Between Morality and Power
The Carter Administration and South African Apartheid
Noor ter Meer – 2388073 e.v.ter.meer@umail.leidenuniv.nl Master thesis MA North American Studies Universiteit Leiden 21-10-2020 Supervisor: Dr. W.M. Schmidli Second reader: Dr. D. Fazzi Word count (excluding footnotes): 19.774
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2 Abstract
When Jimmy Carter was inaugurated in 1977, he promised to make his commitment to human rights absolute. The deeply torn and racially divided region of Southern Africa would become his administration’s stage to illustrate their moralistic foreign policy which was based on the promotion of human rights. Whereas Carter’s commitment to human rights was motivated by his personal experiences during the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, his National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, was led by strategic considerations which could advance the American position in the Cold War. These conflicting approaches to a human rights policy resulted in a vague, often hypocritical, and quickly shifting policy, which started with a strong moral undertone and focus on human rights, yet ended with economic and strategic considerations as the top priorities of the administration. Through its in-depth analysis of primary sources, this study has sought to research the change in the Carter administration’s human rights policy towards South Africa, thereby also discussing the general changes within the foundations of the administration’s foreign policy.
3 Table of contents
Introduction 4
1 Carter, Brzezinski and human rights in South Africa 11
2 1977: The year of hope and morality 28
3 1978-1980: The years of failed attempts and hypocrisy 46
Conclusion 62
4 Introduction
On January 20, 1977, Jimmy Carter was inaugurated as the 39th president of the United States. As Carter set out the plans for the foreign policy of his administration, it became clear that human rights would be the underlying theme.1 When he inherited the global issues faced by his predecessor, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter had probably not foreseen the challenges he would face during his presidency in southern Africa. The issues in the deeply torn and racially divided region would present president Carter with difficult dilemmas, which had, in the light of the administration’s human rights policy, the potential to be of major influence on the administration’s credibility and success.
Since the victory of the Nasionale Party van Suid-Afrika (National Party of South Africa) in 1948, apartheid was deeply embedded in South African politics. South Africa, however, had been racially divided for a long time before the apartheid laws. Having been dominated under white, foreign rule since the seventeenth century, alternately by British and Dutch colonizers, South African blacks had been subject to discriminatory systems of control for a long time.2 The National Party ruled over South Africa with a system and laws based on the ideology of apartheid, which was a “microcosm of human degradation.”3 Deprived of basic political, civil and socio-economic rights, black South Africans were severely repressed by the political regime. As South Africa was one of Carter’s prioritized countries in his human rights policy, South Africa will serve as the case study in this thesis. Through a detailed analysis of the change within the administration’s policy towards South Africa, this thesis will illustrate the general shift of the administration’s human rights policy.
1 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1986), 6.
2 Edward Kamara, “Continuity or change: American foreign policy of human rights under the Carter and the
Reagan administration with particular emphasis on Southern Africa 1977-1984,” PhD dissertation, Wayne State University, thesis (2005): 12.
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Jimmy Carter was President of the United States from 1977 until 1980. Carter was raised in a religious family in the Old South and had personally experienced the African-American struggle for civil rights. Because of his faith and his experience with the civil rights movement, Carter was deeply committed to racial equality and a moral foreign policy. The scholarly assessment of Carter as the president has changed notably over time. Scholars who have researched Carter in the late nineties and early 2000’s emphasize the moral
underpinnings of Carter’s foreign policy and human rights policy, and argue that the
administration remained true to its moral beliefs and its dedication to human rights until the end of its term. Scholars who researched Carter in the past decade, however, argue that Carter did not live up to his initial foreign policy plans, and contend that the administration traded its moral beliefs for power and Soviet containment.
Another important policymaker in the Carter administration, was Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Carter’s National Security Advisor (NSA). Zbigniew Brzezinski, born in Poland in 1928, fled to Canada with his family in 1938. He studied at Harvard – notably, at the same time as Henry Kissinger – and became a well known international relations scholar during the Cold War.4 In 1972, Brzezinski founded the Trilateral Commission, which was aimed at improving the trilateral economic and political relations between Japan, Europe and the US.5 After Carter was introduced to the Commission in 1973, Brzezinski and Carter quickly became close. Having worked together for three years, Brzezinski was eager to support Carter’s candidacy in 1976.6 His early support and his incredibly wide range of knowledge ultimately resulted in Carter’s decision to appoint him to the position of National Security Advisor.7 Being a Polish immigrant, Brzezinski’s particular focus had always been on the
4 Kamara, “Continuity or change,” 111. 5 Ibid., 37-38.
6 Ibid., 38. 7 Ibid.
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Soviet Union.8 He viewed the Soviet Union as one of the primary obstacles to a stable world order, and, therefore, tended to have a power-ridden and strategic view of the world.9 Even though Carter was aware of the influence that Brzezinski’s personal and academic
background might have on their policy, he was very thankful for the enormous amount of information and experience that Brzezinski brought to his administration, since Carter himself lacked any real experience in foreign affairs.10
The academic debate on Brzezinski has also changed over time. Scholars who researched Brzezinski in the nineties and early 2000’s are fairly critical about him. They generally contend that Brzezinski’s background as a Polish immigrant heavily influenced his beliefs, and argue that Brzezinski’s hawkish approach to the Cold War had a negative
influence on the administration’s human rights policy. More recent academic literature, however, emphasizes the positive influence that the NSA had on the Carter administration, and argues that he was in favour of an active promotion of human rights.
As seen in the political history of the United States, the combination of morality and national interest is essential to the character of United States foreign policy. As described by legal scholars Peter Baehr and Monique Castermans-Holleman, “American foreign policy has always been a mixture of idealism and realism. It gives evidence of a certain measure of moralism, of ethical principles, based on the idea that the United States will bring good to the world. At the same time, a careful eye is kept on preserving its own national interests.”11 The combination of idealism and realism, of morality and national interest, has thus been
characteristic for US foreign policy and can also clearly be recognized in the Carter administration.
8 Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 36. 9 Ibid., 135.
