The Government of Unity
A study case of the successful legitimization of
power by the Rwandan Government
Iona Mulder 5897645
Ionamulder@hotmail.com
Master thesis – University of Amsterdam History: Holocaust and Genocide Studies Supervisor: Dr. Kjell Anderson
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
Preface
Introduction
8
1.The Rwandan Government
16
1.1 Their History
16
1.2 Their Visions
23
1.2.1 The
Vision 2020 and the Constitution of 200325
1.3 Social and Economic Reconstruction
26
2.The Official Narrative
32
2.1 Sources and methodology
34
2.1.1 Sources
34
2.1.2 Methodology
36
2.2 The official narrative
37
2.2.1 Pre-Colonial Period
37
2.2.2 Colonial period
37
2.2.3 The Year 1959
39
2.2.4 The Two Republics
40
2.2.5 The period 1990 until the genocide
41
2.2.6 The Genocide
42
2.3 The Identity
44
5
6
2.4 Legitimizing Authority
46
Conclusion
48
3. The Transitional Legal System
50
3.1 Sources and Methodology
52
3.1.1 Sources
52
3.1.2 Methodology
54
3.2 The Transitional Legal System
55
3.2.1 Foundation of the Transitional Legal System
55
3.2.2 The Period 1996-2003
56
3.2.3 The Period 2003-2012
61
3.2.3a The Gacaca-courts
61
3.2.3b The National Courts
67
3.2.3c Laws concerning genocide ideology
69
3.2.4 2012 and Onwards
71
3.3 The Narrative of Transitional law
74
3.4 Types of authority and
the transitional legal system
76
Conclusion
82
Conclusion
84
Bibliography
90
Abbreviations
ASF Avocats Sans Frontières
CNLG Commission for the Fight against Genocide ECHR European Court of Human Rights
FAR Rwandan Armed Forces
HRW Human Right Watch
MRND Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Dévelopment NRA National Resistance Army (Uganda)
NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission RANU Rwandese Alliance for National Unity
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRB Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer project RRWF Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation RTLM Radio Télévsion Libre des Mille Collines
SURF Survivors Fund
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
Preface
This thesis all began with my interest in how historical events shape legal systems. The example I had in mind was the influence of the Second World War on the development of (international) legal systems. However, I was very curious how this process unfolds at a national level, well aware that this would be different for every nation-state. Rwanda seemed like the perfect case study in relation to my interests because the genocide was a very significant event in the history of the country after which the legal system had to be rebuilt. Thus, there was likely a direct correlation between the genocide and the development of the legal system. Moreover, since my last year at high school, I have been fascinated by Rwanda and the genocide that occurred there in 1994.
Because little was written on the national legal system in Rwanda, I decided to go to Rwanda myself in search for information. I planned the trip in the summer of 2015. It was going to be my second visit to Rwanda. The previous time I participated in a study trip on Transitional Justice organized by the University of Tilburg, but this time, I was alone. As soon as I set foot on Rwandan ground, my heart started pounding a little bit faster, excited about what I would experience during my journey and the quest of finding the information I needed in the short term of one month. I really enjoyed my stay in Rwanda. As I was driving (in a white mini-bus) one day at sunset over the Rwandan hills, I was thinking that it would be difficult for anyone not to start loving this country, with all its kindness, hills, smells and its dark edge that causes a continuing curiosity.
I succeeded in arranging multiple interviews with legal experts. However, the more people I spoke, the more I became aware that the development of the legal system was as much influenced by history as by the current social-political circumstances. With current social-political circumstances, I mainly mean the political visions and ends of the ruling elite. History does affect the legal system. However, the political elite also frames this history in a manner that is to the advantage of their interests and ideology, and again this version of history is supported by the narrative presented by the legal system (I will explain how in this thesis). It became apparent to me that there exists a triangular relationship between the government, its version of history and the transitional legal system. After this discovery, I decided to turn my question around and investigate what political reasons the government had to promote a particular version of history and to develop its legal
system in the way it did. It was the works of the sociologists Max Weber and Benedict Anderson that provided me with the methodological and theoretical framework to set the focus of this question on the concept of 'authority'.
I know one thing for sure: I would not have been able to complete this thesis without the help of my friends and family. They have supported me from the journey to Rwanda until the end of the writing process. They inspired me, gave me a kick in the pants when I needed it, reassured me, tolerated my bad moods and had faith that I would finish it. I especially want to thank Anke Tjoelker, Krijn Dijkstra, Anouk Smits, Marieke Zoodsma and Marleen Koning for their critical reading of the text and giving me comments that helped me to develop my thoughts. Moreover, I want to thank my supervisor Dr. Kjell Anderson for the inspiring (long) conversations and comments.
Regarding my field research, I would like to thank Dr. Nick Huls and Amani Chibashimba for helping me to get in contact with many of my interviewees. Also, I want to express my gratitude to my interviewees for their time, information and stories. And last but definitely not least I want to thank Bénigne and Lucie whose hospitality and conversation showed me yet another side of Rwanda.
Introduction
The year 1994: Rwanda is a small green land in the middle of Africa, formed by thousands of hills. It is a small country but has a high population density. The majority of the people live off their lands in the countryside. Therefore, the most fertile land is cultivated by small farms, settling
communities and villages on each hill. On the 6th of April, nearby its capital Kigali, a plane was shot down. On the plane was the President of Rwanda's Second Republic, Juvénal Habyarimana. It seemed as if the shooting of the plane was a starting-signal for mass killings all over the country. The killings were the result of tensions between groups defined as Hutu and Tutsi. The massacre was highly likely planned, and with certainty stimulated by extreme Hutu politicians. From April to July the Rwandan hills were the scene of countless acts of inhumanities: between 500.000 and 800.000 people - the majority Tutsi - were killed.1 People slaughtered their fellow villagers, neighbors or even friends and family. All around the world people watched the event on television, in disbelief about its horrors. Neither the UN nor any country intervened to stop the killings.2
In June, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army composed of Tutsi refugees’ descendants, invaded Rwanda from Uganda. They took over the power in the country, putting an end to the mass killing of the Tutsi. After these four months of killing the country was completely ruined. Its
governmental infrastructure was completely gone; most of the small number of educated people Rwanda had known were killed or fled, buildings plundered or destroyed. The RPF was faced with the immense challenge to develop a new governmental structure. At the same time, they had to find a way for the Rwandan society to deal with the violent past and move on. This challenge included
1 Jacques Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre (Columbia University Press, New York;
2007) 141; Scott Straus, The order of Genocide, Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Cornell University Press, London and Ithaca; 2006) 51.
