Senegal.
To asses these policies, I resort to a recent approach claiming the need for a more political analysis of poverty reduction. This approach moves from the limits of econometric and purely institutional studies, to provide a different assumption of poverty as power inequalities, lack of participation and rights and highlights the role of poor people and the relations among local actors in the actual implementation of poverty reduction interventions. The concept of political space used in this analysis provide a valuable analytical tool which allows to address these policies not only in their immediate institutional dimension but also by providing a closer insight of social and political dynamics that might hamper poor to emerge from their condition. Senegal was chosen because of its long-lasting commitment to both these policies. Short after its independence in 1960, an innovative land reform has been introduced, establishing democratic elected rural council titled to manage land (re)-allocation, abolishing the traditional rights and aimed to redistribute the land among rural peasants, in order to keep it productive. This reform takes hold with two successive decentralisation reforms in 1972 and in 1996. Moreover, rural society in Senegal is composed of powerful actors as rural and religious elites and their relations with poor people are crucial elements in the implementation of these policies. Senegal case study allows to assess these policies by taking
3 into account political and social dynamics involved in their implementation and it represents a notable example to understand the actual functioning of these politics in West-African context.
Research question and research objectives
The aim of this work is to assess to what extent national policies favoured or constrained the reduction of poverty. To what extent decentralisation policy and land reform have benefited poor and reduced poverty in Senegal? In this thesis, to answer this question, I use a political approach to investigate poverty reduction. In this framework, the reduction of poverty is not merely the reallocation of resources, but it is also the shifting of power relations within which poor people are embedded (Hickey and Braking, 2005: 851). Then, reducing poverty means strengthening social and political power of poor and popular agencies, their participation in the policy-making process concerning them (Friedman, 1995; Narayan, 2002; Sen, 1981, 1991; Webster and Engberg-Pedersen 2002). I argue that such power shift can take place when a political space emerges, a space that can be controlled, contested, used by poor to pursue and defend their interest. Institutional channels that involve poor people in the decision-making process, political and social practices that foster participation and mobilise poor people are two crucial dimensions of the political space, analysed in this thesis.
Land reforms and especially decentralisation policies are generally designed to increase political participation and government’s accountability, to alter the political landscape and the power relations it underpins. This study suggests that while the focus on institutions is welcome, the way in which key subaltern actors, as local politicians, elites operates within this space may compromise even the best designed policies.
4 Thus, a political assessment is crucial to shed light on the factors that influence national policies for poverty reduction, since it provides a more comprehensive understanding of political dynamics that promote or reduce the effectiveness of these interventions.
Theoretical framework
From numbers and institutions to agents and participation.
The dominant approaches to poverty reduction are largely focused on institutions and policy design as central momentum of the fight against poverty. The authors find that a “pro-growth policy package”, (Lopez, 2004: 18) made of macroeconomics stability and trade openness, has a positive impact on poverty reduction (Dollar et al. 2002, 2016; Fosu, 2017); other scholars suggest that policies should boost to a pro-poor growth reducing income inequality (Ravillion, 2001; Ravallion and Chen, 2003), or remove the barriers “that prevent the poor from participating in markets” (Cooney and Willams Shanks, 2010: 29).
These approaches bring two potential shortcomings. Empirically, these studies, especially econometric ones, make a widespread use of indicators (GDP, GDP per capita, income per capita etc.) based on data – national account – and dataset that are very likely to be inaccurate and misleading. (Blades, 1980; Devarajan, 2013; Jerven, 2013; Young, 2012). Thus, a “[GDP] increase of 3 percent might mean anything from no growth at all to an increase of 6 percent” (Blades, 1980: 70) and designing policies might do little or nothing to counter poverty.
A second limit comes from the ontological assumptions about poverty, which are largely ahistorical and decontextualized (Green, 2006; Green and Hulme, 2005). These studies mostly rely on economic and income-based measurement of poverty, where poverty is defined as the inability to attain a minimal standard of living (Lipton and Van der Gaag, 1993: 33; Malick, 1998: 11 – 12; Samuah and Wiafe, 2015: 11) and poor as those “unable to feed and clothe themselves properly”
5 (Dixon and Macarov, 1998: 1). Recent multidimensional indicators, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), include “gross national income per capita [that] reflects the ability to achieve a decent standard of living (UNDP, 2016: 3). Even the Multidimensional Poverty index that should capture nonincome dimension of poverty finally fall within this ontological assumption, since its six “living standard” indicators “are likely to be correlated with consumption or income” (Ravallion, 2010) In turn, poverty reduction is simply “the consequence of economic policies and the productive strategies of individuals and households, with poverty as a state into which people fall and from which they can be lifted if their incomes increase.” (Green and Hulme, 2005: 687). Lipton’s Urban bias theory (1977) and Bates’ studies (1981, 1983) on African agriculture started highlighting political and social struggles that underlie policy intervention. Especially, they point out how the state and the market exploit and extract resources from the rural classes in favours of cities and urban population, where political power is concentred. Lipton (1977: 328–40) argue that Poverty reduction policies should be oriented to invert this trend, facilitating land-to-the-tiller reforms, agrarian reforms and allocating more resources to the productive small farmers. Bates (2007; Bates and Block, 2013) argues that democratic institutions may stop this dynamic. In a democratic environment, rural dwellers represent a big part of popular vote and so of democratic power. Therefore, politicians and elites have an incentive to design policies closer to farmers and poor’s interests (Bates, 2007; Bates and Block, 2013).