10 Ibid., 27; 38.
11 Peter R. Baehr and Monique Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy
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Carter began his term as an idealistic and moralistic president, when he promised to make his commitment to human rights absolute. Carter saw human rights through the lens of civil rights because of his personal experiences with the civil rights movement, and was therefore deeply committed to battling apartheid in South Africa. Even though Brzezinski was also committed to human rights, it was through a Cold War perspective. By advancing human rights in southern Africa and showing the moral character of the US, Brzezinski wanted to prevent more Soviet influence on the continent. Brzezinski thus saw human rights as a tool to enlarge US power, whereas Carter saw it as the underlying theme of his foreign policy. Since these approaches to human rights were very different, it is interesting to discover how both Carter and Brzezinski affected the human rights policy towards South Africa and, specifically, to analyse how this policy changed during their term. The research question, therefore, is: how did the human rights policy of the Carter administration towards South Africa change between 1977 and 1980? Ultimately, I argue that mainly under the influence of Brzezinski and other neoliberals in the Carter administration, the priorities in the policy towards South Africa shifted from morality to power, as the administration prioritized economic and strategic considerations over the promotion of human rights. The analysis will illustrate how this shift took place, why it took place, and who pushed the administration away from its moralistic and idealistic foreign policy towards a realist view of the world.
This thesis aims to make a significant contribution to the existing debate on the Carter administration and its human rights policy within the field of political history. This study performs a qualitative analysis, as it presents an in-depth discussion of a large number of primary sources and aims to connect and compare the content of these sources to build its argument. It uses the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series on the Carter administration, specifically volume II on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs and volume XVI on Southern Africa. These files contain transcripts of National Security Council
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meetings, letters between US and South African government officials, presidential directives and policy papers on specific issues. These volumes were published in 2013 and 2016, respectively, and will, therefore, enable this research to review documents which many scholars have not been able to use in their research on this topic. Furthermore, primary sources will be drawn from the Digital National Security Archive and the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Oral History. Brzezinski’s memoir, Power and Principle:
Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981, will also be utilized in this study’s
analysis. Together these sources will offer a fresh analysis of the human rights policy of the Carter administration in South Africa.
In the first chapter, this study analyses the existing secondary source material on the most important themes and topics for this research. Due to the extensive amount of literature on president Carter and apartheid, the literature review limits its analysis to the following topics: Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski and American foreign policy in South Africa. Through a thorough analysis of the literature on these topics, this chapter illustrates the change over time in the scholarly debate on Carter and Brzezinski and discusses potential reasons for these changes in the academic debate. In doing so, it builds the framework for the analytical chapters, in which this thesis aims to make its own original contribution to the debate.
The second and third chapter present a close reading of the aforementioned primary sources. These chapters thoroughly discuss the statements of US and South African officials in both direct and indirect contact. It evaluates the manner in which these statements were made, and discuss the possible hidden meanings behind them. Moreover, the analysis discusses the potential discrepancies between, on the one hand, statements made within the US government by government officials, and on the other hand the communication with the South African government. As there were often differences between the rhetoric and proposed
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actions within the US government, and the actual rhetoric and actions taken towards the South African government, these discrepancies are discussed in detail to clarify the potential
contrast between rhetoric and action of the US government. Through this discussion, this thesis elaborates on the transparency and credibility of the foreign policy towards South Africa and the general human rights policy of the Carter administration.
This study splits up the four years of Carter’s presidential term in three periods. The first period focuses on the first year of the administration, which is discussed in the second chapter. As the policy towards South Africa was distinctively different during the
administration’s first year, than during the remainder of their term, the other three years are analysed in the third chapter. This chapter, however, distinguishes 1978 from 1979-1980. As the analysis illustrates, 1978 can be seen as the year in which the administration shifted its policies and is, therefore, discussed as the second period. The last two years are analysed together as the third period, for two reasons. First of all, the number of documents in the FRUS series of these years is small and do not, on their own, give enough information to write an entire chapter about. Secondly, the policies of the administration in 1979 and 1980 were similar and are, therefore, considered as one period. The chapters discuss the policy through an analysis of the primary documents, after which they consider the underlying motives and ideas behind the policy in more depth. Moreover, the chapters discuss the influence of Brzezinski and other policymakers, thereby tying the case study to the academic debate on the Carter administration and its general human rights policy.
When conducting this research there were, as in any research, some difficulties in the analysis of primary source material. First of all, the formal and inexplicit character of some of the primary sources posed some issues, as the transcripts of the meetings between government officials did not always explicitly show their intentions and potential hidden meanings due to their formal character. Another limitation of this study is its US-centric view. By only
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reviewing American sources, due to the scope of this study, this thesis has solely approached the relations between the US and South African governments from an American perspective. Even though this thesis has critically reviewed the sources, it remains a one sided research of the human rights policy towards South Africa. These limitations might have slightly affected the depth and inclusiveness of the analysis. Unfortunately, however, this will always be the case when conducting an historical analysis, which has, in its nature, an unexclusive character. This study has, nonetheless, aimed to contribute to the existing academic debate through its own original analysis. In doing so, this thesis has hopefully shed a light on how the Carter administration manoeuvred between action and inaction – between morality and power.
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1 Carter, Brzezinski and human rights in South Africa
This chapter will make an assessment of the existing literature on Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski and human rights in Apartheid South Africa. It will illustrate the Christian and moral values on which Carter’s human rights policy was based, the personal and professional background of Zbigniew Brzezinski and his influence on Carter, and the human rights policy of the Carter administration in South Africa. In doing so, it will reflect on the scholars who have written on these subjects and discuss the change over time within the academic debate.
James (Jimmy) Earl Carter, born on the first of October, 1924 in Plains, Georgia, was raised in a Christian family, which meant, according to professor Michael Kramer, that faith played an important role in Jimmy’s life.12 During his visits to the Northern cities as a missionary, before his political career took flight, Carter realized that “politics must be a moral activity.”13 Kramer, professor in communication science, argues that this feeling of moral obligation helped Carter to get elected in 1976. After a difficult period, the American people were drawn to Carter’s way of thinking and his idealist ideas of honesty and integrity would turn out to be the reason for his election.14 Carter’s Christian faith was, according to Kramer, one of the most important pillars of Carter’s character and thus his policy.15
Historian William Steding also emphasizes Carter’s Christian background. He contends that Carter’s ideals were based on principles as justice, “the process of sin, redemption and salvation” and his missionary beliefs.16 Soon, Carter began to see human
12 Michael Kramer, “Jimmy Carter’s presidential rhetoric: Panama Canal, human rights and Zimbabwe,”
University of Minnesota (2005): 4.