2 For a more nuanced and detailed description of the causes and the course of the genocide, the following literature is
recommended: Straus, The order of Genocide (2006); Scott Straus, Making and Unmaking Nations, War,
Leadership, and Genocide in Modern Africa (Cornell University Press; 2015) 273-321; Jean Hatzfeld, Seizoen van de Machetes, Het verhaal van de Daders (De bezige Bij, Amsterdam; 2004); Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide (Columbia University Press, New York; 1995).
the question of how to cope with the hundreds of thousands of perpetrators who participated in the killings and other atrocities.3 Their struggle to deal with the "past wrongs in order to create a decent civil order" is the topic of transitional justice.4 The decisions they made in this regard is referred to in this thesis as transitional justice policy.
Rwanda has been successful in establishing itself as a ‘donor darling’, now twenty-one years after the genocide half of its national budget is still generated by donors. Although around half of Rwandans still live below the poverty level, the economy is growing, and the middle class is expanding. The country is considered as part of the top three investment climates in Africa, partly a result of its strict anti-corruption policy, stability and security within the country.5 Governmental structures are back in place; education and health care are accessible for most Rwandans, roads are well maintained. In the words of Nick Huls: "the country has risen from the genocidal ashes surprisingly rapidly."6 A legal system was developed that had to capacity to trial almost all the perpetrators of the genocide.7 In December 2015 a referendum was held to change the constitution to allow President Kagame a third term; 90 percent voted in favor. One can question the democratic value of this referendum. However, the voting was conducted without (violent) resistance that had any social or political impact, in contrast with similar referendums in Burundi, Burkina Faso, and Congo-Brazzaville where the population raised in opposition against their president and
government.8
It is clear that the current government is dominated by the RPF. They are a military organization in origin composed of the Tutsi minority, moreover, exiles before 1994. In 1990 violent attempts of the RPF to return to their fatherland were repelled with the assistance of the international community, especially France. The odds were thus not in the RPF's favor in the years prior to the genocide, but after the genocide, they seem to have achieved an about-turn in social status. This change of social
3 Straus estimated that around 210.000 Rwandans participated in violent attacks during the genocide. This number
equals 7-8 percent of the active adult Hutu population: Straus, The order of Genocide (2006) 115-118.
4 Jack Rotondi, Nir Eisikovits, Claudio Corradetti, 'Introduction', in Theorizing Transitional Justice ed. Jack Rotondi,
Nir Eisikovits, Claudio Corradetti (EBSCO Publishing, E-book collection; 2015).
5 'World Bank data', <http://rru.worldbank.org/BESnapshots/Rwanda/default.aspx> accessed at 2 March 2015;
'OECD data', <http://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/41105593.pdf> at 2 March 2015; World Bank Group, 'Sustaining Investment Climate, and Making Rwanda a Favorite Business Destination', at: <https://www.wbginvestmentclimate.org/publications/upload/Rwanda-Factsheet-December-2013-2.pdf> accessed at 2 March 2015.
6 Nick Huls, Rwanda: Een Rechtsstaat in de Mist (Boom Juridische Uitgevers, Den Haag; Speech on 24
October 2014 published in short version 2015) 9.
7 William Schabas, ‘The Rwanda Case: Sometimes It’s Impossible’ in: Post-conflict Justice ed. M. Cherif Bassiouni
(Transnational Publishers; 2002) 499-505.
status puts forward the question how they reached this shift.
Following, the central question of this thesis is why is the transitional justice policy of the Rwandan government successful? With successful is meant, a state that can create stability and peace by acceptance of its "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” without the actual use of force, at national and international level.9 The hypothesis of this thesis is that its success is the result of the fact that the current Rwandan government has included different forms of authority within the transitional justice policy. In this thesis these forms of authority are categorized into five types, four of which were introduced by the influential sociologist Max Weber and one of them by the more recent leading sociologist Benedict Anderson. With the 'types of authority legitimization,' Weber refers to social processes that induce individuals to submit to orders of others, but without the direct use of physical force. Moreover, "Authority is distinguished from persuasion by the fact that people a priori suspend their judgment and accept that of an
acknowledged superior without having to be convinced that this is correct."10 This understanding legitimization of authority will be used throughout this thesis.
There are three types of legitimate authority by Weber which are most known; traditional
legitimization, charismatic legitimization, and legal-rational legitimization. Traditional legitimacy is based on traditional norms which define succession. It is thus based on cultural values of power and social relations, bounding individuals to their leader as a result of traditional loyalty. This type of authority is ill-equipped to understand profound social change, as it undercuts its roots: "The norm generates the leader."11 Ideal versions of this type of authority are premodern social orders, as primitive societies or forms of patriarchalism and feudalism. Charismatic legitimization is based on the charisma of leaders, and is in contrast to traditional legitimization ahistorical and unbound by existing social norms. Most often, this leader is a personification of a new social movement or development, therefore, able to create new norms "as long as the prophet retains his or her
charisma."12 The third type is legal-rational legitimization. Ideal examples of this type of authority are nation-states with developed bureaucracies. The legitimization is created by the belief of the supremacy of law, which includes the belief that the legal system is established to serve collective
9
Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation: Lecture to the Free Students Society at Munich University, January 1919' in:
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Routledge, New York; 2009) 78.
10 Peter M. Blau, 'Critical remarks on Weber's theory of Authority', in: Makers of Modern Social Science: Max Weber
ed. Dennis Wrong (1970) 148.
11 Martin Spencer, 'Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority', in: The British Journal of Sociology Vol. 21 No. 2
(June 1970) 125.
interests of the society. This belief is independent of the content of the rules. The foundation of this legitimization is legal norms, but these norms can be modified as long as they are "established in a manner which is recognized to be legal."13 This form of legitimization is thus ascribed to the system and not to the individual with a function within the system.14
In his later work Weber has mentioned a fourth type of authority that legitimizes an authority, that of “rational belief in absolute values”.15 However, Weber has not analyzed this concept in depth similar to the other types of authority. Therefore, it is often neglected in the secondary literature on his work.16 In contrast, the scholar Martin Spencer has convincingly argued, that this concept of Weber is a significant contribution to his other types of authority. Spencer's interpretation of this type of authority, which he calls value-rational legitimization, is based on an overview of Weber's work and is adopted in this thesis. These values-rationals are absolute principles as, “‘consent of the governed’, 'freedom', 'equality', 'the good of the people', 'will of the majority', 'separation of
power'".17 These principles underline the legal-rational system of rules and legitimize this system in its entirety, for example, democracy – although cynics argue that the importance of these values diseases for the governed with the development of a legal-rational bureaucracy -.18 It follows that if the legal-rational system is not in line with these value-rationals then this can lead to frustration in societies, unrest, and finally resulting in the displacement of the legal-rational system; (social) revolutions. Thus, value-rationals are important to understand the legitimization of authoritative systems, apart from traditional norms, leaders and legal rules.