On a similar vein, Mosley (2012) and Khoo (2012) have underlined the role of elite’s commitment in poverty eradication. Mosley argued that political elites pursuing pro-poor policies open to a virtuous cycle that enhances both governmental stability and poor’s life conditions. Khoo stressed that state and elites’ ideological commitment to anti-poverty goals were essential to define the “policy configuration” that sustained economic growth, development and poverty decline in Malaysia.
6 This research enlightens the political interaction among different powerful groups and poverty. Their recommendations for reforms are nevertheless institutional “in the sense that they address themselves to an altering of the policy-induced incentive structures and institutional framework” (Martinussen, 1997: 138). These approaches have some limitations. For example, because of the power that lies behind ‘the land’ in rural areas, land-to-the-tiller reforms or others pro-poor reforms might have to face the resistance of local elites and landlords. Thus, shaping these reforms becomes more the result of political struggles than an institutional outcome, where the participation of mobilised peasants’ movements is a critical element (Herring, 2003; Veltmeyer, 1997). Moreover, as argued by Teichman (2012), by presenting institutions as “autonomous forces producing path-dependent sequences that shape action and therefore outcome” (Teichman, 2012: 4), scholars overlook that these same institutions are manipulated and distorted by powerful social forces for their own interest, with sensitive implications for the distributive outcome. In this context, poverty is rather the consequence of power inequalities, poor people are active agents, (Hickey, 2005; Teichman, 2012; Webster and Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2002) and the politics of poverty reduction should aim at shifting power relations in which poor people are embedded (Hickey, 2005: 851). Consequently, more ‘politics’ is still needed. More ‘politics to deeply understand the political dynamics of poverty reduction and especially the role played by subaltern actors and the way in which they may promote or constraint a shift in power relations in favour of the poor. this approach is also a reflection of changes in the interpretation of participation within development and politics of poverty reduction. Participation is increasingly associated and linked to citizenship, democratic governance and decentralisation (for an overview see Hickey and Mohan, 2013: 3 – 24; Laderchi, 2001). Broadly, the concept of participation has been closely related to a simple mechanism of consultation, in which people are more or less simple ‘choosers’, in the sense that their only power was to accept or refuse predetermined governments programmes, defined in partnership with international development institutions. Concurrently, the concept of citizenship has been the
7 expression of a liberal and individualist tradition in which people, as users of a service, are provided with an equal set of rights and responsibilities bestowed by the state (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000: 53 - 56, Gaventa, 2004). Even when a strong participatory rhetoric was employed, as in the case of World Bank’s Social Investments Founds (SIFs) or the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs), they reported the same barriers to participation and lack of access to interested communities (Brock et al., 2001: 15).
The recent frame (Cornwall, 2002; Coelho et al., 2002; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; McGee et al., 2003) stresses instead an inclusive dimension of both participation and citizenship, where people, as citizens, are entitled to the right to get involved, to act (Lister, 1998: 228). This link among participation, citizenship and the political arena represent a critical point in this understanding of poor people: no longer as users or choosers of interventions and projects made by others, but as active “makers and shapers” (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2000). Scholars showed that when claims are (re)framed in terms of citizenship – thus, as a right – this shift has proven to be crucial in claiming economic, social and political changes (Grugel and Piper, 2009: 89; Grugel and Nem Singh, 2015: 354; Grugel, 2003)
Participation, power and political space
As argued by Grugel et al. (2017: 10, 189), the politics of the marginals involves a process of (re)claiming power since most of the inequalities in the contemporary world are rooted in power relations. Current approaches are paying closer attention to the power and political relations that fill participatory spaces for development, introducing the concepts of “political space” or “policy spaces” (Brock et al., 2001, Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Cornwall and Coelho, 2006; Gaventa and Barret, 2012; McGee, 2004; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). With these concepts, these authors refer to the spaces where poor people, or actors on their behalf, can exercise a participatory political agency. In defining these spaces, these scholars move away from the main criticism in the participation approaches to poverty reduction and development, which is the
8 tendency to treat the sites where participation take place as self-evident and unproblematic categories (Brock et al., 2001; Cornwall, 2002; Hickey and Mohan, 2004).