13 Kramer, “Jimmy Carter’s presidential rhetoric,” 5. 14 Ibid., 6-7.
15 Ibid., 5.
16 William Steding, Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy: Jimmy Carter the Disciple and Ronald Raegan the
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rights as America’s salvation.17 By promoting human rights throughout the world, Jimmy Carter wanted to establish certain moral values in the foreign policy of the US. Steding argues that this idea became one of Carter’s principal beliefs and that the president even saw this as a national interest.18 According to historian Nancy Mitchell, Carter’s Christian faith was “at the core of his being,” which combined well with his appeal to human rights.19
In their book, which was published almost a decade after Brinkley’s article, Baehr and Castermans argue that American foreign policy is often identified with thinking “in terms of good and evil,” and that the principles of moralism, freedom and democracy are personified in presidents as, among others, Jimmy Carter.20 They contend that the thirty-ninth president displayed a “strong moralistic character” through his human rights policy. 21 Baehr and Castermans-Holleman argue that Carter developed some important “activities in the field,” which were not seen during the presidencies of his successors. 22 Ultimately, they emphasize that even though Carter admitted that his human rights policy was to a large extent verbal, he displayed the importance and power of words.23 The scholarly debate on Jimmy Carter and his personal background illustrates that many scholars see the thirty-ninth president as a moral and honest man, whose commitment to human rights was grounded in his personal beliefs and experiences.
The literature on Carter as the president and specifically on his foreign policy, however, displays a significant change over time. This chapter will illustrate this change and discuss the scholars who have written about Carter in the past few decades. The debate in the late nineties and early 2000’s displayed a fairly positive assessment of Carter and his
17 Steding, Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy, 43. 18 Ibid., 46.
19 Nancy Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa: Race and the Cold War (Stanford: Standford University Press,
2018): 8-9.
20 Baehr and Castermans-Holleman, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, 91. 21 Ibid., 92.
22 Ibid., 93. 23 Ibid.
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dedication to human rights in foreign policy. Historian Douglas Brinkley, for instance, wrote an article in 1996, in which he stated that human rights was the most important legacy of the Carter administration.24 Brinkley counters the arguments made by scholars who depict Carter’s presidency as failed, by stating that the challenges faced by the administration made it vulnerable to failure and criticism.25 Therefore, in Brinkley’s opinion, Carter must be remembered for his many successes like the Camp David Accords and the Panama Canal Treaties.26 However, according to Brinkley, Carter’s biggest success was that by the end of Carter’s term, human rights had “permanently entered the diplomatic parlance of American foreign policy.”27
Whereas Brinkley clearly still recognizes the flaws in Carter’s human rights policy, historians David Schmitz and Vanessa Walker argue that “the administration’s commitment to human rights was not merely rhetorical or naïve.”28 Focusing on the early years of the
administration, this article states that the administration quickly turned their promises into a workable policy.29 According to this article, the administration actively pursued their human rights policy despite some substantial risks. Even though the article focuses on the first two years of the administration, at the end of which the administration had made human rights a central factor of American foreign policy according to the authors, they also argue that Carter did not give up on his ideals during the rest of his presidency.30 In making human rights “a key element of all discussions…Carter succeeded in shifting the discourse on American foreign policy away from the dominant concerns of the Cold War and containment.”31 Even
24 Douglas Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter: The “Hands On” Legacy of Our Thirty-ninth
President,” Diplomatic History 20, no 4 (1996): 520.
25 Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter,” 513. 26 Ibid., 527.
27 Ibid., 522.
28 David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights: The
Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 28, no. 1 (2004): 113-114.
29 Schmitz and Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human Rights,” 121. 30 Ibid., 114, 136; 137.
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though Schmitz and Walker convincingly praise the administration’s human rights efforts, their assessment stands in stark contrast with other scholarly opinions. By ignoring the shortcomings of the human rights policy of the administration, Schmitz and Walker have not painted a realistic picture of either the presidency or the human rights policy of the
administration.
Even though scholars were thus fairly positive on Carter and the sincerity of his human rights policy in the late nineties and early 2000’s, the scholarly debate has become more critical during the past decade. Historian William Michael Schmidli, for instance, displays a critical stance towards the degree in which Carter lived up to his human rights goals in his book on the Carter administration’s human rights policy towards Argentine’s military junta. Schmidli explores the extent to which Carter actually lived up to his proposed human rights policy and that the translation of human rights rhetoric into policy initiatives was “an ongoing challenge” for the administration, due to lack of clarity in terms of certain guidelines and opposition in Congress.32 In 1977, it was unclear how the administration would carry out the human rights rhetoric, as there were difficulties during the
implementation of the policy. A major issue was the “relationship between human rights policy and broader foreign policy goals.”33 Moreover, the desire to make the human rights policy “absolute,” as expressed in Carter’s inaugural speech, turned out to be difficult to live up to. Instead, a case by case approach would become dominant. Moreover, Jimmy Carter’s personal development towards a “hawkish stance in foreign affairs” made it increasingly difficult to implement the human rights policy as set out at the beginning.34 Even though Schmidli argues that the human rights policy of the administration became less powerful throughout the presidency, he also contends that Carter did shift the “locus of human rights
32 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Somewhere Else, 4. 33 Ibid., 92; 105.
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advocacy from the nongovernmental sector and Capitol Hill to the White House and Foggy Bottom.”35
In his biography of Brzezinski, Justin Vaïsse argues that there were two major issues that shaped the human rights policy. The first was “conflicting objectives” and the second was the “unequal relations between America and the various authoritarian regimes.”36 These issues would make it very difficult for the Carter administration to carry out its policy plans. Moreover, Vaïsse contends that the administration created very high expectations through its human rights rhetoric. These expectations made the “disillusionment” even bigger when it turned out that the administration had to sacrifice some of their initial values in order to safeguard national security.37
In her book on Jimmy Carter in Africa, Mitchell argues that Carter was much less focused on morality and human rights than believed by many. Even though she argues that Carter saw human rights as an essential tenet of US foreign policy, the historian contends that Carter should be described as a Cold Warrior, or even a “hard-line realist”, from the start of his presidency.38 Mitchell thus challenges the authors that have argued that Carter upheld his morality throughout his presidency, as she argues that he never saw this as the primary goal or motivation of his administration. With this assessment, Mitchell does not necessarily contend that Carter did not see the value of a moral foreign policy. Instead, she argues that his
intentions were both moral and practical, and that US policy should be adjusted to “the circumstances of power in the real world.”39
As Jimmy Carter was born in the South, he was raised amidst the African-American struggle for civil rights. During his childhood, the Jim Crow system was still in place.