The fifth type of authority used in this thesis is, as stated before, not part of the work of Weber. A criticism of the well-known American sociologist Peter M. Blau on the work of Weber is that Weber's focus is merely on slow social change based on social processes in Germany in the period around the First World War.19 He states that Weber ignores eruptions of social change, namely revolutions: "He has no theory of revolution".20 Also, the scholar Laurie A. Brand, who wrote an innovative research on official narratives of governments, states that a revolutionary theory is
13
Spencer, 'Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority' (1970) 125.
14 Spencer, 'Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority' (1970) 125, 126; Dennis Wrong, 'Introduction' in: Makers of
Modern Social Science: Max Weber ed. Dennis Wrong (1970) 41-53.
15 Quote Max Weber, in: Blau, 'Critical remarks on Weber's theory of Authority' (1970) 151. 16
In 1919 Weber became too sick to work because of the Spanish flu. It is argued that this disease and his death a year after did interrupt further development of this type of authority.
17 Spencer, 'Weber on Legitimate Norms and Authority' (1970) 131. 18
Wolfgang J. Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy, perspectives on the political sociology of Max Weber (Basil Blackwell, Oxford; 1974) 81, 81.
19 Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy (1974) 1-10.
missing in Weber's work.21 Arguably Benedict Anderson filled this lacuna of revolutionary
legitimacy within Weber's sociological theories of authority. Anderson first identified this concept in the renewed conclusion of the second edition of his book Imagined Communities. Due to
international developments of decolonization Anderson adjusted and expanded the theories of his first edition. The governments that came into power after independence legitimized their power on their contribution to the independent struggle.22 Anderson solely links revolutionary legitimacy to independence struggles. However, the scholar Brand convincingly argued this concept can also be applied in a broader way to other freedom fights against any (imagined) suppression. 23
Anderson wrote his theories around thirty years ago, Weber even almost hundred years. The question that comes up is: are their theories, written in different times still relevant today? As the scholar Fritz Ringer writes "I do mean to claim that Weber's methodology remains remarkably relevant and fruitful even today, more than three-quarters of a century after his death." 24 Weber's theories of authority are found relevant by many scholars and serve as a basis for many new theoretical developments, as the abstract concept of symbolic power remains ever relevant, independently of social and cultural changes and developing academic debates.25 The use of
Weber's theories by Brands in her recent research book (2014) about the official narrative of Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi-Arabia underlines this statement.26
Another reason why Weber's theories remain relevant is that Weber intended these types of authority to be looked upon as "ideal type". In this thesis, the theories of Anderson will also be applied as such. These theories are thus exemplary analyses of social situations, forming theories that can help to analyze other situations, not stating that these situations are entirely similar or that the theory can be applied in the complete same way. 27 In other words, these 'types' do not make a priori and general conclusions of social situations but provides for an instrument that will help to understand them. Therefore, these theories of authority can be adapted to the rapid social changes of our time, and still contribute to creating insight in authority nowadays.28
21
Laurie A. Brand, Official Stories, Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria (Stanford University Press, Stanford; 2014) 19.
22 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Second Edition (Verso, London; 2006) xiv, 7,162, 163. 23 Brand, Official Stories (2014)15, 16.
24
Fritz Ringer, Max Weber's Methodology, The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences (London Harvard University Press, London; 1997) 171.
25 Ringer, Max Weber's Methodology (1997) 172; Jeffery D. Houghton, 'Does Max Weber's notion of authority still
hold in the twenty-first century?', in: Journal of Management History Vol. 16 No. 4 (2010).
26 Brand, Official Stories (2014)15.
27 Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy (1974) 74; Brand, Official Stories (2014) 15, 16.
To verify the hypothesis of this thesis the two most important elements to deal with the violent past of transitional societies are analyzed, namely the official history and the legal response to hold perpetrators of the atrocities responsible.29 The analysis of these two tools is central to this research, not to analyze its results but to understand how it legitimizes the authority of the ruling elite. As the scholar Brand argues: “The official scripting of both the past and the present are intended to shape popular understandings and responses to the socioeconomic, political, and religion-cultural
environment in ways that will serve regime ends.”30
Throughout this research, the term official narrative is used to refer to the story of past events that is promoted by the authority within society. The official narrative is not the same as collective memory because the official narrative is the story of a nation, including many events that have formed the identity of that nation, whereas collective memory can be created by any group on any event(s).31 Only a few academics have done research on the concept of the official historical narratives, therefore, there exists only little theory on how to analyze this concept.32 One work that has been a great inspiration for this research is that of Laurie A. Brand. In her book Official Stories, she analyzed ‘when and how' national political leadership of Egypt and Algeria used ‘elements of the narrative to consolidate or legitimate its power'.33 Similar to Brand’s work the intention of this research is neither to analyze whether these narratives comply with the historical truth nor to measure its effect on the society, but to construct how this official narrative can contributed to the legitimization of the authority, in this case of the current Rwandan government.
There have been many forms of legal responses in post-conflict society to hold the perpetrators accountable for their atrocities: truth-commission, international courts, hybrid courts, as well as making it a taboo subject, as is the case for Indonesia, hoping the crimes would fall into oblivion. To reiterate, the new Rwandan government was determined to bring all the perpetrators to justice. They came close to realizing this promise, making Rwanda unique in the numbers of perpetrators that have stood trial: over a million individuals have faced trial, either before ICTR (72 cases), the National Courts of Rwanda (there are no exact numbers of the total amount, but between 1997 and
Authority' (1970)151; Ringer, Max Weber's Methodology (1997) 172.
29 Gerhard Anders and Olaf Zenker, 'An Introduction', in: Transition and Justice, Negotiating the terms of New
Beginnings in Africa ed. Gerhard Anders and Olaf Zenker (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford; 2015) 9.
30
Brand, Official Stories (2014) 10.
31 Brand, Official Stories (2014) 9. 32 Brand, Official Stories (2014) 17. 33 Brand, Official Stories (2014) 20.
2002 there were 7.181 cases) or the semi- traditional Gacaca-courts (more than 1 million cases).34 Moreover, the particular features of these latter Gacaca-courts are innovative, as it combined the Western legal system with local norms of justice and arguably shifted its focus from retributive to restorative truth-seeking justice.35 Although much criticized, the Gacaca-court is also seen by many scholars as a progressive development in transitional justice.36
Legal approaches often have the appearance of political neutrality following from the moral drive to do justice. The argument of this thesis opposes this vision and argues that, in the words of the scholar Gerry Simon in regard to the Nuremberg trials: “the state involved is trying not only to illuminate the past, but also to justify the present.”37 In this thesis, it is analyzed how the legal response of the Rwandan government to the genocide crimes has been justifying its authority. The focus in this thesis will be on the national aspects of the legal response, thus on the Gacaca-courts and the National Courts. There is a broad range of academic research on the Gacaca-courts. The transitional response at the National Courts of Rwanda has been a strangely neglected subject of study, perhaps because at first sight it appears less innovative regarding the global developments of criminal justice, or because of the little available data on cases before the National Courts.