These studies are largely informed by French post-war social theories, especially the work of Foucault (1975, 1978, 1982) and Lefebvre (1974) on power and space and how political and social relations are produced and reproduced in the space. For Foucault, power is not simply a “group of institutions and mechanisms”, instead it is rooted in all social relations, it is “the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them” (Foucault, 1978: 92). In his work The Production of Space, Henri Lefebvre claims: “(Social) space is a (social) product […], a means of domination and power. […] Space contains social relations, […] [it] is not a collection of things, a sum of fact, a filled void (Lefebvre, 1974: 35 – 36; my
transl.)”. The creation of new participatory institutions is not immune to power, political and social
relations existing in a society. This is not intended to deny the importance of such institutions but rather requires taking into account the presence of such relations in the analysis of these same institutions (Foucault, 1982: 790). These power relations define the boundaries of this space setting that can join them, what is possible to do with and within them (Gaventa, 2006: 26).
Democratisation processes and decentralisation reforms are key political processes that may shape the political space. Studies have shown that democratic regimes are better than nondemocratic regimes in improving the welfare of the poor (Moon and Dixon, 1985; Przeworski et al. 2000). Furthermore, contrary to a conventional wisdom (Barro, 1996: 204; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005: 79; Lipset, 1963: 31), recent research shows that poor people are as willing as any other citizen to participate to democratic activity and equally imbued with democratic values (Krishna, 2008a, 2008b; Krishna and Booth 2008). For example, in his analysis on poverty and democratic citizenship in sub-Saharan Africa, Bratton (2008) finds that poverty “is actually positive for several important aspects of political participation” (Bratton, 2008: 63).
9 The link between decentralisation and poverty reduction is nonetheless ambiguous. Empirical evidences show weak correlations and general scepticism (Crawford, 2008; Crawford and Hartmann, 2008; Hiskey and Seligson, 2003; Khan, 2013). In fact, the lack of real commitment by the government (Blair, 1997; Crook, 2003), patronage logic within the state, bureaucracy and political parties (Vedeld, 2003: 178; Mathew, 1996: 142), elite co-optation and control at local level (Blair, 2000: 25; Crook and Manor, 1998) might perpetuate existing poverty condition. Conversely, focusing on the power and political dimension of poverty reduction might bring some positive results. Manor (1997) finds that the creation of elective local body increases people’ power position. In his fieldwork study on Ghana, Crawford (2008: 63), whilst concluding that decentralisation had a limited general impact, finds that it helped people to be more aware of their rights, to come together and organise themselves. All things considered, as argued by Khan (2013: 165), notwithstanding the contradiction between theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, decentralisation and poverty reduction have intimately linked each other.
In this context, the role of civil society cannot be neglected. Civil society is often indicated as an autonomous space where non-state actors operate strengthening political participation, democracy and development (Fykuyama, 2001, Putnam, 1993; Sklar, 1987). In the African context, civil society may perform several functions including the limitation of the power of the state and its abuse, promoting civic engagement, monitoring human rights and incorporating marginal groups in the political process (Diamond, 1997: 24). Notwithstanding this crucial task, the actual role played by civil society in Africa is far from be clear. Some scholars argue that civil society has been effective in bringing social and political change (Diamond, 1997; Makumbe, 1998: 307), others claim that it barely exists (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Haberson et al., 1994; Hearn, 2001). Senegal seems to be closer to this second option: while some restricted social groups – the Muslim brotherhood – acquired enough organisational strength and autonomy to bargain and engage political relations with the central state (Bayart, 1986: 115; O’Brien, 1989: 187 - 188), the majority
10 of the population are still marginalised and unorganised (O’ Brien, 1986: 83; Patterson, 1998: 439-441).
The general argument that brings together poverty reduction, participation and decentralisation has been clearly resumed by Blair (2000). Through decentralisation policies, the governments come close to the people, which in turn acquire a significant voice in the decision-making process (empowerment). Local policies are now the expression of the need of people and results in more appropriate interventions, better living and economic condition. “These improvements will then reduce poverty and enhance equity among all groups” (Blair, 2000: 23).