35 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Somewhere Else, 191.
36 Justin Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski. America’s Grand Strategist (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press,
2018), 331.
37 Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 341. 38 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 8; 662. 39 Ibid., 8-9.
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Jimmy’s closest friends were African-Americans and Carter was therefore, according to Mitchell, very aware of this horrible and unjust system.40 For this reason, Mitchell argues, Carter became a strong advocate of the civil rights movement.41 This personal background greatly affected Carter’s beliefs and goals as a politician which, in turn, made him very popular among African Americans as he ran for the presidency.42 According to Andrew Young, Carter’s ambassador to the United Nations, “the hands that used to pick the cotton had now picked a President.”43 Carter saw the Civil Rights Act as “the best thing that ever
happened to the South” during his lifetime, and even stated that he would not have become president if it had not been for the courage of the leaders of the Civil Rights movement.44
Historian Simon Stevens contends that Carter’s commitment to the civil rights movement was “also animated by a sense of guilt.”45 This guilt, according to Stevens, motivated Carter to oppose racial inequality in southern Africa.46 The connection between Carter’s commitment to the civil rights movement and his foreign policy in southern Africa will be discussed in more depth at the end of this chapter.
Whereas Mitchell and Stevens both argue that Carter’s commitment to changing the South and supporting the civil rights movement originated from his personal experiences and background, historian Zachary Lechner contends that Carter only used this rhetoric to gain votes and sympathy. Carter’s claims to “heal the wounds of the US”, according to Lechner, were “nothing more than a hoke.”47 His campaign took place just after the Civil Rights
40 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 11-12. 41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 219; 233. 43 Ibid., 233. 44 Ibid., 667.
45 Simon Stevens, “From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor: the Carter Administration and Apartheid,
1977-81,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 5 (2012): 848.
46 Stevens, “From the Viewpoint of Southern Governor,” 848.
47 Zachary J. Lechner, “’Fuzzy as a Georgia Peach’: The Ford Campaign and the Challenge of Jimmy Carter’s
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Movement, which enabled Carter, as a “racially progressive white southerner,” to frame himself as “a figure well-suited to deal with the country’s racial divide.”48
As illustrated, the academic debate on Jimmy Carter has shifted notably during the past few decades. Scholars who wrote about Carter in the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s, such as Baehr, Castermans-Holleman, Brinkley, Schmitz and Walker, emphasize Carter’s strong moral compass, his successes in foreign policy issues such as the Camp David
Accords, and the positive change in human rights that Carter brought to Capitol Hill. Scholars such as Vaïsse, Schmidli and Mitchell, however, who studied Carter during the past decade, have presented a more critical stance towards the 39th president. Among other things, they argue that, even though Carter was a moralistic president, he did not maintain this during his entire presidency. Possible reasons for this shift in the literature will be discussed at the end of this chapter.
Similarly to the debate on Carter, the scholarly debate on Brzezinski also changed over time. However, whereas the scholarly opinion on Carter became more critical during the past decade, the literature on Brzezinski became more positive. The literature during the nineties and early 2000’s was fairly critical of Brzezinski, highlighting the stark contrast between Brzezinski and Carter and his negative influence on the administration. Historian Gaddis Smith, for instance, argues that Brzezinski and Carter had completely different characters: Carter was an “internalist moralist,” whereas Brzezinski was an “externalist acolyte of power.”49 These two characters resulted in fundamental disagreements between the
importance of power and the importance of principle, according to Smith.50 Not only Carter and Brzezinski had different views of the world, Brzezinski also clashed with Secretary of
48 Lechner, “Fuzzy as a Georgia Peach,” 63. 49 Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 38. 50 Ibid.
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State Cyrus Vance. In a three year rivalry for power and influence in the White House, Brzezinski and Vance’s issues became bigger than anticipated in the beginning, making it very difficult for the president to find a balance between morality and power.51 Even though Brzezinski thus had different views than both Carter and Vance, the differences between Carter and Brzezinski were practically ignored, while the clash between Vance and Brzezinski carried grave consequences.52 Smith even argues that the conflict between these two advisors was a manifestation of a deeper issue within the administration, and on another level, even of modern American foreign policy as a whole.53 Smith even argues that Carter became the prey of Brzezinski’s power-ridden view of the world.54 Even though Carter started his term with a foreign policy based on morality and human rights, Brzezinski’s influence shifted Carter’s focus from improving “global issues of human welfare” to a focus on the Soviet Union and military advancement.55 As power was the ultimate goal for Brzezinski, morality was just “an instrument to be used when appropriate, abandoned when not.”56 This change in policy, which Smith argues was created by Brzezinski, thus made Carter abandon his beliefs and initial foreign policy plans, and shift towards a hawkish, Cold War-focused policy, in which the rhetoric on human rights was almost completely lost.57
Historian John Gaddis argues that Carter’s advisers were not helpful in sorting out the priorities of the administration.58 Carter was faced with a great difficulty in determining what kind of tradition it would follow, and his advisors did not help him to solve this issue.59
51Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 35. 52 Ibid., 38; 43. 53 Ibid., 43. 54 Ibid., 35; 48. 55 Ibid., 48-49. 56 Ibid., 37. 57 Ibid., 48.
58 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During
the Cold War (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005), 346.
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In her biography on Jimmy Carter, Glad contends that by setting up a new system within the National Security Council, Brzezinski was able to exert his influence on multiple levels. 60 Glad points to the daily one-on-one meetings between the NSA and the president, in which Brzezinski had the possibility to present his views on important matters without the interference of other foreign policy advisors.61 Vance, on the other hand, only had meetings with the president when other people were present.62 Glad contends that Brzezinski and his staff were able to exert so much influence on Carter’s policy because their communication was often quick and clear.63 Even though Glad is not necessarily critical of Brzezinski’s influence on the administration, she does contend that he had a lot of impact on Carter and argues that he quickly manifested his power within the process of policy making.