However, at the national level, these trials at the National Courts were innovative and significant. For both reasons my conducted field research in Rwanda was mainly directed at the National Court system and its development concerning genocide crimes. Thus, this thesis will also be a substantial contribution to the available data and knowledge on the Rwandan transitional legal system at the National Courts.
Arguably, a transitional justice policy includes more than solely the promotion of an official
narrative and the transitional legal response to the crimes of genocide. Education, cultural activities, social society and reintegration and assistance programs of victims and perpetrators are also
important elements of this policy to deal with a violent past. Nevertheless, this research primarily focused on the analysis of the official narrative and the transitional legal system of Rwanda. This demarcation is justified within the scope of this research because these two elements are paramount
34 Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 2007)
72, 76, 91.
35
Simon Turner, ‘Making Good Citizens from Bad Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda', in: Transition and Justice,
Negotiating the Terms of New Beginnings in Africa ed. Gerhard Anders and Olaf Zenker (Blackwell
Publishing, Oxford; 2015) 22; Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (2007) 85-99.
36
Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice Without Lawyers (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; 2010).
37 Gerry Simon, Law, War & Crimes, Ware Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law (Polity Press,
and exemplary in many respects concerning the legitimization of the government authority which is the main subject of this thesis. Moreover, the official narrative and national legal response are interesting study objects in itself, as they provide insights on the Rwandan transitional society.
This research is based on both secondary and primary sources. The primary sources are mainly conducted during a month of independent field research by the author in the summer of 2015. The sources and methodologies used differ for each separate chapter and, therefore, will be outlined at the beginning of the chapters in more depth. The first chapter will demonstrate that it is the RPF that dominates the Rwandan government and gives an overview of the history, ideology and transitional policy of the government. This chapter is important because the RPF's current policy follows not only from historical events in Rwanda, but also from their own history in Uganda. Also, this chapter will elucidate on the general social and political circumstance of Rwanda to provide a frame of understanding for the analyses of the following two chapters. The second chapter is an in-depth outline of the official Rwandan narrative. The third chapter is an analysis of the transitional legal response of the Rwandan government. Chapters two and three are employed to verify the hypothesis of this research: that the transitional justice policy includes five types of authority and is successful as a result. In the conclusion, the findings of all chapters will be brought together.
It could be argued that the form of this research can lead to suggestive instead of conclusive
findings, as a result of reading in conclusions on the Rwandan transitional justice policy, instead of having hard evidence on its intentions and effects. However, hard evidence of underlying intentions of authorities almost never exists. It is, therefore, only by reason and factual knowledge of social and political circumstance that it is possible to identify these intentions. The theories of the Weber and Anderson provide a theoretical tool to unravel these intentions in a systematic manner. This is the goal of this thesis.
1.The Rwandan Government
In the introduction and the following chapters, the term 'the Rwandan government' is frequently invoked. The purpose of this chapter is to indicate who is referred to when this term is invoked. This chapter will not merely prove that the current government is equivalent to the RPF and its associates, but will also analyze their governance, and how it came into being. In other words, this chapter will provide the first insight into the ruling of Rwanda by the RPF. It is necessary to answer three questions to provide this insight. First of all, what is their history? Secondly, what is their ideology and how did this ideology develop over time? And thirdly, how do they want to reconstruct Rwanda?
Chapters two and three will discuss in-depth two specific elements of the government's
post-genocide policy, namely its official narrative and its transitional legal response, to analyze how this policy has legitimized the power of the Rwandan government. This chapter is an introduction to the social and political framework of Rwanda, which will support the analyses of the following two chapters. The sources that are used in this chapter are mainly secondary literature, supplemented by government documents, and a comprehensive group conversation with a group of young Rwandans adults. Although questions were prepared in advance, it was an unstructured conversation, during which several topics related to the transitional policy of the government were discussed. I recorded the complete conversation and analyzed its transcription for this chapter. I was pleasantly surprised by the openness of the group and their profound thoughts. Moreover, a few informal conversations I had with several Rwandans helped me to understand the social and political framework of Rwanda better, including the several possible perceptions on it.
1.1 Their History
revolution the authority of the Tutsi elite – part of the Tutsi minority – was questioned by the Hutu majority. This change was supported by the Belgium colonists and the Catholic Church, who both turned their favor from the Tutsi kings as rulers to the Hutu majority. In the chaos surrounding this revolution, which continued for five years, many Tutsi were killed, many other fled abroad. Those who fled formed a considerable diaspora of Rwandan Tutsi. In 1962, Rwanda became independent. Rwanda's first president Kayibanda consolidated his power by picturing the Tutsi as the enemy, who suppressed the Hutu for centuries. He applied this trick again at the beginning of the 1970s, this time with less success in holding on to his power, but still resulting in violence against Tutsi, causing a new wave of Tutsi refugees to neighboring countries.38
The total number of the Tutsi diaspora is disputable, but the known Rwandan expert Gérard Prunier has made a credible estimate based on official numbers of the UNHCR. He stated that at the
beginning of the 1990s the total number of Tutsi refugees was between 600.000 and 700.000; divide over Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Congo.39 The simple vision of the Rwandan history is that the RPF is a military organization of Tutsi refugees and their decedents who fled Rwanda between 1959 and 1990, putting all these refugees under the same umbrella.40 However, these refugees have a complicated history of their own, representing a mix of different political ambitions, regional sentiments, and affiliations based on the time of fleeing from Rwanda. For this thesis, the situation of the refugees in Uganda is of particular interest, because it is within this group that the RPF originated.
In the first decade after the 1959 revolution, many movements of Tutsi refugees made (violent) attempts to return home. Most of these groups wanted to establish the return of the Tutsi monarchy, but on many other aspects, they were too divided to be successful.41 In 1979 Rwandan refugees in Uganda establish an organization called the Rwandese Refugee Welfare Foundation (RRWF), which transformed into a more political and militant orientated organization under the name Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU). A little less than a decade later the RPF will emerge from this organization. The RANU was occupied with the question of "return of the exiles to Rwanda".42 In contrast to many previous organizations of Rwandan Tutsi refugees, this organization openly
38
Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis (1995) 41-61.