In this analysis, the concept of ‘political space’ relates to the work of Webster and Lars Engberg-Pedersen (2002) which provides a valuable analytical tool to assess poverty reduction through a political approach. Scholars identify three different dimensions: institutional channels; political
discourses; social and political practices (Webster and Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2002: pp. 8–12).
These three dimensions try to map a political space: first, the institutional channels help to identify the spaces where the poor or the agents on their behalf can exercise their agency. The political discourse reflects the engagement of political actors and might inform the policies of the government. Finally, the social and political practices look at associational and collective activity that might channel and direct the political action of the poor. These dimensions are mutually intertwined. In fact, although a government might establish a favourable policy environment and provide accessible institutions, this would hardly result in a political space for poverty reduction if social and political practices are missing - and thus poor people are marginalised and unorganised - or poverty is neglected as a political issue. Conversely, an organised pressure from below or an informed discourse may lead a government to introduce innovative institutions.
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Research design and Case selection
Senegal as a case study
The case study method offers several advantages to answer the research question within the proposed framework. As argued by Yin (1994: 13) investigators should opt for the case study method when contextual conditions are believed to be highly pertinent with the phenomenon of study. The aim of this thesis is to assess land and decentralisation policies, not simply at the institutional level but also through a closer analysis of the political dynamics that at the local level came with their implementation. Particular attention is given to local actors involved and the context in which they operate. The way in which the political space is produced, modelled or limited by actors at the local level is informed by the context in which is born. Concurrently, through the intensive study of a single case, the case study may help to shed light on a larger number of cases and a close tie to evidence and data might help the formulation of more precise theory (Gerring, 2007: 20; Stake, 2000, Yin, 1981). In this sense, by focusing on Senegal, this study might be extended to other African countries, especially in West Africa where other countries have recently launched decentralisation reforms (Diep et al. 2016).
The choice of Senegal as case study is consistent with the chosen design and is a suitable case to investigate decentralisation policy and poverty reduction by using the concept of political space for three reasons.
First, the country has also been for long time engaged in land and decentralisation policy. The two-major land and decentralisation reforms has been enacted around five decades ago in 1964 and 1972. Such a long period enables to assess and judge the success or failure of decentralisation in terms of political participation and poverty reduction.
Second, there is a strong interconnection between the implementation of land reform and decentralisation process (Hesseling, 2009). In fact, several scholars and research highlight the
12 importance of this relationship as crucial to achieve poverty reduction. (Sen, 1999; Mathew, 1996; Vedeld, 2003; Webster, 2000).
Third, political parties, local organisations and rural elites might be pivotal for the political space (Hichey, 2005; Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; Rajasekhar, 2002; Lars Engberg-Pedersen and Webster, 2002). Senegal has different potential political actors that might manipulate political agency in the name of the poor including political parties and local elites. In particular, the role of the traditional religious groups (i.e. Marabouts) is nuanced, and they are simultaneously portrayed as feudal lords exploiting rural masses and as main vectors of representation of poor (O’Brien et al. 2002, Godefroy, 2015). The relations among secular and religious actors, political and social dynamics, is a focal point of the political space in the country.
To conclude, Senegal is a representative case for the political space since it possesses – at least on paper – several key elements that might favours its shaping.
Methods of data analysis
In this study, decentralisation and land reform are the independent variables and are operationalised through the concept of “political space”. The operationalisation is adapted by Webster and Engberg-Pedersen (2002) and is composed by three dimensions: institutional channels, social and political practices and political discourse. thus, I will mainly focus on the first two dimensions to trace the evolution of institutions, subaltern actors and their impact on the social and political context, which are studied through process tracing methods (Bennett, and Checkel, 2015).
To start, institutional channels refers to formal spaces where the poor or the agents on their behalf can exercise their power, and through which policy formulation can be accessed or contested by them, as public hearing and popular assemblies. In order to detect the presence of these channels, data are collected through the original text of policies and reforms, NGOs and IOs reports. In
13 Senegal case study, the institutional channels are identified in the rural councils established with the land reform in 1964.
The second dimension refers to social and political practices that influence politics, whose data are gathered through NGOs report and secondary literature. The creation of an effective political space for poverty reduction cannot only rely on governmental interventions. In fact, “a favourable policy environment and committed government may achieve little in poverty reduction if marginalised groups are unorganised, […] and if the interests and views of the marginalised remain excluded from the process of governance” (Webster and Lars Engberg-Pedersen, 2002: 10). This dimension mainly looks at the organisational practises, political experience of poor people and others political and social groups and the way which they can promote or hamper the participation of poor. Specifically, local and religious elites (i.e. Marabout brotherhood) and political parties are identified as main actors to investigate this dimension.