Smith, Gaddis and Glad illustrate the negative stance towards Brzezinski’s commitment to human rights and his relationship with Carter which dominated the academic debate on
Brzezinski in the late nineties and early 2000’s. The scholarly assessment of Brzezinski, however, has become less critical during the past decade. Political scientist David Rothkopf, for example, argued in 2013 that Brzezinski possessed a “unique capacity for foresight” and that he translated this capacity into successful policies.64 Rothkopf declares Brzezinski to be “one of America’s most respected, incisive policy commentators.”65 Robert Pastor, a member of the National Security Council Staff during Carter’s administration, echoes Rothkopf’s opinion, claiming that while other people view Brzezinski’s ideas as conservative, Brzezinski actually was a liberal and “in some ways revolutionary.”66 Pastor argues that Brzezinski did
60 Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House. Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American
Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 30-31.
61 Glad, An Outsider in the White House, 31. 62 Ibid., 32.
63 Ibid., 38.
64 David J. Rothkopf, “Setting the Stage for the Current Era,” in Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew
Brzezinski, ed. Charles Gati (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013), 84.
65 Rothkopf, Setting the Stage for the Current Era,” 84.
66 Robert A. Pastor, “The Caricature and the Man,”Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed.
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not use his personal and professional ties to the president to force his own policy ideas into reality.67 Carter was still the policy maker and ensured that Brzezinski would not be able to obtain too much influence.68 Even though Pastor recognizes the administration’s policy shift from morality to a more realist approach, he sees the developments on the world stage as the reason for these changes, not Brzezinski.69 Moreover, Pastor argues that Brzezinski did not see human rights as something that would solely serve as a weapon against communism and emphasizes that one of Brzezinski’s policy aims was to “promote human rights and racial justice in the third world.”70
Nancy Mitchell also highlights Brzezinski’s positive influence on the administration’s foreign policy and his good relationship with Carter. She argues that, even though “it is a caricature to limn Brzezinski as the realpolitik hawk,” the National Security Advisor was not always solely focused on the power battle between the US and the Soviet Union.71 Mitchell does not ignore Brzezinski’s emphasis on the Cold War, but states that he was mostly motivated by the American duty of “bringing order to the chaotic world.”72 The relationship between Carter and Brzezinski was, according to Mitchell, almost that of professor and student, in which Carter had to be “trained in the cruel ways of the world.”73 Carter was not secretive about this ‘order’ in their relationship, as he often asked Brzezinski to give him ideas, choices, and most of all, solutions.74 Mitchell argues that even though Brzezinski was never unfaithful to Carter or his policy, he did often warn the president of the dangers of a soft approach.75 Making him aware of critics labelling the administration as soft, Brzezinski often
67 Pastor, “The Caricature and the Man,” 106. 68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 108; 110-111. 70 Ibid., 104.
71 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 126; 250. 72 Ibid., 126-127.
73 Ibid., 683. 74 Ibid., 129. 75 Ibid., 665.
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redirected the president towards a slightly more hawkish and forceful policy in order for the administration to be taken seriously.
Justin Vaïsse emphasizes the strong relationship between Carter and Brzezinski. He states that their relationship was “characterized by loyalty, respect, and trust” and contends that they shared the same priorities concerning foreign policy.76 Vaïsse argues that even though Brzezinski sometimes went too far in his policy, Carter would not really tell him to stop.77 This would mean that hierarchy was a less important part of their relationship. Even though Vaïsse emphasizes the close ties between Brzezinski and Carter, he also admits that the president was easily accessible to Brzezinski for meetings and other moments of contact, in which he was able to present his views on important matters.78 Vaïsse also points to the shared ambition of Carter and Brzezinski to stress the importance of human rights.79 He argues that “Brzezinski paid a great deal of attention to sociological, political, and ideological developments that were agitating the planet,” which was in line with Carter’s own desire to focus on the moral side of their policy.80 Even though Brzezinski was in favour of a strong focus on human rights, Vaïsse also argues that he soon recognized the “limitations of the administrations human rights policy.” 81
As visible in the analysis of the historiography, the scholarly opinion on Brzezinski as the National Security Advisor has thus become more positive over time. Whereas the debate in the late nineties and early 2000’s was generally critical, especially towards Brzezinski’s relationship with Carter and his influence on the human rights policy of the administration, the debate has become more positive during the past two decades. Emphasizing Brzezinski’s sincere commitment to human rights and his strong relationship to the president, scholars
76 Vaïsse, Zbigniew Brzezinski, 276; 294. 77 Ibid., 274.
78 Ibid., 284. 79 Ibid., 296. 80 Ibid., 325. 81 Ibid., 331.
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have argued during the past decade that Brzezinski should not be ‘blamed’ for the
administration’s shift from a focus on morality and human rights, to a more realist approach to foreign policy.
The debates on Carter and Brzezinski have thus changed notably over time and have become either more or less critical, which begs us to ask ourselves what could be the reasons behind these changes. Most probably due to the increasing global focus on and sincere
commitment to human rights over the past few decades, scholars have become more critical of the degree to which Carter actually lived up to the promises he made at the beginning of his presidency. Even though Carter’s commitment to human rights was progressive for that day and age, it still was, for the largest part, rhetorical. The contemporary global commitment to human rights, however, demands actual action. As scholars are now able to compare Carter’s human rights policy to the contemporary commitment to human rights, it is logical that they have become more critical and that they raise questions about the degree to which Carter actually lived up to his promises. Even though this is surely not the only explanation for the shift in the scholarly debate on Carter, it is plausible that this can, at least partially, explain the rising criticism towards Carter in the academic literature.
Whereas the academic debate on Carter has thus become more critical during the past few decades, scholars have become less critical towards Brzezinski and his role in the
administration. Even though the reason for this shift can never be explained with full certainty, a possible explanation is that the general stance towards American neoliberalism and neoliberal politicians has become more positive during the past two decades. Scholars argue that even though Brzezinski understood the importance of human rights, he also saw the limitations of this policy and became realistic of the actual potential success of this policy much faster than Carter. Whereas scholars were critical of Brzezinski’s realistic approach in the nineties and early 2000’s, the rising neoliberalism in the western hemisphere of the past
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two decades could explain the shift to a less critical academic opinion of Brzezinski’s realist approach to human rights during his time as the National Security Advisor.