39 Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis (1995) 55-61.
40 Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda (E-book version, Cambridge University Press,
New York; 2013) 'Introduction'; Straus, The Order of Genocide, Race, Power and War in Rwanda ( 2006) 24.
41 Cyrus Reed, ‘Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ in: The Journal of Modern African
Studies Vol. 34 No. 3 (September 1996) 480-482; Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis (1995) 64-67.
opposed the restoration of the monarchy of the Tutsi-kings; instead, they had a more leftist vision that focused on the establishment of a new republic.43 The importance of this organization remained minimal for the following years, during which the Tutsi refugees got involved in the national
politics of Uganda.44
From the 1970s, the Tutsi-refugees got involved in the resistance against the then-president of Uganda, Obote. They were especially active in the successful National Resistance Army (NRA), led by Yoweri Museveni. The Tutsi-refugees were stimulated in their support for the NRA by a wave of persecution against them with the approval of Obote. Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame were two prominent Tutsi members of the NRA. Both later became very influential leaders of the RANU and its successor the RPF. When the NRA took over Kampala in 1986 almost one-third of the army consisted of Rwandan Tutsi.
Soon after Museveni came into power he stopped favoring the Rwandan Tutsi because of various political reasons. Many of them were expelled from the army and governmental positions.45
Consequently, the Rwandan refugees felt unwelcome again in Uganda, which strengthened the wish to return to Rwanda. "Museveni's relative cooling off towards them was the ‘last straw’, even for those like Rwigyema himself, who had never been much interested in a 'return' to Rwanda."46 Many of the Tutsi refugees decided to join the RANU or increased their loyalty to this organization if they were already a member during this period.47
Meanwhile, during a congress of the RANU in December 1987, the organization changed itself into the RPF, with their primary objective to return to Rwanda, by force if needed.48 In addition, the
outspoken left-orientated and anti-monarchical ideology was overlaid with the so-called Eight Point Plan, which was more understandable and appealing for less educated possible followers among the Tutsi refugees.49 The aggressive approach of the RPF was stimulated by Habyarima's rhetoric towards the refugee problem in this period, stating that Rwanda was full, which diminished the hope of a peaceful return. In September 1990 the RPF was able to bring together all those Tutsi
43 Reed, ‘Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ (1996) 484.
44 Colin M. Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(McFarland&Company, Jefferson, North Carolina, and London; 2004) 16.
45 Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis (1995) 71. 46 Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis (1995) 73. 47
Reed, ‘Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ (1996) 485-487; Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis (1995) 72-74.
48 Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis (1995) 73.
loyal to them, many of them soldiers trained in Museveni's army, and on the 30th of September, they made their first invasion in Rwanda. The attack was put on hold by the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), supported by French troops. This invasion was the start of a civil war between the RPF and the Rwandan government, which would continue until 1994.
This first Rwandan invasion of the RPF resulted in military defeat, and two of the most important leaders died, among whom Fred Rwigyema. However, as the scholar William Cyrus Reed has argued, the attack brought one significant victory for the RPF: they became visible for the
international community.50 At the same time, an important change took place within the Rwandan government. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Rwanda fell solely under the sphere of influence of the Western international community. Under their pressure, the government evolved into a multi-party democracy. This significant development was written down in the new Constitution of 1991, which would also be important after the genocide. After a new coalition government was formed in April 1992 in which the prime minister was a member of the opposition, they started - also under international pressure – negotiations with the RPF. The opening of the negotiations proves that the RPF was now indeed recognized as a party on the political table of Rwanda. Multiple agreements were signed before, but a final accord was signed by the RPF and the government on the 4th of August 1993, named after the location of the negotiations, the Arusha agreements. By these agreements, the RPF would be included in the government as well as the army – 40 percent of the troops and 50 percent of the officers. However, the RPF never halted the new offensive they started at the beginning of 1993 in response to the agreement, and the government never made any attempt to execute the agreement.51 The scholar Reyntjens is convinced that the RPF did not have the intention to implement their side of the agreements. Others argued the same about the government. Either way, “by the end of 1993, the Arusha accord was dead.”52
As stated in the introduction, on the 6th of April 1994 the plane of President Habyarimana was shot down. This initiated the start of the genocide in Rwanda.53 During the genocide, the military success of the RPF over the FAR finally brought an end to the genocide. The RPF officially declared victory on the 18th of July 1994. During this final invasion, the RPF did not keep clean
50 Reed, ‘Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ (1996) 489. 51
Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda (E-book version; 2013) 'Introduction'; Straus, The
Order of Genocide (2006) 23-31.
52 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda (E-book version; 2013) 'Introduction' 18 53 Straus, The Order of Genocide (2006) 51.
hands either and committed crimes against humanity and war crimes.54 With its victory, the RPF gained control of the country. "When taking power, the RPF inherited a country it hardly knew."55 However, they were quick to centralize and monopolize their power, as they "introduced a strong executive presidency, imposed the dominance of the RPF in the government, and redrew the
composition of parliament.” The increase of the RPF's power went hand in hand with suppression of dissent, as a result of which many Hutu members of the new government already resigned in August 1995.56 The scholars Reyntjens and Clark agree that the RPF centralized their power on the country and directed the government, however, the two scholars have different theories on at what point when the government can no longer be described as transitional, and the RPF had gained full control over the country and governmental structures.
Reyntjens argues that an important turning-point in Rwandan politics is the year 2000 because the government gained almost complete control over Rwanda following a political crisis leading the president, the prime minister and the speaker of the parliament to resign, allowing Kagame to become president. Moreover, The Forum of Political Parties was established, which gave the RPF the opportunity to control all other political parties. Therefore, Reyntjens argues the government now had the power to implement fully their vision on the reconstruction of Rwandan society, which was confirmed by the publication of the Vision 2020, which will be discussed below.
According to Clark, a new political period started with the first post-genocide national parliamentary and presidential elections in 2003. These elections were won by the RPF and
Kagame, despite the consensus that the elections were not truly free and democratic, as the biggest opposition party was banned on charges of 'divisionism' and 'genocide ideology'. The exact meaning of these accusations will be discussed in Chapter three. The importance of this year was stressed by the adoption of a new constitution, in which the government's vision was applied in (legal) practice, including the eradication of ethnicity from public life and the fight against 'genocide ideology.' The content and implications of the 2003 Constitution will also be discussed in Chapter three. Thus, the year 2003 seems to indicate the actual ending of the transitional phase.57
54 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda (E-book version; 2013) 'Introduction'; Straus, The
Order of Genocide (2006) 23-31
55 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda (E-book version; 2013) 'the capture of Power and the
Path to Hegemony'.
56
Quote from Reyntjens: Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda (2010) 21.