Poverty reduction here is defined in terms of effective participation (Crook, 2003: 78; Vedeld, 2003: 162); a voice in the decision-making process and influence over public policies and political priorities (Khan, 2013: 149), but also the responsiveness and accountability of political actors. In this framework key aspects are: rights to vote and rights to participate to local assemblies, actual information about the reforms the rights and the powers they confer. For doing so, whenever possible, primary data collected in other studies such as interviews to local population, village chief and local councillor are used.
Analysis
Building political spaces: decentralisation and land reforms in post-independent Senegal
Senegal is a young state that became independent in 1960. As typical for African states, Senegal inherited its institutions and state-building process was a particularly sensible as well as complex
14 issue as result of the colonial legacy (Young, 1996). With the access to independence, the government of Senegal started a series of reforms to create the new country and take the distance from the colonial past. Under the leadership of the socialist president Senghor, Senegal took the African way to socialism (Senghor, 1960) with the aim to create a new society, an African communitarian society “that privileges the group over the individual and the community of persons over their autonomy” (Senghor, 1960: 24).
With such an ambitious political goal, the political organisation of the national territory, the land legislation, the organisation of the rural world epitomised both a crucial element and a particular concern. This was the aim of the Law on the National Domain of 1964 and, later on, the
political-administrative reform in 19721. As from the Senegalese Prime minister Mamadou Dia, the
territorial and land reforms aimed to remove the colonial inequalities and provide the basement for the equitable development of the country, through “a technical tool – the bottom-up democratic planning, moving from the base to the top – and participative and formative structures (activity centres and cooperative societies)” (Dia, 1988: 106. My transl.). The promotion of (political) participation, the organisation and the mobilisation of the rural population were essential to create “grassroots rural communities, cell of peasant democracy” (Débène and Caverivière, 1988: 187. My
transl.). In this sense, these reforms start mapping the political space by setting up the institutional
participative channels.
In particular, the Law on the National Domain (LND) of 1964 has introduced an innovative framework that combines the affirmation of state authority of a newly formed state with the willingness to set out inclusive practices at the local level and a fair distribution of resources. The text defines as national lands all non-registered land (“all lands not classified as public domain, not registered or of which property has not been inscribed in the register of mortgages”, article 1, my transl.).
1 The text of law is available on: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/558191435589091130/pdf/Senegal-Law-72-25-on-the-establishment-of-rural-communities-as-local-authorities.pdf [Accessed: 4 May 2018]
15 Then, the national domain land was divided in four categories: urban zones, classified zones, land zone and pioneer zone. Without going into much details, the zones de terroirs (village land zones) are those of particular interest, since they are mainly used by rural populations, families for rural housing and pastoral activities. The article 8 fixes the principles underlying the distribution and allocation of land: free access by membership and productivity (mise en valeur).
Consequently, the access to land primarily depends on the residence and membership to a rural community and on the productive use of the land. The main objective of these principles was not to
dispossess effective users of the land, rather to abolish any sort of right over the land by people who
do not till it. Notably, the second aim was to abolish the customary land system based on family lineage and bloodline and any payment of rent on the land, which in now property of the state and entrusted to (efficient) rural dwellers. (Hesseling, 2009: 250).
The composition of the rural council also shows the inclusive nature of this reform. In fact, while the state retains its right to appoint functionaries and state agents (article 10, point 2), the other members of the conseil ruraux are elected among the people effectively resident in the territory and primary engaged with rural activities (i.e. rural population) (article 10, point 1); and among representatives of agricultural cooperative and collective farms working in the area (article 10, point 2). Rural councils represent an open institutional channel that can potentially empower and be controlled by poor people and their agencies and through which they can take part and be active agents in the policy-process.
Despite the adoption of this reform in 1964, the conseil ruraux have been effectively set up in 1972 when the first major decentralisation reform was adopted. The law n° 72 – 252, Loi relative aux
communautés rurales, set up the rural Community (communauté rurale) to organise the
participation of the population through the action of conseil ruraux. A communauté rurale is composed by “a certain number of villages belonging to the same territory, bound together by
2 The text of the law is available at: http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/558191435589091130/pdf/Senegal-Law-72-25-on-the-establishment-of-rural-communities-as-local-authorities.pdf [Accessed: 4May 2018].
16 solidarity […], having common interest and able to provide necessary resources for their development. […] Its representative bodies are the rural council and the president of the rural councils” (article 1 comma 1 and 2, my transl.).