Carter and Brzezinski clearly had different characters and backgrounds, making it even more interesting to analyse their influence on the human rights policy of the
administration. In order to discuss what kind of influence they had and how this influence potentially shifted during the administration’s term, this thesis will analyse the human rights policy of the administration towards South Africa, as this was one of the prioritized countries in Carter’s human rights policy. To know where the academic debate on Carter’s foreign policy towards South Africa stands, it is essential to review the literature on this subject. The literature on the policy of the Carter administration towards South Africa can be split up in two schools of thought. The first one views Carter’s policy towards South Africa as a success and emphasizes the ways in which the administration remained critical of the South African government. The second school is critical of Carter’s policy towards the Apartheid regime and focuses on the ways in which Carter abandoned the moral underpinnings of his foreign policy.
Smith is convinced of the success of Carter’s South Africa policy. He argues that American rhetoric changed after the massacre at Sharpeville, and emphasizes Carter’s direct condemnation of minority rule once he became president.82 Moreover, Smith highlights the support of the US in the UN resolutions and sanctions, and argues that the US even went beyond these consequences in their policy towards South Africa.83 By cutting off the
equipment of South African police and military personnel, and urging American businesses in South Africa to abide a code of labour practices against that of Apartheid law, the US tied above average consequences to the human rights violations of the racist regime.84
82 Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 143-144. 83 Ibid., 145.
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Both Douglas Brinkley and William Steding also mention Carter’s policy in South Africa. Steding argues that South Africa was on Carter’s priority list.85 Douglas Brinkley states that Carter advocated majority rule in Africa and was the first American president to publicly criticize and condemn the apartheid regime of South Africa.86
Nancy Mitchell views Carter’s policy towards southern Africa as positive and well-executed. She argues that Washington was very concerned with the possibly of a Cuban or Soviet intervention in Rhodesia, and that Carter had to figure out “how to claim the moral high ground but not end up on the same side as the Soviet Union.”87 Mitchell argues that the administration decision to treat “communist-backed rebels as equal partners,” made them break with the American tradition of favouring white minority regimes over any ties with the Soviet Union.88 Through this policy, Carter remained loyal to his administration’s goals and moral underpinnings, even though he pursued a very controversial policy.89 In this policy, Carter was motivated by his own experiences in the Jim Crow South of America. According to Mitchell, race and the Cold War were always intertwined for the president, making it harder for him to solely focus on American geopolitical goals within his policy towards South Africa.90
In contrast to the relatively small number of scholars who contend that Carter’s policies in South Africa had a positive result, more scholars are critical of the South Africa policy of the administration. In their book Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. business support for
apartheid, historians Elizabeth Schmidt and Ron Dellums argue that the trickle down effect,
expected as a result of economic cooperation, did not work.91 Moreover they contend that by
85 Steding, Presidential Faith and Foreign Policy, 54. 86 Brinkley, “The Rising Stock of Jimmy Carter,” 519. 87 Mitchell, Jimmy Carter in Africa, 670.
88 Ibid., 673. 89 Ibid., 685. 90 Ibid., 11;14.
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favouring a moderate, anti-Soviet, pro US government, the policy of the Carter administration placed itself “on the wrong side of the liberation struggle.”92 Furthermore, they state that by doing so, the US tied itself to a racist regime and that any further cooperation would only expand their support and approval for the regime’s policies.93
In his book on US policy during the Apartheid years, historian Robert Massie argues that even though the election of Jimmy Carter initially created high hopes among anti-Apartheid groups, it soon became clear that the administration struggled to find a balance between a gradual increase in pressure on the South African government, or a hard line policy which would contain some risks.94 This in-between policy, together with pressure from other international crises, made Carter shift his attention to other parts of the world.95
Historian Alex Thomson emphasizes the initial attempts made by Carter to reform Apartheid trough economic cooperation.96 The article, however, also concludes that this economic approach did not work as the United States had envisioned.97 Thomson also focuses on the role of Brzezinski and argues that the NSA’s views had become dominant in the
second year of the term.98 The focus on the Cold War made the administration’s priorities clear, when it turned out that the US was willing to defend human rights in South Africa, but not when jeopardizing its own economic interests.99
Historian Simon Stevens contends that the administration’s human rights policy in South Africa was influenced by the personal experiences of Carter.100 Growing up in one of the few white families in his village, he had experienced first hand what segregation could do to a
92 Schmidt and Dellums, Decoding Corporate Camouflage, 84. 93 Ibid., 84-85.
94 Robert Kinloch Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in The Apartheid Years (New
York: Nan. A. Talese/Doubleday, 1997), 403; 407.
95 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 457.
96 Alex Thomson, “The Diplomacy of Impasse: the Carter Administration and Apartheid South Africa,”
Diplomacy and Statecraft 21, no. 1 (2010): 117.
97 Thomson, “The Diplomacy of Impasse,” 117. 98 Ibid., 120.
99 Ibid., 121.
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country and was shaped by “the recollection of the transformation of race relations in the American South.”101 Even though Carter was thus committed to ending racial inequality in South Africa, he still adopted a “very cautious policy for promoting change.”102 Carter was not the only one in the administration who was committed to human rights, according to Stevens.103 Brzezinski recognized the possibility of two problems. First, Apartheid would soon appear on the agenda of the UN, and the US needed to quickly demonstrate its condemnation towards it.104 Secondly, the NSA was well aware of the potential spread of communism in Southern Africa.105 Stevens, therefore, argues that even though his motives were different than those of Vance and Young – Brzezinski’s motive was containing communism, Vance and Young saw it as a moral issue – he still “shared their belief in the necessity of promoting change.”106 Not knowing how to approach the South African
government without angering them, Carter came up with the policy of economic cooperation. The Sullivan Principles were a step towards the right direction, containing guidelines for American businesses in South Africa promoting anti-Apartheid regulations.107 However, the administration was still hesitant to promote real change through not only verbal
condemnation, but actual policy action, which was reflected in the constant fear that the administration would push South Africa too far and lose the possibility of any cooperation.108 This fear resulted in a decline in interest and action towards South Africa from the Carter administration in the second half of its term.109
Not only the commitment to human rights in South Africa declined. Generally,
Washington’s commitment to human rights faded away during Carter’s four years in office.