57 Clark, The Gacaca Courts (2010) 22; Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda (E-book version;
During the first two years after the genocide, the legal response to the atrocities was extremely chaotic. The RFP arrested tens of thousands of people and put them in prison, without a system in place to prosecute them. Many of the suspects of participation in the genocide were executed during this period. “The atmosphere of violent retribution” resulted in the killing of many Hutu civilians by or with the support of the RPF. The number of killings remain unclear until today but run likely over ten-thousand. In 1996 the government was able, backed by foreign governments and NGOs, to start the construction of a legal framework to punish the crimes of genocide.58 The development of this structure helped to consolidate the power of the new Rwandan government. This process is the subject of Chapter three.
Since the RPF has control over Rwanda, the control over the RPF has been mainly in the hands of Paul Kagame. He thus started his career as an officer in the army of Museveni in Uganda; later he achieved an important position in the RANU, as well as the RPF. When his friend Fred Rwigyema died during the first invasion of the RPF in Rwanda in 1990, Kagame became one of the most influential leaders of the PRF. He led the RPF during its invasion in April 1994 that ended the genocide. After the genocide, he remained the head of the RPF and vice-president in the new government. The role of vice-president was not defined by law, and it was known that it was Kagame who was the one pulling the strings in the government. In 2000, he became President after the incumbent president resigned. He was re-elected during the first post-genocide elections in 2003, and again in 2010. His role in ending the genocide and the success of the government in creating peace and stability in Rwanda after the genocide has led to the emergence of a hero-cult surrounding his person, a process that was highly stimulated by the RPF and Kamage himself. The disappearance from public life, or the country – or worse - of many of his rivals ensured that he had little competition in maintaining his hero status.
In 2008, the journalist Stephen Kinzer wrote a biography of Kagame, which frames the admiration that exists towards him based on his visionary view, energy, and his claimed obsession to fight the poverty in Rwanda. To sum, for many people inside and outside Rwanda, Kagame is representative for the new stability and security in Rwanda: "By stabilizing Rwanda and giving it hope for the future, President Kagame has already achieved more than many thought possible." But also the other side of his personality is highlighted: his angry, vengeful authoritarian attitude and his will to control the whole of Rwanda, which according to some will be the downfall of what has been
achieved in Rwanda so far. In a referendum in 2015, ninety percent of the Rwandans voted for revising the Constitution to allow him a third term, but especially the absence of any resistance against this reform show that he is still firmly in the saddle.59
The extension of the government's power is not only limited to Rwanda but also includes the region of central Africa. This becomes apparent by the Rwandan wars against Congo. The initiative to
attack Congo was directly inspired by the genocide. Many Hutu, including many perpetrators of the genocide, fled to Congo ahead of the invasion of the RFP because they righteously feared
retribution by the RPF. Within refugee camps across the border, under the care of international NGOs, former génocidaires organized themselves with the goal to return to Rwanda, regain power and continue the mass killing of the Tutsi. As the scholar Zorba states:
It was well known that Mobutu [the then President of Zaire] was arming the ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces [former national army and para-military forces who both had a
significant role in the genocide] in camps in eastern-Zaire, from which they were launching raids into Rwanda. However, these génocidaires were using civilian Rwandans both as human shields and as a magnet for humanitarian assistance.60
Consequently, thousands of civilians – the precise number has never been investigated – were killed during the forced eviction of this refugee camp by the RPF.61
The military campaign of the RPF in Congo passed far beyond the threshold of what might have been considered legitimate violence to secure the safety in Rwanda.62It is outside the scope of this thesis to go into the details of the wars between Congo and Rwanda. What is clear, however, is that material gain of the natural resources of East-Congo and the expansion of their sphere of influence and power was the prime motivation for Rwanda and other countries in the region that have been involved. The Rwandan government has explained its long-continuing presence in Congo, by stating that these areas are part of 'Greater Rwanda', and that therefore, Rwanda had the duty to protect the people of Rwandan origin against ethnic discrimination and persecution in these
59 Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It (John Wiley&Sons,New
Jersey; 2008) 3-5, 336-338; Broere, 'Rustig in de rij, de dictator helpen' (19 December 2015).
60
Eugenia Zorbas, 'Reconciliation in Post-genocide Rwanda', in: African Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 1 no. 1 (2004) 32, note 10.
61 Zorbas, 'Reconciliation in genocide Rwanda' (2004) 32 note 10; Reyntjens, Political Governance in
Post-Genocide Rwanda (E-book version; 2013) 'Human Rights – A dismal Record'; Johan Pottier, Re-Imaging Rwanda, Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge; 2002) 57.
regions.63 This rhetoric keeps the fear of renewed mass violence warm in the heart of many
Rwandans. The following chapters will explain what political ends this served for the government64
1.2 Their Visions
The RANU, established in Uganda, was a left-orientated, anti-monarchical organization. By its transformation into the RPF, the organization also changed and simplified its public identity to attract a wider range of followers. "The central themes were democracy, national unity, and the right of return of refugees while nepotism and corruption would be replaced with the rule of law and due process. Similarly, the Eight Point Plant called for a progressive foreign policy, an end to the system which caused refugees, and a self- sustaining economy."65All these themes related to the failures of the regime of the second republic of Rwanda, under the leadership of Habyarimana. . After the genocide, the RPF has continued to hold on to these central themes, adapted to the post-genocide social situation of Rwanda. A paper presented by Dr. Theogene Rudasingwa, Secretary General of the RPF, at a conference in Kigali on 'Genocide, impunity and accountability: dialogue for a national and international response', is illustrative for the ideology of the RPF as presented to the outside world.
The goal of the conference was to discuss the creation of an "overall framework of the struggle for fundamental and durable change [in which] the concepts of, and policies on, justice, unity,
reconciliation and democratization have to be discussed. The balance between all these factors should be such that it produces a net forward movement."66 The biggest problems the Rwandan society was dealing with, according to the RPF's vision, were the following: the polarization of the Rwandan society based on different theories; the need for justice in a society where a legal system is almost non-existent; the difficulties of developing a democracy in a country with a history of "political exclusion, state violence, and genocide"; an underdeveloped economy as a result of the genocide and economic policies by previous governments; the arduous task of resettling an enormous amount of returning refugees; the creation of a minimum threshold of security; the
challenge to create a government that is "effective, responsive, efficient and less-costly"; the need to become a respectable member of the international community; and the threat of endangering the
63
Pottier, Re-Imaging Rwanda (2002) 170.