Furthermore, this law fixes the formal rules for the establishment and the functioning of the rural council. Thus, rural councils are democratic structures, whose members are elected by direct universal suffrage for five years (article 4 and article 6; one third of the members are still appointed by the State). The conseil rural is now also titled to pursue more general goals including promotion of activity and service for the benefit of the community and family support for children education (article 26, comma 1 and 2). Concurrently, the central government holds a marked control through the sous-préfet (Sub-Prefect). They are directly appointed by the Ministry of the Interior and act as guarantor by retaining the right to veto the decision of the rural council (article 55 comma 2) and the control over the budget of the rural community (Title V). In this sense, the sous-prefect and by extension the central state retains a considerable power over the local community creating a sort of
‘monitored decentralisation’3 (FAO/FONGS, 1999).
Another major decentralisation reform has been launched in 1996 with the adoption the Code des
Collectivités locales (Law n° 96-064) and the law 96-075 on the transfer of competences to regions, communes and rural community. The reform introduced and reaffirmed some essential elements at the local level.
The whole members of the rural council are now elected by the rural habitants (article 25 of the Code). Currently, the text now specifies that “all sessions of rural council are open to the public” and that “all the habitants of the rural community have the right to consult the minute book of
3 The effective exercise of this power is nonetheless unclear. While Freudenberger (1992: xii – xv) and Gellar (1997:
53) claim that the sous-préfets exercise frequently their authority and have an almost hegemonic control over the rural council, Hesseling (2009: 251) argues that “In practice, however, sous-préfets and préfets rarely use these powers, so in the majority of cases the rural councils are left free to make decisions and have no fear of correction by higher officials”.
4 The text of the law is available at: https://senegal.eregulations.org/media/code-collec-locales-sen[1].pdf [Accessed: 5
May 2018].
17 deliberations” (articles 225, my transl.). The rural community and the rural council are titled with new relevant competences in tackling poverty. According to article 33 of the law 96-07 on transfer of competences, the rural community is now titled to manage centres for the promotion of social rehabilitation; to organise and manage the relief activities and to support the funding of productive projects in favour of poor people.
This brief excursus over land reforms and the subsequent decentralisations reforms provide the institutional framework of the political space in Senegal.
The conseil ruraux are a key institutional channel that can be accessed by rural population and poor. Participation is generally open to “persons domiciled in the territory, that are actually residing there, that are engaged in rural activities as their main occupation, and enjoying electoral rights” (article 10, point 1, National Domain Law, 1964. My transl.). Rural population, as citizens, have the rights to get involved, to become rural councillors and being active part of the policy process. In this regard, another crucial point is the election by direct universal suffrage of the members of the council and the five years term which should enhance the accountability of rural councillors. Conversely, some boundaries stand out. First, the participation of farmers and villagers formally ends with the elections of the councillors. During the sessions, they cannot join the discussion since they do not possess any right to speak or vote. Second, through the sous-prèfets, the central government is a watchful eye on rural communities.
To summarise, as from the legal documents, the rural council represents a political body close to rural population and rural poor, through which they have access to a certain degree of power in terms of rights to vote, eligibility and attendance. Notwithstanding this, while these reforms set up an accessible institution for rural population, a closer analysis of the second dimension of political space – social and political practices – reveals the presence of constraints and barriers to the active role of rural peasants and their participation.
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Constraints and limitation to the political space in Senegal
While the first intent of these reforms aimed to enhance the political participation or rural population and set up a space in which this same participation (rural council) can actually take place, a closer insight reveals that this same space is limited, both on a social and political level. This limitation, I argue, is the result of social and political practices that prevented poor people to participate.
The first limitation is related to the existent social practises that essentially circumvent the political space. As said, one of the intent of these reforms was to abolish the customary land system based on family lineage and bloodline, in order to create the participatory system described above. The Explanatory memorandum of the Commission established to draft the land reform is quite clear on this point describing the customary framework as a backward “gerontocratic structure in which young people have no chance to bloom” (in Golan, 1990: 19 – 20). In the same vein, the article 48 of the 1972 Law prohibits to head of villages, which usually detained power and prestige in the villages, to be elected as president of the rural council. Nevertheless, customary rules are still effective and used by local communities so that the land is still handed down through the family (IIED, 2017: 2)., with the result the rural poor are still embodied in the traditional relations of power.
Furthermore, rural population, especially in the most remote areas, is not aware of legislation on land and decentralisation and have little or no knowledge of the ‘new’ rules, of the rural councils but also of the power and the rights they might have in such bodies (Faye, 2008: 8, UNDP, 2001: 51). In 2008, a chief of a village in the rural community of Sadio said during an interview: “My father has founded this village. He has built the well, and the other people joined us, so these lands have always belonged to us and they still belong to us. We yield the land to whoever wants to settle down” (cited Diallo, 2008. My transl.). While the statement of the village chief cannot be generalised to the whole country, it shows how property and power over the land is still firmly in
19 the hand of local lineage families. As a direct consequence, rural population does not rely on rural council for the allocation or in case of dispute over the land, instead they still resort to village chiefs or other traditional resolution bodies (councils of elders, imams, customary dispute mediation groups) (Hesseling, 2009: 261; Schoonmaker Freudenberger, 1992: 67).