101 Stevens, “From the Viewpoint of a Southern Governor,” 845. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid., 848. 104 Ibid., 849-850. 105 Ibid., 851. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid., 872; 874. 108 Ibid., 868; 876. 109 Ibid., 878-879.
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To exemplify this general shift in the administration, this thesis will analyse the
administration’s policy towards South Africa in depth in the other chapters and discuss the influence of the most important policymakers, such as Carter and Brzezinski. In doing so, it will illustrate how the administration shifted its priorities and under which, or whose, influence this process occurred.
28 2. 1977: The year of hope and morality
Shortly after Jimmy Carter was inaugurated as the 39th President of the United States, he promised to make his commitment to human rights “absolute.”110 As illustrated earlier, the administration’s desire to focus on morality and human rights was very strong, at least in the beginning. Scholars, however, disagree on the degree to which Carter actually lived up to this promise during his presidency. This chapter will shed a light on the human rights policy towards South Africa in the first year of Carter’s administration and discuss the most important motives for that specific policy. Moreover, it will discuss the influence of
Brzezinski on the policy. This year was, as the title suggests, the year of hope and morality, as it was characterized by sincere attention to human rights, a major focus on the issues
concerning Southern Africa and a policy very similar to the initial policy plans of the Carter administration. However, this chapter will also illustrate that the administration’s intentions already started to fade away at the end of its first year, due to a general shift in the
administration’s foreign policy priorities.
Carter made a commitment to globally promote human rights in his early days as a president, which resounded in the better part of his first year. Carter’s commitment was clearly visible throughout 1977, however, it was far from ‘absolute’. Human rights were an important of Carter’s foreign policy, but were sometimes also used as a leverage to solve international difficulties. Even though the administration thus made it clear that human rights would play an important role in its foreign policy, it never became entirely clear in what kind of policy this would result and how this policy would be implemented. In an action
memorandum, written on February 4, from the director of the policy planning staff, Anthony Lake, to Vance, it was stated that “implementation depends on our designing an overall
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strategy – with a coherent set of goals, sense of priorities, and assessment of US leverage.”111 According to Lake, the State Department was lacking this strategy, resulting in uncoordinated attempts to deal with current problems.112 Seven months after this action memorandum, another action memorandum was sent to Vance, this time written by Lake and the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia Derian. In this memo, Lake and Derian conveyed that there was still public misunderstanding about the
administration’s human rights policy.113 This illustrates the incapacity of the administration throughout its first year to publicly clarify the meaning and goals of its human rights policy. The administration’s internal struggle to find a strategy to implement its policy and the difficulties to publicly explain and motivate its human rights policy would turn out to be a large incompetence in its foreign policy. As Carter and his administration struggled to define its general human rights policy, accordingly, they had issues defining their human rights policy towards specific countries. One of the administration’s prioritized countries was South Africa, in which human rights violations were an everyday occurrence.
Carter’s policy towards southern Africa in 1977 was characterized by the interplay between the issues in Namibia, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Even though this thesis specifically researches the policy towards South Africa, the issues in Namibia and Rhodesia were so intertwined with those of South Africa, that it is nearly impossible to assess the situation in South Africa in isolation. Both Rhodesia and Namibia proved to be political challenges for the administration. Namibia had been under a mandate of South Africa since the end of the First World War. As South Africa imposed its apartheid laws on Namibia in
111 Department of State (DOS), Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to
Secretary of State Vance, February 4, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. 2, 26.
112 DOS, Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State
Vance, February 4, 1977.
113 DOS, Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs (Derian) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance, September 15, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. 2, 254.
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1948, tensions rose. The SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization) stood up for its country and contested the South African government. Despite waging a long relentless battle against the colonizers, Namibia only gained independence in 1990. Rhodesia was subject to a white minority government which had remained in power after the division of the Federation of Rhodesia in 1963. Even though the British had distanced themselves from Rhodesia and preferred a black majority government, the Rhodesian government still claimed its
independence in 1965. This government was immediately condemned by the international community and was not recognized as the official government.114 The ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union) – supported by China – and the ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) – supported by the Soviet Union – also contested the white minority government, and eventually gained political power in 1980.115
Even though the issues in Namibia and Rhodesia were of great importance to the administration, Carter’s focus was on South Africa and the elimination of apartheid.116
The Apartheid regime came to power in South Africa in 1948, establishing laws that separated the South African whites from South African blacks. Even though there were eighteen million black citizens in South Africa at this time, making them the majority of the population, John Vorster’s government did not even consider these people citizens of South Africa.117 Through the policy of ‘homelands’, Vorster made sure that the white South Africans would not have to live alongside black South Africans. This system had a lot of resemblances with the Jim Crow system in the American South, which made it crucially important for the Carter administration to demonstrate their unwillingness to support the South African government.
114 Sarah B. Snyder, From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 45.
115 Snyder, From Selma to Moscow, 59.
116 National Security Council (NSC), Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review
Committee, February, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 757-777.
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In a report, written in the beginning of 1977, the National Security Council Policy Review Committee set out the meaning of apartheid and its consequences. According to the committee, racial discrimination had been present in South Africa for almost three centuries, through a system in which white supremacy was “maintained by a complex system of
interwoven coercive economic and social controls.”118 The committee pointed to the fact that the South African law was the only law which maintained its dominance over the majority on the basis of ‘colour’.119 Furthermore, the report pointed to the increasing violence in South Africa, but also recognized that the government was probably, at that moment, strong enough to suppress the violent uprisings.120 In addition, the report concluded that, despite internal and external pressure, the South African government did not envision much change and remained to be influenced by their “traditional attitudes of innate conservatism, racial prejudice and fear of black domination.”121
To encourage peaceful settlements and majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and to end Apartheid in South Africa were thus the main goals of the administration in their policy towards southern Africa.122 Even though the administration aimed to approach these countries separately, it realised that these three issues were undeniably interrelated, and thus concluded that it had to create an intricate way of approaching these three issues all together.123
After the inauguration in January 1977, the administration immediately began developing its policies towards South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia. The first few weeks display the administration’s initial struggles with this region, as they tried to balance
criticizing the South African government on one hand, and their dependence on South African cooperation and contact on the other hand. They concluded that “within the basic policy of
118 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 119 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 120 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 121 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 122 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 123 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777.