64 Clark, The Gacaca Courts (2010)23-25.
65 Reed, ‘Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’ (1996) 485.
sustainability of the environment by short-sighted economic policies.67
In their perception on how to overcome these challenges there are five aspects of particular interest, as they provide a clear understanding of the RFP's ideology and vision for Rwanda. The first aspect is their emphasis that the solutions to overcome these challenges must be found by Rwandans, not by the international community. The task of establishing a mechanism of justice and governance that will enable Rwandans to live a dignified life in peace, and to avoid any renewed violence, is thus a Rwandan task, and its solutions must be based on local conditions. 68
The second aspect relates to the former, because of its opposition to Western influence. The writers of the pamphlet argue that a multi-party system is not a precondition for democracy. The
phenomenon of multi-party rule is European, brought forward by its history. This is a history different than the history of Rwanda, and this should be taken into account when developing its governmental system. "Ultimately, the balance we want to establish is not an equilibrium between Hutus and Tutsis. It is the checks and balances, the rights and obligations, which are the beef to the bone of democracy."69
A third noteworthy aspect of RPF ideology presented in this pamphlet is a reference to the idea of a 'Greater Rwanda', a vision for which Rwandan ancestors were constantly fighting, whether for prestige, power or land. According to the writer of this pamphlet, these political elites treated all Rwandans as one people, called Banyarwanda, Thus, the writer combines the concept of unity with a greater territory than the current state of Rwanda. Moreover, emphasizes the prosperity that can follow from unity. The concept of a 'united greater Rwanda' has been a justification for the Congo wars.70
However, a fourth and salient aspect in this respect is that they state that unity does not mean transforming the Rwandan people into a homogeneous population. "A nation is a heterogeneous entity, a unit of social, economic, political, cultural, ethnic, tribal and religious diversity. The litmus test of competent leadership is not to wash away this diversity but rather to weave them into a relatively stable society."71 This aspect is important because, at a later stadium, the RFP abandoned
67 Rudasingwa, 'Rwanda, National Unity, Reconciliation, Democratisation and Justice' (1995) ii. 68
Rudasingwa, 'Rwanda, National Unity, Reconciliation, Democratisation and Justice' (1995) vii, xx.
69 Rudasingwa, 'Rwanda, National Unity, Reconciliation, Democratisation and Justice' (1995) vi. 70 Rudasingwa, 'Rwanda, National Unity, Reconciliation, Democratisation and Justice' (1995) vi. 71 Rudasingwa, 'Rwanda, National Unity, Reconciliation, Democratisation and Justice' (1995) iv.
this theory, as they do want to create the idea of a homogeneous population by the eradication of ethnicity from public life.
Fifth and final, what becomes plain from this RPF document is that they believe in a malleable society. In this aspect their leftist approach is becoming visible. They blame the pre-genocide leaders for convincing the Rwandan population to participate in the genocide and dehumanize the Tutsi in their minds, therefore, it can also be through strong leadership that people can be led out of the darkness and teach them not to hate, but to reconcile and live peacefully side-by-side. "If you are a credible leadership, guide the people on how they can be useful to themselves and the country."72
The government policy on the development of Rwanda has followed almost the same line for the last two decades, however, is must not be seen as a static set of principles, but as a dynamic process that adapted itself to the development of the society and of the government itself. The Gacaca is the most important example of this statement, which will be discussed in more detail in the third chapter. The government claims that the reconstruction of the Rwandan society has taken place in five steps: security, justice, reconciliation and unity, social and economic development and finally creating sustainability of the achieved results. According to one of the people of my conversation group, the government is now in this final phase. The chronology of these steps and phases is questionable at some points, but it is important to be aware of these different subjects of focus by the government and its separate development to create a clear overview of the vision the
government has for Rwanda.73
1.2.1 The Vision 2020 and the Constitution of 2003
In 2000, Kagame together with the government presented the Vision 2020: a document of around thirty pages, which content would provide a guiding tool for Rwanda's future. It publicizes the government's main aim to become a strong, united, middle-income state, without discrimination, and its vision on how to achieve this goal. In 2000 there were multiple problems to overcome in the Rwandan society and economy that were the result of the genocide and failing economic policy of previous governments. The main issues were the widespread poverty and the vulnerability of the economy because of its dependence on donor money and small scale agriculture. Moreover, the very low level of education in Rwanda was an important hindrance for its governmental and
72 Rudasingwa, 'Rwanda, National Unity, Reconciliation, Democratisation and Justice' (1995) vii. 73 'Group conversation', interview by the author (Butare; 1 September 2015).
economic development.74
The vision of the government on how to overcome these problems is categorized into six so-called pillars:
1. Reconstruction of the nation and its social capital anchored on good governance, underpinned by a capable state;
2. Transformation of agriculture into a productive, high value, market oriented sector, with forward linkages to other sectors;
3. Development of an efficient private sector spearheaded by competitiveness and entrepreneurship;
4. Comprehensive human resources development, encompassing education, health, and ICT skills aimed at the public sector, private sector, and civil society. To be integrated with demographic, health and gender issues;
5. Infrastructural development, entailing improved transport links, energy and water supplies and ICT networks;
6. Promotion of regional economic integration and cooperation.75
These six pillars are overlapped by the three themes of gender equality, sustainable environmental and natural resource management. The Vision 2020 includes social aims but its plans for practical implementation are highly focused on economic objectives. It does not go into detail on how it wants to create a Rwandan united identity. The 2003 Constitution provides more insight on this matter, as it pronounces the eradication of ethnicity from public life, its fight against genocide ideology, and reconciliation achieved by the establishment of the Gacaca. "The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation is mainly based on principles of Good Governance that Rwanda has undertaken to follow, and the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda promulgated on 4th June 2003."76 As stated before, the 2003 Constitution forms an important turning-point in the transitional justice policy of the Rwandan government.
1.3 Social and Economic Reconstruction
Thus, in practice, the aims of the government can be divided into two categories: economic development and fighting poverty on the one hand and social reconstruction on the other. The implementation of the Vision 2020 has brought economic success. Even the scholar Filip Reyntjens,
74 Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, ‘Vision 2020' (July 2000) at:
http://www.sida.se/globalassets/global/countries-and-regions/africa/rwanda/d402331a.pdf > accessed on May 18, 6-10.
75 Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, ‘Vision 2020' (July 2000).
76 Republic of Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, ‘The National Policy on Unity and
who is known as a critic of the Rwandan government, admitted that "the RPF has a vision that is successfully implemented, particularly in economic development, and an ambitious modernization drive more generally."77 Economic growth had an average of eight percent between 2002 and 2012. The country also made a lot of progress in the development of its technocratic governance, creating a favorable business climate. “The 2010 World Bank's Doing business report notes that ‘for the first time a Sub-Saharan African economy, Rwanda, led the world in Doing Business reforms.'"78 As stated before in the introduction of this thesis, Rwandan roads are nowadays of good quality, and health service and primary education are accessible for most Rwandans. Moreover, since the last few years, skyscrapers are dominating Kigali's skyline.