The traditional power of Islamic brotherhoods seemed to be affected neither. On the one hand, the land reform did not prevent the Mouride brotherhood to extend their control over the land. A report for the World Bank (Schoonmaker Freudenberger, 1990) finds that, the concept of mise en valeur introduced by the LND in 1964 has been “used” to spread the peanut’s cultivation and land acquisition, at the expenses of other activities carried out by rural population, as local pastoralism (Freudenberger and Freudenberger, 1993; Juul, 1993). On the other hand, over the years they have developed a patronage rapport with political parties, which enable them to influence the activity of the rural councils (Baker, 1973; Markowitz, 1970; Blundo, 1997). For example, in Touba, the holy city of Mourdism, rural council are largely influenced by the Mouride brotherhood, to the point that politicians of the council are designated by leader of the brotherhood (Beck, 2001: 602). Furthermore, the case of a dispute between a wealthy women farmer and a marabout is illuminating. Briefly, this dispute is about 140ha that this woman bought from a third party in Ross Béthio and that, at one point, started to be claimed by a marabout. The farmer appeals to the rural council, the police and the sous-préfet without any result. Then, the sous-préfet decided to put on hold all the work over the contested land. Notwithstanding the decision of the sous-préfet the marabout restarted working on it, claiming his right to work the land because the case has been closed, without any opposition by any of the involved institutions (Kaag et al., 2001: 15). This case shows the lack of accountability of the institutions that should empower Senegalese peasants, but also how traditional powerful groups can easily ignore the decision taken by formal institutions.
20 In this sense, the political space for poverty reduction in the rural areas of Senegal seems to be circumvented, but it is also restricted. On the one hand, instead of access the institutional channels, rural population and rural poor walk around it and opt for the same traditional framework that the reforms were supposed to abolish; on the other hand, the space is restricted because of the traditional relations of power that the reforms have failed to rebalance. Therefore, traditional relations of power are not only intact but, as argued by Foucault and Lefebvre, they also entered and reproduced themselves in the institutional space, with the result of limiting the participation of rural population.
The second limitation is related to the political practises and the highly political nature of rural councils. that prevent the political space to emerge. While this trait should favour the shaping of a political space, since it indicates that the institutional channels accessed by the poor are actually part of the political process concerning them, the political and power dynamics within the councils constrains the political space. In particular, the overwhelming power of presidents Senghor’s party, the Socialist Party (PS) had largely influenced the activity of the rural council in the allocation of lands. Ultimately, the work of the rural council in the allocation or the settlement of disputes over the land was not oriented to empower rural dwellers according to the principles of mise en valeur, rather it is driven by the party’s interest. In this regard, a member of the opposition Party – Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) – in front tribunal of Ziguinchor in Casamance shortly after the election of the rural council in 1978, argues that the council settled a dispute “by relying on political basis in order to entrust the land to X since he is a member of the PS too. This is made to our detriment, as members of the PDS” (cited in Hesseling, 1994: 254, my transl.)”.
In addition to the political struggle among different political parties, internal fighting within the same political party distort the collegial management of the land. This phenomenon has been described as “political factionalism” and it has especially characterised the PS, divided in faction A and faction B (Baker, 1973; Blundo, 1995; Diop, 2006; Foltz, 1969: 152; Hesseling, 1994; Kaag,
21 2001; Kaag et al. 2001; Venema, 1996). A faction develops from a clan, which Foltz (1969:152) has defined as “the extension of the patron-client relationship into the political arena, […] a group of people united behind a single leader (or leading family) who expect to profit indirectly from any political success the leader may achieve”.
The faction develops at the different political level (national, regional, local), linking the centre with the local, the elite with the mass, through a dense network of personal relationship and patronage around the single political leader. Thus, politics at the local level is largely influenced by patronage dynamics and the internal fights among these factions. For example, candidates for rural councillor are selected by the party also according to his reputation in the community (Vemena, 1996: 7). Not surprisingly, people sitting in the councils are generally local notables or eminent public figures (Kaag, 2001: 121) who enjoy a high reputation within the community, that can extend the patronage network, and on which the party relies to assure the of control on rural masses. As argued by Diop (2006: 151) “the central power count on historical [social] categories favoured at the local level to passing out its authority. Through this mediation, local power guarantees the authority of central power at the local level, which in turn is content with the status quo”. Furthermore, the political factionalism and rivalry hampered the proper functioning of the rural council. This may occur at the operational level – inefficacy of council’s meeting - through obstructionism or absenteeism of the members of the opposition faction, or at managerial level by leading to a misuse of council funds (Blundo 1998). Finally, the political division might also deepen rivalry among rural population and families who belong to a faction or the other (Kaag, 2001: 164, 171).