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restraint on our relations with South Africa”, they would “avoid taking any further restrictive actions which could have an adverse effect on our relationship with the South African
government.”124 They thus chose to loosen the ties on South Africa to some extent, in order to create a solid cooperation with the South African government, which would be essential in their policy towards Namibia and Rhodesia. 125 In March, the president issued a presidential directive in which he stated that the US government would “adopt a new focus in its policies toward the Government of South Africa.”126 Its aim would be “to promote a progressive transformation of South African society.”127 This policy meant that the American government would refrain from imposing any new measures on the South African government, in order to create stability in the region. Almost two weeks after this presidential directive, Carter met with the South African ambassador to the United States, Pik Botha. In this meeting, Carter reiterated his condemnation of Apartheid, but also emphasized that the American government did not aim to publicly criticize the South African government, and only asked for a clearer understanding of the South African policies.128
The months after this meeting, however, illustrate a shift in the American policy. When the administration realised that the initial approach was not successful, because the South Africans had not shown any real commitment to changing their policies, they altered their course.129 In March, the administration successfully lobbied in Congress for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, which made it possible for Carter to halt the import of Rhodesian chrome.130 Even though this action was not specifically aimed at South Africa, it did display
124 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 125 NSC, Study Prepared by the National Security Council Policy Review Committee, February, 1977, 757-777. 126 Executive Office of the President (EOP), Presidential Directive/NSC-5, March 9, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980,
vol. 18, 804.
127 EOP, Presidential Directive/NSC-5, March 9, 1977, 804.
128 DOS, Memorandum of Conversation, March 23, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 805-811. 129 DOS, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 867-890.
130 The Byrd Amendment (1971) prohibited the US from banning the import of strategic materials from
non-communist countries, which made it possible for the US to import chrome from Rhodesia even though this country was not recognized by the UN due to its racist policies; NSC, Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman of
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US condemnation of southern African white minority regimes, which ultimately also affected its relations with South Africa.
In May, the administration made the decision to halt the export of military equipment to South Africa, since “military cooperation (…) would undercut the progress we have made in generating better understanding and acceptance of American goals among black African states and other Third World Countries.”131 This political decision clearly shows the shift in the policy due to a lack of actual change in South Africa, as well as the fear for international condemnation if the US did not take appropriate measures towards the South African
government.
Only three months after the first draft of the US policy towards South Africa, a new policy review was issued in July 1977. In this review, additional measures towards South Africa were discussed. Some of the smaller measures would, for example, be the closure of the American missile tracking station in South Africa and the elimination of commercial services, whilst graver measures would entail discouraging future US investment and discouraging American banks from issuing loans to South Africa.132 The gravest measure would be supporting the call for mandatory sanctions in the UN.133 Even though these steps were seriously considered by the American government, the administration concluded that only a few small measures would be taken at this point, and that the rest of the measures needed further studies, in order to take into account potential economic or political consequences for the US and South Africa.134
the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), April 20, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. 2, 111.
131 DOS, Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), May 28, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 854.
132 DOS, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 867-890. 133 DOS, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated.
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Shortly after this policy review, the US-South African relationship was tested when the Soviet Union supposedly found proof of the development of a South African nuclear weapon. Even though the rhetoric from the American government towards the South African government had been relatively ‘soft’ up till now, the possibility of a nuclear weapon clearly aggravated Washington. In a telegram from the Department of State to the American embassy in South Africa, the US made clear that they considered “the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be a major risk to international peace and stability” and that the administration was
“determined to do everything in its power to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities.”135 The administration, furthermore, emphasized that, if these allegations would turn out to be true, the relationship between the US and South Africa would be heavily damaged.136 It is notable, especially for this study, that during these conversations on the possible nuclear bomb, the worries about the other issues in South(ern) Africa became of much less importance to the administration. Moreover, at the same time that the US showed deep concern about a possible nuclear bomb, the South African and American governments began their conversations on their possible cooperation on the uranium plants in South
Africa.137 Even though this cooperation was more deeply developed in the years after 1977, it is essential to point to the double sided policy of the US at this point in time. By trying to condemn the apartheid regime as well as cooperating with them on uranium production, the administration displayed little perseverance in adhering to their initial policy towards South Africa. Therefore, the few actions of the Carter administration which did actually condemn the apartheid regime, became much less powerful and, at times, almost ineffective and hypocrite.
135 DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa, August 10, 1977, FRUS
1977-1980, vol. 18, 895.
136 DOS, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa, August 17, 1977, FRUS
1977-1980, vol. 18, 899-900.
137 NSC, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of
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As the year went on, US policy seemed to become even more complex. At the same time that the American government set up the first talks on potential cooperation on uranium supply, the administration also decided to end the cooperation on naval surveillance and to add additional restrictions on military exports.138 Moreover, the administration decided to recall their naval attaché and review US economic relations with South Africa. The last few months of 1977 were thus characterized by contradicting interests and signals of the US, which made their relationship with the South African government even more complicated then it already was at the beginning of 1977.
During the first year of the Carter administration, it quickly became clear what the underlying motives and ideas were for US policy towards South Africa. First of all, what was clearly essential to the administration’s approach to South Africa, was an emphasis on
America’s own progress on racial issues. In multiple conversations with the South African government, US officials recalled America’s history, its racial issues and the many
wrongdoings against African-Americans. For example, in a conversation between American Vice President Walter Mondale and African officials Pik Botha and Balthazar Vorster, Mondale stated that “we have undergone a profound transformation over the past ten years” and that the US “record on race was disgraceful” as it “separated people in politics, schools, buses, business and systems of justice.”139 The American record on racism was thus an incentive for the administration to pursue a human rights policy, as this would help “fulfil a moral obligation” that the US had “incurred by virtue of its heritage and values.”140 President Carter also emphasized US racial history in his personal conversations with the South
138 Department of Defense (DOD), Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the Chief of the
South African Defense Force (Malan), November 21, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 980; NSC, Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Commerce Kreps, November 28, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 985.
139 NSC, Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, March 3, 1977, FRUS 1977-1980, vol. 18, 838. 140 DOS, Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August