The genocide gave the new government the opportunity to reconstruct a new state, as mentioned by the scholar Turner, one that would include a social order that would avoid renewed mass violence. To create this new state, the government initiated a social reconstruction of the Rwandan society. The government's two most important governmental organizations in charge of the social
reconstruction of the Rwandan society are the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) and the Commission for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG). The establishment of the NURC was already envisioned by the Arusha agreements but realized by law in 1999. Its task is to implement and monitor the national policy of unity and reconciliation of the government. "There is a mandated Commission for National Unity and Reconciliation, this policy provides a guideline for all institutions and Rwandans in general, to fulfill this obligation."79 The CNLG was established in 2007, officially independent from the government, its primary task being the implementation of the government's fight against genocide ideology, and also the organization of activities of
commemoration and provision of assistance to genocide Survivors.80 The importance of the policy of memorialization will be discussed in Chapter two. This national policy implemented by these two institutions reflects the RPF's belief in a malleable society, in which the government can teach the population how to behave on their own and the nation's good, in the case of Rwanda "fostering
77
Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda (E-book version; 2013) Introduction; The Rwandan government and Filip Reyntjens are not on friendly terms, to put it mildly. In the paper of Rudasingwa Reyntjens is mentioned as one of the causes of the division in the Rwandan society before the genocide. Reyntjens latest book on the government ruling is extremely critical.
78
An Ansoms & Donatella Rostagno, 'Rwanda's Vision 2020 halfway through: what the eye does not see' in: Review
of African Political Economy Vol. 39 (2012) 427-450.
79 Republic of Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, ‘The National Policy on Unity and
Reconciliation'(September 2007) 23.
80 The Republic of Rwanda the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide, 'Charter' (undated) at: http://www.cnlg.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/CNLG_Service_Charter_December_2011.pdf )> accessed on May 16, 2016.
unity and reconciliation and facilitating a change of mindset."81 As stated in the NURC's mandate:
• The following are specific objectives of this National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation:
• To fight any form of divisionism and discrimination;
• To fight against genocide ideology;
• To sensitize Rwandans at all levels, to strive and value their unity;
• To empower Rwandans with the capacity to analyze their problems and find adequate solutions to them;
• To promote a culture of peace based on trust, tolerance and respect for human rights;
• To mentor Rwandans on patriotic values and on actively playing part in the governance of their country;
• To promote values existing in the Rwandan culture that is capable of contributing to the development and national unity.82
Their primary tool to implement these objectives is civic education, including the teaching of the official narrative of Rwanda. This version of Rwandan history and the consequences of its promotion will be analyzed in Chapter two. To be able to educate its population, the Rwandan government has established education camps, called Ingando. The first Ingandos were established to bring together refugees returning to Rwanda from Uganda, Burundi, Europe, Tanzania and Zaire, and teach them about their motherland, in which many of them had never been before. Later two types of Ingando were developed by the NURC, and the aim was that every Rwandan had to take part in one of these camps once in their life.
The first type is the Itoreo solidarity camp, intended for a privileged part of the 'new' Rwandan society, including students, diaspora youth, civil servants and teachers. Those people who
completed these camps were considered as role models of society that had to educate and help the (rural) poor and ignorant population to implement the new values promoted by the Rwandan government. The second form of Ingando is intended for released genocide perpetrators, street-children and Rwandan (Hutu) ex-combatants from Congo and Tanzania, who want to return home. They must take part in these camps for minimal two and a half months before they are allowed to go home. The official description of the camps states that the program includes activities such as sports, singing, and lectures. The subject of these lectures is "unity and reconciliation, history, democracy, development and HIV/AIDS."83 The final goal is to make the students proud of their history and country and accept the values that are necessary, according to the government rhetoric, to avoid genocide in the future.
81 NURC, 'The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation'(September 2007) 9. 82 NURC, 'The National Policy on Unity and Reconciliation'(September 2007) 11. 83 Turner, ‘Making Good Citizens from Bad Life in Post-Genocide Rwanda' (2015) 33.
It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss in-depth the effects of the national policy of unity and reconciliation and the economic measures envisioned in the Vision 2020 on the Rwandan society. However, there are many indications that there is a gap between the promoted values of these policies and their application in practice, which is important to discuss to get a real insight into the transitional policy of the Rwandan government. First of all, concerning its economic policy, in an in-depth article of the scholars An Ansoms and Donatella Rostagno, they clarified that the renewed welfare of Rwanda mainly stays in the hands of a small elite group; consequently, twenty percent of the population consumes as much as the other eighty percent. "The majority of smallholder farmers appear not to fit into the government's vision of a ‘modern Rwanda,'" which aims are presented in the Vision 2020.84 This is demonstrated by the primary focus of the Rwandan government on the development of the formal private sector; that includes private businesses that operate with business licenses, which the majority of the agricultural companies do not have. The last few years, the government has acknowledged this problem and put more emphasis on the modernization of agriculture. However, the new "goals are set in the absence of any plans for a realistic transition" and the proposed modernization "does not match with the priorities and needs of smallholder farmers," only those of the bigger agriculture companies. Thus, again the small-holding low-educated farmer – the majority of the population – is left out of the economic development of Rwanda, in opposition to the government's aim of minimizing poverty in general.85
Secondly, in respect to Ingando, the scholar Susan Thomson, who was obliged by the government to follow Ingando for one week, states: “the re-education I witnessed failed to promote a sense of national unity and reconciliation among my Hutu classmates. Instead, these former prisoners were taught to remain silent and not to question the RPF’s vision for creating peace and security.”86 The scholar Simon Turner had phrased the same point in a more abstract way: "to repatriate, reconcile and re-integrate the former combatants from Zaire, the present state is trying to erase ethnicity by taking the Hutu out of the Hutu. De-ethnicization is therefore not about removing ethnicity per se, but about removing the problematic ethnicity of the Hutu since it may lead to genocidal mentalities. In other words, the state is not just educating subjects to become citizens."87 Thus, as a result of the Ingando education programs, the government is creating new classes within the society: Itoreo
84 Ansoms & Rostagno, 'Rwanda's Vision 2020 halfway through' (2012) 428. 85
Ansoms & Rostagno, 'Rwanda's Vision 2020 halfway through' (2012) 435.
86 Thomson, 'Whispering Truth to Power: The Everyday Resistance of Rwandan Peasants to Post-Genocide
Reconciliation' in: African Affairs Vol. 110 No. 440 (2011) 444.