The fact that parties’ and factions’ interests have a substantial influence in the work of the rural council is only reinforcing a widespread sentiment of mistrust toward the state, that exacerbate the distance between locals and political space. All these actors are generally seen by rural peasants as strangers or exploiters. The secretary of a religious organisation (daira) looking for funding to start an income-generating activity stated: “The council is only interested in politics. That is the reason I
22 don't want to have anything to do with the council” (cited in Venema, 1996: 8). Not surprisingly, far from being a space that can be controlled or contested, rural population or popular agencies consider rural councils as instruments held and controlled by the state or by the ruling party. (Gellar, 1997: 54). This state of play is also strengthened by cultural and social behaviour about the active involvement in public event. According to the village chief of Saly Escale, the lack of participation to the sessions of the council or the consultation of the ledger of the deliberations is explained by the fact that it is not polite to attend events without an invitation: “if you go to a baptism without an invitation, wherever you broke, even a wooden spoon, you must pay” (cited in Blundo, 1998: 7).
Social and political practices refer to the organisational and political experience of social groups. As shown in the previous paragraphs, the practises do not result in an organisation or mobilisation or rural peasants, farmers, who are indeed largely unorganised and scattered (Fatton, 1988: 253; Patterson, 1998: 426). Rather in a re-organisation and a reproduction traditional dominant social group groups, which reaffirmed their power within the new institutions (Markowitz, 1970).
To conclude, the words of a rural Senegalese man state the general failure of these policies in addressing poverty: “Senegal is a difficult country to live in now. There are many more poor people than rich people. But the rich people are the ones with power. Poor people must do what rich people want in order to gain anything” (cited in Patterson, 1998: 426).
Conclusion
As stated by Hickey and Mohan: “it would be misleading to see all participatory spaces, provided or claimed, as disempowering simply because they are touched by the ‘development machine’” (Hickey and Mohan, 2004: 13).
23 The aim of this thesis was to assess decentralisation policy and land reform in Senegal and their influence on poverty reduction. Resorting to the analytical concept of political space for poverty reduction, I analysed the impact of Senegalese land reform of 1964 and the decentralisation policies of 1972 and 1996. This study illustrates the existence of a political space for poverty reduction but, nevertheless, of a restricted one. Findings are consistent with scholars who move away from a purely institutional approach and claim the need for a more accurate investigation of political and power relations existing around and within these institutions.
Therefore, although these reforms set up rural councils, democratic institutional channels oriented to enhance the political participation and empower rural population, both political and social practices are limited. More precisely, they are embedded in their traditional dynamics and relations of power that keep obstructing effective participation. Finally, this did not foster the political power of rural population and poor people.
Firstly, the analysis highlights that the persistence and the re-production of traditional social practices has an important role in foreclosing the emergence of a political space. This result is also amplified by a general lack of knowledge and information about the reforms. First, the traditional local landowners still retain the power over the land, treating it as their own property (despite a formal abolishment of property rights with the Law on National Domain). Second, peasants and farmers continue to address local landowners or village chiefs for everything relating to land allocation and use and disputes settlements, instead of making their voice be heard inside the rural council. Moreover, similar considerations can be made concerning the member of the religious elites. The Marabout brotherhood has continued to make business as usual and they have actually extended their control on land cultivation. At the same time, their power is used to influence the activity of the rural council with little chance for local farmers.
Secondly, the analysis finds out that also political practices do not promote the development of a political space. In rural councils, the internal dynamics, the decision-making process and the
24 verdicts are largely influenced and manipulated by the political parties. This occurs both in political clashes among the parties and in internal rivalry among different factions within the same party. Furthermore, the phenomenon of factionalism spreads a patronage’s dynamics which contributes to obstruct participation and political mobilisation of rural farmers. Finally, peasants and poor people generally mistrust politicians and, in turn, the spaces in which they operate, avoiding them.
The final assessment can demoralise. At the same time, if limitations such the one presented in this and other studies would be properly taken into account, it is desirable that the next reforms would not be the umpteenth exercise of institutional design, but an actual effort to empower rural farmers and poor to reduce poverty in the country.
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